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Progress in Nuclear Energy; Vol. 47, No . 1-4, pp. 672-684 , 2005

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ANALYSIS OF NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE

JUNGMIN KANG

Nuclear Transmutation Energy Research Center of Korea, Seoul National

University, 56-1 Shinlim-dong, Gwanak-gu, Seoul, 151-742, ROK

ABSTRACT

All the civil nuclear energy systems could contribute to the proliferation risk

that weapons-usable material might be diverted or misused for the weapons purpose

by terrorists or states. Proliferation-resistant nuclear energy systems are of great

importance for the peaceful use of nuclear energy by impeding the diversion or

undeclared production of weapons-usable material by states. Since the National

Alternative Systems Assessment Program (NASAP) carried out the assessment of

proliferation resistance of the civil nuclear energy systems in late 1970s, several

comprehensive studies have been performed, including the International Nuclear

Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) by the International Atomic Energy Agency

(IAEA), the Spent Fuel Standard by the United States National Academy of Science,

the Technical Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global

Civilian Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) by the United States Department of

Energy, the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles

(INPRO) Methodology by the IAEA, and the Generation IV Nuclear Energy

Systems (Gen IV) by the Gen IV International Forum. However, all these studies

appear lack in the interpretation of country-specific proliferation risk that is

arbitrary imposed to the specific countries by major nuclear weapons states, even

though the countries are members of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear

Weapons (NPT). This paper outlines the assessments of proliferation resistance of

the above studies, points out the country-specific proliferation risk, and suggests

further studies to increase the proliferation resistance of the civil nuclear energy

systems in the specific NPT member countries such as South Korea.

© 2005 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

6 7 2

Proceedings' of INES-1, 2004

KEYWORDS

673

Nuclear energy systems; Proliferation resistance; Intrinsic barriers;

Institutional measures

1. INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of development of civil nuclear energy systems in the 1950s, the potential for

nuclear proliferation from its implementation has been generally recognized because many of its

technologies and materials also can be used to acquire nuclear weapons. The capabilities of the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards could manage the proliferation risks from the

implementation of the civil nuclear energy systems until the early 1970s (Scheinman, 2004). However,

the Indian nuclear explosion of 1974, which involved material and facilities supplied for peaceful

purposes, brought a reappraisal of the United States nonproliferation policy in the mid-1970s. This

reappraisal culminated the Carter Administration's nonproliferation policy of April 1977, which called

for indefinite deferral of domestic commercial reprocessing and recycling of plutonium and proposal of

commencement of domestic and international studies of alternative fuel cycles (Spiewak and Barkenbus,

1980). Responding to this policy, the Nonproliferation Alternative Systems Assessment Program

(NASAP) by the United States Department of Energy (DOE) begun in late 1976 (US.DOE, 1980) and

the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) by the international community was launched

in October 1977 (INFCE, 1980). Since there are no nuclear energy systems, encompassing all types of

reactors and nuclear fuel cycles, which can be completely proof against diversion of nuclear material for

weapons purpose, the proliferation resistance is emphasized. The proliferation resistance is

characteristics of nuclear energy systems that makes difficulty in diversion or production of

weapons-usable material. The study of proliferation resistance firstly received its political impetus from

the Carter's nonproliferation policy (Feiveson, 1978). After NASAP and INFCE, there have been several

prominent associated studies on the assessment of the proliferation resistance: Plutonium disposition by

the United States National Academy of Science in the mid-1990s (NAS, 1994, 1995 and 2000; Kang, et

al., 2000), the Technical Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian

Nuclear Power Systems (TOPS) by the U.S. DOE in early 2000s (U.S.DOE, 2000 and 2001), and the

International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (1NPRO) Methodology by the

IAEA (IAEA, 2003) and Generation IV nuclear energy systems (Gen IV) by the Gen IV International

Forum under going since early 2000s (US DOE, 2002 and 2003)

2. REVIEW OF STUDIES ON PROLIFERATION RESISTANCE

2.1 Non-proliferation Alternatives System Assessment Program (NASAP) (Spiewak and Barkenbus,

1980; US DOE 1980)

674 .L Kang

The NASAP by the U.S. DOE was started in 1976 to assess proliferation resistance and to

recommend more proliferation resistant nuclear energy systems and institutions. The NASAP final

report was published in June 1980. The NASAP stated that the proliferation resistance is the capability

of a nuclear energy system to inhibit, impede, or prevent the diversion of associated fuel-cycle materials

or facilities from civilian to military uses. The NAPSAP described proliferation resistance attributes in

terms of the resources required, time required, and risks of detection. The resources required are the

technological base, personnel, and financial resources needed for the specified proliferation activities in

light of their inherent difficulty. The time required is the approximate times needed for the specified

proliferation activities, including preparation, removal, and conversion. The risks of detection is the

chances and consequences of detection of the proliferation activities, including preparation, removal,

and conversion, and the possible timeliness o f detection.

The NASAP considered both institutional and technical barriers to supplement existing safeguards

and security measures to increase the proliferation resistance of fuel cycle materials or facilities. Table 1

provides an evaluation of the interaction between institutional and technical measures. Table 1 indicates

that the institutional measures are the most effective in dealing with national proliferation, while

technical measures are the most effective against sub-national threats.

Table 1. Evaluation of Measures to Improve Proliferation Resistance of Closed Fuel Cycles (US DOE, 1980)

Measure Proliferation Proliferation Effect on Proliferation resistance using resistance using IAEA resistance to unsafeguarded safeguarded safeguards subnational threat

facilities or facilities or materials materials

Coconversion Little or no change Increased Little or none Increased Coprocessing Increased ~ Increased a Little or none Increased Preirradiation Increased b Increased b Little or none Increased

Spiking Increased b Increased b Degraded Increased Partial processing Increased a Increased" Degraded Increased

Little or no change Increased Enhanced Increased Passive measurcs and physical

barriers Active use-denial Not applicable Increased Little or none Increased

Fuel-service Little or no change Increased Enhanced Increased centers (including

collocation) Fuel management Increased b Increased b Little or none Increased

and transport control (including storage/transport as mixed oxide or

mixed-oxide assemblies)

"Depends on how easily the facility can be modified to produce pure plutonium stream.

b May not be very effective where reprocessing plant is deployed.

Proceedings of lNES-1, 2004 675

The NASAP summarized following six basic norms for improving proliferation resistance of nuclear

energy systems:

Use of diversion-resistant form of materials and technologies,

Avoid of unnecessary sensitive materials and facilities,

An effective export control system,

Joint or international control of the necessary sensitive materials and facilities,

- Full-scope safeguards and a timely international system of warning and response, and

- Institutions to ensure the availability of the benefits of nuclear energy.

The important findings of the NASAP proliferation resistance assessments are the following:

- All fuel cycles entail some proliferation risks;

- The light water reactor (LWR) fuel cycle with spent fuel discharged to interim storage does not

involve directly weapons-usable material in any part of fuel cycle and is a more proliferation

resistant than other fuel cycles which involve work with highly enriched uranium (HEU) or pure

plutonium;

Substantial differences in proliferation resistance also exist between the fuel cycles if they are

deployed in non-nuclear weapons states;

With the progressive introduction of institutional and technical measures to improve

proliferation resistance, these differences may be reduced by the time the fuel cycles come into

wide spread use; and

The vulnerability to threats by sub-national groups varies between fuel cycles.

2.2 International Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) (Spiewak and Barkenbus, 1980; INFCE, 1980)

The INFCE study by the international community of 66 countries and 5 international organizations

was performed during October 1977 through February 1980. The purpose of the INFCE was to examine

the proliferation resistance ensuring that the benefits of nuclear power do not to be denied. The INFCE

considered proliferation resistance attributes in terms of the resources required, time required, and

detectability, together with safeguardability, using factors as following: the number of sites with

significant quantities of weapons-usable material and the importance of those quantities; the form of the

material, its accessibility varying with its radioactivity and the isotopic mixture; and the nature of the

facility that determines the resources required for different diversion routes.

The INFCE identified both institutional and technical measures to reduce the proliferation risks. The

INFCE bolstered safeguardability as the most important measure that could be taken while there were no

significant problems with the current (1980) safeguarding methods and techniques. The collocation of

reprocessing and mixed-oxide fuel fabrication plants and the coconversion of mixed-oxide from mixed

plutonium and uranium solution were highlighted by the 1NFCE as technical options that could add to

proliferation resistance. The INFCE identified the use of physical barriers to protect special nuclear

material was additional technical measures that have the potential to add proliferation resistance.

The important findings of the INFCE proliferation resistance assessments are the following:

The misuse of civilian nuclear facilities for the production of weapons-usable material is not a

676 .Z Kang

preferred method;

In the long run, there is no real difference in the degree of proliferation resistance between the

once-through fuel cycle and closed fuel cycles incorporating reprocessing; and

International safeguards agreements can offer a substantial reduction in proliferation and should

therefore be an integral part of the global nuclear industry.

On the contrary to the NASAP, the INFCE found no significant difference between the proliferation

resistances offered by the once-through fuel cycle and closed fuel cycles. However, the INFCE, as well

as the NASAP, concluded that the technical measures could significantly reduce the proliferation risk

against sub-national threats but they would not provide significant deterrents to would-be national

proliferators.

2.3 Plutonium Disposition (NAS, 1994, 1995 and 2000; Kang et al., 2000)

The "spent fuel standard" is a proliferation resistance criterion for disposition of excess U.S. and

Russian weapons-grade plutonium, recovered from dismantled U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons. The

original concept of the spent fuel standard was formulated by the Committee on International Security

and Arms Control (CISAC) of National Academy of Science in 1994. The 1994 CISAC report defined

the spent fuel standard as following: Options for the long-term disposition of weapons plutonium should

seek to meet a 'spent fuel standard'- that is, to make this plutonium roughly as inaccessible for weapons

use as the much larger and growing stock of plutonium in civilian spent fuel. The 1995 CISAC report

further elaborated the spent fuel standard by stating that "The spent fuel standard does not imply a

specific combination of (intrinsic properties such as) radiation barrier, isotopic mixture, and degree of

dilution of plutonium. Rather, it describes a condition in which weapons plutonium has become roughly

as difficult to acquire, process, and use in nuclear weapons as it would be to use plutonium in

commercial spent fuel for this purpose." The CISAC reports stressed that meeting the spent fuel

standard depends only on the intrinsic properties of the final plutonium form associated with plutonium

disposition.

The spent fuel standard described proliferation resistance attributes in terms of the intrinsic barriers

to acquisition of the plutonium from its storage site, to separation of the plutonium from diluents and

fission products, and to use of the separated plutonium in nuclear weapons. Table 2 summarizes intrinsic

barriers and threat characterization for final plutonium forms to indicate the relative importance of these

barriers against the three classes of proliferation threats. Table 2 indicates the characteristics that should

receive the weight in the determination of a disposition form's compliance with the spent fuel standard

as follows:

With respect to barriers to acquisition of the plutonium from its site: (1) the concentration of

plutonium in the items, (2) the technical difficulty of partly separating the plutonium from the

bulkier components of the item, and (3) the strength of the aids to detection of the items

provided by their thermal, chemical and nuclear signatures; and

With respect to barriers to subsequent separation of the plutonium from diluents and fission

products: (1) the quantity of material that needs to be processed to obtain a weapon's worth of

Proceedings' of lNES-1, 2004 677

plutonium, (2) the technical difficulty o f dissolution of the plutonium, (3) the technical difficulty

of chemical separation o f the plutonium from solution, and (4) the size of the aids to detection of

those activities provided by their thermal, chemical, and nuclear signatures.

The characteristics of the mass and bulk o f the items, the radiation hazards from the items, and the

deviation o f the plutonium's isotopic composition from weapons-grade deserve small but significant

weight in the determination of compliance with the spent fuel standard.

Table 2. Intrinsic barriers and threat characterization for final plutonium forms (NAS, 2000)

Barrier Importance of barrier against the threat Host-nation Theft for a Theft for a

breakout proliferant state sub-national group Barriers to acquisition of the Pu from its storage site

Mass and bulk of item a Zero to low b Moderate Moderate (low) concentration of Pu in Zero to low b High High

item Radiation hazard to acquires Low Moderate Moderate Technical difficulty of partly

separating Pu from bulk components of item on site a

Zero to low b High High

Thermal, chemical, and nuclear signatures aiding

detection

Zero to moderate b'c Moderate to high c Moderate to high

Barriers to separation of the Pu from diluents and fission products

Technical difficulty of Low Low to moderate Moderate disassembly

Technical difficulty of Low Moderate to high High dissolution and separation Quantity of material to be Low to moderate b Moderate to high High

processed Hazards to separators

Signatures aiding detection Low Moderate Moderate

Zero to moderate b Moderate to high c'd High c Barriers to use of the separated Pu in nuclear weapons

Deviation of isotopic composition from

weapons-grade

Moderate Moderate Low

a Barrier relates both to technical difficulty and detectability, which arc themselves related.

b Importance depends on whether breakout is open or clandestine.

c Importance depends on sensor capabilities.

a Importance depends on degree of proliferant state concern with detection.

678 .Z Kang

2.4 Technical Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear

Power Systems (TOPS) (US DOE, 2000 and 2001)

The U.S. DOE, Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Committee (NERAC) Task Force on Technical

Opportunities for Increasing the Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems

(TOPS) held its first meeting in 1999 to identify areas in which technical contributions could be useful

to increase the proliferation resistance of civilian nuclear energy systems.

The TOPS report released in January 2001 identified two forms of assessments that include the

effectiveness of both the technical features, i.e. intrinsic barriers and the necessary institutional measures,

i.e. extrinsic barriers to proliferation. The TOPS study used an integrated safeguards evaluation

methodology (ISEM) to evaluate the extrinsic barriers to proliferation. About the intrinsic barriers, they

are characterized in generic form as follows: (1) material barriers of isotopic, chemical, radiological,

mass and bulk, and detectability, and (2) technical barriers of facility unattractiveness, facility

accessibility, available mass, detectability of diversion, skill, expertise, and knowledge that are

necessarily involved, and the influence of time factors, including the time that may be required to obtain

access to weapons-usable material. Balanced intrinsic and extrinsic barriers could lead to effective

proliferation resistance. And the effectiveness of the barriers is dependent upon the degree of

sophistication and motivation of would-be proliferators.

Table 3 provides a broad indication of the variations in importance of different intrinsic barriers to

diversion or theft as they apply to different would-be proliferators. Table 3 indicates that although strong

intrinsic barriers are a desirable feature of a proliferation resistant system, they are insufficient alone to

prevent clandestine activities by a state to acquire nuclear material. Accordingly, they must be

supplemented by institutional barriers. The combination of intrinsic and extrinsic barriers could lead to

an effective proliferation resistance. The TOPS study, however, defined institutional barriers somewhat

narrowly focusing on the key elements of the existing regime such as the international safeguards

system administered by the IAEA.

The TOPS study recommended that the United States, in collaboration with other countries, should

initiate a new R&D program in three major areas as follows:

Development of improved methodologies for assessing the proliferation resistance of different

systems, including those that further the understanding of the trade-offs between intrinsic and

extrinsic measures;

Development and adaptation of technologies to further strengthen the application of extrinsic or

institutional barriers to proliferation with major emphasis on safeguards and material protection,

control, and accountability (MPC&A); and

Exploration and further pursuit as appropriate of the development of new technologies to

enhance the intrinsic barriers of various systems against proliferation thereby upgrading the

global nonproliferation regime and reducing the burdens placed on the institutional systems.

Proceedings of lNES-1, 2004 679

Table 3. Relative Importance of Various Barriers to a Selected Type of Threat (US DOE, 2001)

Sophisticated State, Sophisticated State, Unsophisticated Subnational Group Oven Coven State, Covert

Material Barriers Isotopic Moderate Low Moderate to high High

Chemical Very low Very low Moderate to high High Radiological Very, low Low Moderate High

Mass and Bulk Very low Low Low Moderate Detectability Not applicable Moderate Moderate High

Technical Barriers Facility Moderate Moderate High Very low

Unattractiveness Facility Accessibility Very low Low Low Moderate

Available Mass Moderate Moderate High High Diversion Detectability Very low Moderate Moderate Moderate Skills, Expertise, and Low Low Moderate Moderate

Knowledge Time Very low Very low Moderate High

2.5 Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles (INPRO) (IAEA, 2003)

The IAEA initiated the International Project on Innovative Nuclear Reactors and Fuel Cycles

(INPRO) in 2000 to create an innovative nuclear power technology to further reduce nuclear

proliferation risks and resolve the problem of radioactive waste in fulfilling the energy needs in the 21-th

century in a sustainable manner. An interim report of Phase 1A of the INPRO was released in June 2003,

which identified following three subjects: (1) prospects and potentials of nuclear power within the next

50 years; (2) user requirements for innovative nuclear energy systems (INS) in the area of economics,

sustainability and environment, safety, waste management, proliferation resistance, and cross cutting

issues; and (3) methodology for assessment of INS.

The INPRO Phase 1A study identified four types of intrinsic features as follows:

- Technical features of a nuclear energy system that reduce the attractiveness for nuclear weapons

programs of nuclear material during production, use, transport, storage and disposal;

Technical features of a nuclear energy system that prevent or inhibit the diversion of nuclear

material;

Technical features of a nuclear energy system that prevent or inhibit the undeclared production

of direct-use material; and

Technical features of a nuclear energy system that facilitates verification.

The INPRO Phase 1A study also identified five types of extrinsic features as follows:

States' commitments, obligations and policies with regard to nuclear nonproliferation and

disarmament;

Agreements between exporting and importing states that nuclear energy systems will be used

only for agreed purposes and subject to agreed limitations;

- Commercial, legal or institutional arrangements that control access to nuclear material and

nuclear energy systems;

- Application of the IAEA verification and, as appropriate, regional, bilateral and national

680 .l. Kang

measures, to ensure that states and facility operators comply with nonproliferation or

peaceful-use undertakings; and

- Legal and institutional arrangements to address violations of nuclear nonproliferation or

peaceful-use undertakings.

The 1NPRO Phase 1A study identified five basic principles and five user requirements for

proliferation resistance (see Table 4) to provide guidance regarding innovative nuclear energy systems

to governments, sponsors, designers, regulators, investigators and other users of a nuclear power and the

fuel cycle facilities. However, the INPRO Phase 1A study does not propose a specific method for the

evaluation of proliferation resistance indicators for the basic principles and the user requirements,

neither to develop specific technological features and institutional arrangements that will allow the goals

established for proliferation resistance to be realized.

Table 4. Basic Principles and User Requirements for Proliferation Resistance (IAEA, 2003)

Basic Principles

User Requirements

1. Proliferation resistant features and measures should be provided in innovative nuclear energy systems to minimize the possibilities of misuse of nuclear materials for nuclear weapons.

2. Both intrinsic features and extrinsic measures are essential, and neither should be considered sufficient by itself.

3. Extrinsic proliferation resistance measures, such as control and verification measures will remain essential, whatever the level of effectiveness of intrinsic features.

4. From a proliferation resistance point of view, the development and implementation of intrinsic features should be encouraged.

5. Communication between stakeholders will be facilitated by clear, documented and transparent methodologies for comparison or evaluation/assessment of proliferation resistance.

1. Proliferation resistance features and measures should be implemented in the design, construction and operation of future nuclear energy systems to help ensure that future nuclear energy systems will continue to be an unattractive means to acquire fissile material for a nuclear weapons program.

2. Future nuclear energy systems should incorporate complementary and redundant proliferation resistance features and measures that provide defense in depth.

3. The combination of intrinsic features and extrinsic measures, compatible with other design considerations, should be optimized to provide cost-effective proliferation resistance.

4. Proliferation resistance should be taken into account as early as possible in the design and development of a nuclear energy system.

5. Effective intrinsic proliferation resistance features should be utilized to facilitate the efficient application of extrinsic measures.

2.6 Generation IV Nuclear Energy Systems (Gen IV) (US DOE, 2002 and 2003)

Ten countries, including the United States, Republic of Korea, Japan and so on, have joined together

to form the Generation IV International Forum (GIF) in July 2001 to develop future-generation nuclear

energy systems, known as Gen IV nuclear energy systems, for meeting the challenges of safety,

economics, waste, and proliferation resistance. The proliferation resistance and physical protection

Proceedings' of lNES-1, 2004 681

(PR&PP) is one of the four goal areas, along with sustainability, safety and reliability, and economics, of

the Gen IV nuclear energy systems.

Evaluation of PR&PP addressed the relative life-cycle proliferation resistance and physical

protection of Gen IV nuclear energy systems. The GIF report, released in 2002, identified criteria and

associated indicators of PR&PP (see Table 5). In Table 5, the national proliferation (PR&PP-1) involves

the significant amount of weapons-usable material through: (1) diversion of weapons-usable material

from declared inventories or flows associated with normal use in a nuclear energy system, or produced

as a normal and declared byproduct of such a system; or (2) misuse by the undeclared production of

weapons-usable material through clandestine irradiation of undeclared fertile material in a nuclear power

reactor, or production of undeclared highly enriched uranium in an enrichment plant. Nuclear terrorism

(PR&PP-2) involves either through: (1) theft of weapons-usable material from nuclear installations or

transport systems for the production of one or more nuclear explosive devices; (2) theft of hazardous

radioactive material from nuclear installations or transport systems for the production of one or more

radiation dispersal weapons; or (3) damage or sabotage of a nuclear energy installation or transport

system with the intention of causing the release of radioactive material.

Table 5. Criteria and associated indicators of proliferation resistance and physical protection

(PR&PP) (US DOE, 2002)

Type of Criterion Viability and Performance Final PR&PP Evaluation Screening and

R&D Prioritization

PR&PP-1 Minimize life-cycle susceptibility to the diversion or undeclared production of weapons-usable material;

Facilitate implementation of effective IAEA safeguards

PR&PP-2 Minimize vulnerability to theft of weapons-usable material or hazardous radioactive material;

Minimize vulnerability of installations and transport systems to act of terror or

sabotage

Life-cycle accessibility of weapons-usable material; Safety implications and

detectability of undeclared irradiation;

Life-cycle costs of IAEA inspections, including provision

of essential safeguards equipment, per GWyr

Life-cycle accessibility of weapons-usable material; Life-cycle accessibility of

hazardous radioactive material; Robustness of facilities and

transport systems against act of sabotage instigated by insiders and/or external attacks by force

or stealth; Minimize of MC&A and

physical protection costs per GWyr

Compare with once-through

LWR

Compare with once-through

LWR

682 .l. Kang

The 2002 GIF report identified the intrinsic and extrinsic barriers to counter threats of national

proliferation and terrorism as follows:

Intrinsic barriers are defined by material quality (isotopic composition, chemical separability,

mass and bulk, fuel matrix radiation level, dilution and detectability characteristics), and by

technical impediments that are inherent to a nuclear system, such as facility unattractiveness and

accessibility, mechanical impediments to material and vital equipment access, skill

requirements; and

Extrinsic barriers are involved with institutional controls, such as materials control and

accounting (MC&A) and physical protection performed by the nation-state to prevent theft and

sabotage, and the detection of diversion and misuse performed by international safeguards and

by the specific agreements that a nation is signatory to.

2.7 Summary on Proliferation Resistance

This study summarizes the past studies on the proliferation resistance of nuclear energy systems as

follows:

No nuclear energy systems, such as all kinds of reactors and fuel cycles, are proliferation proof;

Characteristics to strengthen the proliferation resistance are defined as both intrinsic and

extrinsic barriers: (1) intrinsic barriers are a combination of material barriers that reduce the

inherent desirability or attractiveness of the material as an explosive, such as the isotopic

composition, the radiological protection, etc., and technical barriers that serve to make technical

elements of facilities difficult to acquire weapons-usable material, such as facility

unattractiveness, facility accessibility, etc.; and (2) extrinsic barriers are institutional measures,

such as international safeguards, physical protection, etc,;

Even the best combination of intrinsic barriers alone are not enough to prevent proliferation

threats posed by various would-be proliferators, hence the combined protection of intrinsic and

extrinsic barriers is essential to effective proliferation resistance; and

It will be difficult to contrive an effective proliferation resistant nuclear energy system for states,

even though effective proliferation resistance measures could be provided against sub-national

groups.

3. RECOMMENDATION OF MULTINATIONAL APPROACHES

Despite the comprehensive analyses of the past studies on the proliferation resistance, those studies

have not dealt with discrimination between the non-nuclear-weapon state (NNWS) parties to the NPT in

the assessment of proliferation risks from the implementation of sensitive civil nuclear energy systems,

including reprocessing and uranium enrichment. While the Article IV of the NPT affirms that member

states have the inalienable right to develop, research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful

purpose without discrimination, there is discrimination among the NNWS in the implementation of

Proceedings of lNES-1, 2004 683

sensitive civil nuclear energy systems. For example, a NNWS South Korea has been hindered by the

United States to develop research and to deploy sensitive civil nuclear energy systems for reprocessing

or uranium enrichment since 1970s (Kang and Feiveson, 2001), while Japan has reprocessing plants as

well as enrichment plant. Therefore, new approaches are necessary to measure country-specific

proliferation risk among the NNWS in the implementation of the sensitive civil nuclear energy systems.

Multinational approaches of nuclear fuel cycles has been proposed for a long time and recently

re-emphasized by the IAEA to strengthen the international nuclear nonproliferation regime, to facilitate

the contribution of the peaceful use of nuclear energy to the economic development of interested

countries, and to attract the adherence from all countries (Scheinman, 2004; Goldschmidt, 2004). The

multinational approaches to the implementation of the sensitive civil nuclear energy systems could be a

very appropriate strategy for the NNWS e.g., South Korea as a prominent institutional measure of

reinforcing nonproliferation.

4. CONCLUSION

This study summarizes a review of past prominent studies on the assessment of proliferation

resistance of civil nuclear energy systems and concludes as follows:

Combined protection of intrinsic barriers and institutional measures is essential to effective

proliferation resistance, although effective proliferation resistance measures depend upon the

proliferation threats;

New approaches are necessary to measure country-specific proliferation risk among the NNWS

to clear the discrimination of peaceful use of nuclear energy among the NNWS; and

Multinational approaches to the implementation of the sensitive civil nuclear energy systems

could be a very appropriate strategy for the NNWS e.g., South Korea as a prominent institutional

measure of reinforcing nonproliferation.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

This work was supported by the Nuclear Transmutation Energy Research Center of Korea funded by

the Korean Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Energy.

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