Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

23
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007 DOI: 10.1163/156916407X227901 Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417–439 www.brill.nl/rp Research in Phenomenology Anarchistic Tendencies in Continental Philosophy: Reiner Schürmann and the Hubris of Philosophy Joeri Schrijvers Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Abstract is article presents Reiner Schürmann’s thought of anarchy through its relation to the thought of Martin Heidegger. e main aim of this article is to examine the relation between Schür- mann’s two major works, Heidegger on Being and Acting and Broken Hegemonies through their respective relation towards other authors in the continental philosophical tradition such as Jean- Luc Marion, Emmanuel Levinas, and Jacques Derrida. e article focuses furthermore on Schürmann’s stress on the theme of the end of metaphysics and interrogates the ambiguities sur- rounding this theme not only in Schürmann’s works but also in the larger bulk of contemporary continental philosophy. Keywords anarchy, phenomenology, existence, Heidegger, metaphysics Introduction “What is to be done at the end of metaphysics?” It is Reiner Schürmann’s question, and it is one that deserves to be posed. For, if indeed we would agree with Schürmann and Heidegger that the collapse of metaphysics and its addic- tive after-worlds is “of immediate historical concern to us,” 1 the question of action, attitudes, and comportment towards such a collapse seems all the more urgent. It is to the latter question that Schürmann has contributed considerably. Reginald Lilly, the translator of Schürmann’s Des Hégémonies brisées, notes, for instance, that “the connection between the existential analytic and the his- tory of being as onto-theology has never been made clear by Heidegger or his 1) Reiner Schürmann, Heidegger on Being and Acting. From Principles to Anarchy, trans. C.-M. Gros (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 191.

description

It's about anarchic themes in a particular branch of philosophy.

Transcript of Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

Page 1: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

copy Koninklijke Brill NV Leiden 2007 DOI 101163156916407X227901

Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 wwwbrillnlrp

R e s e a r c hi n

P h e n o m e n o l o g y

Anarchistic Tendencies in Continental Philosophy Reiner Schuumlrmann and the Hubris of Philosophy

Joeri SchrijversKatholieke Universiteit Leuven

Abstract Th is article presents Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos thought of anarchy through its relation to the thought of Martin Heidegger Th e main aim of this article is to examine the relation between Schuumlr-mannrsquos two major works Heidegger on Being and Acting and Broken Hegemonies through their respective relation towards other authors in the continental philosophical tradition such as Jean-Luc Marion Emmanuel Levinas and Jacques Derrida Th e article focuses furthermore on Schuumlrmannrsquos stress on the theme of the end of metaphysics and interrogates the ambiguities sur-rounding this theme not only in Schuumlrmannrsquos works but also in the larger bulk of contemporary continental philosophy

Keywords anarchy phenomenology existence Heidegger metaphysics

Introduction

ldquoWhat is to be done at the end of metaphysicsrdquo It is Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos question and it is one that deserves to be posed For if indeed we would agree with Schuumlrmann and Heidegger that the collapse of metaphysics and its addic-tive after-worlds is ldquoof immediate historical concern to usrdquo1 the question of action attitudes and comportment towards such a collapse seems all the more urgent

It is to the latter question that Schuumlrmann has contributed considerably Reginald Lilly the translator of Schuumlrmannrsquos Des Heacutegeacutemonies briseacutees notes for instance that ldquothe connection between the existential analytic and the his-tory of being as onto-theology has never been made clear by Heidegger or his

1) Reiner Schuumlrmann Heidegger on Being and Acting From Principles to Anarchy trans C-M Gros (Bloomington Indiana University Press 1987) 191

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418 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

commentators [I]t is precisely such a connection that Schuumlrmann means to make in basing his topology on an analytic of ultimates [Th is] analytic promises to give us those elements structures and dynamics that are funda-mental to human existence and are presumed by any history of philosophyrdquo2 It would be unfair however to see Schuumlrmann as but one more lsquoHeidegge-rianrsquo or as I will show below lsquodeconstructionistrsquo To be sure his interpreta-tion of Heidegger is intriguing and often innovating one need only think of his efforts lsquoto read Heidegger backwardsrsquo without regard for the fashionable distinction between the early Heidegger and its mystical and mythical sequel or of his interpretation of Heideggerrsquos work on Nietzsche which as Schuumlr-mann convincingly shows ldquospeak formally of Nietzsche but materially about technologyrdquo3

And yet Schuumlrmann pushes one to look beyond Heidegger and perhaps indeed to ldquoconsequences more extreme than Heidegger would wishrdquo4 It remains to be considered whether Schuumlrmann actually succeeded in showing the fundamental unity of thinking acting and being but with Schuumlrmann finally the tragic condition of the human being is given a voice in contempo-rary philosophy In effect Schuumlrmann might even have the strongest case to date to take the existential character of metaphysical questions into account

In its simplest form we all know or at least have a pre-understanding of our tragic condition for the ldquopoint of departurerdquo of the analytic of ultimates ldquois the knowledge from which no one escapes and which escapes no one even if the natural metaphysician in each of us closes his eyes to it the knowledge that we arrive by our birth and go to our deathrdquo5

Besides the lsquopracticalrsquo and existential character of the most intimate ques-tions of metaphysics this article will address the import of Schuumlrmannrsquos notion of lsquothe natural metaphysician in each of usrsquo for the question that seems to divide Derrida and Schuumlrmann seems to hinge on precisely this issue of a metaphysics that comes natural to us Th irdly this article will in relating Schuumlrmann not only to Heidegger but also to Levinas and Derrida pay atten-tion to the new understanding of philosophy that seems to emerge from Schuumlrmannrsquos work which is due precisely to its lsquopracticalrsquo starting-point

2) Reginald Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des Heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo Research in Phenomenology 28 (1998) 226ndash42 231 3) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 4) Ibid 38 5) Schuumlrmann Broken Hegemonies trans R Lilly (Bloomington Indiana University Press 2003) 345

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Heideggerian Anarchy

Th e title of this section which may surprise the lsquoHeideggeriansrsquo is not mine but Schuumlrmannrsquos6 Th is section will address Schuumlrmannrsquos temporalizing of the ontological difference turning it into a temporal and therefore an-archic difference and convey the practical import of it

Th e lsquoPractical a Priorirsquo

Th e existential character of metaphysical questions comes to the fore in Schuumlr-mannrsquos beautiful contradictory notion of lsquothe practical a priorirsquo If Lillyrsquos state-ment that only the analytic of ultimates of Broken Hegemonies shows the connection between Heideggerrsquos history of being and some form of existential analytic the lsquopractical a priorirsquo of Heidegger on Being and Acting can serve as a hermeneutic key to bring the profound continuity between Schuumlrmannrsquos two major works to light In this sense my effort here is a sort of lsquoreading Schuumlr-mann backwardsrsquo Th is will allow us to interpret Schuumlrmannrsquos nuanced stance on the question of overcoming metaphysics and to correct some of the views on his œuvre that have emerged in secondary literature as for instance in Vahabzadehrsquos entirely metaphysical characterization of the 1987 work as ldquobear-ing the stamp of a flourishing life an effect of natality while Broken Hege-monies certainly comes from a life pulled toward deathrdquo7

If one of the main theses of Broken Hegemonies is that all of the major meta-physical systems (mainly Plotinus Cicero Augustine and modern philoso-phy) have arisen from the ultimate analytic of natality and mortality in that all these systems are subjected to a sort of natural drive to maximize or overde-termine one phenomenal region over others (according to Schuumlrmannn meta-physicsrsquo main mode of procedure is to focus on the phenomenon of fabrication those thing that are man-made) then this native and natural tendency towards generalization universalization and lsquode-phenomenologizationrsquo inevitably gives birth to its lsquootherrsquo namely the pull and pressure of finitude for the phe-nomenological and singular encounter with finite beings in and through our finite comprehension of those beings resists precisely such a lsquofantasmicrsquo maxi-mization under the rule of one overarching and hegemonic phenomenon (whether it be the One nature or the modern cogito) It is death as the one and only singularization to come that throws the hubris of these philosophies

6) Heidegger on Being and Acting 155 7) Peyman Vahabzadeh ldquoReview of Broken Hegemoniesrdquo Journal for Cultural and Religious Th eory 5 (2004) 51ndash56 55

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420 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

rendering reason of all beings back upon its ldquohumble conditionrdquo8 the lives and deaths that you and I will have to experience9 Th e ontology of natality that is of the natural metaphysician in us inevitably gives way to its parasitical other in the return of the denied10 namely the contingency and historicity of time as that which will lead us to our deaths11

It is true that Broken Hegemonies offers an elaborate discussion of the his-torical moments of such metaphysical madness which was perhaps lacking at the time of Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book Nevertheless the main theses of the first-mentioned book are present in the latter book as wellmdashwhich already makes it impossible to consider it solely as lsquostamped by a flourishing lifersquo What Schuumlrmann will later with Arendt name as the ontological traits of mortality and natality have both figured in his first book as well Take for instance the trait of mortality Commenting upon the lineage from Ancient philosophy the Nietzschean overturning thereof and its connection with our (post)modern technological era Schuumlrmann writes that for ldquothe [technologi-cal] manipulable to inherit the prestige of the ancient Good the representa-tion of an ideal hierarchy must have contained its fatal agent within itself ever since its conceptionrdquo12

Not only does metaphysics therefore write so to say its own testament as if its birth certificate is at the same time its hour of death but even in Schuumlr-mannrsquos Heidegger the dawn of metaphysics originates in the human beingrsquos naturalmdashshould I say compulsivemdashbehavior Indeed even the Heidegger book intimates metaphysicsrsquo natural origins for metaphysics results from a ldquoneed for an archaeo-teleocratic originrdquo the ldquowant of a holdrdquo on our epoch and is therefore perhaps nothing more than a ldquoself-incurred illusion of per-fect presencerdquo13 It is this need and this want that according to Schuumlrmann accounts for human beingsrsquo tragic condition and that forces them on the one hand to posit in one way or another a grand narrative while on the other being forced to hear the demand of that which such metaphysical narratives

8) Broken Hegemonies 629 9) See also Broken Hegemonies 35 ldquothe order established by hegemonic fantasms is conquered each time By what By the nameless abyss where we are devoured by negative experience (the experience of the unjustifiable of evil and of death) Fantasmic consolations and consolida-tions work against that experiencerdquo 10) Broken Hegemonies 624 11) Heidegger on Being and Acting 106 12) Ibid 197 (italics mine) 13) Heidegger on Being and Acting 204 252 226 respectively

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precisely deny namely finitude mortality that is time If one of Broken Hege-moniesrsquo aims was to show how metaphysical positions are rooted in everyday experience one can find thus the appeal to experience in Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy book as well

Such a priority of praxis and everyday experience crystallizes in what Schuumlr-mann coins as lsquothe practical a priorirsquo With this notion Schuumlrmann espouses what seems to be an extraordinary everyday banality namely that ldquoto under-stand authentic temporality it is necessary to lsquoexist authenticallyrsquo to think being as letting phenomena be one must oneself lsquolet all things bersquo to follow the play without why of presencing it is necessary to lsquolive without whyrsquordquo14 In short ldquoa mode of thinking is made dependent on a mode of livingrdquo15 Schuumlr-mann shows that such a practical a priori is present in both the early and the later Heidegger16 For reasons of space I will limit Schuumlrmannrsquos argument to Heideggerrsquos Being and Time Schuumlrmann asks ldquoWhat is it that conceals the transcendence of Daseinrdquo and answers thus ldquoA certain way of behaving a certain attitudinal way of being in the worldmdashinauthenticityrdquo adding that in ldquoBeing and Time the classical ontologies spring precisely from inauthentic existencerdquo and concluding therefore that all this ldquoindicates first and foremost that the retrieval proper of the being question is bound to fail unless it is pre-ceded by what [Heidegger] then calls an existentiell modificationrdquomdashldquoFirst comes an appropriation of existentiell possibilities then existential ontol-ogyrdquo17 Th e later Heidegger Schuumlrmann argues will move away from the indi-vidual implications that Being and Time still could admit and will espouse the public and political dimension of the practical a priori Eigentlichtkeit or authenticity is substituted for lsquoEreignisrsquo

One must note that the practical a priori is for Schuumlrmann a method rather than an empirical stance it is the path that may lead ldquofrom a way of living to a way of thinkingrdquo it is to avoid ldquothe lsquomethodicalrsquo errancyrdquo of meta-physics which substitutes the contingency of time for the consolations of the eternal or the permanent presence of consciousness and forgets about its hum-ble and historical origins and which therefore is accompanied by ldquoa methodi-cal retrenchment of life or of praxisrdquo to the point that one can as angels supposedly have once done ldquospeak from mind to mindrdquo18

14) Ibid 287 15) Ibid 237 16) Ibid 236ndash45 17) Ibid 237 238 18) Ibid 238ndash39

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422 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

Such a priority of praxis is by no means absent from contemporary Conti-nental philosophy it is for instance to be found in the phenomenology of the Other of Emmanuel Levinas and in the phenomenology of givenness of Jean-Luc Marion For both authors the response to the appeal (whether it be from God or givenness) lies phenomenologically prior to the appeal it is only in and through menrsquos and womenrsquos responses that the appeal appears It matters little that for Marion the responsiveness of human being is broadened to entail more than the (Levinasian) human face It matters that in both cases a certain mode of comportment accompanies the act of thinking whether it be for Marion the abandoning of oneself to whatever gives itself or the ethical bear-ing witness to the Other in Levinas19 Levinasrsquo analysis of lsquoenjoymentrsquo in Total-ity and Infinity definitely shows that such a lsquopractical a priorirsquo is accompanied by an attentiveness to life20

Note finally that whereas Marion at one point claims to have found such a priority of praxis in Levinasrsquo thought21 he elsewhere shows that such a prior-ity stems from Heidegger22 Th ough all these thinkers would therefore agree that such a practical a priori consists not in an lsquoonticrsquo determinate and indi-vidual act23 but rather in an ontological and transcendental attunementmdash

19) See for instance Jean-Luc Marion Being Given Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness trans J Kosky (Stanford Stanford University Press 2002) 282ndash319 esp 306ndash7 where the primacy of praxis gives way to a priority of a supposedly extra-moral lsquowillingrsquo over lsquothinkingrsquo which is a reversal of the Medieval adage stating that lsquoacting follows beingrsquo Consider also Marionrsquos conten-tion that it is no longer a matter of representational thinking but of ldquoaiming in the direction of of relating to of comporting oneself toward of reckoning with rdquo whatever gives itself in his In Excess Studies of Saturated Phenomena trans R Horner and V Berraud (New York Fordham University Press 2002) 144ndash45 For Emmanuel Levinas see Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 144ndash53 esp 149 ldquothe appeal is heard in the responserdquo (translation modified) 20) See also Levinas Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 154 ldquoHow would a total reflection be allowed [to] a being that never becomes the bare fact of existing and whose existence is life that is life from some-thingrdquo Life from something that is according to Levinasrsquo thesis of enjoyment as concrete as the drinks that we drink the food we eat and the men and women we entertain and encounter in our houses Consider also the anti-metaphysical (yet theological) statement that ldquolife is not com-prehensible simply as a diminution a fall Th e individual and the personal are necessary for Infinity to be able to be produced as infiniterdquo (ibid 218) 21) Being Given 287 22) Marion Reduction and Givenness Investigations of Husserl Heidegger and Phenomenology trans TA Carlson (Evanston Northwestern University Press 1998) 185ndash86 23) See for instance Otherwise than Being 144 ldquo[Sincerity] is not an act or a movement or any sort of cultural gesturerdquo In Heidegger the call of conscience opens onto the condition () of

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 423

from Heideggerrsquo Stimmung or moodmdashthey diverge as to that which is capable of uttering such an appeal

Th e Event and the Phenomenology of Presencing

For Schuumlrmann this appeal is obviously Heideggerian in nature it is to the presencing of being that the human being is to cor-respond Schuumlrmannrsquos phenomenology of presencing presents a temporalized version of Heideggerrsquos ontological difference According to Schuumlrmann ldquoHeideggerrsquos entire effort consists in recovering that broader sense of being as coming into presence [Anwesung] or presencing [Anwesen]rdquo24 At this point it is necessary to con-sider Schuumlrmannrsquos interpretation of Heideggerian anti-humanism for the his-tory of being to appear as ontotheology it is necessary that all reference from being to human beings (as a privileged relation) disappear In order to think being as time it is no longer necessary to think human temporality that is the human being as time25 In this sense for Schuumlrmann Heideggerrsquos lesson would be a sobering one resisting all consolation and consolidation of an ultimate yet fantasmic referent that would guide and orient our actions Th e (presenc-ing of the) world has become a contingent and goalless process

Schuumlrmann will see the event of presencing as that which liberates us from the anthropocentrism that still accompanied modern philosophy according to which nothing can be said to come to pass if it does not appear to the tran-scendental subject In order to temporalize the ontological difference between being and beings Schuumlrmann will distinguish between (originary) being as the event of presencing and the different lsquooriginalrsquo and epochal economies of presence (the epoch of the cogito and of lsquoGodrsquo are that which presences thus) If the phenomenologist wants ldquoto address presencing and its manifold ways of differing from the economies of presencerdquo26 the three terms of the ontological difference will have to be temporalized accordingly whereas in the unfolding

ldquopossibility of taking actionrdquo precisely because this call ldquofails to give any lsquopracticalrsquo injunc-tionsrdquo or maxim (see Heidegger Being and Time trans J Macquarrrie and E Robinson [New York Harper and Row 1962] 340) Th ough Levinas would perhaps agree with the ontological nature of such a practical a priori it remains to be considered whether he would concur with the extra-moral sense Marion tries to give to it (see Being Given 314 ldquoIf this willing can abandon the given to itself [this] abandon does not belong to the moral dispositionrdquo) 24) Heidegger on Being and Acting 257 25) Ibid 57 26) Ibid 160

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424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

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426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

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428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

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430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

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432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 2: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

418 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

commentators [I]t is precisely such a connection that Schuumlrmann means to make in basing his topology on an analytic of ultimates [Th is] analytic promises to give us those elements structures and dynamics that are funda-mental to human existence and are presumed by any history of philosophyrdquo2 It would be unfair however to see Schuumlrmann as but one more lsquoHeidegge-rianrsquo or as I will show below lsquodeconstructionistrsquo To be sure his interpreta-tion of Heidegger is intriguing and often innovating one need only think of his efforts lsquoto read Heidegger backwardsrsquo without regard for the fashionable distinction between the early Heidegger and its mystical and mythical sequel or of his interpretation of Heideggerrsquos work on Nietzsche which as Schuumlr-mann convincingly shows ldquospeak formally of Nietzsche but materially about technologyrdquo3

And yet Schuumlrmann pushes one to look beyond Heidegger and perhaps indeed to ldquoconsequences more extreme than Heidegger would wishrdquo4 It remains to be considered whether Schuumlrmann actually succeeded in showing the fundamental unity of thinking acting and being but with Schuumlrmann finally the tragic condition of the human being is given a voice in contempo-rary philosophy In effect Schuumlrmann might even have the strongest case to date to take the existential character of metaphysical questions into account

In its simplest form we all know or at least have a pre-understanding of our tragic condition for the ldquopoint of departurerdquo of the analytic of ultimates ldquois the knowledge from which no one escapes and which escapes no one even if the natural metaphysician in each of us closes his eyes to it the knowledge that we arrive by our birth and go to our deathrdquo5

Besides the lsquopracticalrsquo and existential character of the most intimate ques-tions of metaphysics this article will address the import of Schuumlrmannrsquos notion of lsquothe natural metaphysician in each of usrsquo for the question that seems to divide Derrida and Schuumlrmann seems to hinge on precisely this issue of a metaphysics that comes natural to us Th irdly this article will in relating Schuumlrmann not only to Heidegger but also to Levinas and Derrida pay atten-tion to the new understanding of philosophy that seems to emerge from Schuumlrmannrsquos work which is due precisely to its lsquopracticalrsquo starting-point

2) Reginald Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des Heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo Research in Phenomenology 28 (1998) 226ndash42 231 3) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 4) Ibid 38 5) Schuumlrmann Broken Hegemonies trans R Lilly (Bloomington Indiana University Press 2003) 345

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 419

Heideggerian Anarchy

Th e title of this section which may surprise the lsquoHeideggeriansrsquo is not mine but Schuumlrmannrsquos6 Th is section will address Schuumlrmannrsquos temporalizing of the ontological difference turning it into a temporal and therefore an-archic difference and convey the practical import of it

Th e lsquoPractical a Priorirsquo

Th e existential character of metaphysical questions comes to the fore in Schuumlr-mannrsquos beautiful contradictory notion of lsquothe practical a priorirsquo If Lillyrsquos state-ment that only the analytic of ultimates of Broken Hegemonies shows the connection between Heideggerrsquos history of being and some form of existential analytic the lsquopractical a priorirsquo of Heidegger on Being and Acting can serve as a hermeneutic key to bring the profound continuity between Schuumlrmannrsquos two major works to light In this sense my effort here is a sort of lsquoreading Schuumlr-mann backwardsrsquo Th is will allow us to interpret Schuumlrmannrsquos nuanced stance on the question of overcoming metaphysics and to correct some of the views on his œuvre that have emerged in secondary literature as for instance in Vahabzadehrsquos entirely metaphysical characterization of the 1987 work as ldquobear-ing the stamp of a flourishing life an effect of natality while Broken Hege-monies certainly comes from a life pulled toward deathrdquo7

If one of the main theses of Broken Hegemonies is that all of the major meta-physical systems (mainly Plotinus Cicero Augustine and modern philoso-phy) have arisen from the ultimate analytic of natality and mortality in that all these systems are subjected to a sort of natural drive to maximize or overde-termine one phenomenal region over others (according to Schuumlrmannn meta-physicsrsquo main mode of procedure is to focus on the phenomenon of fabrication those thing that are man-made) then this native and natural tendency towards generalization universalization and lsquode-phenomenologizationrsquo inevitably gives birth to its lsquootherrsquo namely the pull and pressure of finitude for the phe-nomenological and singular encounter with finite beings in and through our finite comprehension of those beings resists precisely such a lsquofantasmicrsquo maxi-mization under the rule of one overarching and hegemonic phenomenon (whether it be the One nature or the modern cogito) It is death as the one and only singularization to come that throws the hubris of these philosophies

6) Heidegger on Being and Acting 155 7) Peyman Vahabzadeh ldquoReview of Broken Hegemoniesrdquo Journal for Cultural and Religious Th eory 5 (2004) 51ndash56 55

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420 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

rendering reason of all beings back upon its ldquohumble conditionrdquo8 the lives and deaths that you and I will have to experience9 Th e ontology of natality that is of the natural metaphysician in us inevitably gives way to its parasitical other in the return of the denied10 namely the contingency and historicity of time as that which will lead us to our deaths11

It is true that Broken Hegemonies offers an elaborate discussion of the his-torical moments of such metaphysical madness which was perhaps lacking at the time of Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book Nevertheless the main theses of the first-mentioned book are present in the latter book as wellmdashwhich already makes it impossible to consider it solely as lsquostamped by a flourishing lifersquo What Schuumlrmann will later with Arendt name as the ontological traits of mortality and natality have both figured in his first book as well Take for instance the trait of mortality Commenting upon the lineage from Ancient philosophy the Nietzschean overturning thereof and its connection with our (post)modern technological era Schuumlrmann writes that for ldquothe [technologi-cal] manipulable to inherit the prestige of the ancient Good the representa-tion of an ideal hierarchy must have contained its fatal agent within itself ever since its conceptionrdquo12

Not only does metaphysics therefore write so to say its own testament as if its birth certificate is at the same time its hour of death but even in Schuumlr-mannrsquos Heidegger the dawn of metaphysics originates in the human beingrsquos naturalmdashshould I say compulsivemdashbehavior Indeed even the Heidegger book intimates metaphysicsrsquo natural origins for metaphysics results from a ldquoneed for an archaeo-teleocratic originrdquo the ldquowant of a holdrdquo on our epoch and is therefore perhaps nothing more than a ldquoself-incurred illusion of per-fect presencerdquo13 It is this need and this want that according to Schuumlrmann accounts for human beingsrsquo tragic condition and that forces them on the one hand to posit in one way or another a grand narrative while on the other being forced to hear the demand of that which such metaphysical narratives

8) Broken Hegemonies 629 9) See also Broken Hegemonies 35 ldquothe order established by hegemonic fantasms is conquered each time By what By the nameless abyss where we are devoured by negative experience (the experience of the unjustifiable of evil and of death) Fantasmic consolations and consolida-tions work against that experiencerdquo 10) Broken Hegemonies 624 11) Heidegger on Being and Acting 106 12) Ibid 197 (italics mine) 13) Heidegger on Being and Acting 204 252 226 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 420RP 373_f7_417-439indd 420 101807 44222 PM101807 44222 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 421

precisely deny namely finitude mortality that is time If one of Broken Hege-moniesrsquo aims was to show how metaphysical positions are rooted in everyday experience one can find thus the appeal to experience in Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy book as well

Such a priority of praxis and everyday experience crystallizes in what Schuumlr-mann coins as lsquothe practical a priorirsquo With this notion Schuumlrmann espouses what seems to be an extraordinary everyday banality namely that ldquoto under-stand authentic temporality it is necessary to lsquoexist authenticallyrsquo to think being as letting phenomena be one must oneself lsquolet all things bersquo to follow the play without why of presencing it is necessary to lsquolive without whyrsquordquo14 In short ldquoa mode of thinking is made dependent on a mode of livingrdquo15 Schuumlr-mann shows that such a practical a priori is present in both the early and the later Heidegger16 For reasons of space I will limit Schuumlrmannrsquos argument to Heideggerrsquos Being and Time Schuumlrmann asks ldquoWhat is it that conceals the transcendence of Daseinrdquo and answers thus ldquoA certain way of behaving a certain attitudinal way of being in the worldmdashinauthenticityrdquo adding that in ldquoBeing and Time the classical ontologies spring precisely from inauthentic existencerdquo and concluding therefore that all this ldquoindicates first and foremost that the retrieval proper of the being question is bound to fail unless it is pre-ceded by what [Heidegger] then calls an existentiell modificationrdquomdashldquoFirst comes an appropriation of existentiell possibilities then existential ontol-ogyrdquo17 Th e later Heidegger Schuumlrmann argues will move away from the indi-vidual implications that Being and Time still could admit and will espouse the public and political dimension of the practical a priori Eigentlichtkeit or authenticity is substituted for lsquoEreignisrsquo

One must note that the practical a priori is for Schuumlrmann a method rather than an empirical stance it is the path that may lead ldquofrom a way of living to a way of thinkingrdquo it is to avoid ldquothe lsquomethodicalrsquo errancyrdquo of meta-physics which substitutes the contingency of time for the consolations of the eternal or the permanent presence of consciousness and forgets about its hum-ble and historical origins and which therefore is accompanied by ldquoa methodi-cal retrenchment of life or of praxisrdquo to the point that one can as angels supposedly have once done ldquospeak from mind to mindrdquo18

14) Ibid 287 15) Ibid 237 16) Ibid 236ndash45 17) Ibid 237 238 18) Ibid 238ndash39

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422 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

Such a priority of praxis is by no means absent from contemporary Conti-nental philosophy it is for instance to be found in the phenomenology of the Other of Emmanuel Levinas and in the phenomenology of givenness of Jean-Luc Marion For both authors the response to the appeal (whether it be from God or givenness) lies phenomenologically prior to the appeal it is only in and through menrsquos and womenrsquos responses that the appeal appears It matters little that for Marion the responsiveness of human being is broadened to entail more than the (Levinasian) human face It matters that in both cases a certain mode of comportment accompanies the act of thinking whether it be for Marion the abandoning of oneself to whatever gives itself or the ethical bear-ing witness to the Other in Levinas19 Levinasrsquo analysis of lsquoenjoymentrsquo in Total-ity and Infinity definitely shows that such a lsquopractical a priorirsquo is accompanied by an attentiveness to life20

Note finally that whereas Marion at one point claims to have found such a priority of praxis in Levinasrsquo thought21 he elsewhere shows that such a prior-ity stems from Heidegger22 Th ough all these thinkers would therefore agree that such a practical a priori consists not in an lsquoonticrsquo determinate and indi-vidual act23 but rather in an ontological and transcendental attunementmdash

19) See for instance Jean-Luc Marion Being Given Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness trans J Kosky (Stanford Stanford University Press 2002) 282ndash319 esp 306ndash7 where the primacy of praxis gives way to a priority of a supposedly extra-moral lsquowillingrsquo over lsquothinkingrsquo which is a reversal of the Medieval adage stating that lsquoacting follows beingrsquo Consider also Marionrsquos conten-tion that it is no longer a matter of representational thinking but of ldquoaiming in the direction of of relating to of comporting oneself toward of reckoning with rdquo whatever gives itself in his In Excess Studies of Saturated Phenomena trans R Horner and V Berraud (New York Fordham University Press 2002) 144ndash45 For Emmanuel Levinas see Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 144ndash53 esp 149 ldquothe appeal is heard in the responserdquo (translation modified) 20) See also Levinas Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 154 ldquoHow would a total reflection be allowed [to] a being that never becomes the bare fact of existing and whose existence is life that is life from some-thingrdquo Life from something that is according to Levinasrsquo thesis of enjoyment as concrete as the drinks that we drink the food we eat and the men and women we entertain and encounter in our houses Consider also the anti-metaphysical (yet theological) statement that ldquolife is not com-prehensible simply as a diminution a fall Th e individual and the personal are necessary for Infinity to be able to be produced as infiniterdquo (ibid 218) 21) Being Given 287 22) Marion Reduction and Givenness Investigations of Husserl Heidegger and Phenomenology trans TA Carlson (Evanston Northwestern University Press 1998) 185ndash86 23) See for instance Otherwise than Being 144 ldquo[Sincerity] is not an act or a movement or any sort of cultural gesturerdquo In Heidegger the call of conscience opens onto the condition () of

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 422RP 373_f7_417-439indd 422 101807 44222 PM101807 44222 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 423

from Heideggerrsquo Stimmung or moodmdashthey diverge as to that which is capable of uttering such an appeal

Th e Event and the Phenomenology of Presencing

For Schuumlrmann this appeal is obviously Heideggerian in nature it is to the presencing of being that the human being is to cor-respond Schuumlrmannrsquos phenomenology of presencing presents a temporalized version of Heideggerrsquos ontological difference According to Schuumlrmann ldquoHeideggerrsquos entire effort consists in recovering that broader sense of being as coming into presence [Anwesung] or presencing [Anwesen]rdquo24 At this point it is necessary to con-sider Schuumlrmannrsquos interpretation of Heideggerian anti-humanism for the his-tory of being to appear as ontotheology it is necessary that all reference from being to human beings (as a privileged relation) disappear In order to think being as time it is no longer necessary to think human temporality that is the human being as time25 In this sense for Schuumlrmann Heideggerrsquos lesson would be a sobering one resisting all consolation and consolidation of an ultimate yet fantasmic referent that would guide and orient our actions Th e (presenc-ing of the) world has become a contingent and goalless process

Schuumlrmann will see the event of presencing as that which liberates us from the anthropocentrism that still accompanied modern philosophy according to which nothing can be said to come to pass if it does not appear to the tran-scendental subject In order to temporalize the ontological difference between being and beings Schuumlrmann will distinguish between (originary) being as the event of presencing and the different lsquooriginalrsquo and epochal economies of presence (the epoch of the cogito and of lsquoGodrsquo are that which presences thus) If the phenomenologist wants ldquoto address presencing and its manifold ways of differing from the economies of presencerdquo26 the three terms of the ontological difference will have to be temporalized accordingly whereas in the unfolding

ldquopossibility of taking actionrdquo precisely because this call ldquofails to give any lsquopracticalrsquo injunc-tionsrdquo or maxim (see Heidegger Being and Time trans J Macquarrrie and E Robinson [New York Harper and Row 1962] 340) Th ough Levinas would perhaps agree with the ontological nature of such a practical a priori it remains to be considered whether he would concur with the extra-moral sense Marion tries to give to it (see Being Given 314 ldquoIf this willing can abandon the given to itself [this] abandon does not belong to the moral dispositionrdquo) 24) Heidegger on Being and Acting 257 25) Ibid 57 26) Ibid 160

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 426RP 373_f7_417-439indd 426 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 428RP 373_f7_417-439indd 428 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

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430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

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432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 3: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 419

Heideggerian Anarchy

Th e title of this section which may surprise the lsquoHeideggeriansrsquo is not mine but Schuumlrmannrsquos6 Th is section will address Schuumlrmannrsquos temporalizing of the ontological difference turning it into a temporal and therefore an-archic difference and convey the practical import of it

Th e lsquoPractical a Priorirsquo

Th e existential character of metaphysical questions comes to the fore in Schuumlr-mannrsquos beautiful contradictory notion of lsquothe practical a priorirsquo If Lillyrsquos state-ment that only the analytic of ultimates of Broken Hegemonies shows the connection between Heideggerrsquos history of being and some form of existential analytic the lsquopractical a priorirsquo of Heidegger on Being and Acting can serve as a hermeneutic key to bring the profound continuity between Schuumlrmannrsquos two major works to light In this sense my effort here is a sort of lsquoreading Schuumlr-mann backwardsrsquo Th is will allow us to interpret Schuumlrmannrsquos nuanced stance on the question of overcoming metaphysics and to correct some of the views on his œuvre that have emerged in secondary literature as for instance in Vahabzadehrsquos entirely metaphysical characterization of the 1987 work as ldquobear-ing the stamp of a flourishing life an effect of natality while Broken Hege-monies certainly comes from a life pulled toward deathrdquo7

If one of the main theses of Broken Hegemonies is that all of the major meta-physical systems (mainly Plotinus Cicero Augustine and modern philoso-phy) have arisen from the ultimate analytic of natality and mortality in that all these systems are subjected to a sort of natural drive to maximize or overde-termine one phenomenal region over others (according to Schuumlrmannn meta-physicsrsquo main mode of procedure is to focus on the phenomenon of fabrication those thing that are man-made) then this native and natural tendency towards generalization universalization and lsquode-phenomenologizationrsquo inevitably gives birth to its lsquootherrsquo namely the pull and pressure of finitude for the phe-nomenological and singular encounter with finite beings in and through our finite comprehension of those beings resists precisely such a lsquofantasmicrsquo maxi-mization under the rule of one overarching and hegemonic phenomenon (whether it be the One nature or the modern cogito) It is death as the one and only singularization to come that throws the hubris of these philosophies

6) Heidegger on Being and Acting 155 7) Peyman Vahabzadeh ldquoReview of Broken Hegemoniesrdquo Journal for Cultural and Religious Th eory 5 (2004) 51ndash56 55

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420 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

rendering reason of all beings back upon its ldquohumble conditionrdquo8 the lives and deaths that you and I will have to experience9 Th e ontology of natality that is of the natural metaphysician in us inevitably gives way to its parasitical other in the return of the denied10 namely the contingency and historicity of time as that which will lead us to our deaths11

It is true that Broken Hegemonies offers an elaborate discussion of the his-torical moments of such metaphysical madness which was perhaps lacking at the time of Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book Nevertheless the main theses of the first-mentioned book are present in the latter book as wellmdashwhich already makes it impossible to consider it solely as lsquostamped by a flourishing lifersquo What Schuumlrmann will later with Arendt name as the ontological traits of mortality and natality have both figured in his first book as well Take for instance the trait of mortality Commenting upon the lineage from Ancient philosophy the Nietzschean overturning thereof and its connection with our (post)modern technological era Schuumlrmann writes that for ldquothe [technologi-cal] manipulable to inherit the prestige of the ancient Good the representa-tion of an ideal hierarchy must have contained its fatal agent within itself ever since its conceptionrdquo12

Not only does metaphysics therefore write so to say its own testament as if its birth certificate is at the same time its hour of death but even in Schuumlr-mannrsquos Heidegger the dawn of metaphysics originates in the human beingrsquos naturalmdashshould I say compulsivemdashbehavior Indeed even the Heidegger book intimates metaphysicsrsquo natural origins for metaphysics results from a ldquoneed for an archaeo-teleocratic originrdquo the ldquowant of a holdrdquo on our epoch and is therefore perhaps nothing more than a ldquoself-incurred illusion of per-fect presencerdquo13 It is this need and this want that according to Schuumlrmann accounts for human beingsrsquo tragic condition and that forces them on the one hand to posit in one way or another a grand narrative while on the other being forced to hear the demand of that which such metaphysical narratives

8) Broken Hegemonies 629 9) See also Broken Hegemonies 35 ldquothe order established by hegemonic fantasms is conquered each time By what By the nameless abyss where we are devoured by negative experience (the experience of the unjustifiable of evil and of death) Fantasmic consolations and consolida-tions work against that experiencerdquo 10) Broken Hegemonies 624 11) Heidegger on Being and Acting 106 12) Ibid 197 (italics mine) 13) Heidegger on Being and Acting 204 252 226 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 421

precisely deny namely finitude mortality that is time If one of Broken Hege-moniesrsquo aims was to show how metaphysical positions are rooted in everyday experience one can find thus the appeal to experience in Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy book as well

Such a priority of praxis and everyday experience crystallizes in what Schuumlr-mann coins as lsquothe practical a priorirsquo With this notion Schuumlrmann espouses what seems to be an extraordinary everyday banality namely that ldquoto under-stand authentic temporality it is necessary to lsquoexist authenticallyrsquo to think being as letting phenomena be one must oneself lsquolet all things bersquo to follow the play without why of presencing it is necessary to lsquolive without whyrsquordquo14 In short ldquoa mode of thinking is made dependent on a mode of livingrdquo15 Schuumlr-mann shows that such a practical a priori is present in both the early and the later Heidegger16 For reasons of space I will limit Schuumlrmannrsquos argument to Heideggerrsquos Being and Time Schuumlrmann asks ldquoWhat is it that conceals the transcendence of Daseinrdquo and answers thus ldquoA certain way of behaving a certain attitudinal way of being in the worldmdashinauthenticityrdquo adding that in ldquoBeing and Time the classical ontologies spring precisely from inauthentic existencerdquo and concluding therefore that all this ldquoindicates first and foremost that the retrieval proper of the being question is bound to fail unless it is pre-ceded by what [Heidegger] then calls an existentiell modificationrdquomdashldquoFirst comes an appropriation of existentiell possibilities then existential ontol-ogyrdquo17 Th e later Heidegger Schuumlrmann argues will move away from the indi-vidual implications that Being and Time still could admit and will espouse the public and political dimension of the practical a priori Eigentlichtkeit or authenticity is substituted for lsquoEreignisrsquo

One must note that the practical a priori is for Schuumlrmann a method rather than an empirical stance it is the path that may lead ldquofrom a way of living to a way of thinkingrdquo it is to avoid ldquothe lsquomethodicalrsquo errancyrdquo of meta-physics which substitutes the contingency of time for the consolations of the eternal or the permanent presence of consciousness and forgets about its hum-ble and historical origins and which therefore is accompanied by ldquoa methodi-cal retrenchment of life or of praxisrdquo to the point that one can as angels supposedly have once done ldquospeak from mind to mindrdquo18

14) Ibid 287 15) Ibid 237 16) Ibid 236ndash45 17) Ibid 237 238 18) Ibid 238ndash39

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422 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

Such a priority of praxis is by no means absent from contemporary Conti-nental philosophy it is for instance to be found in the phenomenology of the Other of Emmanuel Levinas and in the phenomenology of givenness of Jean-Luc Marion For both authors the response to the appeal (whether it be from God or givenness) lies phenomenologically prior to the appeal it is only in and through menrsquos and womenrsquos responses that the appeal appears It matters little that for Marion the responsiveness of human being is broadened to entail more than the (Levinasian) human face It matters that in both cases a certain mode of comportment accompanies the act of thinking whether it be for Marion the abandoning of oneself to whatever gives itself or the ethical bear-ing witness to the Other in Levinas19 Levinasrsquo analysis of lsquoenjoymentrsquo in Total-ity and Infinity definitely shows that such a lsquopractical a priorirsquo is accompanied by an attentiveness to life20

Note finally that whereas Marion at one point claims to have found such a priority of praxis in Levinasrsquo thought21 he elsewhere shows that such a prior-ity stems from Heidegger22 Th ough all these thinkers would therefore agree that such a practical a priori consists not in an lsquoonticrsquo determinate and indi-vidual act23 but rather in an ontological and transcendental attunementmdash

19) See for instance Jean-Luc Marion Being Given Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness trans J Kosky (Stanford Stanford University Press 2002) 282ndash319 esp 306ndash7 where the primacy of praxis gives way to a priority of a supposedly extra-moral lsquowillingrsquo over lsquothinkingrsquo which is a reversal of the Medieval adage stating that lsquoacting follows beingrsquo Consider also Marionrsquos conten-tion that it is no longer a matter of representational thinking but of ldquoaiming in the direction of of relating to of comporting oneself toward of reckoning with rdquo whatever gives itself in his In Excess Studies of Saturated Phenomena trans R Horner and V Berraud (New York Fordham University Press 2002) 144ndash45 For Emmanuel Levinas see Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 144ndash53 esp 149 ldquothe appeal is heard in the responserdquo (translation modified) 20) See also Levinas Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 154 ldquoHow would a total reflection be allowed [to] a being that never becomes the bare fact of existing and whose existence is life that is life from some-thingrdquo Life from something that is according to Levinasrsquo thesis of enjoyment as concrete as the drinks that we drink the food we eat and the men and women we entertain and encounter in our houses Consider also the anti-metaphysical (yet theological) statement that ldquolife is not com-prehensible simply as a diminution a fall Th e individual and the personal are necessary for Infinity to be able to be produced as infiniterdquo (ibid 218) 21) Being Given 287 22) Marion Reduction and Givenness Investigations of Husserl Heidegger and Phenomenology trans TA Carlson (Evanston Northwestern University Press 1998) 185ndash86 23) See for instance Otherwise than Being 144 ldquo[Sincerity] is not an act or a movement or any sort of cultural gesturerdquo In Heidegger the call of conscience opens onto the condition () of

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 423

from Heideggerrsquo Stimmung or moodmdashthey diverge as to that which is capable of uttering such an appeal

Th e Event and the Phenomenology of Presencing

For Schuumlrmann this appeal is obviously Heideggerian in nature it is to the presencing of being that the human being is to cor-respond Schuumlrmannrsquos phenomenology of presencing presents a temporalized version of Heideggerrsquos ontological difference According to Schuumlrmann ldquoHeideggerrsquos entire effort consists in recovering that broader sense of being as coming into presence [Anwesung] or presencing [Anwesen]rdquo24 At this point it is necessary to con-sider Schuumlrmannrsquos interpretation of Heideggerian anti-humanism for the his-tory of being to appear as ontotheology it is necessary that all reference from being to human beings (as a privileged relation) disappear In order to think being as time it is no longer necessary to think human temporality that is the human being as time25 In this sense for Schuumlrmann Heideggerrsquos lesson would be a sobering one resisting all consolation and consolidation of an ultimate yet fantasmic referent that would guide and orient our actions Th e (presenc-ing of the) world has become a contingent and goalless process

Schuumlrmann will see the event of presencing as that which liberates us from the anthropocentrism that still accompanied modern philosophy according to which nothing can be said to come to pass if it does not appear to the tran-scendental subject In order to temporalize the ontological difference between being and beings Schuumlrmann will distinguish between (originary) being as the event of presencing and the different lsquooriginalrsquo and epochal economies of presence (the epoch of the cogito and of lsquoGodrsquo are that which presences thus) If the phenomenologist wants ldquoto address presencing and its manifold ways of differing from the economies of presencerdquo26 the three terms of the ontological difference will have to be temporalized accordingly whereas in the unfolding

ldquopossibility of taking actionrdquo precisely because this call ldquofails to give any lsquopracticalrsquo injunc-tionsrdquo or maxim (see Heidegger Being and Time trans J Macquarrrie and E Robinson [New York Harper and Row 1962] 340) Th ough Levinas would perhaps agree with the ontological nature of such a practical a priori it remains to be considered whether he would concur with the extra-moral sense Marion tries to give to it (see Being Given 314 ldquoIf this willing can abandon the given to itself [this] abandon does not belong to the moral dispositionrdquo) 24) Heidegger on Being and Acting 257 25) Ibid 57 26) Ibid 160

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

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426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 428RP 373_f7_417-439indd 428 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 430RP 373_f7_417-439indd 430 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

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432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 4: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

420 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

rendering reason of all beings back upon its ldquohumble conditionrdquo8 the lives and deaths that you and I will have to experience9 Th e ontology of natality that is of the natural metaphysician in us inevitably gives way to its parasitical other in the return of the denied10 namely the contingency and historicity of time as that which will lead us to our deaths11

It is true that Broken Hegemonies offers an elaborate discussion of the his-torical moments of such metaphysical madness which was perhaps lacking at the time of Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book Nevertheless the main theses of the first-mentioned book are present in the latter book as wellmdashwhich already makes it impossible to consider it solely as lsquostamped by a flourishing lifersquo What Schuumlrmann will later with Arendt name as the ontological traits of mortality and natality have both figured in his first book as well Take for instance the trait of mortality Commenting upon the lineage from Ancient philosophy the Nietzschean overturning thereof and its connection with our (post)modern technological era Schuumlrmann writes that for ldquothe [technologi-cal] manipulable to inherit the prestige of the ancient Good the representa-tion of an ideal hierarchy must have contained its fatal agent within itself ever since its conceptionrdquo12

Not only does metaphysics therefore write so to say its own testament as if its birth certificate is at the same time its hour of death but even in Schuumlr-mannrsquos Heidegger the dawn of metaphysics originates in the human beingrsquos naturalmdashshould I say compulsivemdashbehavior Indeed even the Heidegger book intimates metaphysicsrsquo natural origins for metaphysics results from a ldquoneed for an archaeo-teleocratic originrdquo the ldquowant of a holdrdquo on our epoch and is therefore perhaps nothing more than a ldquoself-incurred illusion of per-fect presencerdquo13 It is this need and this want that according to Schuumlrmann accounts for human beingsrsquo tragic condition and that forces them on the one hand to posit in one way or another a grand narrative while on the other being forced to hear the demand of that which such metaphysical narratives

8) Broken Hegemonies 629 9) See also Broken Hegemonies 35 ldquothe order established by hegemonic fantasms is conquered each time By what By the nameless abyss where we are devoured by negative experience (the experience of the unjustifiable of evil and of death) Fantasmic consolations and consolida-tions work against that experiencerdquo 10) Broken Hegemonies 624 11) Heidegger on Being and Acting 106 12) Ibid 197 (italics mine) 13) Heidegger on Being and Acting 204 252 226 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 420RP 373_f7_417-439indd 420 101807 44222 PM101807 44222 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 421

precisely deny namely finitude mortality that is time If one of Broken Hege-moniesrsquo aims was to show how metaphysical positions are rooted in everyday experience one can find thus the appeal to experience in Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy book as well

Such a priority of praxis and everyday experience crystallizes in what Schuumlr-mann coins as lsquothe practical a priorirsquo With this notion Schuumlrmann espouses what seems to be an extraordinary everyday banality namely that ldquoto under-stand authentic temporality it is necessary to lsquoexist authenticallyrsquo to think being as letting phenomena be one must oneself lsquolet all things bersquo to follow the play without why of presencing it is necessary to lsquolive without whyrsquordquo14 In short ldquoa mode of thinking is made dependent on a mode of livingrdquo15 Schuumlr-mann shows that such a practical a priori is present in both the early and the later Heidegger16 For reasons of space I will limit Schuumlrmannrsquos argument to Heideggerrsquos Being and Time Schuumlrmann asks ldquoWhat is it that conceals the transcendence of Daseinrdquo and answers thus ldquoA certain way of behaving a certain attitudinal way of being in the worldmdashinauthenticityrdquo adding that in ldquoBeing and Time the classical ontologies spring precisely from inauthentic existencerdquo and concluding therefore that all this ldquoindicates first and foremost that the retrieval proper of the being question is bound to fail unless it is pre-ceded by what [Heidegger] then calls an existentiell modificationrdquomdashldquoFirst comes an appropriation of existentiell possibilities then existential ontol-ogyrdquo17 Th e later Heidegger Schuumlrmann argues will move away from the indi-vidual implications that Being and Time still could admit and will espouse the public and political dimension of the practical a priori Eigentlichtkeit or authenticity is substituted for lsquoEreignisrsquo

One must note that the practical a priori is for Schuumlrmann a method rather than an empirical stance it is the path that may lead ldquofrom a way of living to a way of thinkingrdquo it is to avoid ldquothe lsquomethodicalrsquo errancyrdquo of meta-physics which substitutes the contingency of time for the consolations of the eternal or the permanent presence of consciousness and forgets about its hum-ble and historical origins and which therefore is accompanied by ldquoa methodi-cal retrenchment of life or of praxisrdquo to the point that one can as angels supposedly have once done ldquospeak from mind to mindrdquo18

14) Ibid 287 15) Ibid 237 16) Ibid 236ndash45 17) Ibid 237 238 18) Ibid 238ndash39

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 421RP 373_f7_417-439indd 421 101807 44222 PM101807 44222 PM

422 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

Such a priority of praxis is by no means absent from contemporary Conti-nental philosophy it is for instance to be found in the phenomenology of the Other of Emmanuel Levinas and in the phenomenology of givenness of Jean-Luc Marion For both authors the response to the appeal (whether it be from God or givenness) lies phenomenologically prior to the appeal it is only in and through menrsquos and womenrsquos responses that the appeal appears It matters little that for Marion the responsiveness of human being is broadened to entail more than the (Levinasian) human face It matters that in both cases a certain mode of comportment accompanies the act of thinking whether it be for Marion the abandoning of oneself to whatever gives itself or the ethical bear-ing witness to the Other in Levinas19 Levinasrsquo analysis of lsquoenjoymentrsquo in Total-ity and Infinity definitely shows that such a lsquopractical a priorirsquo is accompanied by an attentiveness to life20

Note finally that whereas Marion at one point claims to have found such a priority of praxis in Levinasrsquo thought21 he elsewhere shows that such a prior-ity stems from Heidegger22 Th ough all these thinkers would therefore agree that such a practical a priori consists not in an lsquoonticrsquo determinate and indi-vidual act23 but rather in an ontological and transcendental attunementmdash

19) See for instance Jean-Luc Marion Being Given Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness trans J Kosky (Stanford Stanford University Press 2002) 282ndash319 esp 306ndash7 where the primacy of praxis gives way to a priority of a supposedly extra-moral lsquowillingrsquo over lsquothinkingrsquo which is a reversal of the Medieval adage stating that lsquoacting follows beingrsquo Consider also Marionrsquos conten-tion that it is no longer a matter of representational thinking but of ldquoaiming in the direction of of relating to of comporting oneself toward of reckoning with rdquo whatever gives itself in his In Excess Studies of Saturated Phenomena trans R Horner and V Berraud (New York Fordham University Press 2002) 144ndash45 For Emmanuel Levinas see Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 144ndash53 esp 149 ldquothe appeal is heard in the responserdquo (translation modified) 20) See also Levinas Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 154 ldquoHow would a total reflection be allowed [to] a being that never becomes the bare fact of existing and whose existence is life that is life from some-thingrdquo Life from something that is according to Levinasrsquo thesis of enjoyment as concrete as the drinks that we drink the food we eat and the men and women we entertain and encounter in our houses Consider also the anti-metaphysical (yet theological) statement that ldquolife is not com-prehensible simply as a diminution a fall Th e individual and the personal are necessary for Infinity to be able to be produced as infiniterdquo (ibid 218) 21) Being Given 287 22) Marion Reduction and Givenness Investigations of Husserl Heidegger and Phenomenology trans TA Carlson (Evanston Northwestern University Press 1998) 185ndash86 23) See for instance Otherwise than Being 144 ldquo[Sincerity] is not an act or a movement or any sort of cultural gesturerdquo In Heidegger the call of conscience opens onto the condition () of

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 423

from Heideggerrsquo Stimmung or moodmdashthey diverge as to that which is capable of uttering such an appeal

Th e Event and the Phenomenology of Presencing

For Schuumlrmann this appeal is obviously Heideggerian in nature it is to the presencing of being that the human being is to cor-respond Schuumlrmannrsquos phenomenology of presencing presents a temporalized version of Heideggerrsquos ontological difference According to Schuumlrmann ldquoHeideggerrsquos entire effort consists in recovering that broader sense of being as coming into presence [Anwesung] or presencing [Anwesen]rdquo24 At this point it is necessary to con-sider Schuumlrmannrsquos interpretation of Heideggerian anti-humanism for the his-tory of being to appear as ontotheology it is necessary that all reference from being to human beings (as a privileged relation) disappear In order to think being as time it is no longer necessary to think human temporality that is the human being as time25 In this sense for Schuumlrmann Heideggerrsquos lesson would be a sobering one resisting all consolation and consolidation of an ultimate yet fantasmic referent that would guide and orient our actions Th e (presenc-ing of the) world has become a contingent and goalless process

Schuumlrmann will see the event of presencing as that which liberates us from the anthropocentrism that still accompanied modern philosophy according to which nothing can be said to come to pass if it does not appear to the tran-scendental subject In order to temporalize the ontological difference between being and beings Schuumlrmann will distinguish between (originary) being as the event of presencing and the different lsquooriginalrsquo and epochal economies of presence (the epoch of the cogito and of lsquoGodrsquo are that which presences thus) If the phenomenologist wants ldquoto address presencing and its manifold ways of differing from the economies of presencerdquo26 the three terms of the ontological difference will have to be temporalized accordingly whereas in the unfolding

ldquopossibility of taking actionrdquo precisely because this call ldquofails to give any lsquopracticalrsquo injunc-tionsrdquo or maxim (see Heidegger Being and Time trans J Macquarrrie and E Robinson [New York Harper and Row 1962] 340) Th ough Levinas would perhaps agree with the ontological nature of such a practical a priori it remains to be considered whether he would concur with the extra-moral sense Marion tries to give to it (see Being Given 314 ldquoIf this willing can abandon the given to itself [this] abandon does not belong to the moral dispositionrdquo) 24) Heidegger on Being and Acting 257 25) Ibid 57 26) Ibid 160

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 5: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 421

precisely deny namely finitude mortality that is time If one of Broken Hege-moniesrsquo aims was to show how metaphysical positions are rooted in everyday experience one can find thus the appeal to experience in Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy book as well

Such a priority of praxis and everyday experience crystallizes in what Schuumlr-mann coins as lsquothe practical a priorirsquo With this notion Schuumlrmann espouses what seems to be an extraordinary everyday banality namely that ldquoto under-stand authentic temporality it is necessary to lsquoexist authenticallyrsquo to think being as letting phenomena be one must oneself lsquolet all things bersquo to follow the play without why of presencing it is necessary to lsquolive without whyrsquordquo14 In short ldquoa mode of thinking is made dependent on a mode of livingrdquo15 Schuumlr-mann shows that such a practical a priori is present in both the early and the later Heidegger16 For reasons of space I will limit Schuumlrmannrsquos argument to Heideggerrsquos Being and Time Schuumlrmann asks ldquoWhat is it that conceals the transcendence of Daseinrdquo and answers thus ldquoA certain way of behaving a certain attitudinal way of being in the worldmdashinauthenticityrdquo adding that in ldquoBeing and Time the classical ontologies spring precisely from inauthentic existencerdquo and concluding therefore that all this ldquoindicates first and foremost that the retrieval proper of the being question is bound to fail unless it is pre-ceded by what [Heidegger] then calls an existentiell modificationrdquomdashldquoFirst comes an appropriation of existentiell possibilities then existential ontol-ogyrdquo17 Th e later Heidegger Schuumlrmann argues will move away from the indi-vidual implications that Being and Time still could admit and will espouse the public and political dimension of the practical a priori Eigentlichtkeit or authenticity is substituted for lsquoEreignisrsquo

One must note that the practical a priori is for Schuumlrmann a method rather than an empirical stance it is the path that may lead ldquofrom a way of living to a way of thinkingrdquo it is to avoid ldquothe lsquomethodicalrsquo errancyrdquo of meta-physics which substitutes the contingency of time for the consolations of the eternal or the permanent presence of consciousness and forgets about its hum-ble and historical origins and which therefore is accompanied by ldquoa methodi-cal retrenchment of life or of praxisrdquo to the point that one can as angels supposedly have once done ldquospeak from mind to mindrdquo18

14) Ibid 287 15) Ibid 237 16) Ibid 236ndash45 17) Ibid 237 238 18) Ibid 238ndash39

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422 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

Such a priority of praxis is by no means absent from contemporary Conti-nental philosophy it is for instance to be found in the phenomenology of the Other of Emmanuel Levinas and in the phenomenology of givenness of Jean-Luc Marion For both authors the response to the appeal (whether it be from God or givenness) lies phenomenologically prior to the appeal it is only in and through menrsquos and womenrsquos responses that the appeal appears It matters little that for Marion the responsiveness of human being is broadened to entail more than the (Levinasian) human face It matters that in both cases a certain mode of comportment accompanies the act of thinking whether it be for Marion the abandoning of oneself to whatever gives itself or the ethical bear-ing witness to the Other in Levinas19 Levinasrsquo analysis of lsquoenjoymentrsquo in Total-ity and Infinity definitely shows that such a lsquopractical a priorirsquo is accompanied by an attentiveness to life20

Note finally that whereas Marion at one point claims to have found such a priority of praxis in Levinasrsquo thought21 he elsewhere shows that such a prior-ity stems from Heidegger22 Th ough all these thinkers would therefore agree that such a practical a priori consists not in an lsquoonticrsquo determinate and indi-vidual act23 but rather in an ontological and transcendental attunementmdash

19) See for instance Jean-Luc Marion Being Given Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness trans J Kosky (Stanford Stanford University Press 2002) 282ndash319 esp 306ndash7 where the primacy of praxis gives way to a priority of a supposedly extra-moral lsquowillingrsquo over lsquothinkingrsquo which is a reversal of the Medieval adage stating that lsquoacting follows beingrsquo Consider also Marionrsquos conten-tion that it is no longer a matter of representational thinking but of ldquoaiming in the direction of of relating to of comporting oneself toward of reckoning with rdquo whatever gives itself in his In Excess Studies of Saturated Phenomena trans R Horner and V Berraud (New York Fordham University Press 2002) 144ndash45 For Emmanuel Levinas see Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 144ndash53 esp 149 ldquothe appeal is heard in the responserdquo (translation modified) 20) See also Levinas Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 154 ldquoHow would a total reflection be allowed [to] a being that never becomes the bare fact of existing and whose existence is life that is life from some-thingrdquo Life from something that is according to Levinasrsquo thesis of enjoyment as concrete as the drinks that we drink the food we eat and the men and women we entertain and encounter in our houses Consider also the anti-metaphysical (yet theological) statement that ldquolife is not com-prehensible simply as a diminution a fall Th e individual and the personal are necessary for Infinity to be able to be produced as infiniterdquo (ibid 218) 21) Being Given 287 22) Marion Reduction and Givenness Investigations of Husserl Heidegger and Phenomenology trans TA Carlson (Evanston Northwestern University Press 1998) 185ndash86 23) See for instance Otherwise than Being 144 ldquo[Sincerity] is not an act or a movement or any sort of cultural gesturerdquo In Heidegger the call of conscience opens onto the condition () of

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 422RP 373_f7_417-439indd 422 101807 44222 PM101807 44222 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 423

from Heideggerrsquo Stimmung or moodmdashthey diverge as to that which is capable of uttering such an appeal

Th e Event and the Phenomenology of Presencing

For Schuumlrmann this appeal is obviously Heideggerian in nature it is to the presencing of being that the human being is to cor-respond Schuumlrmannrsquos phenomenology of presencing presents a temporalized version of Heideggerrsquos ontological difference According to Schuumlrmann ldquoHeideggerrsquos entire effort consists in recovering that broader sense of being as coming into presence [Anwesung] or presencing [Anwesen]rdquo24 At this point it is necessary to con-sider Schuumlrmannrsquos interpretation of Heideggerian anti-humanism for the his-tory of being to appear as ontotheology it is necessary that all reference from being to human beings (as a privileged relation) disappear In order to think being as time it is no longer necessary to think human temporality that is the human being as time25 In this sense for Schuumlrmann Heideggerrsquos lesson would be a sobering one resisting all consolation and consolidation of an ultimate yet fantasmic referent that would guide and orient our actions Th e (presenc-ing of the) world has become a contingent and goalless process

Schuumlrmann will see the event of presencing as that which liberates us from the anthropocentrism that still accompanied modern philosophy according to which nothing can be said to come to pass if it does not appear to the tran-scendental subject In order to temporalize the ontological difference between being and beings Schuumlrmann will distinguish between (originary) being as the event of presencing and the different lsquooriginalrsquo and epochal economies of presence (the epoch of the cogito and of lsquoGodrsquo are that which presences thus) If the phenomenologist wants ldquoto address presencing and its manifold ways of differing from the economies of presencerdquo26 the three terms of the ontological difference will have to be temporalized accordingly whereas in the unfolding

ldquopossibility of taking actionrdquo precisely because this call ldquofails to give any lsquopracticalrsquo injunc-tionsrdquo or maxim (see Heidegger Being and Time trans J Macquarrrie and E Robinson [New York Harper and Row 1962] 340) Th ough Levinas would perhaps agree with the ontological nature of such a practical a priori it remains to be considered whether he would concur with the extra-moral sense Marion tries to give to it (see Being Given 314 ldquoIf this willing can abandon the given to itself [this] abandon does not belong to the moral dispositionrdquo) 24) Heidegger on Being and Acting 257 25) Ibid 57 26) Ibid 160

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

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428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 6: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

422 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

Such a priority of praxis is by no means absent from contemporary Conti-nental philosophy it is for instance to be found in the phenomenology of the Other of Emmanuel Levinas and in the phenomenology of givenness of Jean-Luc Marion For both authors the response to the appeal (whether it be from God or givenness) lies phenomenologically prior to the appeal it is only in and through menrsquos and womenrsquos responses that the appeal appears It matters little that for Marion the responsiveness of human being is broadened to entail more than the (Levinasian) human face It matters that in both cases a certain mode of comportment accompanies the act of thinking whether it be for Marion the abandoning of oneself to whatever gives itself or the ethical bear-ing witness to the Other in Levinas19 Levinasrsquo analysis of lsquoenjoymentrsquo in Total-ity and Infinity definitely shows that such a lsquopractical a priorirsquo is accompanied by an attentiveness to life20

Note finally that whereas Marion at one point claims to have found such a priority of praxis in Levinasrsquo thought21 he elsewhere shows that such a prior-ity stems from Heidegger22 Th ough all these thinkers would therefore agree that such a practical a priori consists not in an lsquoonticrsquo determinate and indi-vidual act23 but rather in an ontological and transcendental attunementmdash

19) See for instance Jean-Luc Marion Being Given Toward a Phenomenology of Givenness trans J Kosky (Stanford Stanford University Press 2002) 282ndash319 esp 306ndash7 where the primacy of praxis gives way to a priority of a supposedly extra-moral lsquowillingrsquo over lsquothinkingrsquo which is a reversal of the Medieval adage stating that lsquoacting follows beingrsquo Consider also Marionrsquos conten-tion that it is no longer a matter of representational thinking but of ldquoaiming in the direction of of relating to of comporting oneself toward of reckoning with rdquo whatever gives itself in his In Excess Studies of Saturated Phenomena trans R Horner and V Berraud (New York Fordham University Press 2002) 144ndash45 For Emmanuel Levinas see Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 144ndash53 esp 149 ldquothe appeal is heard in the responserdquo (translation modified) 20) See also Levinas Totality and Infinity An Essay on Exteriority trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2002) 154 ldquoHow would a total reflection be allowed [to] a being that never becomes the bare fact of existing and whose existence is life that is life from some-thingrdquo Life from something that is according to Levinasrsquo thesis of enjoyment as concrete as the drinks that we drink the food we eat and the men and women we entertain and encounter in our houses Consider also the anti-metaphysical (yet theological) statement that ldquolife is not com-prehensible simply as a diminution a fall Th e individual and the personal are necessary for Infinity to be able to be produced as infiniterdquo (ibid 218) 21) Being Given 287 22) Marion Reduction and Givenness Investigations of Husserl Heidegger and Phenomenology trans TA Carlson (Evanston Northwestern University Press 1998) 185ndash86 23) See for instance Otherwise than Being 144 ldquo[Sincerity] is not an act or a movement or any sort of cultural gesturerdquo In Heidegger the call of conscience opens onto the condition () of

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 422RP 373_f7_417-439indd 422 101807 44222 PM101807 44222 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 423

from Heideggerrsquo Stimmung or moodmdashthey diverge as to that which is capable of uttering such an appeal

Th e Event and the Phenomenology of Presencing

For Schuumlrmann this appeal is obviously Heideggerian in nature it is to the presencing of being that the human being is to cor-respond Schuumlrmannrsquos phenomenology of presencing presents a temporalized version of Heideggerrsquos ontological difference According to Schuumlrmann ldquoHeideggerrsquos entire effort consists in recovering that broader sense of being as coming into presence [Anwesung] or presencing [Anwesen]rdquo24 At this point it is necessary to con-sider Schuumlrmannrsquos interpretation of Heideggerian anti-humanism for the his-tory of being to appear as ontotheology it is necessary that all reference from being to human beings (as a privileged relation) disappear In order to think being as time it is no longer necessary to think human temporality that is the human being as time25 In this sense for Schuumlrmann Heideggerrsquos lesson would be a sobering one resisting all consolation and consolidation of an ultimate yet fantasmic referent that would guide and orient our actions Th e (presenc-ing of the) world has become a contingent and goalless process

Schuumlrmann will see the event of presencing as that which liberates us from the anthropocentrism that still accompanied modern philosophy according to which nothing can be said to come to pass if it does not appear to the tran-scendental subject In order to temporalize the ontological difference between being and beings Schuumlrmann will distinguish between (originary) being as the event of presencing and the different lsquooriginalrsquo and epochal economies of presence (the epoch of the cogito and of lsquoGodrsquo are that which presences thus) If the phenomenologist wants ldquoto address presencing and its manifold ways of differing from the economies of presencerdquo26 the three terms of the ontological difference will have to be temporalized accordingly whereas in the unfolding

ldquopossibility of taking actionrdquo precisely because this call ldquofails to give any lsquopracticalrsquo injunc-tionsrdquo or maxim (see Heidegger Being and Time trans J Macquarrrie and E Robinson [New York Harper and Row 1962] 340) Th ough Levinas would perhaps agree with the ontological nature of such a practical a priori it remains to be considered whether he would concur with the extra-moral sense Marion tries to give to it (see Being Given 314 ldquoIf this willing can abandon the given to itself [this] abandon does not belong to the moral dispositionrdquo) 24) Heidegger on Being and Acting 257 25) Ibid 57 26) Ibid 160

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 426RP 373_f7_417-439indd 426 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 428RP 373_f7_417-439indd 428 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

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432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 7: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 423

from Heideggerrsquo Stimmung or moodmdashthey diverge as to that which is capable of uttering such an appeal

Th e Event and the Phenomenology of Presencing

For Schuumlrmann this appeal is obviously Heideggerian in nature it is to the presencing of being that the human being is to cor-respond Schuumlrmannrsquos phenomenology of presencing presents a temporalized version of Heideggerrsquos ontological difference According to Schuumlrmann ldquoHeideggerrsquos entire effort consists in recovering that broader sense of being as coming into presence [Anwesung] or presencing [Anwesen]rdquo24 At this point it is necessary to con-sider Schuumlrmannrsquos interpretation of Heideggerian anti-humanism for the his-tory of being to appear as ontotheology it is necessary that all reference from being to human beings (as a privileged relation) disappear In order to think being as time it is no longer necessary to think human temporality that is the human being as time25 In this sense for Schuumlrmann Heideggerrsquos lesson would be a sobering one resisting all consolation and consolidation of an ultimate yet fantasmic referent that would guide and orient our actions Th e (presenc-ing of the) world has become a contingent and goalless process

Schuumlrmann will see the event of presencing as that which liberates us from the anthropocentrism that still accompanied modern philosophy according to which nothing can be said to come to pass if it does not appear to the tran-scendental subject In order to temporalize the ontological difference between being and beings Schuumlrmann will distinguish between (originary) being as the event of presencing and the different lsquooriginalrsquo and epochal economies of presence (the epoch of the cogito and of lsquoGodrsquo are that which presences thus) If the phenomenologist wants ldquoto address presencing and its manifold ways of differing from the economies of presencerdquo26 the three terms of the ontological difference will have to be temporalized accordingly whereas in the unfolding

ldquopossibility of taking actionrdquo precisely because this call ldquofails to give any lsquopracticalrsquo injunc-tionsrdquo or maxim (see Heidegger Being and Time trans J Macquarrrie and E Robinson [New York Harper and Row 1962] 340) Th ough Levinas would perhaps agree with the ontological nature of such a practical a priori it remains to be considered whether he would concur with the extra-moral sense Marion tries to give to it (see Being Given 314 ldquoIf this willing can abandon the given to itself [this] abandon does not belong to the moral dispositionrdquo) 24) Heidegger on Being and Acting 257 25) Ibid 57 26) Ibid 160

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423RP 373_f7_417-439indd 423 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424RP 373_f7_417-439indd 424 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

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426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

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428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

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430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

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432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 8: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

424 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

of the ontological difference beings (Seiendes) lie present in their being (Sei-endheit) from out of their difference with destinal being (Sein) the temporal-ized version of this difference states that the presence (Anwesenheit) of that which is present (Anwesendes) unfolds from out of the event of presencing (parousia)27

Th is lsquoeventrsquo is sobering because it unfolds without why without any other goal than its simple presencing of beings Ereignis grants us its unfolding as in the later Heideggerrsquos terminology world and thing (in its difference from objects) Th ese terms try to suggest ldquothat the world or contextuality announces itself in the lsquoasrsquomdashthe thing lsquoasrsquo thing Th is deals a blow to transcendence since the world is not elsewhere than the thing A phenomenon is taken as what it is only when we understand it as gathering its context as lsquoworldingrsquo And the context is taken as such only when we understand it as gathering the phe-nomenon as lsquothingingrsquordquo28 Th e lsquoworlding of the worldrsquo according to Schuumlr-mann marginalizes human beings they are only ldquoone of the elementsrdquo of ldquothe autonomous play of the worldrdquo29 Schuumlrmann concludes that only this openness towards the presencing of the world allows the thing to appear divorced from metaphysical overdeterminations that cover up radical finitude thus ldquonot in its unchangeable essencerdquo but rather ldquoin [its] singularityrdquo30 It is this contingent and historical process that is the issue of thought bereft of any one single origin (be it God nature or the cogito) presencing shows itself in its very contingency as the ldquoceaseless arrangements and rearrangements in phenomenal interconnectednessrdquo31 as if thinking is thanking ldquothe goalless showing-forth of phenomenardquo32 Ereignis thenmdashand here is the sobering partmdashis ldquowhat establishes us in our precarious dwellingsrdquo not as ldquosome thingrdquo but rather as ldquonothingmdasha mere coming to passrdquo33 Th e (Heideggerian) world-ing of the world thusmdashand we will see that this is a major difference from

27) Ibid 257 28) Ibid 211 29) Ibid 211 30) Ibid 213 31) Ibid 270 32) Ibid 258 33) Ibid 57 Th is sobering up is best contrasted with the optimism of theology see 159 ldquoHei-deggerian lsquophilosophyrsquo would oppose point for point all that the theologizing readings praise in it instead of Subject of history the raw positivity and the irreducible contingency of facts instead of a Doctrine inventoryrdquo

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425RP 373_f7_417-439indd 425 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 430RP 373_f7_417-439indd 430 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 9: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 425

Levinasrsquo thoughtmdashconveys a ldquonon-human facticityrdquo34 as if being can do with-out beings or in any case without a subject to which it since time immemo-rial ought to appear

All this might be unbearable for a modern mind Nevertheless it is close to what Heideggerrsquos course on Platorsquos Sophist intimated already namely that to philosophize is to make explicit the prereflexive and ldquopregiven unitary beingrdquo from out of the ldquothe whole present givennessrdquo35 the unity of the thing appears out of the givenness of the world as a world It is to this unity of our contingent world that Schuumlrmann still refers in his 1987 book when saying that ldquowhat is one is the process of coming to presencerdquo36mdashthe world as it worlds now in our times as our world as qualitatively different from past worlds and modes of presencing what is common to all epochs is the presenc-ing of the world but the presencing of the world differs from epoch to epoch37

A final point then is Schuumlrmannrsquos separation between the event of presenc-ing Ereignis and the epochal lsquoeconomies of presencersquo Th e first is deemed rather surprisingly a-historical albeit that our access to it is granted in and through its various historical and epochal expressions Th e ldquoahistorical showing-forthrdquo38 is however to be understood correctly ldquothe event itself has neither history nor destiny Not that the event is atemporal its temporality is the coming about of any constellation of thing and worldrdquo39 Th e presencing of the event is that which makes possible a gathering of things present an lsquoepochrsquo Such presencing pushes beyond modernityrsquos one-sided emphasis on the human subject An example will perhaps make this clear whereas a mod-ern mind would have a hard time affirming the lsquohappeningrsquo of the world out-side the solipsistic egorsquos lived experiences Heideggerrsquos thought of presencing would take into account how the world persists beyond and outside the sub-ject Th e world lsquoworldsrsquo outside the finite horizons set out by human beings

34) Ibid 57 35) Heidegger Platorsquos Sophist trans R Rojcewicz and A Schuwer (Bloomington Indiana Uni-versity Press 1997) 415 translation modified since the German has respectively ldquoder lsquologosrsquo hat zunaumlchst vorgegeben eine unabgehobene Einheit eines Seiendenrdquo and ldquodie ganze vorlieg-ende Gegebenheitrdquo See Heidegger Platon Sophistes (Frankfurt a M Vittorio Klostermann 1992) 599ndash600 36) Heidegger on Being and Acting 76 37) See also Ibid 153 ldquothe unity does not rest on any ground endowed with permanence be it substantive or subjectiverdquo 38) Ibid 76 39) Ibid 273

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426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 426RP 373_f7_417-439indd 426 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427RP 373_f7_417-439indd 427 101807 44223 PM101807 44223 PM

428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

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430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

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432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 10: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

426 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

and regardless of whether or not it appears to a finite subject Th e event of presencing is not man-made it lsquohappensrsquomdashlsquoworldsrsquomdashwithout any reference to the human being Th e presencing of the event is irreducible to the given constellations of any epoch

With this last point Schuumlrmann not unlike Foucault introduces the thought that there is a radical break between the different epochs ldquopast pres-encing is muterdquo40 In each epoch newness arises because the worlding of the world presences in ever new and manifold ways Th at which was present in a past age however stamped and markedmdashHeideggerrsquos Praumlgungmdashas it was by principles and ultimate referents that are no longer ours lies beyond our under-standing Schuumlrmann insists that the existential analytic turns into an ldquoepochal analyticrdquo41 when Heidegger discovers that even everydayness has a history that the being-in-the-world of the Ancients differs irreducibly from the presencing of the world that is the lot of our technological age One is thrown not into a universal or ahistorical world but into an epoch Th e lsquoepochal analyticrsquo shows the different metaphysical options as ever so many illusory attempts at total reflection attempts to lsquograsprsquo the contingent world in eternal principles Th e epochal analytic shows the return of what has thus been deniedmdashbecause it could not be coped with the simple presencing of world of time and as time of mere lsquohappeningrsquomdashas if being is a playful performance art without a per-former After the lsquoturnrsquo which for Schuumlrmann is not an experience in Hei-deggerrsquos life or writings but is rather a lsquoturnrsquo we all could experiencemdashthe turn from metaphysics to that which will surpass itmdashldquothe reference to daily experi-ence becomes inoperative If presencingmdashlsquobeingrsquomdashis grasped only through its difference from epochal presence then our everyday experience of being is lost forever as soon as a new fold unfurls presence in a new constellationrdquo42 Th is ldquoepochal discordancerdquo43 should not be underestimated it means that the arche of the Medieval age can tell us how medieval men and women lived it does not tell us how to live And die

40) Ibid 158 41) Ibid 159 42) Ibid 157ndash58 See also Schuumlrmannrsquos reading of this into Heideggerrsquos Contributions to Philoso-phy in Broken Hegemonies 519 43) Th e expression is taken from Veacuteronique-M Foacuteti Epochal Discordance Houmllderlinrsquos Philosophy of Tragedy (Albany State University of New York Press 2006)

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

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428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 11: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 427

Technology the Closure of Metaphysics and Anarchic Praxis

Yet according to Schuumlrmann our age the technological one stands out and for a particular reason With Heidegger Schuumlrmann agrees that technology inaugurates the closure of metaphysics and that our age might be the one that witnesses the happening of such a turning An lsquoother beginningrsquo (Heidegger) permeates the end of metaphysics Technology exposes the illusory character of lsquopast principlesrsquo in that it shows that all archic principles are maximizations of the regional lsquofabricationrsquo and lsquorepresentationrsquo With the appearance of tech-nology the ldquometaphysical lineage comes to an endrdquo44 Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchy consists in rejecting all past principles because technology shows the human all-too-human character of all such principles these epochal principles appear as ever so many ontically originated totalizing and hegemonic representa-tions Yet one might say that Schuumlrmann is inspired by a sort of Heideggerian anarchy in that the (Heideggerian) phenomenology of presencing might indeed be taken to say the difference between presencingmdashtranscendental and a priorimdashand that which in each case that is in every given epoch lies present to the subjects of that given age It is in the latter sense that both Schuumlrmann and Heidegger would agree that technology inaugurates the ldquoannihilationrdquo and ldquoextinctionrdquo of metaphysical principles and positions and opens onto the anarchic origin of being as simple presencingmdashnothing more nothing less45 An-archic that is without ldquoa whence and a whitherrdquo46 existence without why neither origin nor goal Our technological metaphysics is according to Schuumlr-mann Janus-headed both the completion of metaphysics in espousing all its inherent possibilities and intimating in and through the crisis and absence of justification of past principles the anarchic presencing of the world and being

Th e ontological and anarchic presencing of the event singles out being as a contingent process across the various ages delivering to each its epoch and setting the standards of that which is epochally possible and what is not If technology is the inauguration of the withering away of every meta-physical principle because it exposes these as illusory then what kind of praxis would be appropriate to correspond to this contingent event Accord-ing to Schuumlrmann this would be nothing less than an anarchic praxis for ldquoto legitimate praxis can no longer mean to refer what is doable to a first

44) Heidegger on Being and Acting 25 and 59 45) Ibid 47 and 59 respectively 46) Being and Time 173

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428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 430RP 373_f7_417-439indd 430 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 12: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

428 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

ground or some supreme reason to a final end or some ultimate goalrdquo47 If we must still learn to see lsquothingsrsquo instead of objects and if we still must learn to think instead of representing then the Heideggerian candidate for accompanying action is releasement or Gelassenheit since ldquo[a]n acting other than lsquobeing effectiversquo and a thinking other than strategical rationality is what Heidegger puts forward under the name of releasementrdquo48 Only then are we able to see the relation between liberation and releasement49 Release-ment is freed from the hold that past principles exercised on thinking and is more properly attuned to the presencing of the network of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo it corresponds to that which the event does letting be For Schuumlrmann releasement is to be taken both politically and philosoph-ically Philosophically it is that responsiveness that makes possible the set-ting free of the lsquothingrsquo out of the representational clutches of our epoch in which any phenomenon always already appears like a present-at-hand object50 It responds to the event of presencing without resorting to the objectivation of this presencing51 Politically releasement is the act of a rebellious philosophermdashSchuumlrmann mentions Socratesmdashrenouncing his or her age-old role as lsquocovert civil servantrsquo once it is clear that a radical fluidity is introduced into social institutions as well as into practice in gen-eral ldquothe entry into the event remains thinkable and doable only as the struggle against the injustice the hubris of enforced residence under prin-cipial surveillancerdquo52

Rather than focusing on the concrete technological aspects of the meta-physical closure the remainder of this article will address Schuumlrmannrsquos rela-tion to other Continental philosophers precisely on this topic of a lsquopossiblersquo closure of metaphysics in order to confront the tragic thinker Schuumlrmann with

47) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281 48) Ibid 84 49) Ibid 242 50) Ibid 93 51) In this respect the parallel Schuumlrmann draws between the Heideggerian lsquostep backrsquo and the phenomenological reduction is noteworthy Not only is releasement or letting-be ldquothe properly phenomenological attituderdquo (ibid 212) but the phenomenological reduction is also the method according to which the lsquodouble step backwardsrsquo ldquofrom the situated or manifest entities toward their site [then] to the self-situating the self-manifesting as suchrdquo (ibid 19ndash20 also 79ndash81) is possible Since it is a form of the phenomenological reduction Lillyrsquos statement that ldquoone finds no delineated methodrdquo in Schuumlrmannrsquos work is to be nuanced see Lilly ldquoTh e Topology of Des heacutegeacutemonies briseacuteesrdquo 230 52) Heidegger on Being and Acting 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 13: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 429

a remainder of an unjustified lsquooptimismrsquo and lsquohopersquo when it comes to over-coming metaphysics

Levinasian Anarchy

Th e relation between Schuumlrmann and Levinas is an odd one Schuumlrmannrsquos Hei-degger book seemed to be sympathetic to Levinasrsquo anti-metaphysical and anar-chic attempt to think the approach of the Other For Schuumlrmann Levinas seemed unlike Deleuze (who turns to jubilation) and Derrida (who mourns its loss) sufficiently sober to cope with the loss of the One53 On the back of the book Levinas in turn praises Schuumlrmannrsquos work for its ldquospeculative and pedagogical value [that] make[s] it a highly welcome publicationrdquo In this sense it is all the more striking that Broken Hegemonies does not even mention Levinas by name

Identities Totality and Hegemony

Th e similarities between Levinas and Schuumlrmann may be obvious just as Schuumlrmann rejects at the end of metaphysics any hegemonic fantasm so too Levinas is wary of the idea of a closed totality Both Levinas and Schuumlrmann then display an attentiveness towards that which cannot be represented and thus forced into a system Moreover both thinkers would in and through their rejection of the monism and the quest for unity characteristic of meta-physics endorse a fundamental plurality and multiplicity of being Schuumlr-mannrsquos ldquoradical multiplicityrdquo54 might thus very well be for Levinas as it is for Schuumlrmann accompanied by a certain anarchismmdashtaken as the absence of any common or unifying principle or foundation of our world once all lsquoarchairsquo have shown themselves to be originated in an ontic lsquoprojectiversquo mannermdashfor ldquothere is an anarchy essential to multiplicityrdquo55 Levinas and Schuumlrmann fur-thermore share a similar attentiveness to the inner divide that haunts the human being once thrown upon its span between birth and death A certain form of such lsquotragedyrsquo might be discerned primarily in Levinasrsquo early works and its effort to ldquobreak with Parmenidesrdquo through a pluralism that ldquoappears [in] the very existing of the existent itselfrdquo56 By that token the existence of the

53) Heidegger on Being and Acting 321ndash22 54) Ibid 148 55) Totality and Infinity 294 56) Levinas Time and the Other trans R A Cohen (Pittsburg Duquesne University Press 1987) 42 and 75 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429RP 373_f7_417-439indd 429 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

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436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 14: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

430 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

human being is according to Levinas double at once chained to itself and longing for its other Chained to itself that is to the impersonal nature of the lsquoil y arsquo contaminating the human beingrsquos person and which Levinas describes through the analysis of insomnia in which it is not lsquoIrsquo that is awake but rather an impersonal lsquomersquo that is waking57 Chained to itself because in this rift between the I of consciousness and the lsquoil y arsquo of impersonal existence threaten-ing it from within the human being inevitably has an awareness of its immi-nent death Longing for the other for existencersquos duality might take another direction and accomplish itself in fecundity

Th is latter route is taken by Levinasrsquo Totality and Infinity which still affirms the necessary break with Parmenides in order to think transcendencersquos anar-chic plurality Totality and Infinity moreover conveys its philosophy of plural-ism in the same formula as Levinasrsquo earlier works In this workmdashand even more so in his later worksmdashLevinas will identify the rupture with the system of being with the very existence of the human subject ldquothe break-up of total-ity the denunciation of the panoramic structure of being concerns the very existing of beingrdquo58 It is true that in Levinasrsquo works this interruption or lsquodis-tancersquo will be progressively connected with (divine or not) transcendence since ldquothe distance [transcendence] expresses enters into the way of existing of the exterior beingrdquo59 For the debate between Levinas and Schuumlrmann it matters little whether Levinas associated the anarchic undertow accompany-ing all discourse on being with divine transcendence it matters all the more that Levinas consigned his anarchism to a principle nevertheless the lsquoexterior beingrsquo is to be equated with the face of the other and only the face in turn is to be equated with that which forever disrupts the system Levinasrsquo lsquoessential anarchyrsquo thus concerns only the intersubjective encounter Th erefore indeed ldquoa principle breaks throughrdquo this essential anarchy ldquowhen the face presents itself and demands justicerdquo60 Th e essential anarchy is undone by the principle of the face

57) Th is duality appears for instance in Levinasrsquo description of solitude in his Existence and Existents trans A Lingis (Pittsburgh Duquesne University Press 2001) 90 ldquoTh e solitude of a subject is more than the isolation of a being or the unity of an object It is as it were a dual solitude this other than me accompanies the ego like a shadowrdquo 58) Totality and Infinity 294 59) Ibid 35 60) Ibid 294

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432RP 373_f7_417-439indd 432 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

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Page 15: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 431

Differences Without Principle

In this sense the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas might turn on the latterrsquos humanism and anthropocentrism for even if it is a lsquohumanism of the other manrsquo it is a humanism nonetheless Let us turn to Schuumlrmann again to consider what the difference between the presencing of being and the inter-ruption of the exterior being or the face might be Commenting upon Hei-deggerrsquos pathway to presencing Schuumlrmann writes ldquoin Being and Time to be present still means to be present lsquofor manrsquo A new way of thinking is required to understand presencing independently of such a referencerdquo61 Now if Schuumlr-mann is considering the presencing of being(s) lsquoindependently of every posi-tion we would have taken in its regardrsquo then it is obvious that that which Levinas reserves for one region of phenomenality namely the human being must be extended to the whole of phenomenality It would thus be necessary to state that for Schuumlrmann not only the human face but also the world and perhaps nature would be able to occur independently of any reference to lsquomanrsquo62

If Schuumlrmann would deem this anthropocentrism in Levinas a residue of metaphysical thought Derrida just as well has criticized the ontotheological character of the excessive importance Levinas attributed to the face this ldquointra-ontic movement of ethical transcendencerdquo props ldquoup thought by means of a transhistoricityrdquo63 Th is intra-ontic movement that just like traditional onto-theology thinks beings (lsquothe facersquo) rather than being seems to be in need of some theological legitimation Indeed since ldquothe Other resembles Godrdquo64 it seems that it is ultimately God who as a supreme being bestows the face of the human other with the power to interrupt the subjectrsquos egoistic being Hence Derridarsquos critique for in his words ldquothe question of Being is nothing less than a disputation of the metaphysical truth of this schemardquo65

Again it is not because Levinas resorts to God to justify the interruption and the distance of the other that his endeavor is lsquoontotheologicalrsquo It is rather that through this recourse to God the human face is attributed the rank of a

61) Heidegger on Being and Acting 72 62) I am alluding here to Levinasrsquo statement that the manifestation of the face ldquoconsists in a being telling itself to us independently of every position we would have taken in its regardrdquo (Totality and Infinity 65) 63) Jacques Derrida Writing and Difference trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1978) 142 and 148 respectively 64) Totality and Infinity 293 65) Writing and Difference 143

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431RP 373_f7_417-439indd 431 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

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438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 16: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

432 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

lsquoprinciplersquomdashan ultimate referentmdashwhich attests to Levinasrsquo metaphysics In this way Derridarsquos and Schuumlrmannrsquos critiques of Levinasian humanism would coincide the critique of ontotheology does not point to one or the other lsquotheologicalrsquo residue in Levinas it is rather that lsquothe human facersquo still functions as an lsquoultimate signifierrsquo that orients all other significations that accounts for Levinasrsquo ontotheology In Schuumlrmannrsquos words the face turns out to be yet another hegemonic fantasm in that it inappropriately singles out one phe-nomenal region (intersubjectivity) at the expense of all the other regions (nature for example)

In this respect it might be good to turn to Levinasrsquo later work especially Otherwise than Being and God Death and Time in which Levinas proceeds to a separation of anarchy and principle66 Indeed in these later works divine transcendence is utterly separated from any principle even that of the human face ldquothis glory is without principle there is in this infinity an anarchical ele-mentrdquo67 If the face at the time of Totality and Infinity was elevated to the point of a principlemdasha being that would be singled out as the highest of beingsmdashand if it therefore would be subject to that which Broken Hegemonies would deem a lsquomaximizationrsquo of one phenomenal region over others then it must be noted that the face in Otherwise than Being is de-phenomenalized to a great extent it is not so much the concrete encounter with a human face that is at issue but rather our pre-original trauma or susceptiveness towards the otherrsquos otherness that is judged to be anarchic that is without principle68 Th is sus-ceptibility always and already turned towards otherness is called by Levinas ldquoa bottomless passivityrdquo it is without ground69 Th e primacy of otherness thus makes up a susceptibility of all for all that Levinas interprets as fraternity One might formulate the difference between the early and later Levinasian anarchy in this way whereas Totality and Infinity although it agreed upon the essential anarchism of intersubjective pluralism assumed and perhaps had to assume ldquothe commonness of a fatherrdquo that according to Levinas is the great contribu-tion to thought of ldquomonotheismrdquo70 in Otherwise than Being fraternity is given

66) See for this Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence 194 and also Miguel Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo Philosophy and Social Criticism 28 (2002) 703ndash26 723 67) Levinas God Death and Time trans B Bergo (Stanford Stanford University Press 2000) 193 Echoed in Otherwise than Being 147 ldquothe anarchic infiniterdquo 68) Otherwise than Being 122ndash23 69) Ibid 151 70) Totality and Infinity 214

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J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

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434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 17: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 433

a strictly philosophical explanation71 and the face is so to say replaced by the trace Th e trace is not a unifying principle it is an lsquooutsidersquo of thinking that somehow operates from within my being and orients (my) existence towards otherness It is an lsquoagrave Dieursquo which implies a goodbye to a (certain) God as well It might be with such a tracemdashwhich is just as much lsquowithout whyrsquo and lsquowith-out groundrsquo as Schuumlrmannrsquos and Heideggerrsquos presencing of beingmdashthat Schuumlrmann agreed when confirming with Levinas that ldquobeing is exterior-ityrdquo72 Considering the later Levinasrsquo assertion concerning the ldquoimpossible indifference with regard to the humanrdquo73 one can safely conclude that on the topic of humanism the differences between Schuumlrmann and Levinas would still stand

If the difference between the early and the later Levinas thus implies a difference in the status of lsquoanarchyrsquo in that an anarchic appearance of exterior-ity gathers concrete human beings as fraternal beings then it is worth noting the confusion this thinking lsquowithout principlersquo has caused among commenta-tors Abensour celebrates Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchy and principle because it refuses a political conception of anarchy that would impose yet another principle on anarchy74 while Rolland suggests that the unprincipled anarchism includes such a political conceptionmdashI will come back to this below75

Schuumlrmann might have experienced a similar confusion considering that Broken Hegemonies makes little mention of lsquoa principle of anarchyrsquomdashif at all Th is confusion comes to the fore in both the brief but harsh discussion between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and an article on Schuumlrmannrsquos work by Rudolphe Gascheacute who inspired the thesis of the last section

Derridean Anarchy

Th e thesis of this section is that the definition of lsquohegemonyrsquo of Broken Hege-monies might be applied to the thematic of Schuumlrmannrsquos book on Heidegger as well Schuumlrmannrsquos debate with Derrida will then help us to underscore the

71) Otherwise than Being 122 and 152 72) Totality and Infinity 290 and Heidegger on Being and Acting 346 73) Otherwise than Being 59 74) Abensour ldquoSavage Democracy and lsquoPrinciple of Anarchyrsquordquo 723 75) Jacques Rolland edited and annotated the French edition of God Death and Time Th ese notes are translated in the English edition as well see Levinas God Death and Time 277 n 1 and 283 n 7

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433RP 373_f7_417-439indd 433 101807 44224 PM101807 44224 PM

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 18: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

434 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

shifts in Schuumlrmannrsquos conception of the lsquoclosure of metaphysicsrsquo and in the conception of its humble everyday origins

Th e whole debate centers upon one phrase of Derridarsquosmdashto which Schuumlr-mann tirelessly returnsmdashfrom his Margins of Philosophy at the end of meta-physics for Derrida it is a matter ldquoto decide to change terrain in a discontinuous and irruptive fashion by brutally placing oneself outside and by affirming an absolute break and differencerdquo76 Schuumlrmann has most force-fully responded to Derridarsquos ldquodeconstructive naiveteacuterdquo and its desire to switch terrains to go to an anti-metaphysical site when Schuumlrmann states that the philosopherrsquos task ldquo[is] more modest for from what lofty position would we be able to draw the geographic map of discontinuous planes What field out-side the terrain must one occupy in order to affirm rupture I know of no other place than the one whereupon the waning twentieth century has planted usrdquo commenting further in a note ldquoDerrida seems to speak here as a chroni-cler of what was going on in France at the time he signed the textmdashlsquoMay 12 1968rsquordquo77 implying importantly that Derrida mistakenly took an ontic event to have (anti)metaphysical significance Schuumlrmannrsquos desire then was not to lsquochange terrainrsquo but to change to another thinking ldquobeyond deconstructionrdquo78 Janicaud confirms ldquo[Schuumlrmann] neither accepted the idea of an end of meta-physics nor the possibility of lsquoplacing oneself outsidersquo even if by a kind of playrdquo79 Yet the latter point stands in need of some proof for it might be the case that at the time of his Heidegger book Schuumlrmann was himself riveted to a naiumlve deconstructive site Indeed several passages show that Schuumlrmann envisaged an ldquooutside of ontotheologyrdquo or at least that an other than meta-physical thinking was a ldquopossibilityrdquo80

In this way Derridarsquos ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo which appeared in a volume dedicated to the memory of Schuumlrmann but which cites him merely two

76) Jacques Derrida Margins of Philosophy trans A Bass (Chicago Th e University of Chicago Press 1982) 135 as cited by Schuumlrmann in Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and in Broken Hegemonies 14 Schuumlrmann cites another passage in which Derrida presumes to go lsquobeyondrsquo metaphysics see Heidegger on Being and Acting 311 where Schuumlrmann quotes Derrida Of Grammatology trans G C Spivak (Baltimore John Hopkins University Press 1976) 4 ldquothe world that is ineluctably to come and which proclaims itself at present beyond the closurerdquo 77) Broken Hegemonies 14 and 634 n 24 respectively 78) Heidegger on Being and Acting 371 79) Dominique Janicaud ldquoRiveted to a Monstrous Site Reiner Schuumlrmannrsquos Reading of Hei-deggerrsquos Beitraumlgerdquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 287ndash97 293 80) Heidegger on Being and Acting 241 and 270 respectively

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434RP 373_f7_417-439indd 434 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 19: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 435

times might be read as turning Schuumlrmannrsquos critique against himself Derri-darsquos text though it deals mainly with Arendt can indeed be read as a critique of the grand Heideggerian rhetoric recounting a history of being and of meta-physics for is not such a rhetoric compromised by ldquoan indestructible opti-mismrdquo in that it seems to presuppose already how the lie or the error of metaphysics might be overcome81 Th is optimism is concerned not with a personal attitude but with claiming to be lsquoin the knowrsquo whether it concerns the end of metaphysics or truth in general

But let us not agree with Derrida too easily and turn to Schuumlrmannrsquos cri-tique of Derrida in the 1987 book in order to understand what the difference between this book and the later Broken Hegemonies might be Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for the large part in the notes of the first mentioned book Schuumlrmann mentions the game Heidegger played with Nietzsche and pro-poses that Derrida is playing a similar game with Heidegger just as much as Heidegger could turn Nietzsche into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo so too can Der-rida by ruse turn Heidegger into the lsquolast metaphysicianrsquo82 Schuumlrmann argues that Derrida can only turn Heidegger into the last metaphysician of presence by forgetting the temporalizing of the ontological difference the difference between presencing and that which is present in each given epoch Derrida can claim that Heideggerrsquos question of being remained an ldquointra-metaphysical effectrdquo only by obliterating presencing and by reducing Hei-deggerrsquos dwelling to a homecoming that interpreted being as lsquomaintainingrsquo and lsquobelongingrsquo and thus as presence In this way Derrida can play with Hei-degger as Heidegger played with Nietzsche just as Nietzsche remained lsquometa-physicalrsquo for Heidegger and therefore ldquoattempted an exit and a deconstructionrdquo from metaphysics ldquowithout changing terrainsrdquo so too for Derrida Heidegger is still metaphysical without switching terrains Deconstruction then would be anti-metaphysical insofar it knows how to change terrains83 Now for Schuumlr-mann the difference between presencing and presence means precisely that being cannot be understood in an optimistic sense as the place where we dwell and belong since due to the lsquoepochal discordancersquo the presencing of our world radically differs from the presencing of any other epoch For Schuumlrmann

81) Derrida ldquoHistory of the Lie Prolegomenardquo Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal 19 (1997) 129ndash61 156ndash57 82) Heidegger on Being and Acting 360 83) See for this Heidegger on Being and Acting 352ndash53 and 361ndash62 Schuumlrmann cites Derrida Margins of Philosophy 22 132 135 and 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435RP 373_f7_417-439indd 435 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 20: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

436 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

we indeed dwell on the world but this world now worlds in ways it hasnrsquot worlded beforemdashif I may play with Heideggerrsquos vocabularymdashand resists there-fore any sense of lsquobelongingrsquo84

Th us just as Derrida criticizes Schuumlrmann for being optimistic concerning the matter of overcoming metaphysics so Schuumlrmann criticizes Derrida for being too optimistic when depicting Heidegger as the last metaphysician Might it be that the confusion comes from the fact that both adversaries are lsquoplaying a gamersquo even more grave than that which prevails in Derridarsquos ldquostep outside the destruction gamerdquo and which ldquowatch[es] the destroyers destroy each other reciprocallyrdquo85 Th is game then would concern lsquothe natural meta-physician in usrsquo and I risk a bold hypothesis in favor of this natural metaphys-ics in the conclusion to this article

Conclusion

If then Derrida utters a similar objection to Schuumlrmann as Schuumlrmann towards Derrida it might be the case that Schuumlrmannrsquos accusation of a lsquodeconstructive naiveteacutersquo can be turned against himself I will turn to Rodolphe Gascheacutersquos article and to the remarkable conclusion of Broken Hegemonies to make this point In this conclusion Schuumlrmann seems to address this game which throws the accusation of metaphysics around and around Th is is a game so it seems of endless reversals in and of metaphysics in which in the end no one escapes the accusation of being the ldquolast metaphysicianrdquomdashSchuumlrmann calls it ldquothe inversion thesisrdquo For instance ldquoto report that sometime after 1830 values got inverted mdashsuch storytelling is not exactly free of interest It allows one to classify onersquos neighbor if he locates his referents up high as lsquostill a metaphysi-

84) In this sense Schuumlrmannrsquos insights might nowadays most forcefully be perpetuated by Jean-Luc Nancy who on several occasions has shown himself to be sympathetic towards Schuumlrmannrsquos anarchistic project It is unfortunately beyond the scope of this text to speak of Nancyrsquos anarchy I will therefore point the reader to a few passages in Nancyrsquos work Jean-Luc Nancy Th e Experi-ence of Freedom trans B Mcdonald (Stanford Stanford University Press 1993) 13 30 (on the anarchy of existence) and 187 (on his lsquocommunityrsquo with Schuumlrmann) Etre Singulier Pluriel (Paris Galileacutee 1996) 69 (again anarchy) See also Lorenzo Fabbri ldquoPhilosophy as Chance An Interview with Jean-Luc Nancyrdquo Critical Inquiry 33 (2007) 427ndash40 435 ldquoone must reinterro-gate from top to bottom the theme of the lsquoarchersquo in generalmdashthe an-archy of the lsquoarchersquo in the sense that Reiner Schuumlrmann spoke of a principle of anarchyrdquo 85) See Heidegger on Being and Acting 362 and Writing and Difference 281

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436RP 373_f7_417-439indd 436 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 21: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 437

cianrsquo for two centuries now a professional insultrdquo86 It is however such insults that accompanied the debate between Derrida and Schuumlrmann and through which the destroyers of metaphysics are destroying themselves It seems there-fore that the concept of ldquocounter-philosophersrdquo that Gascheacute has drawn from Broken Hegemonies is applicable to both Schuumlrmann and Derrida as well Counter-philosophers are those who in a given epoch emphasize the nega-tive the pull to singularity and mortality and thereby tend to lsquomaximizersquo these negative experiences as if they merely reverse the lsquomaximizationrsquo of metaphys-icsrsquos ultimate referents87 Th e danger then is that both positions would miss the originary double bind and diffeacuterend of natality and mortality which posits that lsquometaphysicsrsquo is lsquonaturalrsquo or lsquoonticrsquo since it originates in the natural ten-dency to look away from that which one cannot not look away from namely death and finitude Th us while lsquometaphysiciansrsquo stress the aspect of natality the lsquocounter-philosophersrsquo seem to stress the aspect of negativity and mortal-ity It is at this point however that the conclusion of Broken Hegemonies gets enigmatic for if Gascheacute is right when saying that a hegemonic fantasm is accomplished when the phenomenality of the phenomenon is constituted by turning this phenomenality ldquointo parts of an interconnected worldrdquo88 then this is as we have seen exactly what Schuumlrmannrsquos Heidegger book sought out to do when insisting on the oneness and the unity of the presencing of a world

It is thus a possible escape of metaphysics that is at stake in the conclusion to Broken Hegemonies On the one hand one finds still statements in line with the Heidegger book Gascheacute for instance scrutinizes Schuumlrmannrsquos treatment of Eckhart for whom it would have been a matter of ldquoleaving [the principles] behind of no longer having recourse to themrdquo and then asks poignantly ldquoone may question this possibility by recalling everything that Schuumlrmann has established in this work [Broken Hegemonies]rdquo89 One may question Gascheacutersquos statement in turn though since Schuumlrmannrsquos point was that the lsquonatural metaphysician in usrsquo inevitably has recourse to principles and ultimate refer-ents But on the other hand it is the latter thesis that the conclusion to Bro-ken Hegemonies seeks to overturn in sticking to the ultimate double bind as

86) Broken Hegemonies 626 87) Rodolphe Gascheacute ldquoHegemonic Fantasmsrdquo Research in Phenomenology 35 (2005) 311ndash26 320 and 323 88) Ibid 315 89) Ibid 325

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437RP 373_f7_417-439indd 437 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 22: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

438 J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439

much as possible by stating that the natality ldquoimpulse that unifies liferdquo cannot be equated with the good just as the singularization to come of death cannot be equated with ldquoevil pure and simplerdquo90 In this sense Schuumlrmann realizes that unifying principles and hegemonies are not in advance to be considered as lsquobadrsquo lsquoevilrsquo and lsquoinsultingrsquo as the Heidegger book would have it In this way it opens the terrain from which an escape might be possible rather than leaping into an lsquoother terrainrsquo

Th e lsquoescapersquo of metaphysics then it seems has to do with the question of just how far we can heed Nietzschersquos lsquoextra-moralrsquo view on metaphysics For if the unitary presencing and lsquothe oneness of lsquophenomenal interconnectednessrsquo (Schuumlrmann) or the one fraternal humanity for that matter (Levinas) shows itself to be yet another metaphysical convulsion than the most sober question to ask is to where the lsquoepochal discordancersquo extends Th e question of the rela-tion between the one and the pluralistic manifold would then need to address a possible discordance not only between epochs (as in the grand Heideggerian rhetoric) but also between cultures and perhaps individuals Another warning of Derrida to Schuumlrmann might thus be incorporated into the debate over the end of metaphysics namely that if one wants to philosophize in a manner free of interest then the history of metaphysics must be recounted free of moral denunciation91

To conclude to understand the fact that the end of metaphysics might be related to the question as to whether we can still attain to the level of transcen-dental ontological and therefore extra-moral thinking it is useful to turn to the debate between Schuumlrmann and Levinas For if Schuumlrmann at the end of Broken Hegemonies realized that the natural metaphysician in all of us cannot do without ultimate referents that thus from time immemorial anarchy is indebted to a lsquoprinciplersquo it is not sure whether Schuumlrmann would have applauded the later Levinasrsquo contention that anarchy is separated from any principle (be it a political one) It is furthermore worth noting that Rollandrsquos appreciation of the political anarchism depends on an ontic argument It can also be shown that Levinasrsquo distinction between anarchism and politics is indeed dependent upon the turmoil of 196892 It is only then that we can

90) Broken Hegemonies 624ndash25 91) ldquoHistory of the Lierdquo 154 92) For Rollandrsquos argument concerning the Levinasian without lsquoprinciplersquo see Levinas God Death and Time 283 ldquoLevinas confirms the anarchistsrsquo sense of anarchy We should not forget in effect that lsquothey are without principlersquo was Stalinrsquos fundamental charge against those situated to his leftrdquo I take the second point from Mitchel Verterrsquos online paper ldquoTh e Anarchism of the

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438RP 373_f7_417-439indd 438 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM

Page 23: Anarchy in Continental Philosophy

J Schrijvers Research in Phenomenology 37 (2007) 417ndash439 439

understand Schuumlrmannrsquos ultimate reluctance towards any such ontic point of reference for the question of the end of metaphysics for such a point would make the issue of metaphysics an issue for a report in a chronicle (whether it is 1830 1933 or 1968) Schuumlrmann indeed never considered May 1968 as one of the lsquorare moments of freedomrsquo that Arendt noticed in history93 On the contrary he seems to have recoiled before any such ontic point of reference as is obvious from his recounting of the events of 1933 surrounding Hei-degger94

It is surprising indeed that a thinker who takes great pains to show the ontic origin of epochal presence who singles out the exceptional nature of our age of technology and moreover advances the public character of philosophy ignores the ontic events of our current epoch It is strange finally that a thinker concerned to such an extent with freedom and everydayness (to the point that an intellectual always and already is a lsquopublic intellectualrsquo) remained silent on the cultural and everyday implications of our metaphysics

Th e reason for this Th e reason is perhaps that even Schuumlrmann had too much reverence for the hubris of the hegemonies he contested Indeed if the Heidegger book hesitates to criticize Heidegger for the ldquoinabilityrdquo of this thinking ldquoto emerge effectively from the philosophical traditionrdquo95 then this might be the case precisely because even in Schuumlrmann and even though he has pointed to it the relation between the ontic and the ontological realm between everydayness and epochal presence between the public realm and philosophy is left hanging Even more grave precisely because it remains unclear how one can change terrain from everydayness to the terrain of ontol-ogy Schuumlrmann may repeat one of the most traditional hierarchies since metaphysicsrsquo inception the hierarchy (and the hubris) that separates lsquoontol-ogyrsquo from all things ontic philosophy from culture authenticity from every-dayness96

Other Personrdquo which shows Levinasrsquo meditation on the lsquorevolutionrsquo of 1968 in Paris see httpenwikipediaorgwikiEmmanuel_Levinas (accessed online 1 November 2006) 93) Heidegger on Being and Acting 91 and Broken Hegemonies 679 94) Broken Hegemonies 523ndash28 95) Heidegger on Being and Acting 182 Th is passage echoes Schuumlrmannrsquos noting while pointing to the public dimension of the lsquoprinciplersquo of an epoch that ldquonot all cultural facts have an equally revelatory value For Heidegger the most revealing traces of past historical fields are preserved in philosophical worksrdquo (ibid 35) 96) Th e author is a Postdoctoral Fellow of the Research Foundation-Flanders (FWO-V)

RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439RP 373_f7_417-439indd 439 101807 44225 PM101807 44225 PM