Anne Baxley - Kantian Virtue

8/3/2019 Anne Baxley - Kantian Virtue

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Kants most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are the Groundworkof the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of Practical Reason (1788). His

principal aims in these works are to analyze the nature and ground of morality andto justify its supreme principle (the categorical imperative). Nevertheless, in thesetexts, Kant also paints a picture of what it means to have a good will or goodcharacter, and it is this account of the good will and the associated theory of moralmotivation that have been the target of many of the historical and contemporaryobjections to Kants rationalism. From the perspective of these foundational worksin Kants moral theory, it appears that all that is required for Kantian character is afirm commitment to do ones duty from the motive of duty in the absence ofinclination, or in the teeth of countervailing inclination. Kants defenders haverightly insisted that it would be hasty to draw any final conclusions about his

considered views on character and moral psychology on the basis of the Groundworkand the second Critique. An adequate assessment of these kinds of charges againstKant, they have argued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his otherimportant ethical texts, especially the Doctrine of Virtue(1797) and Religion Withinthe Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his theory of virtue, Kant presents a detailedaccount of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussions of the variousvirtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains that there are moralfeelings that are part of a virtuous character and serviceable for morality. For thesereasons, those interested in gleaning a more complete picture of Kants ethics awaita detailed, systematic account of Kants views about virtue.This entry aims to sketchthe outlines of such an account.

Kants most familiar and widely read works in practical reason are theGroundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) and the Critique of PracticalReason (1788). His principal aims in these works are to analyze the natureand ground of morality and to justify its supreme principle (the categoricalimperative). Nevertheless, in these same texts, Kant also paints a picture of

what it means to have a good will or good character, and it is this accountof the good will and the associated theory of moral motivation that havebeen the target of many of the historical and contemporary objections toKants rationalism.According to Kant, the good will is the only good thathas unlimited value.What makes the good will good is that it acts inaccordance with duty from the motive of duty, not emotion or inclination.


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Feelings and inclinations are unreliable motives for moral action, which canlead only contingently to what is good and can very often also lead to whatis evil (Gr 4:411; 65). In addition to learning that inclinations furnish onlynon-moral reasons for action and fail to express a good will, we are told that

reason, in the consciousness of its own dignity, despises inclinations andgradually becomes their master (Gr 4:411; 65). Indeed, inclinations are soproblematic and burdensome that it is the universal wish of rational beingsto be entirely free from them (Gr 4:428; 79; KprV 5:118; 235). From theperspective of these foundational works in Kants moral theory, it appearsthat all that is required for Kantian character is a firm commitment to doones duty from the motive of duty in the absence of inclination, or in theteeth of countervailing inclination.

Critics from Christian Garve (174298) in Kants own time to the

contemporary virtue theorist Michael Slote have objected to Kants accountof the good will and its particular mode of willing, detailing the variousways in which such an account of character is deficient and incomplete.But Kants defenders have rightly insisted that it would be hasty to drawany final conclusions about his considered views on character and moralpsychology on the basis of the Groundwork and the second Critique.Anadequate assessment of these kinds of charges against Kant, they haveargued, must address his theory of virtue, as it is set out in his other importantethical texts, especially the Doctrine ofVirtue(1797) and Religion Within the

Boundaries of Mere Reason (1793). In his theory of virtue, Kant presents adetailed account of virtue as a character trait, provides lengthy discussionsof the various virtues he sees as central for the ethical life, and maintains thatthere are specific moral feelings that are part of a virtuous character andserviceable for morality. For these reasons, those interested in gleaning amore complete picture of Kants ethics await a detailed, systematic accountof Kants views about virtue.This entry aims to sketch the outlines of suchan account.

After considering how Kant conceives of virtue in general (section 1), I

turn (in section 2) to the particular, individual virtues Kant sees as centralto a life lived in accordance with practical reason. It is well noted that themoral psychology at work in Kants theory of virtue is more complicatedthan that of the Groundwork and the second Critique. For instance, in theDoctrine ofVirtue, Kant claims that sympathy is a feeling implanted in us thathelps us do what the motive of duty alone cannot accomplish, and he insiststhat we are obligated to cultivate our natural feelings of sympathy. In section3, I consider this more robust moral psychology and explore the ways inwhich moral feelings and inclinations might be instrumental for Kantianvirtue. Next, I address a topic widely considered to be central to any theoryof virtue namely, the relation between virtue and happiness and analyzeKants views on the subject (section 4). Finally, I conclude (in section 5) byoutlining some directions for future work in this burgeoning area of Kantsand Kantian ethics.


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1. Kants Conception ofVirtue

Kants most sustained discussion of virtue as a character trait can be foundin the second part of the Metaphysics of Morals, entitled the DoctrineofVirtue.There, he defines virtue in a number of ways, but central to most

of these definitions is a notion of self-constraint or self-mastery, as well as acontrast between virtue and holiness. Kant conceives of holiness as a formof moral perfection for rational beings who are immune to the very possibilityof contra-moral action and consequently need no constraint to conformtheir wills completely to universal moral laws. By contrast, virtue, as moralstrength of a human beings will in fulfilling his duty is the best that finiteimperfect (or non-holy) beings can hope to achieve (MS 6:405; 533).Thereason holiness always eclipses us is that we have sensible inclinations andneeds that do not on their own accord with the demands of morality;

moreover, we have a tendency to grant priority to sensible inclinations andneeds the sum total of which Kant conceives of as happiness even whenconsiderations based on our happiness conflict with duty. Due to this bentparticular to us as imperfect rational beings we require virtue moral strengthof will to resist temptations provided by sensibility and to live lives inconformity with practical reason.

Kant holds that virtue is best understood as a morally good disposition(Gesinnung) or way of thinking (Denkungsart), a disposition or way of thinkingthat is freely acquired and for which we are individually responsible. Hedescribes it in terms of an ability or capacity, or courage or fortitude,and emphasizes that it is a form of strength of mind, soul, will, ormaxims.Virtue, Kant informs us, is no mere self-constraint, which mightbe completely lacking in moral content, but a self-constraint in accordancewith a principle of inner freedom, and so through the mere representationof ones duty in accordance with its formal law (MS 6:394; 525).Thisformulation is especially helpful, insofar as it highlights the various keyelements involved in Kants particular conception of virtue, namely, self-

constraint, inner freedom, duty, and the moral law. Its definition asfortitudomoralis, understood as the capacity and considered resolve to oppose a strongbut unjust opponent in conflict with our moral disposition, underscoresthe notion that Kantian virtue is a moral strength of will known only throughthe obstacles it is able to overcome (MS 6:380; 513).

This glimpse of how Kant conceives of virtue as a character tells us thatthe moral life as he envisions it involves significant effort and struggle.Thetask we face as finite rational beings is to strive to overcome a fierce (internal)obstacle to the morally good, an obstacle that lies in our sensible nature, and

to rule ourselves by reason so that we identify most fully with our properself (Gr 4:457, 461; 104, 106).The concept underlying Kants account ofvirtue as a character trait is what he terms autocracy: moral self-rule inaccordance with reason over sensibility (MS 6:383; 515). Kants autocraticperson disciplines herself instead of yielding to emotion and inclination andis portrayed as playing the master over herself.As a result of having securely


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subordinated her sensible to her rational nature, she has the fortitude to resistinclinations and the temptations they can provide, she possesses the strengthof will to fulfill her moral duties from the motive of duty, and, finally, sheenjoys a feeling of contentment derivative upon having her soul governed

by reason. Relying on a common Greek idea of virtue as a kind of health ofthe human soul, Kant insists that it is precisely when we are in possessionof this form of moral strength of will that we are in a fit state, or in the stateofhealth proper to a human being (MS 6:384; 516).There are three pointsabout this initial account of virtue and the intimately associated concept ofautocracy worth highlighting.

First, it is important to note that the moral strength entailed by virtuedoes not entail a total repression of natural inclinations. Kant reminds usthat the term virtue itself implies a moral disposition in conflict, and not

holiness in the supposedpossession of a completepurity of dispositions of thewill (KprV 5:84; 208).As he explains, both reason and inclination must bepresent where virtue as self-mastery is even at issue, for where there are nopotentially wayward inclinations to contend with, there would no longerbe any virtue at all. Besides, Kant explicitly rejects the idea that the opponentto morally good conduct lies in natural inclinations themselves. In criticizingthe Stoics for making precisely this assumption, he remarks that the Stoicsmistook their enemy (Rel 6:58; 77). In his words:

Considered in themselves natural inclinations aregood, i.e. not reprehensible, andto want to extirpate them would not only be futile but harmful and blameworthyas well; we must rather only curb them, so that they will not wear each otherout but will instead be harmonized into a whole called happiness. (Rel 6:58; 78)

What Kant objects to in the non-autocratic person is not the mere presenceof emotions and inclinations, but the misplaced value she accords them.Theself-constraint implied by virtue does not require renouncing sensibleinclinations, but overcoming a tendency to grant sensible inclinations priorityover moral considerations when the two conflict a tendency that Kant

conceives of as a universal propensity to evil allegedly interwoven intohumanity as a whole, which he rather ominously labels radical evil.1

Second, although Kant portrays virtue in general as strength of will againsta strong opponent at odds with our moral disposition, he nonetheless agreeswith Aristotle that there is a difference between the person who possessesgenuine virtue and the one who is merely continent. Classical virtue theoriesaccept and emphasize the point that there is an important moral differencebetween the person who merely acts rightly and the person who iswholehearted in what she does (Annas 517). Critics from Friedrich Schiller(17591805) to Martha Nussbaum have assumed that Kant implicitly deniesthe importance of this distinction, for, as they interpret him, Kant allowsthat the grudging agent, who does his duty in the face of powerfulinclinations to act contrary to the demands of reason, still qualifies as fullyvirtuous.Yet, in his theory of virtue, Kant rejects the idea that the agent


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who struggles on every occasion to do the right thing in spite of conflictingdesires possesses all of the important ingredients in a morally good character.On the contrary, the virtuous person does her duty with pleasure and witha cheerful heart. Resistance toward duty and a grudging attitude in acting

rightly signify a failure on the agents part to have cultivated the emotionsand attitudes appropriate for the life of virtue.As Kant argues:what is notdone with pleasure but merely as compulsory service has no inner worthfor one who attends to his duty in this way and such service is not loved byhim; instead, he shirks as much as possible occasions for practicing virtue(MS 6:484; 597).

How does this emphasis on the proper comportment and emotionalattitude of the virtuous person fit with the notion that virtue involves moralself-constraint and requires autocracy? In playing the master over herself,

the autocratic person controls and limits the influence on her will of feelingsand inclinations at odds with duty, but, in addition, perfects herself bycultivating morally favorable feelings and inclinations like sympathy asinstruments that facilitate acting well. In the virtuous or autocratic agent,reason alone is sovereign.As a result of this rational self-possession, herfeelings and inclinations have been shaped to accord with the demands ofpractical reason and do not present an ongoing, persistent problem to beovercome in the way that they do for the merely continent person, whofeels the powerful counterweight of inclinations at odds with duty and is

forced to resist their entreaties in acting in accordance with duty from thepure moral motive.

Third, we should not lose sight of the fact that, although Kant canaccommodate some more familiar Aristotelian claims about virtue, anyrapprochement between Kant and Aristotle is partial and incomplete. ForKant, only finite imperfect beings need virtue, because perfect beingslack a tendency to transgress the moral law and consequently require noself-constraint in accordance with principles of inner freedom in the face of(internal) obstacles (MS 6:379, 383, 405; 512, 515, 533). But it is part of

our very nature as Kant understands it that we are inclined to get ourfundamental priorities backwards, by subordinating the dictates of moralityto considerations about personal happiness a tendency he conceives of ashumanitys propensity to evil.This is a substantive and some might sayhighly contentious view about human nature on which Kants under-standing of virtue and character development rests.The fact that Kant takesour propensity to evil as the background against which his conception ofvirtue as moral strength of will is to be understood sets him apart fromAristotle, who thought that we have different, individual tendencies andtemperaments, but not a universal propensity to evil.The key point to grasphere is that the moral life as Kant imagines it is dialectical, involving a strugglein which moral agents must work to overcome a deep-seated tendency ofthe self and to reorient our wills in an effort to align more fully with ourbest (or rational) self.This dialectical feature of Kants ethics puts Kant more


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squarely in line with thinkers like Kierkegaard, Schopenhauer, and Nietzsche,and at odds with Aristotle and other traditional Greek views about virtue.

2. Kantian Virtues and Vices

Having considered Kants picture of virtue in general, I now turn to theindividual virtues he defends as part of a life well lived. Kant begins hisanalysis of the virtues in the Doctrine ofVirtueby explaining that we havetwo general ends that are also duties of virtue our own perfection and thehappiness of others. Kants reason for rejecting the Platonic idea that weought to try to perfect other people for the good of society as a whole hasto do with the nature of ethical duties as Kant conceives of them. On Kantsview, ethical duties in general require us to adopt certain ends and therefore

involve (free) self-constraint and preclude external constraint by another only I can make something an end for myself, which involves an act offreedom (taking something as a goal worth promoting). Similar considerationsabout the concept of duty explain why there could be no duty to promoteour own happiness. In light of the fact that we all desire our own happinessas an end given to us by nature, we have no (direct) obligation to promoteour own happiness.As Kant repeatedly insists, the concept of duty impliesconstraint, and it is therefore contradictory to think that we could beobligated (compelled or constrained) to do something we already desire.

But it is possible for us to strive to promote the happiness of others withoutexpecting anything in return and to work to perfect ourselves, the mostimportant component of which is cultivating ones will to the purest attitudeof virtue (MS 6:387; 518). From these two broad ethical ends of ones ownperfection and the happiness of others, Kant derives a set of specific dutiesto self and to others. Some of our duties are perfect duties of narrowobligation, requiring us to perform or refrain from performing certain acts(e.g., do not lie), while others are imperfect duties of wide obligation,requiring us to adopt a certain end that morality dictates is good to pursue

(e.g., practice benevolence). In what follows, I set out these Kantian dutiesto self and others.We can conceive of these duties more simply as Kantianvirtues, or vices to be avoided.

Our perfect duties to self as animal beings include a duty to refrain fromkilling oneself, a duty to refrain from defiling oneself by lust, and a duty toavoid excessive use of food and drink (the virtue of temperance). Our perfectduties to self as moral beings involve avoiding the vices of lying, avarice,and false humility (servility). In addition, we have a duty to ourselves toserve as our own judge, by cultivating our conscience, and a duty of moralcognition an obligation to scrutinize oneself with respect to ones moraldisposition, which Kant portrays as a maxim of knowing ones heart (MS6:441; 562).

Kant thinks that we have two imperfect duties to self. Our naturalperfection (for pragmatic purpose) requires us to cultivate our natural talents


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and capacities that would enable us to fulfill the various contingent ends wemight happen to set for ourselves over the course of our lives. Our moralperfection obligates us to cultivate both our sensible and rational capacitiesso that we are better able to fulfill our specifically moral ends.As we will

see in further detail below (in section 3), this duty of moral self-perfectionis central to reconstructing the more expansive moral psychology at workin Kants theory of virtue, for it implies that there are feelings and inclinationsrooted in our sensible nature that we can cultivate and strengthen so thatthey facilitate and make more effective action in accordance with moral duty.

Kant divides our duties to others into the two classes: duties of love andduties of respect. Duties of love are imperfect duties of wide obligation, andthey are directed toward the natural welfare or happiness of others.Theperformance of these duties puts their recipient under an obligation, and

performance of them Kant characterizes as meritorious. Duties of respect,by contrast, are perfect duties of narrow obligation directed at the moralwell-being or moral contentment of others, and their fulfillment is notmeritorious, but something owed.

Our duties of love to others include benevolence, or practical love ofhuman beings in general, beneficence, characterized as making the happinessof others ones own end, gratitude, and sympathy.The vices contrary tothese virtues are envy, ingratitude, and malice. Kant characterizes our dutiesof respect to others largely negatively, explaining that the respect we owe

our fellow human beings requires us to avoid the vices of contempt,arrogance, defamation, and ridicule.Yet in the context of accounting forthe difference between arrogance and pride, Kant defends pride as a necessaryand important part of moral virtue. In the Doctrine ofVirtue, he characterizespride as love of honor (MS 6:465; 581), and inAnthropology from a PragmaticPoint ofView, we are told that love of honor is the constant companion ofvirtue (Anth 7:257; 156).

Finally, Kant concludes his account of our duties to others with a briefdiscussion of the virtues of social intercourse affability, sociability, courtesy,

hospitality, and gentleness as well as a lengthier discussion of the virtue offriendship (MS 6:46974; 5848). Kant thinks of ideal friendship as theunion of two people through equal mutual love and respect. In perfectfriendship, we participate and share in one anothers well-being throughthe morally good will that unites us. Kant is extremely skeptical about theprospect of realizing true friendship, because he believes that the love andrespect it requires rarely go hand in hand. For instance, moral friendshiprequires the complete confidence of two people revealing themselves to oneanother, but, at the same time, such disclosure makes it likely that one friendwill lose the others respect. In spite of the difficulties in perfect friendship,striving for friendship is a duty set by reason, which Kant considershonorable. In short, friendship is an important part of a virtuous life as Kantenvisions it, or a life lived in accordance with the dictates of practicalreason.


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3.The Moral Psychology of Kantian Virtue

As we have just seen, in the Doctrine ofVirtue, Kant argues that we have aduty to perfect ourselves (morally) by cultivating whichever of our rationaland sensible natural capacities enable us to fulfill our ethical duties and

thereby promote our obligatory ends set by practical reason. Morespecifically, Kant claims that we are obligated to cultivate moral feeling,conscience, love, respect, and sympathy, all of which he explicitlycharacterizes as serviceable for morality. Since it is in his discussion of theparticular duties of love we have toward others, especially in his account ofsympathy, that the positive moral significance Kant grants to sensible feelingsis most prominent, a closer look at his discussion of sympathy might helpus determine how sympathy as Kant conceives of it functions and why hethinks virtue requires it.

Kant holds that sympathetic feeling is generally a duty. He definessympathetic joy and sadness as sensible feelings of pleasure or displeasureat anothers state of joy or pain, and explains that these are aesthetic feelingsto which we are receptive by nature (MS 6:456; 5745).Although there isno obligation for us to feel mere compassion in anothers plight, or to shareineffectually in his sufferings or joys, Kant insists that we ought to use thesefeelings as means to promoting active and rational benevolence, suggestingthat we are to make use of these feelings as instruments toward fulfilling ourmorally obligatory end of beneficence (MS 6:456; 575).What we are directlyobligated to do, then, is to sympathize actively in the fate of others, and thisinvolves adopting a maxim of beneficence, requiring us to promoteaccording to ones means the happiness of others in need, without hopingfor something in return (MS 6:453; 572). It is in relation to this end ofbeneficence that Kant claims that we have an indirect duty to cultivatesympathetic feelings and to make use of them as so many means to sympathybased on moral principles and the feeling appropriate to them (MS 6:457;575). Further, he adds, this is still one of the impulses that nature has

implanted in us to do what the representation of duty alone might notaccomplish (MS 6:457; 576).The main idea behind Kants (cryptic) remarkshere seems to be that the cultivation of our sympathetic feelings (whichincludes an obligation to visit scenes of human misery such as hospitals anddebtors prisons) increases our sensitivity to human suffering and therebyrenders us better able to fulfill the duty of beneficence. Such contact, Kantappears to think, is an important reminder of the real condition of my fellowhuman beings, whose pain and sufferings I might remain unaware of, orblind to, were I to avoid altogether any association with them. Kant never

spells out in any further detail precisely how it is that sympathy facilitatesour ability to act beneficently, nor does he offer any explanation for hisadmittedly surprising remark that sympathy enables us to do what the merethought of duty alone might not accomplish.Although it goes beyond thedirect textual evidence available to us, there are at least three constructiveroles sympathy might play within a Kantian conception of virtue.


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First, sympathy provides epistemic support to the duty of beneficence inparticular. Sympathy signals morally salient features of the world to the agentherself, when it discloses moral aspects of the world to which the agent hadnot been consciously attentive. In support of this idea that sympathy plays

an epistemological role in virtue, we should keep in mind that the duty ofbeneficence is an imperfect duty, or duty of wide obligation to adopt anend. Duties of wide obligation, such as beneficence, do not, except undervery specific conditions, require us to perform or refrain from performingany particular act.What we are required to do is to try to promote thehappiness of others in need, without hope or expectation of gettingsomething in return.To adopt this duty of beneficence is to adopt a maximor general policy of intent to help others; there is thus significant latitudein this requirement, which leaves it up to the agent to decide when, to

whom, in what way, and to what extent aid is to be offered.Yet, if we areto fulfill the duty of beneficence, we must have the moral perception topick out occasions where promoting the welfare of others is needed, themoral sensitivity to be moved by the consideration of their needs, and theknowledge about how we can help. Having certain feelings, such assympathy, is necessary in order to perceive and understand the relevantmoral features of a situation and to gain insight into what I might do toalleviate the sufferings of others. In short, sympathetic feeling brings to ourattention certain facts about the condition and needs of other people in ways

that lead us to give due weight to the reasons these facts contain.The notion that sympathetic feeling is valuable for moral epistemology

fits nicely with Kants conception of duties of virtue as duties to adopt certainends. Since virtue requires the adoption of ends, it must involve thedevelopment of a range of feelings and desires associated with havingthose ends. If I adopt the end of the happiness of others, I come to have thevarious feelings and inclinations of love that are natural to a beneficentperson ones that are necessary for finding certain features of the worldmorally salient and for perceiving the world in the way this end requires

(Korsgaard 182).Second, Kant suggests that certain emotions and desires are the vehicles

through which we express morally significant attitudes towards others.Thepoint here seems to be that the expression of certain attitudes of interest andconcern towards others is actually part of the content of virtue, what dutiesof virtue require of us, and that such attitudes can take the form of emotionaland affective responses, like sympathy. In other words, moral emotions onKants view not only involve moral appraisal, but communicate that appraisalto others as well.

Third, feelings and desires that have been shaped by moral principles andare governed by moral principles as the ultimate source of value might turnout to be sources of moral motivation (on a reconstructed Kantian view).Such desires and emotions are sources ofmoralmotivation because when adesire is shaped by an agents conception of right action, the agent who acts


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on that desire (i.e., takes the desire to be a reason, or sees a reason for actionin the object of desire) is ultimately motivated by his conception of rightaction. How could appetite or emotion with this shape function as a morallyworthy motive that expresses a good will in Kants sense? Moralized

sympathy would make an agent directly responsive to the needs of others,it would discriminate needs that should be satisfied from those that shouldbe ignored, and it would lead an agent to find reasons for just those responsesand actions that are called for morally (say, by proper concern for rationalagency) and to give those reasons their proper deliberative weight. Itwould also be regulated by the moral law and consequently not prompt anagent to violate any other duties in the service of beneficence. Here, weshould note that such an agent who acts from moralized sympathy showsprecisely what Kant claims is essential to the self-mastery involved in virtue,

for he exhibits a self-government that goes beyond forbidding himselfto let himself be governed by his feelings and inclinations (the duty ofapathy)...[in that] reason holds the reins of government in its own hands(MS 6:408; 536).

4. Kants Conception of Happiness and Its Relation to Virtue

According to eudaimonist accounts of virtue, all action is justified by appealto one ultimate end: eudaimonia, sometimes translated as well-being or

flourishing, but more commonly as happiness. Standard Greek views aboutvirtue, which hold the eudaimonist assumption that the virtues benefit theirpossessors, provide an account of how the virtues themselves actuallycontribute to an agents own happiness.We are told that it is in ones interestto live a life in which the cultivation and exercise of the various virtuesprefigure prominently, because that is the life that best promotes an agentsoverall happiness. Kant, however, distinguishes sharply between moral andnon-moral value and harshly criticizes Greek eudaimonia for justifyingmorality in terms of happiness (Brink 428).Virtue and happiness are not

merely distinct, but heterogeneous, concepts.Virtue is not a means or skillfor attaining happiness, nor does happiness follow from cultivating andexercising the virtues. Indeed, acting virtuously can sometimes detract froman agents personal happiness, when virtue requires sacrifice and comesat a cost. Kants views about happiness are complicated and difficult toreconstruct, but there are three key points on which he is clear.

First, in spite of sometimes portraying happiness as a selfish end, Kantconsiders happiness to be a genuine good that is a constituent ingredient inour overall or final good.Virtue, as the supreme good, is superior tohappiness, but it is not our sole end.While the Epicureans erred in treatinghappiness as the ultimate end at which we should aim, the Stoics wereequally mistaken in treating virtue alone as sufficient for our final good(KprV 5:126 7; 2412). Our final end is the Highest Good, consisting ofvirtue and happiness in proportion to virtue, or, as Kant so eloquently puts


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it, universal happiness combined with and in conformity with the purestmorality throughout the world (TP 8:278 9; 2812). Kant understandshappiness to be an end given to us by nature in virtue of the fact that weare sensible creatures endowed with bodies, it is natural for us to want our

needs and inclinations satisfied and hence to desire our own happiness. Kantdoes not think that we should renounce our natural end of happiness which would be impossible but merely abstract from considerations abouthappiness when what would make us happy conflicts with moralitys demands(TP 8:2789; 2812).

Second, Kant takes care to emphasize that, although we rightly valuehappiness, happiness is always a limited or conditioned good whose goodnessdepends on the presence of a good will or virtue, the very condition underwhich a person is even worthy of happiness.This fundamental point about

the limited value of happiness as Kant understands it can be explained asfollows.Whether considerations based on happiness give me good reasonto act depends on whether happiness is consonant with the moral law, whichserves as the criterion of right action for the agent with a good will. In otherwords, my pursuit of happiness should always be limited or conditioned bymoral considerations, which Kant thinks of as providing rational agents withsupremely authoritative norms governing conduct. On this view, I oughtto promote my own happiness as well as the happiness of others onlyon the condition that happiness does not conflict with duty, for only then

is happiness a good I am justified in pursuing.At times Kant explains thispoint about the limited or conditioned goodness of happiness by notingthat, from the third person perspective, happiness is something we cannotapprove of unless its possessor has a good will and deserves to have her lifego well: an impartial rational spectator can take no delight in seeing theuninterrupted prosperity of a being graced with no feature of a pure andgood will (Gr 4:393; 49).

Third, because he holds that our ultimate moral end of cultivating amorally good disposition can conflict with our natural end of happiness,

Kant agrees with the common sense view that virtue can have a price, evenif it is a price we should always choose to pay. For Kant, the relation betweenmoral and non-moral value is such that moral requirements, as supremelyauthoritative norms of reason, always outweigh or override non-moralconsiderations, which all fall under the principle of happiness. But this impliesthat virtue can sometimes force us to give up or forego something else wevalue and thereby detract from our happiness. Consequently, Kant insiststhat we should strive to be both valiant and cheerful in practicing virtue,for, in his words: virtue not only has to muster all its forces to overcomethe obstacles it must contend with; it also involves sacrificing many of the

joys of life, the loss of which can sometimes make ones mind gloomy andsullen (MS 6:484; 597). In rejecting the eudaimonist thesis that the virtuesnecessarily benefit their possessors, Kant warns us against recommendingvirtue for the purported advantages it brings. Instead, we ought to emphasize


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the genuinely moral lesson behind a dictum to which Kant is especiallypartial, namely, that virtue is its own reward (MS 6:391; 522).

5. Questions about Kants Theory ofVirtue

We now know that Kants account of moral character and the moralpsychology associated with it is far richer and more interesting thancommonly supposed.The work to date on this aspect of Kants ethicaltheory has given us a fuller and more adequate picture of Kants ethics, butit has also raised a number of issues that deserve further exploration. First,while much of the recent work on Kants theory of virtue has attempted toshow how Kant can accommodate more familiar Aristotelian ideas aboutcharacter and moral psychology, residual differences remain and should be

addressed in future research on this topic.A systematic analysis and assessmentof Kants theory of virtue as a whole would show not just the extent towhich Kant can account for other familiar views about virtue, but what isunique about his theory in its own right. It may turn out that Kantsdistinctively modern, Enlightenment conception of virtue in terms of theautocracy of practical reason affords us an appealing alternative to thetraditional Greek views favored by so many contemporary virtuetheorists.

Next, a complete theory of Kantian virtue would require an extensive

treatment of Kants views about the nature of happiness and the relationbetween virtue and happiness, or moral and non-moral value. Kant maintainsthat moral requirements outweigh or override non-moral considerationsand that virtue as a character trait involves a firm commitment to take moralconcerns to be supremely authoritative norms of practical reason that alwaystrump considerations based on happiness. But what is Kants rationale forthis thesis about the relation between moral and non-moral value, and is hisaccount of happiness as the sum satisfaction of our various contingentinclinations a plausible view about human happiness worth defending?

Finally, we need to learn more about Kants views on moral education a topic on which little has been written as well as his ideas about theconnection between ethics and politics a topic that has been almostuniformly neglected.Although we now possess a fuller picture of Kantsviews about the ethical life and virtue as a character trait, thanks to the recentinterest in Kants theory of virtue over the last twenty years, there is stillmuch work that remains to be accomplished in this previously neglectedarea of Kant scholarship.

Short Biography

Anne Margaret Baxleys research is in Kants ethics, the history of ethics,and ethical theory. Her papers on Kants ethics and aesthetics have appearedin Kant-Studien, The Review of Metaphysics, the Journal of the History ofPhilosophy, and The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. She is completing


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a book manuscript, entitled Kants Theory ofVirtue:The Value of Autocracyand is also working on a project in systematic ethics concerning the relationbetween virtue and happiness, or moral and non-moral value. She has heldfellowships from the National Humanities Center, the National Endowment

for the Humanities, the Ford Foundation, and the American Association ofUniversity Women. Before coming to Washington University in St. Louis,where she currently teaches, Baxley taught at Virginia Tech. She holds aB.A. in Philosophy from Wellesley College and a Ph.D. in Philosophy fromthe University of California, San Diego.

Acknowledgements

Special thanks are due to Zach Hoskins, Rachel Singpurwalla, Iain Thomson,and an anonymous referee forPhilosophy Compass for helpful comments onthis article.

Notes

* Correspondence: Philosophy Department, Washington University in St. Louis, Campus Box1073, St. Louis, MO 63130, USA. E-mail: [email protected].

1 By this striking term radical evil, Kant does not mean any extreme or diabolical form of evil.Instead, he explicitly intends for the term radical to be understood in its etymological sense ofroots (from the Latin radic- meaning root). Radical evil thus refers to the root or ground ofthe possibility of moral evil in general and of particular actions that are contrary to duty.

Works Cited

PRIMARY SOURCES

References to Kants writings are cited in the body of the text according tothe volume and page number in Kants gesammelte Schriften (KGS), ed. theRoyal Prussian (later German and Berlin-Brandenburg) Academy of Sciences,29 vols. (Berlin: Georg Reimer [later Walter de Gruyter], 1900);

traditionally referred to as the Academy Edition.The Academy Editionpagination is reproduced in most recent English translations of Kantswritings.The English translations of Kants works cited in this article arelisted below; in the body of the text, they are referred to immediatelyfollowing the reference to the volume and page of the Academy Edition.

Anth Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht(KGS 7). Anthropology from a Pragmatic PointofView.Trans. and ed. Robert B. Louden. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006.

Gr Grundlegung der Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 4). Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals inPractical Philosophy.Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

KprV Kritik der praktischen Vernunft (KGS 5). Critique of Practical Reason in Practical Philosophy.Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

MS Metaphysik der Sitten (KGS 6). Metaphysics of Morals in Practical Philosophy. Trans. and ed.Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

Rel Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der bloen Vernunft(KGS 6). Religion within the Boundariesof Mere Reason.Trans. and ed.Allen Wood and George di Giovanni. Cambridge:Cambridge UP, 1998.


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TP ber den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie r ichtig sein, taugt aber nicht fr die Praxis (KGS8). On the Common Saying:That May be Correct in Theory, But It Is of No Use in Practice inPractical Philosophy.Trans. and ed. Mary J. Gregor. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.

SECONDARY SOURCES

Annas, Julia. Virtue Ethics. The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory. Ed. David Copp. Oxford:Oxford UP, 2006. 51536.

Brink, David. Review of Nancy Sherman, Making a Necessity ofVirtue:Aristotle and Kant onVirtue. The Philosophical Review109.3 (July 2000): 42834.

Korsgaard, Christine. Morality as Freedom.Creating the Kingdom of Ends. Cambridge: CambridgeUP, 1996. 15987.

SELECT REFERENCES TO RECENT WORK ON KANTIAN VIRTUE

Allison, Henry E. Virtue and Holiness. Kants Theory of Freedom. Cambridge: Cambridge UP,

1990. 16279.Baxley,Anne Margaret. Autocracy and Autonomy.Kant-Studien 94.1 (2003): 123.. The Beautiful Soul and the Autocratic Agent: Schillers and Kants Children of the

House.Journal of the History of Philosophy 41.4 (2003): 493514.. Does Kantian Virtue Amount to More than Continence?. The Review of Metaphysics 56

(March 2003): 55986.Betzler, Monika, ed. Kants Virtue Ethics. Berlin: De Gruyter Verlag, forthcoming.Denis, Lara. Kants Cold Sage and the Sublimity of Apathy. Kantian Review4.1 (2000): 4873. . Kants Conception ofVirtue. Cambridge Companion to Kant and Modern Philosophy. Ed.

Paul Guyer. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006. 50537.Engstrom, Stephen and Jennifer Whiting, eds.Aristotle, Kant, and the Stoics: Rethinking Happiness

and Duty. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.Frierson, Patrick. Kants Empirical Account of Human Action.Philosophers Imprint5.7 (December

2005): 134.. The Moral Importance of Politeness in Kants Anthropology. Kantian Review9.1 (2005):

10527.Gregor, Mary J. The Laws of Freedom. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1963.Grenberg, Jeanine. Kant and the Ethics of Humility:A Story of Dependence, Corruption and Virtue.

Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2005.Guyer, Paul. Moral Worth,Virtue, and Merit. Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge:

Cambridge UP, 2000. 287329.Herman, Barbara. Training to Autonomy: Kant and the Question of Moral Education.Philosophers

on Education. Ed.Amlie O. Rorty. London: Routledge, 1998. 25572.Johnson, Robert. Kants Conception ofVirtue.Jarhbuch fr Recht und Ethik/Annual Review of

Law and Ethics 5 (1996): 36587.Korsgaard, Christine. Self-Constitution in the Ethics of Plato and Kant.Journal of Ethics 3 (1999):

129.Louden, Robert B. Kants Impure Ethics: From Rational Beings to Human Beings. Oxford: Oxford

UP, 2000.. Kants Virtue Ethics. Philosophy 61 (1986): 47389.Munzel, G. Felicitas. Kants Conception of Moral Character. Chicago, IL: U of Chicago P, 1999.OConnor, Daniel. Good and Evil Disposition. Kant-Studien 76 (1985): 288302.ONeill, Onora. Kant after Virtue. Constructions of Reason. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1989.

14562.. Kants Virtues. How Should One Live?: Essays on the Virtues. Ed. Roger Crisp. Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1996. 7797.. Towards Justice and Virtue. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1996.Reid, James. Morality and Sensibility in Kant:Toward a Theory ofVirtue. Kantian Review8.1

(2004): 89114.


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Roulier, Scott M. Kantian Virtue and the Intersection of Politics and Nature. North American KantSociety Studies in Philosophy 7. Rochester, NY: U of Rochester P, 2004.

Sherman, Nancy. Making a Necessity ofVirtue. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1997.Stohr, Karen. Virtue Ethics and Kants Cold-Hearted Benefactor. Journal ofValue Inquiry 32.3

(2002): 187204.Timmons, Mark, ed. Kants Metaphysics of Morals: Interpretive Essays. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002.

Anne Baxley - Kantian Virtue

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