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OVERVIEW

The Hamburg Network was a group of 24 radical Islamists operating in

five cells and responsible for the 9/11 terrorist attacks. The origins of the network

lay with a study group at al-Quds Mosque in Hamburg, led by Mohammad

Belfas.1 The group originally consisted of Mohamed Atta, Mounir Motassadeq,

and Abdelghani Mzoudi who were all studying at the Technical University of

Hamburg-Harburg (TUHH). Over time, the study group grew to include Ramzi

bin al-Shibh, Said Bahaji, Zaid Amir Jarrah, Zakarya Essabar and Marwan al-

Shehhi. The actual Hamburg Cell2 began out of this study group when

Mohammed Atta, Ramzi bin al-Shibh, and Said Bahaji moved into an apartment

together on 53 Marienstrasse, which they named Bait al-Ansar or the House of

the Supporters (of the Prophet). It was there that the three held meetings to

discuss their anti-American and anti-Israeli views and began trying to find ways

to further their cause.3 With all eight associated through the study group led by

Belfas and their increased social interaction through school, meetings, and

weddings, their discussions grew more virulent and ultimately led to the friends

looking to join the jihad and go to Chechnya to fight the Russians. It was not until

they met Mohamadou Ould Slahi that they were encouraged to travel toAfghanistan for training.4

Prior to and completely independent of the forming of the Hamburg

Network, the plan for the planes operation was developing in the mind of Khalid

Sheikh Mohammed (KSM). Equally comfortable in a government office or a

terrorist safehouse, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed used his imaginative mind along

1 Marc Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University ofPhiladelphia Press, 2004, 103-104.

2 The individuals that met in the study group in Hamburg are widely known as theHamburg Cell. This paper will use the 9/11 commission report identifying them as the HamburgContingent who became the larger Hamburg Network. See National Commission on TerroristAttacks Upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report,http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html (accessed on November 17, 2010).

3 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 105.

4 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 106.

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with technical and managerial skills to develop plans for a variety of terrorist

acts.5 KSM knew that his plan for using airplanes in a terrorist attack on the

United States required personnel, money, and logistical support that he did not

have, but Usama bin Ladin did. Although KSM had previously fought alongside

Usama bin Ladin in 1987, they did not have a close working relationship. But

Sheikh Mohammed knew he had to meet with bin Ladin because of he could

provided the personnel, money, and logistical support required. Mohammed met

with bin Ladin in mid 1996, but the two did not formally reach a deal to begin the

final planning until late 1998. Sheikh Mohammed formally joined Usama bin

Ladin and al-Qaida in 1998 after being given the green light for his planes

operation.6

With the arrival of the first three members of the Hamburg Network in

Afghanistan, Usama bin Ladin was about to find the perfect group to lead the

attack: the members of the Hamburg Network spoke fluent English, were

educated and knowledgeable of the western lifestyle, and were radical Islamists.

In November of 1999, Mohamed Atta and his Hamburg Network were selected

for the 9/11 operation.7

5 National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Al-Qaida Aims AtThe American Homeland, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch5.htm (accessedon August 30, 2010).

6

Khalid Sheikh Mohammed did not join Usama bin Ladin and Al-Qaida when originallyinvited in 1996 because he wanted to remain independent. This allowed him to remain free towork with other organizations, such as the mujahideen led by Sayyaf, Sheikh Mohammedsmentor, who was loyal to Massoud, the leader of the Northern Alliance. Since bin Ladin wasforging ties with the Taliban, the opposition of the Northern Alliance, allying with Al-Qaida wouldhave proven troublesome for Sheikh Mohammed. See National Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the United States, Al-Qaida Aims At The American Homeland, http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report_Ch5.htm (accessed on August 30, 2010).

7 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 106-107.

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Figure 1 Photos of 911 Hijackers8

Background and Purpose of Our Study

Networks are dynamic. This paper focuses on Dynamic Network Analysis

and Geospatial measures over time. Our objective is to employ Dynamic

Network Analysis in order to identify the timeline in which the Hamburg Networkbecame viable to carry out its purpose and also to highlight potential areas of

vulnerability within the network. The specific question we intend to answer is: at

what point in time did the network have the capacity to attack the World Trade

Center? This study assumes that the minimum criteria for mission

accomplishment was the network required 2 aircraft, each with one simulator

trained commercial pilot and 3 additional personnel for security. Using the ORA

Dynamic Network Analysis software package, we analyze the Hamburg Network

over time to determine when the network met the minimum criteria to conduct the

Planes Operation.

Focus of our Study

8 Source: https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2002/DCI_18_June_testimony_new.pdf.

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For the purpose of this study, our initial data set for the Hamburg Meta

Network consists of 45 agents. This data was derived using open source data

from both U.S. Government reports and academic research on the 911 attacks. 9

Figure 2 Hamburg Network Initial Data

From the above data, we narrowed our focus down to the primary agent in

the 9/11 attacks consisting of 24 actors configured into five cells. Four of the

cells were comprised of the 19 hijackers and the remaining fifth cell was the

9 Primary sources used to generate data was: National Commission on Terrorist AttacksUpon the United States, Al-Qaida Aims At The American Homeland, Vladis E. Krebs,Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells, Connections: 2001, Vol 23, 43-52, and ProsecutionExhibits from United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01-455-A, available athttp://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/prosecution.html.

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active support component located in Hamburg.

Figure 3 Hamburg Network Agents and Locations

The legend for Figure 3 is as follows:

Color Target/Flight

Pink WTC North Tower (AA Flight 11)

Blue WTC South Tower (UA Flight 175)

Green Pentagon (AA Flight 77)

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Teal Capitol (UA Flight 93)

Red Hamburg Cell (Hamburg, Germany)

Yellow Target Name

Table 1. Color Legend

The following table illustrates the agent, the target he was associated with,

and his primary task:

Name Target Primary Task

Abdul Aziz Al-Omari* WTC N Tower Security

Ahmed Al Haznawi Capitol Security

Ahmed Alghamdi WTC S Tower Security

Ahmed Alnami Capitol Security

Fayez Ahmed WTC S Tower Security

Hamza Alghamdi WTC S Tower Security

Hani Hanjour Pentagon Pilot

Khalid Al-Mihdhar Pentagon Security

Majed Moqed Pentagon Security

Marwan Al-Shehhi WTC S Tower Pilot

Mohamed Atta WTC N Tower Pilot

Mohand Alshehri* WTC S Tower Security

Nawaf Alhazmi Pentagon Security

Saeed Alghamdi* Capitol Security

Salem Alhazmi* Pentagon Security

Satam Suqami WTC N Tower Security

Wail Alshehri WTC N Tower Security

Waleed Alshehri WTC N Tower Security

Ziad Jarrah Capitol Pilot

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Table 2. Agent, Target, and Primary Task

Figure 4 Planes Operation Locations (Hamburg not Shown)

Relationships

The first relationship, agent to target, was selected because it provided a

clear and defining method for dividing the Hamburg Network into its five cells.

Additionally, the question we want to answer on network viability is based on

being able to strike the two World Trade Center (WTC) towers. By identifying

agent to target, we are able to identify the point in time the network was able to

strike those two targets. The second relationship, agent to primary task, was

selected because it identifies role played by each Hamburg Network member. In

order to have a viable network to strike the two WTC towers, a simulator trained

pilot and three additional members were needed per aircraft (i.e. 1 pilot and 2

security).

Finally, the two relationships were examined by utilizing ORA to first draw

the network and then analyze it based on established time periods from 3 Sep 91

to 11 Sep 01. We have also provided screenshots from geospatial analysis

performed with the same dataset.

Analysis Over Time

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We utilized ORA to analyze the Hamburg Network over time. For this

study, we used 13 distinct time intervals based on arrival of agents into the

United States.

Time Period Inclusive Dates

1 3 Sep 91 27 Apr 99

2 28 Apr 99 28 May 00

3 29 May 00 2 Jun 00

4 3 Jun 00 26 Jun 00

5 27 Jun 00 7 Dec 00

6 8 Dec 00 22 Apr 01

7 23 Apr 01 1 May 01

8 2 May 01 27 May 01

9 28 May 01 7 Jun 01

10 8 Jun 01 26 Jun 01

11 27 Jun 01 28 Jun 01

12 29 Jun 01 3 Jul 01

13 4 Jul 01 11 Sep 01

Table 3. Definitions of Time Periods

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Figure 5 Hamburg Network at Time Period 1

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arrive in the United States and set up residence in San Diego, CA. They each

take flight lessons at the Sorbi Flying Club but do not obtain licenses. The

Hamburg Cell is still being educated and radicalized in Hamburg, Germany.

Figure 7 Hamburg Network Time Period 3

In time period 3, Al-Shehhi arrives in Newark, NJ where he takes English

language classes. He remains tied to the Hamburg Cell. Al-Midhar and Al-

Hamzi set-up a safe house in Lemon Grove, CA.

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Time period 4 brings Mohammed Atta to New Jersey where he activates a

cell phone listing 1950 Goddard Ave in Norman, OK as his address. This is the

address of the Airman Flight School. Atta and Al-Shehhi rent a car with a

Brooklyn, NY address listed.

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The network is beginning to branch out further in Time period 5. Ziad

Zarrah arrives in Atlanta and arranges flight training at the Florida Flight Training

Center in Venice, FL. Atta and Al-Shehhi check-in to a Norman, OK hotel and

they enroll at Huffman Aviation which is in Venice, FL. Meanwhile, Jarrah takes

up residence in Venice, FL. Although they are in Oklahoma, he and al-Shehhi

also begin residence in Venice, FL. On 9/18/2000, Atta and al-Shehhi receive

their Private Pilots License from Huffman Aviation and enroll in training at Jones

Aviation (Sarasota, FL). They eventually take a test for their instrument rating

with Huffman Aviation. At this point (not including the Commercial Pilot ratedHanjour) the Network has two trained pilots and 3 additional personnel residing in

the United States.

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Time period 6 brings Hanjour back to the United States. Atta and Al-

Shehhi obtain their Commercial Pilot rating and begin simulator training in Opa-

Locka, FL. Meanwhile, Ziad Jarrah completes 737 simulator training in Miami,

FL. With Hanjour and Jarrah simulator trained pilots and Atta, al-Shehhi, al-

Mihdar, al-Hamzi also residing in the United States, the network is nearly viable.

All the the members currently in the United States continue to change addresses,

obtain flight training (to include flying the Hudson Tour in New York), and make

phone calls (presumably to coordinate), and obtain documents such as drivers

licenses. At this point, they could conduct the planes operation, but the lack ofsecurity personnel is noted.

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Time period 7 brings al-Shehri and al-Suqami to Orlando, FL where they

move into a safe house. This marks the presence of enough Hamburg Network

personnel in the United States to conduct the operation as presented in our

research question. However, there is no indication that they personnel are

coordinated to do so at this point. It is proposed that a covert network sacrifices

efficiency for security.10 This applies to the Hamburg Network.

10 McCormick, G. H., and G. Owen. "Security and Coordination in a ClandestineOrganization." Mathematical and Computer Modeling, no. 31 (2000): 175-192.

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In time period 8, al-Ghamdi and Moqed arrive in Washington, D.C.

Hanjour, al-Hamzi, Moqed, and al-Ghamdi check into the Fairfield Inn in Fairfield,

CT. They eventually move to a safe house in Paterson, NJ.

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With time period 9 and the arrival of al-Nami, al-Shehri, and al-Ghamdi in

Miami, the network now appears to be coming together for the planes operation.

Hanjour flies the Hudson Tour and the others continue their tradecraft by

opening mailboxes and joining gyms (presumably, non-attention getting meeting

locations).

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In time period 10, al-Haznawi and al-Sheri enter the United States (Miami,

FL). Members of the network open bank accounts and continue to move around

to various safe houses.

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Finally, in time period 13, the network has separated into 5 distinct cells,

each with their target and roles. Although the network was viable in time period 7

(with the minimum personnel in the United States trained and capable of

performing the operation) the network was not coordinated for the attack until

time period 13.

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Figure 18 Geospatial Time Period 13 Hamburg not shown (Google Earth)

As you can see by examining the network visualized in ORA over the 13

time intervals, the Hamburg Network grows and becomes more organized and

tied together over time. By time interval 7 it has the basic requirements to be

viable and strike the WTC towers. By time interval 13, the network has reached

its maximum potential and becomes capable of making an attempt on all four

targets. By examining the last time interval visualization, you can see that not all

members of each cell are aware of or known to each other. This high degree of

compartmentalization allows for the secure coordination of work by ensuring that

the kill or capture of one member cannot take out the entire network nor

compromise its plan.

Conclusion:

The analysis of the Hamburg Network over time provides more than

network growth and geospatial disposition, it also highlights the key points in time

where the network had the operational capacity to conduct the planes operation.

Based on our given criteria, the analysis shows that the Hamburg Network had

the capacity to attack the World Trade Center with two aircraft by time period 7.

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If the attacks were executed during that time period (Time Period X), the

operational cells may have used the following configuration:

WTC North Tower: Mohammed Atta (pilot); Ziad Jarrah (alternate

pilot/security); Satam Suqami (security); and Waleed Alsheri (security).

WTC South Tower: Marwan Al-Shehhi (Pilot); Hani Hanjour (alternate

pilot/security); Nawaf Alhamzi (security); and Khalid Al-Mihdar (security).

Figure 19 Hamburg Network Time Period X

Key to the success of the operation was the proper training of the pilots.

Without the proper training, the hijackers would not have been able to hit theirintended targets because of the level of technical difficulty associated with

delivering a commercial aircraft to a pinpoint location. While the addition of other

hijackers after time period 7 increased the magnitude of the 911 attacks, it

actually increased the chance of compromise of illumination. While it is unlikely

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that the removal of the Atta and the other pilots would have prevented the attacks

from ever occurring, tougher scrutany of the hijackers indicators of clandestine

and covert behaviorsuch as multiple addresses, mail boxes, pre-paid cellular

phones, etc.could have set the conditions to force the terrorists to abort the

operation due to increased hostiliy of the environment.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

McCormick, G. H., and G. Owen. "Security and Coordination in a ClandestineOrganization." Mathematical and Computer Modeling, no. 31 (2000): 175-192.

National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States. The 9/11Commission Report, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/index.html (accessedon November 17, 2010).

Prosecution Exhibits from United States v. Zacarias Moussaoui, Criminal No. 01-455-A, available athttp://www.vaed.uscourts.gov/notablecases/moussaoui/exhibits/procecution.html accessed on November 11, 2010).

Sageman, Marc. Understanding Terror Networks, Philadelphia: University ofPhiladelphia Press, 2004, 103-104.

Valdis E. Mapping Networks of Terrorist Cells, Connections: 2001, Vol 23, 43-

52.

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Analysis of the Hamburg Network Over Time(Davis-Worth)

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