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"And When Is Now?" (On Some Limits of Perfect Intelligibility)Author(s): Samuel WeberSource: MLN, Vol. 122, No. 5, Comparative Literature Issue (Dec., 2007), pp. 1028-1049Published by: The Johns Hopkins University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/30133975.
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8/11/2019 And When is Now.pdf
2/23
"AndWhen
s
Now?"
(On
Some
Limits f
Perfect
ntelligibility)
Samuel
Weber
This
paper
was
originallyresented
s the
keynote
address
t
the imits
f
ntelligibility
onference
t
Johns opkinsUniversity
n
March
10,
2007
Enabling
"The Limitsof
Intelligibility"
"The Limitsof
Intelligibility"-this
hrase,
when extracted
rom
ny
defined ontext
xcept
hat
f
erving
s
the
title f this
onference-is
as
suggestive
s it s
ambiguous:
ndeed,
suggestive
ecause f
ts
mbi-
guity.
ts
ambiguity
estles
first nd
foremost
n
theword
intelligibil-
ity,"
nd
more
specifically
n
the
gap
that
eparates
ts
non-technical
from ts
technical,
which s to
say,
philosophical,
usage.
The
OED,
which
traces the use
of the
word
in
English
back to
1610,
gives
as
itsprimary efinition,Thequality r character fbeing ntelligible;
capability
f
being
understood;
comprehensibility."
he definition
given
in
Wikipedia-and hope,
the
Williams
College
Library
not-
withstanding,'
hat
may
be
permitted
o
cite this
ource,
at least as
corroboration-[
Wikipedia]
oes
further hen t
states:
Intelligibility
means
clearness,
xplicitness,
ucidity,
omprehensibility,
erspicuity,
legibility,lain speaking,
manifestation,
recision,
word
to
the
wise.
The
degree
to
which
peech
can be
understood."
The
question
that such
unambiguousdefinitions o not address
is
ust
what t
s
thatdetermines
the
degree
to which
peech
can
be
understood"?Or
as
the OED
puts
t,
"the
capability
f
being
under-
stood,"
of
being
"comprehensible"?
Nor do such
definitionsmake
clear what
s to
be understood
by
the
word
"intelligible."
s
it,
s
both
MLN
122
(2007):
1028-1049
@
2008
by
The
JohnsHopkins University
ress
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8/11/2019 And When is Now.pdf
3/23
MLN
1029
definitions
resuppose,
clarity,"
comprehensibility,"
understand-
ing,"
nd
perhaps
ltimately,comprehensibility"?
nd
f
o,
s
such
"comprehensibility"n essential ropertyfknowledge?f"think-
ing"-which learly
s not
necessarily
he same
as
knowing?
s it a
"property"
t
all,
or rathermore kin o a
condition-a condition f
"possibility"-that
of
being
understood"?
Without
ursuing
his
ineof
uestioning
ny
urther,
ll
that eems
clear
t
this
oint
s
that he
dictionary
efinitionsf
"intelligibility"
are
themselves
ar ess
"intelligible,"
n
the ense
of
being
ucid nd
free
f
ambiguity,
han
one
might
ssume. heir
ack
of
precision,
however,eserves o be taken eriously,ince uch definitionsend
to
reflecthe
prevailing
onceptions
hat
nform
idespread
sage
f
the
word,
ven
fsuch
conceptions
o
not
necessarily
omprehend
what
t s
that
hey
re
actuallyaying.
The
ambiguitiesmplicit
n
such
dictionary
ormulations
cquire
newdimension
henwe
consider
hemore
echnical,
hilosophical
usesof
heword. ne of
he
firstraitshat
merges
hen
ne
begins
to
investigate
he
philosophical
otion f
the
"intelligible"
s
that
t
seems
necessarily
inked o an
enabling
limit,"
amely,
hatwhich
distinguishestfromwhat s often alledthe"senses." husKant,n
his
naugural
issertationf
1770,
writtenn
Latin
nd
entitled,
e
mundi ensibilis
tque
ntelligibilisorma
t
principiis
On
the orm nd
Principles
f
he ensiblend
ntelligible
orld),
efines
intelligible"
s
"that
which ontains
othing
utwhat an
be
cognized
olely
hrough
the
nderstanding"
nisi
per ntelligentiam
ognoescendum).
his
tradition
of
defining
he
"intelligible" y
demarcating
t
from
the
"sensible"
has,
to
be
sure,
very ong history,
nd it s
one
that
uggests
hat
ambiguities
ssociated
with
he
word are
not
ust
situated
betweents
non-technicalnd
philosophical
uses
(and
avatars),
buteven
more,
within
the notion itself nsofar s
it is
linked
to
knowledge.
This
relationship
f
intelligibility
o
knowledge
raises
the
question
of
the
enabling
imits f
both as
early
s
Plato's
Republic.
n Book
VI,
Socrates
seeks
o
determineherelation f
knowledge
o
the
Good
(I
quote
the
passage
t
some
ength
n
order o recall ts
ontext):
SOCRATES.
he
sun,
presume
ou
will
ay,
ot
nly
urnisheso
visibles
the
power
of
visibility
ut
t
also
provides
or
their
generation
nd
growth
and nurture hough t s not itself eneration.
GLAUCON.
f
coursenot.
SOCRATES.
n ike
manner,hen,
ou
reto
ay
hat
he
bjects
f
knowl-
edge
not
only
receivefrom he
presence
of the
good
their
being
known,
but their
ery
xistence nd essence
s
derived o themfrom
t,
hough
the
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8/11/2019 And When is Now.pdf
4/23
1030 SAMUEL WEBER
good
tself
s not ssence ut till ranscends
ssence
epekeina
is
usias]
n
dignity
nd
surpassingower.
Rep.,
VI,
509b)3
The
cognizability,
r,
f
you
will,
intelligibility"
f that
which
can be
known
erives
otfrom
ny
mmanent
roperty
r
characteristic
t
may
possess
butfrom
omething
hat ies
"beyond"-epekeina-its
essence"
or
"properties"-ousia-as
well as
beyond
that
whichreveals tself o
the senses.
In
thus
demarcating
tself
onstitutively
rom
the world
of the
senses,
thatwhich
makes
things
knowable,
heir
ntelligibility,
defines
tself
through
what
s held to be
its
ntrinsic
imit,
hrough
which t
"transcends"
he transient
emporality
f sense
experience.
ThisBeyond, omewhatike thesun, s the condition fvisibilityith-
out
itself
eing
simply
isible.
f one
attempts
o
apprehend
t
directly
as
though
t were
ust
anothervisible
bject,
t not
only
scapes
sight,
it
destroys
t.As the condition
nd source of
visibility
nd
knowledge,
the Good
itself s neither
imply
isible nor knowable.Here
is
how
Socrates sums
up
the
resulting
ituation:
This
then
s the lass
hat describeds
intelligible
noetos],
t s
true,
ut
with
hereservation
hat he oul
s
compelled
o
employ
ssumptions
n
the nvestigationf t,notproceedingo a firstrincipleecauseof ts
inability
oextricate
tselfromnd rise
bove
ts
ssumptions,
nd
second,
that tuses s
images
r ikenesses
..
the
very bjects
hat re themselves
copied
nd adumbrated
y
heclassbelow
hem,
nd that
n
comparison
with hese
atter re
esteemed s
clear
nd
held n honor.
I
understand,
aid
he
[Glaucon]
hat
ou
re
peaking
fwhat alls nder
geometry
nd the
kindredrts.
Understand
hen,
aid
,
that
y
theother ection
f the
ntelligible
meanthatwhich
hereason
tself
ays
hold of
by
the
power
f
dialectic,
treating
ts
ssumptions
ot
s
absolute
eginnings
ut
iterally
s
hypoth-
eses,underpinnings,ootings,ndas springboardso tospeak, oenable
it
to
rise
o that
which
equires
o
assumption
nd
s
the
tartingoint
f
all,
nd
after
ttaining
o that
gain aking
old
of
thefirst
ependencies
from
t,
o to
proceed
ownward
othe
onclusion,
aking
o usewhatever
of
any bject
f ensebut
only
f
pure
deas
moving
n
through
deas to
ideas
nd
ending
with deas.
I
understand,
e
said,
not
fully,
or
t
s
no
slight
ask hat
ou
ppear
to
have
n
mind,
ut do
understandhat
you
mean to
distinguish
he
aspect
f
reality
nd
the
ntelligible,
hich s
contemplated
y
he
power
ofdialectic,s somethingruer nd more xact han heobject fthe o-
called
rts
nd scienceswhose
ssumptions
re
arbitrary
tartingoints.
(Rep
VI,
511a-c)4
Glaucon's admission hathe
understands,
lthough
not
fully,"
eems
symptomatic
f
the
Socratic ttitude
owards he "limits f
ntelligibil-
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MLN
1031
ity":
he
ntelligible,
hich
s defined
by
tsradical demarcation rom
all
experience
based
upon
the
senses-that
is,
from ll
experience
that s limited
by space
and time-can never be understood, n the
sense
of
being
fully
nown.
The limits hat define t also
delimit
ts
own
intelligibility,
t
least
in the sense of its
knowability.
s Charles
Sanders Peirce will
put
it at
the
beginning
f the
20th
century,
One
cannotwelldemand
a reasonfor easonableness tself."" utwhat oes
that tell us about the
function
f "limits" n
delimiting intelligibil-
ity"?
o the "limits"
f
intelligibility
ark
imply
he
point
at
which
intelligibilitytops
and
the
unintelligible egins?
Or
do those
imits
affect intelligibility"romwithin, s itwere,vastly omplicatingts
relationto what
exceeds
it?
"Perfectlyntelligible"
These,
at
least,
re some
of the
questions
hat he title f our confer-
ence
imposed
upon
me.
I
have no
idea,
of
course,
f
they
n
anyway
resemble
he considerations
hatwere
n
the mindsof the
organizers
when
they
hose this
title orour
meeting.
Nor am I in
a
position
o
even
begin
o
give nything
ike principledr
comprehensiveesponse
to
these
uestions.
recisely
s
unanswered, owever,
hey
will ontinue
to inform nd
agitate
he remarks
have to
present
o
you today,
nd
which,
ou
will
hardly
e
surprised
o
earn,
oncern he texts f think-
erswho
chronologically
t east re much closer o us thanthose
have
just
touched on. But
as
you
will soon
hear,
the
question
of
proximity
itself
willbe one
of the ssues
n what
have to
say.
Let me
begin
then
with
passage
from short ut
very
rovocative
essay
that
ppeared
in
English
n
2004.
The
text temsfrom
Giorgio
Agamben
nd is
entitled,
uite simply,Friendship."'
he
essay egins
by stating
hat,
s its
name
indicates,
philosophy"
as
traditionally
been "so
closely
inked" o
friendship philia]
thatwithout
t,
philoso-
phy
would not
in
fact
be
possible."
However,
Agamben
notes,
today
the relation"between
the two
has "fallen" nto such
disrepute
that
professional hilosophers"
an
only
onfront
he "so to
speak
clandes-
tine
partner
f
their
hought"
with
embarrassmentnd
[an]
uneasy
conscience."
He then
goes
on to
demonstrate his mbarrassment
y
recounting wo necdotes.The firstoncerns project"toexchange
letters n the
subject
of
friendship"
hathe had
elaboratedwith
my
friend,Jean-Lucancy":
hetwo
riends hus
hoped
"to
tage problem
that
eemed otherwise
o elude
analytical
reatment."
gambenbegan
by writing
he first
etter,
nd then
"waited,
not without
repidation,
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8/11/2019 And When is Now.pdf
6/23
1032 SAMUEL
WEBER
for the
reply."
When
it
finally
rrived, owever,
gamben
notes that
Nancy's
response
erved
nly
to
signify
he end
of
the
project."
Their
friendship,
e comments, urned ut to be "an obstacle"rather han
a
condition under
which
this
difficult
opic-difficult
t least
for
philosophers-could
be
confronted
ollaboratively.
Agamben
then
goes
on
to
give
a
second
example
of
the
difficulty
philosophers
oday
have
in
dealing
with
he
topic
of
friendship.
he
other
philosopher,
who this
ime s not
designated
s a
friend,
t
least
not
explicitly,
s
Jacques
Derrida,
who at
the timewas
in
the
process
of
writing
book
that
would be
published
under the
title,
olitiques
de 'amitietranslateds PoliticsofFriendship).'orthisbook,Agamben
observes,Derrida,
moved
by
an
analogous
nd
probably
onscious
neasiness..
chose
s
Leitmotiv
of
hisbook n
friendship]
sibylline
otto,
raditionally
ttributedo
Aristotle,
that
egates riendship
n
the
very esture
ith
hicht
eems o
nvoket:
o
philoi,
udeis
hilos,
o
friends,
here re
no friends."
sic]8
2)
But to returnnow
to
Agamben's
essay:
his second
anecdote is con-
cerned with hecorrection
f a
different
rror,
his
ime
nvolving
he
Greekphrasetraditionallyttributed oAristotle nd so often ited.
The
phrase
tself s to be found not in
Aristotle's
writings
hemselves
but
n
Diogenes
Laertius'sLives
f
he
hilosophers,
n
the
chapter
dedi-
cated
to
Aristotle
V.21).
However,
Agamben
observes,
If
we
open
a modern
dition f he
Lives...
we
do
not
find
..
the
phrase
in
question,
utrather ne almost
dentical
n
appearance,
he
meaning
ofwhich s nonetheless
ifferent
nd far ess
nigmatic:
i
(subscript
ota)
philoi,
udeis
hilos,
he
whohas
(many)
riends,
as no
friend."
3)
Agamben
then recountshow he was
able to "clarify"heenigma,or
rather,
o cause it
to
disappear:
A
library
isit as
nough
o
clarify
he
mystery.
n
1616 he
great
Genevan
philologist
saac Casaubon
ecided o
publish
new dition f
the
Lives.
Arriving
tthe
assage
n
question-which
till
ead,
n
the
dition
rocured
by
his
father-in-law,
enry
tienne,
philoi
o friends)-he
orrected
he
enigmatic
ersion
f the
manuscripts
ithout esitation.
3)
As a
result,
gamben
oncludes,
without
esitation,
he
phrase
"became
perfectlyntelligible
nd
for
this easonwas
acceptedy
modernditors"
3,
italics
mine).
In
short,
ccording
to
Agamben,
ver ince
1616
"modern ditors"
have been
aware that
he
apparent nigma
of
the
phrase
ttributed o
Aristotle
yDiogenes
Laertiuswas
n
fact
merely
he
result f a
simple
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MLN 1033
errorof
transcription.
o wonder
then,
s
Agamben
tells
us,
thathe
"immediately
nformed
Derrida
of
the results f
[his]
research."
He
does not mentionwhether erridarespondedand if o, how. But he
does recounthow
"astonished"
e was
when,
ollowing
he
publication
of
Politiques
e
'amitie,
e discovered
hat he book
contained
not
the
slightest
trace
fthe
problem"
owhichhe
had
sought
o call
Derrida's
attention.
gamben's
ppeal
had
gone
unheeded.
However,
s
Agam-
ben
concludes,
It was
certainly
ot out
of
forgetfulness"
hat
Derrida
persisted
n
citing
he
phrase
"in
ts
original
orm,"
ut
rather
ecause
"itwas essential o
the book's
strategy
hat
friendship
e,
at the same
time,both affirmednd distrustfullyevoked" 3). In this,Agamben
notes,
Derrida
repeats
a
gesture
already performed
by
Nietzsche,
who also would
have
been familiar
with
Casaubon's
emendation nd
nevertheless
isregarded
t for imilar
easons:
"Both the
necessity
f
friendship
nd,
at
the same
time,
certain
distrust owards riends
were
essential o Nietzsche's
trategy.
his
accounts
for
his
recourse
to the traditional
eading,
which
was
already, y
Nietzsche's
ime,
no
longer
current"
3).
There
is, then,
for
Agamben,
"traditional
eading"
of the
phrase,
and a modern,currentone; the traditional ne is enigmatic,but
only
because
it s based
on an
error;
he
modern version s
perfectly
intelligible,
imply
orrecting
he traditional
rror.The
traditional,
erroneousversion
has nevertheless
een retained
by
certain
hinkers,
Nietzsche and Derrida
among
them,
because it suits their
trategy,
which
s
ambivalent,
equiring
riendship
o be both
"affirmednd
distrustfully
evoked."
One is reminded
here,
mutatis
mutandis,
f the
exchange
that
Hei-
degger
had
with
reader
of his
book,
Elucidations
f
Holderlin's
oetry,
concerning
heremarkwithwhich
Heidegger
had introduced ne of
his
readings.Heidegger prefaced
his
essay
on
H61lderlin's
oem,
Wie
Wenn m
Feiertage
"As
On
a
Holiday")
with he
following
ote: "The
[poetic]
texthere established
s
based,
after enewed xamination f
the
original
drafts,
n
the
following ttempt
t
an
interpretation."'
The
reader,
doctoral
tudent
f German
Literature,
etlev
Liiders,
wrote
Heidegger
asking
for
larification,
r
rather,
uggesting
hat n
the future
e
correct
what eemed
to be
an obvious mistake:
I don'tunderstandow text anbebasedonits nterpretation.text,
would
have
hought,
s
something
hose
wording
s fixed.
our
entence
contains he
paradox
hat
hetext
n
theone hand s "established"
s a
basis-
"zugrundegelegt
--and n the ther
and s tself
ased
n
something
that s
thereforeven
more
riginal
nd fundamental.
rom his
oint
f
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1034
SAMUEL
WEBER
view he ext
an no
longer
e referredo
as
a
"basis." nd
yet
his s what
you
call
t.'"
Heidegger's
reply,
which have discussed
elsewhere,
begins
with
a
phrase
thatwillbe echoed
frequently
n
the
writings
f
Derrida:
"Dear
Mr.
Luiders:
ou're
right."
"Sie
haben
Recht,
vous
avez
raison)."
And
he
therefore
romises
o
"strike"
he ncriminated
hrase
should here
be
a new
edition"
of
his book.
Having
thus
abandoned
all
rights
o
the
phrase,
Heidegger
nevertheless
oes
on to
make two
points.
First,
were
he
to
correct he incriminated
hrase
by
simply
nverting
t,
as
Herr
Luiders
uggests,
hereby
cknowledging
hat
his
nterpretation
is based on the poetic textratherthan the otherwayaround, this
would result n "a
grosstriviality"
nd would therefore
ssentially
e
"superfluous."
he second
point
thathe
goes
on to
make
consists ot
in an
acknowledgement
f errorbut
in a
series of
questions:
Of
course,
he
uestion,
hat
a
text"
s,
how ne should
ead tand when
it is
completely
stablisheds
text,
till emains. his
question ertains
so
essentially
o the
question
f the ssence
f
anguage
nd of
inguistic
tradition
hat have
lways
imited
myself
o what s
absolutely
ecessary
when
omething
as
o
be
noted
oncerning,nterpretations,
lucidations
etc.
237)
And
after
short
remarkon
the
problematic
nd uncertain
tatus
of
the
then current
dition
of
H61lderlin,
eidegger
concludes
his
response
with
question
thatfor
him
presumably
ums
up
"what s
absolutely
ecessary...
concerning
nterpretation"
nd itsrelation
o
its
object, namely
he
question:
"Is therea text
n
itself?"
Now t
s
unlikely
hat
Giorgio
Agamben,
keen reader f
Heidegger,
would have
ever
responded
to
this
uestion
with
simple
ffirmative.
And yet, his s preciselywhatendows whatotherwisemight ppear
to be
a casual
phrase
with
ignificance.
asaubon's
emendation,
he
says,
enders he
phrase
attributed
o Aristotle
y
Diogenes
Laertius,
and
by
a host
of eminent
successors,
perfectly
ntelligible."
nd it
is therefore
nly
on the
grounds
of
strategic
onsiderations
hat t
could be
ignored
by
a
long
and illustrious
radition,
ulminating
n
Derrida's
Politics
f
riendship.
he
question
thathas to be
addressed,
then,
s
ust
wherein
he
strategy
esides
thatcauses thinkers
uch as
Nietzsche
and
Derrida
to
ignore
the obvious
and to
reject "perfect
intelligibility"
n favor
f
a
"mystery"
hat
s
really
none
at
all.
AlthoughAgamben
does
notuse the
term,
he
primary
haracteristic
of the
general
strategy
e attributes
o both
Derrida
and Nietzsche
could
be described
as
that
of a certain
ambivalence,
ne that both
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IV L
N1U
J3
"affirmsnd
distrustfully
evokes"
friendship
t one and
the same
time. t is this mbivalence hatcauses
thinkers o
reject
Casaubon's
emendation, n contrast o the
contemporary
ditors nd translators
who have
adopted
it.
In
other
words,
perfect
ntelligibility
ould
be
defined
by
the
law of
non-contradiction.
Many
friends,
o
friend"
allows for univocal
nterpretation,
hereas"0
my
friends,
here s
no
friend,"
eems
ntelligible nly
s a
paradox:
how can one
address
"friends,"
f one asserts hat"there s no
friend"?
What ,
borrowing
but also
extending
Freudian
term,
ave
designated
s
"ambivalent,"
and what
Agamben
forhis
part
characterizes s a
mixture f
"affirma-
tion"and "distrustfulevocation,"tretches he imits f ntelligibility
by
splitting
he
object
it
intends.
f
friendship
s
something
hatcan
and
must at the same time be "affirmed"
nd
yet
also
"distrustfully
revoked,"
hen thisfractureshe "one and
the same"
of that time"
y
removing
tfrom
tself.
certain
rreducible
patiality,
s
the medium
of
nonidentity
nd of
alterity,
s
thus
ntroduced nto
the self
dentity
of
"friendship,"islocating
ts
meaning
so
that t no
longer
reflects
homogeneous
and coherent nternal
tructure r
seriesor
properties
but rather
ppears
as the resultant f a
conflictual
elationof
forces.
To be perfectlyntelligible,hen,wouldbe to exclude or reduce the
internaldissonance and distance that
prevents
he
object
it
invests
from
supporting
nd
sustaining
unified nd
univocal
meaning.
It is
therefore ot
entirely urprising
hen,
n
the
short
ssay
that
follows his
necdotal
ntroduction,
he
category
n which
Agamben's
account of
friendship
epends
s one that
nvolves
precisely
he
reduc-
tion of distance and
correlatively
he
emergence
of
what he
calls
"excessive roximity."
He
elaborates this
conception by
interpreting
painting by
the
Italian
baroque
artist,GiovanniSerodine (1600-31). This
painting
depicts
the
"Meeting
of
Saints Peter and
Paul"
(Incontro
dei
Santi
Pietro t
Paolo,
1625-26)
(Figure
1).
What
Agamben
finds
articularly
remarkable n this
painting
is that erodine
has
portrayed
he
two
postles
o
close
together-with
their oreheadslmost
lued
ne to one
another-so
hat
hey
re
bsolutely
unable o
ee ach
ther.n the
road
to
martyrdom,hey
ook
at,
without
recognizing,
ach other. his
mpression
f
xcessive
roximity,
s it
were,
isaccentuatedy he ilent esturef haking ands t thebottom fthe
picture,
carcely
isible.
4,
my
talics-SW)
Let
us leave aside
Agamben's
assertion that
the
two
apostles
"are
absolutely
unable to see
each
other." t is
no doubt an
arguable
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1036 SAMUEL WEBER
Figure
1. Serodine
(1600-1631)
Meeting f
ts.Peter nd Paul
(1625-26).
@ Araldo de
Luca/Corbis.
interpretation,nd it sbyno means theonlyone.Wemayreturn o
this
ater.
For the moment et us
merely
onsiderthe
argument
hat
Agamben develops
here.
This
painting,
is
argument
uggests,
s the
visual
ounterpart
o Casaubon'semendation.Whereas he attermade
the
Aristotelian
uote "perfectly
ntelligible,"
he
painting
contains
a
perfect llegory
f
friendship"
nsofar s the "excessive
roximity"
of the
Apostlesprevents
hem
recognizing
ach other-and
yet
not
from
making
ontact. romthis
eading,Agamben
oncludeswith he
rhetorical
uestion:
"What s
friendship,
n
effect,
f
not a
proximity
such that t s mpossible o makefor neself ither representationr
a
concept
of t?"And this
nability
f
friendship
o be
represented
r
conceived s a
concept
eads
him
to a second
determination,
his ime
negative: Friendship
s not a
property
r
quality
f a
subject"
4).
It is no accidentthat
Agamben
turns
o
a
painting
o findwhathe
takes o be a
"perfect
llegory
f
friendship."
or
although
he
painting
permits gamben
to tell us what
friendship
s
not-representable
or
conceptualizable-this
negative
efinition
egates
irstnd foremost
certain
visibility
nd
thereby
resupposes
t.
Friendship
husbecomes
a questionof notbeingable to see and be seen,wherebyseeing" nd
"recognizing"
re
inseparably
inked. The two
Apostles
re
depicted
so close
together
hat,
ccording
to
Agamben,they
an
neither
ee
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MLN
1037
nor
recognize
each
other.When
however t
comes
time to elaborate
not
ust
what
friendship
s not
but rather
what t
is,
Agamben
turns
not to a
painting
but to a
long
and dense
passage
fromAristotle's
Nicomacheanthics
1170a 28-1171b35),
whichhe
suggests
contains
the
ontological
basis"
of Aristotle's
heory
f
friendship.
will
quote
here
ust
enough
of this
passage
for
you
to
be able to
follow,
ope-
fully,
he
argument
Agamben
draws
from
t:
And f he ne who ees
perceives
hat e
sees,
he ne
whohears
erceives
that e
hears,
he newho
walks
erceives
hat ewalks..
and
f
erceiving
that
we
perceive
r thinks
perceiving
hatwe
exist
for
s we
aid,
xisting
is perceivingr thinking);nd ifperceivinghat ne is alive s pleasant
(edeon)
n
tself,
nd
especially
or hosewho re
good,
becausefor hem
existing
s
good,
nd
pleasant
for
oncurrent
erceptionsynaisthanom-
enoi]
of
what s
in
itself
ood,
n
themselves,
ives
hem
leasure;
nd
if
as the
good person
s to
himself,
o he is to
hisfriend
since
hefriends
another self
[heteros
autos])
then
ust
as for
each his
own existence
to
auton
inai)
s
desirable,
o his
friend'ss
too,
or
to a
similar
egree....
In
that
ase,
he needs
o be
concurrently
erceiving
is
friend"-that e
exists
oo-and this
will ome about
n
their
iving
ogether,onversing
and
sharingkoinonein)
heir alk
nd
thoughts
..
(5)
Although
have had to
abbreviate nd
simplify
he
passage Agamben
quotes
from
Aristotle,
trust
hat
neverthelessts main lines
will till
be discernible: bove
all,
the
emphasis put
on both
perception
nd
thinking
s thatwhich
defineshuman
existence.But
although
Aris-
totle
previously istinguishes
uman
from
nimal
existence
precisely
through
he
presence
of
thought
s
opposed
to mere
perception,
n
this
passage
at
least,
t is
perception
that
seems to be
decisive.And
it
is not
ust
any
perception
that s
significant
ut
perception
of the
good, linkedto
self-perception:
heperception foneself inaction."
Which
in
turn means "alive."
Perception
of
oneself n
action,
and
therefore
live,
s
pleasing, especially
or
thosewho are
good."
Now,
for
Agamben
his ense of
being
alive s what inks
he self o the other
in
friendship,
nd
it does so
by
plitting
r
doubling
the
perception
f
oneself nto the simultaneous
erception
of self nd
other,
r rather
of self
becoming
..
other":
Inherent
n
this
erception
f
existing
s
another
erception,pecifically
human, hich akes he orm f concurrenterceptionsynaisthanesthai)
of
the riend'sxistence.
riendship
s
the
nstance fthis
oncurrent
er-
ception
f he riend's
xistencenthe wareness
f ne's
wn xistence
..
The
perception
f
xisting
s,
n
fact,
lwayslready
ivided
p
and
shared
or con-divided.
riendship
ames his
haring
r
con-division.
6)
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1038 SAMUEL WEBER
Agamben's
notion here of
"sharing"
recalls
the
importance
that
his
friend,
Nancy,
ttaches to
the French
word
partage,ust
as
his
neologism,"con-division" ould be read as an echo of Derrida's
notion of
"divisibility."
hat
Agamben's
account of
friendship
ere
in
any
case shares-if
not
divides-with his
two
absent
nterlocutors
is
what constitutes heir
ommon
Heideggerian
egacy
although by
no
means restricted o
Heidegger:
Walter
Benjamin,
for
instance,
is no less
implicated
n
it):
namely,
he effort
o think
friendship
s
something
adically
ndependent
of all
subjectivity:
There
s no
trace ereof
ny
nter-subjectivity-that
himera fthe
mod-
erns-norof ny elation etweenubjects:ather,xistingtselfsdivided,
it
s
non-identicalo
tself:
he and
thefriend
re thetwo
aces-or the
two
oles-of
this on-division.
6)
Concerning
Aristotle's efinition
fthefriend
s
"another
elf'-heteros
autos-Agamben
explains
hat his
phrase
mustbe
distinguished
rom
its Latin
translation,
s alter
go.
The Latin
go
doesnot
xactly
ranslate
utos,
hich
ignifies
oneself."
he
friend
s
not nother but n
otherness
mmanent
n
self-ness,
becoming
other f he elf. t hepoint twhich perceivemy xistencespleasant,
my
perception
s
traversed
y
a
concurrent
erception
hat islocatest
and
deports
t toward he
friend,
oward he other self.
Friendship
s this
de-subjectivization
t the
very
eart f
the most
ntimate
erception
f
self.
6)
Agamben
understands
concurrent
erception"
s
thus
imultaneously
ontological
nd
political:
he
self-perception
hat onstitutes
xistence
necessarily
ntailsa dislocation nd
displacement
f the self
toward
the
other,
movement hat
mpliesco-habitation, living ogether
based not on "a common
substance
but"
on
"a
purely
xistential on-
division,"
he
perception
of
whichhe defines
s
"friendship.""
Having completed
this
brief but
dense account
of
"friendship,"
Agamben
eaves
his
readersto
reflect n the
following
uestion:
Howthis
riginal oliticalynaesthesia
ould
become,
n
the
ourse f
ime,
the onsensusowhich
emocraciesntrust
heir ates
n
this
atest xtreme
and exhausted
hase
oftheir
volution,
s,
s
they ay,
nother
tory,
nd
one
upon
which shall eave
you
o
reflect.
7)
Whether
his
oncluding
remark,
whichconstrues he
historical
hift
from
what
Agamben
describes s an
"original olitical ynaesthesia"
o
the "consensus" hat
nformsmodern democracies n their
extreme
and exhausted
phase,"
s
not related to the
soteriological
ontextof
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MLN 1039
the
Serodine
paintingportraying
he
Apostles
on
their
way
to
mar-
tyrdom,
his s a
question
to which will return
t
the
conclusion of
theseremarks.
In
any
event,
we
are
perhaps finally
n
a
position
to delineate
at
least
part
of the
"problem"
of which
Agamben
was
surprised
not to
find he
slightest
race nscribed
n
Politiques
e
'amitie.What he
finds
both
troubling
nd at the same time
symptomatic
f the
modern
predicament,
pitomized
here
by
Nietzsche
and
Derrida,
involves
the
sacrifice f a
"perfect ntelligibility"
hat would
affirm,
ut
not
distrustfully
evoke,
riendship
s the
experience
of the
self ecoming
othern theprocess fperceivingtself he sacrifice f the intelligibility
of this
co-perception
nvolves
otjust
a
cognitive
matter
ut above all
the "fall"
rom certain
purity":
rom
hat
pure
erception
f
being"
impliedby
the
"original olitical ynaesthesia"
hat
Agamben
finds n
Aristotle
nto an exhausted and
degraded
form
f
ambivalence
that
characterizes
ontemporary
onsensual
heories f
democracy
n
their
most
exhausted
phase.
In
short,
what
s at
stake s the
history
f a
"fall"
from he
experience
of a certain
purity
f
existence s
"purely
...
con-division" o a
most
mpure
consensus that
must
deny
what t
affirms. rput yet notherway--and his sperhapsone of tsdecisive
elements-it is the
problem
of a fallfrom
certain
rust o a distrust
f
that
original, riginating
urity. riendship
or
Agamben
hus
merges
as
the
promise
of a
healing
of the
wound,
since
in
affirming
ivision
it
transcends t as con-division:s that
barely
isible
grasping
f
hands
beforeand
beyond
all
self-recognition.
This is
the
problem
of
whichhe finds
no "trace" n
Derrida's
Politics
of
Friendship.
nstead of faith n the
"purity"
f an
"origin,"
Agamben
registers
strategy
f affirmation
oupled
with
distrust-and
hence,
not the
slightest
race of the
problem
he communicated o Derrida.
It is as if
Derrida failed
to
see,
or take
note
of,
Agamben's
mportant
discovery.
nd
yet,
s we shall
see,
or rather
ead,
Politics
fFriendship
s
laced
with racesof the
problem
withwhich
Agamben
s concerned.
One No More
The
problem,
however,
s
that
Agamben'sproblem
s not
Derrida's-
not at least in the form n whichAgambenpresents t in his text
and
presumably
lso
in
his communication
o
Derrida. This however
is
not at all
tantamount o
the
problem
being
ignored.
Indeed,
an
entire
chapter
s devoted to it. Its
title,
n
French,
s
Replis,
which s
translated nto
English
s
"Recoils";
t should be noted
however
hat
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1040 SAMUEL WEBER
the Frenchword also
suggests
withdrawal"r "retreat."t deals with
the fact hatthere s an alternate ersion f the remark ttributed o
Aristotle,he one communicated o Derridaby Agamben,and that
this lternative emands
a
certainkind of decision:
The timehas
perhaps
ome to decidethe ssue. t would
e
fitting
hen
to also
give
ne's reasons
or
deciding,
or
deciding
o lean to one
side
rather han o
another,
ven
f,
etthere e no
mistake,
petty'3hilologi-
cal
coup
e
theitre
illnever xhaust hevenerable radition
hich,
rom
Montaigne
o
Nietzschend
beyond,
rom ant
o Blanchot nd
beyond,
willhave bestowed
o
many uarantees
n the bias
of
a
copyist
r of
a
reader
n a
hurry
ho bet without
nowing
t on a
reading
hatwas
so
tempting,
ut
misguided
errante),
nd
probably
ff hemark
egaree).
Fortunately
or
s,
no
orthographic
estoration,
o
archivist's
rthodoxy
will
ver
mputate
entamera]
his ther rchive hat n the
meanwhile
hasbecome
edimented,
his reasurerove f educed nd seductiveexts
thatwill
lways ive
s
more o think bout han he
policeguardrails
o
which
ne would
iketo
subject
hem.No
philological
undamentalism
(integrismehilologique)
ill
ver rase he nheard f hance f
genial
invention.
ecausewhat
s
there,
o
doubt,
s a
staggering
rtifact,
n off-
handed
xegetical oup
that s as
risky
s it s
generous,
ndeed imitless
(abyssal)n itsvery enerativity.f howmany reat extswouldwe have
been
deprived
f omeone
but
who,
n
fact?)
ad not
one
day
aken,
nd
perhaps
eliberatelyeigned
o
take,
ike
great ambler,
ne
omega
for
another?
ot ven
n accent
or
nother,
carcely
letter
or
nother,
ust
a soft
spiration
un
esprit
oux)
for
hard
ne-and the mission f he
subscript
ota.
234/208)14
It s difficult
ot to see
this
passage
as
in
part
response
o
Agamben's
discovery,lthough
rather arsh
one,
as
though
Derridawereantici-
pating
the
essay
hat
Agamben
was to
publishmanyyears
ater.
Philo-
logical
emendations,
o the
argument
would eem to
go,
shouldnotbe
allowed
to foreclosediscussion
f the
history
f the differentersions
and their elative
ignificance.
ut this
discussion,
nd the decision t
entails,
need not be
thatof an
either/or.
We
are not
speaking
here
of true or
false,"
Derrida continues
mmediately
fter he
long pas-
sage
ust quoted.
Rather,
t s a
question
of
"doing ustice
to
another
passage."
The
"passage"
n
question
s not
ust
one textual
eading
or
the
other
but the transition
rom
he one
to the otherand what this
movementnvolves. he passagemarks he movement rom
a
reading
hat
s
eloquent
ut ess
robable
nd ess
onvincing
o
reading
that s
more
iscreet,
ore
teadfast,
ore
atient
n
testing
he ext? his
passage
ould wellresemble
substitution,oubtless,
ven correction
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1041
of
an error.
t should howeverbe a
question
of
something
lse,
and,
we
hope,
of a
less
normativizing rocedure.
More
respectful
f
great
ances-
tors.Without utting robityn trialbutout ofconcern withphilological
probability.
235/208)
It is
worthwhile
underscoring
the
"respect"
that
Derrida here
insists
on,
given
the
widespread
but erroneous
tendency
to
see his work
as
destructive
f
all tradition. Here in
any
case his
strategy
s not
informed
by
the
alternative true or false
and does
not aim at
establishing
the
exclusive
right
of the one
reading
at
the
expense
of the
other:
Without
ny
value of
orthodoxy,
ithout
call to
order,
without iscredit-
ing the canonical version, the
passage]
would
engage
differently,
nd
along
other
paths,
sometimes
ntersecting
ith
the first
version),
new
adventures
f
thought.
his other
wager
will
ertainly
e less
risky,
ince t
relies on
a
greaterprobability.
t
will
put
into
play
another
ante,
another
bias,
certainly,
ut without
bsolute
assurance.
There will
be
a
pledge
and
a
wager,
s in
all
readings,
here
will be
speculation
on
possible
nterest,
wherethe
ssue does not concern
imply
pelling, rammar,
nd
accentua-
tion.
235/208)
Is it this
Nietzschean affirmation of
the
inevitable
"lack of
assur-
ance"-the
"dangerous
perhaps"-as
well as
the
"speculation
on
pos-
sible
interest"
that
Agamben
registers
s
the
"affirmation
nd
distrust"
and that
he seems to
distrust?
In
any
case,
as the title of
this
chapter
in
its
over-determination
sug-
gests,
the two
versions are
historically
folded into
one
another,
which
does
not mean
that
they
re
of
equal significance.
Derrida
here
"turns
back"
to this "fold"
not to
confirmthe
authenticity
f
one of
ts
sides or
to
discover
which
of
the two
readings
is
more
authoritative
but
rather
"to mark withseveral signposts [reperes]he possibilityand the stakes
of an
alternative
reading"
(236/225).
This
statement is
contained
in
a
footnote,
in
which Derrida
acknowledges
the
indebtedness of
his
discussion to
a number
of
"friends":
Here
I
should thank the
friends,
men and
women,
who
have
helped
me
along
these
international
aths,
through
he
several
languages,
ibraries
or
bibliographies
o which
refer
here,
whether
Latin,
talian,
Spanish,
English
or German ..
(236/225)
The first ame on the listthatfollows-which, to be sure, is arranged
alphabetically--is
that of
"Giorgio
Agamben."
If
there can
still
be
any
doubt
about
whether the
message
of this
friend
arrived
at its
destina-
tion,
this
footnote should
remove it. The
footnote
is
appended
to the
third
word
in
the
following
passage
of
Derrida's main
text:
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SAMUEL WEBER
To
myknowledge,
here xists n
edition n
English
hat s based
on
the
text,
h6i
philoi,
udeis
hilos,
ranslateds "He
who has
friendsan
have
no true riend." ne could alsotranslate:cannot ave ny rue riend."
(236/209)
Derrida's
philological
"knowledge"
s thus
indebted
to a series
of
"friends,"
he first f
which,
t least n
alphabetical
order,
s
Giorgio
Agamben.
Derrida
proceeds
to cite
similar
ranslations
n
Italian and
German,
before
oncluding
his
survey
ith
what
s
probably
he most
literal
ranslation,
erhaps
because it s
"closer o the
source,"
namely
in
Latin: Cui
amici,
micus
nemo
237/209).
Given thatthisentire hapter s organizedaround a discussionof
the two
possible readings
of the
citation ttributed
o
Aristotle nd
that
GiorgioAgamben
s
named
among
those
friends
whose
help
was
essential o
ts
writing,
he
"problem"
with
which
Agamben
s
concerned
has to
lie
elsewhere. Could it be
precisely
question
of
number?
Too
many
friends,
o friend? oo
many
names
in
the listof
friends
acknowledged
n
the footnote? oo
many
friends,
lso,
to be
subject
to the kind of
"co-synaesthesia,"
o that
concurrent
erception"
hat
Agamben
construes s the essence of
friendship?
hould we
recall
here that n Italian, s in French and in German, heprimarymean-
ing
of the word
"concurrent"-concorrenza,oncurrence,
onkurrenz-is
"competition"?
Would
the
Nietzschean
agonistics"
e
entirely oreign
to the
problem
that
Agamben
has
withDerrida's
strategy?
However that
may
be,
it is true
that
although Agamben,
among
others,
s thankedfor his
help,
there s no
doubt thathis
equation
of the revisionist ersionwith
perfect ntelligibility"
s
severely
riti-
cized. And this s also consistent ith he overall
trategy
r
argument
of the book in which Derrida seeks to
elaborate a mode of
inquirythat would do
justice
to that
"dangerous
perhaps"
that Nietzsche
associateswiththe
"coming
philosophers"
n
Beyond
ood nd
Evil.'5
This is
why
what nterests im
is not
ust
the
"canonical"
versionor
the more
probable,
more
plausible
revisionist
ne,
but
rather heir
interplay
nd
what this reveals about each.
Whereas this
revisionist
reading
consists n a direct
tatement,
declaration,
n
unequivocal
proposition,
r in the
language
of
speech-act
heory,
"constative,"
the
"canonical"
and
improbable
version
appeals
to
Derrida
precisely
because it s firstnd perhapsforemost,n appeal,which s tosay, lso
an
address,
nd moreover ne that
tages
n obvious and undeniable
"performative
ontradiction"
something
of which Derrida himself
was often
ccused).
For
how
can Aristotle ddress his "friends"
f t s
only
to
tell them that there s no friend"?
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What
ppeals
to
Derrida
n
this
performatively
ontradictory
ppeal
is that
t
foregrounds
wo
things
hat
the
constative
ersion
tends to
hide. First, t manifests he element of address thatinheres n all
language,
ncluding
constatives,
nsofar
s
the
latter
re,
and
always
must
be,
addressed to some
one,
or
more than
one.
And
second,
the
paradoxical
appeal
or address
attributed o
Aristotle
stages
the
contradictory,
ven
aporetical
relation
between the
constative
nd
performative
imensionsof
discourse,
ach
presupposing
he
other
and
yet
each
displacing
nd
dislocating
he
other.
The
constative s
presupposed
by
he
performative-one
must
know
hat
"friend"s n
ordertoappeal toone. Buttheperformativentheform f an appeal
or
address s
also
presupposed
nd
contained
within
very
onstative,
as a
form f
utterance n
general.
As
Derrida
puts
t:
The
reader
r isteners
not
imply
implied"
y
r
"implicated"
n
[impli-
quis]
he
tructuref he
tterance.
minimum
f
riendship
rof
onsent
must
e
supposed
f
them;
ne
must
ppeal
to a
minimal
onsensusn
order o
say
nything
t
all.Whether
his
ppeal
s
in
act
met
by
ompre-
hension r
greement,
f
nly
oncerning
he
meaning
f
what
s
aid-this
is
secondary
ith
espect
o the
ppeal
tself.
he
atter
s
coextensive
ith
themost onstative oment f the tatementconstat).n short,heres
indeed
ome ilent
nterjection,
ome
O
friends"
n
the
evisionist
ersion.
It
resoundsn
the
erformative
pace
f n
appeal
ven
eforets
irst
ord.
And
this s
the
rrefutableruth f
the
anonical
ersion.
242/214)
At
the
same
time,
the fact
that
every
ct
of
language
has to
address
itself
o
"someone"
endows
t with
what
Derrida
calls
"two
great
des-
tinies"
or
destinations.
he first s
that
every
nunciation
must
be
addressed
to
"someone"
but
without
ver
being
able
to
precisely
r
exhaustivelydentify
ts
addressee,
whether
male
or
female, ingular
or
plural.
The
reason
for this
uncertainty
s not
simply
mpirical.
Rather,
t
is rooted in
the
structure f
singularity
hat
determines
the
"second
destiny"
f
the
phrase.
Such
singularity-which
hould
be
radically
distinguished
rom
"individuality"-does
not
exclude
multiplicity
ut rather
necessarily
ngenders
t.
The
singularity
f an
appeal
or
an
address s
relational
nd
heterogeneous.
or,
s
Derrida
puts
t,
it s
impossible
o address
anyone,
male or
female,just
nce."
To be
addressed,
an
addressee
must
be
identifiable,
ecognizable,
and thereforeterable. hat s iterable-but neversimplyterated-is
"thus
internally
multiple
nd
divided n
its
occurrence,
n
any
case
in
its
advent s
event
ve'nmentialite)"
243/215).
To
"this
drama
or
this chance
of a
singular
multiplicity,"
oth
versions,
he
canonical
and
the
revisionist,
ear
witness
hrough
heir
ontrast f
the
plural,
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1044
SAMUEL
WEBER
"friends,"
nd
the
singular
friend." here is
no
friend, hen,
n
the
sense that the
singular
an never be
identifiedwith he
actuality
f
an individual, onstrued s self-contained nd self-identical; ather,
the
singular
s,
to use a word
of
Novalis that Derrida does not
cite,
dividual,
nternally
nd
constitutively
ivisible
y
virtue f ts
terability,
withoutwhich t can
neverbe
recognized
or
experienced
s
singular.
The
singular,
n
short,
s not
simply
he
unique:
it
s
nevitably
ultiple,
but
n
a
singular
manner.And it s
onlyrecognizable,
nameable
after
the fact.After he
fact,however,
t
s no
longer
thatwhich t was. The
experience
of
singularity
hen
always
ntails a sense of
loss,
a kind
ofmourning.
All of this s summed
up
in
a French
phrase
thatresists ranslation:
plus
d'un,
whose
meaning hangesdepending
n how t s
pronounced:
with
he s of
"plus"pronounced,
t
means
more han
ne;
with
he final
s
silent,
t means oneno more. ne
possible
English
rendition,
which
however
equires
rather ntricate
cansion,
nd which lso
introduces
an
"appeal"
into what would
otherwise e a mere
"constat,"
might
therefore e
one-no-more
but
pronounced,haltingly,
s: "One. No
More ")
The ambivalence fthis one-no-more "scloseto andyet till uite
remotefrom he
kind of
synaesthesia
r
co-perception
hat
Agamben
seems to
envisage
s characteristic
f
friendship-and
ndeed,
of exis-
tence itself.
or
Derrida,
the other
cannot be construed s
another
self:
nor does
the self"become"
other;
rather rom he
start,
r-to
use
a recent
American
expression,
fromthe
"get-go,"
t is irreduc-
ibly
and
aporetically
ther.From
this
perspective,
t is
by
virtueof
its
singularity
hat there can
be "no
friend,"
ua
individual,
imply,
because
any
friend
would have to
be
both more
and less than one:
one-no more Because number nd timecannotbe
separated,
this
inevitably
nvolveswhatwe call the "indefinite
rticle,"
hat
n
French
and
German,
but not
n
English, verlaps
n
the
single
word "un
e),"
"ein(e)."
In
English
we have to
distinguish
etween one"
and "a" or
"an." At
any
rate,
t s
precisely
uch
singular
multiplicity
hat
enderst nevitablehat he
olitical
e takennto ccount
...
It cuts crosswhat s calledthe
question
f the
ubject,
f ts
dentity
or ts
putativeelf-identity,
ts
upposed
ndivisibility
hat auses t to enter
into ountable tructuresorwhicht seems o be made. 244/215)
As this
passage
shows,
he
strategy
f
Derrida,
here as
elsewhere,
s
both
very
lose to and
yetvery
far from he
argument
ketched
by
Agamben
n his brief
ssay.
Both
deploy
a notion of
friendship
hat
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MLN
1045
is
determined
y
n irreducible
lterity
r
heterogeneity.
ut whereas
Agamben
construes his
lterity
r
heterogeneity
n
terms
f
a
simulta-
neity
f
perception
nwhichthe self s
"deported"
by
and toward he
perception
of
another,
Derrida
develops
his
notion
of
friendship
s
the
effect fa
simultaneity
n
which here s
no
"becoming"
ut
rather
a
discontinuous
jump
or
leap
or cut
n
the
unity
f
the
moment-the
(Nietzschean,
Kierkegaardean)Augenblick.
his
temporality-or
em-
porization,
s his notion of differance
ould
suggest-is
performed
not
through co-perception
but rather
through
co-reading
nd
"co-signing"
f
texts,
whichretraces
nd
reinscribes he
trajectory
f
citations nd re-citationsf an original ppeal that annot be located
as
such-for
nstance,
n
the
corpus
of the
Aristotelian
ext-and
yet
which
precisely
orthatreason continues
o
take
place
once
and for
all in
innumerable
ver-singular
terations.
As a
result,
Derrida formulates
"principle
f
intelligibility"
hat
can neverbe
"pure"
or
based
on an
"origin."
Rather,
he
locates this
"principle"
n
the structural
penness
of
every
etermining
ontext:
A
contexts
never
bsolutely
losed,
onstraining,
etermined,
aturated.
A
structural
pening ermits
t to
transformtself
r to
make
place
for
another ontext. his s
why very
mark etainsforce fdetachmenthat
not
nly
an iberate rom his r that
eterminate
ontext,
ut ven
ssures
it ts
principle
f ntelligibility
nd ts
tructure
ua
mark,
hich s to
say,
ts
iterabilityrepetition
nd
lteration)....
And
this s
what
appens
with
he
history
f ur
phrase.
ts ntire
istory,
rom
he
tart,
ill
ave onsistedn
taking
eave f
unique
ontextnd of n
indivisible
ddressee.
hatwill
havebeen
possible nly
ecause ts nitial
ddressee
friend
r
enemy
ut
in
no
way
eutral)
will avebeenfirstf
ll
multiple,
otentially
etached
from he
ontext
f
ts nitial
ccurrence.
245/215)
This
potential
or
detachment,
errida
concludes,
s also the
reason
that
between he "one no
more" nd
the "more
thanone"
there s not
just
"friendship"
ut also
enmity
nd
"war":
why
he
enemy
s
always
ready
to take the
place
of
the
friend,
nd
why
both
"take
place
in
taking
he
place
of the other"
244/216).
Does this amount to the "distrustful
evocation"
f
friendship
r
the
recognition
f its
neluctable mbivalence?
t
would
in
any
case
suggest
hatthe
"cohabitation"
f
which
Agamben
speaks
can
never
have been purebut ratherhas always lso been the siteand the con-
ditionfor
onflict,
f concurrence
n all
the
multilingual
enses of
that
word.
This
n
turndefines he
"principle
f
intelligibility"
s one
that
is
hyperbolic,
lways
xceeding
and also
defaulting
n
itself,
hich s to
say,
n
what
ppears
to consciousness s its
nitiating
ntention:
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8/11/2019 And When is Now.pdf
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1046 SAMUEL WEBER
When omeone
peaks
n
private
r n
public,
hen e
teaches,
ublishes,
preaches,
rders,
romises
r
prophesies,
nforms
r
communicates,
hat
someforcen him truggleslsonot obeunderstood,pproved,ccepted
in
the
onsensus.. it s
necessary
hat he
ossibility
f ailures not
merely
an
accidental
dge
but
omething
hat
haunts,
nd
leaves ts
mpression
on,
the
very ody
tseems o threaten.
246/218-19)
Without
imply subscribing
o such a
haunting,"
errida neverthe-
less
concludes that
No
"good"
ecisionwould ver ccedeto
responsibility,
ithout hich o
event ould ver
appen.
Undecidability
and
hence ll nversionsf
igns
betweenriendshipnd ts pposite)s not sentence hat decision an
leavebehind. he crucial
xperience
f he
perhapsmposed y
heunde-
cidable-that
s to
say,
hecondition f
decision-isnot
moment o be
exceeded,
orgotten,
r
suppressed.
t
continueso constitutehe
decision
as
such: tcan never
gain
be
separated
rom
t;
t
produces
t
qua
decision
in
and
through
he
undecidable;
here s
no
decision ther han his ne:
decision
n the matter nd
form
f the
undecidable.... The
instant f
decisionmust
emain
eterogeneous
o all
knowledge
s such .. even f
it
may
nd must e
preceded
y
ll
possible
cience nd conscience. he
latterreunable o determine
he
eap
of
decision ithoutransformingt
into he
rresponsible
pplication
fa
program,
ence
without
epriving
it
of... whatmakes
ta
decision,
f
here s one.
(247/219)
"If
there s one
...
." Let me
conclude
by
returning
or
one
last
time
to that
perfect
llegory
f
friendship"
hat
Agamben
finds
depicted
the
painting
f Serodine.
The
two
Apostles,
eter and
Paul,
meet on
their
way
o their eath.
They
are too close
to see each
other,
ut
also
close
enough
to
grasp
each other'shand.
This "excessive
roximity,"
in
which
Agamben
discerns
he
perfect
llegory
f
friendship,
eems
thusinseparablefrom he proximityf death-but of a death that
carrieswith t the
promise
f
something
ther,
omething
ot
entirely
visible ut
perhaps o-perceptible:
he
promise
f
"cohabitation" hat
is
synonymous
ith
human
"existence"
tself.
n
friendship,
uman
existence
grasps
itself nd
thereby
ranscends ts limitations. his
seems to
be the subtext f
Agamben's
reading
of the
painting
that
can
be
"concurrently
erceived"
n
viewing
t-if,
that
s,
one
only
has
sufficient
rust.
One need
only
have trust n
friendship,
ather
than
affirming
nd
revoking
t
"distrustfully,"
n
order to
perceive
"concurrently"
hatwillneverbe
simply
ccessible o the
single
vision
of a mortal elf.
There is no doubt that the
"principle
of
intelligibility"-"if
here
is
one"-elaborated
by
Derrida
in
Politics
f
Friendship
s
very
differ-
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MLN 1047
ent from the
"perfect" ntelligibility
hat
Agamben
associates with
Casaubon's
correction,
hanging
vocative
ppeal
and
address nto
what ooks ike a straightforwardtatement. or the "force fdetach-
ment" that
for Derrida constitutes he
structural
ondition of the
intelligibility
f
every
mark
delimits nd limits t at
once,
making
t
always
more and less than
one,
more and less than
tself,
making
t
"one-no,
more "This
points
oward differentindof"cohabitation"
from
hatwhich the
"perfect llegory
f
friendship"
n
its
"perfect"
intelligibility
nvisages.
uch
cohabitations
perhaps
ess
dramatic,
ess
perceptible,
nd
certainly
ess
reassuring
han thatwhich
s
depicted
on the
"way
o
calvary"-which,
ust by
chance,
is also the titleof a
paintingbya contemporaryfSerodine,Domenichino [1610] (Fig-
ure
2).
In
this
painting,
Christ,
ormented
y
his
captors,
fixesthe
beholder withhis
glance
from
below,
visual
equivalent
perhaps
of
a
verbal
ddress,
ppeal
or
interpellation.
Even less
perfectlyntelligible, erhaps,
than this
glance
is a
very
different,
nd
yet
perhaps
not
totally
nrelated
cene,
described n the
Figure
2.
Domenichino
Domenico
Zampieri,
581-1641)
The
Way
o
Calvary
1610).
@
The
J.
Paul
Getty
Museum,
Los
Angeles.
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1048 SAMUEL WEBER
followingassage
rom
Maurice
Blanchot's
Writingf
Disaster,
hich
Derrida ites n a footnoteo an earlier
hapter
fhis
book,
nd with
which will finally)onclude:
If heMessiahs tthe
ates
fRome
mong
he
eggars