Anatomy of a chief executive

Roman rootsLiebert (2012) argues that the roman emperor was the first executive, not

necessarily because he embodied power like Machiavelli’s “prince,” but because Rome’s republican regime put him in a compromise position that is neither wholly republican nor wholly imperial. The republic, or at least as how the Romans conceived it, paved the way for an individual whose power borders on tyranny yet rules in the noble mantle of popular service. History tells of how in the early first century Rome’s provinces were infested with pirates which at that time was considered distinctive since the attacks were directed against what would be an equivalent of a superpower in modern times. Fed up with escalating grain prices that the pirate raids had caused, the Roman public, in a tone that is eerily familiar in present time, demanded that the senate declare a global war on piracy. Waging war on such a widespread and elusive enemy, however, required a leader far more potent than provincial governors or republican dictators. Piracy has become both a social problem and a universal evil, and as such, required a solution that altered the political form of the Roman republic. Success at these campaigns, however, would also change the image of the one at the forefront as citizens began to praise leaders in worshipful tones as the Roman territorial reach expanded in the aftermath of these campaigns. It is said that Roman emperors such as Augustus were able to radically consolidate formal power by posing as the executor of popular will rather than the executioner of republican government.

American model of presidencyThe question of whom to entrust power and to what extent, which preoccupied the

Roman senate of old, interestingly also became a hotly debated question among the framers of the US Constitution in 1787. Critics saw the grant of executive to a single individual as dangerous in the light of abuses by past executives—particularly, British monarchs and colonial governors (Edwards and Wayne 1999). In the end, the early framers chose to check the powers they deemed most dangerous such as the power of appointment, the power to declare war, and the power to make treaties. Responsible exercise of power was encouraged by providing reelection. Abuse, meanwhile, would be check by the clause on impeachment.

In fact, throughout most of the nineteenth century, it was Congress, not the president who dominated the administration of government. Statutes pretty much provided the organizational details of departments, their jurisdiction, and even operating procedures. This began to change at the outset of the twentieth century, however, as a consequence of the president’s growing influence in Congress. With growing influence came a change of expectations, creating for the president roles and criteria for which his leadership is judged. In the past people did not look to the president to solve most of society’s problems. Nowadays, however, it is commonplace for the president to be the chief architect of the nation’s fate during the years he is elected to office.

The notion of a dominant president who moves the country and the government through effective leadership has deep roots in American political culture. This view, in fact, shapes the expectations and evaluation of the individuals who have occupied the oval office. But what if presidential leadership is not really as preeminent as people

think? What if in reality it is not as powerful as conventional wisdom would have us believe?

Presidential power hinges on two important constructions familiar to students of government: separation of power and checks and balances. Through these constructions, the US Constitution structure executive-legislative rivalry into the very system of American policymaking. The American president is without doubt powerful. In fact the early Federalists had long recognized the prerogatives that make the person at the oval office the first among so-called equals (Tatalovich and Engenman 2003). The president exercises power of nomination in the executive and judicial branches. He can advise and inform Congress of policy goals through the State of the Union. The power to receive ambassadors is tantamount to the power to recognize new nations. The power to appoint heads of missions, negotiate treaties and receive ambassadors makes the executive the preponderant power in foreign affairs. Veto is regarded as the greatest presidential prerogative with respect to Congress (the power of qualified negative). Its exercise is prophylactic in that it encourages good legislation by forcing Congress to deliberate with a branch that will enforce policies. Despite these, however, the US Congress appears to play a dominant role in major public policy initiatives. Although policy proposals from the president and executive agencies are accorded priority consideration, Congress appears to say no as often as it concedes to executive agenda (Mezey 1991).

Latin American presidentsIn a similar vein, the chief executive is also typically regarded as dominant in

many scholarly studies on Latin America, even those that focus on the legislatures. Part of the reason, according to Siavelis (2012), is the way in which these studies defineslegislative power. Studies typically emphasize balance of power, positing a direct zero sum game between the legislative and the executive branches, overlooking the real potential that the legislatures have. The focus on the static powers of the two branches also creates a static view of legislative power and ignores the reality of shifting influence and the true nature and extent of presidential support in Congress.

Using data consisting of congressional initiatives in Chile, Siavelis argues that contrary to the strong temptation to conclude the legislature as a rubber stamp to the executive, they are actually more influential than what a concrete reading of the constitutional guarantees of power suggests.

Even though personal qualities, ideology, history and cultural factors can shape the way presidents govern, institutions remain to be as important in explaining why presidents pursue a certain incentive or behavior. There are those that are driven by the pursuit of the common good while taking into account the broad interests of the majority. There are also those who are driven by personal and political goals. Either way, the powers of the president as laid down by institutional structures and rules determine the strategic actions he may take and the type of transactions he or she may engage in with respect to legislatures, both allies and opponents alike.

Presidential powers may either be constitutional or partisan (see Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Constitutional powers make it easirer for the president to take decisive action when necessary (say, in an emergency or economic shock) but exposes policymaking to whims and accommodation. Constitutional powers may be legislative or non-legislative. In Latin American countries, a president’s

legislative power typically includes the package veto, the partial (line item veto, the power to issue decrees or declare a bill urgent, the exclusive initiative of legislation, budgetary powers and the power to call a plebiscite or referendum. Its exercise may be reactive or proactive. The president, for instance, may obtain policies closest to his preferences by threatening to veto the legislature, issuing decrees to bypass the legislature, or by resorting to consult the citizenry through referendums particularly to bypass legislative opposition to bills that have wide popular support. Non-legislative powers include the power to nominate, appoint and dismiss officials. The rules for cabinet formation and dismissal also have an effect on the relationship between the executive and the legislative. For instance, if the legislature exercises power in the appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers they can use it as a bargaining mechanism with the executive. Another bargaining chip is the power to impeach the president.

Partisan powers relate to the degree of support of the president in Congress. This is typically measured in terms of the size of the president’s legislative contingent (allies) and the strength of party discipline (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).

Philippine presidentsThe Philippine president possesses a number of characteristics familiar to chief

executives in the Latin American context, as well as those of the American president due to the Philippines’ historical and political milieu.

Former colonies of what once were Mercantilist monarchies like Spain and Portugal opted for presidential regimes instead of parliamentary systems which are more popular in Europe. This has been the case in many Latin American countries, which like the Philippines, had been former colonies of the Spanish crown. In fact, the Philippines share many things in common with its Latin American counterparts other than culture.

Ferdinand Magellan’s arrival in March 16, 1521 in what is now part of Samar province is typically regarded as the Philippines’s first recorded visit from the West, although it was not necessarily the first. Spanish settlement and colonization, however, began with the arrival of Miguel Lopez de Legazpi in 1565 who established the first permanent Spanish settlement in Cebu. Legazpi’s expedition pushed northward reaching Luzon, establishing a new town in Manila, and eventually paved the way for the colonization of the archipelago for three centuries. Spanish rule somehow was able to unify most of the archipelago previously composed of independent sultanates and communities. Ruy Lopez de Villalobos who preceded Legazpi named the islands Las Islas Filipinas in honor of Prince Philip of Asturias, who would later become King Philip II. Spain introduced not just its religion but its legal system and for a time the archipelago served as an important and strategic territory for the Spanish crown. However, even prior to the advent of the West, the people were already organized into a system with their own set of laws and forms of government. The barangay, the basic unit of governance in the Philippines, in fact, was a reinvention of the ancient system of government prevalent in Filipino pre-Hispanic communities.

Although our focus is on legislative dynamics under a presidential system, it is important to make a distinction between a presidential and parliamentary system to introduce the literature. A presidential system is typically regarded to be more stable than parliamentary systems where government can change more frequently. Scartascini (2008) argues, however, that presidential systems are actually more unstable because when

changes occur they usually involve either a democratic breakdown or a major reshuffling of government. Some even consider this as one of the main factors for the breakdown of democratic regimes in many Latin American countries (Linz and Valenzuela 2004). The choice between presidential and parliamentary systems apparently have important consequences for policymaking not only because it can determine the stability of institutions involved in the policy process, but also the type of exchanges between the executive and the legislative and their bargaining prerogatives.

Executive-legislative relationshipOne of the most difficult tasks before the president is probably the need to get

Congress to support policies. Presidents need Congress because by constitutional structure he cannot act without its consent. The power to create laws is generally vested in the legislature. In the Philippines, in fact, only a member of Congress can introduce measures. If the president were to declare a state of war, he again needs the consent of Congress to declare its necessity. The treaties he enters needs the concurrence of the Senate to become binding before the international community. Appropriation measures, on the other hand, can only originate from the House of Representatives. Moreover, the appointments he makes to fill his cabinet needs the confirmation of both chambers of Congress.

Representatives and senators of the president’s party typically form the core of the coalition supporting the president’s program. Hence, leading his party in Congress is essential for the president to avoid the conflict that naturally arises because of the constitutional guarantees toward check and balance.

Executive-legislative interaction in the PhilippinesA brief review of the powers of Congress provided in the 1987 Philippine

Constitution readily shows its independence as a co-equal and separate branch. The president, by constitutional structure, cannot dissolve the legislature nor compel its action. However, in the Philippines there is also a lingering perception of dominance by the executive, partly due to a history of having been under authoritarian regime, and partly because the public has widely regarded the office of the president as the center of government decision making.

It is worth mentioning that the constitution as an organic law providing for the constitutional structures and powers of government had undergone several overhauls primarily targeted to expand (as in the 1973 Constitution) or curtail (as in the present 1987 Constitution) the powers of the president. In paper, it must be pointed out, the president under the current constitution is not extraordinarily strong compared to the legislative.

Qualification, term of office and powers of the Philippine president Section 2 Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution states that in order to qualify to run as president a person must be a natural born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least 40 years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least 10 years immediately preceding such election. The president and the vice president under Philippine law are elected by direct vote of the people for a term of six years. If a vacancy occurs in either seat more than 18 months prior to the next

presidential election, Congress is mandated to call for a special election in accordance with Sec 10, Article VII of the Constitution.

However, unlike his counterpart in the American and most Latin American systems, the Philippine president is not legible for “any” reelection.1 Also, no person who has “succeeded” as president and has served as such for more than four years shall be qualified to run again as president.

The president is entitled to an official residence, the Malacanang Palace. But like all elective official, a president is barred from any pecuniary or business interest with any instrumentality of the government. He is also barred from appointing relatives within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity to top positions in government, including constitutional commissions and government corporations. A president may not hold any other public office during his incumbency, except another cabinet post.2 The president sits as chief economic planner (chairman of the National Economic Development Authority) under Sec. 9 Article VII of the Constitution.

The constitution provides the president with various powers both actual and residual, which can be summed up in the following:

a. General powers of execution, control, and supervisionUnder the constitution, the president wields the power to execute, administer and

carry out laws within the standard imposed by the legislature (executive power). Executive power includes control of the executive departments since technically the various executive and administrative organs are mere adjuncts of the executive department. Cabinet officials and bureau heads are mere agents of the chief executive.3

The president also exercises general supervision over local governments including the autonomous regions (e.g. Autonomour Region of Muslim Mindanao) to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed. Supervision, however, simply means oversight and does not include the power to overrule the acts of local chief executives if the acts are within their discretion.

b. Appointive powersThe Philippine president is vested with appointive powers, subject to the consent

of Congress through the Commission on Appointments in some cases. The president may appoint heads of executive departments, ambassadors, consuls, officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain, but their appointment requires the confirmation of the Commission on Appointments. Officers of lower rank need not have the consent of this congressional confirmation body and may be directly appointed by the president.

1 The word “any” in this case has become an ambiguity of sorts. The law is silent as to whether a sitting president can be reelected for a lower office. Constitutionalist Fr. Joaquin Bernas, one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, believes there is no prohibition. And of course, “what is not prohibited, whether expressly or implicitly, is allowed” (see Congresswoman or VP Arroyo?,” The Philippine Daily Inquirer, Nov. 8, 2009). Former Gloria Macapagal Arroyo’s uncontested victory as representative of the 2nd district of Pampanga, in other words, has practically settled this controversy.2 This is because any cabinet department is but a mere extension of the executive, according to the Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency. 3 Free Telephone Workers Union v Ministry of Labor, GR L-58184, October 30, 1981.

The president can even make appointments while Congress is in recess but such appointment is effective only until the disapproval of the Commission on Appointments or until Congress’ next adjournment.4 There are other prohibitions to the president’s appointive powers. For instance, the president cannot make midnight appointments—those done within two months prior to the next presidential elections. However, this applies only to the president and does not extend to local elective officials. Local elective officials, though under the supervision of the president, are not prohibited from making appointments during the last day of their tenure.5

A distinction must be made between regular appointments and ad-interim appointments. Regular appointments are those made by the chief executive while Congress is in session. This takes effect only upon confirmation by the Commission on Appointments. Once approved, tenure is only until the end of the term of the appointee. Ad interim appointments, on the other hand, are those made while Congress is not in session. These appointments take effect immediately but ceases once disapproved by Congress or upon the next adjournment of Congress.

c. Executive clemenciesThe president may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, as well as, remit

fines and forfeitures.6 The president also has the power to grant amnesty but must have the concurrence of majority of all members of Congress.

d. Powers as commander in chiefAs commander in chief, the president may call upon the armed forces to prevent

or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion (although this is merely a police measure meant to quell disorder). In the event of an invasion or rebellion, the president may even suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declare martial over any part of the Philippines (valid only for 60 days). The immediate effect of the suspension of the privilege of the writ is that persons suspected of rebellion or connected with invasion can be arrested and detained without warrant. If martial law is declared, the president can legislate, and order the arrest of people who obstruct the war effort. But all these, of course, are subject to judicial review to determine whether there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the president.7 The president can also lift the suspension or proclamation himself.

Congress can also revoke the proclamation of martial law or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus before the lapse of 60 days from the date of suspension or proclamation. Congress (both the House and the Senate) needs to convene at once within 24 hours of the proclamation or suspension to vote jointly by an absolute majority (meaning majority of all members of the bicameral chamber, not just a quorum) whether to revoke the president’s proclamation or suspension, or to extend it beyond the

4 There are exceptions to the prohibition on temporary appointments, including appointments made so as not to prejudice public service (e.g. appointment of a postmaster) or to endanger public safety (e.g. appointment of a chief of staff).5 De Rama v. Court of Appeals, GR 131136, 28 February 2001.6 Except in cases of impeachment and when the constitution provides otherwise (e.g. electoral offenses, where clemency requires the favorable recommendation of the Commission on Election).7 A grave abuse of discretion amounting to a lack or excess of jurisdiction can be a basis of an impeachment complaint.

60-day period of validity. A revocation by Congress cannot be overturned by the president, as he can normally do in the case of bills. This, in other words, is an extremely important check on potential executive abuse that takes its lessons from the 20 years of authoritarian experience under Marcos. Congress can also extend the validity of the proclamation upon the initiative of the president based on the persistence of the state of emergency.8

The Supreme Court may also review the sufficiency of the factual basis of the proclamation of martial or suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as the extension of the proclamation or declaration (within 30 days from the filing of an extension).

e. Emergency powers Congress, by law, may also authorize the president to exercise powers necessary

and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Emergency powers are different from those the president exercises as commander in chief in that the latter is a constitutional grant of military power which includes lawmaking power. When a president acts under emergency powers, however, he acts under congressional mantle through a delegated lawmaking power. Such power is generally limited in period and subject to restrictions that Congress specifies. As such, it can be withdrawn by resolution, or if Congress fails to adopt such resolution, the power ceases upon the next adjournment of Congress.9

f. Power to contract and guarantee foreign loansThe power to contract and guarantee foreign loans is an important prerogative to

the president as the nation’s chief economic planner because any debt is always a form of burden or liability on the part of the contracting state. This power, however, must be exercised with the concurrence of the monetary board, subject to certain limitations,10 and the requirement that information on foreign loans must be made public.

The president technically does not need prior approval of Congress in contracting or guaranteeing loans because check is already provided through the Monetary Board. Indirectly, however, Congress may enact guidelines and have them enforced through the Monetary Board.

g. Power to fix tariff rateAnother important economic prerogative given by the president is the power to fix

tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage duties, and other imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Philippines. The exercise of this power, however, is subject to its delegation by Congress.

The idea behind the president’s tariff powers is to allow the chief executive flexibility to adjust the economy to the volatility of international commerce through the adjustment of rates to prevailing commercial standards.

8 However, it may not be extended if Congress fails to act within the period of validity. The president can, of course, again declare a state of emergency. 9 Araneta v Dinglasan, GR L-2044, August 26, 1949. It appears it is not enough for Congress to resume session in order for the president’s emergency powers to cease. It has to pass a resolution withdrawing such powers, otherwise, it ceases upon the next adjournment.10 Loans, for one, should not be contracted for purposes inimical to the national interest.

g. Powers over foreign affairsThe president is vested with treaty-making powers. However, a distinction has to

be made between treaties and executive agreements. International agreements involving political issues or changes in national policy and those involving international agreements of permanent character usually take the form of treaties. But international agreements involving adjustments in detail carrying out well-established national policies and traditions, or those of temporary character usually take the shape of executive agreements. This distinction is purely constitutional since from the point of view of international law both are binding upon states as long as negotiating functionaries are within their powers.11 Under the constitution, although the president has treaty making power, it requires the concurrence of at least 2/3 of all the members of the Senate. Executive agreements do not require such concurrence.

The president also has the power to deport undesirable aliens. This can be done either by order of the President after due investigation of the foreigner’s undesirability, or by order of the Commissioner on Immigration. The chief executive has full discretion to determine whether an alien’s residence is inimical to national security, welfare and interest of the state.12

h. Power over legislationEvery 4th Monday of July the president delivers the state of the nation address

which contains his proposals for legislation. The speech is pretty much an outline of legislative expectation which the president hopes Congress will address during the regular session.

Another way by which the president reveals the priorities of his government is through the preparation and submission of the annual budget. The president is mandated to submit to Congress within 30 days from the opening of every regular session a budget of expenditures to serve as basis for the annual appropriations bill. The budget in a sense is a plan indicating the expenditures of government, the sources of financing, and receipts from revenue raising measures.

In terms of legislation, while the Philippine president unlike his Latin American counterparts has very limited lawmaking power (except in times of emergency), his approval is still required for the enactment of laws.13 The president can exercise veto over legislation but this can be overridden by a 2/3 vote of members of Congress. Sitting on a legislation to defer its passage is an option not available to the Philippine president, unlike his American counterpart. A president takes part in legislation either by approving a bill or vetoing it. If the president lets a measure stand, it simply lapses into law after 30 days of inaction. Unless a bill is vetoed, in other words, bills submitted for signature to the president are certain to become laws.

All these powers come with immunity from suit (except one for impeachment) and the immunity extends beyond the president’s term as long as the act in question was done during the course of his administration.14

11 USAFFE Veterans Association v. Treasurer, GR L-10500 June 30, 1959.12 Go Tek v. Deportation Board, GR L-23846, September 9, 197713 There are exceptions, such as when the president’s veto is overridden by 2/3 of votes in Congress, and when the bill pertains to a special law to elect the President and the Vice-President.14 Soliven v. Makasiar, GR 82585, November 14, 1988.

Interaction with Congress1. PET2. impeachment3.

Latin American presidentsThe chief executive is typically regarded as dominant in many scholarly studies

on Latin America, even those that focus on the legislatures. Part of the reason, according to Siavelis (2012), is the way in which these studies measured legislative power. Studies typically emphasize balance of power, positing a direct zero sum game between the legislative and the executive branches, overlooking the real potential that the legislatures have. The focus on the static powers of the two branches also creates a static view of legislative power and ignores the reality of shifting influence and the true nature and extent of presidential support in Congress.

Using data consisting of congressional initiatives in Chile, Siavelis argues that contrary to the strong temptation to conclude the legislature as a rubber stamp to the executive, they are actually more influential than what a concrete reading of the constitutional guarantees of power suggests.

Presidency in Latin AmericaEven though personal qualities, ideology, history and cultural factors can shape

the way presidents govern, institutions remain to be as important in explaining why presidents pursue a certain incentive or behavior. There are those that are driven by the pursuit of the common good while taking into account the broad interests of the majority. There are also those who are driven by personal and political goals. Either way, the powers of the president as laid down by institutional structures and rules determine the strategic actions he may take and the type of transactions he or she may engage in with respect to legislatures, both allies and opponents alike.

Presidential powers may either be constitutional or partisan (see Shugart and Carey 1992; Mainwaring and Shugart 1997). Constitutional powers make it easirer for the president to take decisive action when necessary (say, in an emergency or economic shock) but exposes policymaking to whims and accommodation. Constitutional powers may be legislative or non-legislative. In Latin American countries, a president’s legislative power typically includes the package veto, the partial (line item veto, the power to issue decrees or declare a bill urgent, the exclusive initiative of legislation, budgetary powers and the power to call a plebiscite or referendum. Its exercise may be reactive or proactive. The president, for instance, may obtain policies closest to his preferences by threatening to veto the legislature, issuing decrees to bypass the legislature, or by resorting to consult the citizenry through referendums particularly to bypass legislative opposition to bills that have wide popular support. Non-legislative powers include the power to nominate, appoint and dismiss officials. The rules for cabinet formation and dismissal also have an effect on the relationship between the executive and the legislative. For instance, if the legislature exercises power in the

appointment and dismissal of cabinet ministers they can use it as a bargaining mechanism with the executive. Another bargaining chip is the power to impeach the president.

Partisan powers relate to the degree of support of the president in Congress. This is typically measured in terms of the size of the president’s legislative contingent (allies) and the strength of party discipline (Mainwaring and Shugart 1997).

Legislative structureScholars have mentioned the advantages of having a bicameral legislature such as

its propensity to avoid bad decisions made in haste and being able to represent different interests. However, a two-chamber legislature can be its own pitfall such as when it renders the government slow in responding to crisis, or increases the cost of reaching a decision. The constitutional powers vested in the two houses also determine their relevance (e.g. order of voting on a measure, impeachment powers, specific powers).

Presidential legislative power Latin American presidential system PhilippinesPackage veto Yes YesLine item veto Yes YesDeclare a bill urgent Yes YesExclusive initiative of legislation Yes NoBudgetary powers Yes YesPower to call plebiscite or referendum Yes No

Philippine presidents

Corazon Aquino (8th Congress; February 25, 1986 to June 30, 1992)Corazon Cojuangco Aquino was the first woman to hold the highest office in the

Philippines. Though married to Sen. Benigno Aquino Jr, who at that time was president’s Marcos staunchest critic, Aquino was obscure and occasionally described herself as a plain housewife until her husband’s assassination in August 21, 1983 and the events that later followed.

With former Senator Salvador Laurer as vice presidential running mate, Aquino challenged Marcos for the presidency but lost in the 1985 snap election. She then called for massive civil disobedience and protests, a cause which found the support of a number of Filipinos who felt they had had enough of the dictatorship. The scores of public protests eventually led to the so called People Power Revolution of 1986 (February 25, 1986) which ousted Marcos and ended two decades of authoritarian regime.15

15 On February 25, 1986, Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 announcing that she and vice presidential running mate Laurel would be taking power. Since Aquino was technically sworn not through formal institutions means but through the direct will of the people (people power), the legitimacy of her presidency was contested. One notable opposition, in fact, came from no less than a group of lawyers, albeit loyal to the former strongman (Lawyers League for a Better Philippines, Oliver Lozano, v. Aquino, GR 73748, May 22, 1986; see also In Re: Saturnino Bermudez, G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986). In May 1986 the reorganized Supreme Court declared that Aquino’s government was not just a de facto but a de jure government whose legitimacy had been recognized by the community of nations. In the words of the

Aquino was instrumental in the promulgation of the 1987 constitution, arguably among the most notable of her legacies.16 The constitution reestablished a bicameral legislature and curtailed the powers of the presidency presumably to keep history under dictatorship from ever repeating itself.

Aquino embodied hope, at least at the beginning of her term. She was known to be simple and modest, quite unlike the public’s typical perception of one who wields the nation’s highest political office. But her modesty was not enough to guarantee a strong government. Her six years in office was marked by coups and destabilization efforts coming from factions within her own military as well as insurgent groups operating in the countryside. People also began to feel disenchanted, particularly those who perceived her as ill-equipped for the position. Aquino, for instance, started with +53 satisfaction rating in May 1986 (based on the index by the Social Weather Stations) and even got as high as +72 in public approval (October 1986) but saw her approval rating plummet and left her office with just +7 net satisfaction. This figure is lower than Estrada’s net satisfaction rating of +9 during his exit, or rather his resignation, after massive public clamor for the latter’s ouster in December 2000.

The 1987 Constitution affords the incumbent president only a single term, an apparent safeguard to ensure that the presidency does not once more turn into an autocracy. Corazon Aquino, however, was prompted by advisers and friends to seek reelection as she was “technically” not inaugurated under the Constitution and, hence, free of its restriction. She strongly declined and instead endorsed then House Speaker Ramon V. Mitra as her candidate for the 1992 presidential race. She later on withdrew her support and campaigned instead for Fidel V. Ramos who as chief of staff defended her from the coups and rebellions which hounded her administration.

Many landmark legislations where promulgated during Aquino’s administration such as the Family Code of 1987, which reformed civil law on marriage and family relations, and the Administrative Code of 1987 which restructured the executive branch. The Local Government Code, which provided fiscal autonomy and decentralization to local government units, was also enacted in 1991. Land reform also became a major centerpiece of her legislative agenda. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program was passed in 1988 which provided for the compensable redistribution of agricultural land to tenant-farmers.17

Fidel V. Ramos (9th and 10th Congress)

high court, “the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter,” but one that “belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the Philippines are the judge.”16 Immediately after assuming the presidency, Aquino issued Proclamation No. 3 establishing a revolutionary government and abolishing the 1973 Constitution. The proclamation allowed her both executive and legislative power but only until the ratification of the new constitution and the establishment of a bicameral congress. 17 The CARP arguably was full of loopholes (see Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v Honorable Secretary of Agrarian Reform, GR 78742, July 14, 1989). And, as scion of one of Tarlac’s wealthiest sugar plantation owners, Aquino herself was not spared from the controversy surrounding the program. The same controversy would later haunt her son, Benigno Aquino III, when the latter assumed the presidency in 2010. Corporate landowners, for instance, were allowed under the law to divest capital stock to qualified beneficiaries in lieu land redistribution. Hacienda Luisita, which Aquino’s family owns, reorganized itself into a corporation upon the CARP’s promulgation, and opted to give its tenant farmers shares of stock as the law provided.

Fidel V. Ramos, a graduate of the US Military Academy, served as Aquino’s chief of staff, and later as secretary of national defense during her tumultuous presidency. The former general was among the icons of the People Power revolution and was credited for thwarting the various coup attempts that rocked Aquino’s six years in office.

In December 1991, Ramos filed his candidacy for the presidency but lost the nomination of his party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) to then House Speaker Ramon Mitra Jr. This caused him to bolt his former party and establish the Partido Lakas Tao. Ramos’ new party joined forces with the National Union of Christian Democrats (NUCD) led by former Senator Raul Manglapus, and the United Muslim Democrats of the Philippines (UMDP) headed by Ambassador Sanchez Ali, forming the Lakas-NUCD-CMD coalition. Ramos narrowly defeated then former Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago and, in fact, garnered only 23.58 of the electorates’ vote, the lowest plurality in the history of the presidency. It did not help that Corazon Aquino shifted his support from Mitra to Ramos at the last minute during the campaign. Aquino’s change of heart was said to have isolated the Catholic Church which found it unconceivable to support a non-Catholic presidential candidate. Ramos, in fact, became the first non-Catholic to hold the nation’s highest elective office.18

Unlike the plain housewife in Aquino, however, Ramos hailed from a politically influential family. His father, Narciso Ramos, was a five-term legislator of the House of Representatives and among the founders of the Liberal Party. Her mother was a scion of the Valdez clan of Batac, Ilocos Norte. He and former strongman Marcos were, in fact, second cousins. He was head of the now defunct Philippine Constabulary when martial law was declared in 1972. Thereafter, he served as vice chief of staff, a post he was to hold until the collapse of Marcos’ regime in 1986.

Ramos’ early years in Malacanang had been a period of political stability and economic growth. As a former military officer he had the support of the highly politicized military. He was also able to forge peace agreements with Moro separatists and communist insurgents. The deregulation of major industries and the privatization on public non-performing assets became a centerpiece platform. Economic indicators were performing well and for the first time the country showed promise of becoming “Asia’s next economic tiger.” It can be said that the economic gains during the Ramos administration somehow cushioned the effects of the 1997 financial crisis which struck the region.

Economic achievements notwithstanding, Ramos also figured in a number of controversies that were to hound him years after his administration. His closest rival, Sen. Miriam Defensor Santiago, accused him of massive electoral fraud and cheating her of the true voice of the electorate.19 Some groups also thought that his penchant for liberalizing the economy, deregulating the industries, opening the country to free trade as an economic management approach were actually compromising the economy. His administration was criticized in its handling of the case of Flor Contemplacion, the Filipina house worker who was convicted of killing a co-worker in Singapore.20 Midway during his term, he was accused of orchestrating a grand scam involving the sale of 158

18 Ramos, a protestant, is a member of the United Church of Christ in the Philippines.19 Defensor-Santiago v. Ramos, PET Case No. 001, February 13, 1996.20 Ramos was on a foreign trip when the Filipina maid was meted the death sentence. His last minute attempt to negotiate with Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong proved futile. The unfortunate outcome caused the resignation of Foreign Affiars Secretary Roberto Romulo and Labor Secretary Nieves Confesor.

hectares of reclaimed land on Manila Bay in favor of real estate developer Amari below the market price.21 As he was nearing the end of his term, he was accused of massive corruption and misuse of funds over the Clark Centennial Exposition project, which was intended as a centerpiece of the 100th anniversary of Philippine independence. The Clark Centennial Expo was supposedly Ramos pet project but there were reports that not only were the construction projects for the expo extravagantly inefficient but served as a convenient vehicle for election fund raising for the president’s ruling party.22

There were numerous legislative achievements attached to the Ramos presidency. During his first state of the nation address in July 27, 1992, Ramos called to Congress to enact a law to aid the country resolve the power crisis in the wake of eight-hour brownouts and the decommissioning of the Bataan Nuclear Power Plant. Congress responded by enacting the Electric Power Crisis Act of 1993 (RA 7648) and giving the president emergency powers to negotiate Independent Power Producer (IPP) contracts thought and “fast-track” government’s approval process based on “take-or-pay” system. Ramos also saw through the passage of the amended Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law of 1994 (RA 7718), expanding the scope of private sector participation in government projects and providing for direct negotiation of contracts and investment incentives in certain cases. Ramos also instituted the Legislative-Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC) as a forum for consultation and exchange between the executive and Congress on important bills such as those that relate to economic policy reform.23 Ramos signed the New Central Bank Act into law on June 14, 1993 providing for an independent monetary authority (the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) that enjoys fiscal and administrative autonomy. A year before the end of his term, he signed the Indigenous People’s Rights Act into law on October 29, 1997 recognizing and protecting the right to ancestral domains by indigenous cultural communities.

Joseph E. Estrada (11th Congress)Joseph E. Estrada enjoyed a wide margin of vote when he was elected in 1998.

An accomplished actor, Estrada starred in more than 100 films spanning almost 33 years of a stunning career in the silver screen. He typically portrayed the role of a poor antihero or a modern-day Robin Hood who is forced to take the cudgel in behalf of the weak and the powerless.

Estrada, however, was not just another actor. He served as mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila for 17 years, before embarking on a political career at the Senate. His movie star glitter may have catapulted him into office but as mayor Estrada was known for unparalleled infrastructure development. He also ran for the Senate and served for one term, then as Vice President during Ramos’ presidency. As senator, he was among the 12

21 The deal between the Philippine Estates Authority (PEA) and Amari, dubbed by former Sen. Ernesto Maceda as the grandmother of all scams in a Nov. 29 1996 privilege speech, was later voided by the Supreme Court in 2003 (Chavez v. PEA and Amari, GR 133250,  May 6, 2003)22 See for instance, Chay Florentino-Hofilena and Ian Sayson, 1999, “Centennial Expo: Convenient Cover for Election Fundraising,” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, June 14-16. 23 The Legislative Executive Development Advisory Council (LEDAC) was enacted through RA 7640 on December 9, 1992. LEDAC serves as a consultative and advisory body to the president as the head of the national economic and planning agency, mandated to advice the chief executive on certain programs and policies essential to the realization of the goals of the national economy. 

who voted for the termination of the RP-US Military Bases lease agreement, which eventually brought the withdrawal of American forces from Philippine soil.

Estrada assumed the presidency in the wake of the Asian financial crisis but had a solid economic team that included former Finance Secretary Edgardo Espiritu and Budget Secretary Benjamin Diokno. Power was handed down smoothly from Ramos to Estrada even though Estrada campaigned against Ramos’ move to revise the 1987 Constitution. In fact, Estrada’s economic team adopted the revised macroeconomic targets set by Ramos near the end of his administration.24

Estrada was best known for launching an all-out war against Moro Islamic Liberation Front secessionists and managed to capture the camps of the Muslim separatists. Whether this could have brought the elusive peace in this war-torn region south of the Philippines is debatable, as Estrada’s efforts were cut short by a series of controversies.

Barely halfway through his term, Ilocos Sur governor Chavit Singson who was a close friend of Estrada, alleged that he had given the president P400 million as payoff from an illegal grassroots numbers game known as jueteng. Singson’s exposé prompted the filing of an impeachment complaint by the House and a full blown trial by the Senate. In the course of the trial, 11 senators voted not to open an envelope allegedly containing evidence incriminating the president but were never alleged in the impeachment complaint. The final vote barred the impeachment court from opening the envelope, causing some members of the prosecution to walk out, and a multitude of anti-Estrada demonstrators to gather in front of the EDSA shrine in a show of protest dubbed as EDSA II. Seeing the political turmoil, Estrada’s chief of staff Gen. Angelo Reyes withdraw his support in favor of then Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo who is slated to succeed under the constitution in the event of the president’s incompetency or disability. The Supreme Court declared the office of the president vacant the following day after Estrada and his family left Malacanang palace. Vice President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo was immediately sworn into office.

Estrada was eventually tried and convicted for plunder, but was later pardoned by Pres. Gloria Arroyo.

Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (12th, 13th , and 14th Congress)

Things to consider when studying legislative balance of powera. time (passage)b. legislative successc. substance of legislation

24 For instance, see Doris Dumlao, 1998, “Estrada team adopts FVR economic targets,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, July 20, B4.

Research questions that are related to my study1. What determines the greater likelihood of having his initiatives converted into

law? In Siavelis’ study, although urgency powers may be significant in constitutional terms, they had less of an effect in certain administrations (e.g. Aylwin) than one might expect.

NOTE:a. test to compare the significance of urgency powers

- passage rate of urgent measures- in my case, length of time of passing urgent measures.

b. When the date comparing legislative success and speed of consideration for executive and legislative initiatives are considered separately, it appears that urgency helps the president secure passage. However, when only executive initiatives are considered it appears that urgency powers have little global effect, until they are disaggregated by type (Siavelis 2004).

c. The underrated role of the Judicial Legislative division (in the case of the Philippines, LEDAC), which is commonly referred to as the “kitchen” of the legislative process and the clearinghouse of official requests sent by legislators. In the case of the Philippines, the LEDAC does more.

d. Again, in the case of the Philippines, urgency measures are not purely executive initiatives as legislators can also ask the president to certify specific measures as urgent.

e. Focus: coalition, pro-government support, lacking: discussion on the role of sponsors and their personal and political circumstances

Celebrities and politicians in the Philippines are sometimes one and the same (boxer Manny Pacquiao is a congressman) and politics are covered in tabloid fashion.

Case of Mexico Casar (2004): there is a gap between formal and informal powers of the president, not necessarily because of executive usurpation of powers but from party and electoral systems and incentives institutions have created.

Election year Winner share of votes Closest rival share of votes voter turnout

1986 Ferdinand Marcos 53.62% Corazon Aquino

46.10% 78.80%

1992 Fidel V. Ramos 23.58%Miriam

Defensor-Santiago

19.72% 75.50%

1998 Joseph Estrada 39.86% Jose De Venecia

15.87% 86.50%

2004 Gloria Macapagal Arroyo

39.99% Fernando Poe Jr.

36.51% 74%

2010 Benigno Aquino III 42.08% Joseph Estrada

26.25% 74.34%

Models of presidency: Hamiltonian (strong president, strong but limited government); Jeffersonian (weak president, weak government); progressivism (strong president, unlimited government)

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