Answers to EU Adv

8/8/2019 Answers to EU Adv

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Human Rights Bad/ Ethnic Difference BadiSoft Power BadWe aren't embracing the power of positive thinking

Soft Power BadJran 1NC ..1-4Negotiations U . . .5-6US Invo lvement Link..7-9Escalation.. .10Turns soft pow er.. . 1 1Aff an s ... 12-14Human Rights BadUS-China 1NC...15-18Pressure Links .. .19-23Rts K Rels. . .24Uniqueness..25-27China key to nego ts. . .28- 29Impacts. . .30-3 1Chinese political stability turn.. .3 2A ff ans..33-37Ethnic ConflictsDAShell.. .38-41US gets mo delled.. .42-45 .A2: No threshold.. .46Impacts..47Impact takeou ts.. .48-50


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JVCB. Increasing US-EU relations weakens Europe's credibility with Iran- doomsnegotiationsSmeland, GSCP visiting fellow, 2004 p. http://www.gcsp.ch/e/about/News/Faculty-articles/Academic-articles/Smeland.pdfSean P., "Countering Iranian Nukes..")All of these proposals are mo re easily described than accomplished , and there is an important caveat to theissue of transatlantic coordination vis-avis Iran. By working to co ordina te policy with the United Sta tes,the Europ ean Union runs the r i sk of appea r ing too much l ike the handmaiden of I r an ' spr imaryadversary. I f th e European Union presents i tse lf as too c lose to the United Sta tes, or ap pea rs to bedomina ted by the Uni ted S ta te s, then I r a n i s un likely to forego domest ic u ran ium enr ichment a ndweapons capab il i t ies out of a fear of renewed isola t ion. I t is incumbent upon B russels to avoid th eappea rance of being a U.S. lackey and to continue to dist inguish i tse lf f ro m the U nited Sta tes in i tsper spe ctiv e a n d disp ositio n. FortunateIy (in this context), the continuing tensions over Iraq, as well asongoing differences of opinion on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, provide eviden ce that the EuropeanUnion is charting its own course. Fo r the purp oses of credibilitv vis-avis Iran , it is necessary fo r theEurop ean Union to continue to asser t i ts independence f rom Washington while st il l maintaining i tsoverall partnership with the United States. It is also necessary for the United S tates to allow itself to beinfluenced by th e European Union in order to bolster the European Union's legitimacy and bargainingpower with Iran.


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SDI 2005 (&- &A HR/SoftPowerJV CC. Iranian nuclearization results in a preemptive Israeli strike drawing in the USSalama and Ruster, Fellows @ CNS, 2004 p. http://cns.miis.edulpubslweeW O4O 8 12.htm(Sammy and Karen, "CNS: A Preemptive Attack on Iran's. ..")In I s r ae l, p lann ing and rheto r ic app ear t o have p rogressed qu i te a b i t fur the^-131; i t ap p ea r s t h a tsome in l s r ae l a r e ser ious ly considering a p reempt ive a t tack s imi lar to the June 1981a t t ack o nOs irak tha t destroyed I raq 's nucle ar reactor .[4] Meir Dagan, the Chief of Mossad, told par liamentmembers in his inaugural appearance before the Israeli Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committeethat Iran was close to the "point of no return" and that the spect er of Iranian possession of nuclear weaponswas the greatest threat to Israel since its inception.[5] O n Novem ber I 1,2 00 3, Israeli Foreign M inisterSilvan Sh alom said that Israel had "no plans to attack nuclea r facilities in Iran."[6] Less than two weekslater howeve r, during a visit to the United States, Israel's Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz stated that "underno circumstan ces would Israel be able to tole rate nuclea r weapons in I r an ia n possession"[7] and justsix weeks earlier, Mossad had revealed plans for preemptive attacks by F-16 bombers on Iranian nuclearsites.[8] This report will examine the following: The Ir an ia n n ucle ar facilities most likely to be tar getedand their proliferat ion r isk potential; the l ikely preemptive scenar ios involving Israel or the UnitedStates; an d the possible consequences of any preem ptive act ion.


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SDI 2005 HWSoft PowerJV CD. Middle Eastern War goes nuclearJohn Steinbach, Center for Research on Globalization, 2002 ("Israeli Weapons of MassDestruction: A Threat to Peace" - CRG)http:llwww.globalresearch.ca~articledSTE203A.htm~Meanwhile, the existence of an arsen al of mass des t ruct ion in such an uns tab le r eg ion in tu rn hasser ious impl ica tions fo r fu tu re arm s con t ro l an d d isa rma me nt nego t ia t ions , an dev en the th rea t o fnuclear war . Seymour Her sh warns , "Should w ar b re ak ou t in the Midd le Eas t again ,...or shouldany A rab nat ion f i r e miss iles agains t I s r ae l, as th e I r aq is did, a nuclear escalat ion, once unthinkableexcept as a last reso r t , would now be a s tron g probabili ty ."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's c urrentPresident said "The nu clear issue is gaining mom entum(a nd the) next wa r will not be conventional."(42)Russia and be fore it the Soviet unio n has long been a ma jor(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It iswidely reported that the principal purpose of Jonathan Po llard's spying for Israel was to furnish satelliteimages of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43)(Sinc e launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U S . spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aim ed atthe Russian heartland seriously com plicate disarmam ent and arms control negotiations and, at the veryleast, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dram aticallylowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... ifthe familar pattem(lsrae1 refining its weapons of mass des truction with U.S. complicity) is not reversedsoon- for whatever reason- the deep ening Middle Eas t conflict could trigger a world conflagration." (44)


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SDI 2005 /,jCyo&b;a .) (a ,) HRISoft PowerJ .VC

EU-Iranian negotiations will succeed in the status quoI R N A July 6,2005 p.L/NLuxembourg FM : EU interested in continuing dialogue with Iran Brussels, July 6, IRNA Luxem bourg-IranIran's ambassador to the European Union, Belgium and Luxem bourg, Ali Ahani, met Luxembourg ForeignMinister Jean Asselborn Tuesday and reviewed Iran-EU relations during Luxembourg EU presidencywhich ended on 30 June.It was noted by the two sides that during the six-mo nth period EU - -Iran relationship ma de positive strides,Iranian diplomatic sources told IRNA in Brussels.Ahani and Asselborn hoped that the EU-Iran negotiations on a Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA) aswell as Iran's nuclea r issue would reach desired results in favor of the both sides.Underlining T ehran'spositive role for regional stability, Asselborn said that the 25-mem ber European bloc wa s interested tocontinue its dialogue and engagement with Iran.He referred to Iran's cooperation with the International Atomic Energy Age ncy (IAEA) and noted thatfinding access to nuclear tec hnology for peaceful purposes w as a legal right of the country.Asselborn alsohoped that EU-Iran negotiations would resolve the nuclear issue.


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JV CIran willing to stop enriching uranium- next European proposal keyAFX International Focus July 13,2005 p.L/NTEHRAN (AFX) - Iran could change its nuclear policy, particularly i ts commitm ent to a freeze of ultra-sensitive uranium enrichment activities, top negotiator Hassan Row hani w as quoted as saying .'I think that nobody is hostile to the continuation of negotiations but differences are ~o s s ib le n the questionof the suspension, and it is possible that these differences are implemented,' Rowhani told the Sharghnewspaper .Rowhani 's com ments were published the day after hardline president-elect M ahrnood A hmadinejad vowed'new measures' in the Islamic republic's approach to the nuclear crisis as well as its foreign policy.Ahrnadinejad takes over from reformist President Mohamm ad K hatami on Aug 3, a sensitive junctu re forIran in its negotiations with Britain, France and Germany.The three European powers have promised to c om e up w ith an o utline for a long-term accord by the end ofthis month, and their proposal could make or break a leng thy diplomatic process aimed at easingwidespread fears Iran is seeking nuclear weapons technology.


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SDI 2005JV CIran suspicious of US infringement on nuclear talksBBC Monitoring International Repo rts July 14,2005 p. L/N-A . The re is no doubt that the nuclear issue is the biggest topic in our foreign policy and is even thought tobe our most pressing issue of national security since the imposed war. Apart from the imposed war we havenot had any issue that has caused a ma jor challenge to us like the nuclear dossier, both h o m the viewpointof our national security and our foreign policy. From various aspects the nuclear dossier has been our mostimportant issue in the history of the Islamic Republic and in the history of Iran. This is because in thenuclear dossier on the one hand we ar e facing an international body, which is the International A tomicEnergy Agency (IAEA) with 35 countries on its governing board. On the oth er hand we are facing theentire W estern front, including Europe and the United States. Th e issue is linked to a national desire forprogress and for advanced technology and is also linked to econom ic issues inside the country. On the othe rhand because o f the plots that the United States and other countries may hatch against us w ith regard to thenuclear issue, the matter be comes linked with our national security and other security questions. The reforeit is a very important, com plex and sensitive dossier, which w ill affect our national destiny, nationalsecurity and the country's progress. The dossier can continue its process through the Ministry of ForeignAffairs. At one point, three or four mon ths into the process of the dossier my own personal vie w was that itwo uld be best for the Foreign M inistry to pursue the issue but on the wh ole the officials in the country didnot approve this idea. So I continued with the dossier myse lf and it remained in the Supreme NationalSecurity Council. In the future the dossier could remain in the Council o r it could change its form and go tothe Ministry of Fore ign Affairs, keeping i n mind that at present the bulk of the responsibility for thenegotiations is with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs anyw ay. Th is means that it is the Foreign M inistry'sdiploma ts that cooperate with us, are active and take part in the negotiations. On the whole a major portionof the dossier's load is o n the shoulders of the Ministry o f Foreign Affairs and our various em bassies andsom e of the load is the responsibility o f the Atomic Energy O rganization (AEO). O f course there are otherorganizations and institutions that have responsibilities and for this reason the share of the responsibility iswith various organizations. The work was given to the Suprem e National S ecurity Council but I think thatat this particular point in time we h ave reached a certain stag e when the Ministry of Foreign Affairs cantake ov er the issue as a matter ofdo urse. But in any case the leaders of the regime have to make a decisionon the issue and it is the future president and the future government that will have this responsib ility. Ifneed be the current administration can canyon its work until the end of Mordad (August). The newpresident w ill begin his responsibilities o n the day of his confirmation, whe n he has his swearing-incerem ony in the Majlis in front of all the deputies. From that time he has tw o weeks to introduce hiscabinet. O nce the cabinet has been introduced the Majlis has one week to study the cabinet and then toente r into discussions for votes of confidence . So if we assum e that he is confirmed on 12 Morda d (August3, 20 05 ) and if he then is sworn-in in the Majlis on the 13th (August 4), it is up to him to ha ve his cabinetread y and if the cabinet is ready to go, it can be introduced to the Majlis on that same day. I f he is notready, he has two w eeks. S o we still have som e time yet before the new administration starts its work.Witho ut a doubt the new president himse lf and the other leaders of the regime that have had a presence inthis dossier, who hav e been active, will have a role in the decision-making to se e how they w ill guide theissue. I am sure that our basic policy on the issue will not change. Anyone taking responsibility for thedossier will continue ou r current policy. I am once again certain that all our officials are in favor of theprinciple of talks - for us to continue our negotiations with the Europeans. But as to what the conditionswill be, what sorts of interpretations will the Europeans hav e and whether or not we will be able to continueworking with the Europeans or if the who le issue will reach a deadlock - these are discussions that dependo n a whole host o f other issues that will affect our future activities and decisions.


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SDI 2005 US LJU &-I, HRISoft PowerJVCNe wl y minted conservative nuclear negotiato r will not respond well to pressure tactics innuclear negotiationsWorld Markets Analysis July 07 ,2005 p .L/NTh e head of Iran's Sup rem e National Security Council (SN SC) and leading nuclear negotiator, HassanRow hani, has resigned or is ready to resign according to conflicting Iranian reports. Earlier yesterday, thecountry's official IRNA news agency cited an 'informed source' who claimed R owhani had subm itted hisresignation to outgoing President Moh amm ed K hatemi. Given Rowhani's 'pragmatic' posture, speculationwas rife that he would not continue in his post under the new government of conservative Mahm oudAhm edinejad. However, the spokesperson for the SNSC , A h Aghamohamrnadi, imm ediately disowned thenews report telling Reuters it was 'a sheer lie ...Resigning at this time would be m eaningless'. Compoundingthe uncertainty, an unidentified source who is close to R owhani then told R euters that while the topnegotiator had not resigned, he would probably do s o in the near future. 'It seems he is not ready tocontinue this responsibility of heading nuclear nego tiations] when the new president takes office. It isdoubtful that his policies will be acceptable to the new government's policies', the source said.Significance: Rowhani's tenure as leading nuclear negotiator since October 2003 has proven successful,given Iran's ability to maintain talks w ith the European U nion (EU) despite pressure from the US to findIran in violation of international agreements. Wh ile the negotiations with the EU will resume next month,the Ahmedinejad p residency is expected t o take a far more sterner line: the president-elect has promised hisgovernment will not cower under pressure. However, Rowhan i made no secret of his support forAhm edinejad's rival in the election race, Ali Akbar R afsanjani. With their competing political ideologies,Row hani may now pay the ultimate political price and h and over the nuclear role to a more conservative-minded figure.


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SD12005JVCEmp irically the Europeans negotiate effectively with Iran; only the US can tank talksNewsday (New York) Novem ber 17,2004 p.L/NPresident George W . Bush, like it or not, may have to take Iran of f the "Axis of Evil," at least provisionally,and accept the agreement that the European U nion has wo rked out to freeze Iran's nuclear weaponsprogram. It's not the best deal - far from it - but it's a significant step toward the goal-of preventing lra nfrom becom ing a nuclear power.After lengthy and pained negotiations, EU envoys have persuaded Tehran to suspend within a week alluranium enrichment - a process necessary to the development o f nuclear weapons. In exchange, the EUoffered a g uarantee that United Nations sanctions would not be imposed on Iran fo r violating the NuclearNonproliferation Treaty, unless lran breaks the deal. In addition, the EU offered expanded eco nomic aid,and agreed to help lran de velop technology to produce nuclear power for peaceful civilian uses.The pressure is now on Bush to go along with the European agreem ent, which falls considerably short ofhard-nosed U.S. demands for a permanent freeze and, ultimately, the scrapping of any nuclear activitiesthat could be used to make weapon s - with the threat of stringent UN economic sanctions hanging likeDamocles' sword over Tehran.


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SDI 2005JVC HR/Soft Power

Middle Eastern war escalates to massive nuclear exchangeHouston Space Society, 1997 p . http://www.houstonspacesociety.org/mad.htmlANY nuclear attack initiated by any party ma y well escalate out o f control. I t is widely acce pted that Israelhas nucle ar weapons. If Iraq or any other nation delivers a nuclear warhead to target on a n Israeli city, theresponse is likely to be imm ediate nuclear retaliation. If the warhead is delivered not by missile but byterrorist activity, there is still som e possibility o f nuclear retaliation. Ho w the various nuclear po wers o f theworld respond to a small scale nuclear war in the Middle E ast is certainly an interesting subject fo ranalysis . The possib il i ty of such a small scale conflagration escalating into global thermonucle ar war see msvery real.


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SD I 2005 HR/SoftPowerJVCA preemptive strike on Iran will undo US-European relations destroying our soft powerGerecht, Fellow at AEI, March 1 2005 p.L/N(Mark, "Europe S hould Be Careful What It W ishe s For..")But this is not the direction we are going in. Th e odds are, M r Bush is not go ing to do Libya again. And theFrench and Germans are not going to take America's advice. The two-decade o ld strategy of AkbarHash emi Rafsanjani, the influential former president and the driving force behind Iran's nuclear w eaponsprogramme, is soon likely to come to fruition. Th e Islamic republic will ha ve successfully played divideand con quer against the west. If this leads to a clerical A-bo mb, or to a pre-em ptive US strike amid achorus o f European outrage, the odds are good that the bonds holding the US and Europe together willhr t her f ray. One day, perhaps af ter the EU l ifts i ts arms embargo on China an d France suppliessophisticated radar and torpedo technology to Beijing, they w ill snap.


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SDI 2005 HRISoft PowerJV CGoo d US-EU relations key to preserve stability and peace in the M iddle EastHamilton, Director of Centre fo r Transatlantic Relations, 611 1/03 p.L/N(Daniel, "Future of Transatlantic Relations")If our efforts in the se areas are ultimately to be succ essful, however, the y must be part of morecom prehensive transatlantic strategies aimed at the mode rnization and transformation o f the Greater Midd leEast itself. A circle--with its center in Tehran- that has a diameter roughly matching the length of thecontinental United States covers a region that encompasses 75 percent o f the world's population, 60 percentof its GNP, an d 75 percent of its energy resources. Th e Greater Mid dle East is the region of the worldwhe re unsettled relationships, religious and territorial conflicts, Gagile and failed regimes, and deadlycom binations of technology and terror brew and bubble on top of one vast, relatively contiguou s energyfield upon which W estern prosperity depends. Transform ation of this region is the strategic challenge ofour time and a key to winning the campaign against terrorism. Choices made there could determine theshape of the 2 I st century--whethe r weapons of mass d estruction will be unleashed upo n ma ss populations;whethe r the oil and gas fields of the Cau casus and Central A sia will become reliable sources of energy;whether the Arab world will meet the challenges of modernization and globalization; whether Russia'sborderlands will becom e stable and secu re democracies; whether Israel and its neighbors can live togetherin peace; and whe ther the great religions of the world ca n work together. This is a long term effort. Wecannot hope to transform this turbulent region into an area o f democra tic stability and prosperity soon. Butwe can act more successfully together to defend com mon interests, to dampen the negative trends that aregaining mom entum, and to work with those in the region who seek to carve out areas of civil society wherethe state does not in trude. Such an effort is far more likely to succeed if America and Euro pe were to poolour energies and resources and pursu e it together.


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SD I 2005JVCUS-EU relations key to solving terrorismNational Prospect April 2003 p.L/NBut the most striking and by far the most dangerous m isperception afflicting Bush 's approach to foreignaffairs concerns the war against transnational terrorism. Kagan asserts that Euro pe "has had little to offerthe United States in strategic military terms sin ce the end of the Cold W ar." Widely shared inside theadministration, this view is based on the prem ise that the "en d o f the Cold Wa r did not reduce the salienceof military power." M ilitary power is just as central to American security today as it-was during the C oldW ar -- that is what Kagan would have us believe. And after the Cold War, "E uropean military incapacity"means that our former allies have become alm ost wholly irrelevant to U.S. security. That is the assumptionbehind this book and, presumably, behind the un fathomably cavalier attitude of the Bush adm inistrationtoward our E uropean allies.

That this assumption is fallacious is the very least that might be said. The Sep tem ber 1 1 attacks were partlyplanned, organized and financed in Europe. Th e Muslim diaspora communities into which terrorist cellscan invisibly blend remain the likeliest staging grounds for future al-Qaeda attacks on the United States. Inother words, Europe remains a hontline region in the war against terrorism just as it was in the w ar againstcomm unism. As daily press reports also reveal, the European police have been acting in a perfectlyHobbesian manner, arresting s cores of suspected terrorists. In other words, despit e his pose as a no-nonsense realist, Kagan has apparently failed to realize the deg ree to w hich the contours of Americannational security have been redrawn since 9-1 1. The home front and the foreign ii-ont have now beendisconcertingly blurred. National-security strategy must now operate in a dom ain where soldiering andpolicing have become of coequ al importance. This profound change helps us understand the erroneouspremise of Bush's foreign policy . In our new security environment, despite the prevailing cliche, the U nitedStates is not the world's only superpower.

The war on transnational terrorism depends essentially on information gathering and policing, and in theserespects the Europeans a re anything but security pygmies. T hei r capacities to respond effectively to today'sgreatest security threats easily rival those of the United States. Europeans' linguistic skills and culturalknowledg e alone ensure that they can make ind ispensable contributions to U.S. security. They can performessential tasks of monitoring, infiltration, disruption and app rehension for which our own unrivaled m ilitarymachine is patently inadequate. Dismissing the "platitude" that the United States cannot protect itselfwithout European help, Kaga n announces that "the United States can 'go it alone."' Th is is apparently thethinking (if you can call it that) behind the administration's mindlessly denigrating remarks about Europe.True, European leaders can sometimes be hypocritical and foolishly cond escending. But let it pass. W ecannot afford, for the sake o f a fiisson, to underm ine Am erican security by further poisoning relations withcapable allies in a time of unprecedented national peril.


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JV C fIran plans to continue w ith nuclearizationAF X International Focus July 13,2005 p.L/NWhile Iran agreed to suspend uranium enrichm ent in October 2003 and wid en the li-eeze last year, o fficialshave voiced their determination to resume the dual-use activity - - the focus of suspicions the clericalregime wan ts to acquire the bomb.Iran claims it only wants to make atomic fuel for energy purposes and argues it has a right to do so as asignatory of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). However, it has a track record of covering up itsactivities and shopping illegally on the international black market.Iranian negotiators also said in comm ents published Tuesday that the country would soon resum eenrichment and will reject any EU proposal that do es not recognise the Islamic republic's right to d o so.


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SDT 2005 HIUSoft PowerJV CA . US-Sino relations good now - Condoleezza Rice visit provesAgence France Presse, 10 Ju ly 2005, pg: I/nUS Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice left Beiiing Sunday calling US-Sino relations positive andreiterating Washington's view that China is not a threat, but raised concerns with China's leaders overthe country 's military buildup, copyright violations and hum an rights.Despite rows over Chinese tex ti le expor ts , the surg ing US trade def ici t with China and the C hinesecurrency's inflexibility, Rice, who is on a four- nation Asian to ur tha t takes her next to Thailand, saidrelations were "complex" bu t good."There ar e many extremely positive elements. I still thin k that this relationship has a greatmomentum. It still has more positives th an negatives," Ric e told a news briefing after meeting C hineseleaders.B. I . I f the US increases rights to ease up its War on Terror it will increase rights pressureon ChinaGill , Director of China Studies @ CSIS, 2003 p.-ttp://~wv.~l0bal~olicy.0r~/nations/launder/re~ions/2OO3/O623china.htm(Bates, "China in Transition")I think we can expect some of these issues to become a bit more pressing, but largely on the backburnerfor the t ime being . Pro liferat ion is l ikely to be a problem that is going to keep popping up , especial ly incases that are still ongoing, that Chin a can be identified with to countries like Iran or North Korea , or otherswho ha ve been termed with in the axis of ev il . Taiwan is going to become a m ore press ing issue as theirelect ions approach in March o f 2004. I think we will be hear ing a little bit more language com ing fromTaiwanese poli t ic ians regarding the cross-Strai t relat ionship, about the need for Taiwan to have a moreindependent international stature. That interest has the potential to stir up the pot in US.-China-Taiwan relations. T he United States decided last month not to purs ue an annua l resolution in the UNHum an Rights Commission condemning Chin a for its human rights record. Tha t attempt hasperennially failed on th e part of the U.S., nevertheless, it h as always been a kind of thorn in th e sideof the relationship, and this year, t he United States decided not to pursue it. So that is an indicatorthat even the human r ights set of issues is again beinp pushed a little bit to the back in ord er topursue areas of common interest.


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SDI 2005 (1@ Dh ( d c H R I S O ~ ~owerJV C2. U S human rights policy mov es anger China- frays relationsQi,h.D Candidate @ Johns-Hopkins, 2005 p. I 1 1(Zhou, "Conflicts O ver Human Righ ts Betw een China and the US"), Human RightsQuarterly 27.1While the U S takes pride in pursuing hum an rights abroad and strives for self-identity in i ts foreign policy,many Chinese think tha t US human r ights policy essentia l ly uses t h e i s sue of hum an r igh ts a s anexcuse for the United Sta tes to intervene in other countr ies ' domestic affa irs and to advance its ownstrategic goals.In Chin a, US hum an r igh ts policy is generally called " hum an r ights diplomacy." implying that USpromot ion of human r igh ts in China has a n ins t rum enta l mot ivat ion , in tended to consolidate USpow er globally. "Th e hu ma n r ights issue was taken by th e US as a diplomatic tool to realize i tsnational interests," just a s the "Ping-Pong diplom acy"26 w as used by the Chinese leadership to deal withits relations with the United States in the early 1970s.27 In recent Ch inese publications, U S hum an rightspolicy is condemned, for instance, as "a tool for conducting 'peaceful evolution' in socialist countries . . . toattain its long-range strategic goal: to impose on socialist countries its own values, ideology, politicalstandards, and development model, aimed at changing the nature o f the C hinese socialist system ."28


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SDI 2005 HRISoft PowerJVCC. ].Good US -Sino relations is key to stopping East Asia nuclear arm s race becauseChine se pressure is necessaryMead, 19 June 2005(W alter Russell, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations,http://www.cfi.org/pub8 192/walter~russell~mead/should~nukes~b100mminsia.php)In part, this is a long-term strategy. From Washington's view, hooking a stagnating and increasinglyanxious Japan to a rising India would counterbalance China's growing power in Asia Australia also showssigns of a heightened interest in India as China's influence expands, and Indonesia has historically beenwary of China. The Bush administration is weaving a strategic net that it hopes in time could persuadeChina to keep its ambitions within reason.Short term, the dizzying diplomatic act ivi ty in Asia aim s to al ter Ch ina 's calculat ions abou t NorthKorea ' s nuclear p rogram. Beijing doesn't welcome nukes in Pyongyang. but it is reluctant to usesanctions to raise the pressure on North Korea that could cause its next-door neighbor to collapse. Thatwould send waves of rehgees into Chinese tenitory and might be a pretext for a U.S. military presence onits borders. In China's eyes, the risks of instability in North Korea may be greater than the costs of thestatus quo.The wild card in Washington's new Asia strategy is South Korea, where some opinion polls rank the U.S.as a greater threat than Pyongyang. Like China, Seoul is more fearful of North Korean instability or a clashwith the U.S. than nukes to its north. Any sign of resurgent nationalism in Japan is likely to drive SouthKorean public opinion closer to Beijing. Keeping South Korea on board is crucial for Washington.Th e pressure on Ch ina con t inues. " I f you had a n uclear Nor th Ko rea , i t ius t in t roduces a wholedif ferent dynamic," the U.S. ambassador to Japan recently said. "It seems to me that that increases thepressure on both South Korea and Japan to consider going nuclear themselves."Vice President Dick Cheney has made similar comments, as have prominent Japanese officials, including aformer foreign minister.The idea -- not yet a threat -- is that unless North Korea dismantles its nuclear program, Japan, South Koreaand even Taiwan might go nuclear in the not-so-distant hture. The United States has intimated thatalthough it would not aid or support any nuclear proliferation, it would be unable to control its allies'ambitions, just as China can't restrain North Korea's program.Bus h off icials ha ve repeated this message. China is the only cou ntry th at can pres sur e North K ore ato g ive up it s nukes . Only China ha s the car ro ts and s t icks tha t the Nor th Koreans r espect. W i thou tCh ina , no progress is possible. If North Korea s tays nuclear , the region will respon d in ways thatCh ina will hate.W i th China 's a nd Ind ia ' s power g rowing , Nor th K orea r a t t l ing it s nukes , Jap an becoming m orenationalis t ic a nd S out h Korea reconsider ing i ts relat ions with the U.S., this once-stable pa r t of thewo rld is in flux.A nuclear arm s r ace across East As ia would be hugely dangerous a nd des tab i liz ing . F ar be t ter th a tthe Bus h administrat ion convince China that the wiser course is to preve nt a nuk e rac e by tell ingPyongyang the t ime has come fo r a deal .


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SDI 2005 HRlSoft PowerJVC2. US m ilitary strike against North Korea would cause nuclear holocaust in East Asia( ) Carpenter '03(Ted, vice president for defen se and foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute,http://www.cato.org/pubs/@briefs/fpb73 pdf)I f the United Sta te s launched p reemptive mili tary str ikes against North Korea 's nuclear instal la tions.there would b e an asso r tment of grave risks. I t is not a t a l l cer ta in th at the United Sta tes hasidentified all of th e installations, m uch less th at it could successfully eradicate them . (Indeed, theuncertainty about the number- or even existence-ofNorth Kore an nuclear weapons illustrates the limitso f U.S. intelligence capabilities.) North K orea has had years to build installations de ep underground.Pyongyang's reaction to U.S. attacks would also be a matter of concern. It is unlikely that North K oreawould passively accept such a blow against its sovereignty. At the very least, W as hi ng to n would h av e toexpect terror is t re ta l ia t ion by No rth K orean operatives against U.S. targets overseas and, possibly, inthe United Sta te s itse lf . No rth K orea might even re ta l ia te by launching fullscale mili taw operatio nsagainst Sou th Korea- a development that would put US . forces sta t ioned in tha t country inimm ediate dang er . Indeed, in a worst-case scenar io, there is a r isk that m ushroom clouds couldblossom above Seoul and Tokyo-or above U.S. bases in So ut h Ko rea or Ok inaw a. It is notcoincidental that both South Kore a and Japan are strongly opposed to a confrontational strategy on th e partof the United States.9 Even those American pundits and policy experts who are usually inclined to rattlesabers seem strangely cautious in dealing with the current crisis. It is revealing that, in contrast to 1993and1994 when haw ks both inside an d outside the Clinton administration hinted darkly about the possibility ofpreemptive strikes, almost no on e today recommen ds that course. 10 (The only exceptions appear to beanalysts at the Herit age Foundation-and even their hawkishn ess is tentative.) 1 1 Given the potential fo rdisaster, one hope s that U.S. policymak ers con tinue to spu rn th e military option.


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SDI 2005JVCChina does n't like the western notion of universal hum an rights( ) Moore '99(Gregory, Assistant Professor of Political Science and East Asian Politics at EckerdCollege, http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/papers/O8-moore-O9-OO.pd~So from the Ch inese perspective, full y conceding today to universalist notions of hum anrights could bring great social, econo mic and political unrest to their country, and/orcould even mean the collapse of Chinese comm unism as we know it. The Chinese,therefore, see the present human rights debate as the continued at tem pt by Westerners todominate them and reshape them into an im age of the W est, philosophically,econom ically and politically. Y et the Chinese hav e always seen and continue to seethemselves today as hndamentally different from the West/the world, and quite capableof choosing their own path to developm ent. Consequ ently, they find it insulting that anation (the US) with so m uch injustice and so m any double standards in its ow n history(slavery, genocide of native populations, racism, C IA plots to overthrow governm ents,etc.), should deem itself worthy o f judging they, the C hinese, particularly as it concerns amatter that according to the UN Charter falls within the purview of their own sovereignauthority.


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SDI 2005 it), HRlSoft PowerJVCCriticism of China's human rights record hurts US-Sino relationsThai Press, 3 March 2005, pg: I/nSection: Regional News - China condemned a US State Department report criticizingChina's human rights record, saying that the report was a blow to relations between thetwo sides."We are very dissatisfied with this report and we protest it," Chinese Foreign Ministryspokesman Liu Jianchao said at a regular press conference on March. I-, adding that theUnited States should stop using double standards on human rights and stop interfering inthe internal politics of China under the pretext of human rights.He said that "this kind of report will do nothing good for the improvement of bilateralrelations. It will do no good to improve mutual confidence in each other." The spokesmansaid China has made important progress in human rights, in political and legal areas inthe past years, and that the protection of human rights had been written into the country'sconstitution last year.Liu said that China and the US differ on the definition of human rights and that the twosides should carry out dialogue to narrow their differences. - VNA


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SDI 2005 HRlSoft PowerJVCUS criticism of C hinese human rights record h urts relationsAP, 1 March 2005, pg: llnChina on T uesday condemned a State Department report criticizing B eijing's humanrights record, saying the review was a blow to relations between the two countries."W e are very dissatisfied with this report and w e protest this report," Chinese ForeignMinistry spokesm an Liu Jianchao said. "The United States should stop using doub lestandards on hum an rights and stop interfering in the internal politics of China under th epretext of human rights."H e added: "This kind of report will do nothing good for the improvem ent of bilateralrelations. It will do no good to im prove mutual confidence in each other."T he report, released M onday in W ashington, said China continued to commit "nu merousand serious abuses," especially against writers, religious activists, dissidents andpetitioners.T he abus es, it said, include d instances of extrajudicial killings, and o f torture andmistreatment o f prisoners leading to num erous deaths in custody."Au thorities were quick to supp ress religious, political and social grou ps that theyperceived as threatening to government authority or national stability, especially beforesensitive dates such as the 15th anniversary of the 1989Tiananmen massacre and othersignificant political and religious occasions," according to the report.Th e United States is likely to seek censure of Ch ina next month at the annual meeting ofthe U.N. Human Rights Comm ission in Geneva - a routine m ove by Washington,although no ne o f its proposals have been approved.Liu defended China's record, saying that the protection of human rights had been writteninto the country's co nstitution last year. The mention, howev er, was ambiguous and m adeno reference to political freedom."In the past years, China has m ade important progress in human rights, in political andlegal areas," Liu said. "We are working to improve the human rights situation in China inmo re fields to build a society that is harmonious and united."Th e official Xinhua N ews Agency said the State Council, China's cabinet, will release itsown assessment of the United States' hum an rights record on Thursday in a report that is"based on plenty of facts."It will show "the bad records of the United S tates concerning the invasions into othercountries and the mistreatment of foreign inmates, as well as the bad records in th easpec ts of life, freedom an d personal secu rity of U.S. citizens."Liu urged dialogu e between the United States and China to "narrow their differences."Th e report also said Hong K ong's political au tonomy, promised after the region's 1997return to Ch inese rule, w as "tested severely" in 2004.W hen the mainland's legislature ruled o ut universal su ffrage in the next elections forHon g Kong's chief executive last April, it "raised questions about the PRC 's willingnessto permit Hon g Kong to o perate with a high degree of autonomy."Liu dismissed the criticism, saying that "Hong Kong's affairs belong to China's internalpolitics and ... criticism is not ap propriate."


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SD I 2005 HRISoft PowerJV CChina resents U S human rights interlocutionQi,h.D Candidate@ Johns-Hopkins, 2005 p. 1 17(Zhou, "Conflicts Over Human Righ ts Between China and the US"), Human RightsQuarterly 27.1With regard to the issue of national sovereign ty and its relation to hum an rights, bot h the Chinesegovernme nt and the people believe that human righ ts are within China's own jurisdiction of sovereignty andthat other [End Page 1 181 countries have no right to interfere. China h as alw ays conde mned the USgovernme nt for intervening in its internal affairs and for ignoring its national sovereignty w hen th e latterhas pressured the forme r to improve its human rights record. Thoug h most C hinese citizens believe there ismuch to be d one to improve their country's hum an rights, they also agree that it is not the business of theUnited State s or other Western countries to interfere. Th ere is evidence that anyone in China wh o appealsto Western countries for aid to go toward democratizat ion ef for ts o r the advancement of human r ights willbe treated with disdain by his fellow Chinese citizens.


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SDI 2005 HRISoft PowerJVCRights promotion fails in China empiricallyQi,h.D Candidate @ Johns-Hopkins, 2005 p. 123(Zhou, "Conflicts Ov er Human Rights Between Ch ina and th e US"), Hzrmar? RightsQuarterly 27.1Th e Chinese view of huma n rights, its opinion on sovere ignty, and the Chincse government's practice ofhuman rights have caused conflicts behveen China and Western countries, especially the United States. Butma ny believe that the United States promo tion of human rights in China has failed. "Not only has i t failedto achiev e any significant improvement in China's human rights record, but, equally i-mportant, i t ha sdam aged America's reputation in the eyes of many Chinese, including those who are committed toreform."75 Th is is due to the US government's imposition of its own values and political institutions on theChinese.

Hum an rights criticism from the US destroys Us-S ino RelationsFinancial Times March 4,2004 p.L/NColin Powell, US secretary of state, hinted strongly yesterday that the Bush administration would sponsor aUN resolution this month criticising what it regards as "backsliding" in China's hum an rights record.M r Powell was speaking to a congressional committee shortly after the Hou se of Represe ntatives voted402-2 in favour of its own non-binding resolution calling on the Bush a dministration to take action againstChina at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva.Last year the B ush administration declined to sponsor a resolution critical of Ch ina, citing progress in itsrecord. Although a diplom atic dispute is in the making, the Bu sh adm inistration say s its relationship withChina is mature enough to dea l with the issue. Analysts in Wash ington said the tougher tone in theadministration's public remarks was also fuelled by growing concern at pressure on civil rights in HongKong and tension with Taiwan.China reacted angrily last week to the State Department's an nual human rights report, which was stronglycritical of China's crackd own on political an d religious dissent, sometimes usin g the interna tional "war onterror" as a pretext.


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SDI 2005 HWSoft PowerJVCHu ma n Rights key to U.S.-Sino relations( ) Moore '99(Gregory, Assistant P rofessor of Political Scien ce and East A sian Politics at EckerdCollege, http://www.du.edu/humanrights/workingpapers/papers/O8-moore-O9-OO.pd~Hum an rights is an issue that definitively exemp lifies the differences between the social,cultural7econ om ic and political systems of the world's mo st populous and the wo rld'smo st powerful nations, the People's Republic of China and the United Stat es of Am erica.Former param ount leader Deng Xiaoping him self is said to have stated, "The humanrights issue is the crux of the struggle between the world's two social systems. If we lo sethe battle on the human rights front, everything will be meaningless to us."] Recently,students of Sino-American and international relations h ave published a numb er ofinfluential wo rks describing what they see as Am erica's "coming conflict with China," o r"the clash o f civilizations" be tween the W est and China, both cases in which it is arguedthat the U nited States is destined to find itself if not at war with C hina in the near future,then at least in a serious political standoff with China, perhaps a new C old W ar.2 While Ithink such pessimism i s deterministic and unwarranted, the potential fo r serious conflictbetween Chin a and the United S tates is very real. Why is the human righ ts issue sosalient in Sino-American relations? D eng was right in the statement above, that the"battle" over alternate visions of human rights has im mense ram ifications for China.However, with t he end of the Cold War and th e liberalization of China's economy, I donot se e the "struggle" as being between two w orld systems as was the case during theCol d War, but rather as being between "universal" or "Western" and alternativeparadigms o f society, governm ent and economy. As it regards human rights, the"struggle".centers around an argument that human rights as defined in the U N documentsare universal, t he Western position. A n alternative view, posited by lea ders in China,Malaysia, and Singapore am ong others, is that human rights are not universal, but rathercan be defined only as being relative to local cultural, historical, and/or developme ntalrealities. If the Ch inese government prevails in its bid to m ake human rights seen asdevelopm entally relative, wh ich is the official Chinese view of human rights and will b ediscussed below , they will be a ble to hold their heads high a s they continue on theircurrent course of developm ent, wherein individual rights ar e sometimes subsumed for the"collective good" of econom ic development and the maintenance of order, the status quo,and the Chinese Com munist Party. If China bows to the universal interpretation of hum anrights found in the UN 's Universal D eclaration in the sense that it be fu lly implementedat present, it mu st mak e monum ental change s in its social order, its legal system, and itssystem of governance, acknow ledging that the state must b e absolutely and fullyaccountable to the people it gov erns in every respect.


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SDI 2005JV CNorth K orea talks continuing- the atmosphere is hopefulDaily Yomiuri July 12 2005 p.L/NWu Dawei, C hina's vice foreign m inister, who will head a Chinese delegation to six-nation talks on NorthKorea's nuclear development program, said Mo nda y that Beijing expects it will take som e time to realize anuclear-6ee K orean Peninsula.Speaking in an interview in Beijing with Kiichiro Ha rano , international editor of Th e Yomiuri Shimbun,Wu said, "It would be impo ssible to have just o ne round o f talks resolve every matter," indicating theChina-hos ted framework should be kept intact beyond the next round to deal with the North Korean nuclearissue.His remarks followe d North Korea's agreement with the United S tates on Saturday to return to the six-partytalks--last held in June last year--in the week begin ning July 25.Wu said China, wh ich chairs the talks, had begun approach ing the other participating countries--Japan,South Korea a nd Russia--to set an exact date for their delegations to sit down together in Beijing.Th e Chinese vice minister praised both Py ongyang a nd Wa shington for their efforts in reaching anagreement. He added that the two sides appeared to have had a substantial exc hange o f views.Wu said Tan g Jiaxuan, one o f China's five state councillors, who is scheduled to visit North Korea fromTuesday, was expected to thorou ghly discuss the nuclear issues with No rth Korean leade r Kim Jong I1 andother senior officials in Pyongya ng.North K orea negotiations go ing wellWashington Post July 102005 p.L/NNorth Korea h as agreed to return this month to six-nation talks aim ed at eliminating its nuclear arsenal,ending a year-long boycott, U.S. officials and the North Korean governm ent said Saturday.The agreem ent to restart the talks was reached at a rare dinner meeting here between a sen ior U.S. envoyand his North Korea n coun terpart, held shortly before Secretary of State Condoleezza R ice arrivedSaturday night for talks with C hinese officials on the North Ko rean issue.During the meal, Kim Gye Gwan, the North Korean deputy foreign minister, told Assistant Secretary ofState Christopher R. Hill that North Korea was w illing to attend talks in Beijing the week of July 25 ,according to a senior U.S. official traveling with R ice. In what U.S. officials took as an encouraging sign,they reported that Kim said the purpose of the talks was the "denuclearization of the Korean peninsula" andthat North Korea intended to make progress at the negotiations.Rice met with Ch inese President Hu Jintao, Foreign M inister Li Zhao xing and othe r Chinese officialsSunday morning. S he then was to fly to Phuket, Thailand, for a scheduled tour Mon day o f damage fromlast winter's Indian O cean tsunam i. Sh e then planned to return to Ea st Asia for talks with Japanese an dSouth Korean officials, also focusing largely on the North Korean issue.Rice, after meeting with Li, said Chin a and the United States agreed that resumption of the talks "is only afirst step. The rea l issue now is to mak e progress at these talks."Li added the two countries had a "shared goal -- a Korean p eninsula that is fiee of nuclea r weapons."China has already announced that State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan -- a former foreign minister who a lso plansto meet one-on-one with Rice -- will visit Pyongya ng this week as Hu's personal en voy, apparently toreport on the discussions with Rice.


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SDI 2005JV CCoercive inducements mean these negotiations with North Korea will succeedN Y T July 102005 p.L/Nher more than a year of s talemate, Nor th Korea agreed Saturday evening to return to d isarmament talks lateth is month and p ledged to d iscuss el iminating i ts nuclear-weapons program, according to senior Bushadministration officials.Th e agreement w as reached dur ing a d inner meeting , with the Chinese as the hosts, that includedChris topher Hil l , a former American am bassador to South Korea who has recently become the lead UnitedStat es negotiator to the talks, and Ki m Kye G wan , Nort h Korea's deput y foreign minister, according to aseni or administration official traveling here with Secretary of State Condoleezza R ice.The official Korean Central New s Agency also issued a s tatement f rom Pyongyang announcing the talkswould resume.Wh ile the Nor th Korean s have p ledged m any t imes before to return to the s ix-par ty talks -- the UnitedStates, Japan, South Korea, China a nd Russia also sit at the table -- this is the first time the y have actuallyset a date: the week of July 25 .Th e Chinese hav e offered to be the hosts of the discussions, and "all the parties have agreed," said a senio radminis trat ion of ic ia l t raveling with Ms. Rice, w ho d id not want to b e identif ied because Ms. Rice had notyet mad e a formal announcement. Ms . Rice, who is beginning a four-nation tour of Asia, and Li Zhaoxing,the Chinese foreign minister, plan to announce the agreement on Sunday morning.Am erica n officials were clearly trying to lower expectations. "Frankly," one of the administration officialssaid, "we just don' t kn ow" what will c ome of the talks, if they do take place as promised.Th e long-awaited return to negotiations carries considerable diplom atic perils on all sides, and would takeplace just as three European n ations are scheduled to cond uct talks with Iran about giving up criticalelements of its nuclear program .Am erica n officials say North Korea's e conomic situa tion has continued to deteriorate, and they hope to usethat as leverage in the coming talks. To increase the pressure, the Bush administration has put in p k c eplans for a ser ies of coercive act ions -- crackdowns on Nor th Ko rean sh ipments of drugs, counter fei tcurrency and arm s -- that would probably be ac celerated if the negotiations made n o progress."We've m ade it clear they can' t just com e back and lecture us, like the last sessions," a sen ior administrationoff icial in Washington said . "Either they get on the path to d isarmament, or we m ove to Plan B."


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SDI 2005 L L k HlUSoft PowerJV CChina key to successful North Korean negotiations- failed negotiations end the six partyformatThe Straits Times July 1 1 2005 p.L/NBElJlNG - NOR TH Korea yesterday pledged to 'do its utmost' to resolve the impasse surrounding itsnuclear weapons programme at upcoming talks.How ever, analysts cautioned that the new round o f negotiations later this month is unlikely to be the last .US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, whose whirlwind tour of Asia is focused on the stalled nu cle a~talks, said Pyongyang 's decision to return to the negotiating table is welcome new s, but is 'only a start'.Speakin g to reporters yesterday after meeting top Chin ese leaders in Beijing, Dr Rice sa id: 'It's not the goalof the talks to have talks. It is the goal of the talks to have progress.'The issue now for North Korea is to m ake the strategic choice to give up its nuclear weapo ns programm e.Th is is not just a conce rn of the United States. This is a concern of all of North Korea's neighbours.'Afte r being bogged down for over a year, the six-nation talks - involving the two Koreas, U S, China,Russia and Japan - will reconvene a fourth round of negotiations in Beijing in the week beginning on July25 .

The decision was made after Beijing brokered a secret meeting between Washington and Pyonyyang in theChinese capital on Saturday, media reports here said.U S Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian Affairs Christopher Hill met North Korean Deputy ForeignMinister Kim Gye Gwan, and reached the agreement to resume talks hours after Dr Rice touched down inBeijing on Saturday.A day later, Pyonyy ang followed up with m ore conciliatory comments.A North Korean Foreig n Ministry spokesman wa s quoted by the country's state news agenc y as saying:'The resumption o f the talks itself is important but the most essential thing is for...an in-depth discussion onways of denuclearising the Korean Peninsula to ma ke substantial progress in the talks.'North Korea will d o its utmost for it.'China has hosted three rounds of inconclusive talks to resolve the nuclear stand-off, which flared up in late2002 when the US accused North Korea of violating a 1994 agreem ent not to operate a nuclear armsprogramme.Chinese President H u Jintao yesterday said efforts to resolve the issue have gained 'good m omentum' andthat China 'will continue to play a construc tive role in seeking progress in the new round of six-party talks'Security analyst Wa ng Xiangsui, how eve r, said the fourth round of talks is unlikely to be the last assubstantial issues like Pyonyyang's demands for aid and security guarante es have yet to be hammered out.North Korea has demanded security guarantees, energy assistance and an end to economic sanctions, butthe US has insisted that Pyongya ng dismantle its nuclear weapons program me v erifiably and irreversiblybefore terms can b e negotiated.'A fourth round o f talks provides fre sh hopes but there are also hidden dangers a s well,' said Professor ShiYinhong o f the People's University.If the new round o f talks once again fails to make a ny substantial progress, Washington might be promptedto abandon the six-nation format altogether and take up the issue with the United Nations.


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SDI 2005 I, P r - H ~ s o f towerJVC JThe six party talks are the only hop e for successful North Korean disarmam ent; withoutnegotiations they will con tinue their arm s buildupwashington pist February 132005 p.LI1.JIF NORT H KORE A'S declaration of itself as a nuclear pow er was intended, as it seems to have been , toshock the world and thereby pressure the United States into ma king unwarranted concessions, then theBush administration responded well by playing it down. The erratic Py ongyan g regime, officials pointedout, has m ade similar statements before. U.S. intelligence has cred ited the North with a couple of bombs fora decade, and in the absence o f a nuclear test, there's no way to know whether it has workable warheads.The administration is also right to dismiss, again, North Korea's attempt to insist on bilateral negotiationswith the Un ited States. Th e Bush a dministration's recruitm ent of China, South Korea, Japan and Russia for"six-party" talks was its sole success on the Ko rean front in the past four years and should be preserved.The latest declaration nev ertheless underlined the d istressing truth that as the threat fiom North Koreagrows steadily worse, the administration lacks an effective strategy to counter it.One sympto m of the problem is that the latest North Korea n mo ve took Washin gton and its allies bysurprise. They had expected th e regime of Kim Jong I1 to grudgin gly agree to a new round of the six-partytalks next m onth. It's possible, even probable , that the North wa nts to avoid delivering the answ ers it wouldbe asked for at those talks. Thes e include its response to an eight-month-old U.S. offer of political andeconomic concessions following the disclo sure of its nuclear facilities, and an explanation of ev idence,recently supplied by a U S . envoy to the Asia n governments, that North Korea supplied Libya w ith uraniumsuitable for processing into bom b material. Unsatisfactory ans wers by Pyongy ang would risk alienating notonly the Bush administration -- which anyw ay may not be w illing to strike a deal with Mr. Kim -- butChina and So uth Korea, which have the ability to strangle the North by cutting off supplies of food andenergy or even to cause its collapse by opening their borders to refugees.North Korea has been trying, with some suc cess , to convince its neighbors that the United States is theobstacle to progress becau se o f its refusal to offer the North grea ter concessions. Th e Bush administration,in turn, hopes to convince the Chinese and Sou th Koreans that Pyongy ang will never yield its nukeswithout far greater external pressure -- pressure that only those countries, or the U.N. Security Council, caneffectively apply. In fact, a diplomatic success is hard to imagine without a little of both: more determinedaction by North Korea's neighbors and an unambiguo us dec ision by the Bush adm inistration to settle fordetente with the North, rather than regime change .Neither development seem s likely. The Chinese leadership of Hu Jintao appea rs far more concerne d withsuppressing any hint of political change at hom e than promoting it in North Korea. The leftist South.Korean government, mean while, clings to a strategy of subsidizing Mr. Kim. B ush adm inistration hard-liners brandish the North's latest man ifesto a s proo f that negotiations are a wa ste o f time.Meanwhile, according to U.S. intelligence estimates, North Kore a probably continues to build weapo ns andprocess nuclear material. It may be looking beyond Libya for new customers fo r such products. Mayb ethere is no w ay to neutralize this threat, but the Bu sh adm inistration needs to rethink its own failing policy.


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SDI 2005 -dk @ H R I S O ~ ~owerJVCUS attack on North K orea would result in ma ssive death and destruction on the peninsula( ) Speed and Ma y '05(Rog er and Michael, affiliate of the Center for International Security and C ooperation atStanford University and Professor Em eritus in the Stanford University School ofEngineering http://www.thebulletin.ors/article.php?art~oh=maO5speed)Consider th e case of North Korea. A fter their 2003 summit, Bush and Japanese PrimeMinister Junichiro Koizumi stated bluntly that they "would not tolerate" a nuclear-armedNorth Korea. If negotiations fail, the implication o f the Bush do ctrine i-s that the UnitedStates might try to disarm N orth Korea of its nuclear weapons by a military strike.Intermediate steps such a s a blockade of North Korea appear more likely at the time ofthis writing, but these are acts of war, and North Korea has stated it would construe themas such. A s a result, if negotiations break down , escalation i s a clear possibility.North Korea already has a stockpile of chemical and biological weapons and is thought tohav e at least a few nuclear weapo ns. Locating North Korea's weap ons could be verydifficult, if not im possible. At most, the United States might b e able to strike at theidentified nuclear production reactor and reprocessing plant in Yongbyon and a numb erof suspect military sites. In retaliation, North Korea has ann ounced that it would un leasha massiv e attack (w hich could be co nventional, chemical, biological, and/or nuclear) onSou th Korea and the U.S. troops stationed there.North Korea has thou sands o f artillery pieces and h undreds of missiles that are withinstriking range o f the m ore than 10million people in Seo ul. T o deter a U.S. preventivewar, the North could threaten (and execute if necessary) a retaliatory attack against Seoul.Unless North K orea's firepower could be suppressed, the immediate consequ ences couldbe d evastating--hundreds of thousands in Seoul could be killed in a very short time.To have a chance, the United S tates would probably want to procure hundreds o f newmissiles with sm all nuclear weapons, maintain them on high alert, and maintain constants u ~ e i l l a n c e f the area. Even then protecting S eoul would be difficult, sin ce during theinitial U.S. attack most of North K orea's artillery might be iri hardened shelters. Even ifonly 10 or 20 percent o f the artillery and short-range missiles survived, Pyongyan g couldstill probably devastate S eoul. Sinc e longer-range missiles in the rear might also survive,a nuclear or chem ical attack would not even ha ve to rely o n close-in artillery or missiles.If North Korea d oes have so me numb er of missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, it wouldalso have the option of using a few of these to destroy U.S. base s in South Korea andJapan, o r at least could threaten to do so. Th ese are military targets that could legitim atelyb e attacked following a U.S. first strike. Disabling them w ould cripple U.S. capabilitiesand h rth er split the United States from its allies. A U S . preventive war posture, coupledwith the overt nuclear threat to North K orea posed by the U.S. nuclear posture, wouldenhance both t he plausibility and t he likelihood of such a North Ko rea response.Thus, even if the United States procured ma ny new nuclear weapons and'rnissiles, a U.S.-initiated war could still result in thousands o f Am erican and millions of Korea ncasualties, ma ssive destruction on the Korean Peninsula, and countless other seriousrepercussions--though the United States might eventually prevail.


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SDI 2005 HWSoft PowerJVCAttack on North K orea would cause hu ge collateral dam age( ) Bennett '03(Bruce, senior policy analyst at RAND,http://www.rand.org/commentary/0l1403 SDUT.htm1)

Option two: If we ch oose the option of attacking North K orean nuclear productioncapabilities - as President Clinton apparently considered in 1994- w e would likely ca usesubstantial collateral damage and radioactive fallout that could drift over South Korea,Japan or China. We may b e unable to locate all North K orean nuclear weapons forattacks. North Korea m ight then feel compelled to use the remainder before losing them .And o f course, any military attack on North Korea migh t also kick off North Koreanretaliatory attacks or a wid er war. This could put C hina in the difficult position ofchoosing sides.US strikes on North Korea would cause ma ssive retaliation( ) Blumenthal '05(Dan, Resident Fellow at the Am erican Enterprise Institutehttp://www.aei.org/publications/pubID.228 17,filter.all/pub-detail.asp)An imm ediate option for dealing with North Korea's nuclear program would be toconduct surgical, preemptive strikes against North Korean facilities to eliminate thenuclear threat. This option is all the mo re appealing when one considers America'spreponderance in intelligence gathering capabilities, stealth bomb er aircraft, standoffmunitions, and bunker-busting bom bs; however, th e risks of such an attack far outweighthe likely benefits. Since Israel preemptively destroyed the Iraqi Osirak nuclear reactor atTuwaitah in 1981 , would-be nuclear proliferators have taken a variety of concealmentmeasures in order to prevent the key comp onen ts of their nuclear weapon s manufacturingprocess from being identified and targeted. North Korea, as the world's most closedsociety, has been able to undertake significant measures in this regard, and the UnitedStates has not even been able to successfully identify its uranium enrichment facilities, akey co mpone nt o f its nuclear program. T hus, it is not clear that a preemptive, surgicalstrike would be able to identifjr and destroy targets inside of the D PR K Th ere is also theproblem of how Pyongyang would react. North Korea has 70 percent of its 1,003,000ground forces personnel deployed along th e Demilitarized Zone bound ary between thetwo Koreas, including approximately 4,000 tanks and assault guns, and 2,500 armoredpersonnel carriers.[] 51 North Korea possesses so me 1 00 No-dong m issiles that couldstrike civilian and military targets in Japan, possibly w ith W MD warh eads.[l6] If theDPR K leadership truly believed that it had nothing to lose, its Taep'o-dong 2 missileforce can strike the continental U nited States. In short, we re North Ko rea to retaliate forsurgical strikes, it has great military capabilities with which to do so.


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SDI 2005 HWSoft PowerJVC /Hum an rights agitation in China now is limited to politically inefficacious sortsElliott, Staff Writer, 2005 p. InfoTrac(Dorinda, Time, "The Last Frontier.. ."Should China b e praised for its progress on human rights or criticized for its continued failings? Proba blyboth. According to human-rights monitor John Kamm, some 3,000 people are sentenced for nonviolentpolitical and religiou s offenses every year. And yet, China's people have gained room to maneuver,especially in pursuit of their livelihood. That has set o ff shock waves--hug e incom e disparities andcorruption--that could threaten party control. By official a ccounts, there were 58 ,000 protests in 2003, a sworkers, peasants and even stock-market investors fought e verything fiom corruption to overtaxation.China can't sto p the outbursts, but it won't let any one use those grievances to challenge party rule.

Rapid transition to dem ocratic Western s tyle regimes o f rights will topple the Party inChinaGill, Director of China Studies @ CSIS, 2003 p.-ttp:ilwww.~lobalpolicy.or~/nations/launder/regions/2003/0623china.htm(Bates, "China in Transition")It does cut across the whole range of challenges. Th e Chinese lea dership is facing a kind of double-edgedsword. On one han d, meeting the socio-econom ic and even political challenges that they face will dem anda greater degree of openness, a greater degree of transparency , accountability and acce ptance ofresponsibility, in orde r to gain the confidence of the citizenry, and also to im plement the kinds o f reformsand adequate respons es to these change s in the first place. But in do ing all that, it is going to have in s om ecases an underm ining effect on the party itself, because it is going to call into question m istakes they hav emade in the past, and those they will certainly make in the hture. It will force them to make toughdecisions in terms of staffing and in terms of leadership. It is going to force them to take on a kind ofmeritocracy at the top, rather than leadership that is determined by other factors such as ideological purityand relationships, or what is known is China as guanxi. So they have to walk this tightrope between thesetwo goods. It is a difficult choice between two good things, which ma kes it difficult. So far, I think theChinese lead ership has done a pretty good job, but I think these challenges are only goin g to increase. It isgoing to become a larger and larger set of tough decisions for the fbture.


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HRISofi PowerJV CChina already reforming human rights policiesElliott, Staff Writer, 2005 p. InfoTrac(Dorinda, Time, "The Last Frontier.. ."To anyone w ho has followed China, it's an incredible scene. Not long ago, it would have beenunimag inable for Wang to so openly criticize the government or to arm herself with the law--and all whilesipping a cappuccino. True, W ang hasn't found justice yet. But compared with the repression of the past,when comp lainers went to jail and the Comm unist Party controlled every aspect of life, China can beexhilaratingly free. The Chinese can d o virtually anything today, from finding a job to singing karaoke insparkling broth els to organizing to protect the environment. I f you stood on a street comer and cursed theleaders, passersby m ight think you were nuts, but you might not even be arrested.


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?SDI 2005 P.t/sd.rl , HR/SofiP~werJVCChine se human righ ts reforms inevitableElliott, Staff Writer, 2005 p. InfoTrac(Dorinda, Time, "The Last Frontier.. ."Will a freer econom y lead to more Geedom ? Optimists believe that a growing middle class will push forlegal protections--and, eventu ally, political change. Th e cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Ch ongqing alrea dyhave hired an independ ent pollster to find out what the people think of their governance. Sure, there's along way t o go. Wang, the evicted S hangha i resident, can't even find a lawyer to take up her case. That maybe because m ore than 400 lawyers have been detained since 1997 in connection with defend ing clients."This country is far fiom having rule of law," says Mo S haoping, China's leading human-rights lawyer.China's leaders, eve r conscious of history, argue that stability must come first. " I f you haven't been throughthe Cultural Revolution, you don't know what hum an rights means," say s Sun Chao, a Shanghai officialwho is pushing for transparent gov ernme nt. "In my com pound, people w ere jumping o ff the rooftops."Given that lega cy, Sun go es on, "China is developing huma n rights faster than any country in the world."Taiwa n and S outh Korea, of course, survived for decades as dictatorsh ips even as they opened up theireconomies. But as more Chinese like Wang start demanding their rights, the government may learn toadapt. "H istory was pushed forward by peo ple like me," says W ang. After all, look at Taiw an and SouthKorea today: they are both democracies.


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HRISoft PowerUS-Sino relations good because of Chinese economic developmentPeople's Daily Online, 1 1 July 2005,http://englishl .peopIe.com.cn/200507/1 l/eng2005071 1 -1 95438.htmlRice said China is now in a transition period. A rising China will be an active force onthe international political stage. The US-China relations have made great progresses inthe past years and the bilateral economic and trade cooperation is healthy and energetic.China and the US have carried out effective cooperation in a wide range of fields and thetwo countries have common concerns on many international and regional issues. Somefrictions between the two countries do not mean that the US views china as a threat.China, with rapid economic growth, is making contributions to the world economy.China's economic development is a good thing.


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SDI 2005 HR/Soft PowerJVC,

China is op en to pressure to reform hum an rightsHuang, Margaret, M arch 20 01Program director for Asia and th e Middle East at th e Robert F. Kennedy Memorial Center for Human Rightshap://www.rfkmemoriaI.org/CENTEWHwmggChinaaArtceim

During the 1970s and 1980s, U.S. officials viewed China as an important counterweightto the power and influence of the Soviet Union. T h e primary U.S. objective-to contain theSoviet threat-took precedence o ver any concerns abou t repression or human rightsviolations in C hina. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, Washington policymakershave struggled to redefine a strategic framework for the U S . relationship with C hina.Under the Clinton administration, there was a lot of talk about the importance of humanri$ts, but many Clinton foreign policy initiatives emphasized opening China's econom yto U.S. compan ies more than enhancing human right protections. W ith the newadministration, there is an o pportunity to revise U S . policy to more effectively addresshuman rights concerns. Equally important, as Chin a bids to host th e 2008 Olymp ics,Beiiing ma y be more responsive to international pressure to imp rove its human rightsrecord.


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SDI 2005JVCA . US human rights policies are modeled globally

HFUSofi Power

Mertus, 2004 [ ~ & eA., Professor of Law Ohio Northern, ~ a i t a n d witch: Human Klm ts ana U.S. Foreign

I T h i s book is abou t the future of human r ights in U.S. foreign-policy. Many fear that the era of human rights ended the dayterrorists turned jet planes into weapo ns of destruction an d flewthem in to the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.' Or, manybelieve, human rights ended shortly after September 11, 2when--he Uni ted Sta tes re ta l ia ted wi th u~l~_t_era l i s tolicies invdation of international standards, under th5assumption%tth ey c ou ld e st ab lis h t he rules=-e re st of t he w o ~ d ~ s a g r e e ,-- -b in a waF& at may be s lightly confusing for the reader lookingfor a clear thumbs up or thumbs down on human r ights. Icontend that human r ights are st i l l important for U.S. foreignpolicy. T u t e d States IS in-fact still leadm g the wo rld on- --_-__

h u m an rig hts, b u t in t he w ro n g d i r e c t i ~ o r n o t 1 n g X O r f i $ minstrumentalism L_ver l~ngterrnethicZ~~nc_i~_l~,-&~b&~f~ii-_--d&d s Instead of fair dealing, and a fearful view of hu man natureo v ~ T e e o p ' i G o ~ G C r i G ~ l y p h l s f i c a t e drray ofno&-~~~~afiizations (NG Os ) and other leaders incivicsociety continue;o deman d that hum an rights ideas be morefully incorpora ted in to U.S. foreign policy. To som e extent, theseadvocates have succeeded in framing public policy choices inhuman rights terms, but too often competing interests eclipsehuman r lghts considera tions . H wu n.r ig hts - ta lk h a s not bqena c _ c ~ b ~ h u U m ~ nights behaviors4


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SD I 2005JV CHRlSofi Power

B. Policies focusing on ethnic differences and rights affects ethnic relations in othercountries( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (David an d Dona ld , Professor o f Po l it ical Sc ience a tCorne l l Unive r s i ty an d Professor o f Po li t ica l Sc ience a t Unive r s i ty o f Ca l i fo rn ia a t Davis , TheIn te rna t io na l Spr ead of E thn ic Conf l ict : Fea r , Di f fus ion , an d Esca lat ion , P . 36-37)

6h e . s ec on d segment o f the a rgument r ecognizes that motives to ~e r f o rm h -nically meaningful behaviors are determined partly by the ethnic activities ofot he r stat es. Et hn ic st rif e w-e&ate.-seensitizes peo ple els ew he re to the irown ethnic particularities, possibly raising their expectations of ethnic conthci--a x o m e . We Yhiil-~;Chit inte%tio?d-GG?&ependencies can- ive certaincoun tries dispropo rtionate global significance. Und er the right circumstances,-- nfact ,-..-nzwzahaQroduces- . thnic dissimilation within one coun try might- - ~ .-- .___touskoff a &.erbandwagon that he& htens the role of ethnicity in successive othh)

; 6 p h k argument accom mo &tC sX ex is ten ie o~ondi t ion ; t l ;a t accord_e-&nE---.-

- .--%tilo~n?within a p a r t ~ c u l i r ;u ii!3 $ ~ ~ ~ m i n u n ~ t yo ethn ic dissimilation else--.,_*..-- . ..--w G i t s co ns is te nt w i th a p er si st en t s t a & X I o w e th n ic ac tiv ity M o re ov er,~ t a E m a ynfluen ce one ano ther asymmetrically. Because of the en orm ous influ---_ . , .e n ~ i c i e simed at helping-A'merican ethnic m inorities I,are l ik el y t o k v e a n e ~ ~ e c i a l ~ ~ e ~ ~ i m ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ i o n slsewhere. \--In the presence of multiple social equilibria, small shocks t o a country,whether internal or external, - e-chan~s, nd it the interdepen-dencies among individ ual behaviors are not readily observable, the chan ges willexhibit an other characteristic: imperfect predictability. A key aspect of the modeloutlined below is that the interdependencies among individual behaviors are~ o o r l y bservable. The source of unobservability is ethnicpreferencefalsijication,the act of misrepresenting one's ethnic ne eds un der real o r imagined social pres-s u r e ~ . ~n the p resence of suc h preference falsification, ethni c dissimilation neednot involve changes in ethnic dispositions or prejudices. It can occur withou t aprior buildup of ethnic mistrust or a prior escalation in the perceived need forethnic solidarity. Moreover, the contributors to dissimilation may include indi-viduals who would rather not alter their behaviors. In any case, whatever theattitudinal transformations that precede a dissimilation process, the consequentchanges in the social importance of ethnicity may be disproportionately large.The possibil i ty of di~proport ionali t~etween causes a nd effects, coupled withthe imperfect observability of the possible causes, lessens the predictability ofethnic dissimilation processes. At the same time, the very factors that make itdifficult to forecast the course of ethnic relations facilitate retrospective ex-planation7/( -37


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SD12005JVC HIUSofi PowerC. This dissimilation results in escalatory ethnic conflicts( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (Dav id an d Do na ld , P rofessor of Po l i t ica l Sc ience a tCo me l l Univ e r s i ty a nd Professor o f Po l i tica l Sc ience a t Unive r s i ty o f Ca l i forn ia at Davis , TheIn te rna t io na l Sp rea d of E thn ic Confl ict : Fea r , Di ffus ion , an d Esca la t ion , P . 30-31)

( act as a trigger for lnterslate confl ~ct n fourotherways First , m processes similar E $ e- f i m -and most dlrecl path Bf d~ ffu---- - -o n above , e thn ic war fa re may s ~ l lgvey_in_ton&hbonng terntones and-draw---- - - I_ -1 states Into v~olen ceEthnic combatan ts In one state may use the ternto ry of-a sec--------.-./-ond for s tag ~ng reas, retreats, and so forth-w~th or without the latter's consentThis spdlover can lead to recrlminatlons between the two affected states and, Incases of "hot purs uit," direct border clashes that may sp ~r al ut o f control AsKeller (Chapter Twelve) agarn n otes, s uch spd lovers have been a frequent worryIn A frica In M arch 1 991 , ln but one posslble exam ple, Charles Taylor's forces mL ~ b e r ~ aolned wlth S~ erra Leonean d~s sld ents and w a d e d Sie rra Leone(W ~p pm an 993, 170 ) There have also been problems In the form er Yugoslama,with mlnor mcldents occurring at the Austrian border, SerblaMJNA overflights ofHungary and the bomblng of a border vdlage, and JNA forces withdrawngthrough Italian territory (Steinberg 1993, 52) . Although potentially dangerous,and often used as an excuse for involvement by neighbors looking for a greaterrole, such spillovers can normally be resolved amicably However, as bordersbecome more fluid in areas of ethnic instability, and if the strategic dilemmasbecome acute, violent encounters may ensue.Second, ethnic mobilization often contains within it an irredentist dimension,__.-- -.-__ . .as-!LThE. ieaders d e ~ ~ ~ e a ~ d d ~ y t h ~ ~ b u to n e ~ ~ I e s ssalient ethnic homeland-typically- -. defined as the largest area of terri-to >'e v~ r= & ~= fi3 = to have been controlled by the group (Carment1994; Carment and James 1995). Examples include Somalia3 invasion of theOgaden region of Ethiopia, Nazi Germany3 incorporation of the Sudetenland,and Pakistan and India's continuing conflict over Kashmir. in Chapter Five,Fearon conclu des that irredentist conflicts are particularly prone to problems ofcredible com mitmen t.Third, ethnicityg_rordes a stron g basis for "diversionary wars" stim ulated byL ----._I--- - - - . ~-.. -.-. -- ^ -. --political___eaders-b e s & b ~ & g ~ ! k n- dfrpPm.e rid see~!ng.t.o__r_al~-:upportfd;@ircontin ued ry&-.ipmi!j%~onflict abroad." Ethn icity and its em otion al appe al i o

. -an "us versus them " outlook hrovid es a particularly salient principle of organiza-tion and support. This was precisely the strategy used by Serbian PresidentMilosevic; faced with growing opposition to his presidency and a majority thatfavored far-reaching economic reforms, which he opposed, the embattled presi-dent "played the ethn ic ca r d a nd precipitated the collapse of Yugoslavia (Batesand Weingast 19 95 ; Diilas 199 5. 85 and 105).. >F o u r t h , d a t o r p a & e s ~ t h i n he region may consider states with significantinternal conflicts to be gasy ta=wm-weakeneasenaggressor states may calculate that the xr o sp ec ts for an easy-*pap vi ct or yz e.--- --now Ereater t ~ n - b ~ ~ e _ ; c h a l ~ e ~ g G g t h earget is thu s more attractiv=thiopiakinternal weakness, for example, appears to have contributed to Somaliak 1977challenge in the O gaden (Carment and James 19 95 ,94 ). Such strategies may alsobackfire, however, as predatory states often appear to miscalculate the rally effectthat their aggression provokes. This may have been the case in the Ogaden war,when Siad Barre sought to take advantage of the revolution in Ethiopia to settleoutsta ndin g territorial issues to his advantage; contrary to h is expectations , Barreactually mobilized support for the new regime in Ethiopia and locked his coun-try into a costly war.) 3 -


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HRlSoft Power

D. The impact is war, genocide, racism, and terrorism


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TAe U.S. ?r f - / 64 d + A & i C O ~ ~ P : ~ P; e ~ f &&jOKuran, 1998 [Timur, The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict, "Ethnic Dissimilationand Its International Diffusion," Professor of Political Science at USC, p.-]

We live in an age when Euro-American civilization in general, and AmericanL I T ure in particular, contributes heavily to global understandings, myths, sensi-tivities, and attitudes. People everywhere watch American movies and receivenews from American press services. And throughout the world large numberswant to rebuild their countries in the image of the United States. The globalimpac t of American culture is akin to the influence that Roman-Hellenic c-ultureonce enjoyed in the Mediterranean basin. The relevant consequence here is that

,ethnic relations in the United States set salient examples from which people in~other countries draw lessons, authority, and inspiration. Although the United jStates does not s hape global expectations unilaterally, the influences that it exerts

are highly disproporti na e to its global share of pop ulatio n, even perhaps to itsglobal share of in c o m a5~


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Johnson - Vats - Cleary SD I 2005HR & sof t Power Core u (5 w3 d e \ \ d . of- -Other Countries listen to U.S. human rights messagesSikkink, 2004 [Kathryn, Mixed Signals:U.S. Human R i~ h t solicy and Latin America p.

pummighis m esag es are intrinsically hard t o deliver and hard t$& government engaged in repression does not want to hear messages ab;

L -./ man rights. Gove rnment forces involved in repression are breaking,I L ~ estic and internat ional law. Because they know that what the)' are.e i


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Johnson - Vats - Cleary 5 4 ~od i d l e d SD I 2005HR & Soft Power Core-Of-

Global influence of US ethnic policies based on perception of reality.( ) Lake a n d Rothchild, 1998 (Da vid a nd Do nald, Professor of Pol it ical Science a tCornel l Univ ers i ty a nd Professor of Pol i t ical Science at Univers i ty of Cal i fornia a t Davis, TheInter nat ion al Spr ead of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffus ion, a n d Escalation, P. 55-56)here have been countertren ds. For example, the co nsumption p atterns of allmajor ethnic groups have accommodated the steady flow of new consumer-

goods. And they have been equally quick to adopt new production technologies.Such tre nds undou btedly influence global perceptions concern ing the social sig-nificance of ethnicity in the United S tates. But they do no t offset the influence o fpolicies and statements that celebrate ethnic rights and differences. As in otherdomains, it is the perception of reality that guides individual responses, not real-ity itself; and the perception is shaped largely by trends that receive attention. IfAmerican public discourse emphasizes the negative dimensions of American eth-nic relations, other countries will be exposed to indications of ethnic dissimila-tion in the United States, possibly missing signs of the con tinuin g vitality of theAmerican melting pot. An important reason w hy American public discourse hasbeen sympathetic to ethnic dissimilation is that individual Americans havetended to avoid expressing reservations ab out policies that prom ote dissimilation,lest they be accused of racism or ethnoce ntrism. For a quarter -century, polls haveconsistently shown that most Americans privately reject ethnic quotas, guide-lines, and timetable^.^^ But it is their public actions and statements that outsidersobserve, not their private reservations.

An illustration of the global influence of American ethnic policies lies in anepisode that occurred during Tansu Ciller's 1993 visit to the United States, herfirst as Turkey's premie r. During a joint new s conference with President C linton,she was asked how she would deal with Kurdish unrest in Eastern Anatolia.Attempting to explain her position in terms familiar to Americans, she repliedthat the Turkish state would remain an ethnic melting pot. The Turkish presstreated this re sponse as a gaffe, an d comm entators c ited it as proof of her inex-perience and simplemindedness. Moreover, her embarrassed advisors took painsto make her aware that in advanced couptries the ideal of the m e lt i ~ g ot hasgiven way to that of the "salad b0~1."*3What might have happened had anAmerican president stated in Ankara, where the Turkish melting pot remains apopular ideal, that the United States should remain a salad bowl? The Americanpress would probably not have considered the statement a blunder, if it tooknotice at all. Where most Turks want to adapt to international political norms,Americans generally believe that others should look to them for political guid-ance. The international demonstration and reputation effects of American ethnicrelations thus sw am p the co rresp ondi ng effects of eth nic relations with in Turkey. ,


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Johnson - Vats - Cleary - SDI 2005HR & Soft Power Core U< 1.5 - f-U.S. Hu man R ights Policy influences other nationsSikkink, 2004 [Kathryn, Mix ed Signals: U.S. Hum an Rights Policy and Latin America p.

But the most important cues we send about human rights policy comeC!hrough our own human rights behavior. When the U . S government holds 0,people incommunicado without access to lawyers, it flaunts the rule of law and fi

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