OPERATION APACHE SNOW AFTER ACTION REPORTS

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 18 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry, 22 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 17 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow After Action Report 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Div, 25 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, XXIV Corps, 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Message, MACV, 20 May 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Messages on Tactical Air Support, 7 & 17 May 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Miscellaneous Messages and Memos, 20 May - 8 Jun 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Narrative, 22nd Military History Detachment, Aug 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Report Extract, 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1969

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 1st Battalion, 506th Infantry, 18 Jun 1969

(dj Co D: C o n t i m e d t o proside security for FSB CURRAHEG, A t 2x00 hours, D C O LP vic: YC 405293 reported h e a r k g branches being brOk8n and something onter ing the p t e r , Sml-1 arm were f i r e d , grenades wore

;:nits moved i n t o and

of t h o area was conducted w i t h negative

DS FSB Cmm,

Me, FSB

o c c upie d NDP's a t 2020 hours, Mult iple L P b - YC 3C8919, CO B - YC 324.939, E (-) - FSB C L r n E E , RCM P h t ! -

(d) co D:

ar,d providing

(8) co E ( - ) f FSB CUREIArnE,

(f) RCN P l a t : QPCON 3rd Me, FSB BERCHTESGADEN,

(b ) Co B: Conducted r o c o m i s s a n c e in force operations in assigned A0 and had no onomy contac% dwing t h e day,

(c) Ca C: ContinuEd Lo provjdo s s c w i t y for the Camand Group and conducted rBcomaissamx in force oprations in assigned A l and had negat im cozr?tact with thC3 el2my.

18 Ju.ne 1969 UNCLASSIFIED

(a) Co A: Continuad soarch and destroy operations in assigned AO, eneqy con tac t was mde during tho day,

XRHd3m condt;ctcd soarch and destroy operatior-s ja v i c i n i t y of Hi11 937. It 0820 hours, CO 8 roportcd finding one f resh grave containing 1 IWA K I A ,

c

( c ) co C: Conducted search and desilroy operations in assiped M , v i t h negative enemy contact,,

( C) E (-) : Continued t o provide s e o u r i t y f o r FSB C'lf;i2iHEG,

( 2 6 ) B my -t- 25 (4 Juyio 1969):

(a) Go A: Continued security and construction of FSB CURW?m md omployd mul-tipls TiJF operattons, L P ' s and A P k ,

ril" o c r u 26

I / - 27 u N c LASS I F 1 E Ll

t

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 501st Infantry, 22 Jun 1969

SL,;ECT: Ccmbat Cpsratfons Aftor Action Report, Cparatim Akaclle . . SliUW

7. Supporting Farces:

12. hecults:

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Battalion, 506th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969

.

AVD.MGG SUE3JEGT: Combat Wter Action Report OFOI'UI 3-62

CL En&i.neer: 1 Plat B/32&h Enw.

e* Pathfinder: l6Oth Aviation Woup.

At YD337074, Co D found one (I) *UC&? rifle, one (1) SK? rule, 1 Model & rifle with grenade tiuncher, ten (l.C) arM-tank grenades ad some miscellaneous small arms ammuniti.on, CZothtig and equipment. During the hours of darkness, radar and crew served starlight scopes located at ES3 Airborne, discovered movement of small groups of indlividuals and various lights, A33 sighttip were engazed by 81mm mortars after which the movement ceased. At 1616 hours, Co B was air moved from their field location at yD309039 to FSB Airborne ts take over the secux*ity of the fire base, The CA was complete at 1640 hoErsa

a, The mission was successtilly accomplished and vast quantities of enemy supplies ati materials Were capture&

(2) KBAA: n'one

(3) KBA: Xcme

(r~) Captured: None

(C) Small arms ammo: 84,227 rds

(d) 6Onn-n mortar ammo: 712 rds

(t-3) hCinm mortar Base Plate: 1

(f) 82mm mortar arnno: IL,361 rds

(y) &mm mortar fuses: 100

(q) strut tares : Xl.9

(s) Bunkers: 302

1 Class I 14,000 lbs

2 Class II 300 lbs - / Clnss 2 ITI 20 -&s 0

t. Class V 800 lbs

( c) Ccn:psny c

1 Class I 16~000 lbs

2 Class II 300 lbs

3 Class III 20 lhs

4 :1nss v 1,000 lbs

(d) Co~pmy 0

1 Class I 12,cr30 m-3 w.4

2 Class II 29 lbs

2 CLass III 20 lbs

4 Class v 700 lhs

c. Trcblm Areas - Lessons Learned:

(1) InitialXy, FSB A.irborne had insufficient helicopter landing area for the czount of air tmffic which some days exceed& 9 swticse To d.hv~~te this problem, the CI447 Pad, in the Artillery axa, ~2s ~31lar~f3j as well as im- proved. The existing W-1 Pati was also enlarged to accomodate t;ur, (2) helicop- ters and a new W47 I&d was constructed on the southern edge of the perimeter.

(2) d large resupply of demclitions was rz;iuircd tr, be on hand at all times to 3115% fcs bunker destmction, clearinc 'ields o? fire 3n the perirneer aF:ld cor;structi.on of la.ndj.gg zones. &I initial stocka- of 5000 1% is recornmer?dc

(3) ?Wh of t:w Fire ,%pport Base was alreac'y constructed when the Z-506 Inf initially moved jn. Ctherwise a greater arnol;nt of C~S-S IV material

resupply and maintain airnobility, landing zone requirement. Time bein? d factor, it was SOOn followin? items, ma;!euver elements could rapidly

c* Execu ti.m :

( i) T1-x infantry mission required a careful and thorough search of the imediate tcmain sumoundjng j?S?j hirb orne; cmequently, C/2-319th was wxy limited in jrOVidii>? fix+ suppart due to the proximity of the maneuver clcmen-i;~ to FL33 Airborne,

(2) solution: Extensive use of ~~3cl;n by indirect fire on planned outes of advance and the use of Pik7k Teams to screen areas to the immediate rant of maneuver elements reduces the possibility of this type of encounter nd causes the enemy to dove, thereby exposing him and keeping him off balance. requent reconnaissance by fire, additionally, benefits the ground commander 17 that he is able to encage the enemy with tildirect fire quickly by shiftirjg ram fired in targets.

b. Stay behind forw,

(2) 2; ulu i;;i 92 : Normal dip$ng and preparation of 8'DPs causes noise and !veals friendly Zocations, To avoid indirect fire attack, the maneuver element !nds a SiWI.1 reconcaissan~c force to secure the proposed 8DP. After the hours ' darkness, tk;E: co?xpany m.oves slowly and quj_etly TV the location and further Ito a perimter without digtig firhtjng positions, The arca for the PDP should rntain epough brus'il and undergrowth to hide the eXe%ent from visual detection+ me key to successful execution i s holdin(r movement t;lo a minimum.

d. ;3,dcWxkmal prstection for the poix?t man.

?. (C) Tl!RIWN: Operatzion I'iPACHE STQld WELT conducted ti the A Shau-k LUO~ GI..JAz~~, a traditianal NW/XT established base ama and infiltration mute. The ?-@6th lnf area af operation was located northeast 19 the A Luoi Palley bounded qr <grids YD3Ox2, E&Ulg, m26O3 and YD30c)1e The valley varies in width from 150 xAers to two (2) kilometers. Average e~evat5.t~~ is from 575 meters in the valh: Flanks to 17&O meters k, the northeast. Slopes on the roPlkq terrain vary frw Z-l5 per cent and as s-lxep as 80 per cent CXI higher elevations.

1 (C) VBETATICi$: Multi-canopied iid muuntaixls throughout the area,

dense underzround forest dcsminate the C-1~s The lower slopes are c~verzd with bn-shwxA

ind elephant grass.

b. Durinp the 9peratj.on: The EXI~Y moved the 800th and 802nd Battalions If the 6th KVA.%@nent into the area of operatiorls. HOWeVer, in the latter lart of May, both battalkxx FJere withdrawn frapl $he &II* Contact with enemy 'orces during the operatiola consjsted of engagements with trail wakhers and

iquad-size elements. Contact was broken by the enemy on each occasir>n.

c, Results and effects of the o,peration: Cc3Oued pnz~ure by US ,F'orces II the AC forced the enemy to abandon his cache sifxs and coztinuauy relxate is forces. This action resulted ti cache sites lxi~~g abandxed, which were 'ound and destroyed or evacuated by IJs %cjrces, During the operation, the enemy 'as required to curta II his res~~pply operatf;in$ to elements in t;he mountains, lo thF: northeast, He was compd..led t;&wiQ~Iraw main fcrce tInits back across t&e ,autian border and resort to a role of observation and harassment of Allied pzrations,

,/’ - - q /

0 8

h E:

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 2nd Squadron, 17th Cavalry, 17 Jun 1969

UNClASSlFiED

RHSAOED UNCtASSlFlED BY

2. %t~s, 9 May-7 June 1969.

8, IntelUgencc, Intsm 10 May - 7 Ame 2969.

UNCLASSIF\ED

A, Item, Enfantry packs,

(2) ~mnmendation. Fire base com3tmctim should be done based upm a drmm pLan, Tic bases on hilltops should havo lznding pada on t4he opposite side of the h$JJ.; one for log and one for passengers,

Fim bases on flat terrain should leave two 150 foot+wide Lxnes between strands of defensive tie, iLgai.n theso areas shotid be m the qqmxL%e s%des of -the fire base. Q-d-s area wLl.2. be used for the parktig of aircraft and couId be expanded %EJ inc1udc &rQund level sctiel/ream po&ts if Dql~ed,

2 h.2

. Incl* 1

UNCLASSIFIED b&r Cavalry

.-..

4

insufficient for

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 3rd Battalion, 187th Infantry, 20 Jun 1969

3 3 2

33 71 45

0 0

6a I

43 -Q 266

4 32

2 25 62 52 0 0

63 0

L3 a 263

UNCtASSlFlED

. '

-

barrier bottcm

LL L f --

K-?8, m.2, %d .i3r

Unlacatcd 835

I. 2,

) :: 5. 6, 7, EL 9.

- .__

UNCMSSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

121~ 3/P?? ~..~xLts hzd rr,et only light resistance by tOl5 hours, and continued Still., the 3x1 CO, overhead

At IO??' hours, the En CO rcport;ed th2t all 3/187 units were zbreast, approx-

-- -Ye.

c

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, 3rd Brigade, 101st Airborne Div., 25 Jun 1969

DEPARBSNT OFTI-I.EAiU'ff UNCLASSIF;ED 73 i Headquari;ers 3d Brigade, lOlst brlmme Division (wbfie)

BP0 San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-E 25 Junl? 1969

SUi3jEcT : Co&at Operation@ !titer hctim fit?pUrt - S-7 APmz sxow

Comnding Gw5.ral Headquarters lolst Airborne Divisim C~~obile) kr)~ San Francisco 96383

1. Name rrr,d Ty-pe of Operation: Operation APACHE WOW; ReCWZsWCe *, 7k Force.

2, Dates of Operation: 10 May - 7 June 1969,

3. Location: 'I"hfLs operation was conducted in l&m Hoa Db*ict, Thus 'kim Prodma. Map References: Sheets; l:f;O,CKXl 6i&Z It, 11, 111, Iv; Series L7014 t L7015,

4. Control HcAdwarters: ~~~ 3d me, 10bt ki.rtr=me Ditision kirmobile~~

., &port;-hg Officer: Joseph B, Cmy Jr*, Colonel Infantry, Carrrmandingm 3' a

6. Task Organization:

~(-1 mt-1 N J-s Cav . .

A-2-&5 OPCON 18-21May D4?-5& OPCON

+e Contra&

Bde Scty Plat ~326hgr (m) Rcn l-506 A-158 BHB (A% A-2-17 Cav Us8 AHB (DS) 2-319 drty (m) TACP2OTlrss c-2-11 grty &m 58th Set Dog PLat C-2194 Arty (GSR) 3d F'S% C-1-83 Arty (GSR)

AE~FUDED UNCLASSIFIED BV l)OWGRADED AT 3 YEA3 IHTEIW'JS DI3CLASSIFmkFTER 12-i DOD DXR ~ZOO,lO

UNCLASSIF!E:-i

4tkABsaA-E 25 June 1?69 SUBJECT: Combat Operations hfter AcCiOn %pOpt - SUtlWSy

XFum SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

:1 . i: 24.7 SW - supported 3d Bde by reconnaigaancc, the marking 02 J 1 _'I_. -' prior to insertions, the screening of ground units and along the

,., ~ .'. .: Ji-.t,..;;n border, and by ptipointing enemy mortar and rocket locations, 2% ':iicl 5 for further details).

-. :/” I’\r&jJ-Jery -

/ - units shown in task organizntion provided support

:<~.r~ 2i-l preps, units in contact, H & I: fires, and direct f5.z-o in deiensc 2:: Sx?s underground and sapper attack. (See &cl 7 for further details).

C* 7th 'l2.F - provided 30th preplanned and ixmediate air strikes ~5th air prio;*ity to units in contact, LZ preps, u construction, and j.ntclli,~cncc targets, (See Ino1 3,fo;o f&her detail&

ri, -!fhl. ."JJGCl A-m %-cup - proviiecl airlift for combat assauD- and ::~k%rn ctims f establishment of fire suppmt bases, resupply sortkcs during ,t:.: : 0'1: 2 1-2 $, y! ; and pathfinder control. on both Li: insertions and fire b;lscsu (See ?nci ,$ for further details).

co IQ33tical su,ort - elments of the 1~26 Su

&&ed trv 3d FSSE, DISCC$ 102s-t Abn %.v, ply and Serv&Batt&t.ion, co c 326 Medical %, .

CO D B0ls-t Maintenance % attalion, k 1002 Supply and Service Gmparry, 26th Group tJ/gOL Ptitoon, Laundr-3 and Bath Platoon and Graves &gistration. Section, (See Lx1 h for detailed breakdown on support units, mission rq~iremcnts and services rendered).

8* Iil-tsl ligenCf.2 : See &closure 1 for cqlete details.

Operation APACHE WW confirmed that elements of tht-: bth, 9th, and 29th k,gixxnts were using t.he NOrthem k ShaU VallCy 3s a pI'&lv WC for novment of material and infiltration of troops to enemy units throughOUt I c02?pS~ Using -%dis Research Unit techniques and qui&Ly reacting to information gained through POW interrogation, the 3d Brigmk ;~;:s a-ale La exploit hard intelligence and rondcr the 7th, 8'&,and 9th ~i-Ltaliona of the 29th &gt plus its technical units combat ineffeoti.ve. -.. so identified were sappers of the Kl.2 battalion and the K6 (wcli 806th) ._ --l.II., 6th &qimnt, znd K35 h-by &n (Rock&), These units; after unit

2 UNCLASSIFIED

.4VDG&I:,.-E 25 June 1969 SUBJFGT: Combat Operations After Action &port - Summary

APiiC!B SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

identification and lomtior, had hem confimcd, wore constantly identification and lomtior, had hem confimcd, wore constantly huL?dcd IJ-- '7~~2 Air, i~rtillery, huL?dcd IJ-- '7~~2 Air, i~rtillery, and pr:mqit by 3d Brigade ground and pr:mqit by 3d Brigade ground fOiT.cS. fOiT.cS. This klvariably resulted ir, the capture of a POW WhGSC This klvariably resulted ir, the capture of a POW WhGSC

interrogation resulted in valuable information gainod~ i4. interrogation resulted in valuable information gainod~ i4.

90 Mission:

-3d Bde and 1st AW'Y 3eg-t; conduct combined air-mobile assmlts into the Northern k Shau Valley in conjunction with the 9th Warines and the 3d iXJiJ hq$ to destroy NVA/VC forces, block enemy routes of egress into Lc?OSJ interdict enemy LGC, and to loca-tt and destroy enemy caches.

3.2 . . Concept of Operation:

a3 - Prior to Baay, 10 I4ay 69, the is-t and 3d ARm %gts and the >I+ &iszcic 101 established three i~~~-tualljr suppor%ing fire baSeS at .,..

i'R Sr*:ldJ_oy (‘ij3278122), FB kirborne (YD355070) and FB Currahee (YC3P?P4P)e Oil ll.~II3~;, following a fifty minute rT.K -&--til:i~rji p:ap,

Air prep, an eighteen minute Air Cav LZ examination, and a one minute ku LZ prep,

five maneuver battalions (three US and tTdo UVN) were inserted in%:, five separate U's along the Laotian border overlooking the Northern -4 Sha.1 Valley-, After searching and clearing the immediate LZ area, all L'S b2 ttalio~s began e,&,erisive mF operations to the East arlci i~OdleClS"c

to;-yard tile ValItey f'loore i&f&r the insertion of the maneuver battalions had -tye;yL co;ilpieted at 200 harry, tj;e z-l(-) L!CN BE cambat, assaulted C!..t, i.jYl Ti 6~~~ I4mtab (X3253090) and secured FB Tiger for the jllsertiarl ,-,;.; 3izt.tei-y 12 SVN iktjJ,~ery (10~~). ‘DE 3-5 C~V secured zoute 547 and ---, . 2 1;"2 &es Blaze (QQ4203), Bastogz (1YD62~~P5), and km.non (yD475028), i>L~:~;~e S)J? -js the al!. weather route to SC used for resupplly of U.&t3

:~~rkL:lg -in, the valley and along its ridge lines,

be Operations Narrative: On BJ)ay, 1Q May 1969, utili&,ng lift Ship from tlx 158th and 1Olst mB's, the l-J%6 hf at 073OH, 3487 hf at 08OlI-I, and 2-501 lnf at loOlH, were combat assaulted into LZrs -~i-~lzit-~ X3129 49, YC320988, and YD288015~rcsp&tively. The 44 i,;RW \,A lnf bat'i;alion at 102@I and 2-l ARV'N.Inf Bn(-> at 13OOki combat assaulted into LZ*s ;;t YD2~004.2 and yD253OPO. The LZ for the 4-l ARVN was hot a3 t,;:o lii‘& t/ shins began to receive ~11 ar;ns fire upon exiting the LZ. Sporadic firkg continued until approximately 13oaY. At Tiger IJIountain, one CIi 47 was downed on the LZ by small ar7ns fire. mere were negative casual-ties. The 1Osmm Howitzer being carried was undamaged and the CH 47 XG extracted 1Tiths;r.t further incident. The enemy apparently had no ndvancc kno-wledge of the prtia-ry LZ's and as a result, were umbll: to effect a dcter?&nod or effective dcfcnse.

i&t 110220H May 69, FB Sxstogm received i; pobe by an unknown size cne,my force. ~~pprrJx5zately 10 RW rounds and a substantial amount of small a. c?rns fire were directed into the perimeter, At the initial RPG fire,

3 UNCLASSIFIED

4 ‘.-L, SD 1L.f!-!Y 1 .- L

On 1~00@3 May 69, the 3-l i&W Inf Bn combat nssaciltod into F mmhr 6 at ~1?70~. %z LZ was cold with negative snemy contact. At fi2%, 3 Cc, 3.-187 Infantry began to receive heavy small arms and machine gun fire fr0r.i YC325982. '&is action marked t'nc beginning of the ten day 5.21^;fytE for ihg Ap Bia Xinintai..n, Due to the continuous and heav fight- d.l,':'..I :.r- to tilt capture of Hill 937, a separate Inclosure, Inclosure 9, has I) _ E-12 :j L-c;> 2 I-L d p For aXL further details on the battle for DOng AP Bin j.i;,;;&i;~ refer to Inclo.xrc 9.

i3 * ;ryg 1-8 x,?y 69, the battle for Dong -9 %-a raged as heavy ground r"igh-?,&g cgztmcd, The 3487th Infantry fought its way South to tk-,c x!3.t~qV~ crest of Hill 937, while thci I-S06th Infantry assaulted T:20r-Lh~m~d u; the slope, k-i tixe, cnmy fire frm heavily fortified ~~~kez5 slsxed the mmentum of the l+Z6th I~fmtry assaLLt. The 3-187 ix-ring pushed Pxther +xward the top,&egm W-receive fire from b3th ;r'lz.nks 2s ",h,e cnmy was reinforced. with little daylight remaining, the dccis5.m ms mde to com'bat assault txo additional bat4iaki.on.s into the bcttle to stem the flow of enemy reinforcements and add combat Ixsc, -LO what would be the final assault on HZ.3. 937. i&t I.83W, k-2-506 I17Q-Ji-i tlq- was lifted from Phong Dien -TV ?I3 &rrahee by C3-i b7 then co$mt ;3ss;::_'.A. "Ld ?---)s to ?tic-tity YC320989 at r&i,ch tint they became OPCON to 3-187,

t UNCLASSIFIED

On 39 I&-J 63, the Z-501 Infantry(-) at 15131 and the 2-3 r,RV!J z:t :?27)! were combat aSSaUlted frcm PZ vici-nit hAti U's at X332922 2nd YC33897b.

y YD36~81 rtSld My Chanh resp+zctivciy hth LZ*s wrc cold and the remaindw

of the) dq 'GKIS spent in preparation fx the assault on Dong '1~ Dia scheduled for the next day, %e 3-r kv which had been protidiq security for engineer worksites along rxte 547, became OPCON to the 2d Br&ade. HEI&II~ becn rclicvcd of providin Cannon, the elaents of the 3rd 8

security for FB*s BastGgnc, Blaze and rigade were -then able "k~ more

ef'ft:ctively marsh&l. their resources for the assault on &Cl 937,

Qr: 3; I.&- 69, the 30187th Infantry with h-2-506 OPCOL'II, 2-501 Infantry, &SOS &Gantry and 2-j iJim successf'ully assaulted and drove the 7th ;inc: 8th 31:s of the 29th NVA Regjment from their mountain stronghold atop df- .r' 29 Bi2 Pfutaj.n, L 1 -4 (See J&l 9 fur cwmslete detaU.&

; ;’ .,- - Llj:r;.;;.i-gC 21 May 69, the 3-187 Infan+~ became OPCON to the 2d Bde l(>&"i, &n D iv, 1410 in turn returned the 2-506 k-fantry to 3rd sde cmtroir The time period 21 May 69 - 7 June was characterized by decreasing enq contact and ever increasing discoveries of ene caches, The 2-36 Infantry began their portion of Operation APA I-Z T SKN 3;' regainin.~ A-Z&~ Infantry which had been CFXE to 3-187 Itiantry for the final two days of the battle for Done i;i-7 %a Mountain. The ->a tt&a li Or: CP companies B, C and D(a) mo7ed frzz Ca.m~ Groans, Thong Uen &strict Eea&uari;ers ComplEtj.oil Of thfl? C-A u

and the An Lo @rkl..e to B &ze by CK 47. Upoil (7 move to FB Raze, the Battalion CP and .E Co(N)

wx'uat assault& to 35 Airbor:i.e. hJ"Et~, combat assaulted f'rom Pz

k-2406, upon Amlease by the 3-27 (YC32798~/ to LZ FB Mrborne.

'tie 2&CQ Infantry began RLF operations from vicinity Dong lip %,a3 dong the bng So Qdge, heading for the Valley floor. The l-504 Infantry 'I---a,?,-- LJt$,L:li extensive search and clear Rl@ qxrations from Bong kp Ra Ecuntcin &x.~Lfi tcr,mrd ??I krrahee. mGv& -to PZ

On 5 &E %9, the b-1 MVN Batklion vicinity D278066 and extracted to La vang. The move ws

corrrolate 2-t; 13sfrI. A

i- IivlixuxME 25 June 1969 SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report - Suii

APACIB SNOW UNCLASSIFIED

12, Resclta: a, The 3d Erigade tit.h OFCOW units successfbily accompIi.shzcci its mission in Operation ;SJX,'IE SNOW, This multi-battalion ccxnbined Operation was 2 classic campaign which found the enemy, fixed his location, and methodically and devastatingly destroyed him in place. The effect of this was to destroy the combat effectiveness of not only the maneuver battalions of the 29th ENA %&nsnt, but also its central headquarters with organic and attached technical units, forcing the remaining broken elements to retreat across the border into Laos, whfic at the same time preventing them from again. using the Northern A Shau VaUey & eitfler a staging area for attack or as a large scale storage base to outfit future operations.

5, hemy Losses categorized as frilLlows:

(1) KU (EKJ) NW&C

de 3ody to %apons %tio: vs .

69L/281 = 2,&l

ee Emmy to US killed ratio: g

&n/78 = 8,0&l

f, Captu-cd or destroyzd Equipment: US

(1) 337,250 Ids of sir Hmmo (4)

(2) 2,426 rds CS hw (5)

(jj 2,386 rds Mortar bo (6)

6

340

100

37

AWN .

229/400 = 1:1&J

A!RVrrJ

229&l = 7eOL:b

827 RF'G/RLfle Crencdes

32 Mine/BBT

3h,?76 lbs Rice

UNCLASSIFIED

(7) 2!4l ~tn~cturc~s

(8) 1205 F or tif ics:l;ions

(10) 4 Radios

(11) 1-25 Iti Eqlosives

(12) Vehicles (trucks) 4

(7) 10 l22rmn Rockets

(2) &OOO rds Cs'd (8) 11,735 lbs rice

(yj 257 ~orti.fications

(10) 306 %ructwes

(11) 14,275 lbs explxzives

(6) 227 Mine/BBT h.2) 40 Vehicles itrucks and dozers)

13. khixistra tion: (See lnclosure 2).

I.5 5 Chemical: Non-Toxic chmical munitions for- the M-79 and lO!%m Howitzer mm ex~lopd on several dif'ferent occasions on 15, i.6, 2nd 1'7 May during the attack on Dong q~ %.a i"lountati~, (2~ grenades, both indivldualIy thrown by the foot soldier and bulk air dropped from W-l.3 aircraft were also used prior to and during assaults (See Inclosures 8 8,~ 9). Although the use of these chcrrrical muni.%ions met with sme early success, the changing tin< patterns along the ridge lines of Dong up %.a Mountain. quickly dissLpaCted the agent. The ~~~~~,

i

rcnlizin,r the effect of CS in a confined area such as a static bunker ; i

defense, ceuntcractcd the use of CS by donninz new Chicom protective masks. %xausc of these factors, the further use of chemical munitions

i i

was suspended after 20 May 69.

16. hCl, ~~ffxirs (Omitted).

17. Psychological Operations (See Inclosure 5).

18. Comnuxications (See inclosure 6).

19. %~incer (Omitted).

20. ~~rtj&xy (See Inclosure 7).

UNCLASSIFIED

i,v-DG&A4 UNCL/isslFl 25 June 136$

SUBJXT: Combat %erations A.TACHE SNOW

4Xer Lcti3n Report - Summary

21, Special bipment and Techniques:

fiigger and &ppelillg: Discussion - ipliCH&NOW,

Several times during $erztion aircraft were down in ho&j& terrain where easy ~CCWS WIS

impossible. k-i; timss the only feasible way riggers czGd get to the r?ircraft in order to rig it for extraction was through the use of rappeling techniques from UH-lh helicopters,

Solution - Rc?~' cA,u,ing that this method of entry is not a normal technique for rigger:1 , 9;~ 7infantry security elements, experience shows that as a minitrnun, c? basic course of instruction to include actual helicopter rap/poling is needed in all infantry <and rigger units.

b, Chest Flate Protectors: Discussion -Units of both the l-56 and 2-506 I-nf::ntry battalions employed aircraft crew member ceramic v!?st $&es Tar their point men, %is body armor, while heavy and CmbersoiXt, saved the lives of three men who were struck by 3~ at close rangea

~olxtion - Rc possibT?Aty of adapting this aircraft type body armor to USC by field troop s should be investigated by every inftintry unit engaged in operations where contact is felt to be imminent.

22, Commander's iulalysis:

? bon by Fire - Discussion - At least one Company of each manor% bat-tvalion involved in Operation G'Xl"i;;i; SMOW initiated pre,matura enemy return fire placing the enemy in a poor defens&ve posture through the USC of recon b;: fire, 4 an example, a unit rcconning by fire il.mg its route of advance and using 2-17 Cav Pink teams (1 TC>H 2nd 1 tiship) to screen its advance reduces the possibility of 5ein.g engaged by NVA trail watcfiers, or "Set-piece" ambushes. WUcLng fires" or the use of &tillcry to recon a route of march makes for r&d employment of both blocking fires and close in contact fires with less time lost through h aphazard adjustments and confirmation of ma? lecation.

b, Qak vests: Discussion - The protective or "flak'" vest. SOZXEQJY worn only by troops in either a static security role or convoy &Q, si&ficaXi.y rcducod "uotii the number of KL 8: KL for the US M$talions assaulttilg Dong q &.a Mountain, Clay-more and S'G shrapnel.

Many early casuaities were due to hs this ty-ge projectile does not have the

velocity, r-02: the penetrating power of smaJ.l arms fire except at very close range, 6hc flak vest is an excellent defensive measure. The only drawbacks are its weight which causes heat casualties, and its bulkiness,

S3lu.tlrln - issue "flak" vest as the situation dictates.

t3 UNCLASSIFIED

Solution o ii s!lort class

hir Cx b>- the ground to explain x~d demmstrate the proper use of

&i..gade 1zvel. commander should bc held ;xriodicaUy at

This class should bc clttcnded by all commanders down i;() C;llC! -~~c~~ur:-jnc L; the cornixxy level.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

DEi?!&TMENT OF THE AllMY Headq\rarters 3d Brigade, last Airborne Division

AiT) San Francisco 96383

AVDG-CA-D 25 .Jme 1.9

3rd Bde 1Olst Abn Div ATTN: s-3

The following amlysis of the enew situation and supporting i3lfOrs'W *>ion is submitted for inclosuro in the combat After Actions Renort (ApAc: SNOW).

1 Incl

I InteUgence of Dong Ap %.a

AVDG-CA-D 25 June 1953

SUBJECT: Ccmbnt After Actions Report (APACE SNOW)

1. Terrain: The terrn?n azn?octs of the 3d Pde Area. cf' Operations generally --MB coti'Orined to the original intelligence estimate varying f rotn open vaJ.ley to steep mountains,

32, The Valley; Ths A SHAU Vdlley floor consists of flat open terrain which varies in width from 300 meters(YD363032) to three kilometers near TA BAT. Vegetation includes grass, 2 to 6 feet tall and scattered brush. Foot and vehicle trafficability is excellent, and any portion of the valley floor is condusive to helicopter landings.

be The Transitional Area: Bordering the Northern A SEAU on the wtstorn hills ak depth of one to two kilometers the terrain is covered with matted grass and brush vegetation which impedes foot traffic. The area is laced with numerous trail networkb and trafficability is limited to their use. Tracked vehicles could deploy a3 far north as YD3l.X.

C. The Mountainous Area: Rising abruptly out of the narrow-fingers and uneven contours of the transitional, area, the canopy-covered, Steen slcpes (&to 5s) of the mountainous region form an unbroken barrfer to movement, observation, ,XI~ heXborne oper&&ns, Foot traf'fic is conffnad to trails uld stre3m.beds. Observation and fields of fire were sever3.y li~nited in somt3 al"ftas due to undergrow% and elephant grass. Though no patiicular area of the operational area was reported as impassable, 32-ezs under triple canopy ~eizr stro?ams wczx more difficult due to the amount of tangle foot in the areas where no trails were established, All strem8 encountered were negotiable by foot troopers. Vehicles though not used in operation Apache Snow ~?ouLd be generally limited to Route 54'7, valley floc~r and its long more gradual slofing fingers,

Numerous suitable helicopter landing zones and trails were found in the area. (Overlay :&ll be fwd under sep.erate cover),

2. Weather: Throughout the operational period, the veather was consiycred . B-*.-P e.XCeiIeIlt. GrU Jnd Fog was prevalent in early morning hours in most ravines, usually cleating off around 0800 - 0830 hours,. Also immediately follow%ne thundershowers cumulus clouds developed and remained in the area for a short time. For the most part, thundershowers occured between 1430 hours and 2100 hours drily with clear skies developing after rainfall. Temper- atures were moderate to warm in afternoon prcceeding thundershowe=, Weat her in guleral was excellent for Airmobila Operations,

a, 6th WA Rcgimcnt

(3) BG?rJ Pn - ?ossiblc

c, S5%h kms Group

de 675th Arty Regiment

Though the original estimate of enemy disxsition and commsition I+- not ctinfillrcd .yltogetherp it is believed that, all' elemental WWE opcr~ting in ana of the pknned o~mtiorr except the 9t;h WA Regiment, Cants&s throughout the pcxri.od could have ;utd in all probability were made with elements listed in a, c - e. Contact was established on 10 May lob9 by the 3,&7 and 1/5Cf) Infantry %ttal.ions and was maintained thmwhout the duration of the operation. The sticond dag of the opemtion, the 36 &, I.mth made aprndic contact with snipers that were dug'in as well as tm borne, ‘kb contact continued cmd the fighting increased as the 3,&?7 had enccuntered the two Enenpg Battalions and sections of an NVA Regimenta3i. HeadquarteF3 size unit which ww Later identified throwh documents and Prisoners as the 29th NVA Regiment. The 7th and \Sth Battalions cd element8 of the 2,oth Regt Hqs were located on Dong Ap Eia mountain (YCz289el). A3 the intensity of the fighting increased, the 3/187 wa3 join&d by three (3) additia?al battalions in routing the 29th NVA Regiment. The 29Lh WA Hegtie& was the only new -unit identified in the area, # I f0.r information on Hill 937).

(se0 Inclo3ilre

Elezn&x of the 8O%h Battalion, 6th NVA Rgimmt and the K10 Sapper BattaUon remained active throughout the opertiion.

&. Skew Tactics: The X&h Battalion located North of F'SB Airborne generally remained in a defensive posture of enemey caches and base areas path limit ed recomaissanc e missions. Elements of the 86th did particiDate .:-n a sapper attack on 13 May 69, Remaining element3 of the 6th NVA were nor, contacted during the operation, a defensive role.

The 29th NVA Regbent was deoloyed in The 7th and 0th bttalions were

utilizing concentric knkeL-s on Done Ap Bia (HiU de loyed

P in depth

937 Bunkers were heavily fortified, retnforcod ("A'! Frame) with thick oier head cover and covered with DXU~U~ supporting fires, An intficate series of interconnec- ting troches enabled the enerqp to reinforce any portion of his perimeter. %~ip~.~ and 2-3 man listing post wert" deployed along all Dossible avenues of approach at sufficient distancefram the enolrgrs* pomter to orwide

early umniry,:. With the cxcoptian of the battl.e for Dozqq Ap Pia fmm 11-21 May, the moMlo defense tactic was employed by the enemy. In this role, UT, and ARVN units most frequently encountered trailwatchers, small recon parZ.03 and snipers during rcconn~xissance h for-co operations. The enemy elex~ents ~ploying t,his tactic would attempt to infLict matim friendb xsualties initially and break contact immediately. Sapmr attacks increased during the peri& indicating the eneq's hcreased reliance upon this txXc to inflict maximum casualties and deatn:ction cf instKLl&ions 2nd equipment with a mjnimu.m of forces which are highly trained with suicidal motiviation, Direct and indirect fire attacks on Fire Bases PAd night defensive positions alas increased during the reo~fid pCiOd. Fir-e attacks were usually by enemey animrs deplofing harassing txfrmiques with small arms and rocket propelled errmade, Indirect fire attacks were conducted with 6Omm mortar, EQmm mortar, 122~~ rockets, 1ZYm artillery (Tiger Mtn) and infrequently by rocket promlled gmnadea Cnly one indirect fire attack was followed by a ground attack and that occured on 13 May 69 with a combined sapper and ground attack. Mines and booby traps zerc employed in the area of operation generally along m’s that the erxzny suspected 16 and AWN use. Cache sites were heavily boo@7 trapped in a hasty manner appearing to be a last resort of preventing L.6 and Marlin capture of these desperately needed 3upplies and munitions, Command and trip-device claymores were encountered along XX>Crs and nsrt- icuhrgr in defense of Dong Ap Bia, The claymore's were staggered and placed in depth to provide coverage both in front and to sides of bunkem. Grenades, 60 and Nmmmortar rounds with trip devices placed in ordnance containers and left in open areas were al.03 employed,

5. Trtining: bqy individual and unit trxin~ was considard to be excellent. &.r%iculary noteworthy is the excellent marksmnshi~ and conceaXement axployed by e3xmmts of the 29th NVA Regimmt. Detection of individuals and bunkers were extremely difficzalt in the initial chases of the operation aroumi Dong Ap E&a and improved as ordnance was nlaced. in heavy jungle terrain. The excel1 mt marksmmship of the 29th Regt showed a marked improvement over previous contacts with enemy units, training of the Sapper elements remains in a very high state.

The special.

6. l&$.&d. cs : The overall supply posture of enemy foxes was not COW ' sidered good, however the only known shortages were food. Caches of munitions and other supplies indicate the enemy's ability to infiltrate and store large quantities of supplies in Base areas, Thoughnumerous medical supplies were captured in the area it is believed that the energy is experiencing a critical shortage of medical personnel in adrmi.xx&ering treatment,

7. Combat effectiveness and Morale: The overall combat effectiveness of enec;;7elcments contacted was considered to be good and consider3bl.y better thzn the enemya.elanents previously contacted in lotis and alv the rocks% belts, The 7th and 8th BatWions, 2oth WA Refi was considred to be highly effective until after the battle for Dcmg Ap Bia.

&rale of the enemy continues to be mar, The poor state of morale is

8. I'ntelli~~~~ Opcrztions: UNCLASSIFIED

aii iztanse z.. FAC '855: - :Y : ~.:-xrly FebMiz::,- 1969, 3d Brigade FkC3 bqan

systematic \:il progrim of were! debriefed by S2

the r,otihern A Shau Valley. Pilots personnel after completed missions, and furnsihed

valtlablc data on roads, trails, HLZs and enemy locations.

17, s2 vn - the assist,ant S2 and S2 Air conducted reconntissance of tI:c TAOE in fixed-wing aircmft from the 220th RAC and accompained FAC3 on i2.I. s si. on5 D Hz.nd held photos were taken of HLZ's and enemy locations.

C. A-247 Cav VR - armed helicotier reconnaissance missions were flmm by the 2-1 17 cm in supy?oti of 3d Brigade Operatinns,

2. Airbm:x Pessomel Detector condact,d i;o foc;:,e

- sniffer missions were frecuently er,emey concxxtrations and were a valuable source of

intelligcncc,

FW Interroga-LIc):l z,id :ja~~ent; Readout Ifi! zgction was maintained at the foreward TACP for rapid ex@.oitation of

- a team fmmthe 3d Brig&e

prisoners znd c,?,ptl:red encq documents,

TDTAE- 720

5 581 140

437250 7462 1367

26002 46511 14460

47; 44

1462 547

UNCLASSIFIED

Inclosure 1, of' Cunbat M'ter Action Report,(INTEILI~CE) to A?ACHE SNOW.

SUbJECT: IntelLgenee Exploitation of QONG AP BIA" UPOASSIFIED

IIJ'L"RODUCTIGN: Intelligence played a major part in the success of the 3d Drigadc in Operation "APACHE SNOW" and more specifically, intelligence was the major factor that caused a battle for the 937 hill. in the battle of Dong kp 8-a just about every available source of intelligence gather- ing was exploited,

The mems of gathering t'his information were: Prisoners, scar reuorts, visual reconnaissance and Agent &qx&s.

13ACKGROUND: Ir! mid February, during Operation Ohio Rapids conducted in southem and eastern portion of Base Area lOl,the!3d Battalion, 187th Infantry caflured a prisoner from the 806th Battalion, 6th Regt. During the interrogation of the PW, he stated that hi3 elements received suunlies from a warehouse ccanplex in vicinity of the northern A Shau Valley, The prisoner indicated that his element3 would move for two (2) days to the west and three (3) dnys to the southwhere warehouse 54 was located, Based on this data, exploitation of this area began within the &igade'3 carp= ' ability.

EXPLOITATION: I,mmedi.ately, Air Strikes were planned and flown in the area uf Warehouse 54. These airstrikes received numerous secondary exnlosicms and many secondary fires. Suspecting that the warehouse complex had been Located, additonal air strikes were placed in the area and the area north of warehouse 54. One airsWi.ke further north 7;as 33tiicu32q~1y -reveali.~ and that was the di.scover;y of a large t&l, well used with what apneas& to be spider holes along it running 5.n a Norttiouth direction. About this time, an extensive Visual Reconnaissance Frogram wav initiated. These V'R missions were coordinated and established with Air Force FACls attached to the 3d Bde for direct acir support. The program was sethup to have the FACIs make VRgs of the entire area whiltz Airstrikes were being flown 3.~ the area and when no fighters were available the FAC's would siRt$& recon the area, After each flight into the area, the FAC would renort to S2 and draw all trails, possible landing zones and just generally brief the S2 on his observations in the area. The area of warehouse 54 and the trails leading out of Laos into the Dong Ap Bia were particularly interesting because of the obvious heavy use, after a short pericd, the FACts had established a number of trailnetwoljcs andpossible areas of enemy con- centrations. Results of the visual Reconnaissance missions were three fold; First, they were able to

P n&de the s2 with immediate Information

on specific areas of interest, 2 he added to or improved the dat& base of information on the area for future Operations and third,. he becm very familiar with the terrain so when firiendly troops were denloyed in the ama, no difficulty was experienced in providing very close air support,

In late February andearly March of 1969, indications from UPS showed an unusual increase in Spar readings in the upper part of the Va12ey, Concurrently with the beginning of O$.eration Massachusetts Striker, E URS

i UNCLASSIFIED 1

1

UNCLASSlFlED

indicated deployment of a Major North Vietnamese Commvld in the A Shau area and in Base Area 611 in Laos. Three of these commands v:ere identified as Regimental size headquarters, each regiment having under its command three or more battalions, Discovery of parts of a Coaxial cable tended to battress the idea of a mljor cormno facility located scmewhere in the valley, By early May, a I(Rs report had identified a regiment& headouarkers as being 5-8 kilometers west of Dong Ap Bia and was moving easterly,

Photographs and captured documents played a major role in selecting the landing aunes ‘and general axis of advance of the Battalions patiici- paWig in the Combat Assaulting of multiple battalions along the Laotian border. The f3de II and Ass't S2 officer under the guidance af the S2 and S3 selected specific areas for photographs, The study and analysis of these photographs were instrumental, both to the S2/3 and later.to the b Commanders in their planning of assigned missions,

&thou.& Igent reports were plentiful in the early stages of formt&Jt- ing a dat;a base and preparing plans for Apache Snow, the information was general kind not in deflh, The Bde S2 made a liaison visit to the 525th m Det in Hue and directed specific questions concerning the area of interest to the Det OIC. He was able to respond immediately with some oft he information and levied the remaining requirements on his agents,

As the data base grerw or developed, plans werrg made by the 3d Bde to begin Operation Apache Snow to fully explajit the situation, The Operation 'ticked off on 30 &y with a multiple batt.alian CA into selected U's along the Laotian Border, All assaulting elements reported cold Ws and moved out on mx&tiple axi.3 of advance, On the 2d day of Amche Snow the 3d Battalion, lmh met heavy ezxqy resistance frum a well trained, well concealed and dug in eneqy force, The fight continued for the next eight ($1 days with some of the hardest and costliest fighting enter experienced by an WAforce. As the EL1 was finally taken by a four allied battalion force on 21 May 69, a FW captured reveal&t&&the 29th Regt &s with two of its three orgatiic battalions was located on Dong Ap %a. Further interrogation revealed that elements of the 29th Regt on Don& Ap &.a suffered extreme heavy casualties, One FW estimated that over 80 percent of his Company was destroyed,

UNCLASSIFIED

~m1Osure 3 (Personnel and Administration) to Co'mbht Operations X%er ACT#LQ~

'{sport, Operation Apache Snow. UNCLASSIFIED

I. U-nits Strengths:

a. Initial:

Officers HFIC! 3h.i3de 38 1st Bn, 506th Inf 37 2d Bn; 506th Inf 43 3d Bn, 187th Inf 43

b. Final:

Officers '13X 3d'Bde 36

1st Bn, 506th Inf 31 2d Bn; 506th Inf 40 3d Bn, 187th Inf 28

c1 Casualties:

Officers K-XC 3d'Bde 1 la-t; En, 506th Inf 13 2d Rn; 506th Inf 8 3d Bn, 187th Inf' 22

Warrant Officers 14

2 2 1

Warraizt ‘bfficcrs 14

1 2

A' l

Wasrant Officers 1 0 0 0

EN

z! 778 629

Elyl

L;!

318

d. Roplnoemonts:

Officers Warrant Officers EN HFiC 3d*Bde 2 0 5 1st Bn, 506th Inf 3 0 164 2d Bn; 506th Inf' 0 81 -m 3d Bn, 187th Inf 1 118

e. Thorn wao an averago of fifty poop10 sn leave and R&R during Operation lpache Snow.

> -. Other Aspects:

a. AG F'unctions: An additional administration load was incurredduo to th :lumorouo casualties and tho correspondence required on each one. Other admini- :tration remained at a normal level,

b . PM0 : The Provost Marshal reports .had no increase in crime during this 4 od. .-.

c. Fimnae: There was no change in financo,functions at the 3d Bde during lis period. ,

cl . Chaplain: The brigado chaplains, as a matter of courx?, visited all its on Q regular schedule, no matter whore they were looatod, in order to ,ld religious scrvicos, The 'chatilains also briefdd rGplacemonts and visited rsonnel of the 3d Bde in hospitals in the mea. During this time the chap-

building project for a Catholic Orphanage in tho local Cr\L j-1 UNCLASSIFIED

Cc!~ l r .

UNCLASSIFIED Extrnct, After Act ion Reports, Operatim Apache Snow - Logistical, Ha, 3d Ekie

Reference: a. ADMIE!O l-69, Hq, 3d Bde, lOl& Abn Div (AM), dtd :ii Feb 69.

0. OPCRD 3-69, HCI, 3d We, ?Olst Abn Div (AM), dtd 6 May 690

2. Operation Apache Snow was initiated by a Brigade planning ronfer- ence: ADKIN 7-69, dtd 2R Feb 59, initiated the logistical support for the operation*

3* Logistical Task Organization (as of 6 1By 1969):

3d FSSE, DISCOM

Elements, 426th Supply and Service Battalion

Co C, 326th Medical Battalion

Co D, 8Olst Maintenance Battalion

Detachment, 1002d Supplv and Service Campan,

FOL Platoon

Laundry and Bath Platoon

Grave 3 Registration I'

Detachment 2, 571st Ordwnce dcmpmy (Ammo)

17&h Maintenance Ccmpany

287th Explosive Ordnance Detachment

15th Aerial Fort (US@)

4 3 General: Logistical support for this operation cmsisted of sup- port rendered to the 3d Brigade Task Force, to the Ist A..RVU Beplment, and to the 3d AWN Regiment.

5. Preparation: a. In antic+ti.m of expenditures, a buildup of Class IV cvld barrier materia1ws.s effected at Camp Evans.. The stockage level of all other classes of supplies at Camp %Wm cm 6 rJI,?Y 1969 w,i’s sufficient for extended field operations by this Brigade.

b. Levels (Camp Evans)

(1). Ammunition: a seven day level is maintained in the Cramp Zvms SP by the Da Nang Support Conanande

(2). POL: 70,000 gallons of Jp4

r UNCLASSIFIED

f / 4 .-

i, t: ,.’ . [ cm-’ hrT~

.,’ . UNCLASSIFIED (3)* Rations: a five day level of C-Rations and LWPs.

cm Facilities: All logistical facilities required to 6support Brigade-sized operations were in place on 6 Kay 1969.

6 l Tactical Conduct: a. Operation Apache Snow cQmnenced on 7 May 1969, (D~-3)0 The 1st AXVN Regiment, the 11th; 12th, and 34th .I'WX Artillery J%ttr?:*l- t and the 3+ Brigade (l/506, 3/lW, 2/501, 3/5, Z/319) moved into positions and conducted CA’3 from D-3 to II+1.

Tne 3d brigade forward ccanmand post was located at FB Dertches- garden. The 1st AWN Regiment forward command post wa3 located at FE Br dlcy. The 11506 FSB was locatcc! at FB Currahee, the 3/187 F% tr;cs located at FR Bertchesgarden, and the 2/5O1 and 2/Y% FSR wasat- FB Airborne. The forward caanmand post of the 3/5 was at FB BLa%, and the forward command post of the Z/319 was nt F3 Eagles Veste

1?69:’ The 3/1R7 wcl3 extracted from the operational area on 21 %v

?* Lofiistical Support: a* The plan for logistical support entailed sl2ng-lEded car?0 movement by CH-47 helicopters from Camp Evans to fire bases. IJpon arrival, cargo ?ms stored or further broken dcrwrl to ~ompnny lo,?ds for resupply to units in the field by UH-1H helicopters.

b. Cargo consi3tSng of mail, personnel, and loads which were deemed uneconcznical to move by CH-47 wore hauled by W-IV directly fram Camp Evans to FSBs .or to the unit in the field.

c. USAF Support: Vo additional munitions or supplies were flm into Camp Xwns Army airfield in direct support of the operation=

d. Ground Line of Ccmmunications: 26th C-S Group continued support et a normal rz.te via ground transportation.

e. Helicopter Support:

(1). UH-1H: Assets of the 15&h MB and the 3d Brigade !W.a- tion Section flew in direct support of committed combat elements.

(2) l CH-47: Assets of the 159th AWl3 flew 1188 sc;lties in support of committed ccanbat elemnts as follows:

33 >Arborne FB Currahee FB Ikrtchesgarden FB E~glss IZest FB Bradley F'; Rakkasan Ti<yer Mt

16 29 168 52 17

1; ’ 18 230 78

:: I4 6 14 19 172 ;i

81 24

2 5 2 67 41 6

TCTAL 47 86 82 654 276

CL I CL III CL V CL IV !ITimTR MISC

6 16 6 2

13

43

UNCLASSIFIED

u i~~,u- - rnc . f. Medical Support: Seventyseven d&t-off missions were flown

in support of the operation. UNCLASSIFIED

60 Maintenance: Maintenn:lcc work order s in direct support of the operation were processed by Co D, 8Olst Maint Bn and the 178th Maint Co.

h. Graves Registration: The remains of 63 1US personnel and G AWN personnel were processed.

i.. Laundry and Bath: Unit standowns were provided to 19 ccanpany- sized units irrrmediately prior to. Rnd follovring Operation Apache Snow. Service consisted of hot showers, DX of ciotning and boots (as needed), ice cream issue, ‘and super contact teams*

j- GLCC MSiJlteLUlce : KMCB 10 was responsible for QL 1 mainten- ance. Ko significant problems were encountered during the conduct of '-,he operation.,

l! l Problem Areas: a- Anmunition: Serious problems were encountered

1 ~l:th ;'I% items, i.n particular 81 rrpn HE, M-79 HE, and M-26 Fra@nent.?tion ::!"e%il &se The requirement for H83 fires and close in suppoz*t of man- &-WY elements in -close proximity to the Fire Support Bases far exceed- :.d &he hE8 for the period covered. The ASR based upon experience factors or' operations on the costal plains is not representative of the reauire- ments for operations in the A Shau valley and surrounding mountains.

Recommsndation: Consideration should be given to operational missions when AS'% are determined and increased usage should bc forecasted when terrain and security reouirements change*

be Personnel Movements: The turbulence of replacement personnel and normal administrative personnel reouiring transportation forward created a potential problem, ti sort&d by UH-1. Logistics resupply time was not sufficient to resupply units in the field and move personnel simultaneouslyW Maximum utilization of #l-47’s helped solve this pro- blem. Personnel were loaded internally in CH-4'7's along with the ex-

1 ternal loads to achieve maximum utili~tian~

Recommendation: One central location should be established where per- sonnel from all organizations of the Brigade would be shuttled to for- >rard areas on CH-47's* This would better utilize resources by central- izing the requirement, increasing CH-4.7 payloads, and decreasing blade time of UH-7's.

ce Chain Saws: Significant problems were encountered bv the high deadline rate of chain saws when operated by untrained personnel. Parts for deadlined saws were in short supply. The maintenance reouirement to keep c?!ain saws operational is directly correlated to the usagc-fac- tar- A temporary solution Was found b,. 71 establishing a maintenance float cf saws and conducting field location training on proper technicrues of opcrating the chain saw.

3,eco~ncndation: All combat units bo given practical demonstrations mc! instruct ion in the operation and maintenance of chain saws.

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED . d. Shortage of Air Items: of air items frm ftic bases

Was a serious problem. 'fhen opehing a fire base, supplies flow so rap iU.,- that units tend to drag their feet derigginlr; sorties delivered. At time-s urgentJy needed supplies are unnecessarily delayed or nat, de- livers! dud to air items not being avaaable for ri@$ng.

Rccommc:YMior: Comndcrs at all levels should stress the importance of rcliurn53~ air itom frl>m fire bag&s at the earliest possible moment.

. *,e* Vatcr : Forward elements const&tly in contc7ct and unable to clear ZZt s were operating in areas where water was nd available’ In order to sqply water to these elements, a container which could be kicked out of .e heliccyter without broakixp and one which held an ad- c?.s-:o C.InxO'~ _ -t of water had to be found. The immcdiato solution was to use the 1~5x1 povde~ c&mister. However, servorcl draw backs were . fou:ld which YRC?~ this solution lees than satisfactory* '.Jater trans- pcvted in thsse contc?iners had a particularfy unpleasant taste; many ~L%onnel developed dysentary which was thought to be caused by scme cl.h~S..ic~l residue in the cannisters and the cannisters had to be left J-2 *;qi: opextional area where they can be salvaged by the enemy

SC- :.; L: ~xux?ndation : n light disposable water container, which cdn be kic- LA mt rJf helicopters without breaking should be found. Commanders 2-i; all keels should submit recmendations for a possible solution*

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

Psychological Operations

1, General: During Operation APACHE SNO'JJ, Psychological Operations was confined to Aerial Broadcasts from J.JI-MH helico&ers, aqd mass leaflet drops in support of the 3d (Aimlobile),

Brigade, 1Olst Airborne Division

2. Programs: Aerial Broadcasts used the main WA Chieu Hoi theme interjected with the aspect of unnecessary death in false cause, Mass leaflet drops consisted of an assortment of VIA Chieu Hoi themes: appealin to sense of survival; referring to stamina of American Goons in pursuit of their goals3 and m& fakness*of OIQJ forcres deaU.ng tith NVA W.~'~oi*s

- 30 Results: 'Ihe NVA troops were attacked with Aerial Broadcast and mass leaflet drops. Since vast areas had to be covered in short intervals of time the propaganda medias were considered best suited to effectiveness of such an operation. The material was spread over the areas of hea-&& concentration and reached targets with adequate accuracy*

A total of 5,310,OOO NVA Qxieu Hoi leaflets were disseminated in the 28 days of the operation. A total of &' hours of Aerial Broadcas+;s were also iwluded in support of the operation,,

CONCUSrnii :

&IL-though a &ieu Hoi.* s an& only a slight number of E%&J were taken in t&operation, the effectiveness of Psychological Operations should not be cons5dered a t&al. lo&, All POWs stated that all broadcasts were heard and Leaflets were mc&.ved. However, discipline in the indii&dual unj.t plus 'the fear of fol%ticali officer% pressure in the unit and in home base disrupted -Be mi.nLmal, chances of total success

UNCLASSIFIED

Inclosure 6 - to Combat kfter Action Report - Opertion Apache Snow

SUBJECT: COM4UbJIC~TIOI EHPIiXME3JT DURIKG OPEJ&.TTON "kF%CHE SIuOW".

1. The folio* FX and Ratt radio nets were employed from Brigade to Divis and Subordinate units in support of operation "kpache Snowff and wrzre effect during the entire operation,

ETS Civision Command Net Division Commard Net Division Intel1 Net Division Spt Net 1 Erigade Comtnati Net Me Comm3n3 Ops/Intell. Lrigade Admin/.Log

Moml FM Secure F&i Nonsecure FM Secure Ratt Secure FiI Nonsecure FM Secure FIb1 Nonsecure

TYPE EgUIPbmU'T AI\:/vRC - 46/K&8 M/VRC - 46 AN/PRc - 7'7/KY-38 kN/VSC - 2/K W-7 AN/VRC - i+6 (see fi, kN/miC - 46/w-B AN/W - 46/kN/~ti,

2. VHF communications were employed extensively throughout the entire oper- ?,t.i nr. . ..I ', and was effective. VHF was employed from the following locations

FROM Porchtesgaden

II rt I? II 11

camp 2lkuls

To CampEvans 173 Currahee II3 EaEl.e Nest FB Blaze CampEvans Camp Eagle FB Rakkasan

MODE VHF VHF VHF

VHF VHF VHF

TYPE EQUIPME%T AM/GRC - 163 AIu/GRC - 163 I;N/GRC - 163 klJ/GRC - 163/Ah/MRc-r' AN/plRC - h9(Sec note AN/&X - 69 AN/MC - 68

3. All other means of camrmunications were employed 1AW tith the Brigade SOE experiencing no major difficulty.

rJOTE!S 1. Radio Set Ar\t/VRC - 49 (Automatic Retrans)nas located at FB Eagles 1Jest to communicate with units operating from the wlley floor of the A Shau VaUi

2. Six (6) channels were strapped dver at Camp Eagle to Camp Evans.

I

UNCLASSIFIED 3

DEPARTHEHT OF THE ARNY HEADQU,mmRS, ZD E%l%JJION, 319TH ARTILURY

APO SfLN FRlLlxIsco 96393

18 June 1969

SUBJECT: Combat Operations After Action Report, Operation Apache Snow

Co:Xlanding Officer 3d Brigade, 1Olst Airs&bile Division LTTN: s-3 I20 96383

v UNCLASSIFIED m

1, l%ission: Direct support of the 3d Brigade and controI of artmcrY fires in the 3d Brigade i;rea of Operations.

9 a-e. Concept of Operationsz

a. Organization of the a,rti&ry was as follows:

(1) 2/319th Arty DS 3d Bio (2) E/11 Arty GSR 1Olst kbn Div (3) C2/11 Arty GSR 101st AIn Div (4) Al/B Arty GSR 1Olst ntn Mv [i{ Cl 83 Arty GSR 101st Abn Div

J 77thARAGSR 2/319th Arty

b. Concept of the operation was to previde artillery coverage with ,aJl batteries' for a33 friendly elements as needed.

3. Execution:

a. This Battalion was in DS of the 3d Brigade in the area of operation, the A Shau V&&y, duriq the entire operation, Apache Snow. W Battery was the first battery to support Apache Snow when they mved from Camp Evans to Bertchesgarden on 25 April 1969. On 9 May 1969 ~~A~~ Battery m~ed from FSB Blaze to FSB Currahee, ati on Q May 1969 ~'C" Battery wved from FSB Rakkassan to FSB Airborne, aU roved in suppofi of operation Apache Snow. Part of the Battalion TOC moved to FSB Blaze on 25 April 1969, ard the complete 'IW m~ed to Eaglets Nest on 10 May 1969. On 13 May 1969 %I' Battery 2/319th Artillery came under mrtar and grouni attack from the South ati Southwest grid 35Xl52 2nd from the hili to the East. Personnel loses were as follows: 49 b/IA's and 13 KItIs and 1 died of wounds later, king total of KIAts to 14. Equipment 1osCs were as follows: 1 1Ofdxn Howitzer destroyed ard 1 damaged. Both were replaced the same day, Other equipment loses include:

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

D/i. Hq 2/319 F1, 1Olst ,1bn Div ;8 June 1969

,SUB LTR: Combat Opns ;, fter ,;ct,inn Report, Apache Snow

(?) Radio Set, Control ,Ir\r/GRk39 3 ea (2) Radio Set, ilN/PRC-4'7 i ea (3) Radio Set, liN/PRC-25 3 ea (4) Container, Insulated, Thermal 1 ea (5) Antenna, RG-232 6 ee (6j Launcher, Grenade 1 ea ('7) Light Set, G eneral Illumination 1 ea (8) Computer, M18 lea (9) Rifle, Ml&l 1 ea (10) Trailer, $ Ton 1 ea (11) Generator Set l-5 kw 1 ea (12) Headset, 144 C/V 7 ea

Operation ,\pache Snow ended 2400 hours 8 June 1969, Ik that time the below list& units in support of Apache Snow were disposed as follows:

(1) (2) (3) t 41 (5) (6) (7) t 8) (9)

Hq T0C at Ea&els Nest Ld319 Arty at FSB Curraheo Si/319 Arty at FSB Bertchesgarden C2/319 ixty at FSB Airborne B2/1 ‘i dirty at FSB Cwr,dW C2/9f+ r&y at FSB Nancy X6/33 Arty at FSB Thor Cl/83 Arty at FSB Blaze Au77 AU at CampEvans

b. Number, type of missions and mnition expenditues for organic batteries foI&w:

TYPE OF MISSION NO OF MiSSIONS

Conftimcd Acquire3 &ant erbattery Preparation Interdiction Special Purpose ARViJ, CID3 Register&ion oti1er

528 1829

62 112

2116 643

ii a2

CS 172

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

HE 1506

1 :7:64 1008

10 583 3850

3% 1818

WP ILL EH FC

250 0 0 0 0 0 3: 0 0 0 0

603 0 0 0

5402 62!: 0 0 0 0 0 1+2 0 0

T 0 0 0 0 0 030 0

SK 0. 0 0 0

21: 0 0 0

40 I’JEJ ysis : The operation was a success fromthe artillery point of view. The effect of H&I fires as a deterrent cannot be detertined since results are norm&Ly unobai.nat9.e. Enemy rocket & g:rc?tlr,d &%a&.~, such as the V,"

UNCLASSIFIED

. ,

B

UNCLASSIFIED

D/i; Hq 2/319 F!! 1Olst Ah Div

'

18 lhus 1969

SJB LTR: Comb& Opns After Ixtiori Report, &x&b tic;

&tkr$,i.ncident, have made it necessary .for,the artmery to rr)$@d @.ClsY. This t$@ of response has ~~-oven to be very effecf;ive against such &tack8 on Fire apport Base3 in the Ekigado IhO.

CPT, I?2 Adjutant

UNCLASSIFIED

I 1 I 1 . c.i- ?nc-&j.c:l Ajs Support (Operation Apache Snow) UNCLASSIFIED

1. Xission:

The ession of the 3d We, 101 Ah lJS&J? Tactical Air control parkJ+ to Operation Apache Snow can be divided id:, 5 phases:

ai. Pre-operation reconnaissance, map;>ing, and intelligence gather-in@.

kddsing the (TNb&.r).

Brigade concernin, v f& best use of Tactical Airpower

co Planning and coordinating the Tactical Birpower employment for D&W.

d. controlling airstrikes in support of the ground elements.

e. Visual reconnaissance during the operation.

7 Concept of Operation: i&n enemy routes,

TAC Air tqould be used prior to D-Day to vz cut tiraiJ.s and roads in the A snau VaUey floor,

and prepare LZls for .future use. After D-Day, constant Fxc coverage would provide timediate coverage for units in contact with the ability to rapidly direct already airborne TAC A&+ for additional destructive power on heavily defended enemy emplacements.

a. The pre-operation reconnaissance program was initiated approximately one month prior to D-Day. J-t consisted primarily of working with the Brigade S-2 yin mapping enemy trails and probable enemy Locations. Another important part; of this phaS8 consisted of taking the Brigade and Battalion Comanders and key staff members on flights over the area of operation , thus allowing them to become familiar with their areas before Daay.

b+ The advice of the ALO and FAC*s was sought concerning the most probable areas of enemy concentration, the best locations for LZ!s and the best way of using TAC Air j_n preparing LZ*s, covering the insertions, and supporing troops in contact.

3. Execution:

STATISTIGL SUNURY

Date FAC Sorties Airstrikes &mbs(lbs) iJapalm(lbs)

10 May 27 118,503 29,500 11 : a 119,000 21,000 12 4 16 118;500 16,500 13 6 16 W,O@) EJ,~O 14 1.5

!z s 103,m 16,000 13 99,5+~ 14,000

....--.-(w - - -

UNCLASSIFIED Tactical Air Support (Operation Apache snow)

Jhtc FAG Sorties Airstrikes aOmb&ba) Nap&d-d *

16 ;

12 106,000 i2im 17 14 115,000 18 12 Ir&oQo

I;;;=& 19 ; 17 123,ooo i7loaO 20 4 16 81;000 2t;OOO 21 4 ll 5;ooo 22 3 8 Up0 23 3 1s

g:g

24 4 7 96:ooo l?,S@J

25 ! 13 75po 26 4 9 59,ooo 2% 4:m 27 0 0 3 0 28 4 0 0 0 29 4 0 0 0 z: 3 t l.l,ooo 2,000

3&O@ 1 June : 3 13,000 6;co: 2 4 3 22,000 , 0

:, 4 3 10

2 2 10 ii

58,0(30 Lo,000 lS,occ, C 72,OQJ 76,~ 3rd

7 3 7 66,500 0

27 D+ Ill2 Sorties 287 Aixstrtis 1,937,ooo 285&m

NOTE: These fimres include only those airstriketi actually controlled by this TI+CF. They do not ticlude those controlled by the ARW TACP in .SU~~CX% of the P8VN portion of Operation Apache Snow. Nor do they include &clights or Combat skyspots.

NOTE: 27, 28, and 29 May were bad weather days, requiring all TAC Air to be controlled.by Combat skyspot. 27 May through 2 June were also bad weather days, requiring most of the TAC A3.r to be controlled by combat Sk&Spot.

KMBRAMAGE~LS~';ESSMENT TOTALS FOR&.PhCXl3SNOW

Killedby& 102 Secortiary "&plosiona 81 Secondary Fires 52 Forttiicationa 332 Destroyed r/ii.litcuy SXuctures 47 Destroyed Crew-%rvedweapons 4 iG

ositions Destroyed ood %ts 7

UNCLASSIFIED

Tacticn~. t&r Support (Operation &acho Snm) UNCLASSIFIED

a* *tic Brigade i;u3 did considerable pXarnin end coordineting with the Brigade and division staffs, the %Lst 8 itiTion km, the AWN WI>, and the Direct lair Support Center, llzis involved plannihg the ordnmce load, timing, controlling, ent,ry and oz& routes and altitudezz, and holding locations and altitudes of 32 airstrikes on D&y, rxi.3 planning arid coodins+Wx resulted in an extremely smooth, orderly, effectiva, and accident - free TX Ai.z operation on DJ)ay.

b. LI important part of this TACPtw corrtri?~~+~on to the success of Operation i;pache Snow was the day-to-day controlling of airstrikes in support of the ground corcnanders. Izirstrikes played an ospecialb ~~ortant part in the Battle of &ng lop %a, selda in this or any other conflict has TAC lti been employed so massively as in the hC2.e OX Dong iq Bia,

co -&en not, busy controlI.ing airstrikos the Fomard U..r Controllers conducted extensive visual reconnaissance of the area of operation and possiKLe routes of enemy resupply or retreat, Although the area is not conducive to effective visual reconnaissance due to the thick jungle canopy, on enemy road used for resupply was detected and ' ;~ortially intetiicted,

a. The absolute necessity of gveciso, detailed planxing and coordination for large operations like the prepping of LAGS and the nircxpping of the insertions of Daay, The sidLt$;sneau~ preppFng an6 aircapping of several WS in close prox5mityto each other, in different mtS, controlled by several FX*s from different TAWS and using diffmt ~%qlc-WioS, &d,~tith t&8 irrterW0 Wt~erpfire and multitude of helicopters in the area all comaed to pre8& an excellent opportunity for mid-air collisions, short rounds, or some other disaster. Only by very deteiled planning and coordination was this gotentia3, disaster turned into a smooth, efficient demonstration of air dower.

b. The selection and construction of LZ*s. U. uniti had good Lz's because the s$tes selected were on relatively level terrain that was - origimlly covered by scrub brush or elephant grms. These Lz sites were selected after- several fWS.e attempts were made at constmcj-ng LZls on karst pinnacles or razor-backed ridges coverecl with triple canopy jw?glc. The Daisy Cutter bombs ~yx)B Ibs with fltse extensions) used foiq LZ construction eas33y cleirr out the scrub &ash and elqimnt grc?ss. However, 3.t takes many airstrikes and a great deal of tine to construct an LZ on a jungle-covered mountain top; first; bccsuse the mountain top Is extremely d&ffkult to hit, and secoo~, bccausc mom hits a~ required to klcar out the dense jungle.

b'- 3 UNCLASSIFIED

.

UNCLASSIFIED

. ,‘.

axporienccs of this operation seem to indicate that in the future ' t;h8 pmxss of JJ sslec~ion, where TAG f&r constxuction is required, &ould be more of a compromise bctwcen the highest ground, which is naturaUy desirable, and the mora level ground, which is more practical to constn~ct.

: ., .’ . Cl3 Use of fire power to dislodge the enemy f&m deeply &i-d,

henvily protected positions, such aswere encoun%ered on Dow AP By Mountain, ;Gthough the usual ordnance for ;L troops-in-contact airstrike (500 round bombs and napalm) does destroy some fortified positions and produce mazy casualties, it is not suffic$ent to dislodge a determined GWIQ- from ready heavily protected bllnkcrs. It Would seem that the best my to accomplish the task would be for the friendly troops to

back to safe positions and thoroughly cover the enemy pcsitibns I$$: large (at least 1000 pounders) bombs with delay8d (at l.mst ,025 scxncj) fuses. The larger the bomb and the mwe delay, up to 1 second, the better.

UNCLASSIFIED

Operation Apache Snow, After Action Report, XXIV Corps, 1969

& J .

. a ?

,

I 1

4

GNC~A~SIFIED

-~ .- ----- 0 1 w .

Fro171: Cornmar,ding General, Third iizrine Amphibious Force TO: CorMdanting General,

Vietnam United States PUitary Assistice Cctrrimnd,

7 4-7. ~orwxrded in accordance with reference a.

AVII-CCT

SUBJECT :

THRU:

TO:

/’ 3 ,.-. il

L fl” *-’ DEPAN!'MENT OF'Tm i&hr:

HEADQUNITEXG, XXIV CXBPS UNCLASSIFIED

APO San Francisc~ 96308 27 Aupzf3t l-969

Comht Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC 53-32) (KI)

Commanding General IX1 Marim Amphibious Force ET'0 US Forces 96602

Commdiag Generai united states MiIPt?my Assistance coti, View ATTN: NE J343 APO us Forces 96222

1, (U) COD3 NM@k Operation Apache Snow.

2, (U) DATE3 OF OBEXAT~OW~ MOOCU.H Hay I.969 to 0724OOH June 1969.

3* (U) LOCATION: Nam HO~ Dihrict, Thus Thien Province and wuthwestem Quarig !Pri Protics astride the southern Da Krong Valley. @hp refePcm%3: Yl* +e,wn v a0 uuaurp 1:50,000; Series L7014~ ~h88tt3 &3&l+ I; 6342? II; 6441, 1-m; : tilG.4, III,

4,, (U) COM'ROL HEADQUARTERS: XXIV Corps,

se (U) REPORTIBG OFFICEB: LTG Richard G. St;llwell.,

4, (C) TASK ORGAXIzBTION=

3d Bde, 1Ols-b Atm D~v (AM) - Joseph B, CORW~~~ Jr

1st 9 506th Inf 2d BR; 504th Inf w ER, 187th Iaf 3d Sqdn, 5th CavJ A-2d Sqdn, 17th Cav! B-32&h IEn@ (DS) A-158th AHB CDS) E&8th AHB (DS) 2d Bn, 319th Arty (DS)

GROUP 4 DOWNGRADED AT 3YEAR INTERV DKCLASSIFI~ AFTER 12 Yl3A.R~

AVII-CCT 27 Augu& ir: STJ B.JEC?lT L Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32) (KI)

C4d Bn, 11th Arty (CSR) ea2d .an, gl+th Arty (GsR) c-1st 139, 83d Arty (CSR) 58th Set Dog Plat TACP 20 TASS

UNCLASSIFIED

1st ARVN Regt - LTC Diem

l-1 ARVN Bnw/Fo party 2-l Am? Bn w/F0 party :JlARw Bnw/Fo Party &-LkRlQJ Bnw/FOPar%y Battory 34 ARVN Arty (GSR) Battery l..l ARVX Arty (DS) 1 ~LNO Farty

y NivFJ Regt - COL Hoa

l-3 ARmJ I3.n w/F0 Pmty a-3AmN Snwp?OPady 39.3ARvN Bnx/FQP?u?~ Battery 12 ARVN Arty (Ds)

De& Hq Co, 9th Mmfnes Det, Scout Dog Plat, 3a MP &s

2dBn, l2thkbes B-D (B-105rmra, Towed) Btry E (~-~O~IEUU, Toved) Stry F (6=lofhxm, Tared) Mortar Btry (6-107) 23 PrOT How B-try b155-, Towed 33 Pm-v How Btry b$-155m, TQ~)

7, (S) SUPPORTING FORGES:

(1) Forces: See Task Organization,

(2) Eqaoyment md Effectivemzss:

UNCIASSIFIED

AV ll.-.?;CY d.I JaHp.8 Id J-737

su BCTECT : Combat Oparations After Action Report @XS: MAC 33-32) (KI UNC SSlFlED iA

Cd Units provided support for SZps prior to insertions, units in contact, R&I fires, and d-trect fire in defense of bases under ground and sapper attack.

(b) The artillery support was provided by utilizing a series of mutually s:zpporting fire bases which were establfshed Drier to D-Day. Artillery after D-Day was provided by shiftin;artfflery ttita to additiona? fir& bases as required by troop dispositiorm,.

(1) Tactical Air: 7'77 FAG and 128 CSS sorties (905) were delivered by Air Force, Navy and Marine aircraft during Apache Snow, A total of 1,387,9 tons of bombs and 221.5 tons of napalm were dropped by tactical air. Sorkies flown were as follows:

Bomb damage assessment credited the air sorties with 482 atra;lcturea destroyed, 29 enemy killed, 72 secondary fires and 87 aacondary explosions,

&J Diverts 1

(b) There were 7 Arc Light strikes in. preparation for Operation Apache Snow and 12 during Apache Snow,

(c) The following is the avtilabla BDA,

&, Damage or Destroyeds Numerous trenches, bunkers, huts, traiis, and canopy were destroyed or damaged,

z. Fires and %xplosionsz There were approximately 25 secondary axplosio~s from 1 to 30 times normal. size, Several large sustained (white smoke) fires were also observed.,

,& Enemy Castities: A mass grave con+ain-5ng 40 hodies, believed to be NVA killed by 6 strfkes, was discovered in one target box,

A0 Enemy Equipment: During operations ia tht tar@.seas subsequent to the Arc Light strikes, Allied forces found large quantities of enemy equipment end munitions to include the following::

UNCLASSIFIED

20 Ku:;sian trcrcks go bicycles UNCLASSIFIED yx t:- L?Ck headlampa 6 bul.dozsrs 1 jeep 2090 kg rice 5co@ meters of ccxmno wire Unknown type of auto tools ,woo lb !mT 50 fhzes &X0 ft dst cord 10,003 ant"l-aircraft rds 5000 SA rds

16 C930R and 3000 rds of60 a?. 8z?r!.!E r?lrJr I.00 122snm arty r&3 ,4 8%mn nortar base plates 2 6Omm mortar base plates 2 C&l .50 w; 6 1.2,7~~m anti-aircraft % 2m 3M60m 45 SKS rifles 40 AKL$7% 82Hnn mortar aiming stakes 1 East Germ4n MG i. K&3 rifb%J

Ant~tioated in Objec$&ve Area Prior fo Operatioq Order of Battle holdings prior to -6pg&tion Apache Snow showed at least two and probably three NVA Infantry Remnts, the 6th, 9th and one other Rcgimn$astrids the nor*~cxm end of the A Shau Valley along &th an unknown number of smaller rear service and combat support units, The 6th and 9th Regiments had been recalled or pushed by the prsssure of two earl&w operaMona, Dewey Canyon and Mastsechw ~3t.+: Striker, to draw closer to the present tertirms of the enemy line of comnm- icat2.m (IAC) from Laos in aasc Ama dial, It ~19.3 antfcfpatcd that the enemy had stific5ent strength in and around Base Area 6~. to offer signtficant opposition to an Allied penetration of the northern A Shau Valley if he elected to stand and fight for the supplies undolJb%edly cached there and for the la?ariously constructed LOG wMch wou3.d ti interdicted by Operatian Apache Snow,

b, &ap& mth md S&,&~&y&Jy Fpd As Oneration Was Co&cted: While the elements of the 3d Marine Division met only light and sporadic opposition in the southern Da Krong Valley, elements cl' the 1Olst Airborne Division (AN) and 1st ARV?I Division met considerable ansmy resistance in the northern A Shau Valley, In the early morning hours of 13 May 1969, FSB Airborne vas atticked Qy a large enemy force which was identified by a PU as the entire K6 Battalion (,&CA 806th Battalion), 6th MVA Regfmsnt, On 16 May 1.969, 3/l ARVR Battalion captured a map and several documents, including a battle plan dated 22 April 1969, which indicated that the enemy force charged with the mission of protecting transportation routes and road junctions in the northern porM.on of the A Shau Valley was the 37th Battalion (possibly AKA 33 figineer Rattalion~, Binh Tram 42, These same documents indicated the presence of the 45th Battalion (possibly AU 4th Engineer Battalion), Binh Tram 42, which was responsible for the routes and road junctions in the southern A Shau Valley, While these u.n5* "s *vere not confirmed by contact, other documents provided additional evidence that rear service units of the 559th Transportation Group were actkve in the Apache Snow area of operation (AO), The 3d Battalion, 187th Infantry established contact with a well entrenched and determined force of the 29th NVA Regiment mediately follaJing their combat assault

enemy

UNCLASSIFIED

“‘+ ,@m units .‘;~~~t~~d~d_Ot~~iflc~t _.-uIII Oper~;ion Apache Sn<~w,

ini;e~;bgmf2q: Dxr3-q; units 5f the 6th and 29th WA Regiments and 559th Trans-

portat-Lc.2 Croup 'were XdantlfZed, Tha 806th Battalia and K12 Sapper Ebttalion, 6th &WA Rsgimen,lt, were Sdenttffed In the attack at FSB Airborne while the 7th and 8th En%talionrt, 29$,h WA Rcg%.ment, ware identified in contact on Done AF Bia. Documents cap-tured fn. the ~xorthem A Shau Valley outlined the miszian and operstfoss of the lY?th and &5%h Battalions, B.%nh Tram 42, Tenuous evidence indicates that element s of Wese and other service and support units were contacted during the opesa‘@%on, It was also learned that elements of the 9th WA Xegimn% had oecupbd tbe area just prior to tieration Apache Snow, but could not be identWLed in contactc

(I.? PSYGF actieitlas ,Ln support of !.pache Snow were primm3l.y leaflet disse&.xatioc and ae~faT. 1.oudspeakcr 't?madcasts,,

(3) The 181st Airborns Division (AM) supported tha operation with the dissemination of 5,31O,@QO leaflets (Anti-WA and Chiau Hoi) and aarlaf broadcasts totalltig 47 hours and 40 minutes.

(&) Total Leaflet dissemination by both d2~visions in support of Gperation Apache Snow wag 7,35Z,OOO while aarfal broadcasting time totalled 50 hours and 35 minutes 0

(5) Captured food-stuff: A small percentage of the food-stuff captured during Apache Snow was destroyed due to its condition. The remafndar was distributed to the paopla of Phung Diein, Quang Dien, Eueng Tra, and Barn Efoa Districts,

Commencbg D-Day9 XXIV Corps, in coordinat;fon and cooperation with the 1st A.RW D%visfon, conduct ~pasations in northern A Shau Valley - southern Da Krong Valby to destroy enemy forces a.rxI lmt;allat~o~~fic the AC,

(1) Occiipy suwthtrn Da bong Valley on DJhy,

(2) Block enemy escape into Ima &Long Da Krong Vdlay Road, Concmmmntly, int@rdPctRoute 922 b fl%re,

(3) Conduct operations in zone to destroy enemy fcrses and install.ations,

co -@Be DSvisXcm t&b&: In coordlna%ion wfth 1st ARW Beg-t:

(1) Occur northern II Shau Valley on D-Day*

(2) Black enemy oscapcs into Laos alorg Route 922 bxbd interdict RUKI~XJ 548.

(3) Conduct operations in zone to destroy enemy forces and installations.

6 UNCLASSIFIED

d* Coord~natina Xn:,truct&=g: UNCL.ASSlFlED

(I) The operational nickname for this operation is "Apache Snow".,

(2) Effective on Corps order, !'Apache Snov?" A0 till be established as follows : From YJI 018200 to YD Z22200, to 32 &75970, to YC :Nf;WO, thence no. west along the Laotian border to YD 018200.i The boundary be",;4een 7015-t Airborne Division (KM) and the 3d &rine Division will be as follows: Fl-OIQ YC 160985 north along grid line 16 to YD 160037, north to YD 165057, northea to YD 180078, north to YD 180093, east to YD 195097, northeast to YD 245150, then northeast along stream to A0 boundary at YD 263"167,

(3) The road running northeast from YD 076025, crossing the Da Krong at YD 153097, then to YD 24.5151, then south generally following stream to YD 25 is temperarily designated as Da Krong Valley Road,

Prior to D-Day9 10 May 1969, the Ist <rnd 3 ARVN Rements and the 3C; Btigade 10'9st Airborne Division, established three forward mutually supporting'fire bases at FSB Bradley (YD 278122), FSB Airbcrne (YD 355070) and FSB Currahee (YC 399949>. The 3/5 Cavalry, OJiWM 3d Brigade, assumed

FSB Blaze (YD 535C20), FSB Bastogne and provided security for engineer

forces upgradtig Route 543' .tiom I;fue to the A &au Vali.sf. Three US Infantry Battalions, one AWN Infa.ntry B8ttalion, and one ARW Infantry Company (Rein were staged into a marshalling wea in the vicinity of FSB Blaze. In the northern portion of the AO the 9th Marine Regiment (m)(Reinf) staged twe battalions in the upper Da Krang Vail,ey north of i'ne 36 E4 gr$d lfV.O. n-8-3 ALUQ QULA e&.&lish& i%B ii-aor (‘x”u =l&3igt;), k D-Day, sti sx?an~-~ver 'battalioils (3TJSkmy, 1 US4Cand2ARVN)madea vcombat essault .j,iltO six serbrate Lz!s along the Laotian border in the A Shau Valley and & Krong Valley, After searching and clearing the &urnediate LZ areas, these six battalions along with 2/9 Matines began extensive RIF operations away from the Lzs?to locate and capture or destroy enemy forces and supplies and to interdict Route 54.8 and the Da Krong Valley Road. On D-Day, additional fire support bases were established at FSB Erskine (YD 164107) and FSB Turnage (YD 2&50(X), coqleti: a chain of mutually supporting fire bases,, OR D+7, another AilVN infantry Battalion made a combat assault into an LZ along the Laotfan border and commenced RIF operations, The 3,/5 Cavalry continued to provide security for the fire -bases and engineer forces along Route 547 and prqared for armored cavalry operations in the A Shau Valley upon completing of the road construction,

b, &Day ("10 May 7969), after extensive coordinated air and artillery preparations, the combat assault- began% At 073Ofi, l/506 Infantry (-> comba- assaulted vicinity YC 312949; at 0801H, 3/187 Infantry combat assaulted vi& YC 320988; at 0918H, l/9 Marines com)lrat assaulted into F'S3 Erskine; at 1001H, 2/5Oi Inf.xdxy (-1 combat assaulted vicinity YD 288015, At lWOH, 4./7 ARVN

UNCLASSIFIED

:nl'sl?,ry &.ttdA.on ~rnb~k aesmlt;od v5ciA.ty YI4 25004% rino at 13ij(_H c reinforce k~t‘.xn‘kt~ &xxkpany of 2/l ARVN Infantry B;ltta:!.ion combat assaulted into FSB Turlxlge o Smll &T-m5 fire W!IS received during the combat assaults by 4/1 I-RVN, 2jl ARVfi ad l/9 Marines., At FSB Turnage, ;; CL-47 wws domed vrl Liie LZ Kiti no casuulties and ~r.!inor damage, At FSD Erskine, a CJL4G received fl.re Firirj ci*ashed resulting in 7 fr%endJy KIAbs :Lnd 5 WIA (WAC), Concurrent with the con&t assaults, Z/9 Wines conducted RIF operations vicinity and south of FSB Razor while J/2 ARVN Tnfsnixy Battalion conducted RIF operations immediately south of the A0 bounclarg vicinity Ta Bat,

T-t+1 (11 May 1969): 3/l ARVH Infantry Ba,ttaJ..ion combat aasatited vicinit:; XD 197044 with negatdvo contact,, At 1625H, E/3/187 Infantry began to receive SAY and % fire vicirsitg YC 325982 which marked the beginning of the battle for Dong Ap Xa Mountain, Details of this battle are covered in Inclosure J.,

Dj-2 (12 May lys): The operation continued generally as planned, tith tinor contact, except for l/506 and 3/18'? Infcr,try enjoined fin the -&ttle of Dong Ap Bfa Mountain,,

D+3 (13 May 19691);: The f irst devia%i.on to the original pl.~ occurred on thiLs date after 5+‘2/5OI.. Infantry and artillery at FSB Airbone received a hemy sapper attack at 0335Ho 2/501 Infantry (-) was extracted from PZs along the Laotian border to the vicinity of FSB Airborne and began extensive RIFs to pzlrsue and destroy the enemy in the area,

II+23 (1.8 M&y 1569): In the tattle for" Dmg Ap Bfe Mountain, the 3/187 Infantry fought its way to the military crest on t,h, p north while the l/506 Infantry assaulted up the slope from thei. SOPIL~I., The 3/X87 Infantry began to receive hea%? fire from Xy~th. flanks and, wYth little daylight remaining, the decision was made to reinforce for the final sssault, At 1830R A/2/506 Infantry was combat assaulted vicinity YL 32OW? and became OPCON 3/18? Infantry.

D-+9 (19 M%y 19693 s At 1317H 2/3 ARVI? combat assaulted ticiaity YC 338974 and st 1515X 2/501 Infantry (-> combat assaulted vicinity YC 332?22. 3/5 Cav%lryp provi.dLng sec??_r.i+,y along Route 547A, was chopped OPCW to the 2d Brf.gnde reducing the spm of cont~rol for the 3d Brigade,

Dt.10 (20 Iby 1969; 1: 7,62X7 InTatry (Reinf), Z/501 Infantry, l/506 Infantry and 2/3 ARVN succe~sfullg assaulted and drove the 7th and 8th Battalions of the 29th WA Regiment from the mountain stroughold and began a detal.1g.d search of the area,,

D-b11 !2.l May 19@) 3 3/187 *ins chopped OPCON to the 2d Brigade and moved to the coastal. arm of the dlv:isiou A0 w9i?le 2/506 becxme OPCOR to the jd Erigade and the BattnlMn. (-.) moved to and commenced RIP operations

UNCLASSIFIED

Ali .lI-CGT a 1 y?s;:

27 Augmt w33 $&&JECT: Corn&t Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3=32)CKI! UNC~SSIFIED

D+12 (22 Nay- lc)@): The semai~de~ of 2/506 rxwed to FSE Airborne and began extensive search of ,the Warehouse 54 area0

D-k93 -tf;r~@h C-w (23 - 27 l&y 1969 j 2 ii?/501 Infantry, l/f336 Infantry an? 213 A.NS Infantry continued clear and search of Dong Ap Bia Mountain with YL/50t.-~ moving south, %/3 ARVN moving southwest, and Z/501 continuing to search on the crest, Dur'ag this period, engineers w$.th the 9th M&rine Regiment completed a series of four cuts and 'blocks of the Da Gong Valley Road to deny the enemy immediate future use of the road,

m-18 (28 May 1969): The 9th Marine RegSment began withdrawal from Operatioa Apache Snow with l/S &rines lifting to Vandegrift Combat Base and the closing of FSB Erskine,

Imy (29 May 2969): The 9th I4ar.m~~ Regimz:t withdrawal continued with the lift of 2/9 I43rines (-) to Vandsgrfft Combat Base,

D-220 (30 b!ay 1.969): The 9th Marine Regtient withd:awaL continue4 with the lift of a.dxi.ll~ry elements to Vandegrff~ Combat Base,

lx-21 (31 ida? 1969): The remainder of the 9th Marine Regimenat lifted to Vandegrfft Comb& E&se and 3d Harlne DB~isS.on participation 5n Operation Apache Snow terminated at 3L180SM May 1yh90

Ix-22 -td-lrOU~il De5 (1 = pc June 1969) E The >d Airborne Brigade and 3d ARVM Regimat contjinued opera-Uons, with l/506 Infantry and 2/Y A.RVH Infantry

continuing RliF operations southwest to FSB Cwrahee and vicinity, Ths 2/50l. 1nfmtr-y conducted RIP operation nort;Sleast toward the A Shau Valley 23.50X+ 0

~26 (5 he 1969): The 4,/I ARVN Infantry was extracted from vicinity YD 278066 to La Vang and terminated thee participation fn Operation Apache Snow*

DA-27 (6 June 1y69a Operaticm continued vicinity FSB9s Currahee, Airborne, Bradley and Turnage and northeast of Dong Ap B5a.

D-i-28 (7 June 1969) z The 3d Airborne Brigade and 3 ARVN Regiment terminated Operation Apache Snow effective 072400N June 19690

12 (c) lGESULTS: The objectives of Operation Apache Snow were successfully cyy-pjgj (Jut, A series of mutually supporting fire support bases from FSB Curr&ee OHX the south to FSB Razor on the north was established,, The multi- battalion combined operation in the south was a campaign in which the energy ws 9 d f5xed and ~thod.%cally destroyed, fu.E.~~obked on the north

The 9th Marine Fsghent success- thus denying the enemy reinforcing entrance or

withdrawal from the A Shau'Valley along the Da Krong Valley Roarf., and interdicted the road to deter enemy use of’ it in the future. The resui.t ,:f fhis ojz:i'.iti.on

AVII-GCT UNCLASSIFIED 1

27 August 1969 SUBJEXT : Comba~t Operatfcms After Action Report (RCS: MAC 33=32)(KI)

was the destruction of the combat effectivemms of the mawever batkIlo= of the 29th IWA Begfmant and .Cts Headquarters and Technical Unite, V%C% forced the broken elements to retreat across the border into Laos, It alao denied them use (sf the northern A Shau Valley as either a staging area for

Other

Grain (Tbs)

Demolitions (Ibs)

Docmmnts (Ibs)

Vehicles

BunkePs

Struct;arres

attack or as a storage area for

. I

KU

km

TmAL

1021

6

413

UJ.

555,451

7,426

8,346

1,375

26,002

56,486

l&475

47025

53

1575

731

TOTAL

121

n9

UNCLASSIFIED

.I%‘, A&.oUtJA

SUBJSCT: Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32)(KI)"

13. (C) ADMINISTRATIYE MUTERS: UNC~SSiFirrCf

a., w: The resupply to troops in the field was accomplished exclusive:6 by helicopter, e from Yandegrift Combat Base and Camp Evans for Marine Corps unit: and from Camp Eagle, Camp Evans or FSSE at FSB Birmingham for Amlp* units. Be- supply by US to ARYN units was accomplished by 1Olst Airborne Division (AM) helicopters,

(1) mtity of supplies prcvided to combat units by class:

CLASS

I arid Water 1572

11 12

IXX 2238*

xv G9

v 43u

other em

+ Includes al1 Class XXI and IIIA

(2) LsgfstieaJ. aviation requirements by sortbes:

US MARIFlE CORPS (S/TON1

TXPEI%LICOPTBR

u.5

n

736

Ill

us l4ARIrn CORPS

a=%53 276

XXIX Corps Headquarters e&tablfshed an intersetice support agreement "k-keen lOlst Airkrne Division (AM) and 3d Marine Division to provide additional CH-47 helicopter support to Marine Corps units and for the Army to issue munitions from Army stocks at Camp Evans to Marine Corps units on a reimburseable basis, 3d Marine Division would credit USMC ASP at Quang Trl. where the Army pick&. up the munitions and transported them to Camp Evans. The CH--L$?~~ lifted supplies from Camp Evans to Marine Corps cambat units. By lriftiw supplies from Camp &a?ls, the 1Olst Airborne Division (AM) controlled the use cf the helfcoptars but provided helicopter support to 3d Harine Division units Zn the Apache Snow area of operation.

UNCLASSIFIED

(1) The handling of cesualti.ea during Apache Snow wes considered satfs- f&@%OX=~” Evacr;atfaa. 0 f and care far rim personnel followed ~OXTIZLT~ channels, see In@l.osu"e 2, The large nurnbr UP casualtfes in Army personnel required a change 5.11 normal aeromedical evacuation channels from site of wound to hospit.al, The SOlst I&borne Div5.siom (AM) met this requirement by:

(b) Evacuating casualties from FSB Blaze to Ilospita'ls wlf9;h G%-d? and non-medical IJIL-4 helicopters,

(2) Due to the large number of caszlalties during Apache Snow, Corps medical personnel operated a Forward I4ediea.l Regulating Offlce (m0). This office insured that aX.I. available medical facilities were used and prev6;nted o~vercrawding of one facility uhlle others were idle, Durkng Apche Snow the FHtO accompPi.shed 9ta xissfon by 1186 of telephone. This re@red the hospital. selected to receive casualties or tha unit whose aircraft was transpor%ing the casualties to notify the aircraft at which hospital to land, This method, although not satYsfactory, did accomplish the tission during Apache Snow, Fsr satfsfactory operati.on the FMRO should be a@pped with a radio to make direr:t contact with the avacuation heI.Scopters.

5 0 ~O~iGitiQ~$~ Communications support provided throughout the operation, over and above organic dkorisional assets, consisted of a 12 cha.nnsl VHF sysa;srlin installed from Camp Eagle (HQ, lQ2st Airborne Division) to fTJ3 &wchtesga;-den (Ra, 3d Brigade (ND), X&t M.rborne DivM-on). XXIV Corps 0PLA.N ZO49 (DStisfon Support Conxunicat5oas Contingency Plan) was implemented prk~r ts the operation to comm.i% the necessary assets, On 10 Eqy 1969p eqtipment and personnel of the 63d Signal Battalfon, 22ti Si nal Group, were helilifted to FSB Berchtesgarden and the system (FFH-58 k was actzbated, This 12 channel system provided the required command, control and fire dllrectioo communications between HQ, lOl.st &borne Division, 3d Brigade (F'dD) at FSB Berchtesgarden and 3d Brigade (BEAR) at Camp Evans. 0rgan.b~ %LE equ.%pment of the divisions provided the normal tactical ratio communicatious 0 '1ch.e .'M Mxrbe Division installed a 4 channel VBF system from Bandegrifb Comld Base to FSB RAZOR (HQ, 9th Marine Regiment) to supplement the radio n&s, 101st Ajsbrne Division installed 4 channel systems frum FSB Berchtesgarden to FSB Blase, FSB Currahee, and FSB Eagle's Nests to comp1et e the multLchanne1 system installed tithin tkmir A0 of Apache srzow, l.st AEY'.?~ Dfvisiun 3nstalled ~a *au/'?RC-1 system from Hue Citadel

%.2 UNCLASSIFIED

I‘ . %&J2&&_ &&gj&&~,~ ,' The system of mrjdicaf evacuation us& 5~ the 1.~71st Airborne lliv-l.aion prowd YLZ s~ccesuful that they are going to contirzur? this practice,. The 326th Medical. Battalion is planning to incorporate LOH helicopters into ;Xts air a&&awe platoon,, They found on Apache Snow that tie LOH uas able to land and pick up casualties in areas where the large UK-iH motif?. have to use a sling,, The use of the IUH also increased the speer!

of tbc? ev9,cuation of ca:3ualties,,

(1) Discussion: Sevwrtl .times during Operation Apache Snow, bireraft -were downed ic hostile terra:izl where easy access was impossible, At times the only feas?hle w&y .r#,ggere could get to the aircraft in order to rig it for extractiw was through the use of rappelt,ng techniques from UH-3.E hellcpoter~

i. 2) j%-&Jkhtse :' Rea.l:izJ.ng that this method of entry is not B normal tm.diniqa1e for r:iggerw y 3s %afantry security elcmeilts, experience shows that, as a minimtm:, a bRs.ic COllrSe of iEl.struc3i0a, to include actual hellcopier rapeiing, is seeded :ic aLI. -xnfan-iry rind rigger units.,

(2) D*scnss.~o.u.; Units of both ti;e L/506 and 2/506 Infantry Battalions employed aircraft Oreo membw aeram5:: VW& pI.%tes for their poini; men. Thfa body ariwr, while heaq nnd cumberzome, saved the lives of three men who were, struck by SA at close range,

(2) Solu.t,:iorL> lhe posslb;XSty of adapt;.!2 this aircraft type body armor to uw by fieid tl*oops shou!..d be LwestXgated by every infantry unit engaged in operatSfo.os in which mL't.ad, .ls fsl-f, ,t.o be i&neat,

C” Fbfde~~ Cpri~~ter~ 2 - _A-- .-a.*.-. _a__ A-.- Extens3.ve use of potier cannisters as supplementary water containers was made thrwghou'; the operation, Camlsters 83-e not subject to leakage and may be discarded, elimzinating the need for extraction and retrograde to supporting LSb"a,,

d,% K~tjAmS su~~~.~mc$ws; " a I z r ., i I .w .I_ .._L - __x.- I>..-.. As a Sllpplement to the no=i supply of rations and water, axtenslv e nse was made of canned fruit juices by the Marine units, Normally four cases (12 cans per ease) were included in each company load. The txctensi~e use of &3ces, by those units operating significantly ‘to the reduction of heat casualties

in the field, ~o&ributed and dehydration,

AViLGCT 27 Auguet 1969 SUafECT : Combat Operations After Action Report (RCS: MAC J3-32)(K1)

teamvcrk bvolved ArqyP Marine md two regiments of the 1st AEVB Did-don,

b, The operation focused on titerdiction of enemy Pines of communice%iion and search for enew forces, supply caches and base areas. To this end, Gperatiolo Apache Snow was succtssf'ul with the destruct?.on of two enemy battalions (630 XIA) on Dong Ap Bia Mou.ntain, Hill 937, In addftion, the A S~NI Valley infiltration route was closed to Lhe enemy and large quantities of ammmition and equipment were destroyed or captured,

2 lncl I- Battle of Doxag, Ap Ma 2- Medical Evacuation @hart

GF: Ill MN? 1 - 15 3d Mar Div 16 - 20 10is-t Abn D~v (m) 21 - 25 7th AF 26 3-k-t Xi.1 Hist Det 27 G3 28 - 32

R. Do J!W.XO 4f K4J, AGC

Bsst AG

UNCLASSIFIED

b, The movement toward Dong Ap 1!ia l.mmediately encountered a ~el.2 4.~4: iri *.--.I. enmy, who fought hard to prevent penetration of his 'base Use,*.? The enemy

appeareit to be well dressed and was well supplied with weapons and ammunition. Se made good use of h.Is concentric rings of fortified positions hnri employ& RR I and aut.omat5.c weapons extensively,

iI A - --- /‘., . . <’ c-h7 j, yi;: t;‘p*s f”‘:T- -0 + ‘r .A” _ k-L,” IA L; d&r I, Pt*t.r e!;ie:iii-,7 <jl:.,; i :A 1 .: f-)ils t ‘tt? 2~3 8th j of the 2%h

X'GA Eieg~menl; -&re .~dent.iif:~ 633 F-% ,> 1 .,;m mp;,;.~...~.iij. document; found in the area and et appears that reg.i.menLaI. an3 o%her suppc::ttlng units (anti-afrcraft, heavy weapons and engineer) wsre a&r.: fnvulved, These units had not been identified in-countzy since the fall of ?968 and it appears #at they had just recently returned, presumably ::.L~ increase en:?my m:li.tary activity .'n Thus Thien hovincc Confirmed total body count of 5'XI entzmy kiLled accounts for shout one-half of the total enemy fQrce, Tn addition< to these conffrmed enemy killed, there were substantial enemy casualt%es which could not be counted directly, but whit significantly reduced the effectiveness of the 29th MIA Regiment, A ?4 stated that only 20% of the -Y;w ::ompnrl.i,e:! xi.tn which he was familiar survived the Allied attack. L-i additX!x, to enemy casualties, a major base area was neutrul- ized and sign!Lficant quantities of enemy supplies were captured including 17'7

e .- 'i'hp effectiveness wi d;h which P'i.re power and maneuver were combined is shovn by the !O T-0 1 eneruy tat- f'~~.!;.emilg kj1.1 ratio that was achieved, despite the -rugged terrain? dF,,;-Jse vegetjction u.nd the enemy's use of prepared positions. IS-52 s%rlbes nnd tact:Lcai aIT" strikes wu. &l?-e placed on bases and infiltration routes tc inflict. fix the.r casualties on the enemy forces attempting to reinfore 07 escape fr,iJm the Dong Ap Bia area,

c, ,, As a result of the? c I.nsses It/ i-3 estimated <hat two enemy battalions

5’ c L':iI I'JO8L'!H &3y I$J69, the 3-I 27th infmtr-- CO&at tisvaul t,ecl irI?/> :1ri ii< in : !I::? vicinity of k’C314988 jUjt WfZYt of i.h>Ilg iip i?it%, 9/3-l 07 imr33I!1.;:tel;r :rfidc;

ci:ntnct, with :FD. unknown size enemy force, APP roxmteij- two hxss 1i:ter ;;hile roving from the U, B//3-187 made cuntitct, returned fire and kille?I two I;'Jf-. hitial ImPressions were that‘ the Ni ltt were probably trail watchers, but ilfter sustaining three :a)unded the battalion cor~cl.~~Ioti 'ihat the firir,g was tri,- well controiied and that stiffer resistance might be encountered, (The fo: 'iwing morning Z more enemy bodies were found in the underbush).

bc Lb Ii l&y, the +187th placed artillery and TAC air or, Q I.;::-ge baker complex located astride their axis of advance,, RiE' operations fo?low& the :;trikes ns the .%187th moved to the southeast toward IIfll 937. 'dhile seerch- ing the hut. and bunker compl.ex, the '+187th found 3 NVA bodies killed by the ar::y ,i_, ..; cr~y/T:,.c- - % I tiir JX~FJ.W~%~CI~~ (, t: $jipQycrl.nt; lli.,z:Ccm?rUL’ ir, t1-1e :2rea ‘d&S h grC’2p

of docWents idc.d-ifymg the unit a~ the 29th NVA Regiment, I'he CIccants showed that the 29th NVA Reg,iment had returned from Worth VictnaIi; in April

and had been conducting reconnaissance operations bet\;een fi? 611 in Laos and

Route 548 in the A Shau Vs>Iey,

C” On 12 ,?!.a~ the 3-187th continued ttlalr Push along the rough, canopied rj dp;sr: f Bv iKYl<bI fhrrv mar?~ hon’LrV i-c~nt:wi*~+ vi t,.h f:, _____ ____ __ ,-r ;.. I. J ___-_- -...- -

m.t& at tko co:nF;lniez dug in-$sut %W ..-.. .._a ual ? d-i SC>3 r$j,nEd f’nrr:F. e?“‘tj.=

., mi.t:.:-r; to their front, They man- euvered against the fores and krlied 3 Fw-h., The battalion c&led in AXA a& artillery fire in orde? to dis&odgc: the enemy from his fortified position. The enemy held fast, however, and throughout the day the 3-18'7 received hearf automLstfc weapons end HPG fire and llmited mortar fire. Heavy TAC air and artil- lery fires were placed on theencmy positions,

de The situation rematnecf l?nr:hanged on 73 by as the enemy stayed in bunkers and employed small arms2 FUG, automatic weapons and mortars against maneuvering siements of the 18'7th? The '$=!87th returned fire and employed _ additional artilller-y a-nd TU air,

e, On the mornfng of the lL+th, B:, C, and D companies of the 3-387th once again began slou and deliberate maneuver under artillery, TM air and gunship support, Under thfs heavy attack the ene.xy fell back, Contact terminated about 17UO and the '187th swept the bunker area to find 13 NVA killed in action by artillery, 47 NVA killed by .small arms fire and 23 killed by air strikee.

f, The 187th continued its drive along the ridges to Hi.11 937 on the mcrning of 15 May. As the line companies maneuvered toward their objective they discovered 14 NVA bodies from the previous day's contact, By 15OOH they W3TP M in heavy contact. and realized the force was more than a normal NVX bat- tiLioo size elaracnt .$ Rates of fire were extremely heavy and the enamy trocps sk-i.l.lfu'lly employed command detonated Clay-more mines in large quantities. Enemy reinforcements were being= browht into the contact zone, The neu trc>oF hat

UNCLASSIFIED ,.

1!, f)n !.T ;&JJ, the 187th occupje& an overwatch Awsitj.on nn4. iii~cc!,iG 52 gas strikes, 'The l-506 continued to mneuver tcJ reinforce the 18'lth, i-1- though the enemy had gas masks, the CS attacks were effective and C:~US& h5 to leave some or" his burikers.

k 0 IAte in the morning of 20 MayP 4 ba%talions executed a coordinated assault on Hill 93’To Tns Jti~?8'P'- C,I Inf, w!..th k/&~b-th Inf attached, assaulted the hill fron the north; the '7- 306 Inf from the south and southvest; the 2/3d UNN from the southeast; and the 24OlsL InE from the northeast, The J3-18'7th swept up the hli.11 from the north, while the 1-5O6th and the 2-50lst blocked possible routes of escape, The 2/3d AWN moved onto Hill 937 Cr~m the south, By 1200 hours battalion Tbjectives on the Dong Ap Bia Ridge wmetaken. The determined enemy resis tame disintegrated as rriendly forces .~;'.:rran enemy pcsitions resulting fn i+ total body count for 20 May of 1099

:i 0 on 21 May 1969 Allied forces swept over the hill to check the enemy 'o:is e urea in detail, After ten days of hard fighting the 3-187th Inf had mrned a ~sll deserved rest and returned to the coastal plains, The l-!506th Inf secured the abandoned enemy positions while the ?-50lst Inf conducted RIF operations to the west, The 2/3d AWN conducted RZF qerations to the east. Friendly reconnaissance of the area encountered only isolated and sporad.ic resistance, An additional 5') enemy killed were discovered and Sg wecpom r;ere CFi@Lll.Te~!. o

El" T'ne Dong Ap Blu CFWd.,iOu. cost the enemy a total of 630 hTvi KLk, In additior, to these confirined casualties, a PvJ captured during the operation j.rdicn+,ed th3.t the units in his area suffered 80% casualt.ies. On 22 h&y the

~NCf.ASSlFlED

UN(-j;i&&jlf+-J ,\ )_ ,*. :;Q ; 9 t ‘inf mxi the 2/'3d AliVN continued search operations in the vicinity Of iiill 93'1, :xcouxAifi.g for 72 NVA killed and 3 crew served weapons captured. The search ojperation continued on the 23d of 14ay with the l-50& Inf finding 10 more NVA bodies and the 2-501st Inf finding 3 bodies,, on 3.4 M&y the L5cah discovered 51 individual weapons and the +501st Inf found 1 NVA KIk, thtj end- ing the battle of Dong Ap Bfa Mountain, Hi.11 937

UNCLASSIFIED

.3 I ” L.

., . . , I +a i, .,

I. (, :, ‘;, _ c c.‘Z !

. :; : .

.:- , , .-

.

Operation Apache Snow, Message, MACV, 20 May 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Messages on Tactical Air Support, 7 & 17 May 1969

Operation Apache Snow, Miscellaneous Messages and Memos, 20 May - 8 Jun 1969

e

_* :

I ’

.” ,

i

\

i ‘1

i ;

;i ’

, -_-_ -._.. -...-_ ,-__ __--__.-.-- b.tar, ., . . / V 5: A ‘\

,

lIN\IED STATES ICE CON b 96222

Q

P

Operation Apache Snow, Narrative, 22nd Military History Detachment, Aug 1969

. c

The incloaed narrative of the actlozm involving elamgnts of the

oprrationtookplaoo IUiher~k andlnboqitrrbls AshraVw

fkon lo MtQ to 7 Junb 1969. It i8 hopedthatthis narratlpb will

beofaome benef$tto studentsand 8-0 schoob,andwillgi+s

th~reader8betta.rdemtandiag ofconbatin theVletnm..s~

On the kningof9lbythe lrDlstU.rbomeMrlaW--FIti-

thoThIrdBrigads~~~inconjunctI.on withthsIstW Mvfsion

ad NinthPIrrineBe~nt-- poised for the attack a&aiast 6~

forCea,b88 rrdlW5sofco~cation6 In a& crd*ti to the

Northern AShauVJlrq, TenarWle~batterlua hsdt?nslrtube~~

in pwition at iire buses Brsdlsy (TD 27323), &borne ('ID 35507l),

currahee (m39e5%9),Berchtssgaden (YD424oll),urdcann8n (n,474aw*

Thstroop4bparticipat$q lnthe w*ata#8aultothe follawfng~ninst

werebsingrrr8hdledintheviclnity of FE Blaze(l[D 536020). The

paratroopers of the Ist Battalion, 506th Infant-; 3d Battalion,

187th Infantry; and2d B&t-n, !SOlut Infautry hurriedly prepared _.-

their gear, cleaned their weapom , and wrote the letters that they

would rmthavetheti.me to writs in the co&ngdaya. The following

mx-ning theyuouldbe heililiftedintothe inhospitable A Shau Valley.

XL!!&

At H-hour,lOCV~Hey 1969,thelead elements of the four

battalions were picked up by sixty-five UH-1H helicopters from

*ior to the aorabat waaulta each larxilng u)ne m bodsrdad for

seventy mlnutw by tmtlcal aircraft MM ertlllwy tith fbul

ori nlultAp10 ucelb ticimrd the La&Ian Borar.

By l&OH aLi. coppanie~ and the battxllodu commaad post of t&s

3d Battallon,187th lnfantrJIcombat auatited fPomrBma.se to t&&r

two ahip landing sone (PC 320988)e Once on the elephant gram

hovered la!sli.ng son0 uhstii opened to high grmxi in the w9ot, thy

began thslr reconna%imance in force operationlr in ths ticitlitf of

the Laothn Border. D Conpany, which wan firet on the landing zone,

moved along a ridge to the aouthead ~b plrumed. I5omnte of A

andCCompanlsa,oncstheywer6 ontbu land% zone, aecurdtb

rxwthweat and aouthsrnpartims ofthe landing aona perimeter

lwqmctivttly. Oncethelandlngzonewa~ secured ACoqmny

reconnoitered to tha northwest and C Company reconnoitered to the

southwest. B Company's amadltwm co~?etd by16OOH. They

nerved from the landing zone southwest to the battalion's location

where they received instructims to mve southeast toward Hill 937

(the number reDresenting its height in mter8). B bnpany established w

2

t%tlr night, defensive position on the lower abpsa of kng Aga

Bia (Hill. 937) and began preparatlms to mm out at flrstll@

the followlxqmrnlngrai eecum the hill. Hoone atthir,tiPlb

realised the riseoftha msa~pforac, positionsd onth Mfl or

whatwaa ahead for the battalion before this order could ba

fUfSUed.

The third of the four battalion8 conducting the co&at aarratiLt8

inta the area of operatiorm us6 the 2rJ Battalion, 50lst Infe.

I& C, and D Companion ad the bat%d.ion comnaxrl pmt amaulted onfo

a landing cone (TC 28001$), at 1047H while A kqaqy emcured and

continusdmim6truationofW Alrbome.

The la& battakh to be helilifted into the area on 10 &y

wb8 the4t&Battallan, l8t~%9gimbntWbiCh a88dkOdbl'b~

landing sono at coordinate8 YD 24Ul.and begantheiropsrafi4ite

in theimmdiateama ofthefentian Border.

To rotxxi out one of the mat fantaatia days of airrobS.le operatkm

for the IDW. Airborne Mvision, one conpaqy fkcvm the 26 Battullm,

httAM?#'bgimedwa6 Ssnt into F8Tigar (n> 25209o)to 8eCUJ-O the

firebam for the a88aultof2/1ARVN on the followlngda$. This

brought the total units lifted to four battalion8 ami one wqmny

and coupled with the ten batteries of artllletry which ware tm~ed

the dG,p lefora, indicated the thorou@;t~ass of planning arxi precieemsa

of execution of the Mvision alrmblle operations. The day8'

activity pointed out the tremndou8 influ6nce of the hdicoptar

02 modern military operations.

3

casualtior itwaa evldantthatthe flrewm too w&coatnalUd

for trail WhtChCW8 axI that stiff- re818tnnc. Imild be mm3tmtdoLLbd.

‘he other battakha Involved is tie operation Coat- to

ssamnmr in their re8pectioe zone8 and dimzovsred -tab 8ti

cache8 containing mixed amall arms, mortar rounds and crau4mmed

weapon amunition. I

u On UHay,B Cornam, 3487th conducted a first light check of

the previous day's contact and found numerous blood trails (seven)

and three additional hodies, besides cne M-47, one ll@t machinegun,

one Wcf rocket launcher, and misoellaneous equipment.

4

. /- . . n

- I

UkY EJravoCanpany pntrolU.ngtowmi )till~?nm8imto

.

a well defended hut, and bunker complex(327982). After f'%@b

ingtorecove~utmnded, the company pills bgckto artight

defcsf*?- yrsltion,

4-a

&tar that day a~ they manurtrrovd In the viciAtr cf Qw LotIm

Bordar duo ueat of A xoul, B Co-, 3-le7tb mad. cont*t w24.a

ama fimuhichreuultedin fireNVA )cillrd. Theseuercdi~~~mred

ir,lile the unit was searchimths hut and tn&mr ccraple~~. I3 -*=w@8

1~4 platoonsuffered +AreekllledMdnine~wbuxxiedifithe~t

and ~88 forced to withdraw a 8kwt distance to repxm. leaving tbd

WuuIxied where thay ,fell. The company lnitlated a 8ecolxl adlraYsxJ ta

retrieve tho8e init- wounded and 8ufSmed addUi43ml cmualtlea.

On the third atteqt LTC HonaJrcutt, the battalion co-, iiletslrcted

themto incrsamtheirvolumeof iireazxipxahupoestth~rrotoded

rather thes t,rying to retrieve them undm direct eh~p~ fire. Thilr

At IL7OOH drwlag a medavac for B Compul(v a cobra gumMo acoompa@ag

the zmd-evac indvertentlybankedcurl firesixrpckeM into the

BattaUonmmmaxmipolrt, DCow,and themrtarplakmlearing

one killed axxi thirtv-five wmndead in ita wdre. The battalim

conmander,S2, S3,andartilleryliai8oa offlcerweretrsomdais aad

aU.wsre evacuated accept the battalion comandar and thes3. By

1~Hfihsuwnded~ bean evacuatedandthe co@esbegan eatlbliahing t

thslr night defanaive po8ltiona.

With the battalion% commd post at FB Brdley, a- of t&

2/l ARVN BattaUon co&at ssmulted 8outh of Fire Bake T-r (ID 2W)

to search out the area of operations.

12

3n I.2 Hay the 348'7th continued their push through the thick ba&oo

ad tibpha,nt grass along t?x rsq$ ririgw of Dow & Ma. TWO

air strikes were XXK@e8ted 8nd coqleted at 0804H in uupprt of B

Copsarsp% advance up th~hillarrl C Coxgmy'e advancetothsmrtb-

east of B Coqmny. At 09'IUH B Conpaqp beg- receiring sniper f'lm

from their rear and by 092lHthey were receiving lntenme automtlc

fire fromthe fkont and incomlngmAar munds. To aid in the

evacuation of the wcmxied the battalion coxmmder requeuted englmer

6

\

32 33

12 Msry Bravo Company cannot dislodge the enemy from theti

bunkera. Delta and CharUe move to assist.

support to blow a landtip: sane for B Cowany. Att&ing in

bmrt~onatl024Hthe rrgineer shipwlrs hitt?yIlpGd s4U

arm6 fire causing it to crasha& burnrasulting Fh sevm

Ca8ualti88.

BcOapsny contl.nuedtomsneuvera#nstfhe~disciollzrsd .

force, estimated at two conpa,n%es, which mrdr dug in about 200

m&em to the- fkwnt (See Sketch 2). The battaUon c&led for

MUand artillery flretiorderto dislodgetheeqtimhib

fortified position, but the en- hald fast and thugbe t)re 4

the 3487th contimmd to receive hea- autmatic kapons 81Ki lipc

fire interspersed with mortar fire. Hsav air strties consisting

of SO and1000 poundbode, (highdraganddelayed tie),ln addition

ta napalmand artmew fire,were continuaUy p2acedonthe em18

position.

Me-e, the other battal.ions - 2-5018t and 1+06th- contAmed

to conduct reConnaiSSmcs in force operations throughbut their srW#

of operation encountering lited contact. B colmpw, 1-506thtiile

maneuvering in the vicinity ofcoordinat8sYC 30994l,mcomtersd

three lWA,kUlhg one sml cspturinghls M-47.

While on reconnaissance in folu:a operatialra in the j.mmdiate area

of the titian Border 3/l ARVN Battalion discovered a smll cache of

miscel.lansous equipment and weapons-z&@.t inditridual and twelve

crew-servsdueal~)ns.

SimiNaneous with the maneuvering of the battalions on the pound, e

7

A’bup, ZdSquulron, 17thCavJrJconducWd~ XWOfIMb8UlCO~

support oftha ground fames thmug&utthe srsaofopsratieae.

The s%tuatAon rwuined mow for the 3487th on l,3 w M

the coqmniee conducted rec~nm&~ssnm in force operattins ia i;'ncdr

imaediate areas* ACo~novsdtothebattdion~aPlanbpostud

rdievsd DCoapsnyofthe securitym%ssiori, & D~kqany~~vmlto

aasiat BaxxiCCompanies. Thro~ut the day the ew emp,lo)ed anall

ame, RFG, automaticweapons,and?&wtsrs rrOtpwU entrsnchodpoulMone

q@nat the maneuvertig slexmnts of the 187th. The 3-3.87th retm%ed

fire& enployed sdditionalartUl~az%l tactical&wh%CII hea-

pounded Dong Ap H.&I western slopes.

During the dsyamed-evac helicopter,uMle axtractingwunded pipa

D Company (1536H), uaa shot down by small arm fire from suspected

enemy locations YC 328993 and Yc 324988, rmultlng 2x1 six kXLbd und

one wounded. 'The third platoon of AConp~mvad toUnkuptith

D Coqan.y at the crash site and assisted in the evacuation of the

wowxisd back to the battalian headquarters.

Earlier in the m0Mn.g of the 13th (0330H) Fire Base &borne,

defendedbyACoq.my, 2d Battalion, 5Olst Infantry snd three

Artillery batteries, C-2-U (4 155 How), B-2-319 (2 105 How) and

G-2-319th, was assaulted on three sides by ele~nts of tw NVA

battalions supportml kq 82mm1mrtam andRFG ~flre. After Infiltrating

through the concertina wire on the north side of the per-tar the

8

attackiq force eyatenratically crfrs-cmssed the northerly pfiioa

I .

..-

.

theyonoountemd. Intho glowofthe~pmdertith6

amunition storage area the mm of 1urborne dmve the attam

force f'romthe hix1, kUng fort7 of the attacu fof‘ce, &l&e . mfferingtwenty-two killedand eixty+newurrd&fncrdditionta

fivehoniteerethatuere damaged or destroyed. tter lntbs dy

B, C, and D Coqmnieer, 2-5Olst were axtrscted from the fidd,

minsertedinto Mrborne,and cond~&ed recoXmlaibbaZlc8 in force

operations to the north, south, and east of FB Airborne in search

of the attacking force.

The l-SO&h continued search and da&my xrdsaions in its af,sw

area of operationa mpovingmrthweat along hU?h grourrd checking a#temi+e

along the slopea o,f the AShauVtiey. king the deg ACow- found

eight huts, which were considered to be part of a possible staging amI

and small amounti of anmunition.

While searching the cache area discovered the previous, day, 3/l

dipi{ Battalion found a large cache consisting of e&ht vehic1e8,

seventy-eight individual., and twenty-five crtw-sermd ueaponae

On the morning of the E&h, B, C, and D Companies of the 3018'7th

once again received intenaiva axnaJJ army, ~utmatic, and FzlpG fire M

they began a d&berate fire and BEUK+U~~~ on the Dang Ap Bia comglax, 8 under artillery,tactical a3r and gunship cover, TMsuastha fir&

r! 9

32

UMay lb first concerted drive to gain RUl 937. C

and D Ccnqxnies run into command detonated claymores and

stiff resistance. B Canpany gets two squads on top of 937

but is forced to withdraw when C and D can not advance.

concerted effort to seize Hill 937. B, C, and D COlqp4&tli88 were in the

attack' echelon, when heavy contact wm establtihed (See Sketch 33.

By lmHB ~mpanyreportedhavingtwo squadson topoftthe hill,

but B and C Companies had received heavy camzslties due ta comwnd

detoriated claymores and WWQ unable ti advance snd the battalion .

was forced to break: contact. Throughout the day Light Observation

Helicopters used a8 md-evaca were c&&xi in to evacu&e ain the

S~~OUS~WOIXI~~~ from a 8~~lllmdingson8onthe Adge dawnto the

attalionlSUii.llg zone* This mthod of shutttig the wounded wmrkai

g wall and drew much praise From the XMII on the ground. A rapid

cwnt on the battlefield r8su"t.d in forty-sevan NVA killed b 8ti

ams fire and twenty-nine killed by aJr Arikes. The 30187th lost

-* five killed and fifty-eight uourxied. Y

The other maneuver battalion8 involved in APACHE SNOW contimmd ti

accomplish their search and destroy missions in the area of operationa

encountering light enemy resistance. Many of the contacts were with

en- trail watchers and the rennants of the retreating Airborne

attack force.

!DI~ 34Wth, with A Coxtpany relieving C Coxnpw, continued its

drive along the ridges of Hill 937 on the morning of 15 May. As the

line companies maneuvered toward their cbJective tier heavy enaq

fire they discovered fourteen NVA bodies from the previous days'

contact. B md C &4mnies, once thag reached the U.ne of departure,

10

15 MY A Company broke out of the tree line and secured

the smallknollwhen BCcmpany cillhe under heavy fire, Thep

ARA ships attmpting to suppress the enemy fire inadwrtent2y

hit the lead platoon of B Company.

4

fad clapmxes implaced.by the mew the night before. By l,300#

all conpanles were in extremely heavy contact ati Buffering cammlttfeb~

B Colppoxsy requested an ARA &%ce to aupprsss the heavy enemy fire

to their front. AConpnywas on the right ofB Compe~ly w%thC

Company app~tuly 200 m&n-a to theleft when the ARA B)p1pIved

on'etation at U&OH. (Sue Sketch 4) Instead of cam& in from the

rear ofB Coqmny and fixxiing it8 taPget on the hi& the ARA ship8

cane fbmttheright overnying ACco~aplutyanci raked theleadptitoon

of 3 Compeay with rockets &owing the mmntum of tha attack. A

Company at the sam t&n8 earn u&e heavy enepDT fim and at 163OH

the companisa had to withdraw waler heaoy'preame ta the landing

zone inorder im ev&xatethe wmmded. fater in the day thu battstlian

CodpostwaS hit bgtFpcround8umnding 8eoar~oftheparatmopePs.

Among those wounded ua8 the battalion conmar&r, LTC Honeputt, who

received RPG f?a@ent8 in the back* with one piece lodged clibse

to his apIne. He refused evacuation and mmeine;d in control and w8,8

able to contirnr8 hi8 &tie8 folbwing medic&l. aid zwistered fifiii

Rates of fire scperimced du.zzg the dq were extremly heav

and the enerqg skillfully employed commxi detonated claymres,

satchel charges, and grenades, which thny x&Led down the W-into

the advancing us fOrc98. &tilIl!%tO8 of the size of the eneqy force

rangedas high a8 aregQmnta2headquartera. Theenamy werewell

entrenched-occup@ng bunkers in concentric mw8 which afforded

xmdmm utSUzation of the terrain avaUable. Sitilsrb thw me

wdl. trairzed, experts at concmalnmnt and carmuflage, hard to detect,

sndde~~ar9datrsmsndbusvolwnroit~~tar iire into advancing

11s tZYIop8. It me 8U8pctsdthateMEqyreinfo~~t8 -robe*

brought into the contact zom contlmously because each day the . eneqy force had fresh haircuts, clean uniforBI8, and new weapoxla~

The intensive bunker to bunker fight of thd-l8?thleftlaom than

sixty-tuaNVA soldiers dead; A8 of iiha l%h, *ration flkcm mw

liasses,in terms of friw casualties were thirty-efght m killed

and 245 woumied.

Due to the heavy contact 1' -37thwas experiencing, the l+Cl6th Wa8

ordered tomovamrthwardtO linkup with 3-mh ami aupp~rt thsatb~~k

tin Dong Ap Bia with 3487th +c&ing as a block- force on thu northea&

id&& contact ~58 gtperienced & the l-506 on it8 IMUMUVB[C into the

vicinity of Hill 937.

2+Olst, still on reconnaisssnce in force operations in the area

surrounding FB Airborne, encountered light enemy resistance in 6he force

of trail watchers, two to three men &rot438 which continuil~ harassed

the lf%d 818IQkWIt8. Z3 Airbrne at 1%5H on ths 15th received six 82nm

mrtar rounds causing little damage, Micating that the NVA were still

very much interested in this.area.

Throughout the slight of 1516 Xsy elemmts of the 3-187th were

involved iI; mderata contact. At2J10HCCompaqyheardmmmsntout-

side of their perimt~ and responded with grenades until the mvement

. 12

ceased at 2330H. kter that night (~&lOrJ,) they begm receiving

grenades, satchel. charges, and SIII&~ 8rms ii.233 from probe8 on a fOy

sides of their night defensive position. A Spoo& (AC-47 flare ahip

with mini-guns) was requested and arrived on station working in

conjunction witF I a Snadow (Cl19 with aearcM&jht). AR-A gun tern

were also emloyed, workin* under the searcM.igh% throughout the rest

of the night. One rocket pass restited in three secondary exploatinse

The enema broke contact at 053OH and a first l&&t check of the area

~surraundine: their night defensive position revealed fourteen bodies

and mmy blood trzkti.

Dxbg the dav of 15 a5t 16 May, 3/l ARVN BattaUm continued

to exploit the cache area discovered on the l2th w& or" tiz Dut.

Added to the already imaressive list of captured item6 w8re ten

individual weapom, one 82am mortar tube, in addition TV Large

quantities of ammanittin and the graves of forty NVA soILdims recerrtly

killed by air strikes,

Throughout the mwning of 16 May, l+%th maneuvered mrth to effect

Ux3'link up with the 3-187th lead3ng with the reconnaissance platoon

and followed lqy A and C Compmies. At 083OH A Cozqmm received RPG,

automatic weapons and mach.i.mgun f%re f'rom heavily fortified bunkers

in the vicinity of Hill 9.l6 (YC 3196), Artillery, gumhips, air

S~I%C~S and the battalions‘ orgadC weapons were t31@0yed to supprees

the ene@s fire, but as soon a.13 the friendly fires let up the energy

13

would re-engage the advancing troope. Contact was broken at lk35H

resulting in one U!3 k-d and 88-n woumied. 3Blnaapr lo8888 mre

one Mlled and one AK47 catiwBd. BCamp8nylaturinthum~ - -

. . -

engamd one trafl watcher with small ama fire which broughod

additional. enezqy fire. Artillery and air strikeswure empl0p4

kd contact wae broken at l335H resultinn in one IS kLLl.ed and

seven wunded with unknown ensmy restilt8.

Because of the heavy era- fire A, B, l-506th were haofng

difficulty getting into position for the attack on DOW! AP ?!%

and reported that they would probably not be in positiolr before

the morning of the 17th. Thr CS a,rtXLLer~ preparattin of the

h3ll. was then delayed tmtil the 17th in anticipation of the link

up of the two b&AxUons and the coordinated attack on Icibl 9%

Protective masks and *fl& jackets were drop& to both battalions

(1406th aid 3-237th). The flak jackets were reque8ted as a

preventative mmmre agaimt the increasing amunt of shrapnel

wounds of the chest, abdomen, and back regfom of the body.

Three companies of the 2-50lst continued on 16 May to conduct

reconnaissance irk force operations and saturation patrols in the

vicinit~ofF2 Airborne. The day’8 contacts resulted in one WA

killed*

‘Ihe l-506th began closing on HU.l 937 to the southwest of the

3-18'7th and began roving up the hill An the early morning. while

roving up they received twenty 82mn rumtar rounds all of which *acted

out of the line of the advancing troops. To counter the engry'a

he& fire three air atrikes wwe placed on the high ground to the

1+06th% front. Throughout the morning they aqmiencEbd W&t

and sporadic contact which smp>eded their movsrpent considerabu.

At 0945H the 3487th qrienced radio interfereme on the comannd .

net when a Vietnamese voice repeated “BlackJack, BlackJack” for

siwertrl minutes vem rapidly. U!C Honeycutt, whose call sip ia

W.ackjack,n answeredwithartilleryffreand the resulting qbsionrr

were heard over the net.

At 0955H IX Honeycutt wall evacuated by the Assistarat Division

ConmlAnder, Colonel Smith, to ':ave the shrapnel removed f+om his back.

Major CoUier amsum3 comand of tk,s 3-L87th as they moved into the

blocking positions they tJbUld occupy the hext morning in support of

the main attack by the l-50&h. Atl&&H~Corps Ccmmnder,

Ueutenant General StilweU arrived at the 3-18'7th's location to

receive a first hand briefInE on the situation on Dong Ap Bia.

The plan of attack on Mll B7 was formulated on 17 May. lQ.ements

of the 3-W&h -were roved to the west up to the high ground and wmld

support the attack from vicinity YC 323983 with 90x1, machinegun and

small arms fire, In addition there was to be a one minute art=-

preparation utilizing the 1051~~ CS howitzer round (approximPtelg ZOO

roumis). The wind on the morning of the attack was ideal with the

flow 4x3 the east, The CS preparation would be followed by fifteen

minutes of VT and HIE artillmy fire. At UOOH the attack umild

comence with A, B, C/l+06 on line. At that time the artillerg

fire vmld be shifted to the east and Pink Teams, Air Cavalry

iieconnaissance forces consisting of one Huey gunship and one U&t

Observation Helicopter, would screen the area and & strikes w&id .

beoncall. The attack was de&eyed u&U WH when it was learned

that SL elements were not in position.

As the elments began their attack the fkra they faced was intm8e.

Additional CS drops were &quested at WOH by the 1406th and placed

to the front of A cOmpanyqs position to get the company across the line

of departure; the drops were :ompleted at l405H. At USOH an add.itiond

drop missed the target and as a result A Company was still pinned down

andunable to mvee B and C Companies were nraneuver~~ to a883.h A

Company, but due ,to the intense fire the three companies were unable

to get to their objective,

Although the enemy possessed gas asks, the (23 attacks were

effective and caused them to leave their bunkers and wer5 thus exposed

targets to the attacking forces, At 155OH A Company, l-506th an&

gunships caught eight WA co-g out of their bunkers and killed a13,

eight,

Throughout the 17th ths 3487th remained in bbckfng positions on

the northeast of Dong Ap Bia support- the l-506th tith organic fires

snd in conjunction with th3 3d Drigade'a forward ati controller, directed

16

if-w Joined by the l-fK% Inf., 3-18'7 continues to t-7 and dis-

lodge the eneary.

air strikes on the bunker co~lsxes to their front. The N’VA contin#d4

pop*dviolet smoke genadesto confuse the forward air control d

pilots as thm cam in for their runs. --

The 2-~l&,continued theti eearch and destroy mlssions to the -- . north, and west,of P'B Mrbqraa mvuntering bunkers and eque

. caches. LU&le contact wase#perienced during$he l?th.

The 2/l ARVN Battalion SaarchSng an area southwest of FB Br&w

discovered four Rus+m trucks, five bulldozem, and 3,000 potis .. I ,, ,, ,, ~.,

. of TNT, 6ti Of,whiCh~m/Fe &m5yed.

By l&Y717# May the'tm bo"U.ions were in position aromd Dong

ap Bi.a zmd stsrted up the h5l.l.. (Sm Sketch 5) Two air strikes . .

mre put in as the attacking ~fomsa began their mve and six .I, add%tionaJ. stx%.ky wm bc+p~sd.bg O@OH to art@preas the ena~qy fire.

- ,. 1+0&h made initial &&act early ti the mtm%g with m unknown

size enen& 'force on the southaide of the ridge and contact cmtinued

periodically throughout the day. Theeneraprdelivereda heavyvolw ,,.., 1 ,.

of I@G snd small arms fire as ths attackIng forces tmplopd air

strikes, artillsry,~~~ md smallsmm fire.

. _ At 0800Hartille~was registaredon~get;nith~5~honitzers

in position at F% Currahee. At O@OH a fifteen ndnute artil&y

preparatiun comuencsd. When the artillery preparation was completed

. three companies of the 10506th attacked from the south and three

. . companies of the 348'7th attacked &vxn the north.

AtllOOH~Co~any,3-U??th, ulth AComMgron its rl@tw,

made initial contactbpkiJ.Uagtwo IWL AtlI32H D&qmnyww

d;irecQ to their f'wnt ftiing RFG'a ux! wto~Micweapns, Atl2OOH

DCompanyComuunderwas sewwelynowxMandbp1225HDCo~

had depleted their r&ourcss=&both~man ti amanitlinn. .D Coqrtljr

ai this tim hsd a totAloff~t+sevol~'who us~?ecrbbto fight.

In order to evacuate the wwxied and dead the 3487th had to withdrm

from the crest of tL hill tc 5Le I- 55on0. The 4bne drry tlm

2+06th was alerted'and ,dq&&$to FB Bliim for a possible combat ,,.

assault ix&o $he 8~8~ ta'&einior+ths .j-ltih. At 1645H A h-any,

2+0&h was co&at assaulted Into tha area to rsinforco the belaagpmed

187th. The remainder of the 2-506th was to stay at FB Blaze and on

the Zest wuld assume responsibU.%ty for Airborne.

At 17OOH the I-506ti was still in contact and still advancirq,

fighting frombunker to bwker. At POOHthesgwithdrewand wtablished

tbir night defens$,~ pocrition jwt b&w the cmiet of the hill.

In the evening of18 Mayagresroent between fiieutenant General

Stilwell,&jorGeneral. ZaiaandGeneral Troungthelst ARVN Division

Comder was made to e@q the 2/3 ARVN Battalion to assist the 3d

Brigade. The battalion was to be picked up the folloti,ag day at &e

and heXLifted to FB Currahee (Ssp,,M~p). They wu~3.d then combat

aaa&,t into a landing Bone east of ting Ap Bit ti attack we& tzp

the'%mg Ap BLa rid@~

iL5Laz

me 2J3 m43Battallonm~edbyCW7 atlW@OHProm~e~ rz/pz

at FB c+lrrahee. Fmdu,mih~the~battaltanwa~ air a-d-at

,1305H into a two ship landing cone vicinity XC 3a97p arid begain

adva&ngup theridgeto anattackpos%tionap~tefy %)&es

from the crestc

Following the IX$?~ of the Z/3 ARVM BatMUon three &ompdeS hwec

the 2dBatt&Liun, SOlst &fan&rywere extracted FromaPZ invicinitf

ofFB Airborne and asisauZted Ltrr a IandIng son8 vicinity Yc 333997 .

for the pwpose. of r&nfoxying the attack on Dong Ap Bla. Their

extracttin MM ddsgacll due.6 a downed sW,p on the pick up %one at

O$?XIH, but by 1515H the air a&s&t we coapl&d. From the Ww

zone the three Tpp coqmnies were to move to thati attarlck- position

tidn.ity PC 3329920

The l-506th encountered heavy enemy I3.m daring the day as thq

pme;restssd up the hill. to their attack posittin~ Air strikes were)

called in again and a&n on the etl[lzIp1p% IacationB in addition 4x1

a.rtUerg barngem. The 3-187 roving timthe north encou&~~ed no

en- reaist&nce. Q late af'termon the three forces had discovered

numerous en- bodies in bunkers that had been coU.apaed by air strikea.

The l+Obth moving north emcountered bunker complexes as they

continued up the hiU i'ighting f'rom bunker to bunkur. C Camp-

19

1 A 1

l * . \

I 1 / I \{ I

ZQ WY Four battalions attack Hill 93'7. 3-187 reaches top of hi.33

at lU5 Ho

99

98

work&?? In conjunction Keith A Collqporr;g uure faced with the pmblm

dark when the contact tapered off. At the t+m&ation of the contao%

A and C Conqmnies were only 2OO'mstars fkom the crest of the hill

tithBCompanysUghtly belowthem.

The ARIRJ Battalions- 4/land 2/l-maneuvering in zone encourxterad

mderate enemy contact tith u&mwn size 0neq forcea. Contact lasted

for a short period of time th .n terminated.

bite in the 111y)rning (UXXIH) of 20 May, following an artlf

preparation, the four battalions executed a coordinated ass&.t on

I-&L!. 937 (See Sketch 6). 3r167

At XLOOH 343'7th with A Coq~any on the right, C &-any in the

center and attached A Company, Z+506th on the left, named southeast

for a coordinated attack on the HZU when they received concentrated

RPGand smallamm fire. The attacking elemmts returned the fire

with organic weqxms and continued to fire and maneuver up the h3.l.l.

As the elements approached the crest they aLgain cam under heav

mallarnm fire fiomthe west andRPGand mall arms fire fmnthe

south, inadditionto CS gas (it was laterdetemrdnedthatthe gas

was erra& friendly 4.Omn gas gm~&es). The attacking elements al" the

%l@?th mturned the fire with organic weapons and srqibyad art-#

ARA, and gunships on the suspected enemy location (XC 324997) and

continued with A Cbqmny, 3-lIyI rsaching ths top of Hill 97 fh&t

at U5H. The attacw fon=e received addItional. Fire as the mw

attqted ts cover its withdrawal to the tiouthuest Into the 1406th .

locations. Th8 dlmnts continued to return smdl arms fire and .

anrpl~yedARA,artfusacg~ and gu&Wpsonthe retreatingmemqgt The

contact terminated at 16WH and a'aweep of the area revealed seventy-

eight WA ki3bd and one prisoner of wzar*

Throughout the day- 3-3.mth company conmu&rs noted-the noise

level was so great that they p xZd not ascertain if friendly artill-

was be- em&&, the crack of small. arm fire dmwned out w

other sounds~ The tibility to use radios due to the noise level

made it imperative that mbessangers b8 used tS relay mgsaages md

directims to the forward efements, In addition varfous colored

sake grenadesugredatonatedbytheNVAmaking it estbreme~

difficult to place effective air strikes on the desired targets, and

to control. friendly fires.

l-506

At 1055H A and C cbmpanies, l-506 roved north to assault the h5.U

and encountered heavy eneqy resistance. F;lameats continued to receive

small arms, FPG, and xmrtaz fire from the same location throughout

the day. The coqmniss invalved ret-urned sma.liarms iire and employed

ARA, artiUary and gunships for support on suspected enemy locations. 9..

Contact terminated at approldmately l&OH, but the attacklng elmmts

continued to receive sporadic fire throughaut the night. A ~wddp of

the ar8a revealed eight NVA MXbd.

B Company, i-506 continued to attack the hill from its position

on the left of A and C, and encountered heavy resietame while mom

north toward the hill. TO counter the eneqyymallarm~~ m, and

mrtar ffre they employed air s‘upport on the suspected eneq locaU.ons

with B company lxing between the enemy and the titian Border.

2-501

A, B, and C Companies of the 2-501st while moving southwest up

Hill 9.37 encountered no ene--, ~~r3sistance. As the alaments Contimred t0

mve they discovered meroue huts and bunker complexes vacated by the

retreatina enemy,

At 0'715H the 2/3 ARFN BattBUOn WfiiIe roving northeast for the

coordinated attack on Full 4r37 encountered ught enmqv resistance and

discovered moderate sized caches of assorted amunitiOn, in addition

to a six foot dd8 road with a power cable which they followed to

their objective. Continti to advance toward the top of the hUl

th8y received concentrated sti arms fire and etaployed air amk,

artillery support to destroy the enem location. Contact terminated

at approXimat8~ 16OOH and a sweep of the area was made revem

six N'VA lxxiies and W-66 AIt-47'~.

Rudina the day PSYOP missions were conducted in the vicinity of

22

Dong AD Bia entreating the ensmqp tn ,&ve up and live or be destrom.

To txdng out what pressure the defarriers of Dong Ap Bia wore under,

several shirts were captured&h sign8 sewn on themd~ding~ "u

heriama, lKll the Vietnamme, "and "Stayai~Fightand&t6hol."

A8 the attacking elements maneuvered up the hill they encountered . W~pl?~aNdpOSitionS. The nmcrl bunker8 the encountered ware

4x4 foot with 8-16 inches of over head cover, aml were constrtlcted of

rrod and tige, tiing port8 to the front and 8upplemntary fo%o%es to

athe side& The Urger bunkers were 8xlOx5 foot tithaae foot of

overheadcover andwere similarly conskuctedof sod and tige. Them

larger bunker8 appeared to hve been slm!@.a& area8 with the fi&ting

poaitiontothe front. Qneveryuniqua feature ofthebunkera

discovered on bpng Ap Bia ~88 their tent like constmtion, forming

an tire&y sting fighting position (se Sketch).

The coordinated four battalion assault on 20 May resulted in the

succesaf&l seinrre of Dong Ap Bia and rendered the 29th WA &g-at

co&at ineffective. A r?ystematic search and destruction of the bunker

comlex wadl Uitiated on 21 &w, while pursuit operations wre

Launched by the 247th Cavalry Squadron followed tith a ground pursuit

by the 2-501. The 2+Olst mcountared extensive bunker coxxplaxea

in the vicinity PC 32% which it meticulously searched and destroyed

wfiih xwing on a !sniktipfAl p&~toor, axea west to the kotim &>rdero

The l-%&h continued to encou~&er pockets of resistance of platoon

23

size elenente in hew!& fortified bunker positions almg the aeutb

ridgea of &mg Ap Bia which uwe Alted tith orepnic W-M*

airandartillerymrp~rt. Tboughout the Zlut, 1-506ul accom-

for forty-alx NVA kSiied in these small u&t actimu.

2/3 ARm Battalbn made a detaIled march of the high cp'o\eri lpllf th8 . ridges to the saet of Dong Ap MA. At the sad’of the day tm bed

accounted for tuenty-n.Ine NVA k%lled.

The 3487th wae -acted From the Northern A S'~ILU vd.w OsLd

inrsertedatFB3lazswheretbybscaas~ to the 2dBrlgade.

FoUotig a short respite at FB Blase the battalion urn wed on

standdown statur, and ite eILlrrrPta wentto &@a Beach for Rest

and Recooperation.

The 20506th deplopai from the la&nds to the msntains of the

northern A&au Talky in placsofthe 3-16'7th. AandBCoq&s

con&bd thek aba~ve to p8 Abbome tiththe mat af the

Bdalion to be depkmed the foUm&?uz d8y.

The DOIIR Ap Bia operation cost the enemy a total of 630 8oldiars

killed. In addition to them cunfirmd ca8ualtie8, a priacmw of

WJU captured duriag ths operation Micated thaf E#$ of the amkta

in hi8 unit ware camaltles.

On 22 May tha 1-50&h continued to systematically search and destroy

the bunker coml.exea of Dorm Ap Bia and ad,jace& (upea~~ in addition to

destroyinR pcifnts of resMamce am.i accounting for fifty-four mew Li

killed. The 2-506th deployed hrom F’EI Blue to FB AMDOXTW-B ww),

C (I.l26H), B (l455H) -and contimred bmrch md daatregr Operati6n8

in ilh d&?ectiona aromd FB Atrborns mcountrring a largs en-

base cppp area.

The 2+Olat contimed ground pur8td.t operati&a against the

retreatinp enemy force8 , follming the 2-l%! cavalry Squadron’8

pW8l.lit. While on the pursuit keet to the &&Len Border the battalion

continued to asarch the exte&ive bunker eonqprsrX vfcmty m 329

that wm discovered the prevzbus day.

The 2/3 ARVN Battalion ~9 given the task of searching and destr@M

enemy in the area bounded by mxdinatss ]II: 3399, 3599, 3595, Bled 339%

While patro&g the area they discovered a large ammanition and uW@onS

cache which they evactitsd.

23

&I a &y 6dwl Unit8 COIItjaaed lNi88iDn8

of operation. l-%&h continued it8 Search

ofths bunker COBl&BXeS of bng Ap Bia and

in their re8pective area8

arxi destroy operation8

e;ijacentareas, silencing

pocket8 of resietance and discovering tan additional WA bodies.

They also found treea with the bark stripped off and inscriptions

written with IXU@C markers telling the NVA eoXdi~a to "stay and

figM, this is a good place to fight fro110 2-506th, which was

conducting reconnaiamnce in force operationa and saturation pstroti

.

in the vicinity of FE! Airbme, ~encountered light enenpr resistmce

composed of two to three NVA sold&ers in gmups in addition to a bunker

25

complex and mlscrollaneous equipment. 2-j0lst continued the3.r ptreait

wwst'to the LBbtlan Bcmier sti continued to search and dezrtrafred IUI

&ene,iw btmker complex discovered two duye prariou&y f-g

additional NVI bodies. The 2/3 ARVN B&&i.igxz continusd raeonnais8mm

Jn force operatiolrs in their arm of operattin concmtratw olb the

south central port&m of the A 3v Valley. USC, ap1 the 2% the

4/X UW Battalion diecovered forty huts containing four &ma

mrbr tubee, one -2 lamchar, one -7 ~uN~?x!@, and em’

1 MYA killed Iqy air:etri.k&.

On 24 Hay opqratAons corL.nued a8 3n the pravloue dry wl.th si.&.fi-

Bia and diecovered by l-506th of fifty-ot~~~ individual ueapone. 2-5;om

continued PUPSuit of th8 ensapr west to the I&Mm Border tumiw

north along the bord& and then back to the east.

25

Operations on 25 My continued with Uttle change from the pretriou8

day. BCompany, 2-5OlSt Xnfantrybwame involved at lzG5Htith an

edmhd enemy squad while on reconnaiesa,nce in force operatime

near the ;taotian Border. The contsct continued throughout the day .

with mndl ar~ps, artilbry, and gunsMps add% support, re8ultkrg

InoneN'VAkiUed.

26

The misstin of the three infan- battalions continued without change

26

on 26 Ma;p with prepsration being mrde for redirection of rsconnai88~

in force and eearch and deatroy operationa. 1+06th nab to be prSprr&

to conductreconnaia8ance ti force oper&Aonr to the east to loe8temd a * . destroy enemy forCab, b&868 and cazhe8 ti the tic%.nity of Pa h (2) _-

I (Yc 361973) and Pa Du (1) (rC 394966). The 2-5Olat wae ilso alerted

to redirect their reconnaiseanca in force operationa to thanorthand

esat in the ticinity of Ale Ninh (2) (YD 323013) and Ale II& (1)

(YD 344003). The 2/3 AEm B&ttalion w&e 8~~ alerted and w&8

tci bepreparedto ConduCtreConnai88aIIco in forCeoperation 8outhweat

fa r=&U 996 (PC 314948) and conduct a detailed aearch of the area0

Opar&ione continued unt?Z 7 JUIMD, but the NVA forces were no lomger

bhreeted in mabtablngootiact. wrcrdic anrgagaarsnta with & e

~0~8Wk8t~~@8iturrtidn. On7 June the forceewera reoriented

- towards the east and %er&ion APACHE SNOW ~88 tezarinated. The

combined Allv!l axxi u% etatietice were 898 en- kIlled, four prisonsa.

of war, 560 individualweapona and J&2 crew-served weapon8 captured.

Operation APACHE SNOW use directed toward defeating the North

Vietnamese w in the Northern A shsu Valley. Through intenee

close-in fighting the 103.8t Airborne troopere contributed another

gallant v%ztory to the Vietnamsae War effort & almost coqAetely

eUminatingoneNorth Vietname8e RegAmntanci puttingtheVsllay .

under Free World control for the firat tinm since 1965. Though APACHE

SNOW is over the lolat Airborne Division continues their aggreaaivu

-hitting attack to return contrcaJ of Thus Thien Province to the .

27

hpulilAc of Vietamm~

..- .

. , .

.

. .*

.

-

. . ;? .’ i

.;.

/’ ,, .’

: ? ,.+

-. ,’

I . ; ,

c

,

i

i 0

--..“.- -.I _... .-.:, - ‘.- ‘I- -‘ ”

-- .- --. _

--.- - L___.w -_ .

.,,. \ P

- . -‘. --.- __. _

r’-

I ,

i

_A--

c- - 1

_-- y - ,

Operation Apache Snow, Report Extract, 158th Assault Helicopter Battalion, 1969

23 8 kxmm~issa~ce. For every combat assault, provisions must be mado to permit the AMC and his key persorxnef to make visual recowiss~c~ of prepared 12 * s and routes, Simj&rly the hlc and MT% a, wkth designated assL%x&s, must make a join% reconnaissance cf Ut s to enswe rm;itua3, understanding and agreement as to theix exact locatior! and user

IV

j. k.

-~Y*u\rY WA. J+J” --- -- yy* .-.--“.I -Jr-- -

UNCLASS1FIED en,c;urct ttjr~apa ara divided tito ACL mups far aacOa abrrafi, fat each

UNCLASSlFiED

UNCLASSlFlED