Preparing For The Worst – The SecureMetro Project: Outcomes and Recommendations

Antonio de Santiago Laporte Industrial Technical Engineer Madrid Metro &

Conor O’Neill Rail Vehicles Group Manager NewRail – SecureMetro Project

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Mitigating the Effects of Firebomb and

Blast Attacks on Metro Systems.

Conor O’Neill (NewRail)

&

Antonio De Santiago (Metro de Madrid)

Rail & Public Transport Safety & Security

Mar 2014 - London

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Preparing For The Worst – The

SecureMetro Project: Outcomes and

Recommendations

Antonio de Santiago Laporte Industrial Technical Engineer

Madrid Metro

&

Conor O’Neill Rail Vehicles Group Manager

NewRail – SecureMetro Project

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3½ year EU project – Jan 2010 to Jun 2013

11 partners in 4 countries

PROJECT DETAILS

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PROJECT PARTNERS

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To increase metro vehicle resilience to terrorist bomb

blast through selection of vehicle materials and

structural design.

To increase security against a firebomb attack through

design of fire barriers and fire suppression technology.

To increase the resilience of vehicles to blasts in order to

speed up recovery following attack to return to normal

operation.

To reduce the attractiveness of metro systems as a

target for attack by reducing deaths and injuries and

increased resilience.

PROJECT AIMS

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Review of previous blast and incendiary attacks on metro systems.

833 terrorist attacks identified.

THREATS

1960 -2010

Bombing

57%

Barricade

0%

Arson

5%

Armed Attack

7%

Threat

5%Unconventional

1%

Sabotage

20%

Logistic Activity

0%

Other

5%

Kidnapping

0%

Hijacking

0%

1960-2010

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2000 - 2010

Sabotage

23%

Unconventional

0%

Threat

3%

Armed Attack

6%

Arson

6%

Barricade

0%

Bombing

58%

Logis tic Activi ty

0%

Other

4%

Hi jacking

0%

Kidnapping

0%

THREATS

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THREAT SUMMARY

Primary Threat: Bombing

– 70% of all fatalities

– 77% of all injuries

Fire Attacks

– Low frequency.

– High impact.

Attacks on vehicles more lethal than infrastructure.

– 73% of fatalities were onboard the vehicle.

– 90% of metro vehicle fatalities were onboard the vehicle.

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Subway systems.

Future Threats.

Total Attacks Attacks on Vehicles % of Total Fatalities on Vehicles Injuries on Vehicles

Subway 82 29 35% 90% 67%

Subway EU 35 11 31% 100% 92%

Question posed Highest ranking response

Most severe threat Explosive device

Most probable threat Explosive device

Most vulnerable target Multi-modal terminals

Primary aim of attack Loss of life

Device type Improvised explosive device

Attack type Multiple targets

THREATS – UNDERGROUND SYSTEMS

Analysis of potential future threats, risks and potential trends.

Threat and attack scenarios to provide design approach.

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SCENARIO DEFINITION

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Finite element modelling and simulation of blast conditions.

Study of blast mechanics related to rail metro vehicles and systems.

Small/large scale blast testing (correlation) components and vehicle.

Evaluation of range of potential vehicle design improvements.

SCENARIO DEFINITION

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Panel tests June 2012:

– Driver cabin panels.

– Carriage wall panels.

– Floor and ceiling panels.

– Windows (glazing).

– Material assessment tests (32 individual materials tested).

BLAST TESTING

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Full-scale test Aug 2012:

Decommissioned Metro de Madrid vehicle.

Tested at HSL (UK) for NewRail.

Evaluation of structural and equipment response.

BLAST TESTING

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Delivery of metro!

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AREAS OF INTEREST – Reduce Damage and Injury

Glass fragmentation

Door retention

Structural deformation

Equipment retention

Vehicle derailment

Interior components (floor/roof)

Critical system protection

Driver Protection

Evacuation & egress

Recovery (injured & system)

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BLAST TESTING

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Lighting:

– Assess situation. Seek egress. Communication. Guidance.

Driver:

– Knowledgeable person. Relay updates & commands. Focal point.

Radio communications:

– Co-ordinate evacuation. Link to outside world.

Door systems:

– Operational post incident. Escape means. Useable if unpowered.

Access for emergency response crew.

Surveillance data backup:

– Forensic data. Understanding of events leading up to blast.

KEY SYSTEMS

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A blast resilient demonstrator:

– 14m vehicle.

– Driver’s bulkhead.

– Open-ended design.

– Passengers doors incorporated.

DEMONSTRATOR VEHICLE

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Modified glazing (jointing and glazing films).

Tethering technology.

Evaluation of seat orientation.

Bulkhead reinforcement

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Reduction in glazing debris.

Reduction in debris in gangway.

Tethering held dislodged panels.

DEMONSTRATOR VEHICLE

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Appraisal of State-of-Art design practices (techniques).

Specification of the desired vehicle performance.

Design specification for blast and firebomb mitigation.

Recommendations for future international standards.

RESEARCH OUTPUT

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THANK YOU!

SecureMetro is a European

Commission funded FP7 project

GA# 234148