ENGAGING THE 'FlRANKENSTEIN9 OF MODERNITY:

POSTMODERNISM AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY

A Thesis

Presented to

The Faculty of Graduate Studies

of

The University of Guelph

by

IAIN M. GRANT

In partial fultilhent of requirements

for the degree of

Master of Arts

January, 1998

Q Iain M. Grant, 1998

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A bstract

ENGAGING THE 'FRANKENSTEIN' OF MODERNITY:

POSTMODERNISM AND DEVELOPMENT THEORY

Iain M. Grant University of Guelph, 1998

Adviser: Professor W. Graf

This thesis is an investigation of Development Theory, said to be at an Impasse

because of the 'faiiure' of neo-modedng and neo-Mantist theory. Pnmarily, it seeks to

assas the potenrial of posmiodemism to negotiate this Impasse. Mer sunrmarizuig the

bases of the Impasse, the basics of postmodernism, and postmodemism's strengths and

weaknesses, it is argued that postmodeniism is il equipped for this task. It is then argued

that a re-oriented postmodemism would be better suited to the task than the current

variety, which defkes itself primarily in ternis of its posture of counter-modemity. The

ultimate aim of this discussion is to argue in favour of such a re-orienteci postmodernism,

which would in tuni enable a development theory 'synthesis' based on a combination of

interest- and ethics-driven development imperatives. Such an approach necessady would

incorporate elements £tom both the postmodem and the 'modem' canon.

Dedrcaed to the memory of my &, who. @te wrongly, newr believed himselfmpable of sirch a work,

and never gor the chance to try.

- Iain Grant J a m q 1998

Table of Contents

Chapter One - Introduction . . i . Postmodemism and Development Theory . ü. Postmodernism and the Development 'Frankenstein' . K. Devefopment b r y and the North-South Cornplex . iv. Summary .

Cbapter Two - Tbe Roots of the Impasse . i. Modeniization Theory . ü. Neo-Marxist Theory üi. Defining the Impasse: The Failure of Development Theov

Chapter Tbree - Poatmodemism: The Basics . i. Modemity: Main Themes - ii. Postmodernism: Main Themes .

Cbapter Four - Assessing Postmodernism: Shmgths . i. Generd Strengths . ü. Deconstructing 'Development Theory' . üi. Deconstnictinig 'Impasse' .

Chapter Five - Asswsing Postmodernism: Weaknesses . i . Semantic and Conceptuai Confusions . ii. The Modemity 'Frankenstein' .

Chapter S U - The haterest-Ethics Dicbotomy . . i. Interest-Ethics: An Explmation . ii. Interest . üi. Ethics iv. Jushficatory Versus Revelatory Ethic .

Chapter S e m - Toward a Synthesis . . i. An Interest-Ethics Synthesis? . ü. Summary -

Conclusion .

Chap&t One: Introduclion

In Western popular consciousness, the imagery invoked by the name Frankenstein

is iikely to be fàiriy consistent: a bolt-headed, green-skinned monster goes berserk wreaks

murderous havoc, and ultimately tums against its creator. Although these elements are

present in the actual Mary Shelley novel which engendered it, the Frankenstein metaphor

is more tricky than it a p p m . We infer 'monster' fiom the very Nune Frankenstein, and

assign it the character of expriment-gone-awry, but these are both blatant mistakes:

Frankenstein, in the origuial tale, is Doctor Frankemstein, the creator; the so-called

monster is the actual creation.

In al1 fairness, the popular conception of Frankenstein does not miss the mark

entirely. It aiiows for the novel's presentation of the scientist's attempt to alter nature as

oiisguided, and for the elernent ofjust desserts in which that atternpt is punished by the

unanticipated violence of the monster. But as a result of the basic cognitive error that the

misidentification of Frankenstein represents, two problerns result: first, the name of

Frankenstein becomes associated with d sorts of unseemly traits which are more

appropnately assigned to the creature; second, the misidentification obscures or obliterates

altogether the essenMy admirable quality of Dr. Frdenstein and the objectives which

drove him in the est place. In their absence, the monstrous Hdoween caricature and the

mad scientist are ail that rernain.

A similar dymnic is discernible in the relationship between modernity and

posîrnodemïsm. As with the popular conception of Frankenstein, postmodernism correctly

identifies some aspects of the pst-Enlightenrnent body of ideas typically referred to as

modeniity - the effort to master nature through science and rationaiity, or even, arguably,

the image of a destructive 'creature' going out of wntrol. One might even extend the

application of the Frankenstein metaphor to point out that, as was the case in the novel,

ùuioceut others are vidmized while the creaton emerge relatively unscathed (although

Frankenstein at least felt gdty about it). Despite these apparently accurate identifications,

though, postmodemism features cognitive and amibutive flaws sirnilar to those visible in

the popular Frankenstein myth. These errors center around the tendency of

postmodemists to associate modernity with an oppression - oft-cited examples are the

Holocaust or the Stalinist purges, which are put forth by Lyotard as inevitable outcornes

of the fàith in modemity - that derives fiom the tendency of science to be "enlisted by

capital and subjugated to aciency rather than truth."'

First, as was the case with Fcankenstein myth, postmodeniism's association of

modemity with Stalinism or the Holocaust misrepresents modemity's nobler aspects, or

obscures them dtogether. While it may be worthwhile for postmodemists to point a

critical hger at technocratization or at so-called grand narratives, the merits of the

Enlightenment which are "given shape in the assumed emancipation of hwnankind:

liberation from povew, slavery and ignorance," ought to be beyond reproach.

Postmodemisrn's tendency to understate or ignore these ments is surely no more fair than

history's reduction of Dr. Frankenstein to mad scientist, and of his good name to hideous

creation .2

Second, the identification of modernity with the Holocaust, for example, takes

insufncient account of the fundarnentally difEerent character of the two 'events', thus

committing an attributive error similar to that of the popular mistreatment of Frankenstein.

There may be merit to postmodem arguments which suggest that rnodernity gave birth to

styles of thought and practice which made the Holocaust possible, but as Laclau suggests,

'khen the theorists of the eighteenth century are presented as the initiators of a project of

'mastery' that would eventually lead to Auschwitz, it is forgotten that Auschwitz was

repudiated by a set of values that ... also stem from the eighteenth cent~ry."~ Another

error is made in the degree of inevitability which postmodernism tends to assign to

modernity's path to oppression. Again, though there is arguably a relationship there that is

worthy of exploration, there is a danger of oversimplifcation; as Docherty points out, ''the

development of hiaory over the last two hundred years has not been an inexorable

progress towards evil.'"

It would be difncult to find a better context for an exploration of the modemity

Frankenstein than Development Studies. For the postmodernist, the field encapsulates the

contlict between the modem and the posmiodem in the neatly demarcated match-ups of a

geographic division (North-South), a 'temporal' division (new-old), and a politiCO-CUItural

division (capitalist/SOCialist-indigenous). Moreover, the postmodernist h d s a vast

literature wtiich spells out the mindset behind Northern incursion in the South, rnainly in

the form of neo-Marxist and neo-modemihg literature. Juxtaposing these discourses

agaùist the indigenous ones of the pst-colonial South, postmodernists are able to carry

out their analyses in the style with which they seem most cornfortable, i-e. as a critique of

the dominant paradigm.

But Developrnent Studies also provides an ideal context for those who wish to

take issue with postmodernism for the cognitive and attributive errors of the 'modemity

Frankenstein': where postmodernism tends to obscure the nobler side of modernity by

failing to separate it from the external influences that usurped it, so does it aiso tend to

oversimpl~ the Us that plague the South by failing to separate the structures, processes,

Laclau, in Dochaty (1 993 : 33 1 ). ~ocherty (1993: 11).

agents and context of Northein incursions into the South fiom core 'modemist7 ideas like

citizenship and rationai inquiry.

The most obvious feature of the postmodem approach to development theory is

one that is very typical of postmodemism in general: in its opposition to that body of

post-Enlightenment ideas generally identified as 'modernity', postmodemism "proposes to

set itselfup outside the modem paradigm, not to judge modemity by its own criteria but

rather to contemplate and deconsmict it.775 In its restnicturing and redefinition of the

argument, postmodenllsm in its development theory application cannot credibly be

considered a response to the impasse. That is to say tbat, rather than w o r h g within the

context of what Camille Paglia d l e d %e exhausted stereotype of Lefi versus Right,"

postmodernists stmcture their arguments within the wntext of what might best be termed

the modern-postmodern debate! The main ciifference is that postmodern arguments are

far less likely to base themselves on articles of fàith like the fiee-market ideology of the

neo-modemking camp or the socialism of the neo-Mancists. Moreover, it is arguably

postmodemism's most central feature that articles of fath represent the core of the

problem and therefore serve as the focus of the postmodem critique.

Ln relocating the development theory problematique to the modem-postmodern

debate, postmodernists - as wu be argueci below - focus their attention on modernity. The

impasse-lodged theones fiom the Right and the Lefi are, essentially, recast as competing

strains of theory within the body of modemity rather than as theoretical polar opposites as

they have been typicaiiy understood. In the eye of the postmodemist, they emerge as

opposite sides of the same coin; were postmodeniism to choose a viiiain of history, it

would be as likely to point to Voltaire or Rousseau as to Maoc or Adam Smith.

The postmodern antipathy toward the modem cannot be overstated, rnanifesting

irself as Rosenau has suggested in a postmodem attempt to 'tearrange the whole social

science enterprise." As she continues on to say,

Those ofa modern conviction seek to isolate elements7 spec* relationshipq and formulate a synthesis; post-modemists do the opposite. They offer indetemllnacy rather than detemllnism, diversity rather than unity, Merence rather than synthesis, cumplexity rather than simplification.

At the root of the antipathy is the strident assertion that modernity has not hed up to its

original lofty rhetoric which is "given shape in the assumed emancipation of humanl8nd:

liberation fiom poverty, slavery and ignorance."* Instead, postmodemists point to the

darker associations of modeniity - Lyotard's conviction that modern@ led directly to

Auschwitz is perhaps the best example, but others have been cited:

As we in the West approach the end of the twentieth centu~, the 'hiodemy' record - world wars, the nse of Nazism, concentration camps (in both East and West), genocide, worldwide depression, Hiroshima, Vietnam, Cambodia, the Persian Gulç and a widening gap between rich and poor - makes any belief in the idea of progress or fath in the füture seem questionable.

The crucial point is that while postmodemists are willing to acknowledge that nich iUs

derive more from the rnanner in which Enlightenrnent ideais have been usurpeci and

warped than Eom any evil innate to modemity, they stili lay the blame at modemity's

door. In short, modernity was loaded with Wawed assumptions" from the start,

postmodernists assert, eventually becoming something of a Frankenstein which îurned

against its ma ton and wrought the havoc of genocide, war, environmental degradation,

and so on.

Rosenau (1 992: 8). Schuurman (1993: 23). Kamper and Wulf, cited in Rosenau (1 993: 5) .

P-roderism ~d the Devefopment Frruhstein

When postmodemism is advanced as a possible basis for a new and improved

development theory, it brings its tendency toward cognitive and attributive confusion with

it - now, thougb, the object of its hostility is not modemity but the neo-modernizing and

n e o - W s t development paradigms said to be lodged at an 'Impasse' that has paralyzed

the field. The postmodem position in regard to these paradigms is straightforward: they

emerge as equaily oppressive, 'modemist' institutions by which haked interest is disguised

by a veil of rhetonc, as evinced by the profile of terms like progress, demmratization or

emamiWon. Underneath the veil, poamodemists suggest, the real purpose of the drive

toward mode* is to establish and maintain control over peoples through the 'cultural

imperiaiism' of a hornogenizing definition of progress, and the siiencing of voices wbich

represent altemtives to it.

But the relation of postmodernisrn, in its anti-modem posture, to development

theory is problematic in that the 'why?' of the whole enterprise is feft undehed. That is,

since modemity itselfcannot be the engine behind modemist oppression - it is only an

inanimate body of ideas, after al1 - it is obviously necessary to consider acton. And yet,

postmodeniists assert, the modemity that is pushed on the South is oppressive in nature: it

is therefore reasonable to inquire as to the relevant acton' motives. Two possibilities

present themselves: first, that the driving forces of modernity represent a conspiracy of

sorts, Le., a deliberate cover-up of interests which would be exposed as blatantly unethical

if left uncovered by the rosy rhetoric; or second, that the drive toward modeniity

represents honest but misguided conviction on the part of the forces which carry it out - forces which are also, fnistratingly, often left undefined.

As was the case with Frankenstein and modernity, postmodemism obscures the

nobler side of these 'modemist' development theones: modemkation's emphasis on

democracy, participation, and material wefl-being are washed over in postmodemism's

emphasis on ailturd homogenization, consumerism, and power relations. Neo-Marxism's

emphasis on stnicturd hequities and the oppressive side of international capitalisrn are

similady brushed off in favour of attention to that theory's supposed homogenitùig

tendencies in the politico-economic arena, specifically through its own 'grand narrative'.

But again, these trends alleged by postmodeMsts are ofien left unexplaineci in temu of

why they happen: do 'modernia' theories oppress the South through a deliberate

wnspiracy and campaign of misdirection, or through a misguideci fàith in the rectitude of

thei. respective brands of progress?

The attribution of these traits to neo-hilancist and neo-modernizing theory is

reminiscent of the error in attribution which history has made in relation to Fcankenstein

(who 'kiiied') and which postmodemism has made in relation to modemity (which

'oppresses'), but there are ciifferences in the conceptual parameters of the two examples.

In the first case, the error is fàirly easy to identify, not only because of the blatant nature of

the error, but also because of the limited number of variables to consider: the mistake

e>asts within the confines of the novel and the stereotypic 'Frankenstein' of popular myth.

In the second case, however, the matter is not so simple; in advancing the Holocaust and

Stalinist purges as proof of the 'Ylawed assumptions" of modemity, postmodernists open

something of a Pandora's Box of complicating factors. Postmodemism might credibly

draw attention to the icy technical efficiency with which both processes were carried out,

and the use of narratives which serve- as justification for these events - racial or

ideological 'purification', for exampie - but understates certain extemaiities which were

cmcial to both processes: the pmoia and evident madness of Hitler and Staîin, the long

history of ad-Semitism and Russian totalitarianism, the role of World War 1 and the

Treaty of Versailles in fomenting German nationalism in the 1930s- the long list of

European (and, in 1 9 18- 19 19, American, Canadian, French and British) invasions of

Russian and the Soviet Union, and so on. In al1 of these extemaiities, the spectre of

modernity is far less visible than it is in postmodem assertions of technocratie rationality

and grand na~fative obfiiscation. Far more visible are real-world events, personality cults,

historical enmities, and various associations, perceptions, pressures, historical

idiosyncracies, etcetera - in short, a very complex set of variables which make arguments

that lay the Holocaust at modemity's door far l es convincing.

The point is that with this flawed application of postmodemism to development, as

with its application to modemity, there is a danger of cirastic oversimplification of the

situation, first in its inability to idente a clear motive for the 'oppressions' of

development theory - i.e. was it conspiracy or naiveté?; and second, in its fiiilure to

account for extenial factors. In &g these mistakes, postmodernism runs the nsk of

administe~g the wrong theoretical medicine. The ills which are cited as evidence of the

failure of neo-Marxist and neo-Modeniizing theory are undeniable, but it is just as certain

that if the symptoms are to be cleared up, the disease must be diagnosed correctly.

The question to which this discussion is intended to provide an m e r , namely,

whether or not postmodemism might serve as the basis of a new developrnent theory,

presents interesthg problems which inspire another question: what is it, exactiy , that

postmodemism mi@ alter or replace? It seems as though the initial question

oversimplifies the matter to the point where it cannot be answered directly, mainly by

presuming that previous development theories were somehow neutral ones in which their

advocates simply believed, and which wdd be replaced simply by force of supenor

argument. This is a Bawed notion for two related reasons.

Fust, 'superior' ody has meaning if some sort of ordinal d e exists, i.e., in a

range of less to more desirable, the critena which define 'desirable' are agreed on by ail

parties: this has never been the case. The articles of f&th attributable to the neo-Marxist

and neo-modemizing camps make any universal 'beîter' impossible to dehe because,

simply, what is beîter to a neo-Mamist is not necessarily better to a neo-modeniizer. The

c o ~ e z t i o n between development theory and political partisanship is a tricky one: on the

one hand, modernizers k e Parsons could credibly rest their theories on a gemiine Wh in

the 'good' to be brought about if structural functiohalism were allowed to work in the

South like it had in the North. SUnilarly, neo-Manrists like Cardoso could just as honestly

say that their calls for better terms of trade or even for a degree of delinkage wnstituted a

'good7 for Latin Arnenca. On the other hand, some have ascribed far less honest intentions

to these theonas, and have suggested a more intimate link between these theories and the

political partisanship of the Cold War.

Modemization theory was unambiguously and directly an expression and agent of the then-hegemonic US imperialism. For i ts part, dependency theory was, 'in the last instance', a justifkation and tool of revolutionary strategies.

The second problem with the perception of development theory as neutrai is that it

fails to address the complex of structure, process, agent and wntext that cornes as part

and parcel of a working ideology. Once a link between development theory and Cold War

ideology is suggested, the discussion is no longer restricted to the sentiments or motives

of individual theori~is - instead, development theory becornes intimately lùiked to entire

societies, i.e. the complexes and drives within and between them, and the political tenets

which order them. In this case, as Munck asseris, the neo-modemking theory of the

'West ' derives fiom "U. S. imperialism" and n e o - W s t theory fiom "revolutionary

strategis."

Io Munck (1993: 113-1 14). It is difficult to discuss structure in these t m s without reference to the Cold War

bipolarity that obtained throughout the formative years of development theory; in this

The concept of structure is central to the neo-Manllst critique represented in

dependency and world systerns theories. It was best dculated in the tore-periphery'

temiiwlogy which Walierstein, for one, applied not only to the relations between North

and South, but also to those within Southem counmes as well. The literature on this topic

is vast, but the key idea is that power differentials exist between periphery and wre which

both enable exploitive practices and are maintained by them.

in drawing attention to the importance of the North-South power differential,

multinational corporations, local elite groups, and class structure within developing

countries, development theorists paint structure as institutional weighf, Le. as activities

which embed themselves in structures of varying visibility and which perpetuate hequities,

yet which have been - with very few historical exceptions - strong enough to resist efforts

to change them. The power differentials reflected in this notion of structure may indeed be

meamrable, but in more abstract increments like infiuence, rank and comrnon economic

'culture' among elites and elite institutions.

'Process' refms to the types of politico-economic activity that have dominated

North-South relations since the beginning of European exploration and colonization and

which, despite the altniistic motives o f certain development actors, continue today. l2 It is

tempting to divide process for analytical purposes into the political and the economic, but

sense, strrdchrre refen to a rneaswernent of the distribution of power dong the lines laid out in the structural realia school of international Relations. While such theoiy did tie these measurements to less empiricaf forces like the 'national interest' or the anarchic character of international affairs, the mode1 was stubbomly state-centnc and rejected the internai afliiurs of states as irrelwant to stmctural theory. l2 A distinction wili later be drawn between self-serving development actors and those actors whose activity might better be describeci as being dnven by altruism or ethics, i.e. between a MNC and OXFAM or Doctors Without Borders.

it is difncuit to separate the two, as the influence of Cold War cornpetition again muddies

the conceptual waters somewhat. One can examine ' M ' s t ' development theory through

Soviet-Cuban relations, for exarnple, but it is no easy matter to point to a specific process

and explain exactly why it is occumng. The proces of Soviet development efforts in Cuba

rnay have been intended to serve economic interests through, say, the procurement of

tropical foodstufb or local minerais for Soviet consumption, or to serve the political

interests of domestic entities like the rnilitary or the planning bureaucracies of the

Communia Party of the Soviet Union. Or, ifthe stnicturd redists are correct, the process

served the realpoLitik of the Soviet governrnent in its struggle with the West, in which case

getting Cuba 'on-side' represented a tremendous coup in strategic and tactical terms. On

the other hand, the 'me' dynarnic of modernization theory is no easier to singIe out:

depending on whom one asks, Western development protected the economic gains of

extractive and exploitative business interests, fiirthered the domestic political interests of

various security agencies, or responded to the demands of international political

wmpetition through counter-insurgency and the drive to keep developing countnes frorn

'crossing over'. In characterihg process, then, it is perhaps better to leave the political

and the economic unseparated. Process mi@ better be defineci as the politico-economic

demands of international capitalism or international socialism: in both cases the

seIf-serving practices of the North - i.e. East or West - have resulted in extraction,

exploitation, environmental damage, and, in many cases, violence which has tended to

accompany arms transfers and the tactics employed to protect politico-economic process,

regardless of whether the ' 6 d o m fiaers' in question were counter-insurgents or

revolutionaries.

Agent (Actor)

Because the difficuity in separating the political f?om the economic arises again, it

is kely better to define the 'agent' sub-area of the North-South complex as those entities

with interests in development processes and who, where necessary, do what they can to

mobilize the amcmres and processes that over-arch them in order to serve those interests.

This may be an 'unscientinc' approach, but a systematic classification of a m is of less

interest here than the conceptual confiict between individual actor interest and a wider,

more egaiitarian sense of development. To use a particularly notorious example, the

naturai interests of the United Fruit Company in Central America were directly at odds

with the ethicdly unchallengeable ca l for land refonn throughout that region. l3

Two things need to be noted regarding the ~e~interested actors of the

development complex. Fust7 there is nothing conspiratorial about an aaor's pursuit of its

interests: for an International Financial Institution (IFI) to impose structural adjusmient

packages to ensure repayment on loans, for example, or for an engineering firm to bid on

the construction of a dam is both a natural extension of the purpose of such entities and a

naturd result of organizational pressure on individual decision-makers within those entities

to produce. One could most certainly oppose both of these examples on fairly solid ethical

or environmental grounds, but the point is that such opposition can only acquire meaning

within a ceriain fiarnework of rationality; in the rationaiity of the LFI or the engineering

firm, the pursuit of these interests is perfectly desirable.

Second, actor self-interest is for the most part consistent with the dictates of

development theory, arguably because of the intimate relationship between econornic and

political interest. Thus a dam project which dislocates thousands and which lads to

problems of soi1 erosion and desertification is 'desirable' because it also mates jobs,

provides electricity and inigation, thereby furthering 'modeniization' (its attendant

benefits for hydroelectric finns and agribusiness are, presumably, a happy coincidence).

l3 On the United Fruit Company in Central America, see LaFeber (1984).

Sùnilarly, a Cuban or Sandinista land re-organization or the nationalization of an industry

might compromise productive efficiency, but wiil aiso fwther the theory's egalitarian

ideals and politicai objectives. l4

Like the three sub-areas discussed above, 'context' is only artificially separable

fiom the iarger complex of North-South relations. That is to say that none of the four

exists Uidependently of the others, and that no real-world example of structure, process,

actor-agent or context can be understood without reference to the other t h e .

If a North-South wntext is to be discussed, it will have to be defined in neoliberal

terms primarily because of the loss of credibility that the Left has suffered since 1989, but

dso because neo-Marxist theory, iike its antecedents, defines itself in ternis of its

opposition to what has histoncally been the dominant paradigm, namely, an extractive

capitalist or nediberal one. l5 'Context' is intended to refer, then, to the neoliberal ethos

which pemeates 'official' interaction between North and South, and which provides

conceptual parameters which defme the acceptable and the unacceptable. For example, the

fact that decades of heavy lending to Latin Amencan countnes by Fis has resulted in a net

tnuisfer of fiinds out of those countries wouid, one wouid hope, be considered

l4 This is not to argue that Cuba or Nicaragua are good examples of neo-Man& theory in action, but rather that they represent two notable examples of the 'counter' bent of neo-hilarxist theory in relation to the hegemony of modernization evident elsewhere. l5 It might be argued that the popuianty of dependency and wodd systems theory in academic circles denoted, particularly in the late 1960s and 1970s, a hegemonic context of sorts, but again this represented a critical view of the 'official' hegemony of neoiiberalism - neo-Mancist theory held great sway, but within a limiteci sphere. The sarne is tme of a d 'leftist' development practices discemible at various times in Nicaragua or Cuba or, for that matter, Bulgaria: again, the hegemony of such theory in these pockets was undeniable, but as is particularly evident in the Latin Arnerican examples, their situation in the midst of a larger neoliberaf context bas made them the targets of relentless pressure f+om the dominant wmplex of neoliberalism.

objectionable in terms of what is îypicdy considered fkir, but is perfêctly desirable ifthe

assessing 'gauges' are the balance sheets and shareholder returns of the Northern banks

which control the process. l6

The Devefopmenî Metqhor and the Interest-Ethics Dichotomy

This breakdown of the North-South complex is intended to illustrate the vastness

of the development process, and to mess the importance of this vastness in lirniting the

potential of any new deveiopment theory to effect change. It might even be argued that

the very term development ought to be viewed with suspicion, tidily positionhg as it does

the complexity of North-South interaction under one banner: the extractive practices of

coprate enterprise, the financial ties of Multilateral Lending Agencies (MLAs),

international banks and their investors, private investment, NGO involvement, IGO

involvement, academic study, and, increasingly, New Social Movements and indigenous

development alternatives in the South. Because an individual who says dhe works "in

development" is jua as likely to conjure up the image of the jet-setting bankllig consultant

as that of the khaki-clad Peace Corps volunteer, it must be recogNzed that the term is

redy a loose ceiling for a multitude of meanings.

Another way of looking at this is to divide the agents of the development cornplex

dong the lines of their motivation. Even in the list just presented, a distinction can be

made between two groups: those who participate in the development process in order to

serve pecuniary interest, and those who do so on humanitarian grounds like the Pace

Corps volunteer: this motive will be loosely labeled ethics. To be sure, these labels are

both fàirly loose - the division of development motives into these two categones does not

wnsftute empiridy rneasurable social science data, nor does it purport to represent a

tkory: it does not delineate the relevant system cleariy, nor does it generate predictive

l6 This trend is weil documenteci in Feinberg (1 989).

ability. It is intended merely to illuminate the gap in motivation between individual

development agents, and in doing so illuminate the *ers and losers in the development

process: as was pointed out above, this is crucial when development theorists are

clamouring for a new theory in Iight of the supposed 'tàilure' of the conventional ones.

Where this implies that 'we' had it wrong somehow with neo-modemizing or neo-Marxist

t heory, the interest-et hics dichotorny highlights the fact t hat certain interest-pursuing

agents had it very, very ri@. This is, perhaps, just another way of saying that if we are to

determine whether one of the dominant development theones has 'fded', we need to be

clear about what it was intended to accomplish in the first place, and whom it was

intended to serve.

Attention to the North-South complex aüows for the illumination of three things:

first, the comection tetween development theory and political partisanship, and their

common evolution throughout the duration of the Cold War; second, the structures,

processes, agencies and wntext, and the mass and inertia they possess - not only would

they not be easily re~rdered dong postrnodern lines, they exist as credible explanations in

themselves for many of the ills of the developrnent process, explanations at least as

credible as postmodern ones which focus on deconstruction, discourse analysis and

diversity. Lastly, it provides an alternative to development theory as a target for

postmodern hostility. The cognitive and attributive emors which postmodemism rnakes in

relation to Frankenstein and modemity are just as misleading with neo-modemization and

neo-Marxism: these theoies are saddled with unseemly traits that are fiir more attributable

to externdities traceable to the vanous dynamics of North-South relations in general. Just

as unfair is the obscuring of these theories' nobler aspects: in deriding them as

'modeniist', postmodemism fails to give these theories their due. They are certainly

imperfect, but this is not the same as suggesting that there is no good in them and

advocating th& complete disposal.

I f postmodeniism is to negotiate the development theory Impasse, it must go

beyond deconstruction: it must artidate the concephial material of development in a

sense which allows for the correct identification of the problems rather than the cognitive

and attributive enors of the modemity Frankenstein. This would at least create the

possibility that such development might be brought about in light of the institutional

weight of the larger North-South cornplex as sketched above.

The latter point is, of course, the ditncuit one. Postmodernism certainly brings a

fiesh perspective to development theory, and its skepticism and ability to cut through

iconic obfùscation ought to render it indispensable to any honest attempt to eEect change,

but it is not enough to point to the modernist grand narratives and cry foul; nor is it

enough to advocate the grass-roots assertion of alternative voices. It is weU and good for

postmodeniists to decry modemity's 'Ylawed assumptions" and argue that humankind

took a wrong turn at the Enlightenrnent, but the fact remains that we are two hundred-odd

years into the 'modem' era and are thus saddled with two hundred-odd years of

'modemia' baggage. Postmodenùsm, ifit is to rnake any significant impact, must do more

than contest Enlightenrnent arguments that are two centunes old: it mua do something

about the baggage.

It wi l be atgued below that this is where postmodernism breaks down. Because of

its Mure to accurately - or at least reaiistically - wnceptualize the North-South compleq

because of its tendency to point to al1 its ills as the products of a misguided modernity, and

because of its frustrating vagary, postmodemism is unmitable as the bais of any new

development theoiy. However, it wiii also be argued that the posmiodem critique has

much to offer development theory, and that a version of the postmodem approach placed

within the context of interest versus ethics might stand a better chance of achieving

theoretical coherence, although its practical usefiiness migtit still be questionable. This

latter deficiency rnight be considerd irrelevant in an exploration of theory, but the

development 'theoretical' is of particuiar importance to the practical given the severe

socio-economic, political and environmental &es fàcing the developing world. The

theoretical might be safèly detached from the troublesome demands of the practical in

linguistics, philosophy, or even socioiogy or political science, but the above crises make it

imperative that development theory be accorded no such Iuxury.

Following a brief summary of the roots of the Impasse in the second chapter, the

third d s u d e the fiuidamentals of postmodemism: this chapter will take the fom of

a surnmary of the main themes discemible in the literature rather than a comprehensive

orgahtion of iî, for reasons tbat wiU be made c h . The fourth chapter will explore

postmodemism's strengths, and the fifth will explore its weaknesses. The sixth chapter

will present the interest-etbics dichotomy in greater detail, and the seventh chapter wiü

suggest that a modified version of postmodeniism, which wiil be described as a synthesis

of both the 'modem'-postniodem and interest-ethics dichotomies, wiii be far better suit4

to negotiating the impasse than postmodemism in its current, limited state.

Chapter Two: The Roua of the Ihqmsse

Like 'development', the two schools of thought referred to rather loosely as the

neo-modernizing and neo-Man& development paradigms encompass wider ranges of

opinion than the ternis suggest. Those who argue tbat an Impasse exists generaily refer to

these schools of thought, but there are variations in the tenns used to represent their

opposition to each other. Scott, for example, refers to a "'stdemate" in development

theory between the ''modeminng" and "dependency" nïimeworks, whereas Smith begins

an exarnination of development theo~y's ''state of crisis" by contrasting dependency with

"de~elo~mentalisrn." In another example, O N s seeks an accomodation between

neoliberalism and structuralism. l8

The looseness of the laquage of the impasse might be bothenome to some,

glossing over as it does important Merences among the terms: cleariy, smichiralism,

dependency and neo-h4arxism are not identical. On the other h d , they are aii based in an

antipathy toward the neo-liberal paradigm; to lump them together, then, need not be to

commit to a methodological sloppiness if it is made clear that these headings encompass a

diverse range of literature with important substantive, contextual and temporal

distinctions. With this disclaimer, then, the general labels of neo-modemkation and

neo-Marxism might be left intact, viewed as labels for the contending camps in a general

conflict between those theories traditionally understood to have emanated fiom the Right

and the Left. Thus Schuurman places dependency theory, modes of production theory and

World S ystems theory under the banner of neo-Mancist theory. l9 Similady, the general

neo-modemking heading rnight be assumed to encompass a wider body of ideas

l7 Scott (1995: 2); Smith (1985: 532). l8 Onk (1995: 97) l9 Schuurman (1993: 2-14).

aitematively wntextualized as liberalism and neoliberalism, rnodernization and

neo-modernkation.

Development theorists typidy begin a description of rnodernization theory with a

su- of Amencan policy in the years foliowing Worid War ii. For exarnple,

. . . development studies, which has always been dominated by Amerïcan academics, was founded in the first years &er World War iI, when the United States assumed leadership of a ravaged worid in which the problems of containing the Soviet Union and dealing with national liberation movements throughout much of Asia and Afica were the country's top foreign policy priorities.20

Modernization theory was thus bom in an era in whch larger world order was changuig,

mainly in the form of an mer-inte-g Amencan hegemony reflected in the ambitions

of the Marshail Plan and the Bretton Woods conference. Within a few y=, battle Iines

were drawn between the remnants of the western alliance and the Soviet Union:

containment became the basis of the Arnerican stmtegic position, the Cold War took shape

and, afler the Berlin crisis of 1958-59, it was played out almost exclusively in the s 0 4 e d

TIrird World.

The primary feature of Amencan policy toward Europe, the Far East and,

increasingiy, Latin Amerka was the drive to re-organize these areas dong liberal

democratic lines21 Dwelopment in this period is therefore bea understood as

20 Smith (1985: 533). 21 Where the U.S. was in a position to be proactive in its postwar policy, the European wuntnes were not. Losing their grip on their c o l o d possessions, the European development 'drive' might therefore be better characterized as reactive in nature, designeci to ensure that the coniing transfer of power in Afnca and Asia did not prove too detrimental to European interests. As Apter (1 987: 12- 13) suggests, early development research "took on considerable political urgeacy as nationalism intensifieci and pressures for independence mounted. How to promote development on ternis favorable to the

synonymous with c h g e or as the means through which this re-organization was to take

place. To quote Apter again,

M e r the war when preoccupations with the reconstruction of Europe receded, interest focused on development including colonial and so-cded backward areas. These latter required a re-thinkmg of conventional ideas about political economy and the state, and incorporation of new kinds of knowledge about exotic cultures, customs, social practivces, values and beliefs. The following question was central: Which combinations of n o m and institutions wodd impede, and which fàciiitate, development? Which type of political system might best induce growth became a matter of the creation of new societies, social organitations, and political e c o n ~ r n ~ . * ~

The centraiity of c b g e to the development process rnay have been clear enougb,

but the formulation of a coherent means to bring it about proved to be problematic. The

field itself was, in the postwar years, so diflcùse that, as Smith suggests, 'the divisions

among the academic disciplines and the avowediy eclectic concerns of many working in

the field made it difficult to label developmentalism a '~chool ' . '~~ The Arneiican approach

- one dnven by policy needs which, Apter niggests, "fàr outstretched academic thinking,"

- was geared toward the acquisition of infionnation about specific developing areas:

One needed to know a great deai about development concretely, as it was particularized in terrns of experts and area specialists. In the United States and elsewhere, programs of research on developing countries were estabfished in virtually every major university. Area experts were trained in considerable n~rnbe r s .~~

The initial potential for contlsion in terms of defining the field may have thus been

mitigated by its close relationship with U.S. foreign poli^^.^^ Since what was sought was a

metropolitan powers was the fkst question. " 22 Apter (1987: 12-13). 23 Cornbining elements of behavioraiism and 'operationalism', development researchers fiom the fields of anthropology, economics, sociology and political science worked primarily dong empirical, quantitative and comparative Iines to gather information about the developing wodd (Smith (1985: 533)). 24 Apter (1 987: 13). 25 As Smith suggests, 'Yomal" mechanisms such as the SSRC and 'Worrnai" ones like

wodd re-ordered dong liberal lines, the uieory that emerged denved fiom the sociological,

political and economic aspects of liberalkm prevalent in the United States at the the. In

sociological te-, this invariably leads us to structural fiuictionalism and the work of

Talcott Parsons in partinilar. Parsons developed a sophisticated typology of social systems

from a macro or structural perspective: bis notion that societies could be best understood

in struaural texms that the fundamental unit of the social structure was the stdus-de,

and that the arrangement of w i t s depended on the anangement ofpattern variabes

proved to be enormously influenthi on the structural fùnctionalism of the 1950s which

Davis refmed to as "synonymous with ~ o c i o l o ~ ~ . " ~ ~ h development terms, to re-order a

society, one needed only to re-balance the pattern variables.

The importance of structurai hctionalism to early modemkation theory lay in its

role as the theoretical basis for the types of change envisioned in U.S. policy:

. . . the development project is "modernization" of %ditional" societies through the establishment of networks and institutions similar to those of advanced industrial socides, including strategic norms of work, values of social discipline and beliefs about equity and motivations representing the intemakation of these norms, values and beliefs in a rnanner ensuring role performance through appropriate behavior2'

In terms of specific policy, the spirit of modernization as defined above is clearly

identifiable in a 195 1 publication of the United Nations' Department of Economic Mairs:

There is a sense in which rapid econornic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed, and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons

the personal and professional connections of the academics in the field aided in this process (1985: 533). 26 On Parsons statu-roles, see Ritzer (1 992: 105); on pattern variables, see Parsons (1% 1: 67); Davis (1959). 27 Apter (1 987: 16).

who aumot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a cornfortable life hstrated. Very few cosnsnwlities are willing to pay the fidl price of economic pro gr es^.^*

The economic and political dimensions of modeniization theory, also consistent with

liberal principles, are best representeci in terms of growth and democratization. The most

pro& econornic 'modernizer' is Walter Rostow, whose 'stages of economic growth'

thinking was as uinuential to economic modenllration as Parsons' work was to

suciological modemkation. Rostow conceptuaiized a fiestep transition nom

"traditional" society to the society of "hi& rnass consumption," i.e. the 'bighest ' stage of

modemitation. E s conception is characterized by a curious mixture of the exaltation of

capitalism on the one hand, and acknowledgement of the demise of traditional cuitures on

the other. In his Stages of fionomic Growth, he writes that "it takes t h e to transfomi a

traditional society in the ways necessary for it to exploit the ôuits of modem science, to

fend off dirninishuig r e m , and thus to enjoy the blessings and choices opened up by the

rnarch of compound interest." On the very same page, t h g h , comparing the

modernkition of seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe with subsequent

development, he acknowledges that

The more general case in modem history ... saw the stage of preconditions (for modemkation) mise not endogenously but fkom some extemal intnision by more advanced societies. These invasions - literal or figurative - shocked the traditional society and began or hastened its undoing . .. 29

28 Cited in Escobar (1984: 377). Interestingly enough, this spirit of 'paying the price" is visible in a more recent document. A June 1996 Globe article reviewing the World Bank's annual report was entitled "Get real about ccrpabilities, Wodd Bank tells p r i ~ ~ o n s , , " and, in the article's subtitle, this helptùl trailer "In xts mmal report, agency suys cmntries are going to have to take hard looks ut w h they c m accom~ish, and reduce hreat~cracies. " (26 June: A 1 6). 29 Roaow (1960: 6).

Samuel Huntington's Pofificui Order in Chanpitg Societies (1968) is referred to

by Smith as a work which "moa North American specialists would agree to be the finest

work in developrnentalism by a politicai s~ient i s t . '~~ Like the sociological work which

preceded it, the study of political development took a comparative approach, adyzing the

building of political hitutions in the Third World in order to find as Baum suggests,

'the political analogue of the industrial re~olution."~ Specifically, attention was devoted

to "the growth of speciaüzed politicai structures, such as parties, pressure groups,

legislatures, executive and judicial offices."32 Though the rhetoncal buzzword that

dominates this literature is 'democratization', the actual meaning of political development

is less than clear, as Smith pointed out in 199 1 in an anaiysis of John F. Kennedy's

AUiance for Progress. While it "seemed obvious that democracy entaileci such things as a

decline in class polarization thanks to a growing middle class, and the incorporation of the

working class into politics," Smith suggests, the United States was in no hurry to

encourage the type of social democracy which existed in Europe and involved state

intervention to assure social weWe and incorne redistribution: iristead, U. S. objectives led

it to encourage Liberal dernocracy on the lines of the North American rn~del . )~

In sum, modemkation theory was a loosely amalgamatecl body of literature

initidy characterized by disparateness, but which was eventuaily pulied together and

directed by the United States' domestic and foreign interests, whkh translated into an

Arnerican desire to re-shape the developing world dong North American lines. The works

of Parsons, Rostow and Huntington represent the sociological, economic and political

dimensions of an ' organismic' modemkation theory, developing systerns of classification

30 Smith (1985: 542). Baum, in Harvey (1972: 22).

32 lbid. 33 Smith (1 99 1 : 75). The profile and use of this term are al1 the more questionable when one considen the fàct that programmes tike the Alliance hoped to 'inject' democracy fiom the top dom.

and prescriptions for the transformation of Southern dtures, seeking to 'design' the

South in a fàshion which reflected the 'tniths' that had already been determined about

American society. The inter-relatedness of the three perspectives is spelied out by Smith:

in emphasizing the impact of Parsons' pattern variables, he draws attention to ''their

assumption that cultural values are of a whole with economic, social, and political systems

in such a fashion that mial organization should be conceptuaiized as a self-reinforcing

uni@." The underlying idea, cleariy, was that the transformation of the economic, social

and political systems wodd achieve, by definition, the transformation of the CUItures in

question.

As was mentioned earlier, 'neo-ManOst' theory is a loose label intended to cover

several sub-schools of developmeut theory: three that will be treated here are

smicturalisrn, dependency and worid-systems theory. The main point of commonality

which each of these schools shares with classical Manrism is an opposition to the

liberai-capitalist approach which is built on exploitation, but apart fkom that there are

important difFerences between Marx's work and the 'neo' development theories that it

iduenced. Three of these differences are summacized by Schuurman. The first lies in the

question of point of view: where ciassical Marxism is 'Eurocentric," examining

'hperialism from the perspective of the central capitalist wuntries," neo-Marxjsm looks

at it from the perspective of the peripheral countries. Second, neo-Manosm takes issue

with the '%istorically progressive role of capitalism:" where M d s t s envisioned a straight

progression from feudalism to capitalism to socialism, neo-Mamists argue that impenalism

and capitalism "are more likely to lead to underdevelopment in the periphery than

development ." Lastly, where classical Marxism emphasizes the revolutionary potential of

the proletariat, neo-Mao<ists emphasize that of the p ~ ~ . 3 4

Struauralist development theory, '%barn in cnticism of received (Le. rnodemizing)

doctrine," is rardy mentioned without some reference to Rad Prebisch, an Argentine

economist who wrote a now-bous report for the United Nations' Ecomonic

Commission on Latin America in 1 9 5 0 . ~ ~ Prebisch's central contribution was to argue that

practices deriving fiom classical economic theory and modernization theory were not

living up to their promise in Latin Arnerica, and that this faihire was due to untàir and

worseniog terms of the region's trade with the industriaked countries. Another pillar of

his critique, and that of the structuralists in general, was the assertion that the

elite-dominated and intemationally 'connecteci' social stnichire "prevalent in Latin

Amerka (consti~ed) a serious obstacle to technical progress and, consequently, to

economic and social de~elo~rnent."~~ This was a clear departure fiom the modemizing

position that traditionalist 'pathologies' and parochialisrns were to blame for the slow

economic progress of the region.

Though dependency theory has "its roots in the stmcturalism of the ECLA

economists, it arose most directly and forcefully as an extended critique of the

modernization perspective."37 Leys backs up this assesmeril, pointing more specifically

to "the early 1960s when UDT (underdeveloprnent and dependency theory) emerged as a

militant critique of the ruling ideas of de~elopnental ism.~ The main ideas of

dependency theory, as eiaborated by its foremost Engltsh-wrîting representative Andre

34 Schuunnan (1 993: 2-3). 35 Street, in Dietz and Street (1987: 105). 36 Ibid, p. 107. 37 Fitzgerald (1 983: 15). 38 Leys (1 983 : 3 1) He also refers to the "intellectud deserts h m which UDT rescued us," citing as examples inkgration, nation-building, politid development and rnodeniisation.

Gunder Frank, centre around the UIlSUifability of the experience of the indusîrialued

nations as models or guides to understanding the Third World. For Frank, this was where

modernization theory went wrong: it faileû, first, to to consider the histokal experience

of the colonies in shaping its relations with the industdized world and, second, to

"explain the structure and development of the capitalist system as a whole and to account

for its sirnultaneous generation of underdevelopment in some of its parts and of econornic

development in others. t'39 Underdevelopmextt, for dependency theorists, does not result

fiom the absence of modemization, resistance to modernization or the flawed application

of modemization theory, but "was and still is generated by the veiy same historical process

which aiso generated économie development: the developrnem of capitalisrn itself. "40

The world-system theory of Immanuel Wderstein emerged in the mid- 1970s and

was "strongly based on the ideas of.. . Frank and other dependenti~las.'~~ Two main

features distinguish it fiom dependency theory. First, world-system theory introduced the

concept of the semi-periphery in an effort to account for the development evident in places

iike Brazii or the NIES of East Asia. These states were viewed by Wailerstein as buffers

between the core and periphery whose sale of production set them apart from peripheral

countries, yet which were still dominated by the core. The second point of departue fiom

dependency theory is what Fitzgerald refers to as world-system theory's breadth of

dys i s : rather than viewing the worid in simpler wre-periphery terms,

World-System analysis places a new emphasis on the multilaterai relations of the system as a whole . .. rather than on the unilateral relations of metropole and satellite characteristic of dependency theory. Thus wre-core and periphery-periphery relations becorne as central to the d y s i s as do me-periphery ones!*

39 Frank (1992: 107-108) 40 Ibid, p. 1 12. 41 Schuumuui (1993: 7). 42 Fitzgerald (1983: 19j.

Like dependency theory, world-systems analysis is less a program of action than a

description of poiiticd and economic reality as envisioned by Walierstein, and a critique of

the assumptions of modernization theory. Rejecting the state-centric approach of

modernization, Wderstein chose as a unit of anaiysis the 'broad econornic entity within a

division of labour that is not circumscribed by political or cultural boundaries," i.e. the

w o r l d - ~ ~ s t e m . ~ ~ The system, as he viewed it, is characterized primarily by this

international division of labour, and is based on the developrnent of capitalism itse& which

"provided a basis for the growth and development of a world-economy . . . without the aid

of a unified political stnicture.'* For Waiiersteh, the economic form of domination

represented by the world-system has proved more eEectve than the political domination

of earlier empires.

In sum, 'neo-Manrist' theories serve primarily to question the theoretical bases of

modernization theory, but also to draw attention to the domination that lies behind it. As

Smith summarizes, dependemistas (and, we might include, stnicturalists and world-system

t heorias)

... share the view that the power of international capitalism setting up a global division of labor has been the chef force responsible for shaping the history of the South. Onginally as mercantilism, then as free trade, later as finance capitai, and most recently under the auspices of the multinational corporation, capitaiism over the 1st five centuries has created a wodd economic ~~çtern.4~

Defning the Imprrse: Ine FPiure of Deyelopment meorp

The very notion that an Impasse &sts rests on the ascription of 'failure' to

neo-modeniizing and neo-Mmcist development theocy. While the conceptual danger of

reducing such broad strands of theory to singular entities which can be somehow deemed

to have succeeded or failed will be treated in greater detail in the next section, there can be

littie doubt that, unlike select periods in the past four decades, neither view holds decisive

sway among development theorists today. The su- can now turn to the various

critiques of n e o - M h s t and neo-modemking theory said to have brought the field to this

point.

Factors advanced as expfanations or proof of the Mure of modemization theory

seem to Ml into four groups that mi& loosely be entitied methodological flaw, structural

flaw, misrepresented intent, and real-world conditions. Critiques which have posited this

school's methodoIogicuIflàws mi& take a positivist form in one instance, or more of a

'postmodern' form in another: the difference is that the former accepts the general

assumptiom of positivist social science but questions the quality of particular hypotheses,

propositions or themies. Thus Smith, drawing out the reasons for the Mure of

"developmentalism," argues that:

... the models in m . cases were so formal and abstract that they proveâ too stifling, too tyrannical, and dtimately too sterile for the empincal work they sought to organize. The other problern was that the models were too loose, too incoherent, and too incomplete to act as adequate guidelines assuring the interco~ectedness of research.

Smith does provide a compelling enou& explanation of this apparently contradictory

statement, but the point is that while he acknowledges the faiiure of "developmentalism,"

he suggests a fmlty application of a sound research method rather than a misguided

method itself Similarly, he States that

(the) s t h g shortcornhg of the (developmentaliçt) school was its inability to articulate a unified mode1 of comparative political economy, just as it lacked any broad-based comparative historical perspective into which the problems of mid-20th-cenhiry development could be placed.

46 Smith (1985: 536)

Apter, on the other han& points to the limitations of the positivist approach in a passage

which appears, for him, uncharacteristicaiiy 'posmiodern':

Postive scientific knowledge (especidy quantitative) has relied on conceptual schemes thst are unable to incorporate the range, scope, and number of variables required to understand development problems. It obliterates the tentativeness of more w c e d and intenial knowledge. Quantitative or formalized styles of thinlOng in social analysis have Ied to poor predictions, stated with more pretentiousness than a ~ t h o r i t y ~ ~

Critiques addressing modernization theory's st~cturaiflaws are not necessariiy

derivative of sfnrchtrakm, but they do seem to be d a lefiist bent. However, it does not

require a M-st to rnake the point: such flaws rnight just as easily be called logical flaws

as structuraf ones. Structural flaws, then, refer to impediments to modernization by

resisting or complicating entities like class structure or the conflict in neu-liberalism

between the self-interest inherent in capitalisrn and the egaütarianism inherent in

democracy. Baran, for example, argues that

.. . contirnous capitalist development is irnplausible for the Third World because of the power configuration betweem foreign and domestic decision makers and the people . . . capitalist development in (most underdeveloped) countries was not accompanied by the nse of a strong property-owning middle class and by the overthrow of landlord domination of society. Instead, an accommodation was reached between the newly arrived monopolistic business and the socially and politicdy entrenched agrarian ari~tocrac~.~

The point, obviously, is that modernization is an unattainable goal given the realities

inherent in the method of its propagation, namely, an injected capitalism. In a criticism

pointed more directly at neoliberalism, Schuurman questions the notion that neoliberal

econornics and democracy can go together:

47 Apter (1987: 14) 48 (1992: 82).

... how meaNngfÛi, or even seaire, is that democracy when the new wave of capitalist modernisation is accompanied by W-sale privatisation, and the withenng away of the social and economic fiinctions of the peripheral state - this in societies already severely wrroded by d e r waves of capitalist moderni~ation?~

Critics who point to misreprsented intent highlight the connection between

modeniization theory and U. S. geopolitical interests. The most obvious critique of this

sort would be any Maocist one which painteci the theory as a simple cover for imperialism

and naked interest. Some analysts, though, have been more restrairied in their conclusions.

For Schuurmm, modemkation theory "gave discursive credibility to the expansion for

United States investments, and more Mportantly to the ditfiision of American geopolitical

power." Smith takes a similariy benign view of this connection, acknowledging that '%me

were those Iike W. W. Rostow and Samuel Huntington . . . who indeed explicitly intended

to make their work an instrument of Amencan foreign policy," but suggests that this

served oniy to compt the punty of an otherwise credible theoretical approach:

In view of the ideological .. . concems of those working in developmentaiism, it is dficult to see how .. . they might have sponsored the kind of work in comparative history or political economy that . . . would have ensured more broad-range mode1 building . . . and more robust constructions of theories . . ."%

Neo-Mano'st development theory is aiso widely held to have failed, having been

attacked by Manas and n o n - M s t alike 6om the late 1970s and through the 1980s. It

might then be argued that the demise of the East Bloc and the subsequent

"delegitimisation of socialism as a viable political means of solving the problem of

underdevelopment" in the early 1990s was merely the final stage in a gradual erosion of

credibitity that had been occurring for some tirnee51 For -me, the main faiing of

neo-Marx& theory was simply a Baw in logic inherent in the concept of dependency.

49 S c h u u m (1993: 96) Smith (1985: 542). Schuurman (1993: 10).

Bernstein, for exarnpl~ argues that ifthe difference between the core and the periphery is

defineci by the existence of two development processes, Le. one autonomous and one

dependent, then the core's exploitation of the periphery 'to oppose the Ml in the rate of

profit" suggests that the core c a ~ o t be autonomous: as Schuumian writes, "one carmot

describe the development process of the core as independent if that process depends on

exploitative relations with the peziphery in order to keep the dynamics of its own

development going."52

ûthers have criticized the neo-hlan0st approach for what Booth refers to as its

generaiised and economistic explanatory frameworks" which "aspirecl to excessive

expianatory power" and thus "fàiltàiled to reflect and were incapable of explaining the

diversity and complexity of the r d world of deve~o~rnent .~~ The major problem, for

Booth. was a metatheoretical "commitment" inherent in Marxist theory to "demonstrating

that the structures and processes of las developed countnes are not only explicable but

necessary under capitalism." The result, he suggests is that this cornmitment creates

"distinctive preoccupations btind spots and contradictions" in the Mancist (and

presumably the neo-Mantist) vie^.^ Both Smith and Apter make sirnilar points about the

inabihty of neo-Mmcist theory to account for the apparent victories of modernkation, that

is, for situations in which it appears that capitalism might actudy be generating something

positive. Apter suggests that dependency theory '%as been too dire in its critiques of

capitalism," arguing that neo-Marxists have fded to appreciate the ''ttransfomuitive

potentiaî" of capitalism that Marx himself sugge~ted.~~ For Smith, this point tums - as it

did for Bernstein - on the question of dependence &self Pointing to the possibility that

actual economic growth might occur uader conditions of 'dependencyY7 that ''the shape

52 Ibid, p. 13. 53 Booth (1993: 50).

%id, p.5 1. j5 Apter (1987: 28-30).

and pace of this change" might be d&ed and enacted locaiiy, and that the supposedly

dependent state is responsible for it ail, he argues that:

. . . one quite plausible uiference wouid be that the ability of imperiaiism to make these areas 'dependent' is deciining, and that therefore the cardinal reference poinî of the dependency approach is fast losing its utility as a lodestar. Ironicaily, then, dependencia . . . may be spreading just as the situation that gave nse to it is coming to an end, and the very sophistication of its method can be used as its own cannons tumed against itseE?

Booth has also criticized the neo-Marxist approach for conceptual-rnethodologicai

flaws existing in the form of teleology and tautology, drawing attention respectively to

Marxism's tendency to define capitalism "in teims of laws that produce inescapable and

fixed outcornes (for example, a socialist revolution)," and to the depemkntiriu tendency

to define underdevelopment 'Po terms of the degree of dependence" while at the same time

citing dependency as the cause of underde~elo~ment.~~

As t h g s currently stand, neo-modemizing and neu-Marxïst development theories

might best be understd to have fàiied because of the gap between, on the one hand,

their lofty, predictive rhetoric and their volume of academic attention, and on the other,

their real-world performance. As Apter suggests of modemkation theory, 'the record of

genuine accomplishment seems a good deal more meager than the outpouring of books on

(developrnental science and political development) might a t t e ~ t . " ~ ~ Indeed, the profile of

the academic debate in the North between tbe Rostows and the Wailersteins of the

development theory world might be said to have developed at the expense of actual

development wncerns in the South: as Munck writes, 4he debate on 'marginality' may

#i Smith (1985: 545). 57 Schuman (1993: 3 1; 38 - fh. 11). As Schuunnan points out, modemkation theory is also g d t y of teleology in its presentation of living conditions like those in the United States as an inevitable end product of development in the South. 58 (1987: 13).

have passeci into histoty but not the people it referred t ~ . " ~ ~ men motivated by partisan

politics, and more oflen spiralling into esoteric analysis and jargonistic commentary, the

various strands of development theory have brought thernseives to this Impasse; the

challenge now is to re-instate - or perhaps to instate - Munck's marginalizedpeople and

the degree of control they are able to exert over their own lives as the central focal point

of development theory. Succeeding chapters wiii evaluate the potential of postmodernism

to bring this about.

59 Munck (1993: 1 14).

Chupter 3: Pustmodemism - the Basics

To attempt a definition of Postmodemism is to wade into a morass of sorts. Not

ody are its ideas cornplex and, ofien, interrelated, they are also ofien implicitly underlined

by disclaimers centering around postmodernism's discodort with the very ideu of

defaion, forcing commentators to choose their words very carefuîly lest they betray

assumptions for which they might later draw deconstructive fie. As a result, it is diflicult

to be precise about what postmodemism achially is. This point can be demonstrateci by

looking at an interesting discursive quirk of postmodemism, narnely, the tendency of the

words typically mounding 'postmodemism' or 'postmodemist' to commit an author to a

specific direction. For example, ifone refers to a postmodemist 'position', it might be

inferre- that postmodemism represents some sort of ethos. If we refer to the postmodern

'response', it becomes a critique. If we are enticed to say something like "postmodemists

feei that ...", postmodemism might be construed as an a g e d . And, ifit is used simply to

highlight the 'Ylawed assumptions" of rnodernity in the Third World, it might even be

interpreted as an alternative ~ h e o r y . ~ The &est m e r , in aii Wtelihood, is to step back

slightly and characterize postmodemism as a 'quasi-paradigm', Le., a generai qstem of

ideas, both descriptive and prescriptive, which developed in response to the assumptions

of modernity.

If it is acceptable to thus accept the ambiguity inherent in the tenn, the best

approach might then be - to borrow from an approach taken by Stephen White - to extract

the main themes from the extremely disparate body of ideas across which the

' postmodem' is scattereâ, and then hi@@ their relevance to developrnent theory6l

Such an approach does not do justice to the heterogeneity of the liteniture, but the

alternative is to risk bogging the discussion down in the maddening, hair-spiitting

differentiations and relentless esoterica so typical of postmodernism. Before summarizing

these themes, though, it is necessary to perfonn a similar task for modemity, to which

postmodemism is a criîicai response.

Typicaily said to date k m the Enlightenment, modernity feahies what Boyne and

Rattansi refer tc as "the progressive union of scientific objecfivity and potitico-economic

rationality.d2 The key idea in this union is the notion of 'progress' which underlined this

new objdvity and ratiodty: as Featherstone writes, the 'Tdea of progress implies some

direction to history and suggests the finitude of hiaory, the evennial deliverance into, or

amival at, a better or ideal Society or a 'good s ~ c i e t ~ ' . ~ ~ M m than anything else, then,

modeniity is characterized by a fath in the possibility of this kind of progress, and in the

ratiod modes of inquiq to be employed as means to a desirable and achievable end.

%s based on scientific inquhy and reamn, the Enlightenment is purported to

represent a conscious break fiom the ''past of antiquity," and a promise to free hurnankind

fiom the oppressive political fonns and the erstwfüle mysteries ~ f n a t u r e . ~ ~

'Emancipation' - Wtely the most-used word in explanations of rnodeniity - frequently

appears in this context, in tandem with 'universai'. In relation to the social world,

modemity is said to have promised deliverance fkom, as Schuurman presents it, poverty,

61 White identified four such themes in 'postmodemity': a "'growing incredulity toward traditional rnetanarratives, new awareness of the costs of societal rationalization, the explosion of informational technologies, and the emergence of new social movements." (1991: ix). 62 (1993: 190). 63 (1995: 170).

Habermas (1993: 98).

slavery and ignorance through the ideals of liberty, equality and f ia ter t~i ty~~ So delivered,

the individual subject would be dowed to develop what White calls "an isolated mind and

wiil," enabhg humankind to then tum to the natural world, bring it under the control of

reason and "thus make it available for human projects.'66 As White continues, the

''modem orientation toward a reason aimed at enhancing human d and control has no

limits. It manifests itself Nially in the twentieti~ centuiy as (what Heidegger terms) a 'W

to planetq ~ r d e r . ' ~ ~ Though the scattering of tenns üke '%il" and "projectY' could be

said to imply an excessive 'consciousness' to the sea change which the Enlightenment

represented, their ubiquity has served in no s d measure to make modemity a nahirai and

obvious basis for postmodem and feminist deconstruction and critique. For example:

The Enlightemerit ide& . .. dehe modernity in terrns of rationalization, as an 'advance' in cognitive and instrumental reason. This produces particular categories and systems, through which historical development and social evolution are concepîuaiized, based on the notion of progress as the guideline for a universalist p j e d 8

Lefi in their own terms, the 'objectives' of modemity seem understandable enough in light

of the history of Inquisition, superstition, tyrmy and disease h m which they emerged.

Taken at a giance, modemity's ernphasis on progress, emancipation and reason thus seems

incontestable, an attitude undoubtedly shared by the proponents of rnodemity clearly

identifiable at both the individual and institutional fevel in the world around us.

Nonetheless, this attitude has been the target of ferocious aitickm by postmodemists; the

main themes of that criticism foliow below.

65 (1993: 23). 66 (1991: 3) 67 Ibid. 68 Richard, in Docherty (ed.) (1993: 463)

It is important to note that the division of postmodernism into the thernes

discussed beiow is an amficial one made for anaiytid purposes only. As it is hoped the

following discussion will make clear, postmodemism represents a comprehensive response

to and critique of modeniity at different levels sidtaneously. Thus standing as a general

'counter-paradigm', it does not offer a tidy, point-by-point refbtation. Furthemore, the

initial purpose of this discussion was to assess postmodernism's relevance for

development theov the division of postmodernism into thernes will d o w for a far more

comprehensible - though equaily ai-tificial- 'matchcp' with tbat body of theory, which is at

times just as imposing and just as problematic as postmodemism. From that broad corpus

of literature, three themes seem particulafly ubiquitous:

1. A strong disaffection for the totalking narrative. 2. The identification of hidden power relations in modem& discwrse. 3. The notion of Other and the assertion of the local natrative.

Docherty has suggested that the c'disenchantment" with the totalinng narrative

conaitutes the "min core" of postmodernism. A creature of modemity, the tomiking

narrative incorporates a cornmitment to the rational-objective methods of Uaquiry and

organizition; a faith in both the rectitude and utility of those methods; and a view of

modemity as a superior mode of thlliking and being. It is, moreover, a crucial aspect of the

grand narrative that the superiority of the modem 'way' is not viewed in relative terms,

Le., as the most desirable of a group of altemative modes of thought: the superiority is

viewed as absolute and, therefore, as the naturai basis for human thought and behavior in

general .

In deveiopment terms, the postmodeniist suspicion of the grand narrative is fairy

obviously represented geographically: clear battle lines are drawn between the

meta-narratives of 'modem' Northern incursions into the South and the indigewus

narratives under pressure to accede to them. The movement of modem Europeans into

the Southem hemisphere quite obviousiy represented a clash between a totaliting

European modernity and indigenous cultures, a clash which prompts Lyotard to present

grand narratives as "great codes which in their abstraction necessarily deny the specificity

of the local and traâuce it in the interests of a global hornogeneity, a universal history. -69

Even in this cursory definition, two bases of the postmodem challenge to the grand

narrative are disceniible: the identification of its logical flaws, and the critique of its

inherent S c h u u m addresses the f o m point, arguing that

Universal values do not exist and metatheuries ... which take umversal values as given and see society as 'makeable' are suspect and merely contribute to an apparent reality. The Enlightenment ideal of the ernmcipation of humanity has not been achieved, nor can it be achieved. 'l

The 'makeability' of human societies - a dificult and perhaps impossible undertaking even

withui the w l l e c t ~ t i e s of the relatively homogeneous, 'modem' North - becomes

increasingiy doubtfbl when one considers the number and complexity of alternative

dtures with which modernity came into contact in the South. Because it rests on an

engineered displacernent of the indigenous outlook by the modem one, postmodernists

argue, the rectitude and the viability of the metanarrative as a viable bais of action is

thrown into question:

It was not only the awareness (on the part of development theonsts) that redity in the developing countnes took on such a pluralist c h c t e r that no metanarrative

69 ~ocherty (1993: 11) This terminology is used with hesitation since both points would likely cause discornfort

for the postmodemist: the identification of a 'logical flaw' rests on the assumption of a commonly agreed-upon logic, and 'arrogance' implies an ethicai nom which spells out acceptable and unacceptable behavior. 7L Schuumüui (1 993: 23)

adequateiy could explain it. It was specifically the disenchantment with metanarratives as such that constihited the main core of the postmodeniist point of vie^.^^

Apart nom the viability of the metanarrative, its rectitude stands as a major point of

contention for the postmodemist. R e f h n g to metanarratives as "those foundational

interpretive schemes that have constituted the ultimate and unquestioned sources for the

justification of scientific-technologid and political projects in the modern world,"

Lyotard draws aîtention to the ethical questions mounding the imposition of a totalinng

view on alternative cultures. 73 Summarinng him, Docherty addresses the manipulative

and destructive elements of metanarratives, arguing that they

. . . operate Iike Enlightenment reason: in order to accomodate widely diverging local histories and traditions, they abstract the meaning of those traditions in a 'translation7 into the tenns of a master code, a translation which leaves the specific traditions simply unrecognizable. As metanarratives, they also become mercive and normative: Lyotard argues that they effectively control and misshape the local under the sign of the universai. Such a cfrive to totality carmot respect the historical specificities of the genuinely heterogeneous. 74

Escobar takes this point one step fkther, addressing the point of this need to abstract,

coerce and control; the power that lies behind the metanarrative, he argues, "is exercised

chiefly to maintain economic exploitation," and manifests itself in various ways:

In the Third World, mechanisms of exploitation and domination prevail, aithough contemporary f o m of subjection (from Coca-Cola as a cultural item to therapies for the rniddle classes, consumer values, life-styles, and so forth) are increasingly gaining importance and contibuting io the maintenance of exploitation and class dflerentiaf~.~~

72 Ibid, p. 188. Emphasis added. 73 White (1 99 1 : 5 ) 74 ~ocherty (1993: 1 1) 75 Escobar (1 984: 383).

Posmiodemism thus "challenges" totaliong worldviews, "(disrnissing) them al1 as

logocentric, transcendental meta-matives that anticipate aii questions and provide

p r e d e t d e d an~wers ."~~ Instead of examinin8 an issue in the terms in which it is

presented, postmodeniism seeks to deconstruct "iogocentrisms" of a discourse, and

argues that instead of accepting discursive icons and articles of fith as absolutes, we do

better to view thern as possible points of view arnong many. in the place of objective tnith,

the postmodeniist niggests, we are lefi with myriad, biased subjectivities.

The second theme to be acamined here is the postmodernist assertion that grand

narratives conceal hidden power relations, and that the purpose of postmodernism is to

break down the conceaiment. Rosenau rnakes this point in somewhat neutral terms, but

Kegiey and Wnkopf hint at postmodernism7s more subversive, revelatory fbnction:

"Postmodernisrn is an approach . .. which emphasizes the study of texts, hidden meanings

and diswurse . . . (objective reality) is inherentiy intangible, and what we assume to be

''tme" masks the vdues on which we base our analyses."77 The act of deconstruction,

Ryan suggests, is thus inîrhsically politicai, seeking to break down authoritative claims to

objective mith and to expose "a power phenornenon where it was claimed that only reason

e~isted."~*

The power relations said to lie hidden are traceable to the technico-scientific

rationality that orden post-Enlightenment thinking. Most importantly, postmodernists

contest the notion that this rationality is neutral: 'reason', in postmodem parlance, rarely

appears without the word imtmmental in fiont ofit. This tendency toward instnimentality

creates an automatic scenario for power imbalance when some becorne "fluent in the

language of reason," while others do not: in a world to be interpreted through modemist

lenses, such iiiiteracy puts one at a decided disadvantage. The element of conîrol and

76 Rosenau (1 992: 6) 77 (1997: 28) 78 cited by white ( 1 99 1 : 16)

manipulation alluded to eartier is a h present here, mainly in the altered view of the

natural world espoused by rnodemity. Postmodernists assert that this view reshapes

knowledge itself in such a way that iastrurnentality becomes its underlyïng principle: as

Adorno and Horkheimer suggest, "Enlightenment behaves toward things as a dictator

toward man. He knows hem in so fàr as he can manipulate them. The man of science

knows things in so far as he can make them (sic)."79 The point echoes an eariier one made

by Lyotard who presents the notion of "petformaticity" as a new conceptual determinant

of the worth of knowledge. Under the imperatives of perfomticity,

What counts is not why an act is done or why a thought is thought, but how efficiently and to what irnrnediate end. Applied science is the home of instrumental rationality which . . . gradually cornes to be the standard aga& which al1 knowledge is measured. 80

In the end, the ability of reason to free humanlgnd by enabling the mastery of nature fdls

short: in the creation of a scientitically defined 'reaiity', mode* provides a ready-made

vehicle for a division of humankind into in-groups and out-groups, i.e. those 'in the

know', and those who are not. With its predilection for manipulation and control,

post-Enlightenment rationality enables not so much the mastery by humankind of nature as

the mastery of people by other people. Its failed promise to free humanity from t y r a ~ y is

lamenteci by DeMan:

(The) Enlightentment itself is not the great demystifjmg force that will r e v d and unmask ideology; rather, it is precisely the locus of ideology, thoroughly contaminateci intemaliy by the ideological assumption that the world can match - indeed, can be encompassecl by - our reasoning about it ... Enlightenment, postulated upon reason is - potentiaily, at least - undone by the form that such reason take~!~

79 cited in Docherty (1993 : 6). 8o During, mmmarizing Lyotard (1 993 : 45 5) . 81 Ibid, p.8.

The relevance of al1 of this to development theory is fairly clear: rather than being

characterized by a neutral desire to modernize the South, Northem devdopment activity is

considered to represent a highly skewed interaction in which Northern rationality

represents a lever with which to manipulate the South. In obvious practical terms this

could be taken to apply to things Wre technology transfer or econornic or military

capability, but it is also discernible in the more subtle machinations of organizational

technocratization, education, media incursion, or academic publishing, each of which tend

to be steered into line with the Northern '~ne thod ' .~~ The Seminal work on this topic is

likeiy Edward Said's menfaIism, a work which lays out in detail the author's conviction

that an ostensibly neutral realm of academic specialization (Oriental Studies) bas served

primady to reflect, inculcate and perpetuate European domination over the 'Orient', an

artificial entity conceptually 'constructeci' by the lengthy process of politico-economic

incursion and domination by the West. As Said writes in one passage,

Orientalism can . . . be regarded as a manner of regdmzed (or ûrientdized) writing, vision and shidy, dominated by imperatives, perspectives and ideologicd biases ostensibly suited to the ûrient ... The Orient that appears in Orientalism, then, is a system of representations fi-amed by a whole set of forces that brought the Onent into Western leaniing, Westem consciousness, and Iater, Western empire. 83

The third theme of postmodemism to be exaMned here concerns the notion of the

ûther, how it is created and what it means for local namitives which, it is argued,

postmodemism advances as having value. This latter point is to be sure, a somewhat

touchy one: more vigorously nihilistic postmodernists would undoubtedly bride at the

notion that they are advancing anything. But in the wake of the postmodern denial of the

grand narrative, an impiicit assignment of wonh to local ones seerns obvious.

82 For an interesthg commentary on the role of academic publishing in this context, see Tomlinson (1991: 14). 83 (1 979: 202).

The 'Other' represents a fàirly high-profile concept in postmodemism. It is

presented as the inevitable dect of the cornmitment by 'modem' collectivities to rational

mindsets which. as was diScusseci in the p r d i section, cannot but create in-groups

and out-groups. The out-groups, particularly those differentiated âom the in-group of the

predorninantly white, 'European' North by any combination of language, skin wlour and

geography, are what is meant by the postmodem notion of the Other. White, surnrnarizing

Foucault's treatment of this concept, argues that the 'modem' rational muidset to which

Enlightenment Europe and subsequent Western societies have subscribed cannot btct

produce an Mer.

If the underlying effect ofour Western cognitive machinery . . . has been to introduce clarity, metanarrational unity, and consensus into our lives, then Foucault's purpose cm be described as that of elucidating how an Other is a h q s pushed aside, marpinaiized, forcibly homogenized, and devalued as the cognitive machinery does its work. 84

The creation of Othemess need not be understood as a vindictive or cunscious process:

from the identification of self as 'modem', it is a very short step to the identification of

other as backward. Since the values or opinions of the backward Other are therefore

incredible by default, the dynamic has a seifkeinforcing logic that has, historicdly, given it

great resilience:

Here, Derrida exposes the West's tendency to legitimite itself: the West is reasonable because it says so, and, since it is the definer and bearer of reason, it must be universaiiy reasonable to accede to this proposition. This, as Demda argues, is clearly a false and troubling logic.

Foucault, Docherty implies, is more cutting in his critique of this phenornenon,

going beyond its cognitive aspects to hint at darker political purposes. In his oft-cited

M&es and Civîiiration (1 %S), he argues compeiiingly that that particular Other - madness - "has to be identified and imprisoned in order to enable reason to legitimize

itsetf." in other words, as Docherty writes, "(r)eason, in short, has to produce the

'scandai' of its Other to keep i t s e ~ ~ o i n ~ . ' ~ ~

Overt action k e impnsonment is an extrerne result of the second step in the

creation of the other the identification of an out-group as backward (and therefore

inferior) as a bais for action This aiso may take different forms - we might conceive of a

spectnim in which, at one extreme, this identification l ads to more passive and subtle

forms of oppression like the 'denial of narrative' posited so oflen in postmodem literature;

at the other, the identification is more actively and consciously used as the justification for

more active and blatant forms of oppression like temtorial conquest or even genocide - in

short, for the use of violent coercion. The case of the Spanish anival in the western

hemisphere provides a backdrop for both e~tremes!~ At the more subtle end, the defàult

conception of the indigenous peoples as savages that seems to have existed in the minds of

the early explorers - particularly Columbus - predisposed the Spanish not oniy to discount

the indigenous worldview, but to not consider it in the first place. This manifested itself in

such presumptuous practices as the wning of the Caribbean islands which they

'discovered'. As Todorov wrïtes,

. . . Columbus knows perfectly well that they aiready have names, naturd ones in a sense (but in another acceptation of the tem); others' words interest him very hale, however, and he seeks . .. to give them the nght m e s ; moreover, nomination is equivaient to taking possession. 87

85 (1993: 14). 86 This despite the tenuous assigmnent of 'modem' to the Spanish Kuigdom of the nfteenth century. However, as will be suggested in later chapters, these practices are perhaps more attributable to the pursuit of interest than the 'practice' of modeniity. 87 (1 982: 27).

In the actual act of colonization, the e f f i s of the colonizer on the Other start to

becorne more tangible. It is, arguably, a prerequisite for the establishment of control that

the coatroiier define and manage the value system of the controlee: in the context of

colonitatioq the colonizer is obliged to alter the existing relationships of indigenous

peoples with each other and with the natural world - the sarne relationships so altered by

the European departure dong the modem path - to a degree that, as some assert, their

very history is redefined:

(Indigenous) particularisms, social usages and specificities - ofien rnaintauied without recours to written history, but in altemative fonns and modes such as customs, myths, rituals and oral traditions - were simply mbsvmed under the history of the colonizer . 88

At the fàr extreme of the spectnim, of course, lies the most tangible form of oppression

enabled by the creation of the Other: the p o m y a l of the ûther as savage and therefore as

wonhless or threatening - in either case, desening of what wmes to them - which in tum

serves as a justification for structural violence. As is well documented elsewhere, this

The development implications of Othemess are, once again, f ~ r l y clear. Since we

cm perceive a clear North-South distinction in the history of development, we are

concemed with the mmer in which Northem 'modem' discourse presumes the

backwardness of the South, creating a situation in which, by default, the North exists as a

88 Graf(1997: 3). Emphasis mine. A more conternporary - and proximate - example might be the Canadian practice of removing native childrm tiom their f a d e s and placing them in buarding schools where indigenous language and dress were stridy forbidden. 89 On the Spanish relations@ with indigenous peoples, see Las Casas' writings, cited extensively in Todorov (1 982). More wntemporary examples include the Nazi characterization of Jews in the 1930s, the Arnerican govemmmt's portrayal of the Soviet Union throughout the postwar era (see Holsti's 1962 work on John Foster Dulles) or its cornparison of Saddam Hussein to Hitler pnor to and durhg the Gulf War, described by John Sad as "%o overstatd as to insult our intelligence" (1992: 224).

naîural blueprint for the 'modeniization'of the South. Indigenous views of how indigenous

reality ought to be stnictured simply fidi by the wayside, ifthey enter Northem

consciousness at all. Aside fiom the arrogance which this presumption represents, it also

illuminates an understated but important aspect of the postmodem critique - the value of

local narratives to development theory. It is something of a corohy to the first theme

explored above: in eschewing the totaluing narrative, postmodemism advances the local

or the particular narrative in its stead. In this way diversity, rather than sameness, becornes

a central ordering pnnciple. To be sure, this is something of a contradiction, but the point

is that a postmodem approach seeks to replace the desire for a totalizing narrative with a

line of thinking which is prepared opriori to value the existence of numerous smaller ones

instead. Postmodernists advance local narratives as having worth simply by virtue of their

uniqueness, each a subjectivity amid other subjectivities.

Chaptet 4: Assessing Postmodernism - Stteflgths

The attempt to esses posmiodemism's strengths is troubled fiom the outset by

three complications. The first wncems postmodemism's nebulous definitional character,

which was discussed at the begimiing of the previous chapter, cleariy, a school of thought

which decries the vev idea of concrete categorization is Micult to evaluate in traditionai

terms. The second problem is that, in addition to postrnodemism's amorphous character, a

duality is evident within it; it exists on the one hand as a method of critiquhg other

theories, and, on the other, as a body of theory itself. As a result, an analyst always runs

the nsk of sliding back and forth between these two roles. The best approach rnight

therefore be to acknowledge postmodeniism's dual role before embarking on any andysis,

and to be specific about which 'hat' is being wom at a particular time. The third

complication centen around the very t m 'strength3, which impiies the existence of

critena that defie both strength and weakness, that is, a scale against which the evaiuated

body is deemed good or bad, adequate or hadequate, and so on.

This complication is the most troublesorne. As was asserted earlier, a main theme

of postmodemism is its hostility toward metanarratives and its perpetual suspicion that

they serve Iargely as window dressing for power imbalances and naked interests. This

resentment of supposedly neutral values which serve instead, in the postmodem view, to

cover decidedly partisan ones, casts a shadow ont0 any effort to evaluate postmodemism

itseK Put sirnply, can a neutrd assessment of posmiodernism's 'strengths' ever be

achieved, or mua an assessment invariabiy represent another fom of partisanship?

To meet these cWculties, a two-stage approach will be adopted. In the first,

general 'strengths' will be discussed. It is acknowledged here that the absence of a List of

criteria by which 'strength' is deiïned represents a certain abdication of responsibility, but

these criteria will be made clear in the. For the moment, it is hoped, it will sufnce to say

that the strengths listed take the ineffectveness of traditional development theory as given.

That is to say that insofkr as it represents a means by which these ineffectuaities mi@ be

articulateci, postmodernism has 'strengths'. Granted, this too requires discussion, a need

that, again, d l be attendeci to below.

The second section will represent more of a practical application of

posmiodemism's cntiquing role. Two cornerstones of the current topic - development

îheory and 'Impasse' - wil be eXBmjned. The intention is to look at the icons and

assumptions which they contain, and to reveal and explore the cornplex relationships

behind them. The a h is not to adhere to any strict deconstructive methodology or to

represent 'postmodeniism in action', but rather to represent postmodemism's suspicious

spirit. It will proceed under the assumption that there is value in such an inquisition of

development langage.

The most immediate strength of the postmodern approach is its inherent suspicion.

To be sure, this can be viewed as an advantage only if one accepts that cutting through

efforts to advance a particuiar 'Tmth' represents a desirable end - it therefore exists as a

useful tool for the subversive, and as something of a curse for what Chomsky has

repeatedly identified as the "cultural Predisposed to disbelieve, the

* Chomsky elaborates on the notion of 'cultural management' in the documentary Mamrfacturing Cornent: Noam Chomsky and the Media (1 992). His basic premise is that American socieîy in particular is dominated by large media conglomerates who, by vimie of their interwnnections with the upper echelons of the American business comunity in general, have a vested interest in managing the flow of information to the public in such a way that the basic ordering principles of U.S. society - capitalism, punuit of seIf-interest, etc. - do not appear in mainstream debate. It is a subtle fom of social control, but control nonetheless.

postmodemist refuses to take iconic language in the terms in which it is presented, and

thus represents a position f?om which 'givens' might dwap be deemed questionable.

In its abihty to 'step outside' rnetanarratives, postmodernism accomplishes a very

difncult task. Such a step requires tbat the adyst idente those aspects of a particular

discourse that defuie a particular reality - not an easy task when the anaiyst has

experienced a lifetime of inundation by that discourse. Two ofi-cited examples of such a

step corne to mind. In the first, Canadian efforts to translate the la~guages of particuiar

Inuit peoples are said to have revded that no translation for the word for 'snow' exists in

those languages. The daily reality of the people in question demanded the contiguration of

what we understand as snow in separate conceptuai enîities. In another example, early

European explorers of Canada discovered that certain First Nations languages which they

encountered had no word for 'ddemess', for much the sarne r e a s ~ n - ~ l The point is that

these examples resulted from culture clashes in which the hpuiistic givens of one group

had to be reconciled with the real-world conceptualkations of another. But through the

critical tools of postmodemism, it hm becorne possible to accomplish this same

luiguistic/discursive evaluation within the boundaries of our own culture. in other words,

postmodeniism has served to articulate a separation between the totalinng narrative and

conceptual alternatives to it - no s d accomplishment since the primary trait of a

narrative's 'totalizing' character is its tendency to appear naturd and therefiore invisible to

those bom and r a i d under it.

in development terms, this refers to the marner in which posmiodeniism is able to

extract elements of the dominant development discourses - the 'new socialist man' or

economic growth, for example - and question their relationship to the more sacred cows

of the same discourses: progress, dernocratization, modemization, etc. Its rnost basic

advantage is that it serves to undennine the irresponsible use of iwns as sales tools for

' On the latter example, see Enahgered Spces.

potentiaily unpopdm policies like, for example, the 'ernployment card' for a fhctory that

WU have a negative environmental impact. Negative icons can aiso serve this purpose, as

is perhaps the cax with the creation of the ûther or the incantation of budget deficits as

proof of the need for fiscal constriction. As Booth puts if the postmodem approach "may

have a sienificant practical impact in the longer term, contributing in some small way to

the demise of political cultures based on appeais to spunous necessity and the denial of

choice by leaders and politicai rno~ernents."~~

The second strength of postmodemism to be examined here is its potential to

provide a wmpelling iine of argument in relation to the development theory Impasse. Left

in their own ternis, conventional dweiopment theories interpret their own 'faiures' - if they admit to them at all - largely in tems of extemal pressures over which they had no

control. Thus, to the particularly stubbom neo-modemizer, modemization has not been

achieved in the South because of corruption, careless spmding, comrnunist incursion, or a

'natural' disinclination toward 'progress' - in short, the farnous 'pathologies' of the South.

Similady, the particularly stubbom n e o - e s t might point to the imperidkt pressures of

the West as the root cause of failure in the pumit of a viable socialist society in Cuba or

Nicaragua, or even the Soviet Union. The important point is that though ail of these

factors undoubtediy had an impact on rd-world events, conventionai development theory

persists in looking outside its own assumptions when it comes time to place the blame.

Postmodernism, in contrast, argues that the rasons for the failure of both the Lefl and the

Right in the developing world l e within those modemist projects thernselves, and not to

pathologies or interference by 'outsiders'. As was mentioned eariier, neo-modemking and

neo-Wst theories represent projects whose t o t a b g objectives were, fkst, impossible

to realize tiom the start because they underestimate the depth and breadth of diversity in

the South, and, second, more acnirately describeci as disguised politico-economic projects

whose coercive nature is by definition at odds with the normative-iwnic language of

'development'. As Munck puts it, the collapse of both rnodernization and dependency

theory was "due less to their conceptual inconsistencies than to theû collapse as political

strategie~.'"~ Posûnodeniisrn is therefore able to highlight a disjuncture between what

development theory has traditionally 'said' it is (a progressive plan for the bettement of

developing c o d e s ) and what, postmodemists assert, it has traditiody been (window

dressing on Northem self-interest).

From the line of argument which the postmodern approach enables a theoretical

basis for altemative developrnent approaches emerges. Such approaches are predisposed

to emphasize the wishes of the local (geographically defined, as in the case of Chiapas

natives) and the particular (issue-defined, as in the case of lesbians and gays), and find

theoretical articulation in the postmodem valuation of narrative diversity. One approach

currently very much in vogue is that of participatory action research (PAR). As it is

summanZed by Escobar, PAR has ernerged fiom "'expenences in popular education and

grass-roots activism . . . and it is presently one of the most hopeful lines of research and

action in the Third Worid." A bottom-up approach, PAR is devoted to 'the investigation

of the mechanisms necessary to develop popular counter-power for social transfomation

and their relation to the production of k n o w l e ~ l ~ e . ~ ' ~ ~ Such an approach can be ciearly

interpreted as postmodem in that it bases itselc theureticaily at least, on the need to reved

and subvert what Escobar refers to as 'Western disciplinary and normalking rnechanisms"

t hat make up the development discourse. 9s

The third general strength of postmodemism is the introduction of paradox and

dissensus, both of which are implicit in the desire to factor diversity into a social theory,

into development. To advocates of modernity, this would seem antithetical to the

perfecfibility of the human condition, which ostensibly rests on coherence, universalism

and harmony. But it is just this sort of narrativefy-defined harrnony that postrnodernism

opposes. It is at the rwt of the creation of the m e r cited so often in postmodern

literature. As White writes, for example,

. . . our modern cognitive machinery operates to deny the ineradicability of dissonance. The harmony, unhy and ciarity prornised by this machinery have, for the postmodern, an inmitable cost .. . couched in the hguage of an ûther that is always engendered, devdued. discipline& and so on, in the idnite search for a more tractable and ordered wor~d?

uistead, as has been outlined previously, postmodemism advocates a

predisposition toward acceptance of various smaller narratives instead. Citing Foucault,

whom he suggests is "engaged in the task of describing phenomena in a way that 'incite@)

the experience of discord or discrepancy between the social construction of self, tmth and

rationality and that whkh does not fit neatly within their folds'," White summarizes this

point:

. . . Foucault is proving the reality of his ontological view kdirectly, that is, by exposing the persistent and ineradicable, but submerged, presence of dissonance in Our Iives. Dissonance, in other words, is allowed to show itself to us, an experience that has an unsettling effect on our modern, deep-rooted quest for harmony and unity, for a world of problems finally solved. 97

Unlike a 'perfiable' society, then, postmodemisrn envisions one that is to be ever

characterized by dflerence. Unlike the modemist, though, the postmodernist would not

view such an arrangement as anarchic or chaotic. indeed, such a view implies that an

imposed, centdy defined order is preferable; instead, s/he would view an organued

acceptance of difference as a desirable basis for society.

The issue of dissensus has been addressed at length in socio-political theory, most

notabiy by means of its opposite: consensus. Two notable treatrnents are provided by

Parsons and Gramsci. For Parsons, the issue was a difficuh one, and anaiysts of bis work

stili debate Parsons' position on it today. Lechner, for example, argues that Panons' point

was that the 'large social system was hefd together by value consensus, smoothly

institution&ed.'** Aiexander, on the other hand, suggests that 'Parsons' perspective

does not focus on integration alone, nor does it assume consens us.'^ Though a resoiution

of this point of difference lies beyond the scope of this discussion, the point is that

Parsons' work - even after his death - appears to wrestle with the relationship between

consensus and values "'as the foundation of social order and s t a b i ~ i t y " ~ ~ Curiously,

though Parsons has b e n referred to as a 'theorist of modemity' by Robertson and Turner,

he espouses what seerns to be a postmodern point of view on this point, arguing that

'Yolerance of difference is itself a value, and at the very least fhis must be institutionalized

in a highiy pluralistic way."loL Gramsci was more concernai with the meam by which

consensus could be manufactureci artificially, as he expressed through his notion of

'bourgeois hegemony'. This concept refers to the marner in which a set of ideas achieves

hegemonic stahis les through coercion than through a process of careful cultural

management. Hegemony in this sense, as Green points out, thus entails "?hose aspects of

power relations in which domination commands consent and in which . .. coercive aspects

of domination becorne Iess obtrusive." It represents, then, a process of cultural

management which achieves "a kind of social balance or equilibrium, in wbich the

dominated a d e or adjust to their dornination."lo2

98 Lechner ( 1 99 1 : 174). Cited in Robertson and Turner (1991: 16).

IOo Ibid, p. 1 O. 'O1 Parsons (1991: 41). lo2 Green (1993: 195).

Again, the postmodernist would envision a sort of institutionalized dissensus by

which societies becorne predisposed to value dflerences of opinion and namitive. In the

en4 the most critical point is that all the questioning, the deconstnicting, the negotiation

and the suspicion never en&; a form of social organktion based on the constant

willingness to recvaluate, to listen, and to d e concessions thus takes the place of one

based on the drive to win entire populations over to a single point of view.

The positivist theoretical approach which has typically been employed by the

naturd, physical and social sciences is fairly well understood. Traditionally, theory has

been intended to do two things: h s t , to allow researchers to make observations and

hypotheses wncerning the interrelation of component parts of a system, tbat is, to

detemine what is tme within that system. Second, it has serveci as the basis of "if ... then"

relations orpredictiom, i.e. because X is tme, action Y will have result Z. In development

theory terms this translates into the patently modernist asswnption that rational modes of

inquiry could lead- first, to an accurate understanding of the 'system' in question, and then

to a viable prescription for its transformation. Such assurnptions represent irresistible

targets for the postmodena, for two rwisons.

The first concerns the limited potential for developmnt thwry to be neutral in the

politicai sense. Such neutrality is not difficult to maintain in, for example, Newtonian

physics. Political sentiments c m safeiy be predicted to have little effkct on an individual

who, observing a solid ob~ect fall to the gound, will Orely accept the deiineation of the

component parts (object, gravity, ground), the chain of caudty (gravity on object) or the

end result (object hits ground and stops) as obvious. But even if the cornponent

identifications in the development 'system' were as clear-cut as those in the Newtonian

example, there is still the thomy problem of the end r a f t : instead of an object cotliding

with the ground and cornhg to rest, the end result of modemkation theory was (and is)

modernkation.

This term is obviously fk more complex: in addition to the tàct that it represents a

mdtivariate change that goes beyond a simpler SM nom '£âiling7 to 'not falling', there is

far too much room for subjective interpretation of the term 'modeniization'. If we

understand it as a process designeci to change 'underdeveloped' areas into 'developed'

ones, it is difncuh to see how it can be separateci fiom the particularities - Le. that bundle

of politicai, social and economic assumptions, aims and prescriptions - of the designer's

vision, which in tum define for hirn/her the difference between underdeveloped and

developed. Two Cold War physicists - one Soviet, one Amencan - could easily have found

common ground throughout the brief saga of Newton's apple, but the same could not

always be said for dwelopment planners fiom these two countries during that penod:

developed, modem and progres wuid (and did) take on drasticdy different meanings.

Quite cleariy7 then, the question of political preference must be factored into any

assessment of development theory. Rather than assuming a neutrai, or universal, definition

of development, we need to ask, 'fwhat kinc and '%y and for whom?"

The second target of the postmodem critique of development theory is its

presumption of viability. Where, again, the Newtonian example features a limited set of

variables and thus dlows for fhirly simple prescriptions, development theory is difFerent .

To take the case of modembation theory again, a positivist delineation of the system in

question identifies countless and ever-differing structural wmponents (states,

administrative hierarchies, govemrnental departrnents IGûs, NGOs, economic sectors)

and equally innumerable process components (economic inputs and outputs, GNP, trade

baiances, regime type, etc.). Because the sheer wmplexity of nation-states - let aione an

entire hemisphere - &es it highly doubtful that the data could ever accurately represent

the complex reality of any large coiiectivity, the viability of the Parsonian approach is

thrown into question. Even if it were possible to take an accurate 'snapshot ' of the

complex reality in any one area, would the data still provide an accurate representation at

the end of the time pend such a comprehensive description would require? Further, as

any good postmodemia would point out, there is the question of 'tvho speaks?' when the

information is sou& - are existing pattern variables to be assessed on the basis of official

govenunent statistics and interviews, or would researchers also include the views of

groups who dser dong lines of class, gender, ethnicity, age, occupation, geography and

so forth?lo3 Such questions &ken back to one of the two points of contention of

postmodernists, namely, the status of the grand narrative as a 'good idea': is the

comprehensive acamcy and temporal consistency required by a grand narrative even

for collectivities of more than a few dozen?

Furthemore, even ifthe 'description' demands of the positivist approach - i.e.

accurate deheation of the system's parts and boundaries - could be met, the viability

problem is aggravated by the fàct that mmkrni~anlion is not a measurable term - surely no

srnail problem if'it is to serve as the basis for a positivist theory, which, in modemization

theoiy, it does. We are left, then, with a measurement problem, namely, how to arsess the

transformation implied by the term 'developrnent'. Despite the methods of economic

measurement devised and employed by institutions such as the World Bank, and despite

the belief'amongst the more technocratic development bodies that these terms have been

operatiodized, tenns Lice m h m , progres and deveioped de@ meaningfil linear

measurement. They f i l to account for the wmplexity of nation-states by fading to retlect

actual conditions across and within highly cornplex, variegated populations. The

technocratic reliance on and fZth in GNP, trade, and employment statistics as accurate and

desirable refiections of social reatity stands, therefbre, as a key point of contention for the

postmodeniist.

IO3 In addition to 'who speaks?', the question 'who is spoken about?' is a key feature of posmiodemism, particuiarly in its anthropological application.

The third problern concerns the surgical tidiness of the iwns tossed about within

development discourses. To continue with the example of modemization theory, it rnjght

be asked what is typically meant by modemidon. That is, were a modernkition theorist

asked what couid be iisted under the heading of modemization to describe it, what ideas

or values or changes wodd apped Very likely, another series of apparentiy selfrdefining

and selfendent ternis would corne forth. Democrucy would almost certainly appear at the

top of the Est, perbaps to be foUowed by progres, loosely understood as some

combination of technological and social ahcmcement. It would be highiy unlikely,

however, that any of these icons would be p r d e d by a reference to economics. It is a

touchy issue because, aside from the conceptual problem that it is both a means and an

end, it does not lend itseif as easily to the high-blown language of vahes as democracy

and progress do.

Backtracking slightly, the core assumption of the industrialized Northern states is

that they have achieved 'modem' status, and that they therefore represent a natural and

obvious blueprint for development in the South.lo4 But the notion that our society, insofar

as we want to replicate it elsewhere - i.e. to give 'them' what 'we' have - is characterized

solely or even mainly by those nobler icons cited above is flawed. W e normatively we

(the industrialized North) are relatively democratic and 'modem', we are also capitalist

states, an uncornfortable word in any official Northern discourse, due to its association

with the Mmcist critique. In characterizing Northem society, then, the substantive

component of economic method - Le. capitalism - must be cited alongside the normative

cornponm represented by Democracy and Modem. lo5 Though each of these ternis rnight

O4 in addition to b%lueprint", Schuunnan suggests the photographic metaphor of the South as a latent positive", waiting to be "developed" by a Northem 'hegative" into a ositive print (1993, pp.26-27).

It mua be pointeci out that the substantive economic processer within modemking theory are not devoid of their own nonnative aspects: in place of the decidedly Manrist label of '%apitalist" - let alone "capitalist mode of production7' - one is far more likely to

be said to have elements of both within them, what is of conceni here is the rnanner in

which the substantive aspects tend to rem& in the shadow of the normative ones where

official discourse is concerneci. An interesthg litmus test would be to c d the official

speeches of American hesidents over the lasî Hky years, and compare the number of

times the words 'capitalist' and 'democracy' appear. We might also factor in ternis üke

'communia' and 'sociaii~m'~ and, just for fim, look into the speeches of Soviet leaders as

well.

Since development theory has been similarIy guilty of emphasizing the normative

side over the substantive, we would do weU to concentnite on conceiving of development

theory as having a dual content: the normative and the substantive. The former rdects

what it is that the developer wants the dewfopee to change h o ; the latter the means to be

used to get there.

The point is crucial because, in serving as a blueprint for the Soutb, the North is

delivering not just the normative and not just the substantive, but a combination of the

two. For example, when 'technological advancement' is trotted out as a cornerstone of

development policy, it conjures up visions of highway constmction, hydro-electnc dams or

water purification plants. What it does not typicaIiy invoke are the wntracts, lobbying

efforts and institutional cu~ections between private Nonhem producers and Southem

governrnents that are vital paris of the process. Apter, for one, has touched on this point:

'Industdization (which results from a process of augmentation of rnanufàcturing

outputs) derive@) from the application of. .. (scientific and technological) innovation to

the productive infi.astru~ture."l~ So, rather than Uiheriting Northeni values, the South

inhents the matrix of our values and our methods. Otten presented in neutrai, self-defining

tem, those values and methods are inseparable fiom the cornplex of interests that

enccnuita terms like '%ee market ideology" or ''fiee trade7'. IOa Apter (1987: 16)

interacts with the normative values of Northem societies. Note, for example, the

difference in the treatment that "technoIogical progressy' receives in its iconic forrn as a

nonnative component of modenrization theory, and by Apter as an inseparable,

substantive part of the "productive infrastnrcture."

To summarize, it has been argued here that development theory's neutrality,

viability, and self-defin;@ discursive foundations are ail vulnerable to the postmodm

critique. It has been further argueci that rather than viewhg development theory as a

mtural guide by which the substantive aspects of development might manifest the

normative aspects, we do better to view it as a combination of substantive and normative

components in itselj: The developing world, then, does not just inhezit the North's

normative icons or substantive practices, but the matrix of these two entities and dl of the

conflict and contradiction that tbey contain.

4 iii. Deconsftirdrgng 'Impasse'

The tidy metaphor 'Impasse' serves to highlight a key strength of postrnodernism:

its inherent suspicion of terminology and its ability to question the assumptions which that

tenninology generates. The aim of this section is to examine this metaphor not so much in

postmodem language, but in postmodemism's suspicious spirit. This, admittedly, will not

enable the discovery of any hard tniths about development theory or offer any solutions - this rnay, in ôict, represent one of the more serious shortcomings of the postmodem

approach. Nonetheless, this section will proceed under the assumption that there is value

in such an initial 'inquisition' of development language.

The original objective of this inquby - the assessrnent of postmodemism's potentid

to serve as a solution to the Impasse - is more problematic than it appears. In its simplesi

conception, 'Impasse' implies that a fded neo-Mmist theory and a f i l 4

neo-modemking theory are somehow lodged in such a way that the development theory

field is p d y z e d or stagnant. This rnay lead the observer to take for granted the

composition of the parties involved, their motives7 the nature of their cornpetition, and the

context of failure in which all of this is situateci. Such presurnptions seme only to

oversirnplify the issue. Before evaluating postmodemism's potential as a solution, then, it

is necessary to delve into that which it is supposed to be a solution tu.

The very term 'solution' is troublesome, implying that some sort of 'undoing' is

called for, in this case, presurnably, an undoing of the knot tied by neo-modernizing and

neo-Maixist theory. The problem with this conception is that it suggests an unwarranteci

'matching' of the two bodies of theory in ternis of composition and opposition to each

other - a misleadhg suggestion. Obviously, Impasse cannot reaily be intended to refer to a

deadlock of development theones; theones are inanimate and therefore cannot compete

with each other. Terrns f i e Impasse, knot, and deadlock might better be understood to

refer to a disagreement among groups of development theoris~s, but even this is

misleading - it implies a contest of some sort replete with measurable increments which

refiect the 'score' in the marner of a sporthg match.

There is, certain&, evidence of a theoretical debate which has been characterird

now by the assertions of one side, now by the critiques and counter-assertions of the

other, but it rnight be argued that the bases of these theones are so incompatible as to

represent apples and oranges of sorts. Instead of two cornpeting sides in a sporting event,

then, the Impasse is better viewed as the chaos of two groups piaying different games on

the same field. IIf, then, the conception of the Impasse as cornpetition is found wanting, it

might be more useful to view the Impasse as a lack of consema. Rather than suggesting

that neither 'competing' side can measurably defèat the other, we then do better to

suggest that neither side can convince the other. By definition, this implies that each side

has mamged to convince itse& a notion that opens somethhg of a methodologicai

Pandora's Box through the immediate question of the basis of that conviction: if

modernizing or neo-Mancist theory proved wnvincing to some people at some the , why

did it do so?

To recd a point made earlier, developrnent in its early postwar stages meant

moderaization, part of a (primarily) Amencan plan to align the economies of Europe and,

later, the developing world with that of the Uniteci States and the r e m t s of the alliance.

But the onset of the Cold War amplified the political aspects of this process; hstead of

humanitarian/economic policies intended to put war-ravaged Europe back on its féet, the

bipolar hostility which dominated the next forty years created political incentives to keep

developing countries fiom crossing over to the other side: this became a drivùig principle

of development. The relevance of this to the convictions of development theorists is clear.

In its status as a contexi for the research that was taking place, and on *ch development

theory was ostensibly baseà, the geopoliticd imperative forces us to reconsider the basic

assumption of positivist social science: that mearchers draw conclusions (and,

presumably, convictions) from what their observations reveal.

In the development theory context, the notion that conclusions could be drawn

from an unsullied process of objective, methodologically sound observation is flawed. The

most irnrnediate problem has been touched on above - because it was starbng fiom scratch

as a new field, development theory had to construct some son of coherent identity from

sociology, anthropology, political science, geography, economics and so on. Instead of a

coherent identity, then, development theory was poorly wnceptualized, i.e. un-integrated,

from the start. lo7 However, a more serious methodological problem existeci in the fom of

two conceptuai spectra evident within the acadernic communities of the developed states

which were building the theories. The first concems, once again, the neutrality of

IO7 See pp. 3-4, chapter two.

development theory. WMe we cannot assume that all theorists dlowed their political

preferences to colour th& work to the degree that Samuel Huntington did - surely there

were some who achieved a greater degree of neutrality - it is necessas, to consider his

degree of ideological cornmitment as one possible extreme of social theory. We might,

therefore, conceive of a spectrum on which social theory in its most neutral, objective

seme sits at one end, with ideology in its rnost partisan, subjective sense at the other. In

such a conception, the neutrality of development theory must be viewed as a relative

measure.

The second specmim encompasses the range of research approaches between the

qualitative and the quantitative - a contentious enough distinction when the research

subject is relatively limited, but development theory has traditiody sought the

transformation of an entire (southem) hemisphere. With aii the marner of variation that

this Mpiies, the limitations of both the idiographic and nomothetic approaches are

magnified, while their advantages are minimized: qualitative analysis becornes too

particularistic to be generaiized, quantitative analysis too general to be particularized.

When we consider the atomization of the field and the researchers' general unfamiliarity

with the developing world - they were coming fiom the industrialized North, after ail - the

vast potential for epistemological, ontologicd and axiological bias and simple error

becorna apparent. Io*

These complications were augmented by the timing of early development research.

As the rnethodological problerns cited above suggest, enough potential for fallacious

research would even have existeci had the development theorists of the 1950s extensively

reseerched underdeveloped coumries and then aarted the processes of development. As it

was, though, the theorking began several centuries &er the commencement of the

log It ought to be noted that Latin Amencan 'stnicturalists' and the Depndentista school were able to clah initial credibiiity because, Latin Americans, they could argue that they possessed a Iegitimate understanding of the 'bigger picture' in the South.

rd-world processes that characterize 'development' to this day: foreign investment,

extractive enterprise, and considerable foreign infiuence over local &airs - or, more

pessimistidy, exploitation, colonization, and impenalism. It might be argued that

neo-Manrist or structuralist thwry had sometbing of an advantage in this regard - because

it existed as a response to modeniization theory, stnicturaiists trying ''to be ngorously

inductive in their reasoning from the available data," were responding to a body of theory

that was already in place. The work of modernization theorists thus serveci as the basis for

the theoretical M e w o r k of coreperiphery relations, dependency, etc. log But

modemkation theorists twk an opposite approach - the application of the structural

functionalism of Parsons, for example, was based on the episternologically and

ontologidy contentious assumption that the 'tmths' already determined about Arne&

society could be transfened to deveioping ones. Modemization theory is thus

characterized more by a deductive approach wbich manifestecl itself in processes üke

capital injections and the 'democratization' envisioned in programmes like the Ailiame for

Progress.

The relevance of timing lies in the unijkelihood that any development theory

emanating f?om the Nonh (and specifically the United States) could ever have suggested

any course of action other than one which complernented these longstanding economic,

political and military processes, and which reflected domestic, i.e. Northem, interests

rather than Southem ones. It rnight be pertinent to ask whether the ideas of Parsons or

Rostow were accepted by the pmctical arm of the U.S. policy-making establishment

because they were the most convincing ones available or because they most closely

reflected the actual processes that were aiready deeply entrenched. The question of

wnvincibility, then, is a simple one: to whorn, exactly, does a development theory have to

be convincing in order for a consensus - i.e. the opposite of Impasse - to exist? Has one

existai before? In the development theory titerature, it is typically implied that the 1 950s

and better part of the 196ûs represented the heyday of modeniization theory, but Munck

disputes this notion, pointing to the McCarthyism of the early 1950s and arguing that

Amencan academics were under severe pressure during this period not to depart tiom a

strict ideological line. Simiiariy, the period of neo-Manrist ascendmcy in academic circles

was wntemporaneous with the writings of avowed 'neoliberals' of which Huntington is

likely the best exarnple. If we are to believe that developrnent theory overcame the

methodological problems at hand, we are almost forced to accept its ab* to mesh with

the entrenched practices mentioned above as a happy coincidence.

The implication of 'Mure' in the Impasse metaphor, Le. "development theory is

at an Impasse because wnventional theory has Meci," presents us with a tùial problem.

Have either of them actually fàiled? If so, how is that failure defined? Despite the deged

ills of the neo-modemking model, treated in chapter two, it is obvious that it has created

beneficiaries: international banks, private investors, multinational corporations (MNCs),

and Southern elites are likely brectthing easier than ever before, now that the East Bloc

villain is no more. To such entities, neo-modernizing theory would likely represent a

resounding success. At the same tirne, the neo-Marxist theorists who advocated delinkage

and are now 'discredited' could lay daim to development successes and point to what

might have been in Arbenz's Guatemala, Castro's Cuba, Mende's Chiie or Sandinista

Nicaragua without the blatant interventionism of the United States. The point is thaf

particuiariy with the aeo-modernking modei, the theories of the Impasse have cleariy

produced winners and losers. In addition to asking why a theory can be deemed

convincing, then, we need also address the question of whom to ask - the Manhattan

invesîment banker or the Penivian political prisoner, or conversely, the Mexican oil baron

or former Flint auto worker?

In surn, bebind the tidy term 'Impasse' lies - yet again - a cornplex web of

structure, process, agency and wntext. By conceiving of it as a hck of consensus among

individual theorists rather than a deadocked wmpetition between self-evident and

self-standing camps, we d o w for the range of wmnifmentq opinions and political

striping within each camp. We also dow for the potential of methodologid complication

to befoul developrnent theory research, and for the influence of entrencbed practice and

interest on ostensibly objective theory construction. nie point is that the development

theoreticai - even the metatheoretid - is inseparable fiom the demands of the

developrnent practical.

To summarize, the strengths of postmodemism denve fiom both sides of its dual

nature, Le., fiom its existence as a body of theory, and from its existence as a critiquing

method. The former provides a hdthy skepticism in regard to iconic language, which has

created in tum a language capable of negotiatïng the wnceptudiy tregcherous bridge from

an apparently 'natural' discourse to something which is able to stand 'outside' it and look

in. It dso represents a theoreticai basis for 'postmodem' development policy through its

emphasis on diversity and the value of the indigenous perspective. Lady, the postmodem

'canon' introduces and legitllnizes the concept of paradox or dissensus as a basis of social

organization, mainly represented in its advocation of a predisposition to value the

existence of numerous points of view within larger coktivities. Whiie there is

undoubtedly much work to be done to even begin to bring such an ethos into being, it

does represent a am. The strengths of postmodemism's critiquing roie lie in its ability to

investigate general concepts and deconsmict the termin01ogy that one encounters there; in

the developrnent field, the concepts of 'development theory' and 'Impasse' represent two

notable possibilities for such an inquisition of language.

It is argued above that, as a vehicle of critique, postmodernisrn offers much. Its

deconstructive and inherently suspicious character cm be brought directly to bear on the

theoretical maiastays of any dominant paradigm, which brings mimediate metfioâological

and theoretical benefits: instead of taking icons and 'isms' at face value - be they

neo-modemking iwns ükeprogres or growth or neo-ManSst ones Wte c k conj7ict - a

postmodem critique is armed with a healthy skepticism that cuts through rhetoric. In

addition, it is dificuit to dispute the notion that the postmodem critique makes an ethical

contribution, particulariy in its function as channe1 for "'transmitting the voice of the

tnarealized and dominated."l l0 If it is accepted that the narratives and choices of the

rnarp.iaiized and domùiated have value - a view which, it is argued here, is implicit in

postmodeniism - then a school of thought which legitimates channels of articulation for

alternative narratives must be viewed as desirable.

Despite these advantages, posûnodemism is encurnbered by a number of problems

which lirnit its potential to negotiate the impasse. Observable wealaiesses in the

postmodem approach can be deemed to fd Uito two categories: fiindamental semantic or

conceptual confusions, and the cognitive-attributive errors of the modemity Frankenstein

discussed in chapter one.

'wst I rn- - As numerous observers have noted, the 'post ' in

postmodernisrn implies a temporal break, as if"we have wimessed a histonc transition

fiom rnodernity to posmiodernitytynL1l In attempting to cl* this point, Docherty argues

that the word pstmodern bas îraditiondy descrïbed an "outside" of modernist thuikin&

though '%s meaaing was somewhat obfiiscated by the prefix post." Since even a cursory

glance at the institutions and processes around us reveaf a modemism that is alive and

weü, we likely do better to conceive of any manifestations of the postmodem as being

scattered over a b i d e t of modernity which has had a two-hundred-year head start. 112

Rather than a clear departure from the modem, then, postmodemism represents a

coexistent critical position which Lyotard has referred to as "a mood, or a better state of

mind."l l3 White, in the postrnodern spirit of dissensus, seems tiiUiy cornfortable with this

less tidy distinction between the modern and the postmodem, and hke Lyotard seems able

to conceive of the two as coexistent. Arguing in hvour of a 'postmodem modernity', he

tolerates the vagary on the grounds that ' h o d m is nven by phenornena that are not

easily comprehended within fàdbr cognitive and social structures. If the tem is

awkward and arnbiguous, so is the social reaiity it claims to describe."l l4

The lack of clarity concerning the precise meaning of the term 'postmodem' is not

simply a semantic problem. Definitions which emphasize a temporal progression imply that

the world itself has somehow become 'postmodm', ie., real-world conditions have

changed and 'posmiodern' is simply a better description of them. This almoa impties in

tum that a conscious rejection of modemity has taken place, which brings the definition

directly into conflict with Schuurman's assertion that discontent throughout the South

represents more a demand for access to modemity than a rejection of it. l lS On the other

hanci, definitions which portray postmodemism as an 'outside' of modemist thinking

l l Meiskhs Wood (1 996: 2 1). l l2 Even within the context of development, this is obvious. The technocratie, rational policies of the IBRD, or the mechanies of tied aid are good examples. Il3 ?n White (1991: 5). lL4 Ibid, p.4. l IS (1 993: 27).

emphasize its critical, subversive posture. In this view, rather than reflecting conditions in

an already-changed worid, postmodmiism represents a tool by which it might be changed.

This is not to argue tbat there is no rmm for overiap between these two views, only that

there is also room for confusion as the term is currently 'dehed'. 4 kxd': A more serious problem lies in the need for some son of

reconciliation between the postmodemin suspicion of the grand narrative and the impiicit

need for an ethos necessary to protect the autonomy of the local one. This is problematic

theoretidy because, as Laclau suggests, "the very idea of the abandonmeril of

metanarratives is logidy contradictory, for it reproduces within postmodern discourse

the "logic of foundations" that supposedly characterized modemity." l6 Quite obviously,

an 'ethic' which assigoed value to the local narrative would be, by definition, universai, a

notion cleady at odds with the postmodern rnindset.

There are other points of connlsion. One concerns the relationship between the

size of a collectivity and the attribution of the label 'local' to its narrative; ie., how large is

a collectivity is aliowed to get before its local narrative becomes a totalizing one? And

even if some dividing line is determined, is there any guarantee that these local narratives

remain local? As Flogstad rather snidely puts it,

1 suspect that this enthusiasm (over the 'defeat' ofmodernity) is premature, or rather, that those who want to shout with joy shodd huny up and do it now, before the minor narratives ?bey are so jubilant about begin to grow again. l l7

Beyond the question of the size of a coliectivity, there is also a need to consider

the related question of the character of its narrative. It might be argued that decqhg the

grand narrative implies a de fhcto legitimation of local ones which may tum out to be far

more oppressive - the harsh pend codes and political policies of the Taiiban in

Laclau (1993: 329). H7 In Schuurman (1 993: 25).

Afghanistan, or the more general practice of female genitd mutilation consthte two fairly

blatant examples. There is, therefore, no reason not to believe that even the most local

coliectivities might becorne rigidiy oppressive: the line between a totalizing namative

which rationahes the oppression of four billion and one which does the same for forty

thousand or, for that matter, forty, is left undenned. In other words, it is difficdt to teU

where the grand narrative ends and the indigenous voice begllis, or to teii where

legitimacy is to be 'granted' and according to what criteria. There may be ment to the

argument that the postmodern celebraàon of the local represents a potential "suurce of

resistance to logocentrism7', but oniy from a sort of macro perspective; when we consider

the gohgs-on within a parûcular locality, it would appear that the local also represents a

potential source of srnalier, individual logocentrisms.

Another problern centers around the theoretical

coherence - utility being too hard-headedly instrumentalist a term for the postrnodemist - of dEerence as the ordering basis of a body of theory. Corbridge, for one, has

vociferously asserted its lack of suitab*:

(Postmodem.ismrs) careless espousal of relativistic and nihilistic positions, and its iilogical extension of the critique of aprioristic notions of progress to cover al . . . enquiries about process, render it singularly unsuiteci to the task of reconstituting the basis of social development research. l I8

Booth has been more moderate, ashg '?O what extent ... an interest in the variety of

thkgs . .. amount(s) to a single 'approach' let alone a coherent theoretical or

met hodolog i d framework. "' l9

To backtrack slightiy, the postmodern emphasis on diversity or difference might be

considered the corollary to its distrust of tmth daims: in place of a single objective tmth,

I l 8 Booth (1993: 59). I l 9 Ibid, p.56.

postmodernists wouid advocate that humankind somehow predispose itself to value the

existence of wuntless subjective ones. While it is difiicult to -est the notion that

alternative voices ou@ to be automaticdly considered as having value, the

postmodemism of Lyotard and others which argues that the pursuit of howledge ou@

to be abandoned is "a dangerous and potentidly disabling set of ideas for aitical .. .

theorists to a d ~ ~ t . ' ' ~ ~ ~ Arguing that the point of theorking is to arrive at an hpoved

understanding of things so that real-worid problems might be addressed may leave one

vulnerable to a postmodem attack, but as Parker assertq

Somewhere in my anaiysis 1 have to leap corn the convenient (but philosophically unchallengeable) distance of postmodem relativism to what 1 think is happening, and what 1 think might be possible. To restate the point, how else cm 1 assert thaî what 1 am doing is worthwh.de at a11?121

The gap between the %orthwhileY' and the frustrating nihilism and relativism cited

by Corbridge might represent postrnodernism's most debilitating weakness. Despite the

fact that it serves to initiate a stimulating discursive investigation, it dso serves, as White

puts it, to create LCdistnist" of postmodernism among theorists out of "concern about the

ways in which postmodeni modes of thinking sometirnes seem to revel in a refusal to

engage problems cemral to any continuity of modern discour~e."~~~

et Of && The last semantic-conceptual confusion

to be treated centres around the concept of culture; it will be argued here that 'culture'

represents a far more problematic concept than postmodemism seems to presume. The

ditticuity emerges fiom the problematic relationship between nanative, culture, and

temtory, a relationship that postmodeniism seerns to treat inwnsistently. Gupta and

Ferguson refer to the need to challenge the "naturalism" inherent in the "ethnological habit

12* Parker (1995: 553). 121 Ibid, p.559. 122 1991: ix

of taking the association of a culturally unitsuy group (the 'tribe' or the 'people') and 'its'

temtoiy as naairal ..." Citing ''transnational culhiral flows, and mass movements of

populations," they question the very possibility of homogeneity and insulanty where

cuiture is concemeci. In the 'poshnodern' world, because culture emerges as

heterogenews, disparate, and endlessly permeable rather than as homogeneous, united,

and hermetically seded, ''the illusion of a naturai and essential wmection between the

place and the cuiture (is) broken." By way of example, they argue that English-ness,

. . . in conternporary Uiternationalized England, is just as compiicated and nearly as detemtoriaiized a notion as Pdestinim-ness or Armenian-ness, since 'England' C'the real England") refers les to a bounded place than to an imagllied state of being or moral location. 123

I f this is indeed the postmodem interpretation of the 'naturalisrn' that Gupta and

Ferguson sought to address, one has to wonder if the postmodern association of the North

and its meta-narratives is not somewhat overstated. That is to say that, rather than

painting meta-narratives as conscious or tangible reatities, we rnight better present them as

theoretical conceptions whose intangible character is defined by the very absence of a

coherent consciousness within them. If we assume the existence of a coherent

consciousness, we assume the existence of a coherent corps of dyed-in-the-wool

neo-modernizers or neo-Marxists whose words and deeds are founded on a commitment

to their doctrllially def'ined tnith. We also assume that this corps is eflecntve in its

propagation of the metanarrative, Le., with the population and the culture it presumably

guides: the meta-mtive defines the culture, and the culture contains nothing significant

that is not accounted for by the meta-narrative.

But when we assign coherent consciousness, bas& on a meta-mative, to a state,

we drastically oversimplify the inner workings of states. Thus, when we look at a

'23 Gupta and Ferguson (1992: 10-1 1).

country's latest policy or action, we o f h assume that since we have classifiecl that

country as "aeoliberal", it is that govemment's commifment to neoliberalism which

explains the policy or action We might credibly note that states' actions seem to have a

certain sameness or continuity over tirne, but the presumption that the pattern is explaineci

by a prearisting meta-theoretical bent îs a careless one. It might be better to conceive of

such contuluities as the product of other shaping forces, mmy of which have been

exploreci at great length elsewhere: bureaumatic politics, self-interest and rational choice,

pressure-group politics, boundeà rationaîity, political culture7 domestic political and

economic pressure, technologid, economic aad bistorical idiosyncrasy, structure-agency

relationships and conspiracy theories. When these shapuig forces are assigned value,

policy continuities appear to result from a much looser, conflict-ridden and ever-evolving

cornplex than neat theoretical consmicts - our b'isms'7 - suggest.

This view is, on one level, rougidy in lioe with the conceptual re-evduation of the

p o s t - W s t critique. ûriginaily intended to get beyond the conceptual monolith of class

structure, post-Mancism, as it is outlioed by Laclau and Mouffe, seerns to provide a more

credible portrayal of social 'reairty'. In the place of simple class conflict, post-Mamists

argue that societies contain a number of socid confiicts "of which one is not by definition

more important than the ~ t h e r . " ~ ~ ~ The conaicting groups, moreover, do not necessarily

have a unifid or single goal, or the same opponent. Ladyy Laclau and Mouffe argue that

the "outcorne of conflicts is not pre-determin4 by structural factors but by the interaction

between the intemal dynamics of social movements on the one hand and the reaction of

extemal actors on the ~ t h e r . " ' ~ ~

Post-Menasts thus provide the helpfùl portrait of societies as more fluid in their

coalitions, causes and c o ~ e n t s . It may make for a les tidy delineation of societai

components for the pirposes of theory construction, but to restate White's point, the

tmnhology with wfnch we comprehend cumplex structures ought to rdect the

ambiguous social reality it is attempting tu describe. The postrnodem treatment of

'culture' niils to reflect the ambigtities inherent in the societies that are symbiotically

linked to 'dtures'.

A further ambiguity is evident in the relationship between the offeMgs of

mode- and the right of Southern individuais to choose whether or not to accept them.

A sound argument c w l d be made that 'modemist' incursion um represent an oppressive

force, but this does not mean that it must be so. To imply that it does is to presume the

existence of some sort of cuitural 'pwity' which must be protected - a risky proposition

when one attempts to define such pu* or protection. Even worse, there is just something

hypocritical about a postmodeniism that has emerged fiom the industnalized North and

which would presume to advocate that the South be spared the evils of modernity:

self-proclaimed postmodemists who would take such a stand are likely do so fiom a

comfortable geographic or professional isolation which aliows them to tear into the

depredations of modernity while taking fiiU advantage of its achievements on a daily - if not hourly - basis. As Schuurman argues, conditions in Southern couhes more closely

resemble an "aborid modeniity project" than a postmodem or a cornpleted, modernisî

one, and manSestations of discontent in the South like the New Social Movernents "are

not expressions of resistance against Modemity; rather they are demands for access to

it."lZ6 If Schwnnan is correct, it would seem that sorne ground for disagreement exîsts

between postmodeniists who insist that the South is better off without modernity and

Southern inhabitants who are convinced of the opposite. Furtbermore, there is something

that smacks unwmfortably of ethnocentrism in the very act of teliing the South what they

need and what they do not - at the very least, something no les ethocentic than

preaching to the South the miracles of modemization or ManSsm. That this evident

codict between postmodem Nonherners and desperate Southem 'modemists' ought to

gR.e would-be theorists cause for hesitation is aptly swnmarized by Tomlinson, who

devotes an entire section of his 199 1 work on cultural imperialism to the question of

'%ho speak~?"l~~

Furthemore, in another argument presented by Tomlinson, the notion that the

autonomy of the local culture so vaiued in the postmodemist discourse will be, by

definition, lost through the incursion of modemity rnight be overstated. It is undeniable

that the obliteration of certain traditional social connections was at one time a centrepiece

of official Northem policy, as is evinced by a 195 1 publication of the United Nations'

Department of Ewnomic AfEairs:

There is a sense in which rapid economic progress is impossible without painful adjustments. Ancient philosophies have to be scrapped; old social institutions have to disintegrate; bonds of caste, creed, and race have to burst; and large numbers of persons who aumot keep up with progress have to have their expectations of a cornfortable He mistrateci. Very few communities are willing to pay the fiil pnce of ecommic progress. 12*

However, as Tomlinson suggests, 'culture' is a fàr more cornplex bundle of ideas and

values that may be fm more resilient and durable than postmodernism typically holds. It is

one thing to say that a 'culture' is under attack when an organization such as the United

Nations deliberately seeks to "disintegrate" traditional foms of social organization, but it

is quite another to argue that the same is true when, say, an Arab or Guarani scholar

acquires a cornputer. The difference is that the former example constihites a deliberate

attack on a social fhric, while the latter represents the acquisition of a tool, a hr cxy fiom

the destruction of the complex cultural net of tradition, language, belief and subjective

12' Tomlinson (1991: 1 1- 18). 128 Cited in Escobar (1984: 377).

reality of Arab-ness or Guarani-ne=. It mi@ even be argued that such fniits of modemity

as cornputers or the intemet represent means by which cultural uniqueness cm be

maintaineci or altemative voices aired. 129

The 'Frankenstein' of modemity, it will be recalled, referred to the cognitive and

attributive errors in both the popular conception of the Frankenstein myth and the

postmodernist conception of modemity. Ln both cases, negative traits are rnistakeniy

assigneci to essentially positive entities, and the positive traits of those entities are

obscured fiom view as a result. in the development context, these erron manifest

themselves in postmodemism's £Sure both to separate modemity fkom interest-dnven

processes typically associateci with it, and to give due aedit to modernity's nobler aspects:

an ernphasis on democratic representation, for example, or the ability to advance medical

science. As Meiskim Wood puts it, 'a has bemme the height of fashion to attack the

so-cded Enlightenment project ." I3O

In its opposition to modemism, postmodemism might better be termed anti- or

counter-modemism. However, this lads inevitably to the question of what it is that

postmodernism is wunter fo. Arguing that postmodemity is better conceived of as

counter-rnodemîty, Habermas posits tbat modemity is an "incomplete project" whose

noble objectives have been thwarted by the misguided logic of postmodernism. 131

Docherty takes this further, arguing that the nobler promises of modernity were in effect

hijacked by forces which it spawned, interests which brought about its "barbarous face' in

the form of the Stalhist purges or the Holocau~t.~~~ The key question then, as Laclau puts

i29 See, for example, CarnpbeU (1993) or Burbach (1994). 130 1996: 27 1 3 ' Habermas (1993: 98-109).

&id, p. 12-13.

it, is that ' k e must agree on what, in Modemity, is k i n g put to the test." Rather than

"jettison(ing) al1 that is best in the Enlightenment project," postmodemists ought to be

obligated to be clear about what specific aspects of modemity are being critiqued by

postmodemism, and on what groutfds. 133

Ifit is accepted that modeniity contains within it 'noble' objectives and

characteristics which ought to be considered safe from the postmodern critique, it is

important to identiSr the point of distinction between those objectives and characteristics

and others which are fair game for the postmodeniist. In other words, what emerges out

of the rnodemist project that can be deemed oppressive (despite the cnticisms of the

postmodern approach sketched eartier in tbis chapter)?

In a thoughtfid 1996 article by EUen Meiskins Wood entitled 'Modernity,

Postmodemity, or Capitalism?", the relationship between these three elements is critically

assessed. Citing Jarneson and Harvey as proponents of a view that recent economic

transformations toward 'late capitalism' or 'post-Fordism' evince an "epochai s W that

represerrts the departure fiom modernity into a condition of postmodemity, she questions

these theorists' assurnption that "modemity and postmodeniay represent two different

phases of capitalism." Arguing instead tbat the "so-called project of modernity may have

little to do with capitalism," she directly challenges the automatic association of the two

which many theorists seem to make. A good example is found in a work by Catherine

Scott, in w k h a passage surnmarizing the work of W.W. Rostow contains the argument

that,

During the t h e before take-off (ie. the stage in a society's wolution that, in Rostow's model, preceded its en- into modernity), 'limiteci bursts" of entrepreneurid activity and ''encilaves of modem&?' emerge, spurred on by "enterprizing men" who are w i h g to "take risks in pursuit of profit or rnodetni~ation."~~~

n3 Meiskins Wood (1996: 28) 134 Scott (1995: 31).

Such an association - whether it is actually being made by Scott or Rostow - reflects, for

Meiskins Wood, a misunderstanding of the relationship between rnodemity and capitalism.

Through a cornparison of socio-economic and politico-economic conditions in

Enlightenment-era France and Engiand, she argues that France, the acknowledged center

of the Enlightenment, was chamcterized by a decidedly non-capitalist mode of production.

Enpiand, on the other han& the acknowledged cerner of fiee-market capitalism, fkatwed

no disceniïble philosophical cornmitment to Enlightenment values; "the 'invisible hand' of

classical political economy and the philosophy of British empiricism7' predorninated. 135

Her point is simply h t there is no reason to associate modeniity with capitalism. If her

point is taken, then, it behooves the postmodernist to separate the two when fomulating a

critique of 'modem' policy in the South.

Still, though, there is iikely fodder within the wider concept of modeniity for the

postmodem critique. Having adailateci its separateness fiom capitalism, Meiskins Wood

makes an important observation:

... if you want to look for the roots of a destructive " m o d e r n i ~ - the ideology, say, of technocentrism and ecological degradation - you might start by looking (at Eniighteament-era E n a d ) , not in the Enlightenment but in the project of 'hprovement," the subordination of di human values to productivity and profit. 136

What emerges, then, is a sort of bastardized modernity, one '%ijacked" by other forces, as

was aliuded to in the introduction. Granted, the use of mysterious temiinology like "other

forces" is vague, but it is not intended to refer to some dark wnspiracy. Instead, as much

of this discussion has been devoted to arguing, any "suborclination" that takes place is

more convincingly said to result fiom a dismticulated and disparate cornplex of pressures,

aluiough it may be said to possess a certalli 'character'. It is, then, neither conspiracy nor

accident.

Looking at the developing world and the history of Northern-controlled activity

there, the postmodernist sees greed, injustice, and all mamer of manipulations and

machinations of wntrol. The processes of capitalism, and al1 aspects of m o d e m - the

ccdestnictive7' side duded to by M e i s b Wood and the nobler side of emancipation and

howledge - are cast in together under an excessively broad 'Modeniity'. The aim of the

argument up to this point has been to cast doubt on the bases of this conceptualization of

modemity - in short, to muddy the conceptual waters which postmodemisrn has

unconvincingly attempted to make clea.. This is not to argue that the postmodem exercise

has been a pointless one; those aspects of it cited as strengths in chapter four stiîl stand as

such.

But sornething is still missing. Northem incursion into the South rnay not represent

conspiracy, but it is driven. Cleariy, then, it is in the best interest of development studies as

a field - to say nothing of 'development' as an hitution - that the drive behind Northem

activity be identined correctly. In response to the misidentifications and weaknesses of

postrnodemism's opposition to a blanket modemity, the remainder of this discussion wiU

be devoted to re-situating the modern-postmodem conflin into an altemate context of a

codict between interest and ethics.

Chapter 6: The Interest-Ethics Dichotomy

The approach adopted for this chapter is based on the premise that

postmodernism, as it stands, is ili equipped to serve as the theoretical basis for a new,

improved development uieory. The roots of this inadequacy lie in the dynarnics of the

'Modernity Frankenstein' described at length in the introduction. To recap briefly, the

Modernity Frankenstein reflects a two-fold, foundational weakness of postmodemism:

first, modernity is assigneci d rnanner of negative and destnxtive traits that it does not

desene; and, second, modemity's positive and constmctive traits are obscured altogether.

A possible solution to this dilemma is to remove postmodemism from its position

of across-theboard opposition to modemity and relocate it within the context of an

interest-ethics dichotomy, which wiii be outlined in detail below. From this new position,

it will be argued, postmodeniism stands a much better chance of serwig as the basis of a

new, improved development theory; its strengths will be accentuated, and its weaknesses

palliateci. Admittedly, this approach brings us no closer to a theory in the conventional

sense of the term: no concrete system or constituent parts are identifid, and no predictive

ability is gaineci. It is merely intended to dlow postmodemism to direct itself'at the 'right'

targets, and to leave the 'wrong' ones alone.

In a 1977 article entitled "The Prediuunent of Liberal Democracy", Alan Wolfe

delves into what he refers to as the crisis of contemporary iiberal democracy. The main

points of his argument, though not entirely original, serve to illustrate an important aspect

of politics that ofken goes unnoticed. Spdcal ly , he posits that it ought to surprise no one

that wnternporary Liberal dernomcies are currently nven by conflict and contradiction.

The reason, he argues, is that the original theory of Liberal Democracy contains within it

the seeds of these same ills. In other words Wolfe suggests it is not the contemporary

appiication of Liberal Democracy that is flawed, it is the theory of Liberal Democracy

itself. The main difficulty is that the two conceptual piilars of Liberal Democnicy -

egslitarïanism and self-interest - are uiherently at odds. Given its cornmitment to the

preservation of these two tenets, Wolfe argues3 liberal democracies c m o t but be riven by

wnflict and contradiction.

The view of the supposedly 'modem' industrialized, liberal democracies which

Wolfe provides stands in stark wntrast to the push for consensus said to be a key aspect

of modemity. Though the notion of a politics dominated by competing, self-interesteci

actors is not new - it is represented in poLitical writings h m Hobbes' 'warre of every man

against every man3 to contemporary bureaucratie-politics models - the notion of the

cd ic t between the pursuit of interest and a constraining, egalitarian ethic as the central

defining feature of any politics rnight weîi be.13' Again, fiom the point of view of social

science theory, it is suspect. On the other hand, there is precedent for theoretical work

which advanced particular systemic elements, and disrnissed others as imelevant. One

notable example, fiom the international relations fiterature, is the structural realism of

Kenneth Waltz. Waltz, building on the classid realism of Morgenthau and others, argued

that international relations could largely be explaineci by a structural theory built on two

key elements: the division of the global system into competing nation-states, and the

interplay between the security dilemma and the 'national interest'. Dismissing the inner

workings of nation-states as irrelevant to the structural explanation, Waltz built a career

on a limted set of ideas which, though widely criticized for leaving out dl sorts of relevant

components remains remarkably rdient to this day. 138

13' In Macpherson (1985: 185). 13* For a tidy (and slightly seIf-congratdatory) explanation of structural realism, see Wdtz (1986: 27-46).

Cleariy, Waltz' work stands much more solidly as a 'Theory' than does the

interest-ethics dichotomy, again, no such grandiose status is bemg claimed for the ideas

below. But if such provocative debate can be engendered by a body of work iike Waltz',

which so eeely admits the importance of 'process' to real-world politics in one breath

wMe blithely asserting its imeIev8nce to a structurai theory in the next, perhaps the

interest-ethics dichotomy bas potential. It is difiailt to see how it wuld ever be as tidy as

Waltz' theory - which is remarkably simple (note: not simpiistic) - but we are again

remindeci of White's argument that ambiguity ought not to be feared in theory if it is

staring one in the face in practice. Its development into formal theory would require an

approach aimost opposite to Waltz'; structure muid be downplayed in favour of process.

Rather than being delineated by the static structural aspects of the system's cornponent

parts, then, an interest-ethics theory would be more dynamic, ie., it would have to be

concemed with the ebb md flow of the interest-ethics codict which never really stands

still. Also, unWce structural realism, ir would have to encornpass both the submtional and

supranational lwels of analysis. There is clearly much to be worked out, but the immediate

task would seem to be to define the basic terms of the dichotomy, and to demonstrate

their importance to the larger task at hand.

'Interest' is intended to refer here to a motive for behavior, a force which &ives

political, economic and social events. Its main characteristic is that it is seKserving, i. e. it

is not intended to serve the general weffme; by its very nature, interest is exclusive, not to

be s h e d when realized. Ifrealized, interest results in some sort of pwniary, social or

political privilege for a particular in-group within a larger collectivity. For interest to be

served, two conditions must be met: the sub-group in question must have the capacity to

organize the actual task of securing its pnvilege, and it mua then be able to defend its

interest. The key issue, then, is control: privilege, rarely of use if it is a one-the flair,

refers by definition to a protnicted social relationship. In Weberian terms, interest as the

'~urpose of the organization" supersedes, or at least cornes before, any universal ethic or

sense of the general good. 139 It is hardiy an origVial theoreticai concept, but interest has

been given rather short shrift in development theory literature, except perhaps in its more

leftist variants. Even these, though, tend to overstate the matter, presenting interest as an

organized political force by whicb, for example, the North exploits the South, which

borders uncodort8bly at thes on conspiracy theory. H m , interest is intended to refer to

something fàr more decentralized and disparate; societies encompass countîess

seKinteresteci orgarhtioos, and their attempts to influence the policies of other

organitations (mcluding states) consthte a very naturai and predictable attempt at interest

realization. Stated Wkrently, there is nothing conspiratorial about the motive

self-interestecl entities have to shape events and poticies in their favour.

In wncrete terms, interest is intended to refer, for the most part, to corporate

enterprise, but also to Northern organizations (Le. 'modemia', rational bureaucraties) like

states or their various subdepartments. 141 The best example of non-MNC sub-state

organkational interest pursuit in the South might be the long history of U.S. military ties

to Latin Amencan courtterparts - through hemispheric arrangements with Latin militaries,

U.S. officiais were able to shape hemispheric security policy on U.S. terms on issues

ranging f?om the core strategic and tacticai values (i.e. anti-cornmdsm and

139 Whiie the concept of seKinterest is not new to the social sciences, having had a long tradition in the rational choice fiterature of public policy, in organkation theory, and in the realist school of international relations, the conception advsnced here is more general. The 'seif' has been dropped primarily to distance this treatment of interest from that previous theoretical work. 140 Conspiracy is a valueladen term which, again, irnplies a confiict between ethics and interest: if it is acknowledged that interests are naturai, they can oniy becorne "cunspiratorial" when their pursuit contravenes an ethicai code of some son. I4l individuals as seff-interestecl entities could perhaps be inciuded in this group, particularly insofar as they exert pressure as shareholders.

counterinsurgency) to the most mundane logistics (Le. exclusive purchase of US-made

weapons and supplies). Simiiar anangernents existed between the Soviet Union and its

clients.

There are several good reasons for postmodenùsm and development theory to take

account of interest. One is provided by two authors who, arguing completely diEerent

points, make very sunilar mistakes. The first is Michael Edwards, who c d s for a change in

the objectives of development theory fiom "practice based on the philosophy of

knowledge, to practice based on the philosophy of wisdom, to a fonn of enqujr in which

what we do and w b t we are matter more than what we k110w."~~~ The desirability of

such a change, he suggests, is besed on "two fundamental assertions, one concerning

erhics, the other conceming t n e t h o d ~ . " ~ ~ ~ The second is Schuuman, who makes the

seemingly innocuous comment that the 'Enlightenment gave birth to modemity, a beiief in

the rational politico-economic projects leading to universal h m emancipation.

Socialism and capitalism became the f o r e m pro~ects of r n ~ d e n i i t ~ . " ~ ~ ~ Schuman's use

of the term "projects" and Edwards' of "methods" are troubling. Taking "projects" first,

we can assume that a project requires three things: a coherent group of project architects

and managers; a firm and identifiable ethos of wmmitment to the project, and some

evidence that the projects - if they are the Enlightenment projects - steadfiistly adhere to

the normative foundation of modemity. It is doubffil whether either of the 'foremost

projects" cited here meet any of these requirements. The project managers of capitalism,

for example, are difncult to identie and are certainiy not coherent - instead, capitalism is

dominated by a dizzying array of corporate mtities characterizai mainly by cornpetition.

Funher, as Meiskins Wood cunvincingiy argued, capitalism has had Little to do with the

philosophical foundations of the Enlightenment. Lastly, to take Wolfe's point, capitalism is

142 1993: 79. 143 Ibid, emphasis in original. 144 Ibid, p. 1 87, emphasis mine.

decidedly at odds with the spint of implied in Eniightenrnent thinking,

largely because of its built-in incentives for corporate actors to seek non-level playing

fields. Similar arguments could be made for socialism, with the pro* that the basis of

the cornpetition was iikely more political-bureaunatic than economic.

Edwards' error lies in bis reliance on the term "methodsn as a da mental

assertion" for the reorientation of development. There is no reason not to excoriate

'Northm' rnethods - one need only look at any one of the problems that have plagued the

South since the arrivai of Columbus; clearly, something is wrong - but there is a

womsome implication here that all that is required is some sort of reconsideration in order

that development practice be 'corrected'. This sort of thinking is flawed for the same

reason that State of Nature or S o d Contract theories are: it implies that a Rawlsian 'veil

of ignorance' descended at some point, that time sornehow stopped wMe we pondered

the best way in which to bring about 'just' development, and that everyone bewne

neutrai, forgetting th& identities, capabilities, associations and interests. From this benign

but 'blind' cornmittee, our current development 'methods' thus emerged.

As has been argued repeatedly throughout preceding chapters, our methods are

better viewed as naturai outflows of the stmctureprocess-agent -context 'corn plex '

discussed earlier. Furthemore, given the inertia, mass and character of this cornplex, the

methods that fiow out of it are not things that can easily be changed. To imply that they

can is to presume a coherent 'we' that is accessible and willing to alter Ïts course through

the persuasive force of a rnoraliy superior argument - Robert Reich's 199 1 book, The

WarR of Na-tio~, wntains a chapter entitled 'Who is Us?' that provides an interesting

critique of this presurnption. 145 The main point, then, is that interest is inseparabfe not

ody from development practice, but tiom Northem behavior in generd.

145 Reich questions the viebility of the 'national interest' as a cuhesive force, i.e. as reflective of a common interest within large nation-states, where pst-Fordist economics are aiigning interests dong decidediy non-national lines. Che good example is Detroit auto

The identification of hidden interest - Le. interest 'hidden' behind an iconic,

discursive veil of 'progress'or 'modernization' - is certainly a mainstay of the

postmodernist position. But development theories characterized as postmodem tend to

stress the proactive side of postrnodernism rather than its (critical) reactive one - the two

'hats' of postmodemism, one representinp it as a critical posture, the other as a separate

body of theory, wiil be recalled here. Postmodern developrnent theory, stresshg diversity

and local@ as bases of development policy, tends to wncentrate on micro-level activity.

This is a point of contention for Booth, who acknowledges the value of micro-level

research and project implementation, but asks how we might %concile insights about

indigenous alternatives and room-for-manoeuvre in local settings with the kinds of

understandings of larger structures without which they will lack r e a l i ~ m . " ~ ~ His centrai

point is that development theory needs also to address the rnacro Ievel in order to give

"proper attention to structural constraint."lq7 It is argued here that the son of "'stmctural

constraint" he refers to is represented by the development cornplex. Again, this refers to

emtrenched structures, etc., that have been built on the pursuit of interest, Le. not having

emerged out of a vacuum or by accident.

Generaily, then, t a h g greater account of interest would allow postmodeniism to

move beyond its Limiteci role as a critical exercise; as Parker comments, ''suggestive

metaphors and linguistic play are simply not enough."14* Forcing the discussion omo

concrete issues instead of a vaguely conspiratonal modemism would be a welcome step:

we can examine the forces that cdiw a particular action rather than the discursive cloak it

drapes itself in. In focushg on the 'window dressing' aspects of modernism, i.e. on the

linguistic- or discourse-oriented processes which are obfuscative in nature, posmiodernism

manufacturers' effective abandonment of local employees in favour of production plants in Mexico. 146 1993: 60. 14' Ibid, p.6 1. 148 1995: 562.

has devoted insufficient attention to whar is obfuscated, and why. Modemism cannot be

'responsible' for, say, environmental degradation in the MaScan maquiladoras, the

destruction of the rainforest, or the growing gap between rich and p r . To argue that it

cm is to attnbute to modeniism a consciousness that it cmot have, to essign will to an

im. An im might be cited as a justification for an act, or be associated with the means by

which an act became possible, but it cannot be an act &self Nor can it be serveci or not

served, or have objectives or aims. In other words, modemism cannot win or lose because

it cannot be an agent: it can only be a context for agents. But since North-South relations

have so consistently produced winners and losers, the most relevant question to ask mi@

be one which explores the issues of winning, i.e. who wins, and what it was that was won.

But More we can determine which 'player' won, we ne& to know what made hirnher

step ont0 the field: at its most fundamental ievel, to do this is to delve in to the entire

question - or institution - of want.

'Ethics' is intended here to refer, first and foremost, to an opposite of interest:

where interest is individudistic and seif-se&% an ethics is universalistic and coacerned

with service of the general good. It is a code which acts - tangibly or otherwise - as a

constraint on interest by reflecting a more general group conception of what is fàir and

what is not. Behavior which benefits the few at the expense of the many is decried, while

behavior which provides more even benefit is valued. 'Ethics' represents an over-arching

ethos of epeiitarianism or 'fairness' which values structural integrity and social cohesion

over individual interest. Admittedly, the term is as general and unscientific as interest, but

just as essential to the postmodern critique of modeniism: there is LittIe other raison for

postmodem analyses to attack the Creation of the ûther, the silencing of the indigenous

voice, or the general obfuscative workings of interest than that these practices are unbst.

The uneasy reiationship between postmodemism and ethics has been hinted at

throughout this discussion. Where the advantage of interest as an dyt ica l concept is that

it enables postmodeniism to be more clear about what t stands opposed to, ethics aliows

it to be clear about why. II is a question that is rarely asked: if postmodeniists deny the

worth of ali things universaliong - which premmably (ifnot most especially) includes

universalizing codes of ethics - then what is the basis for their opposition to oppression

and control? Quite simply, why do they m e ? The implication is that postmodemism,

whether postmodeniists k e it or net, is already underlined by an ethical base. Events Like

the Holocaua or processes like the global demise of indigenous cultures - which

postmodemists cite as evidence of modeniity's 'barbarous face' - have no meaning if an

ethic is not already king atnrmed. There is7 surely, more at stake here than narratives: to

argue this point is to suggest that the tragedy of the things cited above is the denial of

Jewish or Apache namitives - an absurd notion. Postmodemists, k e the reg of us, one

would hop, stand opposed to these things on conscientious, humanitananethical grounds

which precede any consideration of narrative or deconstruction.

The major difficuity with this line of reasoning lies in the postmodemist antipathy

toward the totalizing narrative, a headhg under which any conception of a (presumably

universal) ethics must be said to fdl. Quite cleariy, any postmodemist of a more nihilistic

bent wouid have no part of this, but others have been willing to explore the possibiiity of a

relation between postmodemism and ethics. Pauline Rosenau dserentiates between a

nihilistic and negative "skeptical" postrnodeniism and an "afh~ative" postmodeniism

which does not "shy away f?om atlinning an ethic (and) rnaking normative c h o i ~ e s . " ~ ~ ~ In

another example, Docherty argues that the postmodem emphasis on diversity and

dissensus represents "'the basis of an ethical demand for the postmodem" through its

objective of ' real' democracy . lH) And Amin, echoing Schuurman's view of development

in the South as an "'aborted modernity project," argues for a "popular intemationalism that

can engender a genuinely universalist value systern, complethg the unfinished project of

the Enlightenment ... ."lS1

There are dso exampies of theorists who emphasize a natural connedon between

ethics and development. Edwards suggeas that ethics "are ever-present in debates about

developrnent, because development is about things which ough to take Citing

lmmanuel Kant's suggestion that 'ought implies cm', he argues that

. . . the deveiopment debate is as much about practice (or how to bring about what 'ought to be7) as about pnnciple (or what 'ought to be' in the ahtract). Relevant research must help us to develop both good practice and good principle. However, this does not free us fiom defining what 'ought to be' in the first place: in other words, fiom dennùig what we mean by 'developrnent'.

Combining the three elements' then - i.e. postmodeniism, development and ethics - forces

the discussion ont0 specifics. Schuurman stresses the compatibility of heterogeneity with

"certain ernancipatory goals" Wre citizenship and participation, under the mbnc of radical

democracy. 153 For Corbridge, a 'Yocus on development ethics" serves to 'tender

problematic the proposition that there are no alternatives to a given fom of social and

ecunomic organization (and development)." In a point reminiscent of Schuurman7s

assertion that one of the major assets of postmodemism is its potentiai, through skepticism

and deconsmiction, to facikate the demise of political cultures '0uilt on appeals to

spurious necessity," Corbridge asks whether it is "reasonable7 by virtue of stnictural

adjument, to condernn large numbers of people ro a life devoid of some basic human

needs?"lS4 And Habermas provides possibly the best reason for postmodemists to factor

ethics ùito their considerations Listing his 'Wee 'theses' of neoconservatism," he puts at

nimber two its need to keep politics "as far aloof as possible from the demands of

moral-practical justification." l 55

Where an advantage of factoring interest into postmodemism enables it to launch a

more fmused critique on iconic language, the addition of ethics allows it to advance an

alternative; as Slater puts it, to ask "wb.at has been happening to poverty, to

unemployment, and to e q u a l i ~ l M But this highlights the need for a clarification with

regard to the concept of ethics in this contefi, derïving fiom the tendency of the

supposedly oppressive development forces to make eaensive use of these same words. It

is an important distinction - ifit is possible to imagine a group of conservative

neo-modemizers s i h g across a table fiom a group of radical postrnodeniists, and the

latter asks the former why it was doing nothiog about poverty, unemployment or equality,

the result is iikely to be an exasperated assertion that this is precisely what they were

attempting to do with policies f i e stmctural adjustment.

Though it is likely impossible ever to determine which side of the development

coin - the postmodem or the 'modem' - is t d y cornmittecl to such ethics, we can safely

point to a discrepancy between the two. It has been argued throughout this paper that the

postmodem 'stance' is essentiaily an ethical one, but this is not to suggest that there is no

relationship between modemity and ethics, even beyond the ethic impticit in a body of

154 Ibid, 130; 133. 155 (1993: 108) If there was wer a theoria who would welcome a re-tooled postmodemism, it is Habermas. Cited by White as its "arch enemy," Habermas proceeds in this same article to e w e postmodernists with neocunservatives. IS6 1993: 105.

theory aiming at providing universal emancipation. There iq for example, an obvious

ethical appeal in the icons of modemity discussed earlier: progress, democracy and

freedom on the modeniization side, or the new sociaiist order and end to imperialist

oppression on the neo-Man9st side represent good examples. It is of course a major part

of the postmodem 'position' that the practicai applications of these theories have

historically Wered greatiy fkom their lofly rhetonc, but there is no denying their

ostensible 'ethical' character. If we are to adopt a criticai posture, what necessarily

emerges is a dual conception of the ethical: ajwstr9~arot-y ethic which accompanies the

pursuit of rnodemist interest, and a rewlatory one advancecl in the postmodern critique.

The former cm be considered justifiatory because it serves to put a humane face on

processes that are decidediy at odds with typical conceptions of the '£kir': this rnay be

sornething of a moral relativism, but it is diflEidt to see how any modernist enfity wuld

openly suggest to the people t encountered upon its arriva1 in the South that they were

there to subjugate their populations, innuence their politid decisions, plunder th&

resources, and take ali steps necessary to maintain a healthy investment climate. The latter

can be considered revelatory in its intention to expose the interests and motivations behind

the rhetonc. In short, it is important to distinguish between the initial interest that drives

the North-South 'modernizing' relatioaship, the justificatory ethic which helps to "seli" it - Le. to promise mutual benefit from processes which are essentially self-serving - and the

revelatory ethic that illuminates the two. It is the bridge between the assertion that the

North acts out of beneficence, and the suspicion that it acts out of self-interest.

To summaize, the interest-ethics dichotomy presented here is inteodeci to re-focus

postmodemism. It has been argued that, since its diametric opposition to modemity has

cornmitteci it to perpetuate the errors of the Modernity Frankendein, both postrnodemism

and postmodem development theory wouid be b ~ e r served ifthey sat thernselves

squarely within a view of politics and development as a conflict between interest and

ethics. The deveioprnent as which we see in the South today thus re-emerge as creatures

of unconstrained interest rather than a misguided or conspiratord rnodemity, we are thus

able to get past the idea that modernity is to blame for alien incursions into the South.

Drawing from Todorov's exploration of Las C m ' writings, we find that many of the

sarne a s that bave plagued the South throughout recent decades - hegemon-spoasored

violence, exploitation, colonization, etc. - were blatantiy evident at the t h e of Columbus7

who was the zeaious representative of a decidedly pve-rn&m kingdom. As Todorov

writes, 'there is nothing of the modern empiricist" visible in the methods of Columbus. A

pious man who sou@ gold in the New World in order to finance a crusade a e s t

Jenisalem, Columbus was dnven by simple financial interest on the one hand7 and what

niight be identified as the justificatory ethic of a crusading Christianity on the other. 15'

15' Todorov (1 982: 1 7)

It was arped in the preceding chapter that a posmiodernism which took a view of

politics as a contlia between interest and ethics would be more fmsed than

postmodernism is in its curent position of staunch counter-modemity. It was also argued

that such a resrientation would allow postmodernism to avoid the enors of the modexnity

Frankenstein, and would provide it with a more tangible target at which to direct its

greatest strengths - its skeptid, deconstructive bent, and its ability to articulate the

difference between the justificatory and the revelatory ethic.

But what about postmodem déveIoprneni theory? That is, how is a postmodeniisrn

situated within the interest-ethics dichotomy better able to negotiate the development

theory Impasse?

A postmodern development theory which focuses on interest-ethics is an

improvement over one which focuses on modernity for several reasons. First, in its

awareness and achowledgment of the disparate nature of the interest-dnven Northem

cornplex, it c m move development theory past posmiodernisrn's apparent impression that

a concentration on micro processes - the development theory rnani5estation of

postmodeniism's emphasis on locaiity and diversity - is enough to produce change. As

Booth suggests in regard to the research aspects of this same question, it is 'legitirnate to

ask how we are to ensure that the findhgs of local-action studiw reflect ... the constraints

upon action that may only emerge at the regional or national l e v e ~ . " ~ ~ ~ The point, one

might infkr, is that a development theory based on local development 'choices' is well and

good insofar as it represmts the nght to opt out of the 'modernkt project', but no matter

how fonhnghtly development theorists laud such an approach, there is still the thomy

question of what to do when it conflicts with some powerful interest. There are many

potemial points of such conflict, depending on where the local approach diverges fiom the

interests of any of a number of extemal forces; the point of diierence might be politid,

social or economic. Politicaily, for example, a localif/ which sought to unilaterally re-order

its system of representation (or its lack of it!) might wnfiict with an existing one which,

like the Northem compleq did not pop into king by some accident; again, existing

structures derive fkom existing interests. A conflict might also result fiom a local initiative

which diverge- fiom an existing social institution iike ananged mmiages, racial

segregation, chiid labour, or even something as specinc as fende genital mutilation. The

potentiai for ewnomic codict is wen easier to envision through a local refusa1 to allow,

Say, the plmting of a certain crop, the construction of a certain fàctory, or the mining of a

certain mineral. Clearly, there is plenty of room for local initiatives to clash with existing

institutions, property and power relations.

There is also a conceptual problern in the relation between geographically defineci

locality and the postmodem emphasis on c h g e , which postmodemism has been remiss in

addressing. Surely, there is nothing in the postmodeni position which requires that a

locaiity be defined in geographic temu - a village, or a region - in order for its 'narrative'

to be assigned value and thus deemed defendable. It also needs to accwnt for narratives

or commitments to Lifesty1es that diverge fiom the perceived 'mainstream' of the larger

coilectivity: reiigious preference, sanial orientation, politid sentiments, or, for that

matter, the desire to smoke or eat meat represent 'sub-narratives' that cannot be defined

tenitorially and which therefore demand some sort of atemtorial political definition.

The temtonal question a h begs that the relationships between

temtoriallydefined potiticat structures be addressed. It will be recalied that dependency

uieory defines core-periphery relationships not only in North-South terms, but also within

Southem countries. A postmodemism that foarses on countering modemity or on

diversity leaves open the question of exactly where the change is to take piace and wtiere

administrative bodies at the local, regional, national or supranational levels f3 into the

equation. The reaiities of 'aterritorial' issues and existing geopolitical structure neeâ,

therefore, to be addressed in some fàshion by postmodeniism.

An interest-ethics focus aiiows development theory to achieve this to a greater

degree than 'traditional' postmodemism does, in that it highlights the limitations of an

'opting out' approach. We rnight easily envision a locality that chooses not to 'toe the line

where official political messages or eçonornic policies are concemecl, or chooses not to

study science or to reif'y technology, but such choices cm only be made where they do not

wnflict with the interests or predispositions of larger entities. A Cuban village which

opted to remove Fidel Castro's portraits fiom public spaces and establish a private bank

would likely experience just as swifi a reprisal as a 1970s Nicaraguan one which swght to

remove Somoza's portraits and close a private bank. The point is that, in light of the

ability of interest to act as a shaping force of existing power relations, the ability of

postmodem development initiatives to affect the overall design of development is

extremely limited. Development history is full examples in which 'dissident' approaches

intended to disengage peoples fiom the dominant paradigm were violently werced back

into line - again, we can look to the Guatemalan, Cuban, Chilean and Nicaraguan

examples. We rnight also consider the comectjve action directeci at would-be innovators in

Hungary in 1 956, in Czechoslovakia in 1 968, in the Solidarity movement in Poland in the

early 1980s, or in Tiananmen Square in 1989.

On the other band, to recall the point made by Docherty, the last two hundred

years have not been an inexorable progression toward evil. Politics in general may be

driven by interest, but the sense of ethics that has been employai here is certainly visible as

well; even the most repressive examples of despotism have occasionaiiy l m e d the bard

way that it is possible to lean too fàr toward the 'interest' end of the scale, Le., away corn

the 'ethics' end fiom which popular conceptions of the ' f i 3 and the 'unfair' take their

shape. lS9

Ifit is accepte& then, that imerest represents an unavoidable obstacle, one which

cannot be ignored, development theory needs to account for the (probable) fact that it

cannot be removed. On the other hand, even from a strict dwelopment point of view,

there is no reason to sunender to it and aUow it excessive reign - a shortcoming, it mi@

be argued, of neo-modeniizing theory. The constraining force thaî ethics potentiaily

represents ought also to be factor& in.

A dwelopment theory which sought to take the best of both might, therefore.

stand on h e r theoretical ground. Such a theory would combine modemity's emphasis on

emancipation, its scientSc achievements and the productive tiuits of interest with

posmiodernism's releotiess suspicion and willingness to d e c o m a in order to reveal

interests that might prefer to remain hidden, dong with an aflSmiation of the worth d

alternative voices (i-e. the postrnodem 'ethic'). The ideal result would be a development

theory based on a never-ending postrnodem critique design4 to constrain interest, and

which sou@ to work with and within existing 'modeniist' institutions to d e h e political&

the rights to fieedom and choice implicit in the term 'cultural autonomy'.

Theorists £Yom numerous fields, confionted with diametncally paireci, oppositional

approaches, have advocated 'synthesis' approaches. In socd science theory, Radder has

put forward a "refèrential r d s m " through which ''it is possible to reject ontological

relativism without endorsing a realist theoiy of conceptuai representations in science."lm

In economicq Onis has attacked the neoiiberal obsession with cornpetition by pointing to

159 Notable examples pehps include the Shah of Iran, Ferdinand Marcos, Anastasio Somoza and Fulgencio Batista. I6O Cited in Gandy (1 996: 35).

econornies which achieved 'successfuly development through "a mix of cooperation and

cornpetition and the creation of appropriate institutions designeci to sustain a desirable

mix."161 In cultural theory, Said has rejected both the imnisive 'colonking' discourse and

the nationalist post-coloniai one, arguing that the realities of Me in formerly colonized

areas make the choice between either extreme option impractical. lti2 And, in development

theory, Grafhas refmed to a "productive (and necessary) synthesisy' of postmodemist and

modernist approaches similar to the one put forth above. Another endorsement is given by

Gandy who, citing the critical realism of Andrew Coilier, presents perhaps the strongest

endorsement of the interest-ethics dichotomy by arguing that:

the task of critical realist philosophy is to uncover an ethicd ontology whereby our knowledge is predicated not so much on the dixovery of new values as on the uncovering of ~0rtshistoricaI moral trufhr such as social justice and the preservation of biological diversity. The support for political dissent as a harbinger of a new society is thus founded on the possibility for exposing musai inter-rehi'onships between social +es and underlyrng generarive prCiCessesy rather than a relativist endorsement of difference in the absence of any theory of ~ausality!~~

Before proceeding, a brief chification is in order. In iight of the number of

opposing conceptual pairings that have appeared in the pages above - interest-ethics,

postmodemism-rnodemity, neo-modemking-neo-Marxist, and by extension

capitalism-socialisrn - it might be helpfil to specify wbich thesis and which mithesis we

are dealing with: it is interest-ethics. Moreover, no attempt is made here to superimpose

the interest-ethics dichotomy over any of these other pairings, i.e., to suggest for example

that a synthesis between capitalism and socialism represents a synthesis of capitalism as

interest and socialism as ethics: the pairings are not asserted here as being parallel.

uistead, it is suggested that interest and ethics be extracted fiom these othet pairings and

qmthesized into a new development theory, though aspects of the other pairings will no

doubt be visible. It iq as Slater suggests, an attempt to "think of ways in which

development c m be recast in a quite new kind of project."164

The 'Vecast" theory wodd feature four cornponents. The first is an

acknowledgment of the 'productive' capabilities of interest, emphasizllig iîs capabilities,

not its direction. Its ability to drive endeavours which have often (though cextaidy not

always) led to innovations of indisputaHe benefit to hummkind bas been mentioned

earlier, obvious advances Ui medical research, communications and transportation corne to

mind. But beyond this, a more pertinent fature of interest-driven activity ex& The

material scarcity evident throughout the South can safèly be said to have a direct,

deaimental impact on the qualis, of life there - some notable examples might be the need

for more readily accessible water treatment bcilities, comunications or f d distriiution

kfkstructure. This is not to suggest that any interest-driven activity cannot be tumed to

maiign purposes or cannot r d t in the rnass production of items fiivolous or fetishist

beyond description, but rather that there is thepotentiuï for interest to complement human

Me in a constructive way. Tied into this of course7 is an assumption that there is some

innate desire in humam to improve their material conditions, a notion that becornes all the

more salient through even the biefest glance at the gap between Nonh and South where

available goods are concemeci.

The problem, of course, is that interest has a tendency to create conditions in

which the desires of some are reaîized at the expense of the rights of othen. 165 The

second wmponent of a synthesized development theory, then, is one which seeks to

164 (1993: 108) 16' One notorious development-related example is that of the extractive activity of Shel OiI in Nigeria: the self-interested behaviour on that corporation has had a politicai, economic and enviromenttil impact on Ogoni tribespeople that cm ody be oonsidered detrimental.

counterbalance the acknowledgment of interest's productive side with an ethical

foundation designed to keep it in check.

It might be pointed out that such a foundation is, ostensibly, already engmined in

classical liberalism. But Corbridge, citing Crocker, suggests that the current version is

poorly suited as the basis of 'desirable' society:

There is an urgent need for 'mord reflection on a society's basic goals because such things as economic growth and modernisation may be moraliy problmtic and in need of replacement, modification, or supplernentation with more adequate concepts of ' W e s s of beeig". ' l 66

ûther theorists have aiso touched on this point. Slater, for example, argues that 'ivithin

the official dixourse of the World Bank, IMF and a broad range of related international

organizations, one rarely if ever encounters a discussion around the need to r e t M the

privute sector . .." Further, he argua, such nediberal touchstones as ' U e market, 6ee

trade and investment, the functioning of capitalist enterprises, the politics of

accumulation" are "predominantly protected tiom any questionhg ~ r i t i ~ u e . " l ~ ~ What is

asserted in these critiques is at best, then, an interest-ethics combination that has gone out

of whack.

Numerous e th ic s -bd suggestions have been put forth as to how to deal with this

dilemma. Edwards has cited empawennent as a desirable bais for new development

theory, defining it as Tncreasing the control which the poor and powerless people . .. are

able to exert over aspects of their own lives which they consider to be important to

them."168 Similarly, Schuurman argues that development theory ought to concm itseîf

with inequality, that is, "inequality of access to power, to resources, to a hurnane

existence - in short, inequality in emancipation. If we were to let go of this, there would be

no justification for the existence of development theory." l 69 He M e r argues that

. .. too great an emphasis placed on diversity and specificity lads to a voluntarist, pluraîist approach to the development problem, allowing no space for e universalistic emancipation discourse ... a new explanandm for development studies should not be restricted to 'diversity' but be expiicitly concerneci with 'hequality' .. .

ûthers have ernphasized social or radical democtacy as a solution. In an article subtitled

'The Transformative Potential of Social Demmcy", Munck went so far as to suggest

that "social dernocracy @ad by the 1980s) becorne hegemonic in Latin Arnerican political

discourse," and that it was ''the inteliectual common sense of the era, the framework in

which debates take place and th& inevitable horizon." As for radical democracy, White

sunmarizes its trament by Hannah Arendt, who cited '%nef moments in various

revolutions from the eighteenth to the twentieth century" in which there was an "attempt

to free the public do- f?om the coercive weight of the previously dominant principles

and institutions. To this White adds "the goal of mtualiy generating and maintainuig

legitimate procedures for keeping politics open" as a desirable tenet for radical

democracy . l

This brings us to the third f-re of a qmthesized development theoiy: the need to

"keep politics open" through the establishment of dissensus, paradoxica11y7 as a central

ordering p~ciple . As has beem discussed earlier, this is a clear depamire fi-om the

previous 'modenlla' metanarratives which stress the need for consensus in social

organization. But dissensus - or, as Sad terms it, disinereest - also has a noteworthy

theoretical foundation in Habermas' treatment of 'communicative action'. l 72 In this

169 1993: 30 %id.

171 1991: 52 172 For Sad's matment, see 7he Unconcims Civi~zzatiort, particularly cbapter three (pp.72- 1 12).

theory, dissensus cm be interpreted as the basis of an "exchange of knowledge" and as a

"mutuaily 'iuterpretive and cognitive process' through which 'knowledge is built upon the

accwlluiated social expience, commitments and culturally-acquired dispositions of the

actors invo~ved'."~~~ It therefore d s t s as more than an ackncmdedpent of an existing

multipiicity of voices; Habermas argues that it represents a crucial process of "social

integration and ~ociali7ation."~~~ It will be recalled fiom chapter three that this idea is,

despite Habermas' alleged N i t u s as the 'arch enemy' of postmodernism, not that f u

removed fiom the postrnodeniist emphasis on the value of cultural mdtiplicity, i.e., from

its advocation that large heterogeneous collectivities pred-e thernselves to value the

existence of the numerous smaller ones within them.

The son of CUItural 'give and take' irnpiied within dissensus bnngs out an

interesting pardel with interest. In its predisposition to 'give', to concede something for

the purpose of greater social cohesion, dissensus is to homogenizing metatheory what the

willingness to forego pecuniary gain is to seKinterest. Restated, insofhr as interest-driven

societies are based on the reification of the profit motive and the resulting obligation to

base action on the 'bottom line', the willingness to resrient interest-driven action to give

greater weight to an egalitarian ethic parallels the willingness of the would-be propagators

of a metatheory to give greater weight to the local matives within its sphere.

Obviously, it is easier to suggest that dissensus be given 'greater weight ' than it is

to outline viable po1iticaVlegal measures by which it might be operationalized. In strictly

theoretical terms, though, it is clear tbat we are r e f d g to the rights of subgroups to

make choices. And, in a nod to the theonsts cited on the second component of this theory,

this refers to the need to base development on empowennent, equaiity, and the rights of

subgroups where the nature of their commitment - or lack of it - to the wider development

173 h g and Villareal (1993: 146), cituig Habermas. 174 Habermas (1987: 39)

process is concerned. In other words, this is directed at the limited ability of sub-groups to

'opt out' of development objectives that are defined at higher levels.

The final cornponent of a synthesked development theory is the need to maintain

the postmodem suspicion of interest, and to enshrine this suspicion as healthy rather than

subversive. This component takes an often under-ernphasized aspect of the postmodem

critique - its resistance to the modemist idea that societies can eventually reach some

condition of homogeneous perfection thrwgh rational inquiry - and pushes it to the fore.

It is something of a paradox where traditional forms of human organization are concerned:

instead of constnicting hierarchies which breed syco phantic behaviour and 'grou pthink ' ,

this component would encourage ever-vigilant dissent and wbat might be termed a

'healthy disrespect' for authonty. There is, to be sure, room for debate around the

potential of this component to co-exist with one which articulates the ethical foundation

recommended in the second component, but it is argued here that the posmiodem

tendency toward skepticism and deconstruction, embedded as a key pan of that ethicai

foundation, would serve to combat the dangers of iconic obfùscation so prevalent

throughout human history. In short, it is intended to embed the revelatory ethic in the daily

processes of development.

aii Summav

Emerging fiom al1 of this, in a between-the-lines sort of way, is the need to arrive

at a redefinition of the term 'development'. It might be argued that this is what

postmodem development theories have essentially done aiready, but, as has been

repeatedly emphasized here, postmodernism's bais in a posture of counter-modernity has

consigned it to a position that is of limited helpfiilness. But, given the ease with wtiich

interest-driven practice has been able to adopt and dign itself with the so-calleci modemity

project, the same could be said for modemity: despite its nobler side (emancipation,

discovery, universal ethics, etc.) it has hardly serveci as a recipe for a 'just' global society.

As White has suggesteâ, by way of asseshg the potentid of 'Weideggerian-postmodem"

thinking to negotiate a new politics based on radical democracy, neither modemity w r

postmodernism is adequate by itselfto bring such a Tust' wciety about because

they have at their disposal only two ways of thinking about action: the condemned teleological modes spawned within the Gestell (Le. the 'constituting' tendency by which reason creates reality), or the countermodes that have no goal, no 'bvhy", or at least none other than that of unmasking metanarratives and rationalization processes ... This point is often glossed over by posünodems. 175

It might be argued that the lack of a coherent and comprehensive definition of

development is at the root of the success of 'modernist' development discuurses, that is

their resilience and success in selling themselves as viable models and in attracting corps of

adherents. A raiefinition which SOU@ to cut through their iconic language, to cultivate

the principles of dissensus, to articulate an ethical foundation based on the right to choose,

but which also acknowledged the productive potential of interest, might palliate this

problem.

To say that injecting this definition into official development theory and practice

would be a difficdt task is to drastically understate the magnitude of that challenge. This is

a point picked up on by Corbridge, who argues the need to "(intenogate) present policy

arrangements to test their fairness or unfàimess, and then ... to s p i @ some combination

of institutions and processes through which l e s u n f i outcornes might be effied," but

acknowledges the dEcuity of defining the "institutional f o m in and through which these

alternative policies might be put into operation (and argued for)."lw It is a crucial

question, but to seek to answer it at this juncture is to look too far ahead: the objective of

this discussion has been to assess and articulate the theoretical aspects of the development

pro blematique.

175 199 1 : 52 (text in brackets added). 176 1993: 135-137.

Munck has argued that 'hone of the 'ways out' of the development theoy impasse

are adequate to conshict a new paradigm, be it pst-imperialism, regdation theory, a

gender focus, or Miche! Foucault." His conclusion, then, is that ''the underlying choice is

dl between modernisation and dependency theory."ln Beyond the fact that these two

schools are already weU articulated and well known, they do contain ideas to cornmend

them, i.e. strains of the synthesized development theory as spelled out above.

Unfortunatel they stiil represent schools of thought prone to essentialism, partisanship

and the pursuit of exclusive interest, despite their grandiose Ianguage. This is especially

tme of neo-modernizing theory, which has been riding an unprecedented wave of

perceived credibility since the ciramatic politicai changes in Europe and the Soviet Union

from 1989 to 199 1. Ultimately, then, in view of Fukuyama-esque proclamations tike the

'end of history', to abandon development to these two paradigms is to abandon it to

progress, democratization and healthy investment c h t e s as they are defined in a

nediberal ethos. The potential brake on this iine of thinking which dependency represents,

and has always represmted, is unlikely to be effective. Though this may change in time,

the degree to which 'socialism is dead' thinking has been accepteci by the vast rnajority of

the Northern cornplex has Likely jaundiced the dependency approach beyond recovery: at

the very Ieast, if neo-Marxists hope to advance their ideals, they would be weU advised to

change theù name.

104

Conclusion

It is ho@ that the central objective of this discussion - to determine whether or

not postmodemism has the potential to solve the development theory Impasse - has been

met. Saddled with the concephial and atîributive mors of the modernity Frankenstein,

placing too much stock in the concepts of locality and diversity, and troubled by semantic

and conceptual weahesses, postmodernism is, in its m e n t forin, ill-equipped to serve as

the basis of a development theory that d l have to suppiant the institutions of

neo-modemizing and neo-Mantist theory.

However, it has also been argueci, as Schuurman puts it, that 4he postmodem

debate has resulted in an understanding which can benefit developrnent shidies, without it

being necessary to adopt the entire baggage of postmodm idea~."l'~ If the strengths of

postmodemism - its relentless suspicion, its talent for deconsmiction, its reveiatory ethic

and other aspects of its critiquing 'hat' - are retained, and postmodemism is repositioned

so that these strengths can be brought to bear on a politics and a 'development' which it

views as a conflict between interest and ethics, there is potential for it to evolve into a

sound and constructive theory.

In order for it to solve the Impasse, though, postmodemism wiu have to do more

than engage neo-modemization and neo-Marxist theory in strictiy logicdethicai or

normative terrns. Postmodemism has held its own in this regard, but this success has

rested on the willingness of other 'debaters' to extract fiom these other theories only their

philosophicd foundations, i. e., the logical or ethical points of argument which modernizers

or Manrists are likely to bring out in the disembodied arena of debate. The problem is that

these theories - udike postmodeniism - c m o t be separateci fiom the political agendas

which drew them together, gave them direction, and allowed them to be manifêsted in

practice. In order for postmodemisrn to supplant either of these development theones, it

wiIi have to defeat not 09 their IogicaVethical aspects, but also the massive practical

aspects to which they are attached. As has been discussed, these aspects are tightly

intertwined with the economics, domestic and global poiiticai imperatives, and

bureaucratie structures (ranghg firom the World Bank to the U.S.' miIitwj and

inteIiigence orgmbmtions and their industrial suppliers) that tend to be both intransigent

and unfathomably huge.

To accomplish this, postmodenùsm will need to get beyond its fixation on the

rationakations of moderniîy. This does not mean that its criticai, revelatory role should be

abandoned; a critique of the type postmodemism offers of the various discourses that

emerge wiU aiways be beneficial. But postmodernism needs to acknowledge its own

ethical cornponent and the 'good' in modemity and interest, that is, the side that espouses

the desire for universal ernancipation and the benefits of production, innovation and

technologicai advancement to wider society. h other words postmodemism and

development theory need to allow interest at least some fiee reign. At the same time,

though, postmodemism should advance itself as a tool by which interest might be

constrained and manageci. In s e ~ n g as such a brake on interest, postmodemism might

provide parameters for development by advancing a universalistic ethic - referred to eariier

as an 'ethical foundation' - based on sub-group autonomy and the right of such groups to

make choices. Clearly, this would be apolitical process. The result, ifd postmodemias

were to somehow become committed to such a 'program', would be a clearly deheated

universalist ethic that would protect these rights and fieedoms. Again, getting the main

controllhg entities of the age - govenunents, IGOs, corporate enterprise, and elites - to

commit to and enforce such a code is another issue altogether. On the other hand, there is

always hope: postrnodemism has undoubtedly had an impact on developrnent theory and

practice through the popularity of participatory schemes and actorsriented approaches,

for example, and gender issues have achieved a higher profiie in the field than they have

ever enjoyed More. Whether or not these changes have r&ed fkom some sort of official

disillusionment with 'traditional' Northem practice is an open question, but they can be

viewed as improvements.

It is also crucial that this discussion be moved es fm as possible fkom the idea that

the implementation of a synthesized development theory, were it ever to corne to pas,

would represent the crossing of some sort of temporal threshold into a brave new era.

Wthin the confines of individual Northem societies, hiaory has been dorninated by a

constant see-saw conflict between interest and ethics t b t has never been resolved, and

likely never WU be. Even recent Ontario history, which has seen a shifk from nght to left

and back again, fiom taik of social contract to the heavy-handed amalgamations and

budget slashes of the Hanis govefnment, would seem to bear this out. 179 There is also the

global context to consideq at present, the interest-ethics conflict is taking place within the

parameters of fàirly rigid principles - the victory of the 'democratic' and the 'fiee' over the

dark forces of socialism, the universal pursuit of '%ee markets, fiee speech and f k e

elections," and the end of history, but there is no reason to assume that this context will

never change.

In the end, a postmodem developrnent theory that manages to negotiate the

Impasse wiil have to do so with two ironies. Fust, its ability to achieve a high enougb

profile in development studies that it cm be said to have supplanted or negotiated the

179 And, by way of an aside, given the unresotved nature of our own interest-ethics dilemma, it is Little wonder that our development policy is characterized by a contirsed mixture of both. 180 These words, taken h m George Bush's inaugural address, are attacked by Sad: "The order given to the three fkedoms is astonishing from the mouth of a man assuming the chief responsibiüty for the exercise of the Amencan constitution . . . The world is nUed today, as it has often been in the past, with nations that embrace fiee markets, close censorslip and fdse or no general eledons. Singapore and China spring to mind. And the more cornplete these markets, the tighter the controls become on the other two fCeedoms"(l995: 44-45).

blockage of the other theones rests on the achievement of some sort of consensus, among

development theorists, that it is superior and preferable to existing models. Second, it will

likely have to do so on the strength of its ethicai foundation, Le., t hat which asserts the

value of sub-culture narrative and the ri@ to make lifèstyle choiws. In light of the

pressing environmental, socio-economic and political problems in the South, the ethical

'card' may be the strongest one postmodeniists can play. Mer ail, the ability o f

rationaking discourse to jus* activities which perpetuate such as rests on the ability of

the architects of t h t activity to distance themselves fiom the effects on real people. AU

postmodemism has to do is bring this idea home.

Though it is unWtely that development theoy can ever jar the Northem compleq

as the perpetuating engine of the worst aspects of 'modemity', into some new, more

humane orientation, it is apparent that development theoriss are obligated to try: there is

an ethical Unpemtive that demands no less. As Shelley's Frankenstein - the Doctor, that is,

not the creatuce - says in his dying breath,

In a fit of enthusiastic rnadness 1 created a rational creature and was bound towards him to assure, as fiu as was in my power, his happiness and well-being. This was my duty, but there was another SM paramount to that. My duties towards the beings of my own species had pater claims to my attention because they included a greater proportion of happiness or misery. 181

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