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OF THE PHILIPPINES

MARINES IN

WORLD Wu IICOMMEMORATIVE SERIES

B\' CAPTAIN JOHN C. CHAPINU.S. MARINE CORPS RESERVE (RET)

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• • . And a Few Marines:Marines in the Liberationof the Philippinesby Captain John C. Chapin, USMCR (Ret)

t was apparently aninsignificant eventwhen a few Marineplanes flew into amuddy airfield at

Tacloban on the island of Leytein the Philippines on 3 December1944. All around them were theelements of the massive U.S. Armyinvasion which had begun on 20October. Seven infantry divisionsand six Army Air Force (AAF) airgroups dominated the islandscene. It was the start of a majorcampaign in which Marine avia-tion would play a major role

The first Marine planes to arrivethat day were 12 Grumman F6FHellcat night fighters of VMF(N)-541, nicknamed the "Bateye"squadron. They had flown the 602miles from their base on Peleliu inthe Palau Islands. A few hours

On the Cover: A Marine combat artistin Manila while the battle there stillraged, Sgt Paul Arlt described this washdrawing: "Sharply outlined against ris-ing clouds of smoke, the gutted steel andconcrete shell of the nine-story GreatEastern Hotel is one of the countlessbuildings destroyed by retreating Japs.Down on the rubble-strewn street, aPhilippine citizen glances apprehensivelyover his shoulder as Marine dive bombersof the 1st Marine Aircraft Wing sweepoverhead. Seconds later, these planesdropped 20 tons of high explosives onenemy ships in the harbor, knocking outlap antiaircraft batteries

later 66 Chance-Vought F4U Cor-sair Marine fighters roared in tojoin them at the crowded strip,after a series of island-hoppingstops on their 1,957-mile trip fromEmirau in the Bismarck Archi-pelago. These Corsairs were theadvance guard of the 85 planescoming from VMF-115, -211, -218,and -313 of Marine Aircraft Group(MAG) 12 in the Solomon Islands.They would serve as part of the308th Bombardment Wing of theFifth Army Air Force under MajorGeneral Ennis C. Whitehead,USA. The same day they arrived,six night fighters of the "Bateye"squadron were already back in theair for their first mission, flyingcover for a torpedo boat. It was asmall beginning of bigger thingsto come.

Planning for the Philippines

The deployment of Marineplanes to the Philippines was anevent which seemed unlikely ear-her. General Douglas MacArthur,Commander, Southwest PacificArea, had been deeply committedpersonally to the recapture of thePhilippines ever since his speedydeparture from there in 1942 withthe ringing promise, "I shallreturn." On 12 March 1944, theJoint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) issued adirective setting the southernmostisland of Mindanao as the firstAmerican objective in thePhilippines. This prompted MajorGeneral Ralph J. Mitchell, com-manding general of the 1st MarineAircraft Wing (MAW) in thenorthern Solomon Islands, to fly to

At left: Unsung heroes of the air warwere the ground crews, who ensured thateach squadron would have a high opera-tional rate of its aircraft. Capt Elton A.Barnum Collection

With its built-in radar, the Grumman F6F(N) Hellcat nightfighter was directedtowards lucrative enemy targets during nighttime missions in the liberation of thePhilippines. These Hellcats are shown over Leyte.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A700605

:1

Australia in May, and again inAugust, to meet with GeneralMacArthur and his air chief,Lieutenant General George C.Kenney, and strenuously urge theuse of Marine aviation in theimpending campaign. His reasonswere compelling: Japanese airpower was by now almost whollyeliminated in the northernSolomons and his squadrons werebattle-hardened from 22 monthsof almost continuous air opera-tions. General Mitchell hit a stonewall: This was to be an all-Armyoperation.

Then a new factor emerged inthe strategic planning. Subse-quent air strikes on 12 Septemberby Admiral William F. Halsey'sThird Fleet fast carrier force,scourging the island of Leyte (inthe central Philippines), revealedthat Japanese defenses there weremuch weaker than expected.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A41 2617

The fabulous Vought F4LI Corsair, the Marines' aircraft of choice in the Pacific War,gave Leatherneck pilots a victorious edge over their Japanese opponents. As a versatilefighter-bomber, it could carry bombs to 1,000 pounds (as shown here) and providedboth close and long-range air support.

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MARIANA

ISLANDS

Bougaznvi1Ie

SOLOMON ISLANDS'• Guadalcanal

CHINA

Southwest Pacific Area

.QBONIN ISLANDS

VOLCANO ISLANDS

PHILIPPINES

CAROLINA ISLANDS

0..:. MARSHALL• ISLANDS

GILBERTISLANDS

ELLICE ISLANDS

NEW HEBRIDES

Accordingly, the JCS issued a newdirective on 15 September 1944,setting Leyte as the target for a 20October landing. With this objec-tive a considerable distance awayfrom the Marines' Solomonsquadrons, the outlook for theirinvolvement in the Philippinescampaign seemed not to be in thecards.

On 20 October, four Army divi-sions made landings on the eastcoast of Leyte. Following them inon the next day (21 October) wasnot an element of Marine aviationbut the Marine V AmphibiousCorps (VAC) Artillery. This anom-aly occurred because the normalheavy artillery of the Army's XXIVCorps had been detached to sup-port the Marine assault in theMariana Islands. Once there, theywere not available in time for theLeyte landings, and so the Ma-rines' big guns had been sent fromPearl Harbor to support the Armyinfantry in the Philippines. Thus,Brigadier General Thomas E.Bourke led ashore the 1,500 Ma-rines of the 11th 155mm GunBattalion, the 5th 155mm How-itzer Battalion, and the CorpsArtillery Headquarters Battalion.

Moving quickly into action, thecannoneers initially fired in sup-port of the Army's XXIV Corpsfrom positions near the beach-head.

Manning one of the weapons inBattery B of the 11th 155mm GunBattalion were PFCs FrankPinciotti, Shelby Heimback, and

3

Walter Dangerfield. As Danger-field remembered, after they land-ed and emplaced their gun, thethree of them decided that "it wastime [for the Marines] to havesome recognition." Pinciotti cameup with the idea of painting "Bythe grace of God and the help ofthe Marines, MacArthur hasreturned to the Philippines" onthe cover of a wooden ammuni-tion box and hanging it over thebarrel of their Long Tom. "Soonone of our officers ordered us totake it down, as MacArthur wouldcome around to inspect." Appar-ently other Marines saw the signbefore it came down and accord-ing to reports, before long, itappeared elsewhere in the islands.It has also been reported thatGeneral MacArthur saw one of thesigns and wanted the perpetratoror perpetrators found out andpunished. But this perhaps is anapocryphal story.

During the critical naval Battleof Leyte Gulf (23-26 October),

Major General Ralph J. MitchellDistinguished Flying Cross.

In 1939 he was Director ofAviation at Marine CorpsI-ieadquarters. After the war, heretired in 1948 as a lieutenant gen-eral, and he died in 1970.

s Commanding General,1st Marine Aircraft Wing,Mitchell was the original

motivating force behind the assign-ment of Marine aviation to thePhilippines. Headquarters dutyforced him to remain inBougainville, with only occasionalvisits to his subordinates at thescene of action. He was in charge ofthe 1st MAW from April 1943 toJune 1945.

Both the Army and the Navyawarded him a DistinguishedService Medal, and he was alsoawarded a Legion of Merit.

Born in 1889, commissioned in1915 after graduating from the U.S.Naval Academy, Mitchell took anearly interest in flying. He earnedhis Naval Aviator wings in 1921,and served with a Marinesquadron in Nicaragua in 1929-30.While there he was awarded the

BY THE GRACE OF GOD

& THE HELP OF THE MARINES

MACARTHUR HAS RETURNED

TO THE PHILIPPINES

Problems on Leyte

base, and the Americans the otherpart. Meanwhile, the Cub planescontinued to operate on the strip.Finally, the evening of 10 Decem-ber, additional troops cleared outthe Japanese.

That dramatic episode conclud-ed the action by the V AmphibiousCorps Artillery on Leyte. It wasrelieved on the following daywhen the Army's XXIV CorpsArtillery arrived from Saipan.

The Marine artillery battalionsleft for Guam on 13 December,with an Army commendation fortheir "splendid performance" infire support missions for the Armyinfantry divisions.

there was concern for a Japanesenaval attack to the rear of theMarine artillerymen. The threatended when the enemy fleet wasdriven off. As the infantry divi-sions fought their way inland, theMarine artillery made a series ofdisplacements to keep pace withthe forward movement. Eachmove was greatly hindered by theheavy rains in November whichturned the primitive roads intomuddy swamps.

Because of the nature of the ter-rain, visual observation for fireadjustment was frequently impos-sible, but the 12 L-4 (Cub) liaison

planes available to the Marineartillerymen proved invaluable forspotting results. On the night of 6-7 December, the Bun airfieldwhere these planes were basedwas first bombed and thenassaulted by a force of enemyparatroopers who had beendropped to join up with localJapanese infiltrators. Their com-bined force of 350-450 men wasmet by 30 men of the CorpsArtillery Air Section, who fortu-nately were soon joined by otherMarine and Army personnel at theairstrip. A stalemate ensued, withthe enemy holding one part of the

4

Other events on Leyte after thelanding brought an unexpectedchange in plans for the air war.The foul weather of heavy tropicalstorms, with 35 inches of rain in 40days, had badly impeded both theadvance of the Army infantry andthe construction of adequate air-fields for American use.

Japanese bombing continued inspite of preemptive strikes byplanes from Halsey's fast carriers.Most serious of all, waves ofenemy troop reinforcements werecontinuously being landed atOrmoc on Leyte's west coast. Thenumbers were distressingly large;some official estimates were ashigh as 47,900. In any event, itwas clear that enemy strength onLeyte had more than doubled.There was also a special problemin the air war. The Japanese nightfighter-bombers, the Nakajima Ki-43 Hayabusa called "Oscars" bythe Americans, were too fast forthe Army Air Force P-61 NorthropBlack Widow night fighters.

Late in November, MacArthuracted decisively. He arranged fora switch in which the AAFsquadron would go to Peleliu andthe Marine night fighter squadronthere, VMF(N)-541, with its F6Fs

SOUTH CHINASEA

MAC -32MAC- I 4

PANAY 6 Mo 945NAG-I 4

CEBU 26 Mo 1945NAG- 14

MINDANAO I? Apr 1945NAG- 24MAC- 2NAG -32

PACIFICOCEAN

GROUP

Full-Scale Operations

and their 313-knot top speed,would come to muddy TaclobanField on Leyte

Simultaneously, came one ofthose flukes that change foreverthe course of events. Halsey wasanxious to leave Philippine watersfor a strike at Tokyo, and ViceAdmiral Thomas C. Kinkaid, com-mander of the U.S. Seventh Fleet,was very concerned about Jap-anese kamikaze attacks on hisships. (Kamikaze was the Japaneseterm for bomb-laden suicideplanes whose pilots would crashon purpose into U.S. ships.) So,Halsey recommended a substan-tial participation of Marine avia-tion. He later wrote:

I had under my commandin the South Pacific a MarineAir[craft] Group [12] whichhad proved its versatility ineverything from [air combat]to blasting enemy vessels. I

knew that this group wasnow under MacArthur'scommand, and I knew too,without understanding why,that when Kenney was notkeeping it idle, he wasassigning it to missions farbelow its capacity.

Kinkaid's complaint ofinsufficient air cover prompt-ed me to take a step whichwas more than a liberty; to aman of meaner spirit thanMacArthur's it would haveseemed an impertinence. I

called these Marines to hisattention. He ordered themforward, and within twenty-four hours of their arrival,they had justified my recom-mendation.

And so it was that those firstMarine planes flew in on 3December. These Corsairs weresoon augmented to re-form MAG-12 with its original four full fight-

er squadrons under the commandof Colonel William A. Willis: \TMF-115, -211, -218, and -313. Theywent right to work. U.S. navalconvoys had to be protectedagainst enemy air attacks; fighter-bomber strikes had to be directedon Japanese shipping and groundinstallations; ground support mis-sions had to be flown for the Armyinfantry on Leyte; and, perhapsmost vital of all, there had to beinterdiction of the Japanese rein-forcements pouring into the west-ern ports of Leyte.

Working with the P-38Lockheed Lightning and P-40Curtiss Warhawk AAF planes, theMarines quickly were again inhead-to-head combat with thefamous Japanese fighter, the"Zero" (officially called the"Zeke"), as well as a variety ofother enemy planes comprisingthe First Combined Air Force of bothJapanese Army and Navy planes,commanded by Vice AdmiralShigeru Fukudome. The Corsair,with its 365-knot top speed and six.50-caliber machine guns, provedto be still as formidable as it hadbeen in the Solomons. TheHelicats, with their speed, specialradar equipment, and intensivenight combat experience atPeleliu, proved equally effective.

The assigned missions of aircover for friendly forces, as well asattacks on enemy troops, ships,and airfields were not the primarymission Marine pilots of MAG-12had trained so hard for: close airsupport of ground troops.

Nevertheless, along with theAAF fighters, they focused on thepriority task of shutting down theflood of Japanese reinforcementsflooding into the port of Ormoc.For five crucial days, from 7 to 11December, above the bay it wasthe scene of a fierce aerial struggle,with swirling dogfights andbombing runs on enemy ships.When those days ended, so didJapanese reinforcement efforts.

5

There were major differences inthe tactics of the Marine F4Us andthe P-40s of the AAF. One of theAmerican bombing attacks wasdescribed by Captain Rolfe F.

Blanchard of VMF-115:

When the ships weresighted (there was a brokenlayer of cumulus between 6-7,000 feet) the Army startedpeeling off in groups of twoand three planes and dovefrom 10,000 to about 5,000,released bombs and pulledback through the overcast.They accomplished nothingexcept to make interestingsplashes in the water andwake up the Japs. AA [anti-aircraft fire] immediatelybecame very intense. As thelast Army. bombs werefalling, our Corsairs were inposition and coming in fastand low. The Japs never sawus coming until we started toshoot (we received no fireuntil past the screeningdestroyers) . .

A total of six hits were scored inmasthead runs on two troop shipswhich sank, and there was a nearmiss which slightly damaged onedestroyer in the attack. SecondLieutenant Michael A. Gudor shotdown a "Zeke" and then wasjumped by two more. Hedescribed the action as follows:

I tailed in on my Zeke,fast overtaking him. Atapproximately 100 yards, Iwas 10 degrees or so off thedead astern position and puta burst of .50 cal. through theengine and brought it backthrough the cockpit. TheZeke smoked, suddenlymoved down, and spiraledinto the sea.

Two Zekes at the same alti-tude turned towards me, so I

turned into them for the booksays, "In a head-on run, a Japplane will either turn aside orblow up." Evidently this Japhadn't read the book for hekept coming. We were clos-ing fast, prop to prop. All mysix .50 cal. guns were goingand pieces were flying off theZeke's cowling. At the lastpossible instant I nosed myCorsair violently down. TheZeke passed over andsheared off half the rudderand left stabilizer.

In this desperate crisis, Gudordove his plane for the ocean. At aspeed of 400 knots it vibrated sobadly he was afraid it would dis-integrate. In addition, the oil pres-sure sank to zero and his propellerfroze. Finally, at an altitude of 800feet, he was able to level his planeand bail out. All through the nighthe floated in his life raft andwatched the Japanese convoyburn. About 1700 the next day a"beautiful" Navy seaplane res-cued him.

And so it went in a busyDecember for the Marine Corsairpilots. They covered U.S. shippingand the Army landings on thelarge island of Mindoro. Theyencountered miserable, over-crowded conditions at TaclobanField, with a steady dose of badweather, low ceilings, and verypoor visibility. There were opera-tional accidents, such as a planefailing on takeoff and then crash-ing into a jeep, an ambulance, anda truck at the base, with fires anddeaths resulting.

In spite of these problems, theCorsairs flew a full schedule ofmissions against enemy installa-tions in Japanese-occupied townson Leyte.

MAG-12 got good news late inDecember. A new airstrip had justbeen finished near Tacloban atTanauan. The Corsairs were thenable to move to less crowded con-

ditions and better landing surfacesthere.

VMF-212 was one of those busysquadrons. It had had a gloriousearlier history at Guadalcanal.There, one of nine Marine aces, itscommanding officer, LieutenantColonel Harold W. "Indian Joe"Bauer, had been posthumouslyawarded a Medal of Honor. Nowthe squadron's varied missionsranged from Mindoro to the SuluSea, from Luzon to the VisayanSea, from Leyte Gulf to the islandsof Cebu and Negros.

With all this MAG-12 action,there was a steady toll of Marineplanes shot down, pilots lost, andafterwards rescued. In some cases,there were bizarre experiences.First Lieutenant R. M. Robinsonwas shot down by fire from a"friendly" PT boat, and thenpicked up safely by the same boat.Another, Second LieutenantWalter D. Bean, had a series ofmemorable episodes after he waswounded and shot down on 11December. In his official report helater recalled:

I gave up the leakingMae West [life preserver] andall my clothing; every articleseemed to drag me down [inthe ocean] and exhaust mefurther. Not being an excep-tional swimmer, the situationbecame less hopeful. Lucksmiled upon me though, forafter another 45 minutes offloating and paddling in theraw I spotted a large log bob-bing temptingly. Distanceand time were exaggeratedtwofold before I reached andclutched its welcome support

Semi-conscious that night, car-ried in random directions by theocean currents, seeing Japanesedestroyers and AAF P-38s, nowfamished for food and sufferingcramps, the pilot stuck it out until

6

he spotted 10 small fishing boatsheaded for him. After almost anhour, all of the boats except oneturned away. After still another 45minutes, the last little boatapproached and circled him cau-tiously. His closely cropped blondhair, when they were within call-ing distance, led them to show fur-ther caution. Was he German orAmerican, they shouted? Once inthe boat, he lost consciousness.

There ensued a kaleidoscope ofbeing carried ashore and thensleeping, eating, a native doctor,and discovering he was on a smallisland near the big island of Cebu.Bean continued his story with adescription of being taken to thenearby village:

[I was] given the best offood and care. The morewealthy citizens of the towngave me clothes, shoes, soap,toothbrush and all the inci-dentals I needed. I had beenthe first American to be seenby these natives since thebeginning of the war.Everyone wanted to knowwhen the Americans weregoing to liberate Cebu . .

The natives had matches andchocolate bars, sent in byMacArthur in 1942 by sub-marine, which had embla-zoned on the covers andwrappers, "I Shall Return."

While there, Bean was royallytreated by the Filipino natives forseveral days, but his overridinggoal was to get back to hissquadron. Accordingly, he dictat-ed frequent messages which wentout through the guerrilla grape-vine. Three days after he had beenpicked up, two natives in a fishingboat contacted a PT boat. In-formed of the rescue of a downedpilot and given instructions as towhere to pick him up, the PT skip-per suspected that it was aJapanese trick and decided not

venture into a possible trap.A day later Bean departed with

one native in a sail boat for LeyteIsland, a trip of about 50 nauticalmiles. The trip went smoothly, andthey arrived on Leyte. Bean con-cluded his tale:

After spending the nightwith an Army artillery unit, Iconcluded my journey, firston an LSM [Landing Ship,Medium] and, finally, the lastleg in an Army colonel'smotor launch. It was almostnightfall on 20 December thatI arrived in VMF-218's camparea at Tacloban, weary, ner-vous, and quite run down

from loss of weight.

By the end of December MAG-12 suffered nine pilots killed and34 planes lost, but it had racked upa remarkable record against theJapanese, despite some severelylimiting factors. As a componentof the Fifth Army Air Force, mis-sions were assigned in a cumber-some procedure which requiredre-quests to go all the way up toSixth Army. The official MarineCorps history of World War II listsother limitations:

At no time during theLeyte operation did MAG-12ever receive an assignment

7

commensurate with its capa-bilities of giving close airsupport to ground troops.The [Marine] Joint AssaultSignal Companies, equippedwith air-ground signal com-munication facilities, werenot used for direct air-groundcontrol. Pilots were briefedon their missions prior totakeoff and targets assignedon the day preceding the airstrike. Once the flight be-came airborne, no furthercontrol was exercised fromthe ground.

Despite these shortcomings, thegroup had flown 264 missions;destroyed more than 40 enemyplanes; sunk seven destroyers,nine cargo ships, and three trooptransports; and damaged at least11 more ships in less than a month.No wonder the Japanese hadcome to call the Corsairs"Whistling Death."

Meanwhile, the Heilcats ofVMF(N)-541 were equally occu-pied during December with dawnand dusk patrols which broughtthem their share of 'kills.' Attimes, these patrols were dis-patched during daylight hours atthe direct request of the Fifth AirForce, even though the Marines'intensive training and actual prac-tice on Peleliu had been for night-time operations. The Heilcatschalked up 11 kills in one day (12December) during the fierce bat-tles over Ormoc Bay. When flyingprotective cover, they neverallowed an enemy hit on anAmerican ship under their care.

One impressive individualrecord was made by TechnicalSergeant John W. Andre. He hadpreviously served two years as anairplane mechanic, earned hiswings as a Naval Aviation Pilot(NAP), and was one of the Marineenlisted pilots flying in the Pacificin December 1944.

On 22 December, having shot

VMF(N)-541 COMMENDEDTwo years after its Philippine- operations, the Hellcat squadron receivedthe Army's Distinguished Unit Citation, the only Marine aviation unit tobe so honored during the war:

The Marine Night Fighter Squadron 541 is cited for extraordi-nary performance of duty in action against the enemy at Leyte,Philippine Islands, from 3 to 15 December 1944. During a criticalperiod in the fight for the control of the Philippine Islands, thepilots and ground crews of this unit signally distinguished them-selves by the intrepidity and unyielding determination with whichthey overcame exceptionally adverse weather conditions and oper-ational difficulties engendered by lack of facilities and incompleteradar directional coverage.

Their superb airmanship and daring resourcefulness displayedin outstanding night patrol and interception work, which fore-stalled destruction of airfield facilities, and in the completeness ofcover provided for numerous vital convoys and Patrol Torpedoboat patrols, effectively thwarted enemy attempts to prevent con-solidation and further expansion of the foothold gained by UnitedStates forces in the Philippines.

Achieving a record unparalleled at that time, the unit, composedof but 15 aircraft and 22 pilots, flew 136 sorties totaling 298.6 com-bat hours, destroyed 18 enemy aircraft in aerial combat withoutunit loss or damage, and on numerous occasions pitted consum-mate skill and accuracy against overwhelming numerically superi-or enemy strength. The extraordinary performance of the air andground personnel of the Marine Fighter Squadron 541 in overcom-ing the greatest of aerial hazards and maintenance difficultiesreflects the highest credit on themselves and the military service ofthe United States.

BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF WARDwight D. Eisenhower

Chief of Staff

Colonel Clayton C. Jeromeriginally chief of staff of the1st Marine Aircraft Wingunder Major General Ralph J.

Mitchell in the Solomons, Jeromemoved up to take charge, as a colonel,of Marine aviation operations in thePhilippines. For his superior leader-ship during the Luzon campaign, theArmy awarded him a Legion of Merit(to add to two previous ones).

Later, as commander of the 1stMarine Aircraft Wing in Korea, theAir Force awarded him his fourthLegion of Merit, as well as aDistinguished Service Medal. His lastbillet was Commanding General,

Aircraft, Fleet Marine Force, Pacific.Retired as a lieutenant general in

1958, Jerome died in 1978.His earlier career had prepared

him well for such a notable record. Hewas born in 1901, graduated from theU.S. Naval Academy, and was com-missioned in 1922. He saw prewarduty in China and eight differentLatin American countries before histwo tours in the Pacific.

An Army general who knew himwell noted his "forceful personalityquiet dignity and appearance, thor-ough professional knowledge, andunusual sense of cooperation.

down two planes in the precedingtwo weeks, he was on patrol nearthe north end of Leyte. When hesaw two Japanese planes, hedropped down to take a look. Thetwo enemy planes saw him andquickly headed north. He imme-diately followed them for about 70or 80 miles staying around 2,000feet behind them. It was now get-ting dark, however, and he soonlost sight of them.

By now Andre was over Luzon,and he saw a few lights below thatlooked like they were on a run-way. Suddenly, one of the Jap-anese planes appeared again. Thepilot had his wing lights on andwas circling to land. Andre laterdescribed what happened next:

Just as I was pulling inposition to get a burst at him,I saw the second plane com-ing in from about a mileaway so I got behind the sec-ond Jap. I opened up on thesecond Zero just as he wasmaking his turn approachingthe field. He crashed andexploded on the field. I kepton and got the first Zero just50 or 60 feet off the ground.

He nosed over and explod-ed, and I kept on down therunway strafing. The Japs

were throwing a lot of tracerup from small stuff. I pulledover and came back strafingthe other side of the runway.There was one big explosionand two small ones. I thinkthey were probably a gastruck and two planes.

Andre wasn't through. At theend of the strip he did a wingoverand came back down the otherside. Small fires started and therewas another big explosion. All inall he made six strafing runs onthe field. On the last one hismotor cut out for a minute andthat convinced him to get out ofthere and head for home.

By the end of December 1944,the Army considered that Leytewas effectively in its control, andthe campaign to recapture thePhilippines shifted into a secondphase. At this time, VMF(N)-541was released to return on 11 Jan-uary 1945 to Peleliu. Its recordspoke for itself: Despite an over-crowded airfield as a base, badweather flying conditions, unac-customed Fifth Air Force controlmethods, in just over a month ithad chalked up 924 combat hours,22 planes shot down, and 5 moredestroyed on the ground. Twoyears later the squadron received

8

the Army's Distinguished Unit Ci-tation, the only Marine aviationunit to be so honored during thewar.

While the Marine fighter planeshad been prominent in the firstphase of the Philippine campaign,Leyte, Marine dive bombers weresoon to be similary heavilyemployed. The Army's next majortarget was Luzon, on whichManila, the capital of thePhilippine Islands, was situated.The 1st MAW had learned on 20September 1944 that seven of itsdive bomber squadrons would beused later on for the Luzon cam-paign, which was to follow Leyte.

Marine Corps aviation recordedits war-time peak at the end ofSeptember 1944. It had rocketedfrom 13 squadrons following theJapanese attack on Pearl Harbor to145 squadrons at this time.

Without waiting for that futurecommitment, on 10 October theMarine scout-bomber squadronsin the Solomons initiated a strenu-ous close air support training pro-gram. Squadrons of two unitswere involved, MAG-24 andMAG-32. Their squadrons andtheir colorful nicknames were:

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MAG-24 VMSBs

133 - "Flying Eggbeaters"236 - "Black Panthers"241 - "Sons of Satan"341 - "Torrid Turtles"

MAG-32 VMSBs

142 - "Wild Horses"243 - "Flying Goldbricks"244 - "Bombing Banshees"

MAG-32 was commanded byColonel Clayton R. Jerome, whohad been chief of staff to MajorGeneral Ralph J. Mitchell in theSolomons. MAG-24 was underColonel Lyle H. Meyer, who had abrilliant and professionally enter-prising operations officer, Lieu-tenant Colonel Keith B. McCutch-eon. It was McCutcheon who as-sembled all the published materialthat he could find on the theoryand practice of close air support.McCutcheon organized the mater-ial for 40 different lectures for 500pilots and gunners, arranged jointtraining exercises with the Army's37th Infantry Division onBougainville, and supervised thetwo solid months of extensiveindoctrination in close air supporttactics and new communicationprocedures vital to achieve maxi-mum battle results.

These new procedures calledfor a total change from the AAFpractice of control through multi-ple command echelons to a radi-cally simpler process. Therewould be a Marine air liaisonparty (ALP) with every groundunit down to the battalion level.The ALPs would directly controlthe close air support planes fromradio-equipped jeeps, and wouldbe headed by Marine aviators whovery often personally knew thepilots making the close air supportruns.

On 9 December 1944, MAG-24was ordered to begin its deploy-ment to the Philippines from theSolomons. For the flight echelontheir move meant a long, over-water endurance flight. For theground echelon it meant a miser-ably long sea voyage.

Marine Scout-Bomber Squad-ron (VMSB) 341 undertook such amove. The ground element left itsSolomons base on 17 December,and its official history records thetortuous month on board ship thatfollowed:

This was a cargo vesselwith no troop accommoda-tions. Shortly after boarding,Tokyo Rose informed thesquadron that it would nevermake it to the Philippines.After several days squadron

personnel had their doubts,too. Field ranges were set upon deck to feed the troops.Shower facilities consisted ofa length of pipe with numer-ous holes drilled in it,secured to the rigging andconnected to a fire hosepumping seawater. Headfacilities were equally primi-tive.

When the VMSB-341 groundelement arrived at Hollandia,New Guinea, it alternated be-tween that anchorage and the oneat Lae, New Guinea, until finallydeparting for the Philippines on 8January 1945. The •squadronarrived at Leyte on 16 January andcontinued the trip the followingday, arriving at Lingayen Gulf,Luzon, on 21 January Finally dis-embarking on the 22d, VMSB-341proceeded 12 miles inland andthen helped establish the airfieldat Mangaldan.

Still more Marine air power wason its way MAG-14, with itsCorsairs, was also in the Solomonsunder Colonel Zebulon C.Hopkins, and on 7 December 1944,Pearl Harbor Day, it was alertedfor movement to the Philippines.This was a group with a proudhistory, having been awarded thePresidential Unit Citation for its

Lieutenant Colonel Keith B. McCutcheonorn in 1915 and commissionedin 1937, McCutcheon had a bril-liant career. Awarded an Army

Silver Star and three Legions of Meritfor his pioneering work on close airsupport in the Philippines, he went onto become known as "the father ofMarine helicopter aviation." This titlestemmed from his service as the com-manding officer of the only suchsquadron in 1950, followed by 80combat missions in Korea.

In Vietnam he was CommandingGeneral, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing,and was awarded two Distinguished

Service Medals. Duty at Headquar-ters, Marine Corps, brought a thirdDSM and nomination to be AssistantCommandant. A serious illness forcedhim to forego that honor, although hewas promoted to four-star rank byCongress on 1 July 1971. Twelve dayslater, he died.

The following year, at the MarineCorps Air Station, New River, NorthCarolina, was dedicated Mc-Cutcheon Field. Amid the speeches,there were memories of "his boyishsmile, piercing eyes, and youthful,timeless face."

9

superb record at Guadalcanal.During the period 2-12 January

1945, its four fighter squadrons,VMF-212, -222, -223, and -251 flewthe 2,350 miles to Guiuan Field onthe island of Samar. (Their groundechelons would spend five longweeks on board ship enroute.)The field conditions were ab-ysmal: too small for the group,partially incomplete with inade-quate living quarters, omnipresenttropical diseases, and dangerousrunway surfaces. The men ofMAG-14 were glad to be part ofthe real action again, although theprimitive conditions at the airfieldled to 19 non-combat plane lossesjust in the remainder of January.

The worst of these came on 24January when Second LieutenantKarl Oerth's Corsair hit bad run-way bumps, blew a tire, andcareened off the runway, out ofcontrol. It struck a rock, and thencartwheeled through rows oftents. When men nearby rushedto try to extricate Oerth, the planesuddenly exploded and became acauldron of fire. The tragicepisode killed 13 and severelyburnt 54.

Once Leyte was secured, theaerial pounding of Luzon in-creased in preparation for theArmy's landing on 9 January 1945at Lingayen Gulf in the northernsection.

In the landing with the assaulttroops were Jerome and Mc-Cutcheon. They picked out a sitefor an airstrip between two neigh-boring villages, Dagupan andMangaldan. While the latter namewas given to the air base beingbuilt, the former was incorporatedinto a title for Jerome: Comman-der, MAGSDAGUPAN (MarineAircraft Groups, Dagupan). Mc-Cutcheon became operations offi-cer, and welcomed his former"trainees" when MAG-24 andMAG-32 began flying in on 25 Jan-uary 1945, ready to begin oper-tions.

The first mission went out twodays later on 27 January. It was astrike by VMSB-241, a squadronwhich had been awarded a Pre-sidential Unit Citation for itssuperb performance during thecrucial battle of Midway in June1942.

By the end of their first month,Marine pilots had already drop-ped over 200,000 pounds of bombsfrom their 168 SBD DouglasDauntless dive bombers. Alsocrowding the Mangaldan stripswere over 200 AAF planes, withthe AAF's 308th Bomber Wing inoperational control of everything,including Marine planes.

The ensuing four monthsmarked a period when Marineclose air support truly came ofage. With MAG-12 and its fourfighter squadrons on Leyte, withMAG-14 and its four Corsairsquadrons on Samar, and withMAGs-24 and -32 and their sevensquadrons of dive bombers onLuzon, there was now a sufficientquantity of Marine planes to makea major contribution to the large-scale Army drive to reconquer thePhilippines.

Perhaps even more importantwas the quality of the Marines'role. The ground crews continuedto show, under very adverse con-

10

ditions, a remarkable ability tokeep a high percentage of planesready for their missions. TheCorsairs continued to showsuperb ability in aerial combatand, when operating as a fighter-bomber, equal ability to strikedeep tactical targets.

Sadly, however, casualties werea normal part of intensive opera-tions, and there was great concernon Samar when Second Lieuten-ant Keimeth G. Pomasl of VMF-223 failed to return from a missionon 23 January 1945. His wasanother fighter squadron with astoried history: first to arrive onGuadalcanal, 83 enemy planesdowned, a Presidential UnitCitation, and a commanding offi-cer, Major John L. Smith, who wasawarded the Medal of Honor andwas one of nine aces in thesquadron in those earlier dogfights. (Now he was executive offi-cer of MAGSDAGUPAN.)

On 29 January, a plane arrivedfrom Leyte, and, to everyone'sdelighted surprise, out jumpedPomasl. He had quite a story totell. After becoming separatedfrom his flight in bad weather, hefound he could not make radiocontact, so he flew on instrumentsfor an hour and a half, but wasunable to break out of the over-

MAG-12 SQUADRONS COMMENDEDA War Department General order (almost two years later) stated:

The Marine Fighter Squadrons 115, 211, 218, and 313 are cited for out-standing performance of duty in action in the Philippine Islands from 2to 15 December 1944. During this period, at a critical stage in the opera-tions on Leyte, first battleground in the campaign to liberate thePhilippines, these Marine fighter squadrons not only carried out theirprimary mission of providing aerial cover, but also gave close support toour ground troops and intercepted large and heavily escorted enemyconvoys.

The gallantry and fighting spirit of the Marine pilots and the skill andtireless fidelity to duty of the ground personnel, who so well carried outtheir arduous task of maintaining and servicing the aircraft under theworst possible conditions, constituted a major contribution to the successof the Leyte operations and initial American victory in the Philippines.

cast. Then his gas supply finallyran low and he decided to bringhis plane down to make a waterlanding. As he came down out ofthe overcast, he found himselfover land, at an altitude of about500 feet. When he swung out overthe water, he saw he was beingfired on by small arms.

He set the plane down easily,tail first. It remained afloat forabout a minute, giving him plentyof time to get out of the cockpitand onto the right wing, fromwhich he lowered himself into thewater and inflated his rubber boat.It was early afternoon, and landwas about half a mile away. Afterhe had been on the water a shorttime, three small canoes put outfrom shore, headed toward him.The men appeared to be Filipinosand seemed friendly, so heallowed himself to be placed inone of the canoes, while his rubberraft was taken in tow by another.Pomasl described what happenednext:

As we headed for shore wewere met by Japanese smallarms fire; the natives all doveinto the water and swamaway, although all the shotslanded short. I regained myraft and had begun to driftshoreward, when I noticed aJapanese soldier paddlingout toward me in a smallboat. A brief exchange ofshots send the enemy scurry-ing back to land, followedby bullets from my .45 pistol.

With a strong current pullinghim towards land, Pomasl aban-doned his raft and started swim-ming. Seven long hours after hisplane went down, he finally gotashore on a beach. After a staythere of almost two days, he start-ed inland. Suddenly 15 or 20Filipinos appeared and ran up tohim. They seemed to understand

that he was the pilot of the planewhich had gone down two daysbefore, and one of them spoke alittle English. They took him backinto the jungle, where theybrought him water and food,including rice, boiled chicken,eggs, bananas, and coconuts. Herested there until early evening ona mat they'd brought him, whenhis English-speaking friend re-turned with a pair of Japanese san-dals for his feet. He learned thenthat the Filipino was a member ofthe Cebu Home Defense Force.

Moving out in the dark, theycrossed over to the eastern coast ofthe peninsula, where they waitedthree hours for a boat which wasto take them to Santa Rosa Island,the first step back towards Leyte.It appeared at about 2200 and

11

added the two men to its cargo ofnine refugees from Cebu Cityalong with their household goods.Pomasl continued his story:

At this juncture, a manwho spoke fairly goodEnglish identified himself asa captain in the HomeDefense of Mactan and tookcharge of the situation untilwe made contact withAmerican forces on Leyte.On Santa Rosa, I was hailedas a hero by the people of theisland who had not had awhite visitor since 1940 .

Again, the lieutenant was over-whelmed with native hospitality,which recurred on every island hestopped at during the boat trip of

The President of the United States takes pleasure in presenting the

Presidential Unit Citation to

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWELVE

for service as set forth in the following citation:

"For extraordinary heroism in action against enemy Japanese forces inthe Philippine Islands from December 3, 1944, to March 9, 1945.Operating from the captured airfield at Tacloban, Marine Aircraft GroupTwelve employed Corsairs as bombing planes to strike destructive blowsat escorted enemy convoys and to prevent the Japanese from reinforcingtheir beleaguered garrisons by landing troops and supplies on westernLeyte. Undeterred by intense aerial opposition and accurate antiaircraftfire, these pilots provided effective cover for ground troops, shore instal-lations and Fleet units and, on several occasions, when ground troopswere held up by heavy enemy fire, bombed and strafed Japanese Posi-tions, thereby enabling our land forces to advance unopposed.

"As hostile resistance lessened on Leyte, Marine Aircraft GroupTwelve expanded its sphere of operations to strike at enemy garrisons onthe Visayan Islands and southern Luzon and to support the Lingayenbeachheads, neutralizing the enemy's lines of communication, his har-bors, airfields and escape routes, and ranging far from base to provideaerial cover for ships of the Seventh Fleet and merchant-ship convoysoperating in the area. During February and the early part of March, thiscourageous group gave direct support to Guerrilla units fighting onCebu Island and aided in their rapid advance and the ultimate neutral-ization of the island. Well supported by skilled and dependable groundpersonnel, the gallant pilots of Marine Aircraft Group Twelve caused theJapanese severe losses in airplanes, installations and surface craft, con-tributing to the achievement of air superiority so essential to the successof the campaign and thereby upholding the highest traditions of theUnited States Naval Service."

several days to Leyte—includingone greeting where he was hoistedon the shoulders of the Filipinos tocarry him ashore. Concluding hisaccount, Pomasl said:

Departing the nextmorning, the 27th, we arrivedat Bay Bay on Leyte in theevening. I went ashore andcontacted an American ArmyM.P. detachment and report-ed to the Philippine CivilAffairs Unit the names ofthose who had aided me.After securing food for myFilipino friends, I bade themgoodbye, drew a clothingissue from the Army, and leftthe next afternoon forBurauen, where I spent thenight. The next day I trav-eled by jeep to Tacloban,when I was flown to Guiuanairstrip, arriving there onJanuary 29th, six days afterI'd taken off.

While the Corsairs in MAGs-12and -14 continued to show thequality of their work in spite oflosses, the SBD dive bombers now

at MAGSDAGUPAN would showsomething new in quality: flexible,pinpoint accuracy in truly close airsupport, directed right from thefront lines of an infantry attack.Targets during just the first weekon Luzon were spread in a 180degree arc from north througheast to south, up to 150 milesaway, and included 10 towns infive different provinces.

The SBD was, in actuality, anobsolete plane, long since aban-doned in its AAF version (the A-24). Over Luzon, however, itproved amazingly effective. Itsdive bombing procedure was wellsummarized in a 1951 Marine avi-ation history:

The planes approached theobjective area at an altitudenormally about 10,000 to11,000 feet above the target.The flight would then extendits formation so that eachpilot could locate the target;once they had made positiveidentification, the attackbegan. The lead pilot pointedthe nose of his plane down,followed by the rest of his

12

flight, one plane at a time.Dive flaps were opened tokeep the planes from gainingtoo much air speed while indives approaching 70 de-grees.

While the target was held in thepilot's sights, bombs were re-leased at an elevation of about2,000 feet. After that the nose ofthe plane was pulled toward thehorizon, and the dive flaps wereclosed quickly for added speed.By this time the bombers would beabout 1,000 feet above the ground,in a slightly nosed-down position.

The planes would continue los-ing altitude quickly until theywere at treetop level. There theyused their accumulated air speedfor violent evasive maneuvers toavoid the usually heavy enemyantiaircraft fire. Then the planescontinued on to a rendezvouspoint for another bombing attack,or perhaps several strafing runsbefore gathering for the returnflight to the base.

A substantial number of flightswere also made with delayed-fusebombs released at 1,500 feet, and apull-out at tree-top height. Airspeed while using the flaps wouldbe about 250 knots. Bombs variedfrom 100-pounders, 250s, 500s,and 1,000-pounders.

These kinds of tactics soon ledthe press to label the VMSB squad-rons "The Diving Devildogs ofLuzon." Jerome's own homespundescription of their pattern of hit-ting small targets with great preci-sion was "Pickle Barrel Bombers."McCutcheon was precise in hisdefinition of the function of theSBDs: "Aircraft in close supportare, in effect, aerial artillery. Noone claims that they will replace it[ground artillery] or are superiorto it; they augment it."

There soon came a demandingmission to which the Marine SBDswere assigned—while Army andAAF senior officers watched and

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP TWENTY-FOUR

for service as follows:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the United StatesSixth Army in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands Area,from January 23 to April 10, 1945. After landing at Lingayen with theassault forces on D-day, Marine Aircraft Group Twenty-Four operatedcontinuously against Japanese forces, flying a series of more than 8,000daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relentless air and groundforce opposition. Dauntless and determined, these units penetratednumerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroy-ing vital ammunition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troopconcentrations, effectively reduced the enemy's power to resist and con-tributed materially to the sweeping victory of our ground forces in thisarea. The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft Group Twenty-Fourreflect the skill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty of thesecourageous officers and men, and are in keeping with the highest tradi-tions of the United States Naval Service."

II

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 62393A dependable performer for the Marine Corps all through the early years of World WarII, the Douglas SBD Dauntless dive bomber was finally phased out in 1945. Early inthe liberation of the Philippines, it demonstrated what dive bombers could do in closeair support missions.

communication was noted in theofficial Marine Corps history ofWorld War II. In "astonishment"the Marine ALPs found that theAAF was also attaching its own"formidable" ALP. This consistedof:

• . a DUKW [amphibiantruck] (complete with Fili-pino houseboy), a weaponscarrier, a jeep, 27 men andtwo officers . . . but its equip-ment was such that it could-n't keep up with the advanceor semiexposed positions.Besides, for air supportthrough that channel, re-quests would have to be for-warded and approved firstby Division, then Corps, thenArmy and finally by 308thBomb Wing.

waited. It occurred when Mac-Arthur directed Major GeneralVerne D. Mudge, USA, to send aflying column of his 1st CavalryDivision to Manila to free the pris-oners who had been interned atthe Santo Tomas Camp there since1942. MAGSDAGUPAN was toprovide nine dive bombers to stayoverhead at all times. They wouldscout out Japanese positions andtroop concentrations to enable thecolumn to avoid them. If neces-sary, the SBDs would bomb theenemy's strongholds. One MarineALP would ride right with the col-umn's commander, BrigadierGeneral William C. Chase, USA,on the 100-mile trip. Chase wascorrectly concerned about hisopen flanks, with Japanese troopseverywhere between his line ofdeparture south of Lingayen andhis target, Manila. The solution:Marine dive bombers would alsoprotect the flanks. This was anexcellent opportunity to prove theefficiency of the Marine missioncontrol system using ALPs. Tworadio jeeps and a radio truck, witha total of three officers and fourenlisted Marines were assigned to

the mission. They would relay therequests of the ground units forclose air support missions directlyto the SBDs. In reverse, the planescould communicate downwardany information from theiradvance reconnaissance.

An interesting contrast to thehandful of Marines in the ALPsand their direct ground-to-air

13

In 66 hours, the column slashedthrough to Manila, and 3,500internees were freed at SantoTomas on 3 February. The Armywas lavish in its praise for the per-formance of the SBDs and theirALPs. From the 1st CavalryDivision history:

Much of the success of the

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending the

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUP THIRTY-TWO

for service as follows:

"For exceptionally meritorious service in support of the UnitedStates Sixth Army in the Lingayen Gulf and Manila, Philippine Islands,Areas, from January 23 to March 15, 1945. After landing at Lingayen withthe assault forces on D-day, Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Two operatedcontinuously against Japanese forces, flying a series of more than 8,000daring and brilliantly executed sorties despite relentless air and groundforce opposition. Dauntless and determined, these units penetratednumerous hostile defenses ahead of our advancing troops and, destroy-ing vital ammunition and fuel dumps, bridges, gun bastions and troopconcentrations, effectively reduced the enemy's power to resist and con-tributed materially to our ground forces' sweeping victory in this area.The heroic achievements of Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-Two reflect theskill, personal valor and steadfast devotion to duty of these courageousofficers and men, and are in keeping with the highest traditions of theUnited States Naval Service."

I

ROUTE TO MANIIPIT C.*IRV S 37Th INFANTRY

vNPOAN

XI CORPS LANDINGS0 tO 40 )0.S

entire movement is creditedto the superb air cover, flankprotection, and reconnais-sance provided by MarineAircraft Groups 24 and 32.The 1st Cavalry's audaciousdrive down through CentralLuzon was the longest suchoperation ever made in theSouthwest Pacific Area usingonly air cover for flank pro-tection.

Mudge had this to say:

On our drive to Manila, Idepended solely on theMarines to protect my leftflank against possibleJapanese counterattack. Thejob that they turned in speaksfor itself. I can say withoutreservation that the Marinedive bombers are one of themost flexible outfits that I

have seen in this war. Theywill try anything once, andfrom my experience withthem, I have found out thatanything they try usuallypans out in their favor.

The 1st Cavalry's dash toManila had some very talentedmen in its ALPs. One of these wasMarine Captain Francis B.

"Frisco" Godolphin. He had beena language professor at PrincetonUniversity before volunteering atage 40. When he visited the 1stCavalry before its drive, he raninto a staff officer who had for-merly been a student of his. Fromthis chance encounter and person-al relationship came the plan toput nine SBDs overhead duringthe drive to Manila. This proce-dure circumvented the oppositionof the AAF 308th Bomb Wing todirect control by the infantry unitsof their close air support.

Godoiphin not only served inan ALP en route to Manila, but healso spent 38 continuous days inaction. A Marine combat corre-

spondent, Staff Sergeant DavidStephenson, reported on some ofhis other exploits:

During the early part ofFebruary, the Seventh [Ca-valry] Regiment had cap-tured the Balera water-filterplant northeast of Manila.The laps, determined to de-stroy the plant and polluteManila's water supply, hadbeen directing mortar andmachine gun fire at the build-ing from four positions. Fin-ally they brought up rockets.

The rocket attack began atmidnight. Captain Godol-phin went to the roof of theplant with a sextant to deter-mine the azimuth of the rock-et position. Six enemy rock-ets landed within 40 yards of

14

his CP [command post], butCaptain "Frisco" got outalive with enough data topinpoint the target for theSBDs the next morning.

Godoiphin also helped to directthe largest Marine strike onLuzon, an 81-plane attack east ofthe Marakina River. In prepara-tion for this, it was decided tosend a guerrilla lieutenant—a civilengineer graduate of the Univer-sity of the Philippines—into thearea to be bombed. The officer,disguised as a native civilian,sketched and plotted the Japanesepositions by night. After sufficientinformation had been broughtback, Godoiphin called in thedive-bombers. He radioed his datato Major Benjamin B. Manchester,the air coordinator, who was cir-

After Manila

cling the target, picking out eachpoint of attack as it was describedto him. Then Manchester sent hisplanes down for the kill.

The dash to Manila led to fourevents. The Army started slowlyto clear the city of dug-in Japanesedie-hard soldiers; the next objec-tive would become the 50,000 Jap-anese deeply entrenched and forti-fied in the Shimbu Line outside thecity; Jerome and his staff went call-ing on a variety of Army divisioncommanders to try to explain tothem the help that Marine divebombers could give to their infan-try; and the 308th BombardmentWing directed the Marines toassist the guerrillas on Luzon.

When the Army came upagainst the Shimbu Line, it soonbecame more receptive to the useof the SBDs. The 1st CavalryDivision was already a convert, ofcourse, and it had an opportunityto give a practical demonstrationto the skeptical commander of the

6th Infantry Division, who wasvisiting it on 8 February Facedwith very heavy enemy fire from akey hill, the 1st Cavalry comman-der called in the dive bombers.When they had finished their pre-cision work, patrols moved up thehill unopposed and found theshattered remains of eightmachine gun and 15 mortar em-placements, with 300 Japanesedead nearby. In addition, 11unmanned heavy machine gunswere found. Now the 6th Divisionwas convinced.

A major planning conferencetook place on 11 February to makedecisions on future ground and airoperations. Mitchell and Jeromewere able to get agreement thatthree more Marine squadrons,Marine Bomber Squadron (VMB)611 and Air Warning Squadrons(AWS) 3 and 4, would be movedup from the Solomons to partic-ipate in the next major phase of the

Philippines campaign: the inva-sion of the main southern island,Mindanao. These squadrons rep-resented two new and differentresources for Marine aviation.VMB-611 was equipped with thePBJ North American mediumbomber, called by the AAF theMitchell B-25. It had a range ofover 1,300 nautical miles andcould carry 2,800 pounds ofbombs and rockets. The AWSswere equipped with extensiveradar and radio communicationscapabilities for warning of enemyair attacks.

Also, in preparation for theMindanao operation, there was a15 February shuffling of Marinesquadrons already on hand:VMSBs-236 and -341 transferred toMAG-32, and VMSB-244 went toMAG-24. This was a prelude tothe new plan to redeploy MAC-32's dive bombers from Luzonand MAG-12's fighters from Leyteto Mindanao. Mitchell had wanteda full-scale role for Marine avia-tion in the upcoming invasion—and he got it.

Another decision of the plan-ning conference also affectedMAGSDAGUPAN. The AAF308th Wing assigned the SBDs toshow again their flexibility—thistime in support of the growingguerrilla operations in northernLuzon. Accordingly, an ALP teamwas landed 50 miles behind theJapanese lines on 22 FebruaryThere it made contact with a mostunusual man, Lieutenant ColonelRussell W. Volckmann, USA, whowas the leader of the Filipinoguerrillas in northern Luzon. Hisforces had no heavy arms andwere stalled in their attack to cap-ture the important city of SanFernando. Both AAF planes andMarine SBDs were called in todrop their 500-pound bombs onthe enemy's defensive positions,

Enemy antiaircraft artillery fire could tear big holes in a dive bomber, as this SBDshows after a mission over Manila. The pilot, lstLt Frank H. McFadden of VMSB-236,made it back to his base on this one of the 113 missions he flew in the Philippines.

Marine Corps Historical Center

15

Plans for theSouthern Islands

Close Support for Guerrillas

a

sometimes as close as 100 yardsfrom the Filipinos. After two.daysof these strikes, it was all over, andthe Japanese were routed.

There were many similar occa-sions where the ALP and its radiojeep and truck found its way toseemingly inaccessible spots todirect close air support for theguerrillas. During the period from5 to 31 March, for example, 186such missions were flown, and theheavy enemy casualties could beclearly attributed to the divebombers, since no artillery firewas available.

A Marine combat artist in Manila while the battle there still raged, Sgt Paul Arltdescribed this wash drawing: "Sharply outlined against rising clouds of smoke, thegutted steel and concrete shell of the nine-story Great Eastern Hotel is one of the count-less buildings destroyed by retreating laps. Down on the rubble-strewn street, aPhilippine citizen glances apprehensively over his shoulder as Marine dive bombers ofthe 1st Marine Aircraft Wing sweep overhead. Seconds later, these planes dropped 20tons of high explosives on enemy ships in the harbor, knocking out lap antiaircraft bat-teries set up on the hulks."

Together with missions sup-porting the guerrillas, MAGS-DAGUPAN continued its missionof close air support of the Armydivisions— at one time or anotherworking with each of the 10 fight-ing on Luzon. One refinement,late in February, was the use of air-borne coordinators to receive tar-get information and instructionsfrom the ALP, and then make amarking run over the objectivewhen the SBDs arrived for theirdive bombing runs.

There were other marking tech-niques, e.g., white phosphorousshells. An example was a strikeagainst cave positions on 23February, when 18 planes fromVMSB-142 were called in to bombsome Japanese dug into a hillside,from where neither artillery normortar fire had been able to dis-lodge them. First Lieutenant W. E.Dickey, Jr., described the SBDstrike that hit the enemy positions:

The air-ground jeep calledfor Captain Austin Wigginsto dive singly at a given tar-get, marked by white phos-phorous mortar shells. Hewent down and thereafter wewent in, one plane at a time,

each plane having personalcontrol by the jeep on theground. He would tell us,

16

"Now the next plane dropyour bomb 50 feet west of thelast one," or "100 feet south,"

•

'.,'

comparable to that obtainedby field artillery. Thecourage, patience, and will-ingness displayed by thesemen deserve high praise.

etc., until all 18,000 pounds ofbombs had been placedexactly where he wantedthem.

All the time we were in theattack the [air controller inthe] jeep was very elated andwould tell us after each bombhit—"Man, that was right intheir laps."

In the end the Army infantrywas able to move forward againstno opposition.

As Luzon duty drew to a close,the Marine flyers could look attheir exploits with some pride.One ground observer, for instance,had reported after a dive bombingstrike on 21 February, "Bodies,guns, papers blown all over theplace. Kisses from commandingofficer of adjacent ground units."

A more formal evaluation camefrom Major General Edwin D.Patrick, the once skeptical com-mander of the 6th InfantryDivision:

Particularly notewor-thy have been the skillfullycoordinated and accurate air

strikes of the SBDs of theMAGD based at MangaldanField. In one strike made on28 February against Mt.Mataba, these Marine pilotsdive-bombed a pinpointedtarget located between twofriendly forces with accuracy

This kind of punishing perfor-mance by the SBDs naturallycaused the Japanese to try to strikeback against them. They resortedto an ingenious ruse. On 2 Marchan enemy bomber, flying veryhigh, appeared over the Marinefield at Mangaldan, causing greatconsternation amongst those onthe ground. Searchlights soughtthe plane; every antiaircraft gunopened up; the troops poured outto watch. Suddenly, roaring in at300 feet, came two bombers, scat-tering antipersonnel and 500-pound bombs on the unsuspectingmen and their planes. This attackresulted in four dead and 78wounded, but it was only a limit-ed blow, for operations continuedas usual.

Despite such episodes, for the45 days preceding their departure,the SBDs had averaged 159 sortiesa day, running up a total of 49.7

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) A700603U.S. Army 37th Infantry Division troops move up Highway 5 on Luzon after aMarine dive bomber attack on enemy hill positions.

1st Marine Aircraft Wing Commander, MajGen Ralph J. Mitchell, confers with aFilipino guerrilla lieutenant in northern Luzon in February 1945.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 112060

17

I.—-

Corsair Action

percent of the individual sortiesby Luzon aircraft with only 13 per-cent of the planes. (It should benoted that many of the AAF mis-sions were time-consuming andlong-range ones, quite differentfrom the continuous requests frominfantry units which directedMarine missions to close-by tar-gets.)

This high level of operationstook place in spite of varioushandicaps: limited radio capacityand limited range for the obsoleteSBDs; no extra auxiliary fuel tanksfor dropping napalm bombs(which burst into flame whenignited by contact); and—although it is hard to believe thatafter 50 years of American militarypresence in the Philippines—theyhad totally inadequate maps.

The combined figures for MAC-24 and -32 for Luzon operationsshowed 8,842 combat missionsand 19,167 bombs dropped.Lieutenant General WalterKrueger, USA, commander of theSixth Army, had this to say:

Commanders haverepeatedly expressed theiradmiration for the pin-pointprecision, the willingnessand enthusiastic desire ofpilots to fly missions fromdawn to dusk and theextremely close liaison withthe ground forces whichcharacterized the operationsof the Marine fighter groups.

Krueger's citation went on tonote the "constant visits" of com-manders and pilots to front lineunits in order observe targets andto gain an understanding of theground soldiers' problems, thecare which Marine commandersand pilots took to insure the "max-imum" number of hits, and the"continuous, devoted work" ofground crews in maintaining anunusually high average of opera-tional planes.

The two fighter groups, MAC-12 and -14, had meanwhile beenequally busy. One of their morebizarre missions occurred on 23February when four planes fromMAG-12's VMF-115 spotted twosmall Japanese submarines on thesurface near Cebu. Missing ontheir first attack, they returned tobase, rearmed, and went aftertheir quarry again. This time,coming in at a 20 -25-foot altitude,they skipped their 1,000-poundbombs along the water's surface.One submarine was hit; "probablyfirst submarine sunk by Corsair,"the squadron reported.

VMF-211 was another squadronin this group. It had been award-ed a Presidential Unit Citation forits heroic, hopeless defense ofWake Island in December 1941.Now the pilots called their succes-sor squadron the "Avengers."One of them, Major Phillip B. May,had a grim experience at this time.While attacking an enemy airfieldon Mindanao on 27 February,Japanese antiaircraft fire disabledhis plane. So he opened the hoodand jumped, landing in a group ofcoconut trees about 100 yards off

18

the runway, while his planeburned about 25 feet away. As hehit the ground, he fell and sawthat his trousers were on fire andthat a piece of shrapnel wasembedded in his left lower leg.May later recalled:

lap bullets were strikingthe trees all around, but theother planes in my flightstarted to strafe around me,holding down the groundtroops who had started afterme. I quickly got out of myparachute harness and rannorth along a path, but raninto a Japanese soldier run-fling toward me. I shot twicewith my .38 pistol, and thelap fell and rolled off the path

He continued to run withoutstopping, falling frequently, untilhe finally dropped down, tiredand thirsty, after an exhaustinghour. Within a few minutes, heheard Japanese voices close by,yelling and screaming, and hequickly began to cover himselfwith grass and leaves. A Japanesesoldier slowly approached, andMay pulled out his pistol and laystill and ready. The man passed

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 92399The F6F Hellcat night fighter represented a new and very successful weapon for theMarine Corps.

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within five feet of him, but did notlook down to where he was lying.Six or seven others in the search-ing squad were spread out over alarge area. Finally they got into atruck and drove off.

Hiding there until dark, May setout on foot again and eventuallycame to Davao Gulf. His storycontinued:

I found a canoe there onstilts. I pulled it out into thewater, climbed in and set out,using a loose seat board for apaddle. . . . After about twohours of steady paddling, Icame upon another smallcraft with two men silhouet-ted against the moonlight. I

could hear them talking, andassumed they were lookingfor me, because there wereseveral other boats dispersedabout 500 feet apart. Istopped, waiting for them tomove on, which they didabout an hour later, and thenpaddled on.

four years. At one point a wholevillage turned out to welcomehim; the mayor made a speechand the villagers clapped andlaughed and came up to shake hishand. They were overjoyed toknow that the Americans wouldsoon drive the Japanese awayfrom the Davao Gulf area. Themayor then sent runners to theguerrilla lines to have an escorttake May to their leader. Thepilot's account went on:

When they arrived thatnight, a squad of barefoot sol-diers loaded with hand

grenades and carrying car-bines, the village had a cele-bration in which I played thedrums in a four-piece"orchestra" and taught them"The Marines' Hymn."

The next morning he was takento the guerrilla's headquarterswhere a doctor treated his leg.They notified the U.S. Navy whichpicked him up three days later in aMartin Mariner PBM (twin-engined seaplane), and returnedhim to his base at Tacloban.

May flew back a few days laterto bring some badly needed med-

Reaching the far shore of thegulf, he started walking to try tofind some fresh water, as he wasnow very thirsty. Finally he cameto a hut with three women, and hekept repeating to them, "I am yourfriend. I am an American." Theylistened to his story, and then gothim some fresh water, insistingthat he go to their hut and rest.The women then informed himthat the Japanese were about threekilometers away, but the guerrillaswere to the north, and they wouldhelp him get to them. May wasdelighted, as he wanted to getback to friendly troops as soon aspossible. The next day two menvolunteered to lead him to theguerrillas, so they started outabout noon.

All along the beach friendlyFilipinos came out to see him andtry to talk with him, for he was thefirst American they had seen in

19

ical supplies to "his guerrillas."His story ended on a horrific note:

During my time at theguerrilla camp, I learned thatthe Taps had tortured andfinally killed about 50Filipinos and their families inthe area where I had beenshot down, for their failure toproduce me.

These varied experiences ofpilots were only part of the wide-ranging activities of the twoCorsair groups flying out of Leyteand Samar. During just the monthof February, MAG-14 flew 1,944sorties and destroyed 12 Japaneseplanes on the ground, as well as 90enemy buildings and 20 vehicles.Similarly, MAG-12, along with itscontinued strikes on Negros andCebu, began reaching out a long320 miles to attack targets onMindanao. These missions gave ita total of 1,838 sorties in February.

With the first phase of Marineaviation on Leyte long gone, andwith the second phase focused onLuzon successfully over, the corn-

plex operations in the southernPhilippines now took center stageas phase three. The Army plannedfive major operations (codenamed VICTOR) to seize eight dif-ferent islands. Marine planeswould be called upon to providefighter cover and landing zonebombing for these, and then tofurnish close air support for bothguerrillas and Army divisions asthey battled the Japanese. Thus,MAGs-24 and -32 would closedown their MAGSDAGUPANoperations on Luzon and move toMindanao when an airfield wasready to receive them. MAG-12,under a new commanding officer,Colonel Verne J. McCaul, wouldleave Leyte to join them. Jeromewould be in charge of all three airgroups. Meanwhile, MAG-14would remain on Samar to sup-port operations on Panay, Cebu,and also Mindanao. The newsquadrons would also play theirpart: Marine Bomber Squadron611 with its North AmericanMitchell PBJ medium bombersand Air Warning Squadron 4 withits electronic capabilities wouldcome into Mindanao early, withAWS-3 joining later.

The attack on Mindanao began

20

in a unique way. A week beforethe first Army landing, twoMarine officers and six enlistedMarines were inserted behindJapanese lines. They were taken toa guerrilla-held airstrip near thetown of Dipolog, 150 miles fromthe main assault objective, Zam-boanga on the far western tip ofMindanao. Within a few days, 16Corsairs were there. on the primi-tive Dipolog field to support theguerrillas, as well as cover thelanding of the 41st InfantryDivision at Zamboanga on D-day,10 March. Also coming ashore onD-day was Jerome; his objectivewas the nearby San Roque airstrip.Taking over that site, the Marinesrenamed it Moret Field afterLieutenant Colonel Paul Moret, awell-known Marine aviator whohad died in a transport crash aftertaking off from Noumea, NewCaledonia in 1943.

Another D-day arrival wasAWS-4. It would set up its radioand radar equipment to serve asthe 76th Fighter Control Center,coordinating air-ground attacks.As one veteran aviator noted,"The air warning squadrons werethe heart and soul of air defenseand air traffic control."

Right behind them cameMcCutcheon. His assignment wasto organize Marine AircraftGroup, Zamboanga (MAGSZAM)at Moret similar to MAGSDAGU-PAN which had been so successfulon Luzon.

On 15 March, the VMF-115fighters of MAG-12 came in fromLeyte. With Japanese air threatsnearing zero, the F4Us would nowshift their emphasis to close airsupport. A Marine aviation historyexplains the plane's versatility:

The Corsairs, althoughdesigned as fighter planes,proved to be well adapted forclose support work. Theyhad three bomb racks capableof carrying a variety of bomb

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 116887

The Army 41st Infantry Division honored MAGSZAJVI for the close air support itreceived in its drive in the Philippines.

S .1

and napalm loadings, andthey were armed with six for-ward-firing machine guns.Faster than the SBDs, theypossessed ample speed to getin and out of a target area in ahurry. Also, since Corsairswere equipped with bothVHF and MHF radio sets,they fitted into the air-ground liaison system easily,without a necessity for addi-tions or alterations to existingequipment.

When combined with the slowspeeds of the L-4 Cub spotterplanes, the fast F4Us were able toget pin-point directions for theirtargets from the jeep radios oftheir ALP. Then the Marine fire-power grew even heavier as theSBDs of MAG-32 came wheelingin from Luzon on 24 March. Thecombination of F4Us and SBDs atMoret again gave the 41st Divisiondaily close air support to theArmy infantrymen. At a ceremonyheld at Moret on 29 March, MajorGeneral Jens A. Doe, USA, com-manding the 41st Division, for-mally presented to Colonel Jeromeand his Marines a plaque whichcommemorated the close coopera-tion between the Army and theMarines.

The plaque was six feet highand four feet wide, with Japanesenaval signal flags, an enemy lightmachine gun, and a silk Japanesebattle flag. The inscription read,"IN APPRECIATION - 41STINFANTRY DIVISION." At thebottom their combined campaignswere listed: Job, Sanga Sanga,Basilan, and Mindanao.

During the ceremony, GeneralDoe spoke of the Marines' "out-standing performance . . . . readi-ness . . . to engage in any mission

their skill and courage as air-men, and their splendid spirit ofcooperation in aiding groundtroops . . . the most effective airsupport yet received . . .

As always in war, there was apainful aspect to this massing ofsquadrons at Moret. FirstLieutenant Charles F Flock laterwrote of the cruel fate of one flightto Mindanao when, on 24 March,Second Lieutenant Charles T. Rue(VMSB-142) encountered enginetrouble off Panay Island:

One of the escorting trans-port planes accompaniedRue's SBD to a point over asmall strip at San Jose on theSW coast of Panay. This striphad been labeled as friendlyaccording to intelligencereports prior to take-off. Rueexecuted a safe landing, andhe and his gunner, SSgtRobert R. Stanton, were seento wave by the pilots in thetransport before it continuedon its way to Zamboanga.(The strip was too short forthe heavily-laden transportto attempt an evacuation ofthe men.)

As it turned out, the strip wasactually in enemy hands, and both

Marines were taken prisoner.Later, when San Jose came underU.S. control, it was establishedthat Rue and Stanton had beenkilled by the Japanese and buriednear the airstrip.

Besides the missions onMindanao, the Marine planes cov-ered the successive landings onBasilan, Panay, Cebu, and Negros.One of the veteran squadrons overCebu was VMF-251 from MAG-14on Samar; it had previously beenawarded the Presidential UnitCitation (PUC) for its superbrecord at Guadalcanal.

The squadron history of VMF-115 describes a memorable occa-sion when it provided close airsupport for guerrillas. This fea-tured one of the most unusual air-ground tactics used during theentire Zamboanga operation. On27 March, in answer to a requestfrom the American officer incharge of the guerrillas, MajorDonald H. Wills, AUS, a divisionof four VMF-115 Corsairs (led byCaptain Rolfe F. Blanchard) wasdispatched to the guerrilla-heldairstrip at Dipolog. About 150 Jap-

2dLt Willard C. Olson, left, and lstLt Winfield S. Sharpe show how Sharpe doubledup in the cockpit of a VMF-1115 Corsair, which supported guerrillas in their rout ofJapanese forces threatening the Dipolog airstrip on Mindanao.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 117637

21

vs

anese troops, armed with kneemortars, a light machine gun, andautomatic rifles, had advanced towithin 16 kilometers of Dipolog.They were well-seasoned troopswho had been moved into the areafrom Zamboanga about fiveweeks earlier. Major Wills felt thatan air strike might boost the Fil-ipino guerrillas' morale and dam-age the enemy at the same time.

However, control of the strikeby normal means was impossible,because there were no maps orphotographs of any kind avail-able, no method for marking tar-gets, and no means of communica-tion with the troops. But VMF-115ingenuity found a way:

Into the cockpit of aMarine Corsair climbedMajor Wills, who was thor-oughly familiar with theenemy positions; after himclimbed the smallest of theMarine pilots in the division,First Lieutenant Winfield S.Sharpe. Both men squeezedinto the narrow confines ofthe cockpit, with Sharpe sit-ting on Wills' lap.

Soon afterward, with the majorpointing out targets to the pilot,Lieutenant Sharpe's Corsair led afour-plane division in six strafingpasses over the enemy's positions.The enemy area was thoroughlystrafed, and the Japanese werecompelled to withdraw.

The Marines' aerial capabilitieswere once again dramaticallyexpanded when VMB-611, with its16 PBJ medium bombers, flew into Moret on 30 March. Besidestheir rocket and bomb capacity, itsPBJs had a massive array of .50-caliber machine guns, plus radar,long-range radio, and extensivenavigational equipment. In a let-ter, one of the squadron co-pilots,First Lieutenant Willis A. Downs,sketched the varied missions ofthis squadron:

During the Philippinecampaign we strafed, bomb-ed, skip bombed, fired rock-ets, photographed, flew ob-servers, were sent on anti-subpatrols, were sent up at nightas night fighters, and bomb-ed at medium altitudes. Infact, one member of VMB-611

shot down with his fixedguns, and using his bomb-sight as a gunsight, aJapanese twin-engine lightbomber.

During early April there weremore Army landings, this time onthe exotically named Sanga-Sangaand Bongao Islands. Bongao wasa little island that commanded theinvasion beach at Tawi Tawi forthe Sanga Sanga landing. The PBJshad instructions to knock out theradar and radio installations, thenstrafe and rocket the barracks areain a night attack. A pilot of VMB-611 remembered years later thesquadron's strike after it solvedthe problem of how to bomb, rock-et, and strafe something it couldnot see in the night:

Then a pilot (nobodyknows who) suggested a sim-ple, yet most ingenious solu-tion. The flight leader wouldload his bombs (I think theywere 500-pounders) with thebottom rack holding a para-chute flare of one million can-dlepower. Each of the otherfive planes in the flightwould load a parachute flarefirst, followed by the bombload.

The tactic was simplicityitself. The flight leaderwould make a dummy run,dropping only his parachuteflare. The second plane in theflight would bomb on thefirst flare, then drop his flare;the third plane would followsuit, followed by the fourthand fifth plane. By the timethe fifth plane dropped hisflare, the flight leader wouldbe in position to drop hisload on the last flare. Itworked to perfection.

As the tempo of air operationson Mindanao rose, so did the useof Moret Field. Before long it

A Marine flight crew arrives to board a VMB-611 North American PBJ mediumbomber (called the B-25 Mitchell by the AAF). Although a late arrival, the squadronmade a major contribution with these planes in the Mindanano campaign.

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 123037

22

housed a total of 299 widely vary-ing types of AAF and Marine air-craft: 96 F4Us, 151 SBDs, 18 PBJs, 2F6Fs, 18 SBCs (Curtis Helidiverdive bomber), I FM (GeneralMotors F4F Wildcat fighter), 2TBFs (Grumann Avenger torpedobomber), 5 R4Ds (Douglas Sky-train cargo plane), and 6 P-61s.

During April, MAG-14 back onSamar continued a heavy round ofmissions on familiar targets: Cebu,Negros, and other islands.Directed by the Thirteenth AirForce on Leyte, the Corsairsreported daily to AAF support airparties, often B-24 heavy bombers,for control of their strikes. In theteeth of poor weather, the groupachieved more than 5,800 flighthours that month.

One pilot on Samar who hadnewly joined VMF-222 had beenawarded a Medal of Honor for hisrecord in the Solomons. CaptainKenneth A. Walsh, a former NAP,joined MAG-14 with a record of 20victories. (He would get number21 at Okinawa later in the war.)

The Army plans for operationsin the southern Philippines werecomplex—there were lots ofJapanese troops on lots of differentislands. Besides the main objectiveof Mindanao, there was a chain ofsmall islands, called the SuluArchipelago, stretching southwestto Borneo. When all of these werecaptured, the life line of oil flow-ing to Japan from the Dutch EastIndies would be severed.

The first target in the chain hadbeen Sanga Sanga. Now it wasJob. On 9 April the 41st Divisionwent ashore there. The division'sprevious close working relation-ship with Marine air had led thecommanding general and then allthe officers of the assault regi-ments to make pre-landing recon-naissance flights on board theSBDs of VMSB-236. Then VMSB-243 took the commanding generalto observe the actual landing.

On Job the Japanese had retired

to the interior and holed up inMount Daho, a defensive strong-point studded with caves and pill-boxes. For a week they held off theinfantry despite artillery fire andrepeated bombing and rocketattacks. One of these, by VMB-611,was later recalled by a veteran:

The first time out intelli-gence . . . ordered a 12-planelow level attack . . . . It's awonder there weren't somemid-air collisions. We weretooling along at 250 feetalongside Mount Daho whenthe concussion of one bombalmost blew us out of the air.We strafed the top of themountain, the target being ahuge buried tank. My guesswas a water tank of sorts. Thetracers just ricocheted harm-lessly off the silver-lookingobject. The entire missionwas a dangerous fiasco.

23

The problem was finally solvedwhen one of the PBJ pilots offereda simple solution, "Why not go inat 8,000 feet and drop 1,000pounders on it and cave the damnthing in." The veteran continued:

So back we came a dayor so later. Six of us this time

[Our bombardier] tookhis time and "walked" histhree [bombs] right across thetop of the mountain .

Some of the others got twobig ones on top, some onlyone. But all six planes hit it.Results? They walked upMount Daho the next day.Over 400 defending JapaneseImperial Marines had ceasedto exist.

Meanwhile, on Mindanao, theMarines, carrying out instructionsto support the guerrillas, flewdaily sorties from the Moret and

The Secretary of the Navy takes pleasure in commending

MARINE AIRCRAFT GROUPS, ZAMBOANGA

consisting of the following Marine Aircraft Groups:

Marine Aircraft Group Twelve — March 10 - June 30, 1945Marine Aircraft Group Thirty Two — March 16 - June 30, 1945Marine Aircraft Group Twenty Four — April 11 - June 30, 1945

for service as set forth in the following citation:

"For exceptionally meritorious service and outstanding heroism insupport of elements of the Eighth Army during operations againstenemy Japanese forces on Mindanao, Philippine Islands, and in the SuluArchipelago. After landing with the assault forces, Marine Air Groups,Zamboanga, effected wide coverage of battle areas in flights madeextremely hazardous by dense jungles, precipitous cloud-obscuredmountains and adverse weather conditions.

The gallant officers and men of these groups penetrated hostiledefenses to press relentless attacks and reduce vital enemy targets, dis-rupt communications and troop concentrations, and destroy ammuni-tion and fuel dumps despite intense antiaircraft fire over Japanese objec-tives. The vital service rendered during these campaigns in providingconvoy cover, fighter defense and close aerial support of ground forces isevidence of the courage, skill and devotion to duty of the pilots, air-crewmen and ground personnel operating as a well coordinated team,and reflects the highest credit upon Marine Aircraft Groups, Zamboanga,and the United States Naval Service."

Dipolog fields. They worked inclose conjunction with theFilipinos under the leadership ofan American, Colonel Wendell W.Fertig, USA. When the Americansurrender in the Philippinesoccurred in 1942, Fertig took to thehills. With radio contact withMacArthur's far-away headquar-ters and supplies smuggled in bysubmarine or air or small boats, hebuilt his guerrilla force. ByFebruary of 1945, he had 33,000men under his command, with16,000 of them armed. Their com-bined efforts provided crucialinformation which changed thewhole landing plan for the Army'snext thrust, this time on the otherside of Mindanao.

As Fertig later recalled:

By February 1945, advanceplanning by X Corps indicat-ed that the initial landing onthe south coast of Mindanaowould be made in the vicini-ty of Parang. With the assis-tance of MAC Zambo, theguerrillas were able to elimi-nate the strong Japanese gar-risons at both Parang and

Malabang. This action pre-sented X Corps with a freebeachhead when they landedon 17 April 1945. It wouldhave been impossible for theguerrillas to have completedthe elimination of the Ja-panese garrisons without theassistance of the Marine AirGroups, since the guerrillatroops were not equippedwith artillery.

The key Marine in this intelli-gence coup, the man who gath-ered the vital information on thesituation ashore and then got it tothe ears of the X Corps comman-der, was none other thanMcCutcheon. He had flown downfrom Mindoro, borrowed an SBDat Moret, and took off to meet theguerrillas. The events that fol-lowed brought him an award of aSilver Star Medal by the Army.The citation read in part:

For gallantry in actionagainst the enemy . . . . Hearrived at the airfield fivedays prior to the landings ofAmerican forces. During the

24

ensuing five days, from posi-tions within close range ofenemy machine gun andmortar fire and with utterdisregard for his own safety,he reported the situation tothe landing force afloat,briefed pilots and supervisedthe direction of air strikes

Then, flying back to Zamboan-ga, McCutcheon got in a smallboat, put to sea, and interceptedthe Mindanao invasion convoy.His citation continued:

His accurate informa-tion transmitted to the taskforce commander afloat en-abled the formulation ofamended plans and resultedin an unopposed landing onthe Malabang area [i.e., near-by Parangi.

Thus the landing took place atParang 17 miles south of Mala-bang on 17 April. AWS-3 was thefirst Marine unit ashore and short-ly became the 77th Fighter ControlCenter. With its two radar searchsets and eight radio channels, it

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 117638

Filipino guerrillas at Titcomb Field, Malabang, Mindanao, joyfully greet the Marine pilots who came to their aid.

-r

provided a valuable resource forincreasing the number and effi-ciency of air strikes.

Of course, this Army landingwas covered by Marine planes fly-ing from their strips on the otherside of Mindanao. One of thatday's missions was by VMB-611,and one of its pilots laterdescribed what his flight encoun-tered:

What happened in the nextfew minutes was a mae!-strom of bullets, shells, andbombs. A Japanese 90 mil-limeter cannon began pep-pering away at us from itshiding place in the mouth ofa large cave. Events movedtoo quickly to give an accu-rate accounting. What wassupposed to be a single passor two, turned into a wildmelee. We all lost track of thenumber of passes.

Finally, a 7.7 machine gunbullet whined through ouropen cockpit window andout the windshield, and con-vinced me the Japanese hadthe range. It was time toabandon the area. Luckily, allplanes escaped, althougheach was badly holed.

Once the strip at Malabang wasavailable, the Marines poured inthe dive bombers of MAG-24,which arrived on 20 April fromLuzon. One of the first actionstaken was to name the stripTitcomb Field in honor of CaptainJohn A. Titcomb, killed while serv-ing in an ALP on Luzon. Oper-ations from there used new proce-dures. The Army's X Corps had 12forward air control teams direct-ing strikes for two different divi-sions (24th and 31st). More-over,there was a pattern of having aconstant air alert overhead for theinfantry. Working with the 24thDivision, for instance, MAG-24had a flight report in to the sup-

port air party every hour on thehour from 0800 to 1600 each day

Describing the concentratedstrikes in central Mindanao, one ofthe pilots, First Lieutenant Thur-ston P. Gilchrist, said:

This was the most heav-ily bombed area of any in thewhole Philippine campaign.The Japs were dug in under-neath trees and in foxholes sowell that we had to blow upthe whole area before theArmy could advance. OurMarine observers, who werewith the ground liaison partyin this area, said the damagewas terrible and almost inde-scribable. Flight after flight ofplanes bombed and strafedthis small area for days.When we began it was aheavily wooded area andwhen we finished there was-n't. . . anything left but a fewdenuded trees.

The operations numbers for theF4Us told the same story of relent-less attack; during February,March, and April the Corsairs ofMAG-12 and -14 flew 29,836 hourson 11,642 sorties and destroyed 31planes of the vanishing Japaneseair strength.

For one of their squadrons,VMF-218, this marked a final

phase in a diverse range of mis-sions since it had first arrived inthe Philippines. Beginning back inDecember, the squadron hadpatrolled the air over shipping inLeyte Gulf and Ormoc Bay; hadflown cover over American con-voys in various Philippine waters;had escorted South Pacific Com-bat Air Transport (SCAT) planesover Ormoc where they had drop-ped supplies to ground troops;had flown cover for Army groundforces on Mindoro and CebuIslands; had covered the landingby Army troops at Zamboanga;had chalked up a number of closesupport missions on Mindanao;had escorted rescue planes; hadescorted transport planes toMindanao; had provided air coverfor SBD strikes; and had regularlybeen on combat air patrols.

In addition, it had made manyclose-in strikes on southernLuzon, strafing enemy targets anddestroying parked planes, railroadrolling stock, ammunition dumps,and oil storage tanks.

MAG-14 received a tribute fromLieutenant General Robert L.Eichelberger, Commanding Gen-eral, Eighth Army, in which henoted its "outstanding perfor-mance . . . against the enemy atLeyte, Samar, Palawan, Panay,Cebu, and Negros, PhilippineIslands." He added, "The enthusi-

The Douglas R4D Skyt rain—known in its civilian guise as the DC-3—was the work-horse for a wide variety of missions while being flown by MAG-25, the South PacificCombat Air Transport Command (SCAT).

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 108687

25

asm of commanders and pilots,their interest in the ground situa-tion and their eagerness to try anymethod which might increase theeffectiveness of close air support,were responsible in a large mea-sure for keeping casualties at aminimum among ground combattroops."

On 30 April, Marine planesused napalm bombs for the firsttime on Mindanao. Hitting a hillnear the major town of Davao, thefire was terrifyingly effective. TheX Corps reported:

From this time on, firefrom the air was available,with strikes as large as thirty-two 165-gallon tanks beingdropped on a target. In sever-al instances, entire enemyplatoons were burned in theirpositions and in other cases,flaming Japanese fled frompositions, only to encountermachine gun fire fromground troops.

As the two Army divisionsslugged their way acrossMindanao, the PBJs of \TMB-611helped the 31st crack a tough nut.It was a strike near the MalitaRiver that paid off handsomely.The Japanese were holed up in atown that controlled a road. Whenthe Marine fighter planes wouldcome over, the Japanese woulddive into a deep gorge that ranalongside the town. When thefighters left, the Japanese wouldresume their defensive positions.Then someone suggested a coordi-nated attack with both the fightersand the PBJs. One of the pilotslater remembered:

We were loaded with eight250-pound bombs. The attackwas to be low level. . . . Theravine had a big bend in itnear the road. The key was toget as many bombs in it aspossible, dropping in train.

The fighters chased the Japsinto the ravine as we came inlow, bomb bay doors open.

When the fighters had passedover, the enemy reemerged— onlyto find the Marine mediumbombers boring in on them. ThePBJ pilot continued:

our observer, yelled"Purrfect!" It seems the firstbomb hit a small knoll andskipped into the ravine, andthe rest of the load "walked"right up the ravine. It was alucky drop. All the others gottheir loads in the ravine aswell. Results? The entire Jap-anese force was either killedor so severely shocked fromthe concussions they wereunable to defend the town.

On 8 May, VMSBs-241 and -133flew what one squadron reporttermed "the closest support mis-sion yet flown." The Japaneselines were only 200 yards from theinfantrymen of the 31st Division,and the enemy was unyielding.Marked with smoke, the tiny tar-get area was plastered with nearlyfive tons of bombs, and theJapanese position simply disinte-grated.

As the end of the Mindanaocampaign loomed in May, therewere many changes for the Marineaviators. VMSB-244 said farewellto the venerable SBD and was re-equipped with the new SB2CCurtis Heildiver. It was 20 knotsfaster, more heavily armed, andequipped with rockets. (When theSBD was officially retired on 16July after its long and productivecareer, VMSB-244 became the onlysquadron of MAG-24 to remainactive.)

The month of May also broughtthe new F4U-4 to the fightersquadrons, and with it came 41more miles per hour of top speed(446 mph).

26

On 15 May, operations endedfor MAG-14 on Samar. During itsshort four months stay there, ithad amassed a total of 22,671 com-bat hours, 7,396 sorties, anddestroyed 28 Japanese planes onthe ground. On 7 June it flew off tojoin the battle then raging onOkinawa.

That month also saw the lastserious operations and the mostmassive strike yet. On 21 June, the31st Division was facing the threatof a major Japanese troop build-up, so 148 dive bombers and fight-er bombers were called in to drop75 tons of bombs during a four-hour span. Reports afterward esti-mated 500 enemy killed.

With this kind of help, it is notsurprising that Major GeneralClarence A. Martin, commander ofthe 31st, made an official reportabout the "invaluable assistance"of MAGs -12, -24, and -32.

The other division that foughtits way across Mindanao, the 24thInfantry, had identical feelingsabout its Marine air support. Itscommander, Major General RoscoB. Woodruff, also issued a lengthytribute, applauding sorties "flyingover enemy territory in the face ofenemy anti-aircraft fire . . . flownwith determination and couragein spite of losses from enemy fire.Many missions were flown atgreat risk because of unfavorableweather conditions. . .

Amidst this pattern of intensiveclose air support, a sad, and ex-ceedingly rare, tragedy occurredon one mission in support of the24th Division. The Marine aircoordinator used a system todirect the strike, "Bomb on mybomb!" That day, however, theflight leaders mistook Japaneseartillery bursts for the signal bomband 32 men of the division werekilled and wounded. WhenJerome went to see Woodruff toexpress the Marines' sorrow at theaccident, the Army general agreedthat it was most unfortunate, but

Turning Point

nevertheless he would continue torely on MAGSZAM for close airsupport.

On 30 June, Eichelbergerdeclared the Mindanao campaigncompleted (although 2,235 Jap-anese would be killed in the ensu-ing six weeks). The total opera-tional figures for all Marine avia-tion squadrons on the island wereformidable: more than 20,000 sor-ties in 10,406 combat missions forthe X Corps, with 4,800 tons ofbombs dropped, accompanied bynearly 1,300 5-inch rockets.

The final recognition of theremarkable Marine performancethroughout all the PhilippineIslands came from the top.Eichelberger said, "The value ofclose support for ground troops asprovided by these Marine flyerscannot be measured in words andthere is not enough that can besaid for their aerial barrages thathave cut a path for the infantry.From all quarters, commandersdown to the men with the bayo-nets, I have heard nothing buthigh tribute."

The last mission for MAG-SZAM came in covering one morelanding (at Sarangani Bay) of theirfriends, the 24th Division, on 12July. On 1 August, MAG-24 wasdismembered with the decommis-sioning of VMSBs-133, -236, and -241.

There was one final extraordi-nary episode which took place in astrike by VMB-611 on 9 August. AJapanese lieutenant, who had sur-rendered, went in one of its PBJsand guided them to their exact tar-get.

The surrender of Japan on 15August was preceded (on 4August) by an order from the AAFfor the 1st MAW to move up fromBougainville to Zamboanga. Itwas ironic that Mitchell andJerome, the two men who hadbeen so crucial in the Philippineassignment were now gone—backin the United States for a well-

earned leave. Simultaneously, vet-eran squadron flyers were goinghome, and new commanding offi-cers were taking over units thatremained on active duty.

On 30 August, MAGSZAM wasdissolved (but MAGs-12, -24, and-32 would live on to see duty inChina after the war). The 1stMAW would move after the battleto China.

The Philippine campaign trulymarked a turning point in two dif-ferent ways. First, in strategicresults: the severance of Japan'svital supply lines; the eliminationof 400,000 enemy troops and enor-mous numbers of their planes andpilots; the freeing of the Filipinopeople from a brutal tyranny; andthe American acquisition of multi-ple bases to carry the war towardthe Japanese homeland.

Secondly, the campaign was awatershed for Marine aviation.After the Solomons campaign ithad been relegated to milk runs inthe backwaters of the Solomonsand the by-passed areas of theCentral Pacific. Then it had beenshoe-horned in by happenstance

with a few planes six weeks afterthe original landing in thePhilippines. However, the Marineaerial effort grew and grew untilthere were 18 squadrons in con-stant action at the end of thePhilippine campaign. Thus, itcame to constitute a major elementin an operation which was, never-theless, primarily an Army show.

Beyond the quantitative as-pects, there lay more significantqualitative results for Marine avia-tion. A previously sketchy doc-trine of close air support had beenfleshed out, refined, and honed incombat. The infrequent examplesof it in the past had been super-seded by precision missions run-ning in the end into the thousands.Cooperation with another ser-vice—the Army—had begun on asmall scale in an atmosphere ofskepticism and evolved into wide-spread intimate interdependence,with MAG-12, as just one exam-ple, supporting 26 Army landings.

And so the accolades eventuallycame in the form of more than 30letters of commendation and ap-preciation from every Army com-mand level. Whether Corsairs orSBDs, the Marine doctrine of close

Col Warren E. Sweetser, Jr., left, commanded MAG-24 in June 1945. His executiveofficer, LtCol John H. Earle, Jr., is on the right.

Col Warren E. Sweetser, Jr., CollectionC

27

• - • '_•- -t

Marine Aircraft in the Philippines

Designation Manufacturer

CombatHorse

Maximum 'Power atSpeed i sea level

Range Armament Crew Name

F4U1D',FG—1Fighter

PBJ—1DMedium-bomber

Chance-Vought,Goodyear

•

865 knots 2250 850 Nautical miles(without Auxiliarytanks)

6—50 cal. (2400rounds of ammu-nition)2—100 lb. bombs8—5" 1Ockets

Pilot Corsair

North American 238 knots 2—1700 1,326 Nautical miles(without Auxiliarygas tanks)

Maximum load:2800 lbs. of bombsand Rockets

PilotCo-PilotNavigator3 gunners

Mitchell

SBD—6 DouglasDive-bomber

I

234 knots 1300 1,100 Nautical miles 2—50 cal. (860rounds of ammu-nition)2—30 cal. (2000rounds)

PilotGunner

Dauntless

SB2C—4Dive-bomber

Curtis-Wright 256 knots 1750 1,197 Nautical mileswith 1,600 lbs. ofbombs and 2 Aux-iliary tanks

2—20mm. (400rounds of ammu-nition)

2—30 cal. (2000rounds)

1—i 600 lb. bomb2—500 lb. bombs

8—5" Rockets

PilotGunner

Helidiver

Explanation of squadron designations:Preceded by letters V (Heavier-than-Air) and M (Marine); the letters alone or in combination indicate type

squadrons using the planes:F—Fighter. S—Scout. B—Bomber. R—Transport. J—Utility.

Example: VMF—115; Marine Fighting Squadron No. 115.F4U—1D: F—Fighter, 4—Fourth model of this fighter, U—Manufactured by Chance-Vought, 1—D—Modification

of this series.'FG—l: Goodyear version of the Corsair.'Night fighter Version.

air support had been validated.Acknowledgement of this came

in a final evaluation by Eichel-berger. He commented that the"superb" accomplishments ofMarine air stemmed in part fromthe Marine liaison officers [who]were "always in front lines" withthe infantry commanders. Theywere as familiar with the forwardpositions as was the infantry. Byradio they guided in the planes,and often the target of the strikewas no more than 300 yards aheadof the "huddled doughboys."

The official Marine Corps histo-ry of World War II made thisobservation:

A radical departurefrom orthodox methods wasthe adoption of direct com-munications between pilotsand ground-based air liaisonparties. The performance ofMarine aviators on LuzonIsland and in the SouthernPhilippines was to become anoutstanding chapter in a longhistory of excellent achieve-

28

ments, combining rawcourage with skill and flexi-bility. The activities of Marineair in the Philippines consti-tuted one of the few opportu-nities that Marine air groupshad to show their skill inclose air support.

The record is clear, and therecan be no doubt that Marine closeair support contributed to the U.S.victory in the Philippines cam-paign.

GrummanF6F-3N3Fighter

R4D-5Transport

313 knots 2250

Douglas

1,100 Nautical mileswith 1—150 gal.Auxiliary tank

200 knots 2—1 050 1,555 Nautical miles

6—50 cal. (2400rounds of ammu-nition)

Pilot Hellcat

None (will carry27 troops withcombat gear)

SkytrainPilotCo-PilotRadioman

There are three main sources for Ma-rine aviation operations in the Philip-pines. They are: 1. George W. Garand andTruman R. Strobridge, Western PacificOperations, vol IV, History of U.S. MarineCorps Operations in World War II(Washington: Historical Division, Head-quarters, USMC, 1971). 2. Maj Charles W.Boggs, Jr., USMC, Marine Aviation in thePhilippines (Washington: Historical Di-vision, Headquarters, USMC, 1951). 3.

Robert E. Sherrod, History of Marine CorpsAviation in World War II, (Washington:Combat Forces Press, 1952).

In addition to these, there is a morepopularized account in John A. DeChant,Devilbirds (New York: Harper & Brothers,1947). A brief summary may be found inJeter A. Isely and Philip A. Crowl, TheU.S. Marines and Amphibious War (Prince-ton: Princeton University Press, 1951).

There are references to Marine avia-tion scattered throughout the officialArmy history of the Luzon andMindanao campaigns: Robert RossSmith, Trumph in the Philippines—UnitedStates Army in World War II— The War inthe Pacific, vol X, (Washington: Office ofthe Chief of Military History, Departmentof the Army, 1963).

A large collection of LtGen Keith A.McCutheon's personal papers can befound in the Personal Papers Collectionof the MCHC (Box 5A 33) and his reporton close air support in the Philippines canbe found as enclosure A to "Air SupportReports," Headquarters, USMC.

Also in Personal Papers is some usefulmaterial from SSgt Paul Ant (Box 2B 35,Bx 4), Capt Elton A. Barnum (Box 4A 42),Col Warren E. Sweetser, Jr. (Box 3A 37, Bx3), and TSgt John W. Andre (Box 5B 26, Bx1911).

The Reference Section files at theMCHC proved invaluable, both for pho-tographs and doumentation. The latterincludes two summary studies by theIntelligence Section, Division of Aviation,Headquarters, USMC. One is "MarineDive Bombers in the Philippines," whichcovers the VMSB operations in February1945 on Luzon, written in May 1945. Theother, written in June 1945, is "MarineFighter Squadrons in the Philippines,"which covers the VMF Corsair operationsof period February-April 1945. In addi-tion, the individual files for the groupsand squadrons were helpful. VMB-611,for instance, printed a brochure for asquadron reunion with some of its pilots'memories of missions.

Captain John C. Chapin earned a bachelor of artsdegree with honors in history from Yale Uni-

versity in 1942 and was commissioned later thatyear. He served as a rifle platoon leader in the 24thMarines, 4th Marine Division, and was wounded inaction during assault landings on Roi-Namur andSaipan.

Transferred to duty at the Historical Division,Headquarters Marine Corps, he wrote the first offi-cial histories of the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions.Moving to Reserve status at the end of World War II,he earned a master's degree in history at George

Washington University with a thesis on "The Marine Occupation of Haiti, 1915-1922."Now a captain in retired status, he has been a volunteer at the Marine Corps

Historical Center for 12 years. During that time he wrote History of Marine Fighter-Attack(VMFA) Squadron 115. With support from the Historical Center and the Marine CorpsHistorical Foundation, he then spent some years researching and interviewing for thewriting of a new book, Uncommon Men: The Sergeants Major of the Marine Corps, pub-lished in 1992 by the White Mane Publishing Company.

Subsequently, he wrote four monographs for this series of historical pamphlets, com-memorating the campaigns for the Marshalls, Saipan, Bougainville, and MarineAviation in the Philippines operations.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing OfficeSuperintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISBN 0-16-049374-9

•

WORLD WAR II

/ A'ci.vvwu d9/J5

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines in theWorld War II era, is published for the education and training of Marines bythe History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance ofthe 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

Editorial costs of preparing this pamphlet have been defrayed in part bya grant from the Marine Corps Historical Foundation.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIESDIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)GENERAL EDITOR,

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATiVE SERIESBenis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISIONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist;

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1997

PCN 19000314300

About the Author