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Problem: Human and natural systems willprobably have to adapt to climate changeimpacts, but this cannot be planned for usingthe traditional approach based on predictionsbecause of the subject’s great complexity, itsplanning horizon more than 50 years away,and uncertainty about the future climate andhow effectively CO2 emissions will bereduced.

Purpose: This article proposes a moreappropriate basis for planning climatechange adaptation. Anticipatory governance isa flexible decision framework that uses awide range of possible futures to prepare forchange and to guide current decisionstoward maximizing future alternatives orminimizing future threats. Rather thantrying to tame or ignore uncertainty, thisapproach explores uncertainty and itsimplications for current and future decisionmaking.Methods: I review and summarize theliterature on anticipatory governance andprovide three case studies to demonstrate itsapplication to climate change planning. Results and conclusions: DenverWater, New York City, and the City ofPhoenix are all using scenarios to antici-pate the range of global climate changesthat may impact their communities andto develop adaptation strategies toaddress these impacts. Each is developinga decision framework for implementingadaptation strategies incrementally basedon climate monitoring. An incremental

Anticipatory Governance

A Tool for Climate Change Adaptation

Ray Quay

It is becoming evident that the traditional planning paradigm that I term“predict and plan” will not be adequate to address the highly complexand uncertain issue of climate change (Barben, Fisher, Selin, & Guston,

2007; Guston, 2007; Milly et al., 2008). Uncertainty, and the extendedplanning horizon that climate change calls for, will likely still exist at the timegovernance decisions are required. In response to this problem, a new ap-proach is emerging in literature and practice. Anticipatory governance, a newmodel of decision making under high uncertainty based on concepts offoresight and flexibility, uses a wide range of possible futures to anticipateadaptation strategies, and then monitors change and uses these strategies toguide decision making (Chi, 2008; Fuerth, 2009; Quay, 2009). I review the

approach minimizes the resources thatmust be allocated to address these risksand has allowed these cities to plan inspite of the high uncertainty associatedwith climate change science and socialchange.

Takeaway for practice: The complex-ity, uncertainty, and distant planninghorizon associated with climate changecannot be managed sufficiently for thetraditional predict-and-plan approach toyield good decisions about the significantsocial and capital investments likely to berequired for adaptation. To be successful,social institutions must embrace newmethods that explore uncertainty and thatprovide strategic guidance for current andfuture decisions.

Keywords: sustainability, adaptation,resiliency, anticipatory governance

Research support: None.

About the author:Ray Quay (ray.quay@asu.edu), FAICP, is aresearch professional at the Decision Centerfor a Desert City, Global Institute ofSustainability, Arizona State University. Hewas previously an assistant director of theWater Services Department and assistantdirector of planning for the City of Phoenix,AZ. He has written several books andarticles about urban planning, includingMastering Change (Planners Press, 1988),which he coauthored with Bruce McClen-don. He is a doctoral candidate in theCollege of Design at Arizona State University.

Journal of the American Planning Association,

Vol. 76, No. 4, Autumn 2010

DOI 10.1080/01944363.2010.508428

© American Planning Association, Chicago, IL.

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emerging anticipatory governance literature and how itaddresses planning under uncertainty. I then describethree cases in which cities are applying concepts of antici-patory governance to climate change adaptation planning.

Resilience, Sustainability, andClimate Change Adaptation

Concepts important to adaptation are well rooted intheories of sustainability. Resiliency, the capacity of asystem to absorb change or reorganize while retainingessential functions, has emerged in the literature as vital tothe long-term sustainability of social-ecological systems(Folke et al., 2002; Gunderson & Holling, 2002; Lambin,2005; Voss, Bauknecht, & Kemp, 2006; Walker, Holling,Carpenter, & Kinzig, 2004). Adaptability, the capacity ofthe actors in a social system to manage the system tosuccessfully accommodate to change, has been identifiedas one of the major components of resiliency (Brooks,2003; Brooks & Adger, 2004; Walker, Gunderson, et al.,2006; Walker, Holling, et al., 2004). Society’s ability toanticipate change and effect a response are often cited asthe key factors in successful adaptation (Diamond, 2005;Easterling, Hurd, & Smith, 2004; Yohe & Tol, 2002).Unfortunately, our ability to forecast the future is stilllimited (Brewer, 1983; Candau, 2000; Cox & Stephen-son, 2007; Flyvbjerg, Holm, & Buhl, 2005; Lempert &Schlesinger, 2000; Pielke, Sarewitz, & Byerly, 2000;Sarewitz & Pielke, 2000; Stewart, 2000; Taleb, 2007;Waddell, Bhat, & Outwater, 2001) and social institutionscontinue to be unable to solve complex and uncertainproblems like global climate change (Farmer, 1999; Popper, Lempert, & Bankes, 2005; Ringquist, Worsham,& Eisner, 2003; Rittel & Webber, 1973; Sarewitz, 2004;Storbjörk, 2007; van Bueren, Klijn, & Koppenjan, 2003;Wildavsky, 2006; Willson & Brown, 2008).

Planning for Climate ChangeAdaptation

Climate change has been an international concern forseveral decades, but only lately has climate change plan-ning become widespread in the United States, and mostsuch planning efforts have been focused on the reductionof CO2 emissions, not adaptation (Donatantonio, 2009;Sheppard, Comrie, Packin, Angersbach, & Hughes, 2002;U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2009; Wheeler,2008). While efforts to reduce CO2 emissions are laud-able, how successful they will be is highly uncertain

(Willson Brown, 2008; Wheeler, 2009) and there is agrowing concern that, regardless of the success of CO2

reduction strategies, some amount of global climatechange is going to occur (Begley, 2007; Hauser et al.,2009; Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change[IPCC], 2007). Thus, attention to climate change adapta-tion is as important as reducing CO2 emissions (Quay,2009; Schipper, 2006).

Although the green movement of the past decade causedsome of the focus on mitigation results (Cavendish, 2006;Makower, 2007; National Assocation of Home Builders,2006; Walsh, 2007), the wicked nature of climate change(meaning its inevitability, the lack of agreement on itscauses, uncertainty about its effects and their spatial andtemporal distribution, the wide range of solutions, and thepotentially extreme consequences of being wrong; Rittel &Webber, 1973) has stymied adaptation efforts (Lazarus,2009). Current climate change discussions are based on thesignificant body of scientific research represented in theIPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007). The climatechange estimates in this report are based on the aggregationof 23 different global climate models run with differentscenarios of greenhouse gas (GHG) reduction that rangefrom business as usual (no alteration is trends) to holdingemissions at year 2000 levels.

The most frequently used emission scenarios arelabeled in the IPCC report as the “constant compositioncommitment scenario,” referred to here as the baseline,representing holding emissions at year 2000 levels; B1,representing a high degree of success at reducing emis-sions; A1B, representing moderate success at reducingemissions; and A2, representing low success at reducingemissions (IPCC, 2007). The large variance in tempera-ture and precipitation reported by the different modelsand emission scenarios represents the uncertainty abouthow natural climate systems will respond over time to avariety of factors and how successful social systems will beat reducing GHG emissions.

Local and regional assessments of climate change im-pacts use these results as inputs to other models for estimat-ing impacts such as stream-flow changes and flooding, sea-ice and snowpack melting, and sea-level rise. These modelsalso use as inputs the outputs from other models such asland cover and land use models. The result is a web ofmodels that represents a wide range of disciplines andmultiple spatial scales (Blanco et al., 2009). Each layer ofmodels introduces more variance and uncertainty. Thesehigh levels of uncertainty, combined with a 100-year timeframe, have so far prevented successful mitigation andadaptation (Camacho, 2009; Hallegatte, 2009; Patt, Klein,& de la Vega-Leinert, 2005; Popper et al., 2005),

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and the traditional paradigm of predict and plan willlikely not be adequate to overcome these hurdles (Barbenet al., 2007; Guston, 2007; Milly et al., 2008).

“Predict and plan” is my own phrase to describe thecurrent practice of physical urban and regional planning.It has been my experience that most physical planning(including land use planning, transportation planning,and water and sewer planning) forecasts future trends or afuture desired state and then identifies the infrastructureneeded to serve or create this future. This approach has itsroots in the early works of Chapin (1965) and Kent(1964), who both suggest that forecasts of population andemployment drive physical plans. Kent (1964) went as far as to say “A so-called flexible plan is no plan at all” (p. 20). This approach is even more evident in transporta-tion and water and sewer facility planning (Brevard, 1985;Dzurik, 1990; Prasifka, 1988). This approach workedwhen social and environmental systems were stable andpredictable over short periods of time; however, whenuncertainty and complexity are high this is not the case(Milly et al., 2008), making forecasting difficult.

Strategic planning and scenario planning have been usedin city and regional planning to explore a range of uncertainfutures (Envision Utah, n.d.; Hulse, Gregory, & Baker, 2002;Margerum, 2005; McClendon & Quay, 1988; Steinitz, et al.,2003). But strategic and scenario planning have not alwaysbeen successful and have been subject to criticism. Atlanta'sregional visioning effort in the early 1990s, VISION 2020,failed to develop an accepted regional growth strategy (Helling,1998) and a regional visioning effort in Los Angeles failed toachieve a consensus (Maundry, 2009). Some researchers havecriticized scenario planning for failing to explore the full rangeof possible futures (Bartholomew, 2007; O’Toole, 2008),attributing this in part to experts’ inability to speculate beyondtheir past experience (Bartholomew, 2007; Postma & Liebl,2005) and policy analysts’ reluctance to explore the possibilityof rare events (Taleb, 2007). Strategic and scenario planninghave also been criticized for failing to produce significanteffects on decision making (Phelps, Chan, & Kapsalis, 2001;Wack, 1985b). Even in cases in which scenario planning wasconsidered successful, single scenarios may be selected forimplementation, leaving communities vulnerable to the limita-tions of forecasting (Envision Utah, n.d.; McClendon &Quay, 1988).

Adaptation and AnticipatoryGovernance

In its 2010 report, Adapting to the Impacts of Climate,the Panel on Adapting to the Impacts of Climate Change

of the National Academy of Science suggests, “…[A]dap-tation to climate change calls for a new paradigm thattakes into account a range of possible future climateconditions and associated changes in human and naturalsystems, instead of managing our resources based onprevious experience and the historical range and variabilityof climate” (p. 3). Accordingly, anticipatory governancehas emerged in the literature as a tool of scenario planning(Chi, 2008; Cole, 2001; Quay, 2009), adaptive manage-ment (Camacho, 2009), nanotechnology governance(Guston, 2007), and military adaptive capacity (Bankston& Key, 2006). Most of this literature is new, and themethod itself is not yet well defined in theory or practice.Fuerth (2009) describes anticipatory governance as “asystem of institutions, rules and norms that provide a wayto use foresight for the purpose of reducing risk, and toincrease capacity to respond to events at early rather thanlater stages of their development” (p. 29). My review ofthe literature and practice suggests that anticipatory gover-nance consists of three basic steps: anticipation and fu-tures analysis, creation of flexible adaptation strategies,and monitoring and action.

Anticipation and Futures AnalysisAnticipatory governance recognizes that some aspects of

the future are not knowable and that any prediction or forecastrepresents only one of many possible futures. In the earlyscenario planning literature, Berger (1964), Kahn (1965),Kahn and Wiener (1967), and later Ringland (1998, 2002,2006), Schwartz (1991), van der Heijden (1996, 2000, 2005),and Wack (1985a, 1985b), recognized the limitations offorecasting and discussed the use of scenarios to explore futureuncertainty. Lempert and his coauthors suggest that analysismust cover a broad range of possible futures when there is highuncertainty (Lempert, Popper, & Bankes, 2003; Lempert &Schlesinger, 2000), and he and others have proposed and usedadvanced scenario planning methods for considering hundredsof scenarios (Ahmed, Sundaram, & Srinivasan, 2003; Bankes,1993; Bankes, Lempert, & Popper, 2003; Burke & Ewan,1999; Menke, 1979; Quay, 1999). Such analysis typically usesaggregated averages, risk assessment, sensitivity analysis offactors or decisions driving the scenarios, identification ofunacceptable scenarios or worst cases, and assessment of com-mon and different impacts among the scenarios. Thus, antici-patory governance relies on the development and analysis of arange of possible scenarios, rather than a forecast or selection ofa single scenario.

Creation of Flexible Adaptation StrategiesUsing the analysis of the defined range of anticipated

futures, actions to adapt to one or more of these possible

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futures are then developed. Hallegatte (2009) and Easterlinget al. (2004) suggest creating flexible actions that can bebroken into modules and implemented as needed as thefuture unfolds. This allows spreading costs out over timeand reducing losses if investments must be abandoned. Suchstrategies can include actions that preserve future options,contingency plans to respond to specific scenarios, and no-regrets strategies (near-term actions that can be adapted overtime to address several possible scenarios) or worst casestrategies (actions that address the worst outcomes, thus, allscenarios; City of Phoenix Water Services Department,2005; Means, Laugier, Daw, Kaatz, & Waage, 2010).Robust actions are those that work well enough across manypossible futures based on accepted levels of risk (Lempert & Schlesinger, 2000).

Monitoring and ActionEven though Kent (1964) called for physical planning

to be based on forecasts, he did recognize that over timecommunity conditions would change and plans wouldhave to be revised in a continuing process. Foley (1964)articulated the dichotomy between a more fixed predictand plan approach, which he called the unitary approach,and a more adaptive approach in which the city evolvesover time in response to change. It has been suggested thatfor adaptation to be successful, monitoring and responseto change must be constant (Bankston & Key, 2006;Camacho, 2009; Chi, 2008; Fuerth, 2009). Given thatclimate change will unfold slowly over the next 100 years,decisions on and implementation of adaptation actionswill be spread over a long period of time. Indicators ofchange should be monitored on a regular basis and deci-sions to implement anticipated adaption strategies consid-ered in light of actual trends.

Climate Change and AnticipatoryGovernance: Case Studies

Although a number of cities in North America areincluding some level of adaptation in their climate changeplanning efforts, most have not moved beyond reviewingvulnerabilities and adaptation strategies (H. John HeinzIII Center for Science, Economics and the Environment,2007; Lowe, Foster, & Winkelman, 2009; Wheeler,2008). Only a small number have begun to address theuncertainty inherent in current estimates of future climatechange and possible resulting impacts. I present casestudies for three communities that are engaged in climatechange adaptation planning and are using anticipatorygovernance concepts to consider the uncertainty of cli-

mate change. I developed these cases studies by reviewingboth primary documents produced by each planningprocess as well as secondary reports on the efforts andtheir results, and by conducting structured and informalinterviews with their leaders. The planning processes areongoing in all of these communities, thus, they cannot yetbe evaluated. However, given that global climate changemay become significant by midcentury, and that theseplanning efforts will continue for decades, assessing themafter they conclude might not leave time for other com-munities to make necessary changes in their adaptationplanning efforts. Thus, I describe the progress to date foreach case and critically examine it using the anticipatorygovernance framework. All the case studies have pro-gressed through the anticipation and futures analysis phaseand are now developing flexible adaptation strategies.None have yet moved to monitoring and action.

Denver WaterDenver Water is a public utility that is separate from

the City of Denver, but derives its authority from theCharter of the City and County of Denver. DenverWater’s service area covers more than 335 square miles,including the City and County of Denver and surround-ing suburban cities and water distributors. Denver Waterutilizes a system of reservoirs networked by tunnels andcanals to serve over 1.3 million people.

In August of 2008, Denver Water (2008) initiatedwork on a new Integrated Resource Plan that would cover abroader range of issues than previous plans, includingchanges in climate. Climate change has the potential toreduce streamflows in the west and southwest, threateningexisting surface water supplies. The planning processscheduled to be completed in the fall of 2010 (see Figure 1), uses a combination of the integrated resourceplanning approach (Beecher, 1995) and scenario planning(Denver Water, 2008).

Anticipation and Futures Analysis. Denver Water’sfutures development consisted of two efforts. First, thewater utility initiated a traditional scenario planning effortto prioritize factors contributing to future uncertainty.With the help of a consultant, they compiled a compre-hensive list of such factors, using existing literature thatdiscussed trends and possible future conditions for waterutilities. Climate change was only one of several factorsthat was included in this analysis, explored in a series ofbriefing papers, and presented to the Board of WaterCommissioners. The board was asked to rank these factorsby level of uncertainty and importance. Initially, it washoped that this prioritization process would reduce thenumber of factors to be explored, however, many were

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ranked as highly uncertain and of high importance. Tosimplify futures exploration, the Denver Water staffgrouped these factors into five possible future scenarios(Table 1), which were then reviewed by various expertsand the Board of Water Commissioners. These scenarioswere assumed to be mutually exclusive and of unknownprobability and were not intended to be predictions. Eachprovides a story of a possible future (Denver Water, 2008;Waage, 2009a).

The second part of Denver Water's scenario develop-ment included a more expansive futures analysis exploringthe range of potential climate change impacts on DenverWater. A partnership of state and local government agen-cies (Western Water Assessment, National Center forAtmospheric Research, Northern Colorado Water Conser-vancy District, Denver Water, City of Aurora Utilities,City of Boulder, City of Fort Collins Utilities, Colorado

Springs Utilities Department, Colorado Water Conserva-tion Board) has almost completed the Joint Front RangeClimate Change Vulnerability Study (Water ResearchFoundation, 2010). This study has used statisticallydownscaled climate data from 10 global climate models tomodel the potential impacts of changes in temperatureand precipitation on streamflow in the central FrontRange region of Colorado. All of these scenarios showsubstantial warming trends; however, their predictionsrange from above-normal to below-normal precipitationfor the region (Waage, 2009a). Denver is now in theprocess of exploring the implications of these temperatureand precipitation trends.

Flexible Adaptation Strategies. At this time, DenverWater is still developing its decision framework using a flexi-ble, no-regrets approach that includes both a detailed short-range plan and options for longer-range activities. As time

Figure 1. Denver Water adaptation planning process.

Source: Denver Water (2009). Published with permission.

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proceeds, the utility will implement short-term strategiesbased on observed trends that their prior analysis suggests willlead to particular anticipated futures. Signposts, or events orconditions indicating that a certain scenario is likely to occur,can often be identified. For example, if a water reservoirreaches a certain level, it may indicate a high probability thatwater demand will exceed available water supplies within agiven timeframe. Such signposts can warn that it is time toimplement an anticipated adaptation strategy in order toeffectively respond to that specific scenario. Denver Water willdecide which factors to use to track the trends that will bringabout each scenario, determine the decision signposts for eachscenario, as well as when those signposts may most likelyoccur. The short-range plan will include both actions toaddress vulnerabilities that may occur in the short term, aswell as strategic actions to preserve or create options that maybe needed in the longer term.

Denver is conducting a pilot project to evaluateincorporating the robust decision methods developed bythe RAND Corporation (Lempert et al., 2003) into itswater systems model to analyze the multiple climatescenarios they have developed and identify robust strate-gies for adapting to anticipated changes in their watersupply (M. Waage, personal communication, October 27,2009; Waage, 2007, 2009a, 2009b). Denver Water alsoleads an effort by Water Utility Climate Alliance andMalcolm Pirnie to develop a guide for water utilitiesdesiring to use multi-outcome planning methods, includ-ing scenario planning, to address the uncertainties ofclimate change (Means et al., 2010).

New YorkNew York City (NYC) climate adaptation efforts

began in 2004 when the NYC Department of Environ-mental Protection initiated a Climate Change Task Forceto study the potential impacts of climate change on thecity’s water infrastructure. This resulted in the 2008Assessment and Action Plan, which includes general adapta-tion strategies to make NYC’s water, wastewater, andflood control systems more resilient to climate change(NYC Department of Environmental Protection, 2008).In 2006, NYC initiated PlaNYC, a comprehensive sus-tainability planning effort including a climate changecomponent that was primarily focused on mitigation. In2008, Mayor Bloomberg convened the NYC Panel onClimate Change (NPCC). Funded with $350,000 fromthe Rockefeller Foundation; the NPCC was charged withadvising the mayor and the NYC Climate Change Adap-tation Task Force (NYCCATF) on the possible impacts ofclimate change on NYC. The NYCCATF included repre-sentatives from 40 local, regional, state, and federal agen-cies, as well as the private sector, and was charged withmanaging a broad range of infrastructure and social sys-tems for the region (A. Freed, personal communication,October 30, 2009; Freed & Yohe, 2009; NPCC, 2009).New York’s process for developing its climate changeadaptation plan has four phases: 1) quantify the impactsof climate change, 2) identify the impacts of climatechange on the city and develop strategies to mitigate theserisks, 3) launch a citywide strategic plan, and 4) work withvulnerable neighborhoods to develop site-specific adapta-tion strategies. Currently, the NYCCATF is completingthe second of these phases and planning phases 3 and 4(Freed & Yohe, 2009).

Anticipation and Futures Analysis. New Yorkinitially explored four major climate risk factors (CRFs):temperature, precipitation, sea-level rise, and short-termextreme events. To define these CRFs, the NPCC exam-ined the temperature and precipitation results from 16climate change models and sea-level rise results from 7climate change models for 3 emission scenarios defined bythe IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007) anddescribed earlier (A1, A1B, and B1) in each of three future30-year time slices (2010–2039, 2040–2069, and2070–2099). Each climate change model has a baselinescenario. Model results were not scaled down; instead, theNPCC used the smallest areal unit that included NewYork City and its surrounding area from each model’soriginal output.

The NPCC estimated the most likely range for eachCRF in each future time slice in three steps. First, the differ-ence between the baseline forecast for each global climate

Table 1. Summary of Denver Water future scenarios.

Title Story

Traditional future Imagine the future is extrapolated from pasttrends. Few unanticipated major changesoccur.

Water quality rules Imagine drinking water quality is aparamount consideration. The publicdemands the highest practical quality ofdrinking water. Contaminant removal andother drinking water requirements areextremely stringent.

Hot water Imagine a warmer climate accompanied bymore frequent and more severe droughts.

Green revolution Imagine environmental values and sustainableliving become dominant social norms.

Economic woes Imagine an ongoing energy crisisaccompanied by a prolonged, deep economicdownturn.

Source: Denver Water (2008). Published with permission.

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model (which assumes no climate change) and the forecastfor each emission scenario was calculated for each of theCRFs in each of the three future time slices. These differenceswere assumed to be the change each model predicted for eachCRF in each future time slice. Second, all of the estimatedchanges from all models and emission scenarios were treatedas a distribution of the possible change that may occur foreach CRF for each of the time periods. The mean and vari-ance for each of these distributions was then calculated.Finally, the means and variances were used to define a rangeof interest for each CRF. This range of interest was defined toinclude 67% of the variation among models, with the meanchange representing the center of this range.

The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report (2007) does notaddress the possibility of rapid ice melt raising sea levels.To account for this, the NPCC also calculated a range forsea-level rise resulting from rapid ice melt. Table 2 showsthe resulting ranges for each CRF. The NPCC also esti-mated the number of extreme events (heat waves, coldspells, intense rain storms, drought, and coastal stormswith flooding) in each of the three future time slices bymatching model results for CRFs to historical records, andassuming that extreme events would be similar in yearswith similar attributes (NPCC, 2009).

The analysis of New York’s range of possible futuresand the likely resulting impacts focused on having stake-holders assess the probabilities that each CRF would reacha value in the projected range in each future time slice,and the consequent risk and severity of impacts to social

systems and infrastructure. Using probability ranges andlanguage modeled after that used in the IPCC FourthAssessment Report (IPCC, 2005, 2007; Manning et al.,2004) climate science experts assessed the probability ofchange within the predicted range for each CRF for eachof the three future time slices. Regional experts were thenasked to identify which social systems and infrastructurewould be vulnerable to impact from CRFs using theseprobabilities, often through dialogue between scientistsand stakeholders. Stakeholders were then asked to assessthe risk that each category of vulnerable social system andinfrastructure would suffer an impact as a result of changein a CRF and the magnitude of this impact. This was usedto create a matrix for each social system and infrastructurewith the format shown in Figure 2 (A. Freed, personalcommunication, October 30, 2009; Horton, 2009).

Flexible Adaptation Strategies. New York is stilldiscussing its adaptation strategies and decision frame-work. Given its broad regional foundation of social sys-tems and infrastructure, the decision framework will beapplied beyond New York City’s jurisdiction, and willsuggest an approach for other governmental and privatesector organizations. In general, New York is suggestingthat any activity that reduces vulnerability to climatechange impact makes the city more resilient. However theNPCC recognizes that the impacts likely to result evenfrom CRF values in the centers of the forecasted rangesmay overwhelm many organizations. Thus, it is develop-ing a risk-based, cost-benefit approach to assessing initial

Table 2. Climate Change Projections for New York City.a

Baseline: 1971–2000 2010–2039 2040–2069 2070–2099

Air temperatureb 55�F � 1.5 to 3�F � 3 to 5�F � 4 to 7.5�FPrecipitationb 46.5 inches � 0 to 5% � 0 to 10% � 5 to 10%Sea-level riseb,c Not applicable � 2 to 5 inches � 7 to 12 inches � 12 to 23 inchesRapid-ice-melt sea-level rised Not applicable ≈ 5 to 10 inches ≈ 19 to 29 in ≈ 41 to 55 in

Notes:a. These data are based on 16 global climate models (7 global climate models for sea-level rise) and 3 emissions scenarios. The baseline is 1971–2000for temperature and precipitation and 2000–2004 for sea-level rise. Data are from the National Weather Service and the National Oceanic andAtmospheric Administration. Temperature data are from Central Park; precipitation data are the mean of the Central Park and La Guardia Airportvalues; and sea-level data are from the Battery at the southern tip of Manhattan (the only location in NYC for which comprehensive historic sea-level-rise data are available).b. Projections represent the middle 67% of values from model-based probabilities; temperature ranges are rounded to the nearest half-degree,precipitation to the nearest 5%, and sea-level rise to the nearest inch.c. The model-based sea-level rise projections may represent the range of possible outcomes less completely than the temperature and precipitationprojections.d. The rapid ice-melt scenario is based on acceleration of recent rates of ice melt in the Greenland and West Antarctic ice sheets and paleoclimate studies.

Source: New York City Panel on Climate Change (2009). Published with permission.

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near-term plans for adaptation (Stutz, 2009). At the coreof the decision framework is a method called flexibleadaptation pathways (Environment Committee of theLondon Assembly, 2008) that breaks adaptation strategiesand decisions into small incremental steps on whichaction can be taken over time as appropriate, or aban-doned at some point, minimizing lost assets (Freed &Yohe, 2009; Horton, 2009; Overpeck, Rosenzweig,Hobbs, & Wuebbles, 2009). The following conceptsguide such decision making:

1. The impact assessment matrix (see Figure 2) shouldbe used to identify and implement adaptationstrategies that address the impacts most likely tooccur.

2. Actions with benefits that go beyond climatechange adaptation should get special attention.

3. Day-to-day decisions should be reviewed for op-portunities to implement adaptation strategies.

4. Strategies for protecting infrastructure or resourcesfrom climate-related threats should be developedand implemented in self-contained modules ifpossible so that protection can be slowly increasedin small increments as climate change does or doesnot unfold.

5. Adaptation actions that require lead time should bestarted now so they are ready to be implementedwhen needed.

6. Resources needed for adaptation should be identi-fied and included in financial planning efforts as

appropriate (A. Freed, personal communication,October 30, 2009; Freed & Yohe, 2009).

To assist in this effort, the city will conduct neighbor-hood-based workshops to provide information aboutclimate change vulnerabilities and adaptation strategies inthe forty communities around the city most vulnerable toclimate change impacts (NYC Mayor’s Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, 2009).

PhoenixThe City of Phoenix Water Services Department

adaptation efforts were split into two phases, the processcreating the Water Resources Plan 2005 Update (City ofPhoenix Water Services Department, 2005) and the 2010process to update that plan. The Water Resources Plan2005 Update focused primarily on planning for drought,while the 2010 planning process is examining the impactsof global climate change on both normal and droughtstream-flow conditions.

The historic climate in the watershed serving Phoenixhas oscillated between highly unpredictable wet and dryperiods from 10 to 100 years long (Ely, Enzel, Baker, &Cayan, 1993; Sheppard et al., 2002; Smith & Stockton,1981). Phoenix has used reservoirs to store excess stream-flows during wetter periods and to deliver water duringdryer periods. As water demand from urban and agricul-tural growth exceeded surface water supplies and threat-ened to drain regional aquifers, the state passed the Ari-zona Groundwater Management Act (GMA) in 1980.

Figure 2. New York City climate change adaptation risk matrix.

Source: Horton (2009). Published with permission.

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504 Journal of the American Planning Association, Autumn 2010, Vol. 76, No. 4

The GMA created active management areas to managegroundwater for sustainable yield, and required newdevelopment to demonstrate an “assured water supply”(Arizona Groundwater Management Act, 1980) for 100 years. However, the GMA assumed that surface watersupplies were constant, and did not account for climatevariability or long-term droughts (Holway & Jacobs,2007; Jacobs & Holway, 2004). The Phoenix WaterResource Plan 2005 Update requires 100 years of sustain-ability under conditions of long-term drought, a standardhigher than that required by the State of Arizona (City ofPhoenix Water Services Department, 2005; S. Rossi,personal communication, September 1, 2009).

Anticipation and Futures Analysis. In developing the2005 plan, the Phoenix Water Services Department de-fined ranges of possible future conditions for three factorsthat may impact the utility’s water supplies and demand inthe future: delivery of surface water supplies (from the Saltand Verde Rivers and the Colorado River), growth anddevelopment patterns, and water use behavior. Usingpaleo-streamflow estimates created from tree-ring data, andworking with the staff of the Central Arizona Project andthe Salt River Project, Water Services Department staffestimated surface water availability from the Salt/Verdeand Colorado River systems under normal, moderate, andsevere drought conditions. Since these systems are inde-pendent, this established nine different possible water-supply conditions. Working with the Planning Depart-ment and HDR, a private consulting firm, the WaterServices Department also projected alternative spatialpatterns of growth based on assumptions about the popu-lation growth rate, economy, shifts to higher densities inthe urban core area, and transit-influenced growth. (Phoe-nix recently completed a 20-mile light-rail system in thecentral part of the metropolitan area.) Spatial characteris-tics of growth are important because the use of somesurface and groundwater supplies is spatially restricted.Finally, Water Services Department staff considered threedifferent levels of customer water use based on past andpossible future trends. These factors were combined togenerate 144 scenarios of water supply and demand andresulting water budgets, including water deficits (City ofPhoenix Water Services Department, 2005; S. Rossi,personal communication, September 1, 2009).

As part of the 2010 plan, Phoenix is participating in aproject to downscale global climate model output toreplace the nine climate scenarios in the 2005 plan. Thepartnership includes the City of Phoenix, the Salt RiverProject, the Central Arizona Project, the U.S. Bureau ofReclamation, the University of Arizona, and Arizona StateUniversity. The project has five components: 1) selection

of global climate models, 2) downscaling model precipita-tion and temperature projections to the Phoenix region,3) estimation of future streamflows, 4) analysis of impactson reservoir management, and 5) analysis of impacts onlocal municipal water allocations. The partnership willundertake both statistical and regional dynamic modeldownscaling and compare the two methods (Dominguez,2009). Estimates of streamflows will be done using thevariable infiltration capacity model for normal anddrought conditions. Impacts on reservoir managementwill be tested using the Salt River Project reservoir man-agement model and scenarios for local municipal waterallocations will be derived from the reservoir model re-sults. Impacts on local water management will be assessedusing the same process used in the Water Resource Plan2005 Update (City of Phoenix Water Services Depart-ment, 2005; S. Rossi, personal communication, September 1, 2009).

Flexible Adaptation Strategies. Phoenix identifiedtwo types of adaptation strategies to implement in itsWater Resource Plan 2005 Update: robust short-termstrategies that would work well across a wide range ofscenarios; and a worst-case infrastructure timeline fordrought response. One example of a robust strategy arosefrom the finding that all scenarios assuming no furthergrowth showed water supplies to be adequate to meetalmost all existing demand even under the most severewater shortage scenarios. In all cases, it was growth of newaccounts that would either trigger the need for new orsupplemental water supplies or require significant demandreduction. In response, the city increased its water acquisi-tion impact fee to shift the burden of financing additionalsupplies to new growth.

The 2005 plan included a worst-case timeline portray-ing the timing and magnitude of water shortages over 25 years assuming that current precipitation trends in thewatersheds reflected the early stages of the most severewater shortage scenario, a 30-year dry period (see Figure 3).(Phoenix was in its 10th consecutive dry year in 2005.)Using this timeline with different demand scenarios(different growth and water use rates), Water ServicesDepartment staff estimated trigger points when new waterresources or demand reductions would need to be de-ployed. Since adoption of the 2005 plan, Phoenix hasbeen monitoring growth, demand, and climate trends,and adjusting these trigger points accordingly. For exam-ple, the recent economic recession resulted in negativegrowth in new water accounts, pushing some of the trig-ger points further into the future (City of Phoenix WaterServices Department, 2005; S. Rossi, personal communi-cation, September 1, 2009).

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Phoenix’s ability to finance infrastructure for rehabilita-tion, environmental compliance, and growth has declinedrecently, and financial resources to respond to climate changeare likely to be limited in the near term. The city plans tomodify its worst-case timeline to minimize the investmentrequired to ensure that adequate water supplies will be availableto meet water shortage conditions. Based on characteristicssuch as water volume, certainty of availability, cost and time todeploy, the Water Services Department will create a decisiontree indicating the latest possible time at which action can betaken to either preserve future options, plan for deployment offuture options, or fund and deploy future options. Indicatorsof climate, drought, and certainty of water supplies will bemonitored for change, and every five years the decision treewill be reassessed and a short-term plan developed. When thepartnership the Water Services Department is participating incompletes its work assessing the potential impacts of globalclimate change on regional water supplies, the results will beincorporated into this worst case decision framework (S. Rossi,personal communication, September 1, 2009).

Analysis

Although there are differences among these three casestudies, their commonalities illustrate the elements ofanticipatory governance. All three cases used scenarios toanticipate future climate change possibilities, developed

flexible adaptation strategies, and are contemplating usinga flexible and incremental decision-making frameworkover long time periods. The following examines the com-monalities and differences between the cases for each ofthese three phases.

Anticipation and Futures AnalysisEach case has developed a wide range of climate

change scenarios based on climate science information andcarried forward the full range of climate change scenariosinto their decision-making processes. Denver and Phoenixinitially used paleo-streamflow records from tree-ringresearch to anticipate possible future stream-flow condi-tions. All three are using multiple global climate models(ranging from 3 to 16) and are engaged in some level ofdownscaling global climate model results to higher resolu-tion at the regional level. The Denver and Phoenix scenar-ios also vary population growth and economic factors.Although each presents the range of scenarios in differentways, none is trying to reduce them to a single, best-guessscenario. All utilized assistance from local universities indeveloping their climate change scenarios.

Neither Phoenix nor Denver assigned probabilities totheir scenarios, but New York assigned very simple proba-bilities to specified indications of climate change andpossible resulting impacts. New York is using these proba-bilities to create priorities to guide short-term decisionmaking.

Figure 3. The Phoenix worst-case planning timeline.

Source: City of Phoenix Department of Water Services (2005). Published with permission.

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Flexible Adaptation StrategiesGiven that uncertainty is unavoidable when planning

for climate change, all three cases emphasize maintainingflexibility to allow responding to a range of possible futureconditions. Phoenix has developed contingency plans inanticipation of different possible patterns of growth andclimate-driven water shortages. Denver and Phoenix haverecommended robust actions that will be desirable across alarge number of scenarios in their current short-termplans. New York has suggested taking prompt action onalternatives that will take a long time to implement, sothey will be available if needed. Similarly, Phoenix hasproposed taking low-cost actions that will prevent optionsfrom being precluded in the future, such as acquiring wellsites but not drilling the wells.

One important difference among these three cases isstakeholder involvement. Stakeholder participation hasbeen cited as a key element in successfully implementingprograms to develop public policy that is based on fore-casts (van der Helm, 2007) and programs to developclimate change adaptation policies (Sales, 2009). NewYork’s technical and stakeholder committees engaged inextensive dialogue with local business and communityleaders to frame the climate risk assessment and adapta-tion priorities (A. Freed, personal communication, October 30, 2009; Freed & Yohe, 2009). Denver’s proc-ess focused on a discussion of scenarios and priorities withthe Denver Water board and partnerships with theircustomers and regional water providers. Phoenix focusedon regional water suppliers, interest groups, and the citycouncil, but had no formal priority-setting process withthese stakeholders.

Monitoring and ActionAll of the cases are still in the process of developing

adaptation strategies and have not yet begun to implementclimate change adaptation, however, the drought adapta-tion efforts of Phoenix and Denver have prepared thesecities well for climate change adaptation. All have indi-cated that they intend to implement long-term decision-making processes based on monitoring climate change andmaking incremental decisions guided by anticipatedchange in climate trends. The Phoenix drought adaptationis structured around a worst-case timeline with a definedset of triggers for deploying various water resources torespond promptly to climate-driven water shortages. New York has proposed to respond to the uncertainty ofsea-level rise with protection structures designed in mod-ules, with decisions made to deploy them incrementally assea levels begin to rise. Denver is prepared to take actions topreserve options if climate-driven changes in precipitation

and demand occur. In each case, planners recognize thatsome investment can be anticipated, but delayed.

Although each city reports that monitoring will be akey feature of its decision-making framework, none haveyet formally developed a structured climate change moni-toring program to be included in these frameworks. Onereason for this is the current state of climate science. Bythe time actual changes in temperature, precipitation, andsea levels are recognized it may be too late to adapt.Rather, climate indicators such as variability in the NorthAtlantic oscillation and the El Niño southern oscillation,as well as CO2 in the atmosphere, should be monitoredand used to suggest possible trends in long-term globalclimate change patterns. However, how these factors canbe used to advise decision makers of possible changes at aregional level is not yet clear. All three cities have beenparticipating in national discussions with climate scientistsand adaptation planners about what type of decisionsupport systems are needed to support regional and localplanning and decision making (American Water WorksAssociaton Research Foundation, Water EnvironmentResearch Foundation, & United Kingdom Water IndustryResearch, 2008).

Conclusion

There is valid concern that traditional physical plan-ning efforts will not be adequate to adapt to climatechange given the high uncertainty and long time frameinvolved. Anticipatory governance, which has roots inscenario planning and adaptive management, represents agovernance framework in which planning and decisionmaking may be able to overcome these obstacles to tradi-tional physical planning for climate change. Although Icould not assess the success of the anticipatory conceptscurrently being applied in Denver, New York, and Phoe-nix because their adaptation planning efforts are notcomplete, other communities will experience the impactsof climate change at roughly the same time, leaving littletime to transfer lessons from these cases. These three casesare on the leading edge, incorporating the uncertainty ofclimate change into their adaptation planning and imple-mentation, and their experience provides several lessons.

1. The uncertainty inherent in climate science neednot be a barrier to taking action to adapt to climatechange. A set of scenarios representing a wide rangeof possible climate change futures and their result-ing impacts can be used to devise possible actionsfor adapting to this range of futures. Methods for

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analyzing a wide range of scenarios (from dozens tohundreds) are emerging in the literature and inpractice, and further research and development ofsuch methods is needed. Implementing thesemethods will also require more resources thantraditional scenario planning methods because theymust incorporate climate change science and assessclimate change impacts.

2. Flexible strategies that can be initiated incremen-tally over an extended period will make the cost ofclimate change adaptation more manageable andavoid waste. This will require new approaches toengineering large projects such as water, waste-water, and flood protection systems, so that theycan remain functional while being implemented inmodules over time. It will also challenge traditionalcapital planning and financing processes which arestructured around one-time investments and life-cycle cost analysis.

3. Anticipatory governance requires monitoringchange over time and recognizing future conse-quences in sufficient time to take effective action.Unfortunately, such a system does not exist today,in part because global and regional climate model-ing are so complex. An effective monitoringsystem would require identifying climate factorsthat are closely associated with future local im-pacts and can be forecast at least 10 years into thefuture. It should advise local stakeholders periodi-cally on how climate change is proceeding, andwhich anticipated climate scenarios are likelyrelevant and which can be ignored in the shortterm. Developing such a monitoring system willrequire cooperation between national agencies,research centers familiar with global climatesystems, and local adaptation planners familiarwith applying climate change to unique localissues.

4. Finally, it will be critically important for locali-ties to institutionalize flexible decision-makingframeworks that extend long into the future,possibly for 50 or more years. Such frameworkswill exceed the careers of existing politicians andpolicy managers and, even if initiated success-fully, may be difficult to sustain. Politicians areoften unwilling make investments that pay offonly after they leave office. Public support forsuch efforts may also diminish as the costs ofenergy, water, and taxes to pay for adaptationincrease over time. Strong and ongoing stake-holder participation in the process, as is planned

in New York, may be critical to sustaining politi-cal and public support for 50 to 100 years.

These three cities are not the only cities engaged inanticipatory approaches to climate change adaptation.Although the literature of adaptation is smaller thanthat on climate change mitigation, three recent publi-cations discuss the issues in this article and providefurther examples of climate change adaptation plan-ning in the United States and Europe (Adger, Loren-zoni, & O'Brien, 2009; Davoudi, Crawford, &Mehmood, 2009; Panel on Adapting to the Impacts ofClimate Change, 2010). The concepts of anticipatorygovernance, such as scenarios, incrementalism, andflexibility are in themselves not new. What is new ishow they are blended into a governance frameworkthat acknowledges uncertainty through the entireprocess, from planning through decision making andimplementation. This recognizes that climate scienceand climate policy cannot be reduced to a single fore-cast. Rather practitioners must embrace the uncer-tainty of climate science, which will be difficult formany. We are used to believing that we can know thefuture because we know the past, but to remain re-silient in the face of climate change, society must beprepared to adapt over a long time period to a futurethat can be anticipated, but not known.

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