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Transcript of Anticipating and Addressing Security Challenges in an ... · SLIDE 1 ANTICIPATING AND ADDRESSING...
SLIDE 1
ANTICIPATING AND ADDRESSING
SECURITY CHALLENGES IN AN
EVOLVING POWER SYSTEM
10th October 2016
PRESENTED BY JENNY RIESZ
SLIDE 2
AGENDA
1. Future Power System Security Program
2. Identifying future challenges
3. High priority challenges:
• Frequency control
• Management of extreme power system conditions
• System strength
• Information, models and tools
For each challenge:
• Non-technical introduction
• AEMO’s work program
SLIDE 3
FUTURE POWER SYSTEM SECURITY
• The power system is changing
Conventional generation
Wind & PV
- Variable availability
- Non-Synchronous
Centralised Distributed resources
• What challenges will we encounter?
• How do we maintain power system security?
SLIDE 4
FUTURE POWER SYSTEM SECURITY
(FPSS) PROGRAM
Short-termTo be transparent in how
AEMO intends to meet its
obligations
Long-termTo identify, rank and promote
resolution of long-term
technical challenges
Adapt AEMO’s functions and processes to deliver ongoing
power system security and reliability
SLIDE 5
TIMELINE
2017 →Dec 2016May 2016Dec 2015
Identify challengesAnalysis to define operational bounds
and risks
Identify technical solutions
Develop solution
frameworks
Analysis of other
technical challenges
Where are we at now?
• Identified challenges
• Quantitative analysis underway
• Analysing technical solutions
• Commencing work on implementation frameworks
SLIDE 6
IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES
• Power Systems Issues Technology Advisory Group (PSI-TAG)
o Stakeholder consultation group
o Formed a comprehensive list of challenges
o Prioritised the challenges requiring immediate focus
SLIDE 7
HIGH PRIORITY CHALLENGES
Frequency control
Management of extreme power system
conditions
Visibility of the power system
(information, data and models)
System strength
SLIDE 9
WHAT IS FREQUENCY CONTROL?
LOAD GENERATION
50.0
ImbalanceFrequency changes
Contingency FCAS
• Corrects the generation / load imbalance following major contingency events
Regulation FCAS
• Continually corrects the generation / load imbalance in response to minor deviations
Maintain balance with FCAS:
Frequency Control Ancillary Services
SLIDE 10
FREQUENCY CONTROL ANCILLARY
SERVICES
• Will there be sufficient FCAS in future?
Increased variability in supply and demand may
lead to increasing need for FCAS services
Only conventional units registered to provide FCAS
(retirements anticipated)
Reducing
supply
Increasing
need
SLIDE 11
INERTIA
DEMAND GENERATION
50.0
INERTIA acts
as a “brake”
High inertia → frequency changes slowly
Synchronous generators contribute inertia
(coal, gas, hydro)
NO inertia from non-
synchronous generators
(wind, PV)
As wind & PV displace synchronous
generators, inertia reduces, and the
frequency changes more quickly
SLIDE 12
RATE OF CHANGE OF FREQUENCY
• Following a contingency event (unexpected loss of generation)
o Imbalance causes system frequency to fall
• If “Rate of change of Frequency” (RoCoF) is too high:
o Could result in cascading trip of load or generation
o Emergency control schemes may not prevent system collapse
Contingency event
RoCoF
SLIDE 13
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED
Challenges: Work Program:
Projecting FCAS Supply-Demand Balance
Review of FCAS Specifications
International Review of Frequency Control Adaptation
Advising on RoCoF System Limits
RoCoF Withstand Capabilities of South Australian Generators
Fast Frequency Response Specification
Insufficient FCAS
High RoCoF
SLIDE 15
TWO TYPES OF CONTINGENCY EVENTS
Credible
• Reasonably possible
• Eg: loss of a single transmission line or generating unit
• AEMO must manage proactively
Non-credible
• Less likely
• Eg: loss of multiple transmission lines or generating units
• AEMO has limited powers to manage proactively
UFLS:(Under Frequency Load Shedding)
- “Emergency” mechanism
- Trip load at 49Hz to prevent
complete system collapse
SLIDE 16
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED
Challenges: Work Program:
UFLS re-design
Exploring OFGS design
Reviewing procedures to operate SA as an island
Rule change proposal
• Broader and more flexible provisions for ‘smarter’ emergency frequency control schemes
• Clarifying obligations, roles and responsibilities
UFLS• May not work properly with high
RoCoF
• May not work properly with DER
OFGS• No emergency scheme for over-
frequency events
Non-credible events• Now more serious consequences,
but AEMO has limited powers to
act pre-emptively
SLIDE 18
SYSTEM STRENGTH
• System strength is a measure of power system stability
• Related to “fault current”
• Synchronous generators contribute fault current (coal, gas, hydro)
• Non-synchronous generators do not (wind, PV)
Wind & PV displace
synchronous generators
Less fault current
System strength reduces
Fault occursSynchronous
generators contribute fault current
Triggers protection systems to detect &
isolate the fault
SLIDE 19
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED
Challenges: Work Program:
Protection systems• May not work properly in weak
systems
Inverter-connected plant• May not operate as designed in a
weak system
Modelling challenges• Weak systems not always easy to
identify/model
International engagement to identify suitable metrics
Rule change for revision of Generating System Model Guidelines
• Expand the scope of data about plant performance, to improve modelling
Refining power system models
Modelling of the NEM to identify timing and location of challenges
Working with the AEMC on regulatory/frameworks challenges
• Who has responsibility for maintaining system strength?
• What if a retirement causes system strength issues?
Voltages• Greater difficulty maintaining stable
voltages in weak systems
SLIDE 21
INFORMATION, MODELS & TOOLS
Distributed resources displace scheduled
generation
Fewer levers to maintain system
security
Visibility increasingly important
Distributed storage?
Changing customer
behaviour?
Distributed PV?
Electric vehicles?
SLIDE 22
CHALLENGES IDENTIFIED
Challenges: Work Program:
Modelling tools• May not be accurate for the future
power system
Other data gaps• Eg. RoCoF withstand capabilities
Distributed energy
resources• Not visible to AEMO (or
controllable)
• Not well-represented in AEMO’s
models
Assessing requirements for representation of distributed resources in AEMO’s models
Developing tools and capabilities roadmap
Surveying requirements for standing and real-time data