'The Economy of Morals and Its Applications': An Attempt to Understand Some CentralConcepts in the Work of Albert O. HirschmanAuthor(s): Andreas HessSource: Review of International Political Economy, Vol. 6, No. 3 (Autumn, 1999), pp. 338-359Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4177315Accessed: 06/07/2009 14:33

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTOR's Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.

Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=taylorfrancis.

Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.

JSTOR is a not-for-profit organization founded in 1995 to build trusted digital archives for scholarship. We work with thescholarly community to preserve their work and the materials they rely upon, and to build a common research platform thatpromotes the discovery and use of these resources. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

Taylor & Francis, Ltd. is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Review ofInternational Political Economy.

http://www.jstor.org

Review of International Political Economy 6:3 Autumn 1999: 338-359

'The economy of morals and its applications' - an attempt to

understand some central concepts in the work of Albert 0. Hirschman

Andreas Hess School of Sociology and Social Policy, University of Wales Bangor

ABSTRACT

This article argues that, with very few exceptions, social theory has neglected the usefulness of concepts derived from 'the economy of morals' approach as theorized by Albert 0. Hirschman. In an attempt to popu- larize Hirschman's unique critique of political economy, it is treated here as a middle-range theory that dissents from the two extremes of grand theory and factual empirical evidence, and thus provides social scientists with concepts that, rather than offering an altemative between either 'deducing down' or 'building up', both 'deduce down' and 'build up' at the same time. After the events of '1989', social science and social theory have barely begun to reflect on the impact that these events had on a theo- retical level. It is argued that Hirschman's approach differs from most current sociological reasoning in that it can be used to explain unforeseen circumstances and unexpected events. Hirschman's conceptualization of 'the economy of morals' thus provides a new theoretical framework that has the potential to overcome most of current social theory's weaknesses in conceptualizing the 'post-1989' world.

KEYWORDS

Economy of morals; critique of political economy; middle-range theories and concepts; '1989'; Albert 0. Hirschman.

I INTRODUCTION

By looking at some of the central concepts in the work of Albert 0. Hirschman this article attempts to 'trespass' the narrow and somehow artificial academic boundaries in the social sciences. It is further hypoth- esized that a hermeneutic encounter with the work of one of the most innovative contemporary thinkers can not only help to break down the somewhat 'defunct' divisions of labour between political economy and

?) 1999 Routledge 0969-2290

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

sociology (an anomie that did not exist at the beginning of the estab- lishment of social science); encountering Hirschman might also help to enhance and enrich social theory, thereby providing a link that could renew and strengthen the ties that bind the common enterprise of social science as a whole.

In what follows, Hirschman's work will be treated as a middle-range theory that dissents from the two extremes of grand theory and factual empirical evidence, thus providing concepts that, rather than offering an alternative of either 'deducing down' or 'building up', both 'deduce down' and 'build up' simultaneously.

Readers will ask: Why the insistence on a middle-range approach when it comes to Hirschman's work? The answer to this question is twofold. Firstly, middle-range theory is one possible solution if and when one does not have a Weltanschauung. Secondly, a middle-range approach allows us to link Hirschman's discoveries to other social theories.

In the first instance, as taken from an autobiographical interview, Hirschman once remarked that only late in life did he fully understand his father who, when asked by the young Hirschman about a complex political issue, confessed to having no Weltanschauung, no world view or standard set of answers derived from a grand theory (Hirschman, 1997). Only later, when looking back at his own rich life experiences, would Hirschman understand his father's reluctance to formulate or voice a Weltanschauung. Hirschman was born into a Jewish family in Berlin in 1915. While still in his formative years and even more so as an adult he became involved with radical left-wing and anti-fascist politics. In exile - Hirschman left Berlin in 1933 - he studied economics in Paris and at the LSE in London. During this time, he remained politically active: he worked with Italian anti-fascists, signed up for the Spanish Republican Army, and later fought with the French army until it surrendered. After the French capitulation in 1940, Hirschman went underground and worked together with Varian Fry for the Emergency Rescue Committee, one of the few organizations that actually succeeded in helping many refugees to escape occupied France. When his activities were discovered, Hirschman fled via the Pyrenees - and finally made it to America. He fought with the US army in North Africa before returning to Europe. In Italy, Hirschman worked for the Allied Command until the end of the war. After the war he became involved with the Federal Reserve Board whose task it was to supervise the European Reconstruction Programme. Hirschman's role was that of a research economist. After helping to 'export Keynesianism from the United States', Hirschman took on a posi- tion with the World Bank in Colombia. It was his experience of Latin America which added another, new dimension to Hirschman's work. For the first time he was in an underdeveloped country which added an even more complicated dimension to economics. These years in Latin America

339

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

were crucial in developing Hirschman's ideas, and numerous essays along with five books - all dealing with development policies - are a clear sign of this. Returning to the United States, Hirschman followed an academic career. He taught at Yale, Columbia, Harvard and Stanford, and is at present a member of the Institute for Advanced Studies at Princeton. Hirschman frequently retums to Europe and has held various visiting fellowships with well-respected and well-known European research institutes. Reflecting on Hirschman's rich curriculum vitae, it becomes immediately clear that the belief in 'possibilism', and in the dialectical relationship between 'exit' and 'voice', as well as the distinction between public engagement and private retreat, was crucial - not only in terms of dealing with extreme circumstances but also as a compass in coming to terms with the increasing complexities of the individual life course in an 'Age of Extremes'.

In the second instance, where a middle-range approach is linked to other social theories, it is important to note that Hirschman's work can be described not only as a middle-range theory developed short of a Weltanschauung, but also as a unique conceptualization of political econ- omy, one that takes moral questions into account. I would like to stress, though, that in referring to the moral dimensions of Hirschman's approach, I do not refer solely to mores. The term 'moral' can also mean 'social' or 'civic'; at times it can even refer to 'psychological' dimensions; and I hope that the multiple use and the rich semantics of the word 'moral' will eventually become clear during the course of this article, par- ticularly when Hirschman's own application of the concept in different social contexts is under consideration.

In what follows, I limit my efforts to discussion of the main concepts stemming from what I consider to be the most important theoretical 'windows' in Hirschman's ceuvre. In this respect, I hypothesize that The Passions and the Interests (1977) provides the more general background to the concepts explored in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), Shifting Involvements (1982) and The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991). In The Passions and the Interests Hirschman prepares the ground for addressing what had been neglected in political economy: the moral dimension (Section II). In Exit, Voice, and Loyalty he takes his arguments a step further: he shows how concepts derived from a renewed understanding of political economy, i.e. a political economy that is preoccupied with moral ques- tions, can help to shed light not only on the black boxes employed by economists, but also on how some of its concepts can be used to inter- pret the social world at large (Section III). In Hirschman's follow- up study, Shifting Involvements, he goes even further in attempting to apply his concepts to concrete issues such as the relationship between private and public life (Section IV). With The Rhetoric of Reaction, Hirschman's circle of argument comes to a preliminary halt; the

340

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

conservative rhetoric and ideology of economists and other thinkers is deconstructed and criticized in the name of the economy of morals (Section V).1 In the conclusion (Section VI) I discuss how Hirschman's work figures in the ambiguous tradition called 'critique of political economy', and then finally suggest how Hirschman's concepts can be linked to other theoretical efforts in the social sciences.

II LAYING THE FOUNDATIONS FOR THE ECONOMY OF MORALS: THE PASSIONS AND THE INTERESTS

The Passions and the Interests carries the subtitle Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph and it is this subtitle which illuminates the epistemological interest of Albert 0. Hirschman to its fullest. The author is interested in what actually precipitated the emergence of capitalism. Both Marx and Weber explained the rise of capitalism through a set of radically new ideas and revolutionary new social and economic rela- tionships. Hirschman dissents from such a view.2 He demonstrates that the new emerged from the old in a more compact fashion and with much closer continuity than has been acknowledged. As a matter of fact, Hirschman gives a much more realistic interpretation of the famous Marx quote - that the new becomes pregnant with the past - than Marx himself did. But Hirschman does not only aim at a better understanding of how capitalism has been explained. He also attempts to demonstrate why people argued in favour of capitalism. It is only in this context that the epistemological interest of the moral dimension of political economy will eventually become clear.

Hirschman asks why throughout a long period in European history, making money and being involved with trade and commerce were regarded as disreputable activities, and he points out that only with the rise of modernity were these activities eventually regarded with some respect. A change was necessary as the European society that emerged from the Middle Ages was no longer able to function along the lines of inherited status. The question therefore arose of what would replace the old morality and religion that had held society together. Furthermore, if status was no longer inherited and the old hierarchy and order no longer had absolute command, what would serve to regulate and balance the passions? These questions necessarily raised another: What is it that binds a society together in the first place? Throughout history, philoso- phers and intellectuals have given different answers to these questions. The first possibility consisted of a Hobbesian solution of controlling the passions through force and repression. A second response was to channel the passions into other purposes. Mandeville for example argued that private vices could lead to public good.3 A third solution was to differ- entiate between passions and to play one off against the other. Hirschman

341

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

calls this the 'neutralization of passions'. Hume, Kant, Bacon, Spinoza, all elaborated their theories along such lines of reasoning.4 However, the most successful solution proposed through intellectual argument was the long-term abolition of the separation of passions and interests and the channelling of the former into the latter. In this instance, interests were first seen in context with activities that were linked to some form of rational calculation. Later this concept was narrowed down and became associated with the realm of solely economic activities. The successful career of the latter concept can also be appreciated by looking at the semantic shift that occurred over time: the interests of the few became the interests of the many, i.e. classes and groups. Once 'interest' became synonymous with common economic success, the point of no return had been reached; interest had indeed become the new hegemonic paradigm now conveying only positive connotations.

Here one must ask what exactly was so positive about this new hege- monic notion of interests. To explain this one must acknowledge that the concept of interest based on rational calculation in terms of means and ends also meant predictability. This element of calculation allowed one to plan ahead and grasp the implications and possibilities for the future. Furthermore, a network of interdependent players devel- oped. These players helped to enforce a balance through their shared and mutual interests, a balance that would again lead to more stability, reliability and the development of trust. In short, interest became synony- mous with the notion of the love of or desire for money, and increas- ingly, the interest in gain and profit came to be seen as an innocent and harmless passion.

After having explained the complex relationship between passions and interests, Hirschman takes a closer look at how certain arguments invented and valid only in the realm of economics were also used for political purposes. According to Hirschman, it was the French polit- ical philosopher Montesquieu who first argued that civilized behaviour is both a precondition for and a result of free trade; interest in trade and commerce would serve to temper warfare among nations. A slightly different argument was put forward by the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment. Sir James Steuart and Adam Smith argued that trade and commerce would be the most effective means of constraining the powers of absolute monarchs and feudal landlords, as the expansion of trade was in the interest of the growing middle class. Adam Smith went even further in maintaining that it was only economic activity that could serve and contribute to the progress of mankind. With Smith in partic- ular a state had been reached where all moral arguments became channelled into one argument - that of economic interest.

As western societies underwent a radical transformation from the agrarian societies of the Middle Ages to modem capitalist societies, it

342

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

became the main focus of philosophers to identify a moral mechanism that would in effect prevent societies from losing cohesion. But the origi- nal idea of political economy, i.e. that of interests functioning as the tie that binds the 'society of individuals' (N. Elias) together, proved to be illusory. Yet Hirschman is careful in the workings of his argument in this respect; he notes that authors such as Adam Ferguson or Alexis de Tocqueville were able to see both sides of the coin, the advantages and disadvantages of economic activity. Where early political economy had argued that the pursuit of interests in trade and commerce would accel- erate the demise of the old political structure of feudal landlords and royal despots, Ferguson also recognized that the preconditions for flour- ishing trade and commerce were stability, tranquillity and predictabil- ity, and that these preconditions could in fact also be provided by authoritarian, autocratic regimes. Alexis de Tocqueville argued along similar lines in Democracy in America: he warns of the detrimental con- sequences of a development in which materialist desires develop faster than political democracy. In referring to both Ferguson and de Tocqueville, Hirschman stresses that there is no automatic relationship between the development of capitalism and the development of democ- racy. As both Ferguson and de Tocqueville highlighted, private enter- prise can diminish public activities and political democracy. Yet as Hirschman points out, this warning should not lead us to assume that the early theorists of political economy were completely misguided. Quite the opposite in fact: there was a strong moral impetus behind their rea- soning - the impetus being the leading question of what prevents soci- ety from becoming fractionated and drifting apart. Hirschman argues that the question was indeed valid but that it was also overburdened with the anticipation of making progress. Thus, once the theorizing of economic activity and the practical pursuit of interests were on track, economists lost sight of their original morally motivated epistemological interest.5 Yet, as Hirschman points out, the early thinkers from the political economy tradition serve as reminders that economy was first conceived of as a moral activity and served mainly moral purposes. It is thus justified to say that by reminding us of this forgotten dimension of the history of political economy, Hirschman attempts to reclaim those moral motivations that triggered the entire enterprise. Thus, a framework of reference is established - although it remains an ex negativo frame- work in that it hints at hidden possibilities of a human science that lurks beyond the moral dimensions of political economy.6 In what follows, Hirschman's other works are dissected and interpreted for the purposes of elaborating upon this early theme of the economy of morals and its implication for a new Menschenwissenschaft.

343

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

III THE ECONOMY OF MORALS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (1): EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY

Hirschman's book Exit, Voice, and Loyalty attempts to break down and explore the possible variations within an established tradition. In examining the ways in which Hirschman's concepts of exit, voice and loyalty are connected to the theme of the economy of morals, one must understand that in The Passions and the Interests he stressed the moral imperatives behind the reasoning of political economy. One is surprised at first when in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty the author makes use of concepts that were historically applied when analysing economic performance. Yet Hirschman's intention is not to interpret the social world through an economic lens, but rather to emphasize the point that having acknow- ledged that political economy developed from considerations of moral issues, the same must necessarily be true of its concepts. Hence exit, voice and loyalty are not solely concepts that may be used only to describe economic functions, but may also be considered as useful tools for investigating and interpreting a whole range of social and political issues.

Hirschman opens with the observation that the difference between the concepts 'exit' and 'voice' to some extent parallels the difference between the realms of economics and politics. While the notion of exit is an option frequently used in economics where it is the customers' and employees' way to show their dissatisfaction (i.e. they choose a competitor's product or buy less of the original product or service), the notion of voice is frequently used in politics. The implications become remarkably clear when one attempts to apply them in opposite camps. To use democratic voice in the economic realm would be a dangerous option and the very logic of the mechanics of economics would be threatened. It also follows that if one was to use the economic option of exit within politics, i.e. if people were to opt out of political life en masse, the consequences for the political realm in question would be profound.

Yet the rigid and narrow application of these concepts presents con- siderable limitations. To break through these Hirschman proposes more flexibility. Much more could be gained if the two concepts were not limited to the specific application in either field, economics or politics. It is in other words the relationships and interactions bet- ween the two realms that must be studied more carefully. Thus, the use of the economic tool in politics and the use of the political tool in economics could serve to shed light on the complexity of social action. The following example illustrates the possibilities of this option. In economics the rational calculation of means and ends nor- mally reduces the question down to the brass tacks of one is either a customer or one is not. In economic affairs this rigid separation has

344

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

traditionally been regarded as healthy. Mass withdrawal prompts the power base to reorganize, reconstruct or even reinvent their busi- ness enterprise. Yet as Hirschman stresses, it is a reaction that is some- what futile in that one waits for the disaster to hit, whereas if the voice option were to be taken into account, this would in essence act as an early warning system, and reconstruction and reform could be instigated prior to a crisis. Ultimately everyone would benefit: employees and customers could interact and participate, their voice would be heard and the powers that be would not be in a position of waiting for disaster to occur.

The reason, however, that the voice option is rarely taken into con- sideration in economics is due to its democratic potential. Once members or customers get a taste for participation and democracy, it becomes difficult to stop the impetus, and the logic of fully applied democracy would probably mean the end of capitalist business enterprise as we know it. In other words, the voice option can have its extremes. If everyone was freely able to take up the ideal of participatory demo- cracy, and was allowed a complete say in what had a direct impact on their lives, the mechanics of 'work' would break down. This re- mains true for economic matters as well as for modem democratic systems.

To be a fully activated citizen would be a nightmare - and quite tiring as well, particularly over a long stretch of time. Hirschman clearly recog- nizes this dilemma - hence his arguments for a middle ground between 'permanent activism' and 'total apathy' in both the economic and the political realms. To differentiate further, he insists on the distinction between the dominant and the subsidiary mode in each field. Thus the realm of economy would benefit from a degree of democratization; and the political realm would flourish with some form of exit option - but again only in a subsidiary form. Yet social situations can be imagined where neither option, not even the complementary one, is fully acces- sible. Here Hirschman points towards such social organizations as family, state and church, where there are no real exit options. The only alter- native that remains open in these cases is the option of voice. Yet situations can also be imagined where voice becomes dependent on exit. This possibility may arise when voice works only in combination with the threat of leaving. Hirschman describes this as a situation where exit becomes something of a last resort for voice to be heard. Particularly in the realm of political organizations this is an option used by members who want to voice their opinion and for whatever reason are not being heard. Whether it is an issue of a minority or individual principles being at stake, their last chance of being heard is often through the threat of exit. A slightly different situation can be imagined in the case of boycotts. Here exit is the prime condition for voice.

345

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

Hirschman is particularly interested in the question of which social sit- uation one opts for: exit or voice, or a combination of the two? However, amidst the various examples and constellations that Hirschman discusses, it is interesting to note that he repeatedly favours voice over exit in situ- ations where both options are possible.7 According to Hirschman, 'while exit requires nothing but a clearcut either-or decision, voice is essentially an art constantly evolving in new directions' (Hirschman, 1970: 43). Thus an important factor of time comes into play: the exit option requires no time, just a simple logic and a rational decision here and now. Voice on the other hand is more time-conscious and time-consuming, and is not based solely on the 'short cut' between past experiences and the antici- pation of the future. Voice allows one to think about a complete range of possibilities. It thus increases the choices available to us in the present, and thereby enriches future options and possibilities. Hirschman criticizes the emphasis that is usually given to the exit option, as it reduces choice to formal rational decisions in terms of a narrow means-ends relation- ship; it excludes other rational possibilities where means are seen not simply as means to an end but as ends in themselves.8

At this point Hirschman introduces the concept of loyalty. For him loyalty 'holds exit at bay and activates voice' (ibid.: 78). It is loyalty that makes it likely that voice will be heard and that reduces the risk of exit.9 In other words: it provides voice with the extra time that it needs to formulate its priorities. It does so by simply raising the loss quotient for exit; here Hirschman uses the German term Bauchschmerzen to describe the uncomfortable feeling members would experience upon leaving. Such a situation can be imagined in the case of membership of voluntary organizations. Yet, as Hirschman stresses, there are organizations and forms of membership where a member cannot actually leave. This is particularly true for organizations that provide public services such as health care, education and transport. Here it would be self-limiting and potentially problematic (not to say dangerous in the case of health care and education) to opt for exit. Hence one stays with them and tries to improve things by raising one's voice. But even here there is a last choice, one can still resign and protest from the outside.

Of course, in a complex society many choices can be made and are possible, whether at the same time or sequentially. The balanced combi- nation of both exit and voice is what is required. Overall, though, it has to be said that if in doubt, it is better to give the voice option prefer- ence. It is the more democratic option; it would also be the option where people would be given an arena in which to consider the moral impli- cations of their decisions. Rarely does the same hold true for the economic exit options, even when situated in a context infused with the political voice option.

346

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

IV THE ECONOMY OF MORALS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (2): SHIFTING INVOLVEMENTS

We have seen how Hirschman conceives of political economy as being also and foremost a moral enterprise. It is but a small step to apply some concepts stemming from the economy of morals to social action in general. In Shifting Involvements Hirschman does exactly that. As its subtitle Private Interests and Public Action suggests, the main concern and focus is now on the shift from public to private spheres and vice versa. However, before going into specific details, we must understand where this is placed theoretically: the economy of morals is the general presup- position and approach, while exit, voice and loyalty are the conceptual elaborations derived from that general framework. There are two new forms of activities that Hirschman sets out to analyse in Shifting Involvements: the public vita activa and the pursuit of private interests. These two new forms stand in a relationship with the overall approach, yet they differ from the concepts of exit, voice and loyalty in that they aim at a more concrete level of analysis.10

Hirschman hypothesizes that there are phases in history where private activity is more important than political and public activism. Yet this should not lead us to assume that the two are not connected. The oppo- site is actually true and what connects one activity with another merits some explanation. Hirschman acknowledges that economists have thought this through, yet they clearly have no specific epistemological interest in why people sometimes opt for particular preferences. The reason for this seems to be the economists' assumption that the main motivations rest outside the sphere of economics, and therefore do not warrant being studied as part of their discipline. Hirschman objects to such a view and argues that even if all material desires could be fulfilled, disappointment would necessarily be part of the human condition. What still needs to be explained then is why some people opt for private activ- ities and others for public engagement.

The answer to this question could be personal contentment or fulfil- ment, or in this context disappointment, if the former is not achieved. Yet this would not adequately explain the shift between and within the two realms. Why is it that at one point in time people are willing to partici- pate in the public sphere, yet at others they retreat into the private sphere? Against the logic of a hierarchy of needs (as put forward by sociologists and psychologists) Hirschman argues that human action is more compli- cated. Human beings sometimes want something specific, yet once that need is fulfilled, the desire diminishes and is less intense than originally imagined or perceived. Furthermore, Hirschman argues that individuals often want, desire or achieve something beyond what was sought in the first place, although this is often only realized retrospectively. In short,

347

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

from time to time we pursue interests and follow a particular passion only to realize later that the goal posts have moved. Thus disappointment and unhappiness are an integral part of the human condition - a fact that is too often ignored and neglected in the social sciences.

Hirschman sets out to dissect these aspects of the human condition and in order to do so he first takes a closer look at private consump- tion. In doing so he demonstrates the basic fact that most of the goods desired provide happiness for only a limited time. Here the author distin- guishes between desires and needs that can only partly or occasionally be completely satisfied, and moves on to desires that can never be fully achieved. For example, a home, a car or stereo system would fall into the first two categories, food and entertainment into the latter. Hirschman stresses that there have indeed been occasions when new products were introduced and actually served to provoke some rupture in challenging the stability of society. This situation would arise due to the very fact that it begged the question of who would have access to these new resources, and further raised the question of how and why they would be acquired and in what quantity. In short, the distributive mechanisms of society were put in a position of being questioned. Once it became clear that certain groups or strata had more access than others, the very equilibrium of society became jeopardized.

Hirschman here echoes Marx in saying that society produces needs and desires that it cannot itself fulfil. It is thus an illusion to think that with progress needs will necessarily be fulfilled. Traditional economics, however, has contested such a view in that disappointment has never been seen as its main concern. Maintaining the standpoint that materi- alist fulfilment is in fact possible, economics necessarily turns into an ideology. The situation is further compounded by the fact that economics maintains, and stresses again and again, that the act of consuming is the most important function in life: I consume, therefore I am. It is precisely this ideology that Hirschman attacks. He remains convinced that it is the notion of the impossibility of the fulfilment of needs and desires that has a direct impact on the decision to participate or not to participate within the public sphere. If it is true that materialist conditions even in the most perfect society have their shortcomings, then the public sphere could possibly provide another opportunity for the pursuit or fulfilment of happiness. Hirschman is well aware that it is within this arena that his earlier distinction between exit and voice has a bearing, in so far as exit has been described as belonging mainly to the private economic sphere, and voice to the public realm of politics. Hirschman is now in a position to bring together the levels of analysis, making the relation- ship between the two clearer: it is in fact disappointment within the private sphere that leads to an active engagement in the public sphere. In other words, exit becomes the precondition for voice.

348

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

To make it clear who actually engages in the public sphere, however, further clarification is needed. Hirschman states that it may be the lower strata of society who suffer disappointment and who, in reality, have less access to the means of consumption, while at the same time the wealthy have the means to benefit from that extra psychological kick of entering the arena of politics. Both examples demonstrate that the private sphere should not be seen as something completely opposed to public engagement but rather as something which provides a ladder upon which to climb into the world of politics.

At this point, Hirschman is well aware that he must still rationalize the implications of the public political sphere and here offers an obser- vation on the unique relationship between means and ends in politics. He stipulates that disappointment cannot be measured in terms of investment and gain. In this respect, the author's earlier hypothesis of voice preserving a different means-ends relationship can now be qual- ified. Public happiness is something where the means, or the process of attaining those means, are as important as the ends in themselves. The pursuit of public happiness therefore cannot be regarded as something that has a net outcome.11 It should be clear at this point that the happi- ness of being involved in the public sphere is unquantifiable yet certainly not without its disappointments.

It is in this context that Hirschman stresses that to retreat from poli- tics and the public sphere into the private sphere is not as easy as the reverse, stepping from the private sphere into the political arena. The problems raised by the first instance are necessarily more complex and therefore more difficult to pinpoint. To illustrate his argument, Hirschman discusses two different forms of engagement: the ballot box and social movements. While the first activity is clearly a form of minimum engagement, the second demands the commitment of the full- time citizen and disappointment may be experienced within both activities. For some, the ballot box will never be sufficient, while others will seek an equilibrium of activity and reject the demands of acting as full-time citizens. Both cases could result in a retreat into private life and, as Hirschman observes, this return to private life would in- deed resemble the situation within the private sphere prior to the attempt of pursuing the path of public happiness. The significance of this ob- servation is that it could possibly imply the demise of not only the vita activa but the attempt and capacity to understand and explain the vita contemplativa.

From what has been said so far, it would be wrong, however, to conclude that engagement in the public sphere is the only true path. For Hirschman both spheres are complementary and necessary, yet a successful balance between them would depend on individual circum- stances. A societal framework would be required, one that allows citizens

349

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

to engage in both the public and private sphere. This proposal necessi- tates a radical agenda: rethinking the notions of public and private and the relationship between the two spheres. Hirschman, in an attempt to summarize the dilemma, asks the following main questions: Why is it that work is stfill regarded as private although we are working publicly? Why do we regard instrumental action as being limited to the private economic sphere? Are we less expressive and do we stop being indi- viduals while working? Why does democracy appear to stop at the gates of the factory? It is these questions that any 'decent society' (A. Margalit) should be looking to answer.

V THE ECONOMY OF MORALS AND ITS APPLICATIONS (3): THE RHETORIC OF

REACTION

Like thinkers of the Durkheimian tradition, Hirschman is concerned with the question of what binds society together.12 However, Hirschman clearly steers away from the Durkheimian idea in that he draws more attention to the ambiguities of modern civil society: the distinction between private and public, the distinction between economy and poli- tics; in short, all the contradictions that run through social life in modern societies. In his summation of these contradictions Hirschman makes moral choices and does indeed take sides; and it is in this respect that Hirschman differs from Durkheim. He recognizes that in the radically changing conditions of modern civil society the critical impetus will be achieved through finding a new balance between the public and the private, and between economics and politics. However, the process of finding this new balance is perpetually under threat - particularly from what he calls The Rhetoric of Reaction.

Hirschman explains this idea by referring to T. H. Marshall's histor- ical distinction between civil rights, political rights, and social and economic rights. In general, Hirschman sympathizes with Marshall's broad account but objects to the fact that such a view tends to overem- phasize historical progress and ignore the waves of reaction at various stages within it. He reminds us of Burke's attack on the French Revolution, his arguments against universal suffrage, and his polemic against what he imagined to be a welfare state. Taking a closer look at this rhetoric of reaction, Hirschman argues that reactionary logic can be narrowed down to three main concentric circles of reasoning.

First there is the theory of turning meaning upside-down. This theo- retical argument, however, serves little purpose in improving conditions: it is argued that any desire for improvement along these lines can only lead to a worse state of affairs. Hirschman argues that thinkers such as Edmund Burke, Joseph de Maistre, Gustave Le Bon and Herbert Spencer,

350

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

as well as modem sociologists and political scientists such as Charles Murray and Nathan Glazer, are actually keen supporters of a view that may well be highly aware of human limitations when it comes to unfore- seen circumstances of purposeful human action. Yet in the end this view tends to reverse the reality of the situation: what first was conceived of as the new freedom is now turned on its head in the sense that it enforces the idea that society should remain as it is, i.e. everything has its place and can be calculated in terms of means and ends. In other words, these thinkers are driven backwards, seeking predictability in individuals and their actions. Hirschman asks where within the confines of such a view is there room for the concept of freedom. The premise of these thinkers also throws up the question of what society would be like if there was no provision or arena for the possible option of action.

Hirschman then discusses the theory that all desire for change is futile, and all attempts for change are useless and lead to nothing. This theory assumes that the deep underlying structures of a society are beyond the impact of human action and reform will therefore lead only to cosmetic and remedial correction. Hirschman calls this theory the 'law of non- movement'. In comparison to the theory previously discussed, the futility theory assumes that the action for change has absolutely no impact and leaves no deep traces. This view clearly casts considerable doubt on human agency and democratic action in general. Italian elite theorists such as Mosca, Pareto and Michels fall within this category of pessimism. They argue that throughout history it was a small elite that formed the political class. Democratic efforts to change society and its political arrangements were, and to this day remain, futile. What prevents Mosca, Pareto and Michels from being subscribers to the notion of the first theory is their insistence on the validity of eternal laws. Any attempt to alter these governing laws would also be a futile effort. Hirschman points out that these thinkers see the world as having some certain structure while the first theory assumes the world simply to be unstable. The problem with the second view of structure is that it discourages people from acting democratically by denying the real possibility of acting for change.

The third theory regards all reform as dangerous and assumes that change only serves to threaten what has so far been achieved. The main arguing point here is that past reforms are seen as being played out against new r-eforms. The two arguments that are being put forward are, first, that increased democracy threatens liberty and, second, that the expansion of the modern welfare state threatens freedom and democ- racy. As for democracy threatening liberty, the crucial point to be considered here is the distinction between positive and negative liberty. Liberals more often than not stress that negative liberty is what makes democracy work. Hence all arguments in favour of legislation that go

351

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

beyond this negative conception (aiming for example at attempting to improve the well-being of disadvantaged citizens) must be seen as attempts to argue for positive liberty. Hirschman's own historical example here is Benjamin Constant, yet it must be said that the current American debates on affirmative action demonstrate more lucidly the conflict between positive and negative conceptions of freedom. As for the second argument of the modern welfare state threatening freedom and democracy, this must be recognized as a theory that draws heavily on the purely modern, twentieth-century experience of state interven- tion in the economy. The argument here is that all modem welfare states minimize individual action and individual freedom. Hirschman polemi- cizes against such views. In his view we are confronted here with the logic of 'one step forward and two steps backward', which he recog- nizes as a basic defence of the status quo. Concerning the particular narrow-mindedness of the two variations of the last theory, Hirschman questions why people do not seem to consider the complex relationship that exists between civil, political and social rights.

Hirschman is concerned that all three major rhetorical themes tend to minimize the importance of action and of public and democratic engage- ment; there is also the common recurring theme of a mythological past, or references to an existence of a state of nature or a civilization that never was. Hirschman also stresses that it would be wrong to assume that it is only conservatives who can be accused of using this rhetoric of reaction. Certainly conservatives are much more inclined to use reac- tionary rhetoric - particularly along the first two of the three themes outlined above - yet history shows that there is an equivalent to the conservative rhetoric of reaction among progressives. The left Marxist vision of a societal progress that follows the laws of history stresses the same language of impossibility for individual action and democratic poli- tics that the rhetoric of reaction uses.

What Hirschman proposes as a solution is neither to denounce nor to accuse each other of using such rhetoric. For him only a move away from the discourse of mutual elimination - 'the dialogue of the deaf' - provides an answer. Only democracy-friendly environments and free lines of communication can keep the door open for possible new ways to explore and find solutions to the ambiguities, contradictions and ambivalences of modern civil society.

VI CONCLUSION

Before finally discussing how Hirschman's work links up with other approaches in the social sciences and how it can enrich social theory in particular, it is helpful to leave him for a second to discuss briefly some of the general ambiguities and dilemmas to be found in the critique of

352

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

political economy. Critique of political economy can be approached from two different angles: first, one which understands, explains and criti- cizes modem society using the tools provided by such classical political economists as Jean Baptiste Say, Sir James Steuart and Adam Smith; from this viewpoint the applicant would stand firmly within the grounds of political economy. The second angle would be one that is critical of classical political economy, an approach implying that one would operate analytically outside the realm of political economy. To be sure, Marx attempted to incorporate the perspective of the two angles by being both a critic of political economy and a critical economist. However, at times his ambiguity and ambivalence left not only followers but also serious interpreters of his work puzzled and confused. In particular, when it came to the normative implications of Marx's critique of political economy, one could never be sure precisely which normative basis Marx was using as a tool to analyse and judge society. One would have to question whether or not any explicit norms and values exist in his concep- tion of political economy. To be more precise: what, for example, is the non-alienated platform from which to think about and criticize alien- ation? And what are we alienated from in the first place? Furthermore, if it is true that everybody is blinded by the reified and fetishistic qual- ities of commodity production, how is it possible to state that only the critical theorist, by virtue of his approach, is able to recognize what is true and maintain an appropriate consciousness? One possible answer to these questions could be that Marx's thought stems from the Enlightenment tradition and is thus deeply rooted in and indebted to that tradition - hence the emphasis on the autonomy and happiness of individuals in his work. But one then hesitates and upon reflection asks: Is there not an evident contradiction between means and ends in Marx's work? Why must one necessarily use collective means to achieve indi- vidual ends? And - particularly after the experience of communist regimes this century - is it realistic to think that individual ends can be achieved by collectivist means? The answer is obvious: it is highly unlikely - even when the complex issue of unforeseen circumstances is taken into account.

Other critical thinkers became increasingly aware of the normative ambivalence of Marx. Thus Edward P. Thompson aims at balanc- ing Marx's economistic views by stressing the cultural dimensions of social and class relationships (Thompson, 1978); and in his studies of late eighteenth-century English social history, he tried to prove his point by referring to the rich experiences of the 'moral economy' of the English crowd (Thompson, 1991). Jiirgen Habermas followed a different path. He proposed breaking away entirely from the tradition of the critique of political economy and its contradictions and ambigu- ities (Habermas, 1974, 1984/1987). After looking at the values that stem

353

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

from interaction and communication, Habermas dissents radically from any form of economic or economistic thinking - though with the questionable result that the economic realm becomes 'liberated' from criticism. Thus the Habermasian approach simply substitutes one extreme for another: if emancipation can only be expected to come from the communicative realm of life, then the economic system can only be criticized in so far as it still draws and relies heavily on the resources of the life-world; beyond the necessary work, the irreducible 'hard core' of the economic system, there is nothing to discuss (Habermas, 1984/1987).13

How does Albert 0. Hirschman's work fit into this discussion? Albert 0. Hirschman's attempt to conceptualize the economy of morals resem- bles Thompson's idea of the moral economy. Yet Hirschman's understanding of the economy of morals differs from Thompson's in that he perceives and conceptualizes 'the moral' from a completely different perspective which is clearly outside the Marxist tradition. It is further hypothesized here that Hirschman's arguments also reflect those of Habermas in that he notably rejects productivist or economistic interpretations. Yet Hirschman does not develop his own concepts from the world of communication and the metaphysics of mutual under- standing as Habermas does. Instead, Hirschman follows a rather differ- ent line of reasoning, a line that allows him to address almost all the questions which Thompson and Habermas have raised but without falling into the traps of either cultural Marxism in its more empirical form (Thompson) or the metaphysics of mutual understanding (in the grand theory of Habermas). Thus by avoiding both, Hirschman's approach can be regarded as what Robert K. Merton once called 'middle- range theory': a theoretical framework that tries neither 'to build up' as empiricism does nor to 'deduce down' as grand theory does, but instead 'builds up' and 'deduces down' at the same time (Merton, 1957). The idea of a middle-range approach is further enhanced through Hirschman's ideas of 'nibbling', together with what he calls 'possibilism'. Nibbling avoids the futile attempt 'to look for a generally valid solution. Historical experience provides us with occasional hints and discoveries, but they are different for different societies and for the same society at different times' (Hirschman, 1995: 5); 'possibilism' refers more to the sense of increasing space and allowing more time for think- ing and action under complex circumstances; it stands in a coexistential relationship to 'nibbling'.

It should have become evident by this stage that Hirschman is truly a critic of political economy. It still comes as a surprise, however, that Hirschman does not employ the term 'economy of morals' in his work - although there are, as we have seen, many hints in his work

354

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

that suggest that he would sympathize with such a term. Thus he concludes in the final passage of one of his essays, 'Morality and the social sciences':

Morality is not something like pollution abatement that can be secured by slightly modifying the design of a policy proposal. Rather, it belongs into the center of our work; and it can get there only if the social scientists are morally alive and make themselves vulnerable to moral concerns - then they will produce morally significant works ... Down the road, it is then possible to visu- alize a kind of moral science that would be very different from the one most of us have been practicing: a moral social science where moral considerations are not repressed or kept apart, but are systematically commingled with analytic argument, without guilt feelings over any lack of integration; where the transition from preaching to proving and back again is performed frequently and with ease; and where moral considerations need no longer be smug- gled in surreptitiously, nor expressed unconsciously, but are displayed openly and disarmingly. Such would be, in part, my dream for a 'social science for our grandchildren'.

(Hirschman, 1981: 305f.)

A morally conscientious critique of political economy such as Hirschman's should not be taken as an overall rejection of the social sciences' effort to discover general laws. As the economist M. S. McPherson has stressed:

It is important that Hirschman never sets this search ... for 'the unexplained phenomenon ... the odd fact' opposed to the social scientific search for general laws. One could imagine such a nihilistic posture: a claim that since all putative general laws in social science are bound to fail, the search for them - the standard kind of social science activity - ought to stop. This would be quite alien to Hirschman's intention, which is to obtain 'equal rights of citizen- ship in social science to the search for general laws and to the search for general laws and to the search for uniqueness'. The concession to the value of general laws is not mere tactical polite- ness - indeed Hirschman himself has more than once propounded social scientific 'laws' of his own. Besides being useful in them- selves, such general laws provide the necessary background against which the unique and the unexpected can stand out.

(Foxley et al., 1986: 305f.)14

Yet having stressed the relationship that may exist between the social sciences' attempt to strive for eternal laws and Hirschman's 'nibbling',

355

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

it has to be said that the 'tremendous events' of 1989 (Wolf Lepenies) highlighted again that what social science actually needs is fewer concepts derived from Weltanschauungen in the form of grand theory (or empiricism for that matter); rather, 'we must train ourselves to be on the lookout for unusual historical developments, rare constellations of favourable events, narrow paths, partial advances that may conceivably be followed by others' (Hirschman quoted in Meldolesi, 1995: 203).

I am convinced that the epochal events of 1989 and their global long- term implications provide an opportunity to do exactly this and to rethink the appropriateness of refined middle-range approaches like that of Hirschman. Many fields of research can be imagined to be receptive to the application of Hirschmanian concepts: from the reshaping of poli- tics and society in individual countries (the British case serves as a good example), to European reconstruction and redefinition after 1989, to the new developments in Eastern Europe.15

NOTES

For feedback and suggestions on earlier drafts of this article I am grateful to Howard Davis, Diana J. Holubowicz, Donald Winch and three anonymous reviewers. A slightly different version of it was presented at the BSA conference 'For Sociology' in Glasgow, April 1999.

1 I would like to stress that the four books were not published in the order listed above. Nevertheless, I hold to my hypothesis that The Passions and the Interests (1977) provides the more general background to the concepts explored in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), Shifting Involvements (1982) and The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991).

2 Albert 0. Hirschman remarks that his views owe much to the 'intellectual history' approach of John G. A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner. Yet as Donald Winch has pointed out (in a letter to the author), it is rather the older tradi- tion of Ideengeschichte to which Hirschman belongs. In the approach of Ideengeschichte 'unit ideas' are traced back over long periods and different settings rather than within specific historical contexts, thus making Hirschman's approach more pertinent in modern day than the concepts of Skinner or Pocock.

3 As Hirschman points out, this line of thought would later be used by Adam Smith and would require just a little twist in the argument to change 'vice' and 'passion' into 'interest'. For a slightly different opinion see Donald Winch's Adam Smith's Politics (Winch, 1978).

4 Hirschman stresses, though, that it was the Federalists who first put this theory into practice in that they conceived of the American political system as one where different passions could be effectively neutralized through the fragmentation and separation of powers.

5 Today the question of what holds society together is left to sociologists to deal with; rarely is it a question that economists will take an interest in. Fred Hirsch's Social Limits of Growth (Cambridge, Mass., 1976) and Amartya Sen's Inequality Reexamined (Cambridge, Mass., 1992) remain exceptions.

356

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

6 'Human science' is not synonymous with 'humanities'. I refer here to Norbert Elias's use of the term Menschenwissenschaft, a term Elias coined to distinguish his intellectual enterprise from the social sciences and the humanities.

Die Strukturen der menschlichen Psyche, die Strukturen der menschlichen Gesellschaft und die Strukturen der menschlichen Geschichte, sie sind unlosbare Komplementarerscheinungen und nur im Zusammenhang miteinander zu erforschen. Sie bestehen und bewegen sich in Wirklichkeit nicht dermagen getrennt voneinander, wie es beim heutigen Forschungsbetrieb erscheint. Sie bilden, zusammen mit anderen Strukturen, den Gegenstand der einen Menschenwissenschaft.

(Elias, 1987: 60)

7 Particularly instructive are two historical cases where the voice options are not so self-evident. The first historical example is discussed in Exit, Voice, and Loyalty and deals with the notion of the USA being a nation founded on 'exit' - with all the serious implications for its political culture (Hirschman, 1970: 106-19). The second example is the former GDR, a case that threw new light on the complex relationship between exit and voice. After all it was the mass exodus of GDR citizens that triggered 'voice' among the remaining citizens (Hirschman, 1995: 9-44).

8 Here Hirschman is indeed close to Hannah Arendt's notion of action in the context of public life.

9 For Arendt this role would be played by the political community, i.e. the republic to which one belongs. It has to be said in this context that Hirschman would object to the new communitarian emphasis on loyalty through Gemeinsinn. Too much Gemeinsinn in terms of covering up conflicts that should be resolved openly and fairly can have detrimental consequences for the communities in question. For an elaboration on this argument see Hirschman (1995: 231-48).

10 In Hirschman's own words, he is aiming at a 'phenomenology of engage- ment and disappointment' (Hirschman, 1982: Introduction). Yet Shifting Involvements can also be read politically in that Hirschman is trying to find a middle ground between the demands of public life (clearly a republican thought) and the right to privacy (a point often made by liberal approaches). It is indeed regrettable that in his phenomenology, Hirschman does not discuss some of the concerns that have been voiced through feminism. At the same time, it is quite remarkable that an approach such as Hirschman's, which in principle provides very useful tools, is not taken into account by feminists. Thus for example the index of the Oxford reader J. B. Landes (ed.) Feminism, the Public and the Private (1998), a volume which purports to collect the main contributions in the field, carries no entry for 'Hirschman' between 'heterosexuality' and 'Anita Hill'.

11 Hannah Arendt stresses the same point when discussing public engagement. While work/labour entails an instrumental means-ends relationship, this is not true for interaction/action in the public sphere. Here the means - other human beings - are never solely treated as a means towards certain ends but as ends in themselves. Intersubjectivity in general lacks the purely instru- mental relationship between means and ends, usually to be found in subject-object relationships of labour and work. Jurgen Habermas would later elaborate on this distinction.

357

REVIEW OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL ECONOMY

12 This also distinguishes him from a Weberian approach. Hirschman writes:

Weber claims that capitalistic behaviour and activities were the indi- rect (and originally unintended) result of a desperate search for individual salvation. My claim is that the diffusion of capitalist forms owed much to an equally desperate search for a way of avoiding society's ruin. Clearly both claims could be valid at the same time: one relates to the motivations of the aspiring elites, the other to those gatekeepers. But Weber's thesis has attracted so much attention that the latter topic has been totally overlooked.

(Hirschman, 1977: 130)

13 The reader might wonder why Habermas and Thompson have been singled out over any other social scientists. The reason for this is twofold: first, as has been pointed out before, both Habermas and Thompson refer to the problem of the critique of political economy; second, both represent oppo- site ends of the science continuum. Habermas is foremost a social philosopher thinking along the lines of the one end of the science spectrum that is occu- pied with general presuppositions and 'grand theory' (with leanings to almost metaphysical arguments); Thompson, in contrast, is a historian who operates at the other end of the continuum - that of factual and empirical evidence, marked by specificity.

It is my contention that most of the current social theories can be identi- fied as leaning towards and being identical with the end of the continuum that is marked by generality, i.e. general presuppositions and 'grand theory'. Having said that, it is also my contention that Hirschman's approach certainly fits the description of 'social theory' but that compared to other social theo- ries his approach is less ambiguous and therefore less likely to fall into metaphysical traps. For a more detailed discussion of the science continuum see Alexander (1987).

14 Among the current grand theory approaches in social science, Jeffrey C. Alexander's neofunctionalism stands out in particular; it is open, tolerant and democratic enough to incorporate middle-range theories such as Hirschman's without diminishing their unique contribution in terms of analysing the unexpected. In particular Alexander's understanding of differ- entiated modern civil society (which he calls 'civil society III' - 'civil society I' referring to the classic tradition of Ferguson, Smith and de Tocqueville and 'civil society II' referring to the rather narrowly conceived Marxist reduc- tion) is a referential framework that is sophisticated enough to provide a standpoint from which to observe both the unique and particular and the general and universal aspects of social life. For a more elaborated discus- sion of the democratic aspects of the neofunctionalist approach see Alexander (1998a); for the discussion of modern civil society see Alexander's intro- duction in Alexander (1998b).

15 For an excellent application of Hirschmanian concepts see C. Offe, Varieties of Transitions. The East German and Eastern European Experience (Oxford: Polity, 1994); see also John Elster's contributions and the work of other scholars using the 'deliberative democracy' approach.

358

HESS: HIRSCHMAN AND THE ECONOMY OF MORALS

REFERENCES

Alexander, J. C. (1987) Twenty Lectures. Sociological Theory Since World War II, New York: Columbia University Press.

(1998a) Neofunctionalism and After, Oxford: Blackwell. (ed.) (1998b) Real Civil Societies, London: Sage.

Arendt, H. (1958) The Human Condition, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

(1963) On Revolution, New York: The Viking Press. Elias, N. (1987) Die Gesellschaft der Individuen, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp. Foxley, A., McPherson, M. S. and O'Donnell, G. (1986) Development, Democracy

and the Art of Trespassing: Essays in Honor of Albert 0. Hirschman, Notre Dame: Ill.: University of Notre Dame Press.

Gorz, A. (1989) Critique of Economic Reason, London: Verso. Habermas, J. (1974) Theory and Practice, London: Heinemann Educational Books.

(1984/1987) The Theory of Communicative Action (2 vols), London/ Cambridge: Heinemann/Polity.

Hirschman, A. 0. (1970) Exit, Voice, and Loyalty, Cambridge, Mass., and London: Harvard University Press.

(1977) The Passions and the Interests, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

(1981) Essays in Trespassing: Economics to Politics and Beyond, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(1982) Shifting Involvements. Private Interest and Public Action, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

(1989) Entwicklung, Markt und Moral, Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag. (1991) The Rhetoric of Reaction, Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard

University Press. (1992) Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays, Cambridge,

Mass.: Harvard University Press. (1995) A Propensity to Self-Subversion, Cambridge, Mass., and London:

Harvard University Press. (1997) Tischgemeinschaft. Zwischen offentlicher und privater Sphdre (Jan Patocka-

Gedichtnisvorlesung, IWM 1996); Grenziibertritte. Orte und Ideen eines Lebenslaufes, Vienna: Passagen Verlag.

Landes, J. B. (ed.) (1998) Feminism, the Public and the Private, Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.

Meldolesi, L. (1995) Discovering the Possible. The Surprising World of Albert 0. Hirschman, Notre Dame, Ill., and London: University of Notre Dame Press.

Merton, R. K. (1957) Social Theory and Social Structure, New York: The Free Press. Pocock, J. G. A. (1975) The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and

the Atlantic Republican Tradition, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. (1993) Die andere Biirgergesellschaft, Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.

Priban, K. (1983) A History of Economic Reasoning, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.

Thompson, E. P. (1978) The Poverty of Theory and Other Essays, London: Merlin Press.

(1991) Customs in Common, London: Merlin Press. Weintraub, J. and Krishan, K. (eds) (1997) Public and Private in Thought and Practice.

Perspectives on a Grand Dichotomy, Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press.

Winch, D. (1978) Adam Smith's Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Wolfe, A. (1991) Whose Keeper? Social Science and Moral Obligation, Berkeley and

Los Angeles: Califomia University Press.

359