Synthesis report

Analysis of financing mechanisms and funding

streams to enhance emergency preparedness

Jan Kellett

Hannah Sweeney

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Synthesis report

Analysis of financing

mechanisms and funding

streams to enhance

emergency preparedness October 2011

Development Initiatives

Keward Court, Jocelyn Drive

Wells, Somerset, BA5 1DB

United Kingdom

This study has been funded by the Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Team on Funding for Preparedness.

The findings, interpretations and conclusions expressed are the responsibility of the authors and not those of

the donor or Development Initiatives. For comments or suggestions please contact info@devinit.org

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Contents

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .................................................................................................................................. IV

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................................... 1

INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................................................... 5

BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................................ 5

OBJECTIVES AND SCOPE OF THIS STUDY ........................................................................................................................ 6

STRUCTURE OF THIS REPORT ...................................................................................................................................... 7

KEY FINDINGS FROM THE INCEPTION REPORT ................................................................................................................. 7

METHODOLOGY ...................................................................................................................................................... 8

THE DEFINITION OF EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ............................................................................................................ 9

THE SCALE AND LOCATION OF THE NEED ....................................................................................................... 12

PREPAREDNESS FUNDING: CURRENT STATUS ................................................................................................ 14

PREPAREDNESS FUNDING WITHIN DEVELOPMENT AID ................................................................................................... 15

THE COMPLEXITIES OF CALCULATING CONFLICT PREPAREDNESS EFFORTS .................................................... 17

DONOR ARCHITECTURE ................................................................................................................................. 20

THE TASK BEFORE DONORS ...................................................................................................................................... 20

WHAT DOES THE DATA TELL US ABOUT DONOR FINANCING? ........................................................................................... 20

THE ABSENCE OF CONFLICT ...................................................................................................................................... 21

RISING FUNDING OBSCURES ISSUES ........................................................................................................................... 23

ELEMENTS OF IMPROVED DONOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS ........................................................................................ 24

INSTITUTIONAL ARCHITECTURE ..................................................................................................................... 26

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES MATRIX ......................................................................................................................... 27

FUNDING ............................................................................................................................................................. 29

INSTITUTIONAL ISSUES: A PRELIMINARY ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................... 31

CONSOLIDATED APPEALS PROCESS (CAP) ...................................................................................................... 34

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 34

OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES ............................................................................................................................ 34

FINANCING ARCHITECTURE............................................................................................................................ 39

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POOLED FUNDS ..................................................................................................................................................... 39

POLICY AND DATA ANALYSIS OF POOLED FUNDS CURRENTLY IN USE .................................................................................. 39

POTENTIAL CRITERIA FOR MORE EFFECTIVE PREPAREDNESS FINANCING ............................................................................. 47

BUILDING ON EXISTING FUNDS ................................................................................................................................. 48

TRACKING ANALYSIS ...................................................................................................................................... 49

INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................................................... 49

THE TRACKING METHODOLOGY ................................................................................................................................ 49

BACKGROUND – DAC ANALYSIS TRENDS OVER TIME ..................................................................................................... 50

TRACKING RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................ 52

EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS FINANCING IN NEPAL: DESK REVIEW ............................................................... 55

BACKGROUND TO RISK AND FINANCE IN NEPAL ............................................................................................................ 55

DRR/PREPAREDNESS STRUCTURES AND INITIATIVES IN NEPAL ........................................................................................ 56

NEPAL RISK REDUCTION CONSORTIUM (NRRC) .......................................................................................................... 57

LESSONS LEARNT FROM THE CONSORTIUM ................................................................................................................. 60

TOWARDS IMPROVED AND PREDICTABLE PREPAREDNESS FINANCING: KEY FINDINGS, OPPORTUNITIES,

CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................... 63

OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................................... 63

POLICY CONTEXT FOR EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS MECHANISMS .................................................................................... 64

ALL ACTORS FOR CHANGE ........................................................................................................................................ 66

EXAMINING THE OPTIONS........................................................................................................................................ 67

THE ADDED VALUE OF A VERTICAL FUND ..................................................................................................................... 70

DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CONSIDERATION ........................................................................................................ 71

SUGGESTED COMPONENTS FOR PHASE II: ..................................................................................................... 77

ANNEX 1: DONOR PROFILES ........................................................................................................................... 83

ANNEX 2: INSTITUTIONAL PROFILES .............................................................................................................. 99

ANNEX 3: FINANCING MECHANISMS PROFILES ............................................................................................ 111

ANNEX 4: LITERATURE REVIEW .................................................................................................................... 127

ANNEX 5: LIST OF PEOPLE CONSULTED/INTERVIEWED................................................................................. 132

ANNEX 6: DEFINITIONS: ............................................................................................................................... 134

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Acknowledgements The work has been led within Development Initiatives by Jan Kellett and Hannah Sweeney. Other

staff members involved in data investigation and analysis were Dan Sparks, Kerry Smith, Lydia Poole

and José Fernandez. External contributors included Andrew Rogerson (Special Advisor to

Development Initiatives), Emily Wilkinson (Research Fellow for Climate Change, Environment and

Forests at the Overseas Development Institute (ODI)) and Philip Tamminga (Head of the

Humanitarian Response Index (HRI) at DARA). It has been proofread by Georgina Brereton. Judith

Randel, director at Development Initiatives, oversaw quality control of the work.

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“Not all the solutions are within our

[humanitarians] hands but perhaps we are best

placed to ensure overall aid is targeted correctly,

because we are otherwise left with the failure of

not doing so.” Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) Donor

“In many countries development funding is

declining whilst humanitarian funding is

increasing at an alarming rate. Yet a number of

these countries are not receiving any

preparedness funding. How can this be

addressed?” UN representative

“Preparedness is essential - it saves lives; and it is

more cost-effective than response. National and

local authorities are central in this regard – they

are the first responders in every emergency, and

we have to focus on further strengthening their

knowledge and capacity so that they can respond

better.” Emergency Relief Coordinator – Valerie Amos

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Executive summary “The aim of emergency preparedness is to strengthen local, national and global

capacity to minimise loss of life and livelihoods, to ensure effective response, to

enable rapid recovery and increase resilience to all hazards (including conflict and

epidemics).

This entails readiness measures (risk assessment, contingency planning, stockpiling

of equipment and supplies, training, community drills and exercises) and institutional

preparedness (coordination arrangements, early warning systems, public education)

supported by legal and budgetary frameworks.1”

This report was commissioned by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on behalf of the

Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) in order to examine the current financing architecture for

emergency preparedness as well as the structures that promote or hinder that financing, to highlight

the challenges and opportunities that are inherent in the current humanitarian and development

system and to make recommendations for change, especially with regards to the financing

architecture.

Throughout the life of this study (which is the first of a planned two-phased initiative) there has

been renewed and increasing emphasis on the importance of preparedness. At the United Nations

Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) substantive session in 2011 every main segment and most of

the side events focused upon preparedness as the main or related topic, no doubt fuelled in part by

what was happening in East Africa, where a particularly devastating drought, the latest in a cyclical

chain of such events in the region, underlined the need for improvements in preparedness funding.

The initial stages of this study have shown there to be an almost universal acceptance of the need

for urgent change in the way that preparedness is understood, engaged with and funded. Indeed, a

sharper focus on preparedness is seen by many stakeholders as potentially transformative. It could

connect humanitarian and development actors better and focus national priorities, as well as lower

the costs of humanitarian intervention”

In an era of increasing pressure on humanitarian financing, preparedness expenditures are very low,

coming in at less than 5% of all humanitarian funding in 2009. Looking at the top 20 humanitarian

recipient countries for 2005-2009, for every US$100 spent on humanitarian assistance only 62 cents

went to disaster prevention and preparedness. Our ‘real-time’ tracking of funding in 2011 highlights

that where donors and agencies do fund preparedness it is likely to take place immediately after a

crisis, a trend which must change. Current reporting remains very weak and the limitations of

available systems need addressing. Yet despite these issues with the data, it is clear that in general

donors still give a low priority to preparedness financing, representing a fraction of overall

humanitarian spend.

An examination of nine specific financing mechanisms shows that preparedness funding is already

undertaken through six of these funds, though its proportion of overall amounts spent is relatively

small. Even the humanitarian fund with the largest proportion of humanitarian financing for

preparedness in 2011 (the Sudan Common Humanitarian Fund (CHF)) spent only 3.8%. The Global

1 This definition of emergency preparedness was developed as part of this study. See page 8 of main report for more

details.

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Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR), a development fund, despite being tied

directly to track five of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) on preparedness, still only directs 15%

of its budget to this area. More importantly, none of the existing funds are easily adaptable to

meeting the need of improving funding for preparedness and making it more predictable. It is

revealing that the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP), despite a lack of specific guidance, is already

being used by humanitarian country teams to prioritise preparedness within sectors and projects.

There are also some specific quick-win possibilities in using the CAP (see below), though it should be

understood that it is not a comprehensive solution.

A desk study examining the progress of preparedness in Nepal was undertaken, in part due to the

ongoing work of the sub-working group for preparedness in this country. The Nepal Risk Reduction

Consortium (NRRC) has shown that a properly articulated country programme that has developed

from lessons learnt in other countries, can garner both interest and funding for preparedness as part

of a broader disaster risk reduction (DRR) framework. It bridges the humanitarian and development

divide, brings all actors together, and involves government within an overall funding and

coordinating umbrella supported by the presence of a strong Resident Coordinator. Nonetheless,

not all donors have bought into the programme as yet, with the absence of evidence of impact (a

characteristic of the global debate on preparedness) cited as a key factor. The programme has also

taken three years to really gain traction, engagement and funding, highlighting that if it is to work, a

long-term view is needed as well as financial investment. Finally, and very importantly, if the

Consortium were to become a model to be used across the world in prioritised countries it must be

adapted to fit a broad range of contexts.

The problem is that donor humanitarian agencies are not set up to respond to such a request, even

if it were forthcoming. For most donors, policy and funding linked to preparedness are largely based

on the HFA, focusing on natural disasters and part of a longer-term DRR policy. Yet responsibility for

preparedness itself almost always remains within donors’ humanitarian divisions, who report that

they do not have the funds to deal with this on top of their growing response expenditures.

Meanwhile, few donors consider conflict and disaster preparedness together, and if conflict

preparedness is mentioned in policy it is usually connected to prevention and seen as a political

issue, managed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Throughout the development of the study, particular attention has been focused upon the issue of

conflict and how it relates to emergency preparedness, and by extension the complexity of

calculating conflict preparedness efforts. We conclude that there is a need for a more inclusive view

of preparedness which focuses upon all emergencies, hazards and risks, and a focus upon measures

that contribute to building capacity and resilience to minimise the effects of these risks. However,

this holds out a further challenge, as whilst preparedness for disasters is already articulated within a

long-term perspective of DRR, there is no comparable and coherent long-term policy perspective for

conflict preparedness.

These different but interrelated analyses have fed into the examination of financing options, where

a series of alternatives were explored, including the setting up of a new global, regional or country-

level fund, using the CAP, increased bilateral funding or utilising existing funds. Although this initial

investigation highlighted that no one suitable mechanism currently exists to meet all the

requirements outlined above, further research is needed especially at a country level to determine

whether they should be adapted or a new fund created. Perhaps a short-term solution would be to

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split conflict from disaster and use a mechanism such as the emergency response fund for the

former and GFDRR for the latter.

This study highlights the fact that financing for emergency preparedness should above all be

prioritised, based on needs and put in place before the crisis has struck. At present none of the

mechanisms or institutions working in preparedness carry out multi-risk analyses and fund according

to the risks and needs presented. Currently all of them, if they do risk analysis at all, do it for natural

disasters alone. There are, however, some all-risk assessments made that could be adapted for use

to improve and prioritise financing, and this should be examined further.

As a result of the analysis undertaken and described above the study team has developed specific

recommendations for change, especially with regards to the financing architecture (a fuller list of

recommendations is included in the final section).

Enabling environment :

Work with donors via forums such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and

the G20 to address the issue of bifurcated aid architecture and especially its impact on

funding.

Develop working partnerships with key actors working in the same environment as

‘humanitarians’, including the development community, peacekeepers, private sector etc.

Develop an understanding of how emergency preparedness fits with other processes such as

peacebuilding and transition.

The Risk Context:

Undertake comprehensive risk analyses which address multi-hazards including conflict, and

which will ensure emergency preparedness financing is needs driven.

Explore exactly what is meant by conflict preparedness and how it relates to disaster

preparedness, both short and long term.

Evaluate the need for further cost benefit analysis specifically related to preparedness, that

can make the case clearly. This should be based on a common understanding of all risks,

highlighting strategies to reduce those risks. Disseminate existing cost benefit analyses and

ensure they reach senior decision makers.

Financing:

Increase preparedness financing using existing pooled funds that already channel money to

preparedness and adapt them to fit.

Explore in detail the value-added feasibility of a creating a new vertical fund dedicated to EP

for all risk sources.

Consider setting aside funds for specific preparedness projects within existing funding

mechanisms..

Use the CAP to fund preparedness strategically. Include preparedness in guidance notes, and

track investment in preparedness through a marker.

Leadership and Role Clarification

Work to reduce duplication and promote global coordination by identifying global leads that

work to an overarching risk reduction framework linked to different funding streams.

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Extend and adapt the country-based model:

Investigate the possibilities of adapting the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium model of

integrated preparedness and DRR to fit other country contexts.

Reporting:

Work with the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s

Development Assistance Committee (DAC) and the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) to

improve reporting of preparedness of all kinds by establishing coherent coding.

All actors to greatly improve the transparency of all preparedness expenditures.

Whilst these recommendations go some way to addressing issues concerning the financing

architecture and are likely to bring more predictable funding for preparedness there remain

considerable structural and systematic hurdles. These, such as the humanitarian/development aid

structure and conflict/disaster complexity need to be examined in detail, in order to create a long-

term sustainable solution to better preparedness financing. This is generally beyond the reach of this

study but attempts have been made to highlight these issues wherever possible.

Recommendations for Phase II

The limitations of this exercise need acknowledgement. The preliminary data investigation has shown the

need for future work to go beyond the available databases and examine data forensically at project level

to extract and re-aggregate spending on preparedness. It has also shown that tracking preparedness real-

time solely through FTS is of some value but needs to be undertaken long-term as part of other

improvements in both expenditure and tracking. Thirdly, and more importantly, research for this phase of

the study has been (with the exception of the Nepal desk-based study) limited to discussions with

headquarter–based stakeholders (and largely humanitarian ones) and the examination of policies,

databases and financial information at a global level, which provides only part of the picture.

Examining emergency preparedness in a variety of country contexts will be essential if we are to

understand the interplay between the different kinds of activities undertaken, the actors involved, and

how the work is financed. This work needs to be complemented by an examination of all the remaining

actors (and their work) not included in great depth in this study, including the private sector,

peacekeeping, non-DAC donors, domestic governments and also development actors including donors,

both globally and at country level. Core elements of Phase II will also address the need to identify any

issues of mandate and leadership, duplications and gaps in delivery and programming. In addition,

advocacy and outreach are seen as essential to making preparedness an important issue for all those with

decision making responsibility. Based on this work and building on the synthesis report, clear

recommendations for change should be made which build upon those already present here.

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Introduction

Background

This report was undertaken by Development Initiatives (DI) and commissioned by the United Nations

(UN) Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) on behalf of the Inter-Agency Standing Committee

(IASC) in order to examine the current financing of emergency preparedness as well as the structures

that promote or hinder that financing. Its task was also to highlight the challenges and opportunities

that are inherent in the current humanitarian system and to make recommendations for change,

especially with regards to the financing architecture. The IASC has clearly recognised current

weaknesses in preparedness financing and has stated that adequate funding is not about money but

also proper structures, planning and processes. It has also made considerable connections between

preparedness and longer-term disaster risk reduction (DRR). Whilst it has underlined that

humanitarian actors do need to play a key role in preparedness, it has also indicated that only a

holistic approach involving all stakeholders, one where development actors are part of the solution

and national actors are central, can ensure that needs are met in a sustainable way2.

Last year, the IASC Humanitarian Finance Group formed a Task Team on Funding for Preparedness

with a view to identifying ways to ensure a more coherent and predictable approach to funding,

which also includes building capacities of local and national actors. Within this framework, the IASC

Working Group asked the Task Team to:

track humanitarian financing to preparedness in the Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and in

pooled funding mechanisms, based on an agreed definition

support the fundraising pillar of the five-country case study being undertaken by the Sub-

Working Group (SWG) on Preparedness, and

engage in a structured discussion with the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD).

More recently, the IASC Principals tasked the Task Team to provide support to the SWG

preparedness pilots in an effort to strengthen global inter-agency coordination in providing better

support-to-country efforts for preparedness capacity development. Specifically, the request was to:

prepare a resourcing advocacy strategy to support SWG preparedness country pilots, with

individual pilot country strategies completed by the end of 2011

explore possibilities within existing financing mechanisms including national budgets, to support

country-level preparedness activities, and

advocate for a predictable, flexible, timely and risk-tolerant financing architecture.

In order to bring the above recommendations into effect, the FAO, as Task Team Chair, tendered for

a consultancy group to undertake elements of this work, to be supported by the Task Team, in a

project entitled ‘Analysis of financing mechanisms and funding streams to enhance funding for

emergency preparedness’.

2 It is important to note that the work being carried out by the United Nations is only one part of a wider preparedness and

resilience agenda that is being pursued by others such as the GHD group of donors and the G20. The preparedness agenda is also moving at a fast past. Every attempt is made to ensure that the analysis and recommendations are in line with current debates up until the publishing date of October 2011.

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Objectives and scope of this study

The terms of reference (TOR) for this piece of work incorporated the following: “establish a

framework for tracking emergency preparedness funding. To achieve this DI will undertake a review

of the existing preparedness funding architecture, including policies, structures, stakeholders and

financing.3”

DI agrees with FAO, the IASC and others that the agenda has moved on from the time when this TOR

was developed. There is renewed high profile focus on the need for better preparedness. Conflict

has become a much more central element of the study. It would be fair to say that the tracking itself

is no longer a primary issue (although it is covered in a section of this report, beginning at page 45).

However, the review of the existing preparedness funding architecture is certainly apposite, and is

essentially at the core of this synthesis report’s investigation. At times a line is drawn under how far

this part of the study can go in investigating some of the bigger issues regarding preparedness

funding. Where this is the case, it is indicated in the text and is referenced, as appropriate, as a

suggested component of Phase II of the work.

The implicit consideration underlying this study, which has been driven by the meetings, discussions

and investigations to date, is not only that the current financing architecture for preparedness is

inadequate to meet needs, with current mechanisms either not fit for purpose or insufficiently used,

but also that a single fund, either existing or to be constructed, could meet the range of needs

described below. Considerable work has therefore been undertaken to examine such a possibility,

framed in the context of current preparedness financing issues and options for the way forward

which have been presented.

This synthesis report forms part of Phase I of a planned two-phase project analysing these ‘financing

mechanisms and funding streams’, and is designed to set the stage for the work ahead. A series of

interconnected activities have helped produce the results. An institutional mapping of key

stakeholders highlighted connections and gaps. A detailed preliminary investigation of current data

has examined trends in preparedness financing. This has been followed by a series of consultations

and bilateral meetings with key stakeholders (drawn from the donor, coordinating and

implementing agency communities), supported by presentations on early data findings, aimed at

exploring current structures, policies and future opportunities. In addition, a substantial literature

review has provided important background material.

The study included investigations consisting of an analysis of the Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium

(NRRC), the tracking of preparedness financing within the Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs’ (OCHA) Financial Tracking Service (FTS) together with detailed examinations of

both donor agencies and nine specifically relevant financing mechanisms. This synthesis report

brings together these elements with the findings of the inception report. The findings of this study,

whilst forming only the first and shorter phase of the much larger project, have already confirmed

not only that more work must be done to improve the situation, including a much needed

examination of how aid structures work in complex policy areas that cut across the

humanitarian/development divide, but also that there is an urgent need to move forward,

3 Taken directly from the Terms of Reference for this study.

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particularly in light of recent events such as the drought in the Horn of Africa and in the context of

current financial pressures.

A suggested list of components and objectives of Phase II of the project can be found on page 72.

Structure of this report

The report has 12 sections and a series of supporting annexes. This section introduces the study and

its objectives, restates some of the key findings from the inception report including the agreed

definition for preparedness financing, sketches out the scope of the study, including the ongoing

tracking work, and presents the methodology for the study. Section two presents a brief analysis of

the scale and location of the needs related to preparedness. The third section presents an analysis of

current funding to preparedness. Section four discusses the complexities of conflict in relation to

preparedness. The fifth section examines donor architecture in detail, including policy, priorities, and

funding. Section six outlines the current institutional architecture for preparedness and highlights

any gaps or duplications that exist. Section seven investigates whether a standing element within the

Common Humanitarian Action Plan (CHAP) and CAP can meet the needs for emergency

preparedness. Section eight offers a detailed analysis of nine of the most relevant financing

mechanisms in view of using them to encourage greater investment. Section nine is the first report

on a year-long preparedness tracking initiative. The tenth section examines the NRRC and draws out

key lessons that can be learnt from this initiative. Section eleven is key in synthesising all these

findings and offers conclusions and recommendations for further reflection and action where

appropriate. The final section suggests a number of components that should be considered for

Phase II of the study. A series of annexes can be found at the end of the report that support much of

the study, including profiles of the nine financing mechanisms, 12 donors, as well as key institutions

and the private sector.

Key findings from the inception report

During the completion of the inception stage of this study the team identified various issues that

helped to frame the work undertaken within the larger synthesis report. Five main lessons were

drawn out:

the central complexity: preparedness bridges the divide between humanitarian and

development aid

expenditure on preparedness is increasing, both in volume and proportion, but only

incrementally

the structure of the humanitarian financing system is a hindrance

there are significant and related competing pressures on donors

conflict is still orphaned in these discussions; work in this area remains more incoherent than

for disasters, with an absence of joined-up work and policies.

In addition to these five issues three central tensions were identified as appearing in various

different analyses:

conflict and natural disaster

local/national and institutional

short-term preparedness and long-term risk reduction.

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Despite these issues and tensions, and to an extent because of them, there is universal

acknowledgement from all sides that engagement and investment in preparedness must be

improved.

Key outputs from the inception report that directly inform the completion of this phase of the study

are as follows.

The definition: the detailed analysis of data and discussions with stakeholders have helped to

form a precise definition of emergency preparedness, one which both connects to existing work

but also goes further, ensuring the context of conflict is included. It is important to note however

that a clear definition of emergency preparedness alone is not the answer to more preparedness

funding.

Tracking preparedness: the establishment of the definition has also allowed the study team to

develop methodology for tracking expenditures over the period of a year, which was a key task.

From the work undertaken thus far two key findings should inform better preparedness. Firstly, and

this is supported by all stakeholders, this exercise should be used to help bridge the aid divide. We

should not, for example, equate emergency preparedness with the ‘humanitarian segment’ of

longer-term DRR, which would only reemphasise the divide and lead to more short-term planning.

Secondly, the way to avoid this divide is to focus attention on actual requirements in the countries

and communities most in need of better preparedness, and less on our own structures and

definitions. Recipients are not interested in where investments come from – they are looking for

change.

Methodology

DI used a combination of quantitative and qualitative approaches to inform the study, which

included one-to-one interviews, group discussions, presentations, desk reviews and financial

analysis.

Following the identification of key stakeholders DI carried out 29 meetings with 69 people at

headquarters (HQ) level, both face-to-face and via teleconferencing. These covered a wide range of

UN agencies, donor governments, institutions and non-governmental organisations with the aim of

understanding how they view preparedness.

In addition to discussions with donors, DI carried out a review of 11 donors that belong to the

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)’s Development Assistance

Committee (DAC), looking at their policy and structure, to identify where the blockages to financing

preparedness exist. The team also reviewed the five main institutions involved in preparedness to

highlight any overlapping mandates and identify gaps. Separate profiles were produced looking at

the private sector as a whole and the engagement of non-DAC donors (NDD). A literature review was

conducted to better understand the scope of preparedness and to assist in agreeing definitions for

the data tracking.

The team carried out a detailed financial analysis of preparedness funding over time using the OECD

DAC’s Creditor Reporting System (CRS). Though limited to those donors reporting to the DAC, this

analysis enabled a more robust examination of past trends, key recipients and donors and the

channels that have been used to provide financial support to preparedness activities. This database

also allowed us to go beyond the data coded as ‘prevention and preparedness’ within the

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humanitarian expenditure to examine the levels of funding that are found within official

development assistance (ODA).

A key element of the study involved detailed tracking of funding to emergency preparedness

expenditures for a set of ten countries over a period of a year, using the FTS managed by the UN.

This database was used as it provides up-to-date information and allows real-time examination of

expenditures, although it is important to note that it is focused purely on humanitarian aid. Another

limitation of the FTS is that there is no separate reporting category for tracking preparedness. To

overcome this DI carried out a detailed search of the dataset using a pre-defined set of words based

on the agreed definition of emergency preparedness. All project lines that contained the relevant

words in the subcategory ‘description’ were examined one by one and marked according to whether

they are solely focused on emergency preparedness or could include elements of it. This was done

using a traffic light system, classifying projects as being either fully focused on preparedness,

preparedness mixed with other activities such as response, or being DRR-focused with no specific

reference to preparedness. This is similar to project marking, such as that undertaken in the CAP for

gender. A further search was conducted for activities considered to go beyond emergency

preparedness, but that were considered as wider DRR.

To stress the importance of transparent reporting of preparedness funding and DRR more broadly,

DI analysed under which codes the funding is found, highlighting inconsistencies in current reporting

practices.

The definition of emergency preparedness4

Through working with key stakeholders and an examination of essential documentation we decided

upon the following as the definition to be used as a basis for this study, and in particular for the

tracking exercise.

“The aim of emergency preparedness is to strengthen local, national and global

capacity to minimise loss of life and livelihoods, to ensure effective response, to

enable rapid recovery and increase resilience to all hazards (including conflict and

epidemics).

This entails readiness measures (risk assessment, contingency planning, stockpiling

of equipment and supplies, training, community drills and exercises) and institutional

preparedness (coordination arrangements, early warning systems, public education)

supported by legal and budgetary frameworks.”

The first part of the definition describes the broad aims of emergency preparedness, ensuring that

people are the focus for all measures undertaken. It also stresses that emergency preparedness is

not just about preparing to respond but must also be connected to the whole crisis cycle –

prevention, mitigation, preparedness, response, recovery - and will contribute to increasing

resilience.

4 Towards the end of the preparation of this report there has been a suggestion that there needs to be more

work done on the definition itself, particularly in how it may or may not recommend to donors exactly what activities should be funded. Given the need for this to be discussed in detail by many stakeholders there is no time to review that in detail before this report is finalised. It is recommended this be undertaken as part of Phase II of this study.

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The second part of the definition is based upon that used by UN International Strategy for Disaster

Reduction (ISDR) for disaster preparedness, which lists examples of specific activities falling within

preparedness5 (this is not exhaustive and we understand that there are many more measures and

activities that could be included).

As previously discussed the definition will not be focused solely on environmental hazards but is

extended to encompass preparation for all eventualities, including conflict.

Emergency preparedness: the methodology of the definition

Issues will clearly arise around any definition when there are many stakeholders involved, all with

their own opinions of what is or is not preparedness (and in some cases with mandates that are

determined by such definitions). During our discussions with these stakeholders and throughout this

report we have applied the definitions used by UN ISDR. However, given the need to move from

disasters to all risks there has been a need to reinvent and adapt to a degree, and following

discussion the definition above has been agreed upon.

The need to both isolate emergency preparedness as something that can be tracked over time whilst

also ensuring that it remains connected to wider DRR work has become clear to us, as indicated in

the early findings which are presented in this report. Indeed, preparedness should be seen as one

element of DRR, as indicated in the ISDR definition which follows (our emphasis):

“The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse

and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to

hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the

environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.”

In the following diagram we have used concentric circles to denote connections between the various

elements of DRR, resilience, emergency preparedness etc. This is meant to act as a guide to where

we see the work of this study sitting within the overall effort to ensure that natural events do not

become natural disasters or complex crises, and is again drawn from ISDR definitions as well as our

own for emergency preparedness. The circles represent some of the key processes, with the shared

areas suggesting a particular connectedness. We have also indicated some of the activities or sub-

processes that these shared areas may represent. At this point conflict-related processes such as

peacebuilding and peacekeeping are not added; this may become appropriate if all risks are to be

assessed together, as is recommended in this report.

5 http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology

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Figure 1: Concentric circles denoting connections between the various elements of DRR, resilience, emergency

preparedness etc.6

6 This figure has been created by the authors to provide an idea of how the various areas within DRR, preparedness and

climate change fit together. It is not meant to be a definitive examination of the connections but intended rather to provide a visual guide to how elements may interrelate.

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The scale and location of the need Despite the acknowledgment of the need to significantly increase funding for emergency

preparedness it is considerably challenging to put any figure on the amount needed given the global

data available to us. We can offer at this stage only a series of proxies which indicate in different

ways both the location and scale of need.

The numbers of those affected by natural disasters have increased since 2006 from 126 million to

214 million. This is despite the fact that the number of disasters has declined over the same period

from 401 to 352, with 2010 seeing more disasters than the previous two years (just over 500). This

alone provides the evidence for the need for increased preparedness to help reduce the number of

those affected. The long-term trend also suggests an overall increase in the number of disasters; if

this continues on the same trajectory without further investment in DRR and preparedness, the

number of those affected is also likely to rise.

Figure 2: Number of natural disasters and people affected. Source: Development Initiatives based on data from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED)

There is however little information on exact numbers of people affected by conflict. Numbers can be

gleaned from battle report data collected by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

(SIPRI) or a use of the rather crude recipient figures within the CAP, but there is no comprehensive

information available. What we can say, however, is that millions of people affected by natural

disasters each and every year, actually live in conflict-affected countries, reaching a high of over 80%

in 2008.

Figure 3: Number of people affected by natural disaster, by conflict or non-conflict-affected (millions of people). Source: Development Initiatives based on CRED and other sources

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

0

100

200

300

400

500

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

20

04

20

05

20

06

20

07

20

08

20

09

20

10

Nu

mb

er

of

affe

cte

d (

mill

ion

s)

Nu

mb

er

of

dis

aste

rs

Number of disasters Total number affected (millions) Linear (Number of disasters)

56.5 28.3 49.8

58.1

37.6

18.6 8.8 40.2

12.3

32.2

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

Non-conflict-affected (excluding China)

Conflict-affected

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We can also say very clearly that the bulk of humanitarian financing goes to conflict-affected states

with levels increasing to close to 70% of all funding in each of the last four recorded years.

Figure 4: Proportion of total official humanitarian assistance by conflict-affected states, 2000-2009.

The global demand for humanitarian financing is not only driven specifically by natural or conflict-

related hazards in country; global and local economic factors profoundly influence both people’s

vulnerability to crisis as well as the financial cost of meeting humanitarian needs. Fluctuations in

food and energy prices in particular have had far-reaching effects on levels of humanitarian need

and the ability of the system to respond.

Figure 5: Changes in commodity prices, 1990-2011 (first quarter). Note: Food and energy price indices here show

variation from the year 2000 when the index value is set at 100. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank

Global Economic Monitor (GEM) of Commodities

13.7%

13.3%

17.2%

21.6%

22.1%

20.9%

24.6%

26.7%

24.8%

25.9%

26.4%

30.6%

28.7%

28.2%

28.0%

35.3%

42.0%

35.6%

42.2%

39.1%

59.9%

56.1%

54.0%

50.1%

49.9%

43.8%

33.4%

37.7%

33.0%

35.0%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

% of total humanitarian aid to top 3 conflict-affected recipients

% of total humanitarian aid to all other conflict-affected recipients

% of total humanitarian aid to non conflict-affected recipients

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

20

00

=10

0 (

con

stan

t 2

00

0 p

rice

s)

Food Price Index Energy Price Index

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Preparedness funding: current status Following a review of OECD DAC and FTS data we have determined that reported preparedness and

DRR funding has increased over the last five years both in volume and proportion of overall

humanitarian spend7. The data suggests however that a low priority is given to preparedness

financing which, despite having increased significantly since 2004, still only represents a fraction of

overall expenditure. Only eight of the 23 donors reporting to the DAC spend more than 5% on

preparedness, and only three of those spend more than 10%. Priority is still given to ‘material relief

assistance and services’ and ‘emergency food aid’, which are essentially the core codes dealing with

response rather than preparedness/prevention or reconstruction.

Figure 6: Funding to prevention and preparedness code, 2004-2009 (US$m constant 2009 prices). Source: OECD DAC data

By 2009 funding to prevention and preparedness reached US$455 million of the total humanitarian

expenditure. This represents a 4.2% share of total humanitarian and a 0.3% of overall ODA.

Figure 7: Funding to prevention and preparedness code as percentage of total humanitarian aid, 2004-2009 (constant 2009 prices). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

Amounts received for preparedness activities have not been significant for any of the top

humanitarian recipients in the past five years. Only eight of the top 20 humanitarian recipients

7 A disaster prevention and preparedness code was introduced by the OECD DAC in 2004 but has only really started to be

widely used by donors in 2007.

4,251

6,731

4,985

4,672

5,223

5,414

1,756

2,612

2,214

2,247

3,604

3,286

6

70

41

99

333

455

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

6

70 41

99

333

455

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

% o

f to

tal H

A

US$

mill

ion

(co

nst

ant

20

09

p

rice

s)

Disaster prevention and preparedness

% of total humanitarian aid on disaster prevention and preparedness

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have received more than US$10 million for prevention and preparedness between 2005 and 2009,

and of those only two (Iraq and Indonesia) received more than US$30 million.

Figure 3: Prevention and preparedness expenditure on major humanitarian recipients, 2005-2009, ranked by mortality

risk (figures in brackets). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and UNISDR data

For certain countries in Africa the situation is much worse. In the five years between 2005-2009 a

total of only US$33.3 million was spent in seven conflict-affected countries combined – Burundi,

Chad, DRC, Sudan, Somalia, Uganda and Angola – while in those same years more than 17.5 million

people have been affected by natural disaster, especially drought. Of the US$6.4 billion spent in

Sudan in the past five years, only US$3.6 million has been spent on preparedness and prevention,

while over the same period nearly 5.5 million people have been affected. For these top 20

humanitarian recipient countries, for every US$100 spent on humanitarian assistance only 62 cents

has gone to disaster prevention and preparedness.

Preparedness funding within development aid

Preparedness funding US$ million

Disaster prevention and preparedness 454.6

Other humanitarian funding 73.7

Development funding 130.2

Total 658.5

Figure 8: Total disaster preparedness funding found within total ODA (2009). For detail on method and terminology applied in the search please see section on tracking data for preparedness, page 45. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD CRS data

Preparedness expenditure is not, however, only found within the specific humanitarian code used by

the DAC. Our detailed keyword search on all other expenditure beyond ‘disaster prevention and

1.9

0.2

0.5

47.4

11.6

11.1

5.5

4.2

3.5

0.7

0.6

0.5

0.3

9.3

16.5

8.8

3.6

11.4

15.6

11.9

30.0

1,602

2,585

6,081

1,996

1,454

0 200 400 600 800 1000 1200 1400 1600 1800 2000

Palestine/OPT (2)

Jordan (3)

Angola (4)

Iraq (5)

Sri Lanka (5)

Kenya (5)

Burundi (5)

Zimbabwe (5)

Somalia (5)

Liberia (5)

Lebanon (5)

Chad (5)

Serbia (5)

Average (5.5)

Ethiopia (6)

Uganda (6)

Sudan (6)

DRC (7)

Pakistan (8)

Afghanistan (8)

Indonesia (9)

US$ million

Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness Total remaining humanitarian

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preparedness’ has revealed a further US$203.9 million found in projects spanning 61 sectors, each of

which have an element of preparedness.

Figure 9: Disaster preparedness funding within total ODA, 2009. Note: sectors coloured red fall under humanitarian funding. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data

Disaster prevention and preparedness

69%

Emergency/distress relief 8%

Flood prevention/control

5%

Infectious disease control

3%

Relief coordination; protection and support

services 2%

Health policy & admin. management

2%

Civilian peacebuilding, conflict prevention and

resolution 2%

Reconstruction relief 1%

Agricultural extension 1%

Public sector policy and adm. management

1%

Remaining 51 sectors 6%

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The complexities of calculating conflict preparedness efforts

Recent disasters such as the Pakistan floods, Haiti earthquake or famine in the Horn of Africa have

led to renewed calls for more strategic investment in disaster preparedness and risk reduction

measures in humanitarian and development assistance programmes. Unfortunately, the issue of

conflict preparedness receives considerably less attention from donor governments.

This is despite the fact that the bulk of humanitarian assistance – about 65% in 2009 – was allocated

to a handful of countries that are considered fragile states, or in a “post-conflict” transition8. These

same countries also receive significant funding provided through ODA, stabilisation funds, or other

programmes. The OECD reports, for example, that in 2008, US$34.6 billion in ODA went to fragile

states, 31% of the total9. Add to this the presence of multilateral peacekeeping operations, with

costs estimated at US$7.1 billion in 2009, and the scale and dimension of funding allocated to

conflicts and fragile states becomes even higher.10

With these kinds of numbers, the argument for a more coherent and integrated approach to include

conflict preparedness in overall emergency preparedness efforts seems patently obvious. Yet the

debate is still in its infancy, making it difficult to develop a clear consensus on how to best approach

the issue.

Part of the problem is the absence of a clear international policy framework to orient conflict

preparedness activities – there is no equivalent of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) – and few

agencies have any direct mandate or experience in conflict preparedness. The UNDP’s Bureau for

Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) is one of the main actors in the field of conflict prevention,

managing a budget of US$153.8 million in 2009 to cover activities in 122 countries11, however little is

known about how much is actually spent on conflict preparedness. Its budget is a miniscule amount

compared to the UN Department of Peace Keeping Operations’ (DPKO) 2010-2011 operating budget

of US$7.3 billion (although it should be stated that some of this budget goes towards preparedness

and prevention activities). 12

Another considerable challenge, similar to the one that has been faced by disaster preparedness, is

that there is no clear definition of what constitutes conflict preparedness. As a recent OECD report

on transition financing points out “consensus on how to categorise transition activities is lacking.”

The report highlights “compartmentalised” aid architecture and artificial divisions between

humanitarian and development assistance, and “fragmentation between different funding

instruments” as some of the key barriers to a more effective approach. This is compounded by a lack

of reliable data or evidence base through which to compare the costs and benefits of conflict

preparedness to more complicated interventions aimed at protection of civilians, stabilising the

country, peacebuilding and supporting the transition to recovery and development. In effect, these

8 GHA Report 2011, p.55-56

9 http://www.oecd.org/document/13/0,3746,en_2649_33693550_45789965_1_1_1_1,00.html

10 These figures exclude military operations or expenditures reported for use of military assets in the delivery of

humanitarian assistance – a practice that is contrary to international guidelines that state costs should not be imputed as humanitarian funding. See: GHA Report 2011, p.55-56 11

http://www.undp.org/cpr/annualreports/2009/flash/home.html 12

http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/publications/yir/yir2010.pdf

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are exactly the same concerns as those raised about disaster preparedness, so on the surface at

least, there may be grounds for stronger alignment between the two areas.

The issue of how conflicts are conceptualised is also worthy of discussion. To date, most of the focus

on conflict situations has been on dealing with armed groups – for example, disarmament and

reintegration process, training of national police forces, promoting rule of law etc. These are all valid

efforts, and may contribute to better preparedness to minimise the potential for future conflicts.

But as Michele Bachelet, the Head of UN Women, recently argued, this is “a perpetrator-centred

paradigm of peacebuilding, not a peacebuilder-centered one” where civil society, and in particular

women, have a more inclusive role in conflict resolution, conflict early warning and community-led

processes to avoid, prevent, and when necessary respond to situations of conflict and violence.13

This last point is particularly important, as the nature of conflict has changed dramatically in recent

years. Rather than dealing with wars involving states or clearly organised non-state actors fighting

over political interests, the actors in conflict have become more fragmented, less motivated over

political issues and less inclined to engage with international actors. In Colombia and other

countries, for example, armed groups formerly demobilised under peace processes have now re-

emerged as armed gangs engaged in criminal activities, and violence has become endemic at the

community level.14 Yet the effects of that violence remain the same. Therefore, the international

community’s approach to conflict preparedness needs to adapt to this new reality, just as disaster

preparedness is gradually moving away from an almost exclusive focus on natural risks and hazards

towards a more nuanced view of risk drivers that contribute to disaster impacts.15

A final and important area of complexity to be considered in any attempt to integrate preparedness

for both conflict and disaster is the practical logistics, in relation to the role of preparedness in long-

term risk reduction. For disasters, considerable amounts of policy exists connecting preparedness to

long-term DRR, the HFA being a prime example. There are no such equivalents for conflict, which

link preparedness to long-term processes in such a uniform and well articulated manner. Conflict

prevention is discussed by donors and agencies but rarely includes preparedness. This suggests a

need firstly for much more examination of how conflict preparedness can be linked to longer-term

processes, and secondly for investigation into whether such processes are compatible with those

which already exist for disasters.

Perhaps the place to start is a more inclusive view of preparedness, as proposed by this study, to

focus on all types of emergencies, hazards and risks, including conflicts, and to focus on measures

that contribute to building capacity and resilience to minimise the effects of those risks. Under this

definition, many of the same interventions for disaster preparedness are equally relevant and

appropriate for conflict preparedness. This includes, for example, better tools to assess risks,

vulnerabilities and capacities, contingency planning, first aid training, early warning systems16, and

community-level preparedness measures, including knowledge and awareness of resources available

to communities facing a crisis.

13

http://www.unwomen.org/2011/09/un-women-executive-director-michelle-bachelet-keynote-speech-on-dag-hammarskjold%E2%80%99s-legacy/ 14

http://daraint.org/humanitarian-response-index/humanitarian-response-index-2010/response-to-crises/colombia/# 15

http://daraint.org/human-impact-of-climate-change/disaster-risk-reduction-initiative/ 16

It should be noted here that not all processes for disasters and conflict are the same. For example, early warning for cyclones is a very specific scientific process which has been developed through four decades of research.

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At the international level, it may be too early to begin an ambitious effort aimed at integrating

disaster and conflict, and preparedness financing and programming. However, there are some

incremental first steps that would go a long way towards achieving closer alignment. These might

include:

clearer consensus on definitions of preparedness measures, especially conflict

more consistent reporting on funding for preparedness, using internationally comparable

standards (such as OECD CRS and UN OCHA’s FTS)

better tools to assess multiple risks and hazards facing a country, and better integration of

this into programming

stronger evidence base built on the costs and benefits of preparedness as well as best

practice, to complement the examination of risks and needs at country level

less rigid compartmentalisation of funding streams and more flexibility to include

preparedness measures in all programming.

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Donor architecture17

The task before donors

It is fundamental that well integrated emergency preparedness ensures an effective response,

enables rapid recovery and helps increase resilience to all hazards, natural disasters as well as

conflicts and epidemics. This comprehensive approach is strongly supported by the literature, which

also suggests that emergency preparedness needs to be addressed holistically, recognising the

complexity from which humanitarian crises can arise18. For instance, a recent study by UNDP

concluded that disasters and conflict that happen at the same time intensify risk of future crises and

damage people’s lives which further undermines their coping capacities and increases their poverty

levels19. Similarly, one can expect that natural disasters that occur in conflict areas, already

characterised by weak institutions, can further reduce the ability of national governments and the

international community to effectively operate within the disaster management cycle. This interplay

between conflict and natural hazards is key; natural events such as drought may lead to or

exacerbate conflict whilst conflict can lead to a reduced capacity to deal with those events.

Consequently, it is essential that an emergency preparedness strategy encompass all risks and the

interaction between them.

The question asked in this section is whether or not donors follow a comprehensive approach? Are

they able or willing to fund one? Do they have adequate policies? Do they have the necessary

structure?

What does the data tell us about donor financing?

Figure 10: Breakdown of humanitarian aid by ten donors profiled, 2009 (US$ million). Development Initiatives based on OCED DAC data

17

It is clear from undertaking this study that the divisions in aid structure that inhibit adequate preparedness expenditure extend beyond donors to coordinating and implementing institutions and organisations. A separate section of this report (page 24) undertakes a review of the major global organisations and their work. However our ability to go into detail beyond this, such as the structures of the UN implementing agencies, NGOs and other organisations is limited in this study. 18

See: Disaster-Conflict Interface: Comparative Experiences; Conflict and Disaster and Climate Change and Security. 19

Disaster-Conflict Interface: Comparative Experiences

2

3

6

23

25

28

46

53

59

77

22

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Switzerland

Denmark

Canada

Sweden

Germany

Australia

Japan

UK

USA

EU

Norway

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid

Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Reported funding highlights immediately how different donors give a different priority to what is

termed disaster prevention and preparedness within the DAC database20. Of the ten donors

examined in this section only Japan in 2009 gave more than 10% of humanitarian financing to

preparedness, with Australia and Norway following at around 10%. Some donors appear to give very

low priority to preparedness, such as the United States and Switzerland, both providing only 1% of

their total humanitarian aid to this area in 2009. The US figure is particularly significant since this

means that only US$59 million of nearly US$4.4 billion (which accounts for more than 33% of all

governments’ humanitarian aid in 2009) went to preparedness.

Figure 11: The detailed profile of what is funded by donors within 'prevention and preparedness'. Note: this is drawn from DI’s examination of each project line and a bringing together of expenditures by core activity. It therefore does not correspond to a code or sub-code within the DAC CRS. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data.

When examining the reported funding levels in detail we see significant variations around what

donors report to the same code. In fact there is no clear pattern and no single programme activity

undertaken by all donors, except for ‘institutional capacity building.’ Some expenditure seems to be

misplaced, such as climate change or civil protection. Three donors report ‘conflict preparedness’ to

the disaster prevention and preparedness code, even though it is actually only intended for

disasters.

The reported data however, and even a detailed investigation within codes, which reveals both

significant differences in priority given to preparedness, as well as considerably different activities

being undertaken which donors class as preparedness, needs to be placed in the context of the

varying policies that exist.

The absence of conflict

An examination of all 11 donors’ preparedness policies reveals that none of them have a policy that

is capable of addressing short- as well as long-term complexities in an integrated and comprehensive

20

It should be noted that the data examined here is disaster prevention and preparedness as per the DAC database code. It does not include preparedness for conflict, for which no separate code exists in any part of the DAC database.

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

EU

UK

USA

Germany

Japan

Australia

Canada

Denmark

Sweden

Switzerland

Norway

Total

National and local capacity building Disaster Prevention and Preparedness Reconstruction and Recovery Broad DRR Early warning Institutional capacity building Prevention - conflict and natural disasters Livelihoods - Resilience Conflict preparedness Climate change adaptation Emergency Operations (response and management) Civil Protection

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manner i.e. one that also includes preparation for conflict (see the table below). Similarly, only one

donor has an emergency preparedness definition that is clearly their own. In most cases, donors

have adopted preparedness definitions exclusively within the context of natural disaster as defined

by the ISDR and as specified by priority 5 of the HFA.

The one exception is the emergency management policy described by USAID's Office of US Foreign

Disaster Assistance (OFDA) where preparedness includes a set of activities for conflict as well as

epidemic emergencies. However, within this policy there is no definition that addresses all the

specific risk factors in an integrated and comprehensive manner21. Of the ten donors considered in

detail in this study only the US and Canada appear to have implemented conflict preparedness

programmes in 2009. For instance, when analysing Canada’s emergency preparedness policies, it is

not apparent that it addresses conflict preparedness within a humanitarian aid context. However,

the data in the OECD DAC shows that at least one programme with these characteristics has been

financed in 2009. This is by no means an isolated case but rather one of many examples, which

reflects both inconsistencies among donor policies as well as reporting to the OECD DAC database.

Figure 12: Donor policy and financial mechanisms matrix. * Indicates donor has a conflict prevention strategy and

possibly has a conflict preparedness policy. **

Indicates a country has an emergency preparedness policy with substantial elements of disaster, pandemic and conflict preparedness, but not integrated a single coherent strategy.

21 For more details on USAID’s emergency preparedness activities see USAID Budget: OFDA.

22 CIDA funds pandemic preparedness through its Development Aid programmes, Key Development Challenges.

23 For more information see Germany’s Action Plan for Conflict Prevention

24 “The Initiative for Pandemic Preparedness is commissioned by the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation

and Development (BMZ). The Initiative collaborates closely with local German Technical Cooperation (GTZ) offices and international organisations.” Source: Strengthening pandemic preparedness in partner countries 25

The European Union’s mandate to ECHO *Regulation (CE) n° 1257/96] is to provide emergency assistance and relief to the victims of natural disasters or armed conflict outside the European Union. 26

Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC) engages in conflict prevention, but not in conflict preparedness. Source: Conflict prevention - A cooperation priority 27

Sweden’s International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) supports conflict prevention, but not conflict preparedness. Source: Peace and Security 28

AusAID funds both conflict and pandemic through development aid programmes. Sources: Pandemics and Emerging Infectious Disease Framework 2010-2015 and Conflict and Development Policy 29

Norway addresses pandemic preparedness in its policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises.

Donor Preparedness

definition

Funding mechanism Emergency preparedness policy

Own Adopted Hum.

Aid

Dev.

Aid

Other Integrated

All Risk Policy

Nat.

Disaster

Conflict Pandemic

HFA ISDR

Canada X Y Y Y Y X X Y Y Y22

USA**

Y Y Y Y Y Y X Y Y

Y

Japan X Y Y Y Y X X Y X*

X

United Kingdom X Y Y Y Y X X Y X* Y

Germany X Y Y Y Y Y X Y X*23

Y24

European Union X Y Y Y X X X Y X* X

25

Switzerland X Y Y Y X X X Y X* X

26

Sweden X Y Y Y X X X Y X* X

27

Australia X Y Y Y Y X X Y X* Y

28

Denmark X Y Y Y Y X X Y X* X

Norway X Y Y Y X X X Y X* Y

29

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Looking at some other examples of donor policies it is clear that despite the disparities many address

conflict prevention although the extent to which this includes conflict preparedness is unknown.

Germany works on conflict prevention within a climate change context, and is likely to engage in

conflict preparedness activities. However, it does not have a specific conflict preparedness policy30.

The disaster preparedness programme of the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department

(ECHO/DIPECHO) encompasses natural and man-made disasters (i.e. technological hazards, fires) but

excludes conflict.31 Nevertheless it is possible that ECHO engages in conflict preparedness through its

conflict prevention strategy. The UK is similarly likely to fund elements of conflict preparedness

through its policy focus on conflict prevention32. Denmark funds emergency preparedness from its

humanitarian and development aid as part of the new development policy strategy – freedom and

development. Conflict prevention is defined, but not conflict preparedness.33

Rising funding obscures issues

Nevertheless, despite these conflict-related issues, overall funding for the disaster part of

preparedness has seen reasonably significant increases since 2006. Since there is an overlap

between the natural disaster and conflict preparedness activities funded, donors can (and probably

do) use the same framework to address some aspects of humanitarian emergencies as a result of

conflict. For example, activities such as building community capacity, stockpiling of emergency

commodities and constructing internally displaced person (IDP)/refugee camps are among a number

of activities that are part of an effective response to both natural disaster and conflict emergencies.

However the evidence suggests that much of this increase is probably down to the positive impact

that the global DRR strategy set by the HFA has had on disaster preparedness policy strategies and

funding.

Clearly emergency preparedness associated with risk factors such as conflict and epidemic are not

being addressed either financially or strategically in an integrated manner34. The individual donor

analysis indicates that donors have separate policies and funding mechanisms to address all aspects

of emergency preparedness. It is this separation that largely leads to humanitarian financing being

30

Climate Change and Security Challenges for German Development Cooperation 31

ECHO - Humanitarian Aid and Disaster Preparedness 32

CHASE Operational Plan 2011-2015 33

Strategy for Denmark's Development Cooperation 34

Please refer to disaster and conflict complexity section, page 15.

What humanitarian donors say about their own policies

“Our funding is restricted to reactive life-saving policies.”

“We have the *preparedness+ needs but we don’t have the funding.”

“We have no discussion or coordination with development actors. There is no national policy.”

“Changes are taking place to allow preparedness to be funded from humanitarian budgets.”

“DRR is seen as a development issue but is addressed by us humanitarians.”

“Preparedness is for disasters mainly *in our policy+, not conflict.”

“DRR is spent by the development agency but the preparedness is under the humanitarian aid

division.”

“Bilateral funding to DRR comes from country budgets. Multilateral funding to GFDRR comes from

humanitarian budgets.”

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left responsible to fund preparedness activities. For example in 2009 80% of all funding for

emergency preparedness reported to the DAC (using a detailed examination of all projects reported

that year) was marked as humanitarian35. This in turn limits both the amount of funds available, and

probably the effectiveness and sustainability of preparedness programmes financed36.

This emphasis on using largely humanitarian funding to do preparedness programming and activities

is significant. Humanitarian funding is primarily set up to work in post-crisis environments, based on

the need to respond and thus prioritises shorter-term interventions. Therefore, does it have the

necessary structural flexibility to meet the needs of both long- and short-term preparedness

programming? This would appear to be an important obstacle towards a comprehensive and

integrated emergency preparedness policy. It reinforces our preliminary findings about the practical

choices donors make, which suggest that sometimes humanitarian donors fund preparedness

activities despite the system rather than because of it.

Elements of improved donor emergency preparedness

A summary of donor emergency preparedness policy and engagement is as follows:

funding for preparedness has increased since 2006, in part due to donor commitments to

support the HFA

the fact that reporting alternatives are poor help reinforce inadequate policies

there is wide disparity in priority and activities funded

humanitarian funds are financing preparedness, not development

policies on preparedness usually relate to disaster only.

conflict preparedness is rarely articulated, and when it is it is usually within the bounds of

‘prevention’; it is not clear what, if any, conflict preparedness activities are undertaken

reporting appears to be quite poor

donor engagement with preparedness is built on the bifurcated aid structure foundation.

A key question that underpins future developments in donor funding for emergency preparedness is

whether or not humanitarian financing is either ‘enough’ money or the ‘right kind’ of money for the

kind of preparedness programming that is envisioned for the purpose of bringing about real change.

35

It should be noted that it is possible for donors to, on the one hand, articulate internally certain funding as ‘development’ and yet report it as ‘humanitarian’ within the DAC, and vice versa. 36

See page 14 for details.

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Non-DAC donors and preparedness

Although this section of the report focuses on donors that are members of the OECD DAC, it is important

to highlight the contributions that ‘non-DAC donors’ (NDD), a group of donors that sits outside this

member group, can make to preparedness and the wider DRR agenda.

In 2010 NDD contributed US$622.5 million in humanitarian aid (as reported to UN OCHA’s FTS), an increase

of US67.2 million from 2009 figures. Saudi Arabia was the largest NDD, contributing US$255.9 million.

Top 10 Non-DAC donors in 2010

1. Saudi Arabia 255.9 6. India 36.5

2. Turkey 60.9 7. Brazil 28.9

3. Russian Federation 38.3 8. Thailand 11.7

4. United Arab Emirates 37.8 9. Mexico 10.7

5. China 37.6 10. Kuwait 10.6

Figure 13: Top 10 non-DAC donors of humanitarian aid, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS

Several NDDs already channel money through DRR-related funds, such as UNDPs Thematic Trust Fund for

Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF) and the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Risk Reduction of ISDR. In

2010 ten NDD channelled a total of US$9.2 million to the TTF-CPR and three contributed US$0.9 million to

ISDR. Brazil is the only NDD to contribute to GFDRR up until 2010, to a total of US$1.6 million. It has

pledged a further US$0.2 million for the period 2011-2012 along with Nigeria, a second NDD that has

pledged US$0.5 million. Brazil is also the largest NDD to the TTF CPR and ISDR.

These pooled funds along with others such as the Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and country

level emergency response funds (ERFs) also provide NDDs that do not have field presence or in-depth

country knowledge with an alternative channel for their funding. They also help to reduce the

administrative burden associated with bilateral funding.

Many of these NDDS are also focused on DRR at a national level, due to the risks posed by a range of

hazards. This knowledge and experience could be built upon by the international community and any

lesson learnt applied to other country contexts.

As many NDDs are already key actors in the humanitarian community and gaining prominence in relation

to DRR both internationally and at a national level, it is essential to ensure that they are involved in any

dialogue relating to the preparedness agenda. Only then will their potential as partners for assisting in a

more coherent and predictable approach to funding emergency preparedness be understood.

Information and excerpts are taken from the “Non-DAC donors and humanitarian aid” report produced by the

Global Humanitarian Assistance programme (GHA) http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/non-dac-

donors-and-humanitarian-aid-2.

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Institutional architecture Background

Major institutions have been established to champion disaster risk reduction (DRR), promote

engagement with key issues, advocate for its importance and for the need for change in policies, and

help obtain funding. At the same time, already existing institutions working across a wide range of

issues interconnected with DRR, including those directly responsible for the aftermath of poor

investment in this area, have evolved to contribute to the DRR agenda. This mix of new and evolving

institutions is key to understanding how gaps and duplications exist. This section takes into account

the fact that the institutional architecture did not develop from a tabula rasa but rather grew over

time into the complex interconnected picture we see now. (It should be made clear at the outset

that this is very much a preliminary review of the key institutions and their activities, based on

interviews with a few officials in each organisation, with a review of the existing documentation and

an analysis of funding. A more detailed examination is advocated for Phase II of this study).

The Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA), adopted in 2005, is a key force behind setting the current

DRR agenda. Its five priorities for action often form a fundamental basis for institutions’ strategic

approaches, with DRR and preparedness mainstreamed throughout policies, agencies and

programmes. This section will examine five major institutions involved in DRR and preparedness –

the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)37, UN International Strategy for

Disaster Reduction (ISDR)38, UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR)39, UN Office for

the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)40 and the International Federation of the Red Cross

(IFRC)41.

The following section consists of a matrix outlining each institution’s structure, role, partnerships,

mandate, country focus and key areas of work42.

37

http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/ 38

http://www.unisdr.org/ 39

http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/overview.html 40

http://www.unocha.org/ 41

http://www.ifrc.org/ 42

Please see Annex 2 for more detailed institutional profiles.

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Institutional structures matrix

GFDRR UNDP-BCPR UN OCHA UN-ISDR IFRC

Level Global/national. Global/national (supports country offices of UNDP).

Global/regional/national. Global/regional/national. Global/regional/national/ community.

Role To be main global forum for DRR; provide technical and financial assistance to mainstream DRR in national strategies.

To advance peace and development by strengthening capacities to prevent and recover from crisis.

To be main coordinator of humanitarian response.

To be UN focal point for DRR; create system of partnerships to generate support for global DRR movement.

To carry out relief operations assisting victims of disasters, as well as strengthen the capacities of national societies and enhance safety and resilience at community level.

Institutional partnerships

Managed by the World Bank. In partnership with ISDR system to support the HFA.

Managed by UNDP. Member of CADRI with OCHA and ISDR.

43 Partner of ISDR.

Member of CADRI with UNDP and ISDR. Partner of ISDR.

In partnership with GFDRR to support the HFA. Sits under the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs. Member of CADRI with OCHA and UNDP.

In partnership with ISDR, GFDRR, UN OCHA, DFID and ECHO.

Supports HFA All 5 priority areas.

All 5 priority areas.

Priority 5: strengthen disaster preparedness for effective response at all levels.

All 5 priorities of the HFA. Tasked with supporting the implementation of HFA.

All 5 priority areas.

Mandate “To mainstream DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA) in country development strategies by supporting a country-led and -managed implementation of the HFA.”

“Responsible for advancing peace and development by strengthening capacities of countries to prevent and recover from crisis and regenerating the well-being and livelihoods of those affected by natural disaster and armed violence.”

Resolution 46/182: “To strengthen the UN’s response to both complex emergencies and natural disasters”.

“To serve as the focal point in the UN system for the coordination of disaster reduction and to ensure synergies among disaster reduction activities.”

“To inspire, encourage, facilitate and promote at all times, all forms of humanitarian activities by national societies, with a view to preventing and alleviating human suffering.”

Country focus

20 priority low-income countries most at risk to

86 countries, 100 country offices.

All countries in humanitarian crisis.

Coordination with various partners around the world,

Present through network of 186 national societies.

43

Capacity for Disaster Reduction Initiative, CADRI, brings together three core organisations - OCHA, ISDR Secretariat and UNDP – in a collaborative mission to ‘deliver as one’ on DRR: http://www.cadri.net/

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GFDRR UNDP-BCPR UN OCHA UN-ISDR IFRC

multiple natural hazards plus additional 11 countries.

44 The multi-

donor trust funds retain 20% that is open to any country.

representing numerous countries. Seven global offices.

Key focus areas for preparedness and DRR

Track I: Global and Regional Partnerships Track II: Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) in Development Track III: Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF) for Accelerated Disaster Recovery.

45

1. Conflict prevention 2. Crisis governance and

rule of law 3. DRR and Climate Risk

Management 4. Women in conflict,

prevention, peacebuilding and recovery

5. Immediate crisis response

6. Livelihoods and Economic Recovery.

46

1. OCHA's internal response capacity

2. The capability of the humanitarian coordination system's in-country members to make a coordinated emergency response

3. The capacity of national authorities and regional organisations to request/mobilise international humanitarian assistance - effectively utilise the in-country humanitarian coordination system.

47

Objective 1: DRR accepted and applied for climate change adaption Objective 2: Measurable increase in investments in DRR Objective 3: Disaster-resilient cities, schools and hospital Objective 4: Strengthened international system for DRR.

Disaster preparedness and

mainstreaming DRR should be

prioritised and integrated into all

IFRC and programmes.

Three core components of preparing for disasters:

48

1. Mitigation/prevention, Risk reduction fully integrated into sustainable development planning

1. Vulnerability and Capacity Assessments

2. Disaster preparedness for response.

Pooled funds Multi donor trust fund (MDTF).

Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR TTF).

Various humanitarian pooled funds – none specific to preparedness and DRR.

United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction.

Disaster Relief Emergency Fund (DREF) and global appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction.

Conflict preparedness

No Perhaps through work on conflict prevention, though not clear.

Not clearly articulated though clearly conflict-affected countries are part of their core caseload.

No Maybe

44

List of countries: http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/GFDRR_Partnership_Strategy_2009-2012.pdf 45

http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/56 46

http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas.html 47

http://www.unocha.org/what-we-do/coordination/preparedness/overview 48

http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/preparing-for-disaster/

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Funding

There has been an increase in funding to a number of institutions working on DRR and preparedness,

although funding levels vary significantly. Financial support to UNISDR increased from US$2.1 million

in 2000 to US$28.6 million in 2010 and funding to UNDP’s BCPR has nearly doubled from US$84.9

million in 2001 to US$156.7 million in 2010. BCPR total expenditure on the DRR and recovery

category increased from US$2.7 million in 2004 to US$25 million in 2010. Over the period of 2004 to

2009 it is reported that early warning and preparedness activities accounted for 4.5% of total UNDP

expenditure (US$866 million) in the area of disaster prevention and recovery (this includes

expenditure through BCPR).

GFDRR has different reporting periods but funding doubled from US$43.8 million in the period 2006-

2008 to US$88.1 million in 2010-2011. IFRC’s total expenditure on DRR increased from CHF68.1

million in 2009 to CHF88.1 million in 2010.

This increase demonstrates some growing donor support to DRR and preparedness activities,

although total funds to the institutions are still dwarfed by funding to humanitarian crisis, for

example, which was estimated at US$16.7 billion in 2010.49

Institution (US$m) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Total

UNISDR funding 2.1 0.8 3.7 3.6 9.1 17.9 15.0 21.0 28.9 15.5 27.1 146.1

UNDP expenditure on disaster

prevention & recovery

52.9 150.8 180.0 152.9 143.5 186.1 - 866.2

UNDP BCPR

Total funding to BCPR 0 84.9 119.1 128.8 170.9 248.4 115.9 151.2 138.4 127.1 156.7 1,441.4

Contributions to CPR TTF 0 84.9 119.1 128.8 170.9 248.4 115.9 99.2 86.4 73.1 105.1 1,231.8

Allocations received from

UNDPs regular resources

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.0 52.0 54.0 51.6 209.6

Total DRR & recovery

expenditure

0 0 0 0 2.7 55.5 20.1 10.6 20.0 15.9 25.0 149.8

Expenditure of CPR TTF – DRR

and recovery window

2.7 55.5 20.1 10.6 12.8 10.6 17.1 129.5

Expenditure by fund category

of regular resources – DRR

and recovery

7.2 5.3 7.8 20.3

Figure 14: Institutional funding for DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on institutional annual reports50

It should be noted that it is difficult to understand exactly which activities have been undertaken and

whether or not they fell within preparedness or wider DRR.

49

GHA Report 2011 http://www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/report/gha-report-2011 50

For more financial information on UNDP please see Evaluation of UNDP Contribution to Disaster Prevention and Recovery http://erc.undp.org/evaluationadmin/downloaddocument.html?docid=4397

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Figure 15: Contributions to GFDRR, 2006-2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data

0 20 40 60 80 100

2006-2008

2008-2010

2010-2011

World Vision: An example of NGO Preparedness

World Vision (WV) addresses preparedness through a dedicated disaster management policy. This policy

places emphasis on working in partnerships and collaborations, and increasing quality and accountability

to complement technical capacity and assistance that WV provides from early warning, preparedness,

mitigation, response, recovery, and transition. Closely connected to these aspects of WV work is disaster

risk reduction (DRR).

WV has in place preparedness standards which address the period leading up to the declaration of a

disaster. They apply to all WV offices and are considered requirements for ‘normal operations’ even

when no disaster is occurring or anticipated. These clarify where responsibility for implementing each

standard lies. They have been updated recently to reflect what WV has learnt in the last ten years.

In the last decade, WV has invested in preparedness by expanding offices for strategy and quality

assurance, which increase the quality of preparedness through organisational learning, better policy

analysis, development of standards and management systems, initiatives to increase downwards

accountability, and improved quality of the preparedness systems.

Some of WV’s preparedness mechanisms are as follows.

A worldwide logistics network with three global hubs and regional warehouses near areas prone to

emergencies. Relief supplies and equipment are maintained in a constant state of readiness to

enable WV to respond to up to three major disasters at the same time.

The Partnership Emergency Preparedness and Response Fund (EPRF) which enables preparation for

and response to emergencies. The EPRF has inherent fund recovery and replenishment mechanisms

rather than being simply a discretionary fund which provides grants, as it is usually approved within

48 hours.

WV National Emergency Preparedness and Response Fund (NEPRF) may be utilised for

preparedness, pre-positioning and rapid response activities and can be used to fund responses to

any emergency. Each national office will determine the size of its NEPRF depending on individual

country vulnerabilities. It can be funded from a variety of sources including funding from long-term

development resources. As the NEPRF is managed locally by senior national office staff,

disbursements can be made without delay.

The Global Rapid Response Team (GRRT) is a group of highly skilled professional relief practitioners

from within the WV Partnership who can be mobilised in teams at short notice.

Most of WV preparedness activities are funded from a variety of sources such as private donors,

government grants and corporate funding.

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Institutional issues: a preliminary analysis

Preliminary conversations with key stakeholders both within and outside of these organisations as

well as an examination of their policies and interrelated work has suggested that there are areas

that need to be investigated further, and that there are perhaps illogicalities, gaps and duplications

that need to be addressed.

There does appear to be some top level duplication with regards to who is in the lead globally51. All

of the institutions have committed to implement the HFA in their strategies for DRR and

preparedness. However all but one of the institutions (OCHA) state that they work in all five of the

areas for the HFA and it is not clear whether there is a delineation of duties or responsibilities to

deliver either between themselves or within the five objectives of the HFA itself. Of those

institutions, BCPR and GFDRR state that they work operationally52 at a global level, but there does

not appear to be clear designation of what each of their roles should be, in which areas they take the

lead or otherwise. This appears to be replicated at a country level where World Bank and UNDP

country offices undertake activities to support national governments in areas such as mainstreaming

DRR in their development strategies, but it is not clear who does what and where. This appears to be

further complicated in those countries where OCHA is present, where it also supports governments

to build national capacity. Interestingly, one member of these institutions suggested that in this area

it was not duplication but gaps that are the main issue, especially at country level; due to the fact

that there is no clear lead and no clear prioritisation, whether or not countries with preparedness

needs will receive the necessary focus is largely unpredictable.

There have been visible efforts to join up coordination. For example, the Capacity for Disaster

Reduction Initiative (CADRI) brings three UN organisations, OCHA, UNDP and ISDR, together at a

global and country level “in a collaborative mission to ‘deliver as one’ on disaster risk reduction.”53

There has been direct cooperation between the World Bank and the UN to jointly engage in DRR and

preparedness, for example GFDRR (World Bank) and ISDR (UN) have agreed to jointly support HFA

implementation and this joint work has been recognised by other stakeholders as an important step

in partnership development and coordination. GFDRR’s Track I currently finances ISDR (tapping a

separate World Bank internal funding source, rather than the GFDRR multi-donor trust fund) with

the aim of promoting global and regional partnerships, and the World Bank is the second largest

donor to ISDR. This partnership is particularly important as it links an operational institution with a

coordinator at a global level. However there are clearly improvements to be made. The OCHA 2009

meta-evaluation, for example, whilst acknowledging the importance of the organisation ensuring

that DRR and preparedness are elements of its strategy, highlights a lack of connections between

OCHA and UNDP, and OCHA and ISDR54.

All of these institutions claim that they work in conflict-affected areas in one way or another, with

OCHA and IFRC having a particularly strong country-level focus. However, it is not evident from

51

One element of the structure of coordinating work on DRR and preparedness that does not seem appropriate is the reporting line of the head of ISDR to the ERC. With ISDR dealing with long-term DRR (as well as preparedness) and OCHA more concerned in that part of preparedness closest to humanitarian need, it does seem to be incorrect. However in this phase of the report there is no time to go beyond a bald presentation of the issue, not how it works in practice and what the alternatives might be. 52

Finances or carries out projects at a global and country level. 53

http://www.cadri.net/ 54

http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OCHA_Meta-evaluation_Final_Report.pdf

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reviewing their policy whether or not they carry out specific conflict preparedness activities. This is

almost certainly due to the fact that disaster preparedness has profile, clear leadership and

consistent policies whilst conflict preparedness still requires more detailed articulation.

Greater transparency and visibility of exactly what is being done by each organisation on

preparedness could provide clarity of information and reduce duplications, whilst also highlighting

gaps. One donor interviewed stated that time had been spent trying to understand what was being

done by who globally, but the information was either fragmented or did not exist. This would

suggest that meeting HFA objectives is going to be challenging at the very least, but could also lead

to inefficiencies of expenditure. Some institutions have made a considerable effort to measure the

results of DRR and preparedness financing and make that information transparent. The GFDRR has

set up a Result Based Management System (RBMS) and is operationalising a new results

framework,55 whilst an outcome from UN ISDR’s evaluation was that it lacks systematic monitoring

and evaluation. The institution is addressing this by developing and implementing an RBMS.

In summary, whilst it is acknowledged in this study that the work to examine institutions is only

preliminary at this stage, it is evident that there are issues to be addressed. Specific actions and

individual activities have not been clearly delegated to relevant institutions, and organisations with

the greatest knowledge and expertise are perhaps not leading in the specific areas where they

would be best placed to do so. The Nepal Consortium56, whilst not without challenges, has

designated key institutions to lead those flagship areas most relevant to their work, while linking

them to a single coordinator for all of the work. As things stand, with the current institutional

architecture, both globally and at country level, there does not seem to be a clear segmentation of

roles and responsibilities for delivering on the HFA.

55

http://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/44) 56

See page 51.

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The private sector and emergency preparedness

The private sector is mentioned by many actors as a key player, actual or potential, with regard to

emergency preparedness. Whilst there is not enough time to go into detail on private sector activities in

this phase of the study, some key facts are highlighted here, indicating scope and scale of private sector

involvement in preparedness to date.

Funding financial mechanisms: it is not only government that is able to donate to pooled funds. In recent

years the private sector has utilised these funds to channel contributions; however these are general

contributions and only the funding for the UNDP CPR-TTF may have been expended on preparedness

activities.

In 2010 a total of seven private organisations channelled US$0.4 million through the Haiti ERF. A

further number of individuals and smaller unspecified organisations donated US$0.3 million.

Foundations, private individuals and individual organisations such as the UAE Red Crescent have

contributed to the CERF. By 2010 there were 22 private sector donors providing contributions of

over US$10,000 to the fund. The amount received reached US$4.4 million (1.2% of the total).

UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF) receives funding from

private sector donors. In 2010 this amounted to US$1 million.

Funding Haiti: after the 2010 earthquake the private sector contributed considerable amounts of money

in response to the earthquake. The figures below (covering the period January 2010 to May 2011) reveal

sizeable contributions, but these are all for response:

total humanitarian aid (from all donors): US$3.9 billion, (with US$20.2 million for DRR)

private sector humanitarian aid: US$959 million, (with no funds for preparedness)

total number of private sector companies, corporations, foundations contributing: 447, of which

343 included a cash component.

Partnership development is a key component.

OCHA facilitates partnerships between operational agencies and private companies wishing to

complement existing mechanisms and disaster response tools. A website provides orientation to

businesses on how to contribute to relief efforts. OCHA is active with the Disaster Resource Network,

a World Economic Forum initiative to grant expertise and equipment to humanitarian organisations.

It also collaborates with companies such as Ericsson which provides deployment of communications

solutions and skills. OCHA has a partnership with PricewaterhouseCoopers, offering pro bono

services for accountability and transparency.

ISDR works with members of the private sector through its private sector advisory group. There are

currently 13 members who represent companies that are ‘taking the lead in ensuring the safety of

long-term investments and planning ahead to protect industry and society from disasters, economic

disruptions, while ensuring business continuity’.

BCPR receives funding from the private sector and UNDP has a private sector strategy that provides

a framework for UNDP private sector interventions at global, regional and country office levels.

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Consolidated appeals process (CAP) This section of the report examines the possibility of using the United Nations consolidated appeals

process (CAP) for better engagement and articulation of emergency preparedness,57 including

investigating the potential for standing sections within humanitarian action plans dedicated to

preparedness.

Introduction

The UN-led CAP is a strategic planning tool with the overall goal of supporting a collective

humanitarian response to crises with rational and equitable coverage.

The CAP cycle includes:

strategic planning leading to a Humanitarian Action Plan (HAP)

resource mobilisation (leading to a consolidated appeal or a flash appeal)

coordinated programme implementation

joint monitoring and evaluation

revision, if necessary; and

reporting on results.58

Consolidated appeals include projected activities for the following year where the needs are

relatively predictable. Flash appeals are a rapid strategic and fundraising tool based on immediately

identified needs following sudden onset disasters. These appeals often cover only the first three to

six months of a new emergency.

The volume of humanitarian financing flowing through the UN CAP has grown from US$1.1 billion in

2000 to US$7.1 billion by 2010. Moreover, the CAP is a key tool for informing donor financing

decisions and therefore engaging with the UN CAP process to promote more strategic emphasis on

financing for preparedness is an opportunity that cannot be overlooked.

Opportunities and challenges

There are a number of pragmatic advantages in using the CAP to promote funding of preparedness

as a strategic priority. Not least, the CAP is well established and many donors rely on the analysis

and prioritisation within the CAP to inform their funding allocations. This is particularly important for

donors who have limited capacity for in-house situation analysis, including non-traditional and

smaller donors.

Whereas the focus of much preparedness and DRR funding is on natural disasters, the overwhelming

majority of funding within the UN CAP flows to complex emergencies, many of which are conflict-

affected. All but four of the 17 or 18 countries being considered for a consolidated appeal in 2012

have conflict as a key driver of humanitarian need. Consolidated appeals therefore provide potential

opportunities to pursue a more coordinated response to preparedness in conflict-affected crises.

57

The use of the CAP to encourage engagement with preparedness issues and investment has already been examined in some detail by Humanitarian Outcomes (on behalf of the Norwegian Government) in investigating the possibility of establishing a thematic CAP for disaster preparedness, and many of the main advantages or disadvantages have already been discussed. These are included in this summary and added to where appropriate with examples specifically connected to the use of the CHAP/CAP processes. 58

http://www.reliefweb.int/glossary/pageloader.aspx?lista=C

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Given that most consolidated appeals take place in chronic crises, where needs can often be

anticipated, it is not surprising that despite limited attention to DRR and preparedness in the official

consolidated appeals guidance,59 many appeals do already include preparedness projects, and in

some cases preparedness is identified as a strategic priority. This is a prime example of actors on the

ground being ahead of policy development.

In the 2011 humanitarian appeal, preparedness is mentioned 18 times and two of the 18 appeals

(Djibouti and West Africa) have sectors entitled ‘Emergency Preparedness and Response.’60 These

are for preparedness activities usually focused on coordination, logistics, working with government

crisis management agencies etc. At the same time a degree of preparedness mainstreaming is

evident. In the 2011 CAP for example, projects are spread across most sectors with health and

nutrition (23 projects), and water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) (13 projects) being the sectors

where the need for emergency preparedness is most clearly articulated.

Figure 16: Preparedness projects within the 2011 consolidated appeal mid-year review, using search terms developed to

track preparedness expenditures in FTS. See page 45 for details. Source: Development Initiatives using OCHA FTS data

Mainstreaming thematic priorities however poses problems from the perspective of tracking

investments. We were able to manually identify 74 projects in the 2011 CAP that fall either fully or

partly into emergency preparedness, but clearly this sort of approach to tracking preparedness is

unsatisfactory and unsustainable.

59

The guidance note of 2012 has only two references in the entire document, one suggesting it as a possible strategic objective and the other in reference to when the Humanitarian Dashboard triggered. 60

Activities within these sectors include disaster management, logistics hubs, capacity development for humanitarian responders, national response capacity enhancement and health emergency preparedness.

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Yet there is no obvious barrier to introducing new procedures and guidance to the CAP. Despite

being a relatively new concept, early recovery is now firmly mainstreamed within the CAP process,

with a section on how to programme early recovery within the CAP, and a standalone document

agreed by the CAP SWG that provides the necessary detail for humanitarian country teams (HCTs) to

programme early recovery. Similarly, a gender marker was introduced in 2011. The impact of the

gender marker on the funding priority gender receives is worth paying close attention to. The

introduction of a preparedness marker would improve traceability of preparedness funding and give

greater visibility to preparedness as a strategic priority at the global level.

There are also opportunities to improve the emphasis and priority given to preparedness within

appeals at the national planning level. In practice, appeals are relatively heterogeneous in the way

processes are organised and priorities set at the national level, and humanitarian coordinators have

considerable latitude. This provides important opportunities for alignment and coordination with

structures and actors at the national level – including national disaster management platforms and

UN Development Assistance Frameworks (UNDAF). The extent to which this is possible may be

limited by the capacity of domestic actors and the stage of evolution of disaster management

structures and plans, however, it is an area in which the global CAP, OCHA and resident and

humanitarian coordinators could afford much greater priority and leadership.

Innovation and good practice are already evident at the country level, and this could be shared and

replicated.

The Somalia HAP incorporates the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) system, which enables clear

benchmarked statements about the severity and scale of food security and livelihoods needs, and

the necessary humanitarian response - including strategic mitigating responses as well as functioning

as a crisis early warning mechanism.

The DRC 2011 HAP included regional rankings against four humanitarian risk factors (natural hazard,

armed conflict, displacement and epidemic), which were considered alongside vulnerability,

response capacities and needs analysis to inform regional CAP priorities.

These two examples represent an important shift in thinking about the starting point of

humanitarian problem analysis and the phasing of humanitarian intervention in a crisis. Shifting the

conceptual framing of humanitarian problems to consider the risk, likelihood and likely impact of

potential crisis as opposed to manifest humanitarian need could have a powerful effect in raising

preparedness and mitigating action higher in the list of funding priorities.

Where preparedness is identified as an important priority within some humanitarian action plans,

country-level pooled humanitarian funds (emergency response funds and common humanitarian

funds) provide humanitarian coordinators with powerful tools to direct humanitarian financing in

support of these priorities. In some cases these funds are already being used to channel financing to

preparedness activities.61

However, the CAP also has inherent structural limitations which mean that it can only provide a

partial contribution to a complex problem. For example, the CAP has limited coverage in global

61

For more information see page 34

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terms. Some major recipients of humanitarian assistance opt not to participate,62 while other crises

may not be considered of sufficient scale or severity to warrant an appeal. This, by default, excludes

many countries with chronic needs which hover below emergency thresholds but which are acutely

vulnerable to shocks and would be ideal candidates for investing in preparedness.

CAP appeals are not inclusive of all actors who have a stake in humanitarian preparedness and

response. The IFRC and International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are not part of the CAP, and

they have their own emergency and annual appeal process. There is no requirement in CAP appeals

to include national stakeholders in planning and prioritisation, which has been highlighted by the

IASC Principals and others as an essential element of better emergency preparedness.

Successful preparedness requires multi-annual funding commitments and planning. It is likely that

programmes requiring longer-term financing would be marginalised within a competitive

prioritisation process that often privileges short-term humanitarian outcomes and which is

predicated on, at most, a one year planning cycle.

The heterogeneous nature of the CAP, with devolved responsibility for situation analysis and

prioritisation, generates a great deal of variation in quality and emphasis. While some appeals move

towards shifting assessment and intervention paradigms towards analysing risk, vulnerability and

promoting mitigating early action, the UN acknowledges that ‘inter-sectoral needs analysis remains a

challenge for most CAPs’63, and there seems to be little investment or drive at present to support

country teams to replicate this good practice.

There remain no clear guidelines, no clear roles and responsibilities and no clear champion for

preparedness within the CAP at a global or national level, and while there are a number of

opportunities to advance the articulation of preparedness within the CAP, the impact of this is

limited by the inbuilt limitations in the coverage and influence of the CAP on donor behaviour.64

Therefore, changes within the CAP should be seen as a necessary but not sufficient part of the

solution.

Our recommendations for these changes include:

that work is undertaken to place emergency preparedness as a specific element within the

CAP, including within the guidance note and in supporting material that provides definitions

of terminology and stipulates reporting practices

that the possibility of using a marker for tracking levels of preparedness funding within

individual projects within the CAP should be examined

that a decision is taken to make a single institution responsible for articulating, presenting,

and developing policy on emergency preparedness within the CAP, both at a global and

country level

that emergency preparedness is integrated as a core component of work underway within

the CAP SWG to make the CAP more strategic

that setting a certain target for minimum preparedness expenditure is considered.

62

Ethiopia, for example, received US$4.8 billion of humanitarian assistance between 2000 and 2009 and has had no formal CAP appeal. 63 UN Humanitarian Appeal 2011, http://ochaonline.un.org/cap2006/webpage.asp?Page=1911 64

The consolidated appeals in Somalia, Kenya and Djibouti in 2011 anticipated and called for funding to enable early preventive action, which was met with a disappointing funding response until the situation escalated into a major crisis.

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It should not be forgotten that work in encouraging preparedness investments through the CAP will

only be a part of the overall requirements; above all there needs to be a way of connecting greater

investment in emergency preparedness through the CAP to longer-term processes, which in the

context of the UN implies connection to the UNDAF at the very least.

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Financing architecture

Pooled funds

Pooled funds are now a significant tool of the aid system. Whether for humanitarian, development

or environmental assistance, they provide donors with the opportunity to pool their financial

resources, sharing risk, reducing overall costs and allocating funds based on an overall strategy. They

also allow for coordinated, coherent and flexible action to address identified needs or priorities at

either a global or national level. Yet these funds vary greatly in size, have different mandates, use

different implementing agencies, are managed by different institutions and have several advantages

and disadvantages one over the other.

Policy and data analysis of pooled funds currently in use

There is currently no one financing mechanism that attracts resources solely required for addressing

the need of a country or system to prepare for an emergency. With this in mind DI has researched

nine funds that are currently in operation, three of which are humanitarian, three which have a DRR

focus and three a climate change focus, to analyse their current structures and policies, and identify

whether they can be used to channel more money for emergency preparedness.

The funds that have been analysed include:

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

Common humanitarian funds (CHFs)

Emergency response funds (ERFs)

UNDP Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) Thematic Trust Fund (CPR-TTF)

United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)

The Least Developed Countries Fund (LDCF) of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)

Strategic Climate Funds (SCFs)

The Adaptation Fund.

In addition to these nine funds DI has also revisited the idea put forward in a previous study carried

out by Humanitarian Outcomes that suggests using the model of the Global Fund to create a new

mechanism to finance emergency preparedness and DRR activities (see page 67).

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Humanitarian Development Climate change adaptation

Fund CERF CHF ERF CPR-TTF GFDRR UN-TFDR LDCF (GEF)* SCF Adaptation fund

Full name of fund Central Emergency Response Fund

Common humanitarian fund

Emergency response fund

Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (ISDR)

Least Developed Countries Fund

Strategic Climate Fund

The Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund

Coverage Global National National Global/national Global/national Global Global Global Global

Support to CAPs Yes Yes No No No No No No No

Donors DAC Non-DAC Private sector

DAC DAC Non-DAC

DAC Non-DAC Private sector Organisations

DAC Non-DAC Organisations

DAC, Non-DAC, IFIs, Private sector Organisations

DAC Non-DAC

DAC DAC Non-DAC

Implementing agencies

UN agencies UN agencies NGOs

UN agencies NGOs

Governments NGOs

Governments UN agencies NGOs

- UN agencies and IFIs

AfDB, AsDB, EBRD, IDB, WB

National entities UN agencies World Bank

Specific to DRR No No No Partly Yes Yes No No No

Mandate Humanitarian Humanitarian Humanitarian Development Development Development Climate change

Climate change

Climate change

Managed by OCHA OCHA OCHA UNDP World Bank ISDR GEF SCF GEF

Financially administered by

UNDP UNDP UNDP UNDP World Bank ISDR World Bank World Bank World Bank

Main activities Emergency Response

Planned response

Emergency response

Prevention, response, recovery

Risk reduction, recovery, adaptation

Risk reduction Mitigation and climate change adaptation

Mitigation and climate change adaptation

Climate change adaptation

Priority countries No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No No

Timeframe 2006-2011 2006-2011 1998-2011 2000-2011 2006-2011 2000-2011 2006-2011 2008-2011 2009-2011

Size (US$m) 2006-2010

1,957 1,346 431 466 147 approx. 106 254 (2002 to March 2011)

1,150 (to May 2011)

86

Figure 17: Characteristics of funds. Note: At the time of writing GFDRR is administering a consultative process to develop a strategic approach to include and serve civil society organisations. Source: Development Initiatives based on various sources - information up to 2010

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Humanitarian funds

Of the three humanitarian funds analysed only the country-level mechanisms have channelled

money to preparedness activities; at present the global CERF does not have the ability to go beyond

its emergency response mandate and some of those donors that fund this mechanism would prefer

that it did not. At a country level there is an ongoing debate as to whether the CERF should expand

to fund emergency preparedness especially in contexts such as Somalia where humanitarian funding

makes up a large proportion of the country’s aid.

The four country-level CHFs in operation attract a large amount of donor support, US$261 million in

2010, nevertheless only two of these funds, Sudan and DRC, reported spending on preparedness

activities amounting to a very modest 0.9% (or US$1.8 million) of the total disbursed (US$203.5

million) that year. So far in 2011 the CHF in both Somalia and South Sudan have reported to have

spent 2.1% and 3.8% respectively on preparedness. The activities financed have concentrated on

institutional preparedness and the capacity of clusters and agencies to respond. The CHFs fund

planned humanitarian response for the following year based on strategic planning and identification

of needs that includes an element of risk analysis, the likely event of an emergency occurring and

therefore addressing the need to prepare for that emergency. It is perhaps surprising therefore that

the CHFs have supported very few emergency preparedness activities to date, especially in countries

that are at risk of natural disasters and affected by conflict. Perhaps the level of funding for

emergency preparedness from CHFs could be increased and more money directed to strengthening

community preparedness capacity in these conflict-affected contexts; this could go some way to

reducing the need for the same level of response in the future. A more detailed investigation of this

possibility is needed at the country level.

ERFs are much smaller in scale; the 14 funds combined attracted US$164 million in 2010, the

majority of which went to Haiti and Pakistan following the emergencies. Despite the emergency

response mandate of the ERFs and their short-term funding period of up to six months, several have

disbursed funds to emergency preparedness projects. In 2009 the ERFs in Somalia and Zimbabwe

spent 5.9% and 2.9% respectively on emergency preparedness out of the total money allocated in

country. In 2010 the fund in Kenya spent 20% of its budget on flood preparedness, one of only four

projects funded that year. The ERFs could continue to fund emergency preparedness where possible,

however their small-scale and short-term funding will not allow them to address all the long-term

needs in country.

DRR-focused funds

The UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (UN-TFDR) is not an operational fund; it finances ISDR

which is mandated to coordinate DRR at a global level and ensure synergies between actions to

address disaster risk. As a result it does not fund the implementation of emergency preparedness

activities at a national level, although it does support the creation of national platforms that aim to

coordinate the implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA). An element of its

expenditure could be seen as supporting institutional preparedness through the strengthening of the

international system, strategic objective four and the dissemination of information, however it is not

possible to ascertain exactly what amount is spent on preparedness specifically.

UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF) is well supported with

over an average of US$100 million in contributions since 2001. It is not mandated to finance DRR

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alone, though one of its five funding windows focuses on DRR and recovery relating to the HFA five

priority areas. The fund does not only address risk due to natural disasters but also funds conflict

prevention. Although it is a global fund it finances DRR operations at a national level that address

community and national emergency preparedness through contingency planning, establishing early

warning systems and creating policy frameworks. Of the five windows, the one for DRR and recovery

had the third highest expenditure between 2007 and 2010, US$51.2 million (12.3% of total),

although the amount that was spent on emergency preparedness alone is not available in the annual

reports. Information gathered from an evaluation of UNDPs contribution to disaster prevention and

recovery suggests that between 2004 and 2009 US$35.6 million was spent on emergency

preparedness projects, which accounted for 4.1% of the total US$866 million spent on disaster

prevention and recovery over that period.

The Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) is the only operational65 fund that is

solely focused on DRR. Around 70% of its funding comes from humanitarian aid budgets. It is

managed by the World Bank at a global and national level with the aim of mainstreaming DRR and

climate change adaptation within a country’s development plan. In order to achieve this it relies on

working with national governments to address risk from natural disasters - it does not address

conflict but does operate in conflict-affected countries. It has received almost US$150 million since

its inception in 2006, which includes contributions from both DAC and non-DAC donors, and has

received pledges of the same amount for the next three years. Track II of the fund allocates money

to 20 priority countries deemed to be most at risk to disasters plus 11 donor earmarked countries.

The fund aims to address all the priority areas of the HFA including preparedness, and its

expenditures are broken down to reflect this. Up until September 2010, US$13 million had been

spent on priority area 5, disaster preparedness. This accounted for 14.5% of the total.

Climate change adaptation funds

The Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) is focused on mitigation and climate change adaptation

and is one of the funds managed by the Global Environment Facility (GEF). The primary objective of

this fund is to address the adaptation needs of the 49 least developed countries as identified by the

UN66. A reduction in vulnerability is sought through the implementation of National Adaptation

Programmes of Action (NAPAs) which supports the countries to become climate resilient. Once

these programmes are in place the fund supports different sectors to ensure resilience. A holistic

approach is taken addressing prevention, mitigation and preparedness. As a result 29% of the total

expenditure of the fund since 2001 has reportedly been spent on disaster preparedness and risk

management activities, the largest share of funding.

The Strategic Climate Fund (SCF), a relatively new fund created in 2008, is one of two funds within

the Climate Investment Funds (CIF). One of the focus areas of the fund is the Pilot Programme for

Climate Resilience (PPCR) which provides funding to multilateral development banks to pilot ways in

which climate risk and resilience can be integrated into development planning and implementation.

Pilots that are successful can then be scaled up. As the focus of the fund is on climate resilience it

could be said that this will include DRR and emergency preparedness activities, however it is difficult

to ascertain specific funding levels for these areas. One example that can be provided is a

65

Finances or carries out projects at a global and country level. 66

For a list of these countries please visit: http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641&lang=1

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Hydrometeorology Modernisation project in Tajikistan. This will include “the improvement of the

forecasting, warning, operational response and early warning system of the Committee for

Emergency Situations”67 which can be deemed to sit partly within emergency preparedness.

Nevertheless, of the US$7 million that the PPCR has approved for the project, it is not known how

much will be spent on this emergency preparedness component.

The Adaptation Fund is also managed by the GEF and was operationalised in 2009. It provides

financing to projects that contribute to reducing the adverse affects of climate change, to developing

countries that are Parties to the Kyoto Protocol. Unlike the other funds analysed, the Adaptation

Fund does not rely on donor contributions alone. It receives a large proportion of its income through

the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) that allows emission-reduction projects in developing

countries to earn Certified Emission Reduction (CER) credits, each equivalent to one tonne of CO2.

These CERs can be traded and sold, and used by industrialised countries to meet part of their

emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol.68 A 2% share of certified CERs goes to the

Adaptation Fund. As part of its activities it supports ‘capacity building, including institutional

capacity, for preventive measures, planning, preparedness and management of disasters relating to

climate change, including contingency planning’. As the Fund is still in its early stages only ten

projects have been approved to date and the amount of money spent on emergency preparedness

has not yet been reported.

Donor support for the funds

Donors support different financing mechanisms for different reasons. Some prefer to provide

earmarked money so that they have control over where it is spent, others are restricted by their aid

structures and budgetary regulations, determining rigidly what activities can be funded with a

certain pot of money. Those donors that have a strong presence in a country may prefer to fund

bilaterally to already established implementing partners or choose a fund that is aligned with their

funding priorities.

Even by solely analysing the contributions to the nine funds from the 11 donors that have been

profiled as part of this study, clear differences can be identified. Japan, the EU and the US have

channelled more money through development or climate funds than humanitarian funds, others

such as Sweden and Norway have done the opposite. The UK has contributed almost three times as

much, US$1,078.2 million, through humanitarian funds compared to climate change adaption funds

(US$377.7 million) and even less to the three development funds. For a number of donors,

contributions to development funds have come from a humanitarian budget due to restrictions of

donor budgets. Germany, for example, funds GFDRR from its humanitarian budget. Norway and

Canada’s contributions to ISDRs trust fund (UN-TFDR) are also reported as humanitarian

expenditure.

What is also evident from the analysis of the subset of donors is that certain funds such as the CERF,

CHF and the SCF receive substantially greater financial support than the others, although the total

income of the CHFs (936.9 million) and SCF (US$633.7 million) can be attributed to large

contributions from the UK, US$628.8 million and US$359 million respectively. The Trust Fund for

Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF) has received US$310.9 million compared to the GFDRR

67

http://www.climateinvestmentfunds.org/cif/sites/climateinvestmentfunds.org/files/IBRD_tajik_pid.pdf 68

http://cdm.unfccc.int/about/index.html

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that received only US$89.4 million to carry out similar activities. This can perhaps be attributed to

the fact that the CPR-TFF is well established and has been in existence since 2000 whereas the

GFDRR only began in 2006.

Donors Humanitarian Development Climate change adaptation

CERF CHFs ERFs CPR-TTF GFDRR UN-TFDR LDCF SCF Adaptation fund

Australia 44.7 2.2 12.5 15.8 4.8 14.3 33

Canada 168 6.2 1 33.9 3.1 1.2 6.5 84

Denmark 46.8 16.8 15.9 21 8.4 2.3 30.2 14

EU 21.9 2.8 12.7

Germany 62.6 4.1 10 5.5 41.3 20.7 13.9

Japan 12.7 21.2 9 4.9 0.3 56

Norway 248.5 103.8 39 43.5 7.6 6.9 12.6 12

Sweden 262.1 181 54 56.3 17.9 19.7 12.1 14.6

Switzerland 28.6 0.3 2.9 7.5 3.5 3.6 5.3

UK 358.2 628.8 91.2 75.6 11.3 10 18.7 359

US 25 13.4 0.5 30 55

Total 1257.2 936.9 206.2 310.9 89.4 72.1 171.3 633.7 28.5

Figure 18: Donor contributions to financing mechanisms, 2006-2010 (US$ million). Source: Development Initiatives based

on various sources

Fund comparison

Of the nine existing funds analysed six currently fund emergency preparedness activities to varying

degrees, although the exact amount of money that is allocated is difficult to extract. The analysis

relies on the reporting carried out by each fund as there is no one database that contains the

relevant information. Two of the funds might have financed elements of emergency preparedness

due to their focus on DRR and climate change adaptation but the available information does not

allow us to identify this for certain.

The table below considers each of the nine funds against essential criteria that we believe would

enable increased funding to emergency preparedness. It also includes an analysis of The Global Fund

as a model that would allow for tailoring of the funds’ design to enable specific funding for DRR and

emergency preparedness.

As can be seen no one fund exists that fulfils all the criteria. This does not mean that they should be

discounted as each fund contributes elements and has comparative advantages which could be built

upon. The GFDRR and CPR-TTF are two current funds that fulfil most of the criteria.

Three of the funds already go some way to promoting the profile of preparedness through their

wider DRR agenda and more could be done using other humanitarian and environmental funds that

do finance preparedness. Only two existing funds, GFDRR and CPR-TTF, prioritise their financing

based on risk analysis, however this is restricted to disasters. No fund considers the risk of multi-

hazards (including conflict and pandemic). Even with the creation of a new DRR vertical fund it

would be challenging to include conflict risk, as there is currently no comprehensive framework or

risk analysis for conflict to base funding on. It is extremely challenging to determine whether any of

the funds currently finance specific conflict preparedness activities especially as there is no clear

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articulation of what these activities are (see page 16). The CPR-TTF does support conflict prevention

which could include conflict preparedness, and other funds such as the CHFs that operate in conflict-

affected countries could also be considered as channelling money to fund these activities. However,

until there is a clear consensus on what constitutes conflict preparedness it remains difficult to

understand whether this is indeed the case.

Allowing all implementing actors access to preparedness financing is important so measures can be

taken at a global, regional, national and community level, yet none currently do this. A new vertical

fund could attempt to address this issue.

What is clear from the overall analysis that has been undertaken is that the transparency of

information and data related to preparedness is poor in most funds. Data is reported in varying

formats, using different timeframes and against different polices and frameworks, which makes it

difficult to extract information. This greatly inhibits a comprehensive comparison.

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CERF CHFs ERFs CPR-TTF GFDRR UN-TFDR

LDCF (GEF)*

SCF Adaptation Fund

Global Fund DRR model

Comprehensiveness

All risks considered No No No No No No No No No No

All countries considered Yes No No No Yes Yes No No No Yes

Prioritised countries based on risk No No No Yes Yes No No No No Yes

Country-level based

National ownership No No No Yes Yes Partially Yes Maybe Partially Partially

Managed at a country level No Yes Yes Partially Partially No No No No No

Stakeholders

All donor types fund* No No No Yes No Yes No No No No

Flexible donorship (e.g. facility with more than one fund available) No No No No Yes No No No No No

All implementers can access funding No No No No No No No No No Yes

Coordination focus

Coordinated globally (policy and decisions) Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Coordinated with national DRR priorities No No No Yes Yes Yes ? ? ? Yes

Administration Expansion/start up costs minimal No No No Yes Yes No No No No No

Donorship

Allows earmarking by country No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No No No

Allows earmarking by theme No No No Yes No No No Yes No Yes

Reduces donor administration Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Fund profile

Helps to raise preparedness profile No No No Partially Partially Partially No No No Yes

Competition with existing pooled funds No No No Maybe Maybe No Maybe Maybe Maybe Yes

Preparedness financing

Earmarks for preparedness No No No No No No No No No Yes

Funds preparedness No Yes Yes Yes Yes Maybe Yes Maybe Yes Yes

Transparency of funding data, marking used No No No No Partially No Partially No No Partially

Figure 19: Pooled funds assessed against essential criteria for financing emergency preparedness. * Includes, DAC and Non-DAC donors, private sector, international financial institutions and agencies. Information is up to 2010. Source: Various.

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Potential criteria for more effective preparedness financing

Donor access

Only the Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction of the ISDR receives contributions from a wide range of

donors (DAC, non-DAC, international financial institutions, agencies, organisations and the private

sector). However, this fund is limited to coordination - the remaining operational funds are

supported by only a subset. Finding a fund that suits the needs and aid architecture of all donors is

very challenging as they are not a homogenous group - their priorities, policies and financing

architecture vary, creating restrictions on which funds they can or will support. This is especially

relevant for a financing mechanism for preparedness as it seems to fall between the humanitarian

and development divide at a donor level.69

National leadership and funding

Pooled funds operate in all contexts ranging from countries with a stable government and society to

countries where no government exists and conflict is widespread. It is therefore important to

understand that one fund may not meet the needs of all countries that require investments in

preparedness, as demonstrated by the nine funds analysed. Where a government exists that has

sufficient capacity and political engagement, funding could aim to support that government directly,

with funds supporting government-led policies and strategies. Promoting national ownership is

essential for long-term preparedness to be effective as part of a wider sustainable risk reduction

agenda. This is a characteristic of the operational DRR and climate change funds. If no stable

government is present then funding should be aimed at other national-level stakeholders that have

relevant knowledge and expertise and should ensure capacity is built. National-level funds can allow

greater flexibility to adapt to different country contexts.

Holistic approach

Preparedness is a key humanitarian concern that requires a long-term approach linked to conflict

prevention, wider risk reduction and building resilience. It is just one element of the HFA on DRR.

With this in mind it would be inappropriate to create a standalone fund solely for the purpose of

funding preparedness; a holistic approach is needed to ensure the coordination of policy and

implementation is achieved. This has been the idea of several existing operational funds, GFDRR and

CPR-TTF, that finance DRR and preparedness, and the LDCF and Adaptation Fund that finance

climate change adaptation, DRR and preparedness. Yet although their approach is comprehensive,

neither earmark a proportion of income for preparedness, and it is very difficult to ascertain how

much is actually spent on preparedness through the current reporting. To enable greater visibility of

preparedness expenditure and ensure that activities are financially supported a fund could set aside

a certain amount of total income for specific preparedness activities (though this should not replace

the need for the development of multi-risk prioritisation).

Based on risk

Only two of the funds, GFDRR and CPR-TTF, base their financing on a set of countries that have been

identified as most at risk, analysis that is also limited to natural disaster hazards. Funding for

emergency preparedness would need to examine multi-risk hazards and prioritise accordingly. The

World Risk Index which has recently been developed by the University Institute for Environment and

69

For more information on this see the section on donor architecture on page 18.

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Human Security goes some way to combining an assessment of risk, vulnerability and capacities of

each country and could be used to prioritise funding to ensure a high return on investment.

However, it too is only based on exposure to natural hazards; to date no such tool exists to provide a

comprehensive country assessment that could assist in the prioritisation of preparedness funding.

Building on existing funds

It is evident that financing for preparedness is already being channelled through several of the funds

and it could be scaled up with perhaps specific earmarking, helping to ensure a minimum of funding

for emergency preparedness. However of the nine funds analysed in this section it is clear that no

one fund fulfils the essential criteria for an effective mechanism to channel preparedness financing.

Adapting them to do this may require architectural changes at a donor level and certainly

amendments to the mandates of existing funds, all of which requires the consensus of key actors

and could take some time. Nevertheless this should be vigorously examined.

Analysing all risks for preparedness

There is considerable work to be done to make all-risk analysis a central part of preparedness financing.

Discussions with stakeholders throughout this study have revealed that many see disaster risk as

something that has been analysed in great detail, that there is a wealth of material mapping out all kinds

of environmental hazards by location, severity, frequency, and that many of the key institutions working

globally to coordinate DRR work alone and with partners in natural hazard risk analysis. It was further

implied or sometimes stated that this same coherence was not as evident for conflict risk.

This is not necessarily the case. There are examples of considerably complex conflict analyses. For

example, Carleton University has developed a methodology for assessing risk bringing together a

number of key indicators, including the history of armed conflict, economic performance, political

instability, militarisation etc. It also links these political/security indicators to natural hazards and

demographics. The International Crisis Group, perhaps the most high profile of organisations analysing

conflict risk, has three programmes looking at conflict early warning. UNOCHA prepared a detailed

analysis of natural and conflict hazards in Southeast Asia.

Most institutional funding for these organisations comes from government donors. During its lifetime

the Carleton University project has received funding from both Foreign Affairs and International Trade

Canada (DFAIT) and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). In 2010 the International

Crisis Group (ICG) received funding from 21 government donors, not including the European

Commission. Some donors have, meanwhile, compiled their own risk analysis; DFID in Pakistan compiled

a comprehensive ‘political’ risk analysis that included “politics and society, economic growth/policy,

governance” though this did not go so far as to link these issues to natural hazards. A few donors base

funding decisions partly only examples of analysis of all risks; ECHO’s Crisis and Vulnerability Index is

prominent but also one of the few examples. As one GHD member stated, “we don’t spend according to

risk. We spend according to how easy the country is to spend in”.

Financing mechanisms are mixed when it comes to funding based on risk analyses. Some funds are not

built upon risk analyses at all. Those that are, GFDRR and TT-CPR, look only at natural hazards and do not

have joined up analyses for making funding decisions.

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 49

Tracking analysis

Introduction

A requirement of this study is to track funding to emergency preparedness expenditures for a set of

countries over a period of a year, using the UN-managed FTS. The tracking looks to examine levels of

funding and the quality of reporting, outlined as one of the key recommendations put forward by

the Task Team, the aim of which is to contribute to enhancing the predictability and quality of

emergency preparedness.

The tracking focused on the ten case study countries identified in the inception report which were

chosen to ensure a wide range of contexts, geographical coverage and countries with and without

existing funding mechanisms, CAPs etc.; these are shown below. Four of these countries have also

been chosen as pilot projects for improved preparedness by the SWG on preparedness.

Bangladesh Colombia DRC Ethiopia Ghana

Haiti Nepal Somalia Sri Lanka Uganda

The tracking methodology

Currently within UN OCHA FTS there is no separate reporting category for emergency preparedness.

The only way to identify programmes and activities for emergency preparedness is to investigate the

project descriptions for each reported contribution.

Using an agreed pre-defined set of words associated with emergency preparedness, a macro in excel

was developed to pull out all project lines that contain the relevant words in the subcategory

‘description’70.

Each project line was then marked according to whether it is solely focused on emergency

preparedness or could include elements of it, using a traffic light system.

Project line corresponds entirely to emergency preparedness.

Project line includes elements of emergency preparedness but also broader activities.

Project line does not specifically mention any of the elements of emergency preparedness

but focuses on broader DRR and resilience which could include aspects of emergency

preparedness (this could also be an element of a larger project).

70

This methodology can also be applied to data extracted from the OECD DAC Creditor Reporting System (CRS). See page 13 for details.

Emergency preparedness

Preparedness (any derivations ) Capacity Hazard

Early warning Planning (contingency) Search and rescue

Mapping Stockpiling Emergency services

Drills Evacuation Disaster risk management

Pre-positioning Risk assessment/analysis Stand-by

Emergency operation centres (EOC) Exercise Simulation

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A second macro was created to pull out ‘broader activities’ beyond emergency preparedness such as

DRR and resilience. These were marked in the latter two categories of emergency preparedness.

Data for funding reported to the UN OCHA FTS in 2011 was downloaded in September 2011. The

funding dates reflect the reported ‘decision date’. Some funding for 2011 appeals was reported in

the later months of 2010. As the FTS is a real-time database which is retrospectively amended,

values and decision dates can vary on different downloads.

Background – DAC analysis trends over time

The OECD DAC CRS can be used to measure trends of ODA to specific countries, sectors and from

donors, as well as ODA performance against targets. This is useful in providing background

information on the levels and types of ODA for the ten case study countries. The OECD DAC CRS also

provides probably the most accurate and easiest way to track funding for preparedness over time.

The project-level data in CRS allows particular issues to be examined through sector codes and

project descriptions. Using the CRS we can examine trends in preparedness funding and how it

relates to overall volumes of ODA in each of the ten case study countries.

Over the last five years the ten case study countries have received significant levels of ODA. For all of

the countries between 2005 and 2009 levels of development assistance have been higher than levels

of humanitarian assistance (HA), with the exception of Somalia where HA has been the dominant

proportion of total aid, peaking at 80% in 200971.

71

Using GHA analysis based on OECD DAC and FTS data.

Broader activities

Mitigation Resilience

Climate Risk

DRR Protection

Adaptation Prevention

Use of OECD DAC and UNOCHA FTS data sources

The differences in the quality of reporting procedures means that OECD DAC and FTS data cannot be easily

examined together. The methodology in the introduction of this study highlights the strengths and

weaknesses of both data sources.

While the OECD DAC CRS is useful for looking at past trends in preparedness funding, it is not possible to

look at figures beyond 2009. An advantage of the UN OCHA FTS is that it is a real-time database with more

recent data available. Thus, the tracking exercise uses the FTS to extract funding for preparedness from the

beginning of 2011 and track the money on an ongoing basis.

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 51

Figure 20: Total humanitarian aid as a share of ODA, 2005-2009. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC

data

Between 2005 and 2009 Ethiopia (US$2.8 billion), DRC (US$2.2 billion), and Somalia (US$1.9 billion)

have been consistently in the top ten recipients of humanitarian assistance72. Noticeably for Ghana

(1%), Bangladesh (6%), Nepal (10%) and Colombia (11%) humanitarian assistance makes up a very

small proportion of the total ODA received in the five year period.

Funding for disaster prevention and preparedness for all countries increased from US$70 million in

2005 to US$455 million in 2009 when it accounted for 4.2% of total humanitarian assistance. For the

ten countries selected for tracking, levels of funding for disaster prevention and preparedness have

increased from US$4 million in 2005 to US$71 million in 2009. The ten countries in the five year

period have made up 15% of total disaster prevention and preparedness funding.

Figure 21: Humanitarian breakdown for ten case study countries, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC data

Combined funding for disaster preparedness and prevention for our case study countries made up

1% of total humanitarian assistance since 2005, increasing to 3% in 2009. Of the case study

72

Using GHA calculation but does not include private contributions.

US$0.3m

US$3m

US$3m

US$9m

US$11m

US$11m

US$12m

US$16m

US$32m

US$53m

US$151m

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

Ghana

Colombia

Somalia

Uganda

Nepal

DRC

Sri Lanka

Ethiopia

Haiti

Bangladesh

Total

Emergency food aid Emergency/distress relief

Reconstruction relief Relief co-ordination; protection and support services

Disaster prevention and preparedness

6.9

3.9 5.2

10.6

6.2

3.1 2.8 0.6

2.7

6.8

0.4

0.5

2.2

2.8

0.1

0.5 0.3 1.9

1.2

1.0

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

16

Bangladesh Colombia DRC Ethiopia Ghana Haiti Nepal Somalia Sri Lanka Uganda

US$

bill

ion

(co

nst

ant

20

09

pri

ces)

Other ODA HA

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 52

countries Bangladesh (US$53 million) and Haiti (US$32 million) have received the largest volumes for

disaster prevention and preparedness. For Bangladesh this has accounted for 11% of total HA while

for Haiti it was 5%.

Noticeably Somalia, DRC and Ethiopia, who are large recipients of humanitarian assistance, have

received very little for disaster prevention and preparedness. Although Ethiopia has received US$16

million this makes up less than 1% of total HA funding. The percentage of preparedness and

prevention funds is even smaller in Somalia and DRC.

Tracking results

Country by country breakdown of emergency preparedness funding

Funding for emergency preparedness identified in the tracking exercise totalled US$71 million for

2011 up until the beginning of September. The majority of funding identified, US$39 million (56%),

fell within programmes with a broader DRR agenda (red).

Recipients

Emergency

preparedness

(green)

Part

preparedness

(amber)

Broader

DRR

(red)

Total

preparedness

Total HA

reported to

the FTS

2011

% of HA

2011

Haiti 1.4 1.2 19.1 21.7 396.3 5%

Somalia 10.5 2.5 4.8 17.8 857.3 2%

Ethiopia 1.5 1.0 7.7 10.1 630.7 2%

Bangladesh 0.0 2.0 4.5 6.5 27.0 24%

Nepal 2.2 2.3 0.6 5.1 38.7 13%

DRC 2.4 0 0.8 3.1 501.6 1%

Colombia 0.0 2.0 0.9 3.0 44.7 7%

Sri Lanka 0.0 1.4 0.4 1.9 146.6 1%

Uganda 0.1 1.1 0.6 1.8 32.1 5%

Ghana 0.3 0%

Total 18 13 39 71 2675.3 3%

Figure 22: Country comparison of disaster preparedness financing reported to the FTS in 2011. Source: Development

Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

Haiti (US$22m), Somalia (US$18m) and Ethiopia (US$10m) have received the largest reported

volumes for emergency preparedness, however this makes up a small proportion of total HA

reported to the FTS for all three countries. Disaster preparedness has made up a significant

proportion of funding to both Bangladesh (24%) and Nepal (13%).

Noticeably for Ghana there is no disaster preparedness data and a very small amount of

humanitarian assistance has been reported to the FTS. The vast majority of Ghana’s aid is through

development assistance. Emergency preparedness projects in Ghana may be reported against the

West Africa UN Consolidated Appeal (CAP), which has not been tracked in this exercise.

While it is difficult to connect FTS and DAC data, some of the trends that emerge are similar. The

percentage of preparedness funding as a total of HA is relatively consistent in both data sets. For

example in the FTS and DAC, Bangladesh has the highest percentage of preparedness funding, while

large humanitarian recipients such as Somalia and Ethiopia have very low levels relative to their total

HA.

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 53

Emergency preparedness funding within the CAP

Preparedness funding to appeals US$m

Democratic Republic of the Congo 2011 3

Haiti 2011 16

Somalia 2011 15

Sri Lanka Floods Flash Appeal (Revised) (January - June 2011) 1

No Appeal 35

Total 71

Figure 23: Preparedness funding to appeals 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

Of the ten case study countries Haiti, Somalia and DRC have a CAP for 2011. There has also been a

flash appeal for Sri Lanka in 2011. Not one of the three countries with a 2011 CAP has a dedicated

sector/cluster for emergency preparedness. The only two with dedicated emergency preparedness

and response sectors for 2011 CAPs are West Africa CAP and Djibouti.

Of the preparedness funding identified, 49% fell outside of the CAP. The appeals that have received

the highest levels of funding have been Haiti (US$16m) and Somalia (US$15m). The importance of

preparedness and DRR is a common theme throughout the Haiti 2011 CAP document. The CAP

highlights how disaster preparedness in Haiti was overwhelmed by the devastating earthquake of

12th January 2010. One of the key strategic objectives of the Haiti appeal is to “enhance disaster

preparedness and contingency planning: put in place disaster risk reduction methods and

contingency plans to reduce the impact of disasters”.

Emergency preparedness sector breakdown

Figure 24: Sector breakdown of emergency preparedness funding for ten case study countries in 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

Preparedness funding falls across sectors, with coordination and support sectors accounting for the

largest volumes (US$27m). Other noticeable sectors include US$11 million to agriculture emergency

preparedness in the Somalia 2011 CAP, which makes up 59% of the total preparedness funding

identified for the country.

AGRICULTURE, US$10.5m

COORDINATION AND SUPPORT SERVICES,

US$27.3m

ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND INFRASTRUCTURE,

US$0.6m

FOOD, US$5.8m

HEALTH, US$4.1m

PROTECTION/HUMAN RIGHTS/RULE OF LAW,

US$2.0m

SECTOR NOT YET SPECIFIED, US$6.8m

SHELTER AND NON-FOOD ITEMS, US$1.8m

WATER AND SANITATION,

US$12.1m

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 54

Emergency preparedness is often a theme within sector specific programmes such as food or

agriculture, which makes it difficult to extract an exact figure for funding. Currently emergency

preparedness does not have a separate reporting category and is often hidden within wider

programmes.

Tracking preparedness funding over time 2011

Figure 25: Tracking 2011 preparedness funding reported to the FTS by month. Note: period from 2011 FTS downloaded on September 5 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS

The tracking exercise aims to look at investments in emergency preparedness over time. The funding

identified suggests the majority of emergency preparedness funding is tied in with response

measures. For example, the peaks in emergency preparedness funding to Haiti in November and

December 2010 coincide with peaks in overall funding reported to the FTS. Of the US$91 million

reported to Haiti in December 2010, US$9 million was for emergency preparedness. This funding

relates to prevention efforts in response to the cholera outbreak and also coincides with the release

of the Haiti appeal.73

73

Whether the FTS is a useful resource for tracking funding dates for preparedness is questionable. As mentioned in the

methodology, the FTS is a real-time database; values and decision dates can be retrospectively amended and may not

necessarily reflect when the funding has actually been delivered. Also donors may not necessarily report funding in time

with disbursements.

0.1

6.1

9.8

2.8 4.5

8.9

5.9

12.6

3.9

9.8

6.5

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

Oct-10 Nov-10 Dec-10 Jan-11 Feb-11 Mar-11 Apr-11 May-11 Jun-11 Jul-11 Aug-11

US$

mill

ion

Bangladesh Colombia DRC Ethiopia Haiti Nepal Somalia Sri Lanka Uganda

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 55

Emergency preparedness financing in Nepal: desk review74

Background to risk and finance in Nepal

Risk profile: background

Nepal experiences a range of natural hazards, some of which occur year on year such as floods and

landslides and others which occur less frequently but have the potential to cause more devastation,

such as earthquakes in particular. This makes the country one of the 20 most disaster-prone

countries in the world.75 The World Risk Index ranks it 99 out of 173 countries in terms of overall risk

– scoring ‘very high’ in terms of vulnerability (61.7%) and ‘high’ in terms of susceptibility (50.7%),

with a lack of coping capabilities (81.8%) and lack of adaptive capacities (52.5%).76

The risk of exposure to natural hazards has been exacerbated by the fact that the country has only

recently emerged from ten years of intrastate conflict. It is still vulnerable and has a long way to go

in terms of development. In 2007, a year after the conflict ended the country was ranked fourth out

of the 23 regional countries in terms of the probability of intrastate conflict occurring in 2008.77

Lack of government capacity, weak infrastructure (roads, buildings) and over-population in urban

areas, makes it difficult to reduce the risk. There is a high need for prevention and preparedness

approaches and DRR strategies that take account of the country’s vulnerability.

Aid to Nepal

Over the last 15 years Nepal has received US$8.3 billion in ODA, ranking it 39 out of 175 countries.

The amount of humanitarian aid received as a percentage of ODA has averaged at 6.5% since 1995.

However, following a peak in 2002 (US$38.3 million) humanitarian aid increased steadily from

US$32.7 million in 2004 to US$85.3 million in 2008 before declining by 7.8% in 2009 (to US$78.7

million). This increase can be attributed to support for those people affected by conflict or floods.

74

The IASC SWG on preparedness that works in collaboration with the Task Team on financing for preparedness is undertaking a five-country initiative focusing developing national and international contingency plans. The role of the Task Team is to assist in identifying funding options to support national contingency planning and the resulting preparedness. Nepal is one of five countries selected for this initiative along with Ghana, Uganda, Haiti and another to be decided upon. 75

The NRRC http://www.un.org.np/sites/default/files/report/2011-04-19-nrrc-doccument-version-april-2011.pdf 76

http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/Full_Report_2240.pdf - the results of the World Risk Index have been calculated with non-dimensional ranks with values between 0 and 1. To facilitate comprehension and for cartographic implementation, they have been converted into percentages. 77

http://www.grid.unep.ch/product/publication/download/Naturalconflictrelatedhazard_Asia_Pacific.pdf

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 56

Figure 26: Development and humanitarian aid to Nepal, 1995-2009 (constant 2009 prices) and number of people

affected by disasters. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and CRED data

Tracking preparedness and DRR through UN OCHA FTS

In order to get an idea of current funding for preparedness, data has been analysed from OCHA’s

FTS. There is no code for preparedness funding in the FTS so each project line has to be examined

and extracted.

Between 2007 and 2009 levels of preparedness funding averaged US$1.7 million, however by July

2011 preparedness funding had already reached US$4.0 million for the first seven months of the

year, all contributed by only one donor, the European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Department

(ECHO). This accounts for 10% of humanitarian aid to Nepal for the same period.

Figure 27: Funding for disaster preparedness reported through UNOCHA FTS, 2007- 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS *2011 data download 28 July 2011

DRR/preparedness structures and initiatives in Nepal

The hazards to which Nepal is exposed make it a priority country for risk reduction initiatives and

preparedness interventions. The institutionalisation of disaster risk management is proposed

through various strategies as well as revision of existing legislation relating to disasters.

Legislation

Current legislation in Nepal is largely focused on response and relief and the Natural Calamity Act

1982, the guiding legislation for disaster management which does not detail systems or procedures

for preventative or preparedness measures. A revision of this is currently going through parliament

0.0

0.1

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009

No

. aff

ect

ed

US$

mill

ion

Other ODA Humanitarian aid No. people affected

88

125

121

74

33

1.9

1.6

2.1

1.3

4.0

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011 *

Broad DRR

Total remaining HA

Total preparedness

Floods Floods

End of conflict

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 57

and is waiting to be passed. This new act will be titled the National Disaster Management Act and

will include DRR.

Despite a lack of current legislation covering DRR, the Government of Nepal has taken steps to

address risk reduction in several plans and strategies. The environmental policy and action plan was

introduced in 1993 by the Government to decentralise disaster risk management; this was

complemented by the Local Self-Governance Act in 1999 that grants local leaders the responsibility

and decision making capability for local-level disaster management. In order to facilitate the

dissemination to all levels of information relating to disasters, the Disaster Preparedness Network

(DPNet) was established in 1996.

More recently the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management was devised in 2008 (approved in

October 2009) by the Government in partnership with UNDP and “endeavours to facilitate the

required change in order to achieve the goal of a disaster resilient Nepal by providing guidance for

improving the policy and legal environment, and by prioritising the strategic interventions”78. It

builds on the aims of the tenth National Development Plan (2002-2007) and the Interim National

Development Plan (2008-2010) to establish an organised approach to DRR and reinforce this

approach in plans and strategies based on the capacities of national actors.

In order to effectively reduce the risks caused by hazards the Government of Nepal led a multi-

hazard assessment. This was facilitated by the Ministry of Home Affairs in collaboration with multi-

disciplinary technical and scientific partners and supported by the World Bank’s GFDRR. It includes

detailed assessments of different risk exposure, hazard by hazard, which lead to initial

recommendations for risk-reducing interventions in key at-risk areas.79

Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC)

The Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium (NRRC) was launched by the Government of Nepal in May

2009 and is supported by a number of international institutions and donors. Building on the success

of other countries such as Bangladesh and Mozambique, the Consortium aims to generate funding

for, and improve the coordination of, disaster preparedness and risk reduction in Nepal. It attempts

to build on the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) and help support the

Government of Nepal develop a DRR Action Plan. The NRRC is based on the assumption that a

coordinated approach between different organisations engaged in DRR issues needs to be adopted,

drawing on the experience and strengths of different institutions. The objectives of the Consortium

are based on the pending draft Act which will replace the 1982 National Calamity Act. In recent years

the frequency and impact of global seismic activity in Haiti, New Zealand and Japan has

demonstrated the severity and destructive outcome of such disasters, highlighting the need for

preparedness and preventative measures in Nepal.

Flagship areas and budget

The Consortium has been broken down into five flagship areas with a coordinating institution

assigned to each, details of which can be found in the table below. These five areas have been

identified as priority areas for addressing DRR in Nepal. The flagships have each proposed a budget

78

http://www.undp.org.np/pdf/NSDRMFinalDraft.pdf 79

http://gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/331

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based on a three year programme, which have an estimated total of US$146.8 million. The individual

budgets vary in size, as does the current funding committed to each area.

Donors

Donors have two options for providing support to the Consortium:

to fund government departments for the activities covered by the Consortium

to form bilateral agreements with agencies that are implementing activities under the

Consortium, which relies on agencies’ own fundraising efforts.

Funding inside and outside the Consortium

There are currently six donors that are funding or plan to fund activities inside the Consortium;

information can be found in the table below. For some, especially those that joined in 2011, the

exact detail of their financial support is yet to be decided.

Flagship 1 Flagship 2 Flagship 3 Flagship 4 Flagship 5

Area School and

hospital safety

Emergency

preparedness and

response capacity

Flood management in

Koshi River Basin

Community-

based

DRR/DRM

Policy and

institutional

support for DRM

Issues 30% of schools at

risk of collapse

during major

earthquake, 80%

of hospitals

require seismic

retrofitting

Lack of emergency

responders e.g.

Fire Service and

Urban Search and

Rescue, difficulties

in coordination

and

communication

Annually, floods and

landslides cause 300

deaths and estimated

economic damage of

US$10 million

Annually

10,000

families

affected by

disaster, an

average loss

of two lives

each day

The previous four

flagship areas will

only work if they

have strong

institutional

guidance and

support from the

government

through legislation

Coordinator Asian

Development

Bank (ADB)

(supported by

WHO)

OCHA World Bank IFRC UNDP

Government

of Nepal

focal point

Ministry of

Education,

Ministry of

Health and

Population,

Ministry of

Physical Planning

and works

Ministry of Home

Affairs

Ministry of Irrigations

and Department of

Water Induced

Disasters,

Ministry of Environment

and Department of

Hydrology and

Meteorology

Ministry of

Local

Development

Ministry of Home

Affairs,

Office of the

Prime Minister,

National Planning

Commission,

Ministry of Law

and Justice

Budget US$50.8 million US$28 million US$24.2 million US$30 million US$13.8 million

Estimated

committed

funds

54% funded

13-20% funded by

bilateral

arrangements,

currently limited

resources

Scheduled for 2012 40% funded

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 59

Donor Funding to

Consortium

Agencies Timeframe Flagship

areas

Date

joined

Funding outside the Consortium

DFID £20 million

tbd April 2011-

March

2015

1, 2, 4, 5 2011 £25 million (April 2011-March

2015)

Nepal Climate Change Support

Programme

£20 million (April 2011-March

2015) Forestry

GFDRR US$10.4

million

3 years 1, 2, 3 2009 US$900,000 (to date) - risk

assessment at district level

Glacial lake outburst floods

mapping

Seismic safe school programme

ECHO*

(DIPECHO)

€3.2 million 7 NGOs,

3 UN

Agencies

March

2011-Sept

2012

1-5 2010 -

AusAID tbd ADB 2011-2012 1 2011 AUD400,000 (June 2008-Dec 2010)

establishment of the Nepal

Emergency Operations Centre and

Surakshit Samudaya

AUD141,367 (June 2009-Dec 2010)

– building disaster resilient

communities in Nepal (Banke,

Sunsari and Udaypur)

USAID Information

pending

tbc tbc 2010 Info pending

Japan US$1.5

million tbc

Via World

Bank

1

Asian

Developm

ent Bank

(ADB)

US$5.1

million

- 2010-2014 1 Planned intervention to support

the Government to prevent water

induced disasters

*NOTE: There is no direct funding from ECHO to the NRRC. ECHO contributes to the various NRRC flagship programmes

through its own DIPECHO programmes. This funding can either be placed inside or outside the Consortium.

The role of the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

IFRC is not an implementing organisation in Nepal. Its function is to support the activities of the

Nepalese Red Cross through technical support as well as help coordinate support for other partners.

IFRC is the lead for flagship area 4 ‘community-based DRR (CBDRR)/management’. It will work with

and support the Ministry of Local Development and partners as well as support the rolling out of the

work plan, meet targets and generate funding, whilst internally supporting the Nepalese Red Cross.

Flagship area 4 has progressed fairly quickly and has set clear targets, established an advisory

committee, developed a work plan and implemented M&E guidance. IFRC will actively seek funding

for flagship area 4 after a funding strategy has been developed.

The World Health Organisation (WHO)

With the introduction of the Consortium, WHO has been nominated to take the lead in health

related DRR and preparedness measures in Nepal; these are covered predominantly by flagship

www.devinit.org SYNTHESIS REPORT P a g e | 60

areas 1 and 2. In relation to flagship 1, WHO has been designated as the agency responsible for the

hospital safety component on behalf of the NRRC. It recently received funding from ECHO for

further structural and non-structural assessments in three MOHP identified priority hospitals. The

MOHP have also developed a proposal to conduct detailed assessments in MOHP identified hospitals

that require retrofitting and rehabilitation and estimated cost that would be associated with this

work. With this information WHO in consultation with the MOHP will develop a detailed proposal

with a 5 year plan to build the capacity of the health sector and improve the safety of infrastructure.

Under flagship 2’s health component (emergency preparedness and response capacity) WHO has

developed a concept note to expand its preparedness activities in particular training and capacity

building exercises. This will continue to be financed by WHO core funding as well as support from

donors.

Lessons learnt from the Consortium

The Consortium is still in its infancy, a three year process that has only recently gained momentum.

In 2011 a number of donors made significant financial commitments. At this stage therefore, it is a

little too premature to assess the Consortium’s successes, outcomes and impact and to use it as a

template and tool for future effective preparedness financing. However, a number of lessons can be

learnt and good practice identified. The coming year is a crucial time for the Consortium in terms of

project implementation and assessing its impact.

Strengths

Timing – The strategic focus and the timing of the development of the Consortium have been

important elements of its success. It evolved during a period of ‘mega’ disasters such as the Haiti

earthquake and Pakistan floods in 2010, and the realisation that Nepal could be next. By the time it

came to implementation in 2011 a number of donors were already committed to investing in DRR

activities.

Before and after: what has the Consortium done for preparedness in Nepal?

Funding to Nepal for preparedness, as reported through the UNOCHA FTS, shows an increase from US$1.9

million in 2007 to US$4.0 million in 2011 (see funding to UNOCHA FTS section). Whilst this increase could be

linked to the establishment of the Consortium, which may have raised the profile of funding for

preparedness in Nepal, this cannot be said for certain based only on only an analysis of humanitarian data.

The US$4 million has been committed by only one donor, European Commission Humanitarian Aid & Civil

Protection Department (ECHO), whereas we know that other donors such as the UK have also committed

funding. The reason for this is that the donors, excluding ECHO, that have provided details of their financial

support for the Consortium have indicated that the money will come from a development budget, as

opposed to the humanitarian, and is therefore unlikely to be reported to the FTS.

As many of the funding commitments are still to be confirmed it would be premature to assume that the

Consortium has assisted in greater financial support to preparedness in Nepal. The Consortium is still in its

early stages; the implementation of activities is just commencing so any assessments on impact and

outcomes will come much later. In addition, the increase in funding to preparedness activities in 2011 may

actually reflect improved reporting of preparedness activities.

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Multi-stakeholder approach – its institutional set up is unique in that it provides a platform for

multiple stakeholders - governments, UN agencies, International Financial Institutions (IFIs) and

NGOs - to become engaged in DRR/preparedness issues, set around an agreed framework.

It attempts to bridge the development and humanitarian divide – the Consortium brings together

humanitarian and development actors and financing, whereas previously preparedness activities in

Nepal had come mainly from humanitarian budgets and were delivered by humanitarian actors. A

fundamental component for emergency preparedness and DRR activities is the capacity for long-

term planning – in terms of both strategy and investment. This aspect makes the institutional set up

of the Consortium essential, with a mix of both long- and short-term actors.

Engagement with IFIs – a notable success of the Consortium, in attempting to overcome

development and humanitarian silos, has been the engagement with development agencies such as

the IFIs, with the Ministry of Finance also involved in this partnership development.

Strong leadership with support at senior level – the Consortium has had strong leadership and

political buy-in at a senior level which has helped raise the profile and visibility of risk reduction

needs in Nepal. The Government of Nepal leads the Consortium and actively endorses it; without its

involvement, the Consortium would lack the national ownership required for long-term

sustainability. A crucial aspect was gaining support from the Ministry of Finance which was essential

for engaging the IFIs. The role of the UN Resident Coordinator has also been critical in pushing

priorities and driving the process, as has public support from Margareta Wahlström, the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for DRR.

Holistic approach – in order to ensure adequate national frameworks and legislation support

activities on the ground, the Consortium combines the development of DRR policy with the

implementation of projects. Furthermore, it seeks to prevent new risks from occurring as well as

mitigating the effects of known risks.

Challenges

Balancing humanitarian and development approaches, planning and financing – a key issue is

getting the right balance between humanitarian and development perspectives and partners. Whilst

long-term planning, or the lack thereof, can be a problem within the humanitarian system,

humanitarian financing is often delivered quickly. In contrast, within the development system there

is less urgency, and in some cases funding can take up to a year or more to be approved. With this in

mind, preparedness approaches need to include long-term planning and financing with the same

sense of short-term humanitarian urgency.

Building a strong evidence base – one of the main challenges facing the Consortium and

preparedness activities in general is building an evidence base which demonstrates value for money

in these types of investments. This might explain why there was initial reluctance amongst donors to

invest in the Consortium, because there are no quick visible results and often the impact and

benefits are difficult to quantify. The current focus of the Consortium is on implementation rather

than fundraising as it does not want to generate too much income without having the capacity to

implement or the evidence of outcomes. There is obviously a balance between project

implementation, investment in future fundraising and building an evidence base.

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Regional buy-in and inclusion – there appears to be limited involvement and engagement with key

regional actors. Outreach with influential countries such as India and China might prove significant,

especially in emergency response planning. India is a neighbouring country to Nepal and it would

probably be the first to respond internationally. It also has previous experience of responding to

disasters domestically. An earthquake that hit the Himalayan region on 18 September 2011,

affecting Bhutan, India, Nepal and Tibet, and the Koshi valley disaster in 2007 that greatly affected

Eastern Nepal and India’s Bihar state, demonstrate the importance of regional coordination in

preparedness and DRR strategies, planning, activities and funding.

Government leadership – as previously mentioned the priorities of the Consortium were based

upon the National Strategy for Disaster Risk Management (NSDRM) and the NRRC continues to work

with the Government and relevant ministries to further these priorities. Despite high turnover within

the Government and ministries there has been a consistently high level of cooperation and

responsiveness. The multiple challenges facing a state such as Nepal in a post-conflict phase can

mean that ensuring that comprehensive risk management remains near the top of the agenda can

be difficult. One consequence of this is that the legislation approving the new National Disaster

Management Authority (NDMA) is still to be passed despite the fact that the Cabinet approved it in

2009. As some of the more structural elements of the NRRC work plan depend on the passing of this

legislation, this is a critical issue. Nevertheless it is clear that in a range of government agencies

including the Ministry of Finance and the National Planning Commission, DRR has a higher profile

and is more clearly embedded in planning than ever before.

Information sharing – key to the purpose of the Consortium is to improve coordination and

communication, and whilst it is set up in such a way that allows core sponsors to take responsibility

and ownership for individual flagship areas, this in itself could create silos. It is currently difficult to

assess how much money has been committed by each donor to each flagship area. There is limited

information sharing amongst agencies and publically available funding documents. Whilst the

Consortium is still in its infancy and information sharing needs to be improved, as of July 2011 DFID

is resourcing the Consortium Secretariat which will enable greater capacity to coordinate

information sharing.

Pooled funds and the Consortium

A pooled funding mechanism, where donors contribute finances into one single fund, has not yet been

set up for the Nepal Consortium. There have been initial discussions but a decision has been taken not to

develop one at present. According to Nepal-based stakeholders this is largely because the Consortium is

still in its early stages. Establishing a fund prematurely could be detrimental as it has the potential to put

additional pressure on absorption and capacity and extra resources would be required.

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Towards improved and predictable preparedness financing: key findings,

opportunities, challenges and recommendations

Overview

Humanitarian aid is being stretched. Millions of people in sub-Saharan Africa are living with conflict

and its legacy; natural disasters such as the earthquake in Haiti and the floods in Pakistan have

disrupted, even paralysed economic and social infrastructure; recovery and reconstruction remain

uneven following large-scale conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan; and political turmoil has escalated

throughout the Middle East and North Africa, heralding in civil strife and even outright war.

Increasingly, the people affected by crises face additional threats, their livelihoods made more

insecure by the effects of climate change and the vagaries of the global economy.

The pressure on the humanitarian system appears to be growing. Aid from governments reached

US$12.4 billion in 2010, the highest figure on record. At the same time the CAP for 2010 reached its

highest ever figure of US$11.2 billion, double what it was in 2006, and for the first time in five years

the level of needs met fell significantly80. This is occurring alongside a rise of basic commodity prices

that on the one hand creates more need and on the other reduces the amount of aid that each

humanitarian dollar can buy. At the same time there is considerable pressure on donors to be

spending less or justifying each dollar spent, prioritising value for money and pushing for more and

more impact with the same expenditure. Whilst it would be overly dramatic to say the humanitarian

system is near breaking point, it cannot be denied that it is under substantial strain.

The humanitarian community has responded to these multiple needs and risks by making

preparedness a priority. The IASC has already prioritised preparedness, considering it to be an issue

that can help forge a link between humanitarian and development actors. The GHD group, now co-

chaired by Germany and Poland, will have preparedness as one of its key elements over the next

year. At the 2011 United Nations Economic Social and Cultural Organisation’s humanitarian

segment, which brought together a range of key donors, UN agencies, NGOs and others,

preparedness made its way onto the agenda of almost every main session or side event. Senior

agency representatives and donors talked continuously of the need to considerably increase

investment in preparedness and disaster risk reduction, and this all occurring as the crisis in East

Africa (which has seen 42 droughts and more than 10 million people affected in the last 30 years)

was escalated to famine status.

This all comes in the context of what appears to be both an ineffective preparedness financing

architecture and inadequate levels of financing. Only 4.2% of total humanitarian aid in 2009 was for

disaster prevention and preparedness. For every US$100 spent on the top twenty humanitarian

recipients over the past five years only 62 cents are spent on preparedness; for every US$100 spent

on the much larger development aid only US$1 was spent on all aspects of DRR.

80

See the GHA report 2011 for full details.

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This has been the setting for the work of this study so far, comprising an inception report and this

synthesis, with the aim of highlighting opportunities and challenges of the current system to address

preparedness financing.

There are many positives to be taken from the process itself.

Clearly humanitarians have recognised the importance of obtaining greater investment in

preparedness as well as the limitations in their mandates, policies and financing.

The IASC Principals and most of those interviewed have talked of the need for preparedness

to be considered as both a conflict and disaster matter that must be tackled in multiple

ways, both in the short-term and as part of a long-term plan. It should also involve

development actors and wherever possible be led by national actors.

There have also been specific positive examples of how preparedness is articulated and funded.

HCTs find ways of using the CAP for preparedness funding in the absence of clear guidance.

Humanitarian donors go out of their way to make preparedness needs a priority for their

development counterparts and work together to get around funding silos.

Some financing mechanisms do fund preparedness activities of different types in different

contexts.

Global institutions have formed both informal and formal relationships to improve

preparedness, especially for disasters.

The Nepal Consortium, though the start-up process was lengthy and considerable

international advocacy was required, is an example of how a well argued and articulated

plan can garner both attention and funding.

However it is also clear that the current architecture for financing and delivering preparedness

highlighted is inadequate for delivering emergency preparedness expenditure. Improving the

preparedness financing means addressing the policy context as well as the financing modalities.

Policy context for emergency preparedness mechanisms

Through the work of this study a series of policy issues have arisen that need consideration when

making a choice on the development of existing or new financing mechanisms for emergency

preparedness.

Systemic division between humanitarian and development assistance

The major challenge in enabling adequate and predictable preparedness financing is the

bifurcated aid structure; appropriate preparedness financing cannot be developed if it is

conceptualised as a humanitarian issue. Finding ways of overcoming or working around this systemic

divide will also progress other key areas for preparedness including the importance of country- and

needs-driven approaches, being based on all risks, part of a long-term solution, allowing any donor

to fund and funding any appropriate actor to implement. Financing architecture and mechanisms

therefore need to meet these requirements and enable funding from development and

humanitarian budgets. Specific key findings are as follows.

Emergency preparedness is a key humanitarian concern that requires a long-term

developmental approach in combination with shorter-term activities, but is usually mandated to

humanitarians who have smaller budgets and shorter-term planning horizons, leading to

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activities more likely to be led by global institutions and agencies rather than national authorities

or communities.

Though DRR policies often articulate a holistic approach to reducing risk, preparedness still tends

to find its way into the humanitarian’s responsibility, though largely without the necessary

funding or ability to plan in a long-term manner. 81

Currently, there is no evidence that any of the evaluated donors (or as a matter of fact, any

institution) have adopted a holistic and integrated approach to emergency preparedness in line

with the definition we have proposed as central to this study, which incorporates all risks,

including conflict.

The current policy and funding dynamics for emergency preparedness have potentially reduced

its effectiveness. Most donors address emergency preparedness from a humanitarian and

‘natural disaster’ context and, as a result, focus on post-emergency actions rather than pre-

emergency measures. This is often informed by the political and media realities of aid funding. In

order to increase the effectiveness of emergency preparedness, an environment is needed

where donors can agree on an inclusive strategy, developing a preparedness policy that

recognises its complexity but acknowledges the benefits to cost-effective humanitarian action,

and includes financial commitments.

Long-term risk reduction and building resilience, for disasters and conflict

The lack of consistent ‘preparedness’ donor policies which cover conflict, disasters, epidemics or an

interaction between all of these, is given as part of the explanation for the failure to develop holistic

approaches, coherent policy targets or adequate financial commitments. While many donors have

adopted preparedness as defined by the UNISDR and its policy actions in line with priority 5 of the

HFA, these cover only natural disasters. There is no equivalent framework for placing conflict

preparation within a longer-term conflict risk reduction. Neither the terminology, policies or

institutions exist in the same way as they do for disasters.

Furthermore, situating preparedness financing in the context of long-term risk reduction and

building local and national resilience is important, but it is also a challenge for donors and agencies,

because the parts of the institution which focus on long-term issues and national capacities are not

necessarily found in the humanitarian wings.

National leadership and ownership

Promoting national ownership is essential if long-term preparedness is to be effective as part of a

wider sustainable risk reduction agenda. National leadership and ownership should ensure that

financing will be directed to programmes considered to be a national priority, will be integrated with

other national policies and strategies, will be mixed and matched with national budgets and will be

sustainable. Realistically however, there are situations where national leadership is weak or

unwilling. Two things flow from this. Firstly, if no stable government is present then funding should

be aimed at other national-level stakeholders that have relevant knowledge and expertise and

should ensure capacity is built. Secondly, the mandates for financing mechanisms must be flexible,

enabling national leadership of all kinds wherever possible, but not preventing actions by donors or

81

An additional advantage of having all actors working together on DRR was offered by the UN Resident Coordinator in Nepal, who suggested that one intrinsic success of the initiative was bringing the urgency and pragmatic (and often community-level) approach of humanitarians to bear on the long-term planning and larger budgets of development actors.

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multilateral agencies where that is more appropriate. In all cases however, local knowledge and

expertise needs to be effectively incorporated, especially given the importance of community

mobilisation in many preparedness initiatives and its role as the first line of response when a crisis

occurs.

All- risk analysis and appropriate prioritisation

It is clear that a financing mechanism that has as its key role the provision of adequate funding for all

emergency preparedness, must be based on a synthesised analysis of all risks to a country, those

risks then being compared across different contexts to ensure that priority is given to those

countries most in need and lacking in national capacity. This will enable the invariably limited funds

to be targeted appropriately (see page 48 for more details).

A mechanism open to all

Any financing mechanism for preparedness should be open to all actors. Any donor of any kind,

whether institutional, donor agency, corporation or private should be able to contribute, which in

turn demands flexibility in its procedures. For example, a global ‘facility’ akin to GFDRR, which allows

donor earmarking of different ‘tracks’ within an overall fund, will encourage greater engagement

and investment. Furthermore, the funding should be accessible to all appropriate actors working on

preparedness, whether international or national, government or civil society. All should be eligible to

receive funding for those activities they are best placed to undertake, even whilst understanding

that there may be a need for lead or umbrella agencies.

All funds should therefore be available for both national governments (a point which has been

stressed by the IASC Principals and many donors during this investigation) as well as for key

organisations, agencies and NGOs82 undertaking preparedness activities. Funding should be granted

to those best placed to work in each situation. Due consideration should be given to ensuring that

funds do not stay at central level but are disbursed to communities which are directly involved in

DRR at local level. In a conflict setting (or where a government is seen as corrupt or simply lacking

adequate capacity) an institutional or international actor may well be best placed to undertake

preparedness. National actors can and are used to take the lead even in these more complicated

scenarios, the Red Cross Red Crescent national societies being a prime example.

This range of contributors and implementing agencies places considerable pressure on the fiduciary

and governance structures to get the right balance between access and accountability.

All actors for change

All actors working in environments with preparedness needs should be brought together.. This is

where the link is made from the humanitarian system and its particular actors to those working in

peacebuilding and transition, to the development community and its donors and institutions, to

peacekeeping (both UN and other) and private sector and foundations.

82

It should be noted here that the issue of institutional preparedness is something that is beyond the scope of this work. There are many questions that have not yet been examined in detail. For example, is funding for the cluster system actually preparedness? Are all mechanisms to respond that are prefunded, such as UNDAC, preparedness expenditures? Do agencies already mainstream preparedness expenditure through their programming, such as the examples from our examination of the 2012 CAP?

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Examining the options

Funding despite the system, not because of it

It is clear from the interviews and feedback received during the study that many agencies and

donors manage to finance preparedness despite the system – they find ways around the obstacles or

inertia. Thus, there is a corresponding opportunity to improve the quantity and quality of

preparedness finance, by addressing the architecture and mechanisms. But changes in the

mechanisms can only deliver if the political economy provides the right incentives. This section

therefore examines in detail both mechanisms and incentives to explore what recommendations for

improved preparedness financing can be made.

Mechanism Criteria83

Based on the above essential criteria the study has examined the potential approaches for creating a

new fund or amending an existing one. The possibilities have been examined for their:

comprehensiveness of approach

connection to country-level needs and priorities

global coordination of priorities

possible levels of accountability

relationship with global institutions

administrative costs and speed

ability to bring in many stakeholders

ability to foster good donorship

likely profile given to preparedness.

Strengths and challenges facing funding mechanisms for emergency preparedness

The Task Team working on financing transition as part of the DAC International Network on Conflict

and Fragility (INCAF) has commented on the dangers of assuming that a new fund will be successful

where existing mechanisms have fallen short, and on the risks of fund proliferation. Consequently

any proposals for a new vertical fund are likely to be treated with caution.

On the positive side however, any new fund is likely to bring immediate profile to DRR and

preparedness issues. With clear leadership and mandate, policies and strategy, it could also bring

clarity, focus and urgency to preparedness investments.

Although a new fund can take time to set up, the challenges in adapting existing instruments should

not be underestimated and may be complicated by institutional interests and politics.

It is clear that any global fund, whether new or building upon an existing facility, would be likely to

share characteristics with other global vertical funds. They may be less prepared to work with the

dynamics of national actors, priorities and processes, given their more specific mandate. A global

fund may be vulnerable to being over-influenced by its donors. There is also a risk that a new global

fund would add to transaction costs and further complicate global coordination. On the plus side, it

is likely that a global fund would bring much needed profile to preparedness in general and there is a

83

The methodology of this table is as follows: for the new global, regional and country-level funds a generic example is considered and the answers are suggested as those most likely. Increased bilateral funding and using the CAP are as stated.

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clear gap in global leadership and visibility for the issue as a global public good. It would also be

more likely to ensure that there is a coherent single policy and strategy, with decision making based

on comparable indicators of need and programming prioritised accordingly. It may be less

constrained than other donors by wider institutional interests or procedures.

Any country-level fund would have strengths where a global one would have weaknesses. It would

be likely to be more closely tied into country needs and programming and to be driven by national

priorities. It would be in a much better position to draw on local expertise and knowledge and have a

sustained engagement, although it may need to guard against capture by particular interest groups.

Country-level funds would not enable comparisons across situations or equitable prioritisation of

resources and it would be more difficult to unify policy and strategy across different countries. It is

likely that a country fund could be accessible to actors to whom a global fund may not be (such as

local civil society and NGOs) but the obvious down-side to the country-level specific element is that

the fund would be largely unnoticed outside of the country, unless the government or other key

actors invested considerably in international advocacy. A country-level fund could however provide

a vehicle for many different donors to contribute, increasing the volume of resources without adding

to the coordination burden or transaction costs.

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New global fund

New regional fund

New country fund

Increased bilateral fund

Using the CAP[1]

Using existing global fund

Using existing country fund

Comprehensiveness

All risks considered Yes Yes Yes Maybe Partially Yes Yes

All countries considered Yes No No No No Yes No

Prioritised countries Yes No No No Partially Yes No

Administration

Scale/start-up speed No No No Yes Yes Partially Partially

Start-up costs minimal No No No Partially Yes Yes Yes

Country-level based

National ownership Maybe Maybe Maybe Yes No Maybe Maybe

Demand driven Partially Partially Yes Yes Partially Partially

Expertise and knowledge local No Partially Yes Yes Partially No Yes

Stakeholders

All donor types can fund Yes Yes Yes No No No No Flexible donorship (e.g. facility-fund) available Yes No No No No Yes No

All implementers can access funding No No Yes Yes No No Yes

Coordination focus

Avoids proliferation/fund fatigue No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Coordinated globally (policy and decisions) Yes No No No Partially Yes No

Coordinated with national priorities Maybe Maybe Maybe Yes Maybe Maybe Maybe

Donorship

Avoids earmarking by country/issue Yes Partially Partially No No Yes Partially

Reduces donor administration Yes Yes Partially No Partially Yes Partially

Donor trust in processes, objectivity etc. Yes Partially Partially Partially Partially Yes Partially

Institutional issues

Agency conflict minimised No Yes Yes Yes Partially Partially Partially

Clear leadership offered No No No Yes No No No

Institutional resistance to change unlikely No No No Yes Partially No No

Fund profile

Mechanism recognition No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Raises preparedness profile Yes Partially No No No Partially No

Competition with existing funds unlikely No Partially Partially Yes Yes Yes Yes

Accountability Likely transparency of funding choices Yes Yes Partially No Partially Yes Partially Figure 28: Detailed examination of strengths and weaknesses of possible financing mechanism solutions for better emergency preparedness.

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The added value of a vertical fund84

While there is clearly a debate to be had about the merits and downfalls of a vertical fund, this

report approaches the issue more from the perspective of what value it would add to existing

instruments and channels as part of a suite of financing mechanisms. If a vertical fund were to be

created, it would not replace all current financing tools and it is important that the expectations

placed on any new mechanism are realistic.

Preparedness financing needs to operate in both disaster and conflict settings, to fund institutions as

well as national agencies, to finance short-term needs and long-term risk reduction, to be open to all

actors (whether as donor or recipient), to be country- and needs-driven, and secure coherent,

predictable funding. A vertical fund could add value in some of these areas but it clearly cannot

provide a perfect solution to all of these demands.

It is clear from other vertical funds that they can be effective in raising profile and providing a vehicle

for a very wide range of donor contributions. Both of these are needed for preparedness.

Preparedness is often a small part of other programmes and many donors lack both the policies and

expertise to design their own programmes. If they can entrust these complex situations to a vertical

fund, that may give them the confidence to increase their financial contributions. Evidence from

other funds also suggests that the visibility that a vertical fund can create may also encourage

financial commitments through pledging rounds and similar techniques.

Other options for a strategic mix of funding structures include, firstly, funding for disaster

preparedness as part of long-term global DRR funding (similar to GFDRR or a DRR-focused Global

Fund), and secondly, funding for preparing for conflict to be increased through additional funds to

ERFs (and where appropriate creating new ones) or through a CERF with an expanded mandate.

84

“Global Programs or ‘vertical funds’ focus ‘vertically’ on specific issues or themes, in contrast with the ‘horizontal’ approach of the country-based model of aid.” International Development Association.

Feedback on funding mechanisms and a global fund

Through interviews, several UN staff have suggested that we need a global fund like that which exists

for AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria (GFATM).

One stated that we need to fund through regional bodies and avoid global coordination. One

representative suggested that we must avoid the creation of a ‘preparedness empire’.

Others say that we need a fund which can suit many different contexts. Some agencies argued

(supported by some donors) for increased institutional funding for preparedness through a

mechanism (especially for conflict).

One donor suggested that no such mechanism was needed at all, that rather there should be funds

pre-positioned at agency level.

“Why do we need another mechanism?” one person asked, “when GFDRR already funds in 31 priority

countries.”

One donor suggested that it was still too early for discussing a funding mechanism for preparedness –

the scope of what preparedness means was still too disparate between donors.

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Draft recommendations for consideration

1. Creating an enabling environment for improved funding

To be successful, any financing mechanism for better preparedness must have built-in incentives

for donor governments to consider using it. These could include the reduction of transaction costs,

the increase in profile for the funding government, or the sharing of risk. Similarly, the policy

context for preparedness needs to be positive and based on increasing levels of dialogue between

key actors of all kinds. Connections should be made to all the other key actors working in the same

environments where preparedness is needed.

1.1 Establish a programme of further structured engagement on preparedness with

donors via forums such as the Good Humanitarian Donorship (GHD) group and the

G20. Within this programme of engagement, promote the importance of prioritising

preparedness in the context of both humanitarian and development programmes.

Attention needs to be given to reaching out to key non-DAC donors outside the GHD

such as China and India.

1.2 Work with the GHD group to support their members to develop policies and working

practices on preparedness and to lead discussions with their counterparts working on

development and conflict. The sub-components of this key area, all of which should

link to building long-term resilience, include consideration of:

State of readiness of donor financing for large-scale multi-country crises such as

the food crises in East Africa

the development of specific principles of preparedness financing and linking this

to or incorporating into existing GHD principles

the development of policy that makes funding for preparedness an issue for aid

in general, neither humanitarian nor development alone, so that proper

financing is set aside that does not unnecessarily stretch humanitarian response

funding.

working to combat artificial distinctions in aid structures even now by focusing

on joint programmes based on thorough examination of all risks (see

recommendations in section 2 for more detail)

identify the structures and policies that would encourage donor support for

multi-year mechanisms.

1.1 There should be a considerable widening of partnerships between those working in

disaster and conflict preparedness, prevention and mitigation. This should include

actors working on peacebuilding, UN and other peacekeeping and political

development and transition, and include the military, development actors and

institutions, and all those working domestically. This work should not only include

developing an understanding of current activities (global and country-level) but also

examine potential contributions.

Many stakeholders state that although cost-benefit analyses exist, they are not well disseminated,

nor have they permeated institutions to reach senior decision makers, nor are they as strong as

they need to be to make substantial policy revisions. Particularly in situations where preparedness

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is treated as part of other approaches, the data on cost effectiveness and value for money can be a

useful tool in ensuring adequate investment.

1.4 Communicate to stakeholders the relevance, evidence and benefits of improved

emergency preparedness financing, and in particular, the existing data on cost-benefit

of preparedness investments should be synthesised and proactively disseminated.

Conduct direct advocacy with key groups of senior stakeholders beyond the IASC and

the GHD, including the G20, African Union, ASEAN community etc.

It is evident that conflict preparedness does not seem to be explicitly receiving much financial or

policy attention amongst all donors. Firstly, conflict preparedness requires a complex approach in

itself, with both short- and long-term strategies, and little of this is seen in donor policies. Secondly,

several donors have also referred the issue of conflict preparedness to their Ministry of Foreign

Affairs, which suggests that there is an automatic connection between this, and state-building or

stabilisation.85

1.5 Donors should investigate further how conflict preparedness can be better served in

their policies. This should include how conflict in general relates to disasters, how

conflict preparedness is connected to disaster preparedness and how conflict is

articulated as something needing to be tackled by long-term risk reduction.

2. Defining the scale of need and prioritising through comprehensive risk analysis

There is no figure for what resources are needed by the system in order to achieve an adequate

level of preparedness. Ideally, funding would be allocated according to demand, based on a

synthesised analysis of all risks to a country, which are then compared across different contexts, to

ensure that priority is given to those most in need and lacking in national capacity.

2.1 Examine in more detail what is meant by conflict preparedness, both in the short- and

long-term.

2.2 Identify tools for a comprehensive risk analysis that addresses multi-hazards including

conflict in all contexts (urban and rural) as well as the interface between conflict and

disasters, to ensure emergency preparedness financing is needs-driven. For national

hazards this could for example draw on The World Risk Index which has recently been

developed by the University Institute for Environment and Human Security and goes

some way to combining an assessment of risk, vulnerability and capacities of each

country. This can be used to prioritise funding to ensure a high return on investment.

2.3 Ensure that work to define needs and decide priorities is designed to help bridge the

aid divide. It should not, for example, equate emergency preparedness with the

‘humanitarian segment’ of longer-term DRR, which would only reemphasise the divide

and further reduce the planning horizon.

2.4 Start with analysis of overall requirements in the countries and communities most in

need of better preparedness, and not with only those requirements which are eligible

for either humanitarian or development funding. Analysing need within the narrow

confines of eligibility for funding, risks masking the overall requirement. The response

85

Note that this complex area is explored further in a note on the subject on page 15 of this study.

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may have to be limited, but the analysis of requirements should not obscure the gaps

in funding.

2.5 Bring in to risk analyses likely future scenarios and trends, such as urbanisation, food

prices and scarcity, and climate change impacts, in order to maximise the

effectiveness of preparedness.

3. Offering leadership and champions, clarifying roles

Leadership is essential throughout this developing work on improving preparedness expenditures

and implementation. To date the IASC Principals (and Task Teams for preparedness and

preparedness financing) have led the way. Nepal is also cited as example of leadership, obtaining as

it has clear results for preparedness. However, more has to be done. Champions are needed across

key constituents, including donors. More clarity on specific roles and responsibilities is required.

3.1 In particular, the IASC and UNDG should identify and resolve issues of mandate and

leadership, duplications and gaps in delivery and the relationships between the UN

ISDR, GFDRR, OCHA and UNDP, leading to a clearer articulation of the role of all

actors, including the cluster system and humanitarian coordinators.

3.2 Set out options to reduce duplication and promote coordination by identifying global

leads that work to an overarching risk reduction framework linked to different funding

streams. This could be similar to the Nepal Consortium and could operate at both

global and country level, similarly to cluster operations.

3.3 Given the importance of national ownership and local views, review guidelines and

policies which enable appropriate engagement and ownership in different conflict

situations.

3.4 There is a need for clearer leadership on the issue of preparedness amongst the donor

community and constituencies such as G20 and GHD.

3.5 Recommend a single institution responsible for articulating, presenting, and

developing policy on emergency preparedness within the CAP, taking account of

developments within DRR engagement and financing where appropriate. In the

absence of a cluster for preparedness, or a clear preparedness leader at global and

national level within the CAP process, this recommendation could lead to increased

clarity between global institutions working in preparedness.

4. Replicating the lessons of the Nepal model

The Nepal Consortium is still in its infancy, a three year process that has only recently gained

momentum. However, it has shown that a properly articulated country programme can garner

both interest and funding. It bridges the humanitarian and development divide, bringing actors

from both sides together within an overall funding and coordinating umbrella. It involves

government, although their leadership is not always strong. However not all donors have bought

into the programme as yet, with the absence of evidence (a characteristic of the global debate on

preparedness) cited as a key factor.

4.1 In a much more comprehensive fashion, bring to bear lessons learnt from Nepal and

other countries that have had significant success in programming and funding DRR.

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4.2 Document and disseminate the lessons from the National Disaster Management

Legislation as a tool for strengthening national resilience that can be applied in other

settings.

5. Building a suite of financing mechanisms

Existing pooled fund mechanisms

Pooled funds are now significant tools being used throughout the aid system, and there are several

which finance or have the potential to finance emergency preparedness. Of the nine funds

examined six finance preparedness, although the proportion disbursed is considerably variable and

relatively small compared to overall amounts of expenditure. The comparative advantages of these

funds can be drawn on to enable more predictable funding to preparedness in a range of country

contexts.

It should be noted that the possibility of using any mechanism for preparedness is also contingent

on donors willing to commit more funding.

5.1 Increase preparedness financing using existing pooled funds that already channel

money to preparedness such as Track II of GFDRR and UNDP’s Thematic Trust Fund for

Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF). Investigate setting aside a percentage of the

Fund’s income for preparedness based on prioritised risk analysis.

5.2 Review the role of CHFs in supporting preparedness, with particular attention to

countries where national leadership is not viable, and direct more money to

strengthening community preparedness capacity.

5.3 Consider expanding ERFs to include preparedness activities and the number of

countries in which such expanded ERFs can operate.

5.4 Give further consideration to the expansion of the CERF to enable it to fund

emergency preparedness measures. Engage further with donors and implementing

agencies at a global and country level to understand any concerns they may have and

the implications of such an expansion.

Vertical fund

The lack of adequate delivery channels for effective preparedness has been cited as a brake on

adequate funding and, as highlighted by the inception report, a number of stakeholders in the

system are looking for a mechanism that can work in both disaster and conflict preparedness. This

is different from having a fund that tackles natural disasters in a conflict setting86.

5.5 Consider the added value of a vertical fund solely focussed on preparedness based on

analysis in this report and in the context of the challenge presented by both

combining disaster and conflict preparedness, and spanning the divide between

humanitarian and development assistance in many donors and agencies, and identify

next steps as appropriate.

Role of the CAP

86

In this study there is no time to go into detail on the interplay between natural disasters and conflict. The UNDP authored document ‘Disaster-Conflict Interface: Comparative Examples’ is a useful guide to this complex area: http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/undp/library/crisis%20prevention/DisasterConflict72p.pdf

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It is not at all clear how the current system of flash appeals in response to largely natural disasters,

and consolidated appeal ‘planned response’ to complex emergencies or large-scale disasters

requiring ongoing humanitarian financing, fit with long-term preparedness engagement and

funding. There remain no clear guidelines, no clear roles and responsibilities and no clear champion

at a global or national level. However, despite this the CAP is being used for preparedness

expenditures. The CAP process itself does connect directly to needs on the ground and is therefore

well placed to contribute to discussion about the need for preparedness investment.

5.6 Incorporate a strong component of emergency preparedness within the developing

work on making the CAP more strategic.

5.7 Take the necessary steps to make emergency preparedness a specific element within

the CAP, both within the guidance note and with supporting material where

appropriate. Specifically use this process to encourage articulation of preparedness

needs, ensure consistency of terminology and processes and clearly delineate project

and reporting practices.

5.8 Assess the possibility of using a marker for tracking levels of preparedness funding

within individual projects within the CAP to allow donors and others to better track

their existing and future investments in preparedness.

An element of this study’s work that has not been examined in any detail is the actual quality of

preparedness programming, whether standalone or mainstreamed.

5.9 Whilst calling for improved funding for emergency preparedness, also investigate how

good current activities are and what can be improved.

6 Building the evidence and improving the data

Data on financing for preparedness is poor. Improved reporting which captures more preparedness

spending and enables more accurate tracking is an important tool for measuring impact and

progress, drawing attention to funding requirements and maintaining commitment.

6.1 Using the methodologies developed in this study provide a forensic analysis of

preparedness spending from project-level data for both development and

humanitarian aid.

6.2 From this, work to support ongoing initiatives such as those being undertaken by the

World Bank and ISDR to improve coding and reporting preparedness (and DRR)

expenditures which are consistent with the requirements of the DAC CRS, the FTS and

the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI) common standard.87

6.3 Promote the introduction of a marker in OECD DAC and OCHA FTS databases for

projects which include preparedness activities.

6.4 This work should also help examine in detail what is meant by conflict preparedness,

working towards a clear consensus (as well as investigating what is currently reported

in key databases).

87

The IATI standard offers considerable scope to improve reporting, with multiple sector codes, more timely publication of data and links to project documents.

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6.5 Track preparedness funding requirements and receipts within all CAP appeals (see

recommendations 5.5 to 5.6).

6.6 Advocate for much better preparedness reporting by all actors and therefore obtain

greater visibility of existing funding for preparedness, not just within key databases

but in their annual reports and other documentation. This should extend beyond

those already working with a clear focus on emergency preparedness such as

implementing and coordinating humanitarian organisations and agencies, and extend

to actors also working in those same environments, such as peacekeepers. It needs to

include the financing mechanisms.

Final Point: the aid architecture

The recommendations developed in this report, if discussed, refined and implemented are likely to

increase both engagement and investment in preparedness. However, they alone will not tackle

the fundamental schism in donor aid architecture that perpetuates a situation where

humanitarians are left dealing with the consequences of a lack of development investment in risk

reduction. Only by tackling this core issue can a sustainable, long-term solution to preparedness

financing be found.

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Suggested components for Phase II:

country focus and all actors Whilst the study thus far has presented some key recommendations that can be achieved with

action from system actors, and from within current budgets, there are clearly elements that need

to be built upon through the work of Phase II. In part, these elements arise from the fact that Phase

I has been limited largely to a global study working with global architecture, institutions,

mechanisms and data. It has been focused on the supply of emergency preparedness and its

financing, not the demand. Furthermore, the work in the synthesis report has revealed much

needed investment in areas such as a detailed review of global institutions working on

preparedness and decision making and advocacy previously not envisioned. In addition, whilst not

limited to humanitarian ‘thinking’ alone, this first phase has been discussed largely with key

humanitarian players within the IASC and partners, and donors – significant efforts in Phase II must

be made to connect to the other actors often working in the same environments as humanitarians.

Therefore, interconnected elements recommended to be within the second phase are as follows.

Country-level work essential

Research for Phase 1 has been (with the exception of a desk study on Nepal) limited to discussions

with HQ-based stakeholders and the examination of policies, databases and financial information

at the global level. These provide us with only a very partial picture. Examining emergency

preparedness in a variety of country contexts will be essential if we are to understand the interplay

between the different kinds of activities undertaken, the actors involved, how the work is financed

(including detailed country work on different financing channels) and how international and

national policies and priorities work together.

An important element of this country work is identifying a representative cross section of

environments where preparedness is needed, including countries in conflict and those where

natural disasters are more important, those with issues of rapid urbanisation and those prone to

drought or famine, those with or without UN appeals etc.

All actors examined and partnerships developed

Country-level work will enable a full understanding of the work of all actors. More detailed

investigation is also needed at a global level on the preparedness activities and expenditures of

those outside of the humanitarian/development system, including non-traditional donors, military

actors, peacekeeping and the private sector. This work should go beyond simply exploring data and

activities and move towards building partnerships across groups not previously connected. This

should include dedicated conversations with the development arms of key donors. Phase II of this

study should investigate what is needed and work with the IASC and others to ensure the right

interconnections are made.

Forensic data examination

The preliminary data investigation has shown the need for future work which goes beyond the

available databases and examines data forensically using tailored means to pull out and

amalgamate spending on preparedness.

Data and reporting advocacy

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Based on the work so far on the limitations of current data reporting, Phase II will include direct

support to existing initiatives on improving the way in which preparedness (and DRR) expenditures

are recorded.

Risk analysis

The need for comprehensive risk analysis to underpin prioritised expenditures on preparedness has

been highlighted in this study as essential to ensuring demand-driven, prioritised interventions, to

bring the same rigour and multi-stakeholder approach to conflict as is applied to natural disasters.

The interplay between conflict and disaster is of considerable importance and more investment is

needed to explore this, vis-à-vis preparedness. All risks should be mapped and analysed together.

Phase II will examine the interplay between conflict and disaster in more detail and investigate the

current development of multi-risk analysis, making recommendations for how this can be achieved

at country level and how it can feed into global prioritisation. This analysis should include

investigation on long-term trends such as urbanisation, commodity prices and the effects of climate

change on natural hazards.

Financing mechanisms

Not all financing mechanisms have been examined as part of Phase I of this study. For example,

stabilisation funds and other conflict-related mechanisms could well be funding preparedness

activities. Direct engagement with the owners and managers of these other funds is needed.

Analysing the Quality of Activities

There is a need to not only improve the level of financing for emergency preparedness but this

should not be done without thinking of current preparedness activities and examining whether

they are appropriate. Part of this examination should include whether or not the definition

developed for this is comprehensive enough to ensure understanding of what should or should not

be funded.

Advocacy and engagement

There are clearly moves being made to give emergency preparedness a higher profile amongst

decision makers. Phase II of this study should support these initiatives, and where needed start its

own, with tailored presentations to key audiences made, and support given to the IASC and others

in making the case for improved engagement and funding for preparedness.

Improvement of preparedness system

Phase II of the study should pick up on the early work on institutions and the comments of many

actors regarding the need for more dedicated work to resolve system issues on preparedness. A

core element of Phase II will be to identify any issues of mandate and leadership, duplications and

gaps in delivery. Clear recommendations will be given on how to resolve these issues, bring clarity,

and effectively focus leadership.

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Figures

Figure 1: Concentric circles denoting connections between the various elements of DRR, resilience, emergency preparedness etc. .............................................................................................................. 11 Figure 2: Number of natural disasters and people affected. Source: Development Initiatives based on CRED. ............................................................................................................................................... 12 Figure 3: Number of people affected by natural disaster, by conflict or non-conflict-affected (millions of people). Source: Development Initiatives based on CRED and other sources. ................. 12 Figure 4: Proportion of total official humanitarian assistance by conflict-affected states, 2000-200913 Figure 5: Funding to prevention and preparedness code, 2004-2009 (US$m constant 2009 prices). Source: OECD DAC data ........................................................................................................................ 14 Figure 6: Funding to prevention and preparedness code as percentage of total humanitarian aid, 2004-2009 (constant 2009 prices). Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data ......... 14 Figure 7: Total disaster preparedness funding found within total ODA (2009). Source Development Initiatives based on OECD CRS data. ..................................................................................................... 15 Figure 8: Disaster preparedness funding within total ODA, 2009. Note: sectors coloured red fall under humanitarian funding. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data ................ 16 Figure 9: Breakdown of humanitarian aid by ten donors profiled, 2009 (US$ million). Development Initiatives based on OCED DAC data ..................................................................................................... 20 Figure 10: The detailed profile of what is funded by donors within 'prevention and preparedness'. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data.. ............................................................... 21 Figure 11: Donor policy and financial mechanisms matrix. .................................................................. 22 Figure 12: Institutional funding for DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on institutional annual reports ...................................................................................................................................... 29 Figure 13: Contributions to GFDRR 2006-2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data. ............................................................................................................................................. 29 Figure 14: Preparedness projects within the 2011 consolidated appeal, mid-year review, using search terms developed to track preparedness expenditures in FTS. Source: Development Initiatives using OCHA FTS data. ........................................................................................................... 35 Figure 15: Characteristics of funds. Source: Development Initiatives based on various sources. Information up to 2010......................................................................................................................... 40 Figure 16: Donor contributions to financing mechanisms 2006-2010 (US$ million). Source: Development Initiatives based on various sources .............................................................................. 44 Figure 17: Total humanitarian aid as a share of ODA 2005-2009. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC data...................................................................................................................... 51 Figure 18: Humanitarian breakdown for ten case study countries, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC data ....................................................................................................................................................... 51 Figure 19: Country comparison of disaster preparedness financing reported to the FTS 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS ..................................................................... 52 Figure 20: Preparedness funding to appeals 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS ......................................................................................................................................... 53 Figure 21: Sector breakdown of emergency preparedness funding for ten case study countries in 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS ........................................................... 53 Figure 22: Tracking 2011 preparedness funding reported to the FTS by month. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS. ................................................................................. 54 Figure 23: Development and humanitarian aid to Nepal, 1995-2009 (constant 2009 prices) and number of people affected by disasters. Source: Development Initiatives based on OECD DAC and CRED data ............................................................................................................................................. 56 Figure 24: Funding for disaster preparedness reported through UNOCHA FTS 2007- 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNOCHA FTS *2011 data download 28 July 2011 ......................... 56 Figure 25: Detailed examination of strengths and weaknesses of possible financing mechanism solutions to better emergency preparedness. ..................................................................................... 69

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Figure 26: Allocation of Australia's humanitarian funding, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 27: Australia’s contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ............................. 83 Figure 28: Examples of Brazil’s funding to DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS Figure 29: Brazil’s contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various .................................. 85 Figure 30: Allocation of Canada's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC Figure 31: Canada’s contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ............................... 87 Figure 32: Allocation of Denmark's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 33: Denmark's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ............................ 88 Figure 34: EU’s contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: OECD DAC Figure 35: Allocation of EU’s humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC .............................. 89 Figure 36: Allocation of Germany's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 37: Germany’s contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various.......... ......... 91 Figure 38: Allocation of Japan's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 39: Japan's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various............... .............. 92 Figure 40: Allocation of Norway’s humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 41: Norway's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ............................... 93 Figure 42: Allocation of Sweden's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 43: Sweden's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various .............................. 94 Figure 44: Allocation of Switzerland's humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 45: Switzerland's contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ........................ 95 Figure 46: Allocation of UK's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 47: UK’s contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various....................................... 96 Figure 48: Allocation of USA’s humanitarian funds, 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 49: USA’s contributions to pooled funds, 2006-2010. Source: Various ................ 97 Figure 50: Unearmarked contributions to OCHA as of 6 December 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA in 2011: Annual Plan and Budget ............................................................. 100 Figure 51: Expenditure of the DRR and recovery window of the CPR-TTF. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNODP data........................................................................................................ 102 Figure 52: Contributions and pledges by GFDRR to Tracks II and III (US$ million), as of July 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data. ............................................................ 106 Figure 53: Annual appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction, 2010. Source Development Initiatives based on IFRC. ............................................................................................. 108 Figure 54: Donor contributions to the CERF, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA CERF .................................................................................................................................... 111 Figure 55: Donor contributions to the CHFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS ...................................................................................................................................... 112 Figure 56: Examples of preparedness activities funded by CHFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS....................................................................................................................... 113 Figure 57: Donor contributions to the ERFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS ...................................................................................................................................... 114 Figure 58: Examples of preparedness activities funded by ERFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS....................................................................................................................... 115 Figure 59: Contributions to the TTF-CPR, 2001-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNDP data .......................................................................................................................................... 116 Figure 60: Expenditure of the TTF-CPR according to the five windows of the fund, 2007-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNDP data. ..................................................................... 118 Figure 61: Contributions to UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data ............................................................................................................................. 118 Figure 62: Expenditure of the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction according to the strategic objectives of ISDR, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data. ............................... 119 Figure 63: Expenditure of GFDRR according to HFA priority areas up until September 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on GFDRR data. ................................................................................. 121

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Figure 64: Examples of preparedness activities funded by LDCF. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF data. ............................................................................................................................. 123 Figure 65: Allocation of LDCF resources to approved projects, up to 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF data.............................................................................................................. 123 Figure 66: Examples of funding for preparedness through the Adaptation Fund. Source: Development Initiatives based on Adaptation Fund .......................................................................... 126

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Abbreviations CAP Consolidated appeal process

CERF Central Emergency Response Fund

CHF Common humanitarian fund

CPR-TTF Conflict Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund

CRS Creditor reporting system

DAC Development Assistance Committee

DI Development Initiatives

DRR Disaster risk reduction

ERC Emergency Relief Coordinator

ERF Emergency response fund

FSNAU Food Security and Nutrition Analysis Unit

FTS Financial Tracking Service

GEF Global Environmental Facility

GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery

GHD Good Humanitarian Donorship

HCT Humanitarian Country Team

HFA Hyogo Framework for Action

IASC Inter-Agency Standing Committee

IFRC International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies

ISDR International Strategy for Disaster Reduction

LDCF Least Development Country Fund

NRRC Nepal Risk Reduction Consortium

OCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs

ODA Official development assistance

OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PPCR Pilot Program for Climate Resilience

SCF Strategic Climate Fund

SWG Sub-working group

UN United Nations

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Case Study

45

2

13

5

16

14

43

0 10 20 30 40 50

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e US$ million

Annex 1: Donor profiles Australia profile

Policy and structure

Australia, through AusAID, has had a long engagement in disaster management, mitigation and preparedness, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region. The Australian

Government has invested in a broad range of disaster risk reduction activities at the regional, bilateral and community level in over 30 countries. AusAID views

preparedness as a component of wider disaster risk reduction (DRR).

DRR has been a policy focus for AusAID since the publication of the Humanitarian Action Policy (2005). AusAID has stated a desire to dedicate significant human and

financial resource to embed DRR within its development programming. A policy for DRR was released in 2009 named ‘Investing in a safer future’. Within AusAID the

management of DRR policy is undertaken by the Humanitarian and Peacebuilding Branch. Implementation is carried out by AusAID development programmes at a country

level. Thus, funding for DRR comes from both humanitarian and development budget lines. Total expenditure on DRR across the aid programme has increased since the

launch of the policy.

Finance

Figure 29: Allocation of Australia's humanitarian funding 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 30: Australia’s contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual

breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Australia has reported funding to prevention and preparedness since 2006 with significant contributions in 2008 and 2009. In 2009 it was the fifth largest donor

to prevention and preparedness accounting for 9% of humanitarian aid in that year.

213

132

103

113

114

13

48

4

77

78

36

38

73

84

2

13

28

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services

Emergency food aid

Relief co-ordination; protection and support services

Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Case Study

Total expenditure in 2008-2009 was just over $40 million. In 2009-2010 this figure rose to over $59 million88

.

The largest recipient of Australia’s US$43 million (2006-2009) to prevention and preparedness has been Indonesia (US$13.8 million). This highlights Australia’s

strong links with Indonesia, and with disaster risk reduction activities and knowledge sharing89

.

88

Progress report for the DRR Policy 2009-2010 89

Australia Indonesia Facility for Disaster Reduction (AIFDR) announced in 2008 a $67 million commitment over five years for DRR in Indonesia and the region, a unique partnership between AusAID and BNPB. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF.

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Case Study

Brazil profile

Policy and structure

Brazil’s international focus on DRR and preparedness is part of its humanitarian assistance policy that is led by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

“Humanitarian assistance is any action that contributes to an immediate and effective response to protect, prepare, prevent, reduce, mitigate suffering and help other

countries or regions that are momentarily or otherwise, in emergency situations”.90

Brazil is also focused on DRR at a national level. It works towards DRR under the twin-track approach of emergency and structural actions. Its strategy on disaster risk is

based on two pillars:

1) national system of civil defence

2) participatory public policies for strengthening the resilience of vulnerable groups and areas.

Brazil is also committed to the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) which is coordinated by the Ministry for National Integration. At present there is no national platform

for DRR in Brazil.

Finance

Channel Appeal Project description US$m

Bilateral (to affected

government)

Mozambique

2009

Disaster prevention 0.04

WFP Timor-Leste

2009

Disaster prevention 0.10

FAO Nicaragua

2010

Resilience of agrarian populations

to socio-natural disasters

0.05

Figure 31: Examples of Brazil’s funding to DRR. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA FTS Figure 32: Brazil’s contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

90

http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/temas/acao-contra-a-fome-e-assistencia-humanitaria/assistencia-humanitaria/view; translated from Portuguese using Google Translate.

0 2 4 6 8 10

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e

US$ million

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Case Study

It is not possible to track Brazil’s contributions to preparedness through the OECD DAC as they do not report their spending to this database. However some

money to DRR can be found in the UN OCHA FTS; see table above.

Brazil is the only non-DAC donor to contribute to the Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) up until 2010 and also the largest non-DAC

donor to the thematic trust fund for crisis prevention and recovery (CPR-TTF).

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Case Study

168

6

1

34

1

3

7

84

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e

US$ million

Canada profile

Policy and structure

The Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) considers reducing the impact of natural disasters to be an integral component of poverty reduction and

sustainable development.

DRR and disaster preparedness programmes are for the most part under the umbrella of CIDA's International Humanitarian Assistance Programmes. Additionally, CIDA is

currently funding DRR and disaster preparedness efforts across a variety of development as well as governance programmes. CIDA provides proactive financial support to

the ISDR and other key international disaster risk reduction actors for their preparedness, mitigation, and early warning activities in support of the HFA. CIDA does not

have a specific percentage allocated for DRR or disaster and emergency preparedness. Such activities may be targeted or integrated across a range of projects.

Finance

Figure 33: Allocation of Canada's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC Figure 34: Canada’s contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Canada has reported US$26.8 million between 2006 - 2009 on disaster prevention and preparedness through the OECD DAC, peaking at US$12 million in 2008 (3% of

humanitarian spending).

Canada is unique in its reporting practices for projects that cross sectors as they work out the percentage breakdown for each sector. For example, a project that

addresses health (50%), education (25%) and prevention and preparedness (25%) will be reported separately under each sector with the appropriate share of total

project funding assigned to each sector. This gives a clear a picture of the total amount of financing that a specific activity is allocated within one cross-sector project.

112

97

135

166

121

3

129

99

132

173

2

6

12

6

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Case Study

47

17

16

21

2

8

30

36

0 10 20 30 40 50

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e US$ million

Denmark profile

Policy and structure

Disaster risk reduction (DRR) has increased in prominence in the development of Denmark’s foreign aid. The Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) has been an ardent

supporter of both GFDRR and UNISDR and an active participant of EU DRR processes. This support is in line with MFA policies on protecting the most vulnerable and the

focus of their strategy for humanitarian action to strengthen the resilience of societies to disasters. In Denmark’s Strategy for Humanitarian Action it is acknowledged that

disaster preparedness is often a component of DRR, however, they do differentiate between the two. “Disaster preparedness is often very concrete and limited to

preparing what to do when the sudden onset disaster strikes. Risk reduction is more subtle, varied and general in its concept, while being specific in each sector and is

mainly employed before a disaster.”

Denmark’s humanitarian aid is managed by the Danish Development Cooperation (DANIDA) – a sub-agency of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and this is where the majority

of funding for disaster preparedness comes from and some DRR financing. Lots of DRR which may include preparedness comes from development funding. DANIDA also

supports a variety of NGOs and multilateral organisations that specialise in disaster preparedness and DRR, which can fall across both budgets.

Finance

Figure 35: Allocation of Denmark's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC CRS Figure 36: Denmark's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual

breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Denmark reported a relatively small amount of funding for disaster prevention and preparedness, US$8 million between 2007 and 2009, 2% of total humanitarian

aid. Five countries received direct funding, Myanmar (US$2m), Bangladesh (US$2m), Ethiopia (US$1m), Tajikistan (US$0.4m) and Mali (US$0.2m).

Denmark has been a significant supporter of global DRR efforts between 2006 and 2010, contributing US$8 million to GFDRR, US$2 million to UNISDR, US$21

million to BCPR and also global climate funds such as ‘The Pilot Program for Climate Resilience’ (US$36 million).

10

82

84

96

93

11

8

19

1

3

6

14

14

10

15

14

12

2

4

3

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Case Study

791

797

561

741

842

239

217

626

555

342

375

581

328

501

241

26

95

77

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services

Emergency food aid

Relief co-ordination; protection and support services

Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Disaster prevention and preparedness 0 5 10 15 20 25

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e US$ million

European Union profile

Policy and structure

The overall objective of the EU’s strategy91

for DRR is to contribute to sustainable development and poverty eradication by reducing the burden of disasters on the poor

and the most vulnerable countries and people. DRR and disaster preparedness activities are undertaken as an integral part of the European Commission Humanitarian Aid

and Civil Protection Office’s (ECHO) relief operations in areas affected by ongoing humanitarian crises.

ECHO’s disaster preparedness policy rests on three pillars: the European Commission Humanitarian Aid department’s Disaster Preparedness Programme (DIPECHO),

mainstreaming and advocacy92

. DIPECHO’s main objective is to address Disaster Preparedness and Prevention (DPP) in a regional framework, targeting the most

vulnerable populations in the main disaster-prone areas across the world (with low coping capacities). Its main focus is on "preparation” rather than “mitigation” or

“prevention”. ECHO’s contribution to disaster preparedness goes well beyond the DIPECHO programme as many of ECHO’s major humanitarian financing decisions include

disaster preparedness or mitigation of disaster impacts as an objective. Even post-disaster emergency responses often have a risk reduction element.

Finance

Figure 37: Allocation of EU humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source OECD DAC Figure 38: The EU’s contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

91

EU Strategy for Supporting Disaster Risk Reduction in Developing Countries 2009 92

http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/dipecho/presentations/programme_overview_11_07_en.pdf

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Case Study

Between 2007 and 2009 the EU reported US$198 million to the OECD DAC and has consistently been the largest donor in those three years, accounting for 22% of

total prevention and preparedness funding. A total of 68 countries have received funding, the largest being Bangladesh (US$12m) and Nepal (US$7m).

Disaster prevention and preparedness funding has predominantly been channelled through the public sector (US$69m) and NGOs (US$52m).

Since 1998, DIPECHO has spent €186.42 million in prevention and preparedness activities. In 2008 alone, ECHO allocated €32.3 million for disaster preparedness

in the regions of Central Asia, South East Asia, Central America, South East Africa and South West Indian Ocean.

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63

4

5

10

41

21

14

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e

US$ million

Germany profile

Policy and structure

Germany regards disaster risk reduction and management as crucial to sustainable development and closely links them with the overarching MDG of reducing poverty.

The Federal Government has stepped up its engagement in the field of disaster reduction over the past years. The aim is to earmark 5-10% of the regular emergency

humanitarian aid funds each year for disaster reduction.

Germany addresses DRR and disaster preparedness in a comprehensive way from many different angles and agencies. DRR and disaster preparedness are addressed at

the inter-ministerial level within the Federal Government. Measures are carried out within the framework of emergency humanitarian aid by the Federal Foreign Office, as

part of development-oriented emergency and transitional aid by the Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ) and as part of the disaster relief

activities of the Federal Ministry of the Interior, which although primarily responsible for disaster relief in Germany also supports some operations abroad through the

Federal Agency for Technical Relief (THW). disaster ppreparedness measures are also supported by the Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation and

Nuclear Safety.

Finance

Figure 39: Allocation of Germany's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 40: Germany’s contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Germany has reported US$40.5 million towards disaster prevention and preparedness between 2007 and 2009.

In 2009 disaster prevention and preparedness spending made up 7% of total budget allocation (meeting targets outlined in their policy of 5% to 10% of HA).

The major delivery channels German disaster prevention and preparedness funding have been NGOs (32%), the public sector (29%) and the World Bank (21%).

221

243

151

164

183

98

90

56

77

115

30

9

6

52

80

48

36

41

4

11

25

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services

Emergency food aid

Relief co-ordination; protection and support services

Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Japan profile

Policy and structure

Preparedness is a key component of Japan’s overall policy on disaster risk reduction in international development cooperation. Japan’s official humanitarian budget is

allocated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and administered by the Humanitarian Assistance and Emergency Relief Division within the International Cooperation Bureau.

The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) manages the bilateral component and is responsible for promoting and incorporating disaster risk reduction

initiatives within country programme partnerships (OECD DAC peer review Japan 2010).

Within JICA, DRR and post-crisis reconstruction assistance are incorporated within the fourth mission statement, “achieving human security”, which aims to “protect

people from threats and build societies where they can live with dignity”. According to JICA “preparedness” is preparation to minimise the damage even if a disaster

occurs, and falls under development strategy goal 1, “building disaster-resilient communities and societies” as set out in their guidelines for DRR (JICA 2007).

Finance

Figure 41: Allocation of Japan's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 42: Japan's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown

of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Japan has only reported significant financial spend to the prevention and preparedness code of the DAC CRS since 2008. In both 2008 and 2009 Japan has been

amongst the top five donors under the prevention and preparedness code. In 2009 15% of Japan’s humanitarian spending went towards prevention and

preparedness, the highest percentage of the top donors.

The bulk of Japan’s funding to disaster prevention and preparedness has been bilateral and only a few recipients have received funding: Bangladesh (US$10m),

Philippines (US$8m) and Sri Lanka (US$7m). All of Japan’s disaster prevention and preparedness funding has been channelled through the public sector.

13

21

5

9

0.25

56

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e US$ million

561

321

84

119

57

1

22

9

23

4

92

140

45

48

20

90

49

1

46

46

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Case Study

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e

US$ million

Norway Profile

Policy and structure

Through the work of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Norway views preparedness and risk reduction as key to preventing humanitarian crises and an area that requires

stronger international focus. Norway’s polices and strategies on risk reduction and emergency preparedness are documented in several government white papers,

including ‘Norwegian policy on the prevention of humanitarian crises’ and ‘Norway’s humanitarian policy.’ Norway aims to “follow up and strengthen cooperation on

prevention, preparedness and adaptation to climate change with countries that are especially vulnerable to natural disasters”93

. Preparedness must be integrated into all

development activities.

The main activities in which Norway engages are concentrated in “pilot countries” – China, Vietnam, Bangladesh, Cuba and Uganda. In addition, Norway supports the

Asian Disaster Preparedness Centre (ADPC) in Bangkok, and through it, more than 20 countries in their network. The main focus is on strengthening capacity at national

and local levels, with concentration upon low-cost technology measures, assisting in building up weather forecasting and reporting systems and timely information

dissemination to the people who need it.

Finance

Figure 43: Allocation of Norway’s humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 44: Norway's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual

breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Between 2008 and 2009 Norway increased its funding to prevention and preparedness by over 150%. Just over half of the total amount (US$22 million) went to

national NGOs.

Preparedness and DRR funding comes from Norway’s humanitarian budget. There is no separate budget line for DRR but there have been discussions to do this.

93

http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/Hum/humpolicy_eng.pdf

311

252

314

213

171

8

22

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Case Study

232

268

246

275

281

11

4

2

27

29

10

19

42

23

39

15

6

4

4

7

23

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

262

181

54

56

20

18

12

15

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e

US$ million

Sweden profile

Policy and structure

Reducing risk is a priority of the Swedish International Development Agency’s (Sida) current humanitarian policy. They see reducing risk and improving preparedness as a

key component of humanitarian assistance, and as complementary to the long term development assistance efforts, in accordance with the principles of the HFA.

Disaster prevention is one of two key perspectives that inform the goals of Sida’s humanitarian assistance policy. Sida supports measures to prevent natural disasters and

reduce vulnerability at national and local level with a particular focus on countries where Sida is involved in humanitarian action. Sida promotes the inclusion of disaster

prevention measures in the regular programmes of humanitarian partner organisations and support measures to strengthen international DRR system94

.

Finance

Figure 45: Allocation of Sweden's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 46: Sweden's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Between 2007 and 2009 Sweden has reported US$34 million to disaster prevention and preparedness through the OECD DAC, accounting for 6% of Sweden’s

humanitarian funding in 2009. The majority of Sweden’s disaster prevention and preparedness financing has not been allocated to a specific country (68%).

The majority of Sweden’s disaster prevention and preparedness funding has been channelled through multilateral organisations: UNDP (25%), UNISDR (14%),

World Bank group (9%). This highlights that since 2006 Sida’s DRR strategy has focused on bilateral support to global and regional mechanisms.

Sweden has been one of the largest donors to UNISDR, contributing US$20 million between 2006 and 2010, as well as giving US$18 million to GFDRR.

94

Taken from the Strategy for Humanitarian Assistance provided through Sida 2011-2014

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101

161

207

175

170

46

44

42

50

46

60 13

9

15

13

12 2

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid

Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation

Disaster prevention and preparedness 0 5 10 15 20 25 30

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e

US$ million

Switzerland profile

Policy and structure

Within the Swiss Development Cooperation (SDC), disaster risk reduction (DRR) and preparedness lie with the Humanitarian Aid Department. SDC define preparedness as

activities and measures taken in advance to ensure effective response to the impact of hazards, including the issuance of timely and effective early warnings and the

temporary evacuation of people and property from threatened locations. Preparedness is incorporated within DRR objectives in the SDC’s 2010 strategy document. DRR is

one of the four priority areas of its Humanitarian Aid Department.

SDC’s preparedness activities focus on supporting partners through awareness raising and/or capacity development (institution building, networking, system reforms).

SDC follows the conceptual framework of risk management defined in the HFA. SDC seeks to eliminate or minimize the effects of natural disasters through three targeted

mechanisms: mitigation, response and recovery. DRR is not defined as a crosscutting issue in SDC. Therefore, it is not compulsory that it be taken into account in all

activities.

Finance

Figure 47: Allocation of Switzerland's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 48: Switzerland's contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no

annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Switzerland has only reported a small amount to OECD DAC to prevention and preparedness in their humanitarian spending, just US$2m in 2009 (1% of total

reported HA in that year). The top recipients were Georgia (US$0.5m), Syria (US$0.5m) and El Salvador (US$0.25m).

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Case Study

358

629

91

76

10

11

19

599

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF**

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e US$ million

United Kingdom profile

Policy and structure

One of DFIDs policy focus areas is resilience (economic, physical, social, environmental and national), an element of which is response preparedness. Despite the

terminology DFID does not limit this to specific preparedness activities for response to an emergency; rather it has a wider remit and incorporates areas of work such as

the building of institutional frameworks and legislation at a national level.

The Conflict, Humanitarian and Security Department (CHASE) responds to humanitarian needs arising from conflict and natural disasters. It also works to identify

emerging risks in order to build greater security and access to justice, and improve the resilience of communities in order to prevent conflict situations arising or

escalating and reducing the damage of natural disasters. CHASE hopes to produce a strategy on preparedness in the near future that will be based on the wider DFID

policy commitments made on resilience in their recent response to the 2011 Humanitarian Emergency Response Review (HERR). These policy commitments help to link

DFIDs work on DRR to climate change and provide the basis for a move towards a cross-departmental approach to resilience.

Finance

Figure 49: Allocation of UK's humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 50: UK’s contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no

annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

In 2009 prevention and preparedness accounted for 7% of total humanitarian spending. Of the US$81.8 million reported to the prevention and preparedness code,

US$81.7 million came from DFID whereas US$0.1 million came from the foreign and commonwealth office (FCO), the exact channel is unknown.

The majority of the money that the UK reported to prevention and preparedness is not allocated to a specific country – a total of US$47.8 million. Of this money,

42.9% was channelled to national NGOs.

417

439

421

435

489

48

100

27

92

129

29

53

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

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Case Study

United States profile

Policy and structure

Funding for DRR and disaster preparedness activities is provided through the USAID/OFDA office as part of their humanitarian assistance programme. The disaster

preparedness activities are designed to promote at least one of the five priorities identified by the HFA, with the aim of mitigating both natural disasters and “complex

emergencies”, in order to reduce the loss of human life, alleviate suffering, and reduce the economic impact of disasters. DRR and disaster preparedness funding includes

Natural Disaster as well as Conflict Preparedness programmes.

In 2009 OFDA provided 3% of its budget to the “Risk Reduction” sector. However, DRR and preparedness funding was also allocated to other sectors (e.g. Water,

Sanitation and Hygiene, Economic Recovery etc.), which comprise DRR and preparedness components. All DRR programmes from 2006-2008 contain prevention and

preparedness activities in their programme descriptions. However, from the budget outline it is unclear and difficult to determine exactly how much of the total

programme budget is directed to prevention and preparedness activities (OFDA Annual Report 2009).

Finance

Figure 51: Allocation of USA’s humanitarian funds 2005-2009. Source: OECD DAC Figure 52: USA’s contributions to pooled funds 2006-2010. *From 2002, no annual breakdown of funding is provided for the LDCF. Source: Various

Between 2005 and 2009 the United States has reported US$175 million to disaster prevention and preparedness through the OECD DAC making it the second

largest donor since the disaster prevention code was created.

1620

1645

1608

1869

2211

1748

1355

1236

2264

1942

57

15

14

30

59

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Material relief assistance and services Emergency food aid Relief co-ordination; protection and support services Reconstruction relief and rehabilitation Disaster prevention and preparedness

25

13

0.5

30

55

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

CERF

CHF

ERF

BCPR TTF

ISDR UN Trust fund

GFDRR

LDCF*

SCF

Adaptation fund

Hu

man

itar

ian

D

RR

C

limat

e

US$ million

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Case Study

In 2009 disaster prevention and preparedness made up 1% of the United States’ humanitarian spending. The United Sates reported US$59 million in 2009 to

the OECD DAC. This is consistent with approximately US$60 million highlighted from USAID’s disaster risk reduction budget outlined in their 2009 Annual

Report95

(the total DRR budget for 2009 was US$86.7 million).

The top recipients of United States’ disaster prevention and preparedness funding between 2005 and 2009 have been Iraq (US$47.3 million), Haiti (US$16.7

million) and Ethiopia (US$5.9 million).

95

Preparedness identified within project descriptions and totalled using USAID’s OFDA Annual Report 2009.

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Case Study

Annex 2: Institutional profiles

Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) profile

Approach to preparedness

OCHA is mandated by the United Nations (UN) to act as the coordinator of humanitarian response.

As a result the organisation’s approach to preparedness is to enhance the response of all actors, as

part of a comprehensive framework to address DRR. OCHA does not have its own definition of

preparedness, rather it has incorporated the UNISDR definition into its agenda whilst adopting a

multi-hazard approach.

Emergency preparedness is “The knowledge and capacity developed by governments, recovery

organizations, communities and individuals to anticipate, respond to and recover from the impact of

potential, imminent or current hazard events, or emergency situations that call for a humanitarian

response.”96

The definition does not restrict the organisation to addressing natural hazards alone; it incorporates

highly vulnerable areas prone to both risk of disaster as well as conflict. Nevertheless the central

focus of OCHA’s work in this area remains on disasters, as seen from its work on disaster

preparedness planning.

Policies

In 2010 OCHA adopted a new response-preparedness policy.

OCHA’s disaster preparedness objectives are in line with priority 5 of the Hyogo Framework for

Action (HFA), and they aim to strengthen the capacity of all actors, local, regional, national and

international, to respond in a timely manner to assist affected communities. This is achieved by

defining tasks and responsibilities and providing guidance on activities that need to be undertaken in

the case of a disaster.97

OCHA’s preparedness four-year strategy:

“OCHA will aim to more clearly define its role in preparedness, consistent with its mandate, to

support governments and regional organizations in response preparedness. OCHA will intensify

discussions among partners to help provide greater understanding and predictability on institutional

roles, responsibilities and accountabilities.”98

Internal structure

All offices within OCHA (regional and country level as well as headquarters) play an important role in

disaster response and preparedness. At a global level the Preparedness Support Section within the

Emergency Services Branch takes a lead on these issues.

96

OCHA Preparedness Overview 97

OCHA Disaster Response Preparedness Toolkit: DRR Programming 98

Reference Guide for OCHA’s Strategic Framework 2010-2013

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Case Study

Financial flows

Donors to OCHA are grouped in an informal OCHA Donor Support Group (ODSG). They provide

financial, political and technical support towards fulfilling OCHA’s mandated coordination activities.

The group currently comprises Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,

Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, New Zealand (Chair), the Netherlands, Norway,

Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Arab Emirates, United

Kingdom, United States and the European Commission. Members commit to annual funding of a

minimum threshold (currently US$0.5 million), which is preferably unearmarked.99

Figure 53: Unearmarked contributions to OCHA as of 6 December 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on OCHA in 2011: Annual Plan and Budget

99

http://www.unocha.org/about-us/ocha-funded

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

Canada France

Belgium Ireland

Germany Japan

Denmark Other donors

Finland US

New Zealand Australia

Netherlands Norway

UK Sweden

US$ million

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Case Study

Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) profile

Approach to preparedness

One of the focus areas of the Bureau of Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) of the UN

Development Programme (UNDP) is DRR and climate risk management. This reinforces UNDP’s

mandate as the organisation responsible for operationalising natural disaster mitigation, prevention

and preparedness.

BCPR’s strategic goal on DRR is based on the HFA and its five priority areas. It works to build

national capacities to manage risks and reduce loss of life by the identification of institutional gaps

and technical skills that need to be improved for disaster risk management. This is supported by the

promotion of early recovery with the overall aim of protecting development investments.

As part of its DRR policy BCPR addresses preparedness as outlined in HFA priority area five. It has no

set definition on preparedness, rather it uses the one provided by ISDR.

BCPR focuses on preparedness for natural hazards mainly due to the fact that disasters can be

scientifically identified and mapped, whereas this is much more difficult to do in the case of conflict.

In a disaster situation, there is generally speaking more potential for coordination with the

government, whereas this can be more challenging in a conflict situation.

However, conflict is addressed through another of BCPR’s focus areas, that of conflict prevention.

This supports national and local institutions and leadership in their efforts to prevent violence,

manage conflicts constructively, and engage peacefully in political transitions and rapid change

processes.100

Policies

The main DRR goals of BCPR consist of101:

Working closely with countries at risk of disasters involving natural hazards, assisting them in

adopting new laws and policies and establishing new institutions addressing the need to

anticipate and minimize the effects of disasters, prevent losses, and recover when disasters

occur.

Helping high-risk countries to build their ability to analyze, prevent and manage risks related

to climate variability and change— droughts, floods, sea level rise and extreme

temperatures— and define risk management solutions over the short and longer terms.

Integrating climate risk management and disaster risk reduction into broader national

development and recovery plans.

Implementing community-level disaster preparedness and recovery activities such as

contingency planning, early warning systems, and restoration of community infrastructure.

Promoting the use of gender analysis to differentiate women’s risks, impacts and needs from

those of men and encouraging women’s participation and leadership in disaster risk

reduction.

100

UNDP Annual Report 2010: Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery 101

http://www.beta.undp.org/undp/en/home/ourwork/crisispreventionandrecovery/focus_areas/climate_disaster_risk_reduction_and_recovery/introduction.html

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Case Study

Coordinating the UN system for recovery planning after disasters, and collaborating with the

World Bank and the European Commission in integrating tangible risk reduction

commitments into post-disaster needs assessments and recovery frameworks.

Work with the private sector

By engaging with the private sector, UNDP increases the coverage and effectiveness of its risk

reduction programmes. UNDP collaborates with Deutsche Post DHL to develop a disaster

preparedness capacity building programme, Get Airports Ready for Disaster (GARD).

Internal structure

The BCPR is managed at a global level under UNDP’s Office of the Administrator. UNDP country

offices can also engage in preparedness at the national level which is funded through bilateral

country programmes.

Financial flows

The bilateral programmatic work of UNDP country offices in DRR is supported by the BCPR through

two main sources of funding: a portion (7.2%) of UNDP regular resources (known as TRAC 1.1.3), and

voluntary contributions to the Thematic Trust Fund for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (CPR-TTF). For

more information on the CPR-TTF please see the profile on page 108.

In 2010, resources from TRAC 1.1.3 and the CPR-TTF were disbursed in 103 countries. The largest

thematic area, both in terms of contributions and expenditures, was conflict prevention and

recovery, followed by early recovery and disaster risk reduction.102

The amount received for TRAC 1.1.3 in 2010 was $51.6 million. Contributions received through the

CPR-TTF totalled $105.1 million. Of this amount, $42.4 million was unearmarked.

Figure 54: Expenditure of the DRR and recovery window of the CPR-TTF. Source: Development Initiatives based on

UNODP data

102

UNDP Annual Report 2010: Financial Summary

Expenditure in 2010 CPR-TTF (US$m) TRAC 1.1.3 (US$m)

Conflict prevention and recovery 71.7 20.5

Disaster risk reduction and recovery 17.1 7.8

Early recovery (and immediate response under TRAC 1.1.3) 37.4 13.2

Gender equality 5.3 -

Policy and programme support 10.6 10.2

0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18

2007

2008

2009

2010

US$ million

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International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) profile

Approach to preparedness

The International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) system provides a vehicle for cooperation

among governments, organizations and civil society actors to assist in the implementation of the

Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) adopted in 2005. It was set up to coordinate UN DRR activities at

a global level and is therefore not operational. ISDR sits under the authority of the Under-Secretary-

General for Humanitarian Affairs. It is a distinct and separate entity from OCHA, and is not integrated

in the administrative and financial structures and processes of OCHA.

As previously mentioned the ISDR has set a definition for preparedness that is used widely among

actors.103 This is used to inform implementation in line with HFA priority area 5, that of

‘strengthened preparedness’. What is not clear however is to what extent ISDR itself contributes to

preparedness in its coordinator role.

ISDR has developed tools, guidance and training packages that could be considered as institutional

preparedness measures. It coordinated the development of “a guidance and indicator package for

strengthening disaster preparedness efforts” by the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian

Affairs.

ISDR is focused on natural disaster risk and does not incorporate conflict risks. This is apparent when

looking at the General Assembly Resolution on ISDR. :

“[The General Assembly] Acknowledges that disaster risk reduction and increasing resilience to all

types of natural hazard, including geological and hydro meteorological hazards, in developing

countries, in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action , in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action,

can promote the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals, and that reducing

vulnerabilities to these hazards is therefore a high priority for developing countries” 104

Policies

ISDR’s four strategic objectives are integral to driving forward the global disaster risk reduction imperative and in particular implementation of the HFA 2005–2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities in Disasters:105

- Strategic objective 1 - disaster risk reduction accepted and applied for climate change

adaptation

- Strategic objective 2 - measurable increase in investments in disaster risk reduction

- Strategic objective 3 - disaster-resilient cities, schools and hospitals

- Strategic objective 4 - strengthened international system for DRR.

Internal structure

ISDR is managed by a secretariat team that sits in Geneva. The team is split into four separate units

and is led by Margareta Wahlstrom, the Assistant Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction and

Special Representative for the implementation of the HFA.

103

2009 UNISDR Terminology on Disaster Risk Reduction 104

http://unisdr.org/files/resolutions/N1052196.pdf 105

UNISDR summary annual report and financial statement 2010

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Source: Evaluation of the UNISDR Secretariat Asia and Pacific 2009

Work with the private sector

ISDR does engage with the private sector through the private sector advisory group which includes

representatives from the leading companies. ISDR also helps to promote partnerships through the

‘private sector partnerships’ initiative.

Financial flows

ISDR is funded entirely from voluntary contributions. The United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster

Reduction was set up in 2000 to manage these contributions. See the financing mechanism profile

on United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (UNTF-DR) for more information.

The United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs (USG) and the Special

Representative of the Secretary-General for Disaster Risk Reduction provides overall guidance for

the use of the Trust Fund. This guidance is based on priorities set by the General Assembly, and the

outcomes of the Global Platform for Disaster Risk Reduction.

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Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR) profile

Approach to preparedness

GFDRR was set up in 2006 and is managed by the World Bank. Its mission is to mainstream disaster

risk reduction and climate change adaptation in country development strategies by supporting a

country-led and managed implementation of the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA).106

The aim of GFDRR is to build institutional capacity of countries which can then be used to leverage

further funding either from the World Bank or other donors. At risk countries are identified using a

ranking and focus is on natural disasters.

As a result GFDRR does carry out preparedness measures according to the definition provided by

ISDR. It prioritises countries based on risk analysis, however this is confined to natural hazards and

does not include conflict risk.

“GFDRR recognises that natural disasters are a key concern for sustainable development particularly

in a changing climate”. 107

The GFDRR coordinates its activities with the ISDR. World Bank provides funding to ISDR through the

Development Grant Facility (DGF).

Policies

The three objectives of GFDRR are:

1. Enhanced advocacy, partnerships and knowledge management for mainstreaming disaster risk

reduction.

2. Standardised and harmonised disaster risk reduction tools and methodologies.

3. Improved coordination, coherence of actions and communication among ISDR system’s

partners to support HFA implementation.

The GFDRR programmes on DRR are:

Track I - Global and Regional Cooperation: this track aims to enhance global and regional advocacy,

strategic partnerships, and knowledge management for mainstreaming disaster risk reduction whilst

promoting the standardisation of hazard risk management tools, methodologies, and practices.

These activities leverage Track II country programmes for ex-ante investment in prevention,

mitigation, and preparedness activities, particularly in high-risk, low- and middle-income

countries.108

Track II - Risk Reduction: provides ex-ante assistance to developing countries to mainstream and

expand DRR and climate change adaptation (CCA) activities. Under this business line, GFDRR works

closely with the World Bank regional teams, UN agencies, and client governments to integrate DRR

into national poverty reduction strategies and country development agendas.

Track III - Sustainable Recovery: is aimed at early, post-disaster recovery in low-income countries

106

GFDRR Partnership Strategy, 2009-2012 http://gfdrr.org/docs/GFDRR_Partnership_Strategy_2009-2012.pdf 107

GFDRR programs: Disaster Risk Reduction Building Resilience in Changing Climate http://gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Building_Resilience.pdf 108

Track I: Partnership in DRR

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through its Standby Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF). SRFF assists country governments with

reliable and internationally acceptable damage, loss and needs assessments; it provides technical

assistance for subsequent post-disaster recovery and reconstruction planning and financing; and, it

promotes accelerated recovery through needs-based and speedy recovery programmes in extreme

situations.

South-South Cooperation Programme: is a special GFDRR initiative to promote institutional

cooperation among low- and middle-income disaster-prone countries to mainstream DRR and CCA in

development planning. By systematically sharing experiences and lessons learned, disaster-prone

countries facing similar challenges—and operating under comparable financial and political

constraints—can arrive at better solutions to climate change and disaster-related problems.

Internal structure

GFDRR’s day-to-day operations are managed by a secretariat which is housed at the World Bank

headquarters in Washington, DC. The programme manager and head of the secretariat is Mr. Saroj

Kumar Jha, who leads a team of dedicated experts in Washington, DC., Brussels, and Geneva.109

Financial flows

Combined contributions and pledges for tracks II and III have increased dramatically since the

funding period 2006-2008, from US$43.8 million to US$88.1 million for 2010-2011.

For detailed financial information please see the financing mechanism profile on GFDRR on page

110.

2006-2008 2008-2010 2010-2011 2011-2012 2012-2013 2013-2014 Total

43.8 65.5 88.1 50.0 38.9 33.7 320.0

Figure 55: Contributions and pledges by GFDRR to tracks II and III (US$ million), as of July 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on World Bank data

109

http://gfdrr.org/gfdrr/node/62

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International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC)

profile

Approach to preparedness

The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) does not have an official

definition of preparedness but it is included in the constitutional mandate of the organisation and

provides a basis for work carried out by the federation and national societies. The Disaster

Preparedness Policy essentially involves reducing the vulnerability of households and communities in

disaster-prone areas and improving their ability to cope with the effects of disasters as well as

strengthening the capacities of the national societies in disaster preparedness.

When referring to preparedness IFRC tends to use the ISDR definition of disaster preparedness. IFRC

focuses more on natural disasters but when it comes to building the capacities of the national Red

Cross and Red Crescent societies across the world many of their activities align with the International

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)’s work on conflict preparedness at a global level.

The IFRC’s approach to preparedness is to build national capacity. This is done holistically by building

leadership, legislative frameworks, policies etc. The various national societies use their money for

different activities but it can all come under the umbrella of preparedness.

Disaster preparedness is also described as those “measures that help ensure a timely and effective

‘first line’ of response supported by national societies’ volunteers, branches, regional and national

capacities, e.g., community action teams backed up by national society contingency planning and

regional and/or international response teams.”110

Policies

To reduce disaster risk, the International Federation has three main strategies:

to strengthen the preparedness and capacities of communities so that they are in a better

position to respond when a disaster occurs

to promote activities and actions that mitigate the adverse effects of hazards

to protect development projects such as health facilities from the impact of disasters.

The IFRC DRR efforts aim to support the five priorities established by the HFA. The IFRC supports the

HFA priorities through the following “programmatic outputs”111:

increase community orientation in global and national DRR policies and strengthen national

and local institutions for disaster risk reduction

encourage and support expanded community-based programming to identify and tackle

disaster risks

integrate enhanced community-centred DRR measures as part of comprehensive disaster

response management whenever this is applied

strengthen national society capacities to deliver and sustain scaled up programmes in

disaster risk reduction.

110

http://www.ifrc.org/en/what-we-do/disaster-management/preparing-for-disaster/risk-reduction/reducing-disaster-risk/ 111

Global Alliance for Disaster Risk Reduction

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The IFRC’s Framework for Community Safety and Resilience represents a common Red Cross Red

Crescent understanding of DRR, and provides a foundation upon which all activities contributing to

the building of safe and resilient communities can be created, developed and sustained.

The greatest strength of the International Federation in DRR is its background in community-based

programmes, implemented by branches and volunteers rooted in their communities. The rapid

progress of DRR initiatives in South East Asia and the Americas, in particular, has been bolstered by

longstanding community-based programming.

One of the key tools of the IFRC on disaster prevention is the Vulnerability and Capacity Assessment

(VCA). The VCA uses various participatory tools to gauge people’s exposure to and capacity to resist

natural hazards. It is an integral part of disaster preparedness and contributes to the creation of

community-based disaster preparedness programmes at the rural and urban grass-roots level.

The aims of VCA are to:

assess risks and hazards facing communities and the capacities they have for dealing with

them

involve communities, local authorities and humanitarian and development organisations in

the assessment from the outset

draw up action plans to prepare for and respond to the identified risks

identify risk-reduction activities to prevent or lessen the effects of expected hazards, risks

and vulnerabilities.

Internal structure

The IFRC secretariat is responsible for the day-to-day operations whilst the decisions on its policy are

made by governing bodies. In addition there are 186 national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies

around the world that are responsible for their own day-to-day management. National Red Cross or

Red Crescent societies have special status by national laws to function as auxiliary partners.

At the secretariat level the IFRC’s DRR framework has been consistently under the scrutiny of a

Global Alliance on DRR advisory group set up from among disaster management staff, while the

disaster preparedness and risk reduction group of the Participating National Societies has also been

regularly consulted.

Financial flows

In 2010 IFRC launched a specific global appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction. It

received CHF3.4 million (approximately US$3.7 million) making it 105% funded.

Annual budget

Opening balance

Income Total funding

Total expenditure

Closing balance

% Funding vs budget

% Expend vs budget

Shelter and settlement 3.3 0.2 1.6 1.8 1 0.8 54% 30%

Community preparedness & risk reduction

3.2 1.0 2.4 3.4 2.4 0.9 105% 76%

Logistics 4.7 1.3 0.5 1.9 1.5 0.4 40% 32%

Disaster management strategy and coordination

0.8 1.5 -1.0 0.5 0.2 0.5 64% 35%

Disaster services 4.6 0.5 4.1 4.6 3.9 1.0 99% 77% Figure 56: Annual appeal for community preparedness and risk reduction, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on IFRC

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Private sector profile

Policy and structure

Although states have the primary responsibility for implementing measures to reduce disaster

risk, the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) calls for a comprehensive approach to DRR. An

effective DRR policy relies on the efforts of many stakeholders including the private sector.

Therefore public-private partnerships (PPP) are an essential component of the HFA.

Recently, the ISDR and members of the private sector released the Statement of Commitment for

Disaster Prevention, Resilience and Risk Reduction outlining two aims in support of the HFA and

UNISDR risk reduction efforts:

1. The commitment to make DRR and resilience building an integral part of the private sector

sustainable development strategy, goals and programmes.

2. To embrace, support and enact, within the spheres of influence and capacities, ‘Five Essentials

for Business in Disaster Risk Reduction,’ and to partner with the public sector with a focus on

local action, taking into account the most vulnerable population groups, such as women,

children, elderly and the poor.

The private sector issued a Statement of Commitment for Disaster Prevention, Resilience and

Risk Reduction and outlined Five Essentials for Business: 112

1. Promote and develop public-private partnerships for DRR to analyse the root causes of

continued non-resilient activity, such as in the urban built environment and related

infrastructure, and develop frameworks and policies to change these causes. Encourage,

develop and use financial risk-sharing mechanisms to ensure the resilience of facilities and

communities to hazards and allocate adequate resources for these.

2. Leverage sectoral private sector expertise and strengths to advance DRR and mitigation

activities, including enhanced resilience and effective response.

3. Foster a collaborative exchange and dissemination of data: share information on assessment,

monitoring, prediction, forecasting and early warning purposes and action between the public

and private sectors, including through cooperation with UNISDR, ISDR System Partners and

other international, regional and national actors.

4. Support national and local risk assessments and socio-economic cost-benefit analyses and

capacity-building, and demonstrate opportunities where resilience building and DRR is a sound

economic strategy, with attractive returns and competitive advantages.

5. Support the development and strengthening of national and local laws, regulations, policies and

programmes that enhance DRR and improve resilience.

There have been calls to further engage with the private sector on DRR. The Chairs summary

from the 2011 Global Platform on DRR asked for a commitment to “fully engage the private

sector as leaders in the construction of resilient infrastructure, sustainable development of

urban areas, energy safety, and the protection of critical resources.”113

112

http://www.unisdr.org/files/19873_statementofcommitmentbytheprivatese.pdf 113113

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/20102_gp2011chairssummary.pdf

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This is due to the recognition that the private sector can contribute to DRR efforts by partnering with

the local and national government as well as communities by:

taking the lead in ensuring the safety of long-term investments

planning ahead to protect industries and society from disasters and economic disruptions while

ensuring business continuity

investing more in human, technical and financial resources to increase the resilience of nations

and communities.114

114

http://www.unisdr.org/partners/private-sector

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Annex 3: Financing mechanisms profiles

Humanitarian pooled funds

Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF)

Figure 57: Donor contributions to the CERF, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA CERF

According to General Assembly Resolution 60/124 the CERF was established to:

“ensure a more predictable and timely response to humanitarian emergencies, with the objectives of

promoting early action and response to reduce loss of life, enhancing response to time-critical

requirements and strengthening core elements of humanitarian response in underfunded crises,

based on demonstrable needs and on priorities identified in consultation with the affected State as

appropriate.”115

The CERF provides donor governments and the private sector with the opportunity to pool their

financing on a global level in order to respond to those affected by natural disasters and armed

conflicts. Donor contributions are unearmarked. There are two funding windows, one provides rapid

funding to countries in response to an emergency and the other distributes money to countries

where an underfunded crisis has been identified. These decisions are based on needs assessments,

the percentage of needs met and consultations with agencies and humanitarian coordinators.

Since its inception in 2006 the CERF has received total contributions of US$2.1 billion and a further

US$254 million in pledges from more than 150 government and non-government donors, together

with a great number of individual contributions from private citizens.

Direct funding is only available to UN agencies, although some of this money will be channelled to

NGOs. CERF can enable agencies to leverage funding from other donors for a particular project or

programme. They can also apply to the fund for a loan in order to bridge the gap whilst they are

waiting for other funding from donors or country-level pooled funds.

115

http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N05/495/04/PDF/N0549504.pdf?OpenElement

299

385

453

392

429

0%

1%

2%

3%

4%

5%

6%

7%

8%

9%

10%

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

400

450

500

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

US$

mill

ion

Funding to CERF % total HA

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Fund management

The CERF is managed by a secretariat which sits within the UN Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) in New York. The team comprises financial and humanitarian affairs

officers who report to the Chief, currently Steve O’Malley. Direct disbursements from the fund are

administered by the UN controller in New York. There is no funding minimum or maximum limit

imposed by the CERF Secretariat.

In order to provide an oversight of the use of funds an advisory group was established which at

present has 18 members. Their role is to offer periodic policy guidance and expert advice on the use

and impact of the Fund. Members include both donor and recipient government officials,

representatives of humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs), and academic experts.

The majority of donors provide funding on a yearly basis, however there are a few such as the

United Kingdom and Sweden that have set up multi-year funding contracts.

Preparedness financing

At present the CERF does not fund preparedness activities, rather its focus remains on response. In

order for the fund to accept preparedness project proposals it would need agreement by member

states and the advisory group but not necessary a general assembly resolution.

Common humanitarian funds (CHF)

Figure 58: Donor contributions to the CHFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

Common humanitarian funds (CHFs) are in-country pooled mechanisms that allow humanitarian

coordinators (HC) to fund strategically within country-level humanitarian workplans. Funding

received is totally unearmarked. The objective of a CHF is to provide core funding towards the

consolidated appeals process (CAP). As a result these funds are often much larger than emergency

response funds (ERFs). During the allocation process cluster leads and other humanitarian partners

are consulted in order to prioritise the disbursements. At present there are only five funds in

operation: Sudan, South Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Central African Republic (CAR)

and Somalia. In 2010 these funds attracted US$261 million from donors which equated to 2.4% of

total humanitarian aid that year.

Fund management

0.0%

0.5%

1.0%

1.5%

2.0%

2.5%

3.0%

3.5%

0

50

100

150

200

250

300

350

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

US$

mill

ion

Funding to CHFs % total HA

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Case Study

CHFs are overseen in-country by the humanitarian coordinator and managed on a daily basis by

OCHA. Money received by donors and any disbursements made are administered by UNDP.

Allocation rounds are typically undertaken two to three times a year, with the majority of CHF funds

allocated at the beginning of the year. Allocation proposals are developed and submitted by

agencies and organisations; these are then examined by a technical review board. Based on the

outcome of the review the HC makes a final decision. An advisory board with donor, UN and NGO

representation is on hand to advise the HC on policy issues and strategic direction of the fund.

In general 10% of the CHF budget is reserved for emergency response allocation.

Preparedness financing

Typically CHFs fund planned humanitarian response according to needs identified and outlined in the

country’s humanitarian action plan. Occasionally emergency preparedness activities are included in

these plans. Below are examples of projects that have been funded.

CHF Implementing

organisation

Year US$ Description

Somalia Caritas 2011 611,999 Emergency response and preparedness in

drought-affected Eastern Somaliland

Somalia UNPF 2011 500,000 Emergency preparedness and response to

pregnancy and childbirth complications in IDPs

Somalia WHO 2011 151,679 Health cluster coordination and emergency

preparedness in Somalia

South Sudan WHO 2011 200,000 Health cluster coordination, emergency

preparedness and humanitarian action

South Sudan WHO 2011 1,675,000 Strengthening epidemic preparedness and

response capacity at all levels in Southern

Sudan

Sudan UNOPS 2011 40,000 Strengthening leadership, preparedness and

capacity to respond to humanitarian

emergencies

DRC UNICEF 2010 511,013 Urgent stock reserves, capacity building and

innovation in the shelter and non-food items

(NFI) sector

DRC World Vision

International

2010 285,930 Pre-positioning contingency stock for shelter

and NFI cluster in North Kivu

Sudan UNICEF 2010 250,000 Strengthening system-wide preparedness and

technical capacity to respond to humanitarian

emergencies

Sudan Catholic Relief

Services

2010 106821 Shelter, infrastructure and emergency

preparedness for IDPs in Khartoum State

Sudan WHO 2010 253312 Health sector coordination, emergency

preparedness and humanitarian action

Figure 59: Examples of preparedness activities funded by CHFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

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Emergency response funds (ERF)

Figure 60: Donor contributions to the ERFs, 2006-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

The main aim of ERFs is to provide rapid and flexible funding to in-country actors to address

unforeseen humanitarian needs. ERFs also provide governments and the private sector with an

opportunity to pool their unearmarked contributions to a specific country to enable timely and

reliable humanitarian assistance in response to emergencies. For those donors that do not have a

presence in country or in-depth country knowledge, ERFs offer a platform through which they can

channel their funding. In 2010 funding to ERFs reached US$150 million, which was mainly due to the

support for the funds in Haiti and Pakistan.

ERF funding is available to both NGOs and UN agencies for emergency response and occasionally

emergency preparedness. There are limits set on the size of projects which vary between each fund

and range from US$100,000-700,000. This means that project sizes are usually smaller when viewed

alongside bilateral funding or projects supported by CHFs where they exist, and can attract more

proposals from NGOs.

Fund management

OCHA manages the ERF in country. All project applications have to be approved by the HC before

they can receive a grant from the fund. The financial administration is in most cases managed by

UNDP.

21

39

99

81

150

0.0%

0.2%

0.4%

0.6%

0.8%

1.0%

1.2%

1.4%

1.6%

0

20

40

60

80

100

120

140

160

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Funding to ERFs % total HA

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Preparedness financing

In general ERFs fund lifesaving activities in response to a humanitarian emergency. However there

have been some examples of ERFs funding preparedness activities.

ERF Implementing

organisation

Year US$ Description

Yemen Care International 2011 225,000 Contingency / response plan for

humanitarian assistance in Yemen

Zimbabwe Médecins du

Monde France

2011 92,129 Reinforcement of early warning systems

and emergency obstetric care

Kenya World Vision

International

2010 80,000 Flood preparedness to reduce the

incidence of Rift Valley fever

Zimbabwe UNHCR 2009 70,000 Prepositioning of kits and supplies in

readiness for cholera epidemic

Somalia Norwegian

Refugee Council

2009 500,000

Emergency preparedness and response

to fires in Bossaso and provision of

temporary shelter

Somalia Various 2009 100,000 Flood preparedness

Figure 61: Examples of preparedness activities funded by ERFs. Source: Development Initiatives based on UN OCHA FTS

Project proposal •Ideas for a project are discussed with OCHA •Organisation submits proposal to OCHA in-country office

Proposal review by Technical Review Commitee •A Technical Committee reviews project proposal and criteria is cross-

checked •Possible amendments needed by organisation to proposal

Approval and verification •The proposal is approved, grant agreement is completed by applicant •The grant agreement is sent to Geneva for verification •Grant agreement is returned and signed by applicant

Fund transfer •Signed by Humanitarian Coordinator •A request is sent to Geneva to release funds

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Disaster risk reduction (DRR) pooled funds

Crisis Prevention and Recovery Thematic Trust Fund (CPR-TTF)

Figure 62: Contributions to the CPR-TTF, 2001-2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on UNDP data

The CPR-TTF was established in 2000 by the UNDP. The aim of the fund is to provide UNDP with a flexible funding mechanism that it can use to respond in a timely manner following a natural disaster or complex emergency, to reduce disaster risk or prevent conflict. Since its inception, the fund has mobilised more than US$ 1.1 billion.

There are five thematic windows of the CPR-TTF, one of which focuses on DRR and recovery. UNDPs

goals on DRR are in line with the Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) and include strengthening

disaster preparedness for effective response.

CPR-TTF contributions may be ‘earmarked’ to target specific thematic areas or country programmes,

or ‘unearmarked’ which enables UNDP to respond more flexibly and quickly to country crisis

prevention and recovery needs. The CPR-TTF:

works closely with countries at risk of disasters involving natural hazards, assisting them in

adopting new laws and policies and establishing new institutions addressing the need to

anticipate and minimise the effects of disasters, prevent losses, and recover when disasters

occur

helps high-risk countries to build their ability to analyse, prevent and manage risks related to

climate variability and change— droughts, floods, sea level rise and extreme temperatures—

and define risk management solutions over the short and longer term

facilitates the integration of climate risk management and DRR into broader national

development and recovery plans

implements community-level disaster preparedness and recovery activities such as

contingency planning, early warning systems, and restoration of community infrastructure

promotes the use of gender analysis to differentiate women’s risks, impacts and needs from

those of men and encourages women’s participation and leadership in DRR

0 50 100 150 200 250 300

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

US$ million

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is the coordinator of the UN system for recovery planning after disasters, collaborating with

the World Bank and the European Commission in integrating tangible risk reduction

commitments into post-disaster needs assessments and recovery frameworks.

Fund management

UNDP's Bureau for Crisis Prevention and Recovery (BCPR) serves as the fund manager, responsible

for both its fiduciary oversight and programmatic results.

All projects requesting funding from the CPR-TTF that are unearmarked or earmarked for specific

thematic areas are submitted to the BCPR Project Appraisal Committee (BPAC). The Committee

meets monthly (or on an ad hoc basis in case of specific emergency situations) to review each

project, based on the following criteria:

alignment with the funding criteria of the fund, the Bureau Strategy, and the crisis

prevention and recovery priorities of the region and country where the project will take

place

technical soundness of the project design, including gender equality, monitoring and

evaluation, and knowledge management components

implementation capacity of the sponsoring country office (based on a track record of

successful delivery of crisis prevention and recovery projects), and

an appropriate and reasonable budget that reflects a diversity of funding sources, including

commitments from other partners and from the UNDP Country Office.

Once a project has the endorsement of the Committee, the BCPR Director approves the project for

funding.

Preparedness financing

Expenditure is reported according to the five windows of the fund. It is not possible to extract the

exact amount that is spent on preparedness within the DRR and recovery window. Information

gathered from UNDP suggest that between 2004 and 2009 US$35.6 million was spent on

preparedness projects, which accounted for 4.1% of the total spent on prevention and recovery.

Of the five thematic windows, the disaster risk reduction and recovery window had the third highest

expenditure between 2007 and 2010, US$51.2 million (12.3% of total).

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Figure 63: Expenditure of the CPR-TTF according to the five windows of the fund 2007-2010. Source: Development

Initiatives based on UNDP data

United Nations Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction (UN-TFDR)

Figure 64: Contributions to UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data

The UN-TFDR was set up in 2000 to finance the United Nations International Strategy for Disaster

Reduction (ISDR) through voluntary contributions.

The mandate of UNISDR is to serve as the focal point in the UN system for the coordination of DRR

and to ensure synergies among the disaster reduction activities in development, humanitarian and

environmental fields.

The mission of ISDR is to be an effective coordinator and guide for all the ISDR partners, globally and

regionally, and to:

mobilise political and financial commitments to DRR and Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-

2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (HFA);

develop and sustain a robust, multi-stakeholder system

0

50

100

150

200

250

Conflict prevention and

recovery

Early recovery Disaster risk reduction and

recovery

Policy and programme

support

Gender equality

US$

mill

ion

2010

2009

2008

2007

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

US$

mill

ion

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provide relevant knowledge and guidance.

Donor contributions to the Trust Fund generally come from an humanitarian budget as this allows

flexibility to support a global fund - development budgets can be restricted to providing resources

for country programmes.

Fund management

The ISDR Secretariat which is overseen by the Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs

(USG) and the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) for DRR provides overall

guidance for the use of the Trust Fund.

Preparedness funding

It is difficult to ascertain exactly how much of the money disbursed by the fund is spent on

preparedness, if any. Expenditure is reported in line with the four strategic objectives (SO) of ISDR.

Figure 65: Expenditure of the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction according to the strategic objectives of ISDR, 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on ISDR data

Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery (GFDRR)

The GFDRR was launched in 2006. It is a partnership of 38 countries and seven international

organisations that are committed to supporting the implementation of the HFA.

The GFDRR operates through multiple donor funds to enable low- and middle-income countries that

are at most risk to mainstream disaster reduction in national development strategies and plans. The

work of the GFDRR is divided into three tracks, all of which have funds to provide resources for the

programmes of work.

Track I – provides support to ISDR: through this track the World Bank provides financial support to

the ISDR Secretariat to enhance global and regional advocacy, partnerships, and knowledge

management.

5.16 23%

5.65 25%

4.62 20%

7.13 32%

SO1: Disaster reduction accepted and applied for climate change adaptation;

SO2: Measurable increases in investments in disaster risk reduction;

SO3: Disaster-resilient cities, schools and hospitals;

SO4: Strengthened international system for disaster risk reduction

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Track II – supports countries to mainstream DRR: this track consists of donor contributions provided

to various trust funds administered by the World Bank. It also supports strengthening of national

institutions for disaster reduction and preparation of risk mitigation projects, and emergency

preparedness.116 Track II has a two-category financial structure: core funds and non-core funds.

Core funds are provided through a multi-donor trust fund (MDTF) for mainstreaming disaster risk

reduction in country strategies.

Donors: Australia, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, European Commission, France, Germany,

Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the Netherlands, the

United Kingdom and the United States and the World Bank.

Non-core funds are earmarked by donors to specific themes, activities, countries, or regions and

provided via single donor trust funds.

Donors: Australia, Japan, and Spain.

The recipients of Track II funds include country governments, United Nations agencies, International

Financial Institutions (IFIs), regional intergovernmental organisations or research organisations.

The South-South Cooperation grants: complement track II and aim to strengthen the leadership role

of developing countries in finding effective and efficient risk reduction and climate change

adaptation solutions.

Donors: Italy and Norway.

Track III - supports primarily low-income countries for accelerated disaster recovery: donor

contributions are provided to trust funds administered by the World Bank that make up a Standby

Recovery Financing Facility (SRFF).

Like the UN Trust Fund for Disaster Reduction, donor contributions to GFDRR generally come from a

humanitarian budget.

Fund management

The GFDRR is managed by the World Bank on behalf of the participating donor partners and other

partnering stakeholders.

Proposals for Track II are submitted by national authorities or ISDR system members and must go

through the GFDRR Secretariat for vetting and approval. These activities should demonstrate

commitment to increased investment in disaster reduction and emergency preparedness.

Track II beneficiary countries are low- or middle-income countries that

are prone to high disaster risks with more than 30% of their population and gross

domestic product in areas of risk to one or more hazards, and

116

https://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Partnership_Charter_2010.pdf

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require special attention due to adverse geo-economical settings, such as small-island

and fragile states.117

Selection of these countries will be based on procedures approved by the Consultative Group, and

the number of countries selected will depend on available financing. Proposals are assessed by the

GFDRR Secretariat against the set of criteria which follows.

Consistency with the GFDRR mission: all activities must be consistent with the GFDRR’s

overarching objective of mainstreaming DRR and assisting sustainable recovery to help

eliminate poverty and achieve sustainable development.

Government commitment: there must be clear evidence of country ownership of country-

specific activities.

Donor coordination: the GFDRR activities must be undertaken in a way that promotes

effective coordination with the activities of GFDRR partners.

Co-financing: all proposals should include co-financing with a target of at least 10% financing

from the proponent or the relevant low- or middle-income country government, as well as

from other sources. Co-financing can be in the form of in-kind assistance.118

Preparedness financing

The expenditures of GFDRR are broken down according to the priority areas of the HFA. Up until

September 2010, US$13 million had been spent on priority area five, disaster preparedness. This

accounted for 14.5% of the total. It is possible that preparedness activities were also funded under

other priority areas.

Figure 66: Expenditure of GFDRR according to HFA priority areas up until September 2010. Source: Development Initiatives based on GFDRR data

117

https://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Partnership_Charter_2010.pdf 118

https://www.gfdrr.org/gfdrr/sites/gfdrr.org/files/publication/GFDRR_Partnership_Charter_2010.pdf

HFA 1; 44.6; 49%

HFA 2; 20.6; 23%

HFA 3; 2.9; 3%

HFA 4; 9.1; 10%

HFA 5; 13.0; 15%

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Climate change pooled funds

Least Developed Country Fund (LDCF) of the Global Environment Facility (GEF)

The LDCF was established in 2001 under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate

Change (UNFCCC) as part of the GEF. The primary objective of this fund is to address the adaptation

needs of the 49 least developed countries as identified by the UN119. These countries are deemed to

be especially vulnerable to the adverse impacts of climate change. A reduction in vulnerability is

sought through the implementation of National Adaptation Programmes of Action (NAPAs) which

support the countries in becoming climate resilient. As of November 2010 45 countries had

completed their NAPAs.

Once the NAPAs have been completed the LDCF focuses on reducing vulnerability of those sectors

and resources that are central to development and livelihoods such as water, agriculture and food

security, health, disaster risk management and prevention, infrastructure and fragile ecosystems.

Fund management

Implementing partners of the LDCF are ten selected GEF agencies. Four of these are UN agencies and

the remainder are international finance institutions. These agencies partner with eligible

governments and NGOs in country in the development, implementation and management of LDCF

projects.

The overall management of the LDCF rests with the World Bank as trustee to the GEF. It is

responsible for mobilising resources for the fund and the disbursements to the GEF agencies. The

process for project approval is:

1. Council approval – a project proposal is submitted by a GEF agency to the GEF Secretariat

for review. This is provided within ten business days. It is circulated for comments among all

GEF agencies. Once approved by the CEO the proposals are sent to the Scientific and

Technical Advisory Panel (STAP) for screening.

2. Approval by GEF Council – the GEF Council reviews a selection of project proposals that

have been recently cleared by the GEF Secretariat.

3. Endorsement of the full project proposal by the GEF CEO (commitment of funds) – the GEF

Agency submits the full project documentation to the Secretariat along with a request for

CEO endorsement. The Secretariat has ten business days to review and submit for

endorsement. Revisions by the agencies may be necessary or the project preparation may be

cancelled altogether. If the proposal meets conditions for endorsement it will be circulated

among council members for a four-week review period.

4. Implementation supervision, monitoring and final evaluation – implementation is carried

out by the agency. The Secretariat will conduct annual monitoring reviews. Agencies are

required to submit the final evaluation report to GEF evaluation office.

Projects can be tracked using the GEF online project database.

Preparedness financing

119

For a least of these countries please visit http://www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=3641&lang=1

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The LDCF is mandated to fund climate change adaptation activities; these can include elements of

preparedness.120

Country GEF agency LCDF grant

US$

Co-financing

US$

Description

Rwanda UNEP 3,160,000

3,300,000

Reducing vulnerability to climate change by

establishing early warning and disaster

preparedness systems and support for integrated

watershed management in flood-prone areas

Lao PDR UNDP 4,700,000 25,927,478

Effective governance for small-scale rural

infrastructure and disaster preparedness in a

changing climate

Thailand UNDP 869,091 2,000,000 Strengthening the capacity of vulnerable coastal

communities to address the risk of climate change

and extreme weather events

Lesotho UNEP 1,595,000 1,763,000 Improvement of early warning systems to reduce

impact of climate change, and capacity building to

integrate climate change into development plans

Figure 67: Examples of preparedness activities funded by LDCF. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF data

According to the GEF, of the US$147.4 million that has been approved for projects up until March

2011, US$42.8 million has been allocated to disaster preparedness and risk management activities,

which accounts for 29% and is the largest share of funding.

Figure 68: Allocation of LDCF resources to approved projects, up to 2011. Source: Development Initiatives based on GEF

data

120

http://www.gefonline.org

Disaster preparedness

and risk management

29%

Water resources management

19%

Agriculture/food security

26%

Health 1%

Natural resources

management 8%

Community level adaptation

15%

Infrastructure 2%

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Strategic Climate Fund (SCF)

The SCF was created in 2008 and is one of two trust funds operating within the Climate Investment

Funds (CIF). Financing is allocated according to the three programmes of the fund:

the Pilot Program for Climate Resilience; provides funding to multilateral development

banks to pilot ways in which climate risk and resilience can be integrated into development

planning and implementation building on National Adaptation Programmes of Action

(NAPAs)

the Forest Investment Program; funding will aim to reduce deforestations and forest

degradation and promote improved sustainable forest management, leading to emission

reductions and the protection of carbon reservoirs

the Program for Scaling-Up Renewable Energy in Low Income Countries; will demonstrate

the economic, social and environmental viability of low carbon development pathways in

the energy sector by creating new economic opportunities and increasing energy access

through the use of renewable energy.121

Eligible countries are those that have a multilateral development bank programme in operation. Implementation is carried out by these banks using their core processes.

Fund management

An administrative unit for the SCF sits within the World Bank. Decision making rests with the SCF Trust Fund Committee and the Sub-Committees for each programme. The Fund Committee or Sub-Committees decide on the programming priorities and financing modalities for the SCF, while the development and management of individual funded projects and programmes will be country-led. The Sub-Committee consists of the following.

Up to six representatives from contributor countries to the SCF Program, identified through

a consultation among such countries. At least one of these should be a member of the SCF

Trust Fund Committee.

A matching number of representatives from eligible recipient countries of the SCF

programme. At least one of these should be a member of the SCF Trust Fund Committee.

Such other representatives designated by the SCF Trust Fund Committee for this purpose.122

The functions of the Sub-Committee include approving programming priorities, operational criteria and financing modalities, approving financing for programmes and projects and ensuring cooperation between the SCF programme, the GEF and UN country activities to maximise synergies and avoid overlap.

In addition to the SCF Trust Fund Committee and the SCF Sub-Committee(s), points to note about the governance and organisational structure of the SCF include:

The Partnership Forum: a broad-based meeting of stakeholders, including contributor and

eligible recipient countries, multilateral development banks (MDBs), UN organisations, GEF,

UNFCCC, the Adaptation Fund, bilateral development agencies, non-governmental

organisations, private sector entities, and scientific and technical experts.

121

http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/strategic-climate-fund 122

http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/strategic-climate-fund#TOC-Fund-Governance

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an MDB Committee: this facilitates collaboration, coordination and information exchange

among the MDBs.

Preparedness funding

Due to a lack of available data it has not been possible to ascertain whether any of the funds’ expenditure has gone towards preparedness.

Adaptation fund

Although the fund was proposed in 2001 during the seventh conference of the United Nations

Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), it only became operational in 2009.

The fund was established to provide financing for adaptation projects that contribute to reducing

the adverse effects of climate change, for developing countries that are Parties to the Kyoto

Protocol.

The Adaptation Fund supports the following activities:123

adaptation activities, where sufficient information is available to warrant such activities, in

the areas of water resources management, land management, agriculture, health,

infrastructure development, fragile ecosystems, including mountainous ecosystems, and

integrated coastal zone management

improving the monitoring of diseases and vectors affected by climate change, and

related forecasting and early-warning systems, and in this context improving disease control

and prevention

supporting capacity building, including institutional capacity, for preventive measures,

planning, preparedness and management of disasters relating to climate change, including

contingency planning, in particular, for droughts and floods in areas prone to extreme

weather events

strengthening existing and, where needed, establishing national and regional centres and

information networks for rapid response to extreme weather events, utilising information

technology as much as possible.

Implementing organisations are comprised of national and multilateral agencies accredited by the

fund. There are currently four accredited national entities and seven multilateral agencies.

Contributions to the fund are comprised of a 2% share of certified emission reductions (CERs) issued

for a clean development mechanism (CDM) project plus voluntary contributions from country

governments.

Fund management

The Adaptation Fund is supervised and managed by the Adaptation Fund Board (AFB). The AFB is

composed of 16 members and 16 alternates and meets at least twice a year. It has created a results-

based management and evaluation framework to ensure coherence of the Fund’s projects.

123

http://www.climatefundsupdate.org/listing/adaptation-fund

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The Global Environment Facility (GEF) provides secretariat services to the AFB and the World

Bank serves as trustee of the fund.

Preparedness funding

The projects highlighted below have elements of preparedness in their detailed project outlines. It is

not possible to extract the amount of money that would be spent on preparedness alone.

Country Implementing

agency

Amount

approved

Amount

disbursed

Description

Ecuador WFP 7,449,468 2,647,029 Enhancing resilience of communities to the

adverse effects of climate change on food

security, in Pichincha Province and the Jubones

River basin

Egypt WPF Not yet approved Preparing the Lake Nassar Region In Southern

Egypt as a Climate Adaptation Hub

Samoa UNDP Not yet approved Enhancing resilience of coastal communities of

Samoa to climate change

Figure 69: Examples of funding for preparedness through the Adaptation Fund. Source: Development Initiatives based on Adaptation Fund data

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Annex 4: Literature review 1. United Nations (UN), Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: Guidelines for

Natural Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. This document is the output of the

World Conference on Natural Disaster Reduction, held in Yokohama, Japan, from 23 to 27 May

1994. It provides guidelines for natural disaster prevention, preparedness and mitigation.

2. UNISDR, The Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the

Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters. This document is an agreement by 168

governments with a distinctive goal of “substantial reduction of disaster losses, in lives as well as

the social, economic and environmental assets of communities and countries” by 2015. The

Hyogo Framework for Action (HFA) offers guiding principles, priorities for action and practical

means for achieving disaster reliance for vulnerable communities.

3. UNISDR-OCHA, Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for

Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework. This Guidance and Indicator Tool is designed

to provide guidance on how to meet the challenge of being prepared to respond as set out in

Priority Five of the HFA. This tool aims primarily to assist governments, local authorities, and

other stakeholders concerned with natural hazards in potentially vulnerable settings.

4. World Bank, Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters. This study looks at disasters primarily through

an economic lens. The study provides useful analysis to increase resilience and minimise the

impact of natural disasters. The report concludes with four main policy implications for

governments and donors.

5. UNISDR, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2011). The 2011 Global

Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction - revealing risk, redefining development -

contributes to achieving the HFA by monitoring risk patterns and progress in DRR. Additionally, it

provides guidance and suggestions to governments and non-governmental actors alike, on how

they can, together, reduce disaster risks. This landmark publication builds on and moves beyond

the analysis provided by the inaugural report in 2009.

6. Harmer, Taylor, and Haver, Thematic CAP for National Disaster Preparedness: Feasibility Study.

This report was commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in order to examine

the feasibility of a thematic consolidated appeal process (CAP) for national disaster preparedness

and response capacity. It ultimately concludes that a CAP is not the most appropriate mechanism.

The research process highlighted some important systemic issues, however, and the report

moves from its initial focus on the CAP to explore a range of options to improve the coherence

and predictability of financing for disaster preparedness. It does so with the caveat that there

was not sufficient scope in the study to examine the feasibility of each of these alternatives in

significant detail.

7. UNISDR and Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies - Kyoto University, A Guide

forImplementing the Hyogo Framework for Action by Local Stakeholders.The aim of this

publication is to serve as a guide for HFA implementation for local governments and stakeholders

by customising the International Strategy for Disaster Reduction (ISDR) publication “Words Into

Action: A Guide to Implementing the Hyogo Framework” (2007) for local governments and

stakeholders to support their HFA implementation to take comprehensive DRR actions.

8. UNISDR, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009). The Report is the first

biennial global assessment of DRR prepared in the context of the ISDR. The report urges a radical

shift in development practices, and a major new emphasis on resilience and disaster planning. Its

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primary focus is on the disaster risk and poverty nexus in a context of global climate change.

9. UNISDR, Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction: Summary and Recommendations

(2009). This summary presents the key findings and recommendations of the report, which

identifies disaster risk, analyses its causes, shows that these causes can be addressed and

recommends the means to do so.

10. UNISDR, Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 Mid-Term Review. This report presents the

findings of the Mid-Term Review of the HFA, and is aimed at critically analysing the extent to

which HFA implementation has progressed and at helping countries and their institutional

partners identify practical measures to increase commitment, resourcing, and efforts in its

further implementation.

11. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, Handbook for RCs and HCs on Emergency Preparedness and

Response. This report outlines key actions resident coordinators (RCs) and humanitarian

coordinator (HCs) should take to prepare and respond to humanitarian emergencies.

Additionally, it provides a checklist for RCs and HCs on emergency preparedness and response.

12. UNISDR, HFA Progress in Asia Pacific: Regional Synthesis Report 2009-2011. This document

provides an insight into the HFA implementation progress in the Asia-Pacific region since 2005,

with particular focus on the 2009-2011 period. It also captures the progress made against the

declarations and outcomes of the four Asian Ministerial Conferences on DRR (AMCDRR) held in

Beijing, New Delhi, Kuala Lumpur and Incheon.

13. CNA and OXFAM, An Ounce of Prevention: Preparing for the Impact of a Changing Climate on US

Humanitarian and Disaster Response. This report examines the likely impacts of a changing

climate on the US Government’s civilian and military humanitarian response systems. It analyses

both humanitarian and security implications of climate change as well as how the US Government

responds to overseas climate-related emergencies.

14. UNOCHA, Emergency Preparedness Forum III Final Report.This document reports on the third

annual Emergency Preparedness Forum (EPF III) to bring together OCHA colleagues dealing with

preparedness in the field and headquarters, and was expanded to encompass preparedness

partners. The report is organised around the six sessions of the forum, all linked to OCHA

Strategic Framework objectives related to preparedness, with a view to identifying 'actionable

outcomes' or tangible results. Under the main theme: 'Capacity Assessment and Development' it

underscores the importance of this cross-cutting topic that touches upon many different

preparedness issues.

15. Benson, Twigg, and Rossetto, Tools for Mainstreaming Disaster Risk Reduction.This report is a

series of 14 guidance notes for use by development organisations in adapting programming,

project appraisal and evaluation tools to mainstream DRR into their development work in hazard-

prone countries. This preliminary note outlines the rationale underlying the series, introduces the

guidance notes and highlights critical factors contributing to the successful mainstreaming of DRR

into development policy and practice.

16. Tearfund, Turning Practice into Policy: Linking Good Practice CBDRM with Government Policy and

Practice. This report is the result of a two-phased research project addressing the essential needs

for a strong national policy framework to support and scale-up Community-Based Disaster Risk

Management (CBDRM). “The report highlights the important role that institutional donors can

play in creating a national political environment supportive of CBDRM.” This document provides

evidence for the NGO community to “develop DRR advocacy initiatives that suit their own

country and location context.”

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17. DIFID and DEV, Disaster Risk Reduction: a Development Concern. A Scoping Study on Links

between Disaster Risk Reduction, Poverty and Development. The document explores evidence on

linkages between poverty alleviation, development and DRR, and seeks to establish why DRR is

often not part of development policy and planning. It provides strong evidence supporting that

“poverty alleviation, development and disaster risk reduction are strongly interdependent.”

18. World Health Organization (WHO), Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness: WHO Six-Year

Strategy for the Health Sector and Community Capacity Development.This report provides an

overview of the WHO’s strategy on health sector risk reduction and emergency preparedness and

community capacity development as well as implementation and monitoring and funding

resources.

19. Moench and The DRR Study Team (ISET), From Risk to Resilience - Benefits and Costs of Disaster

Risk Reduction. This is a series of nine papers that evaluate the benefits and costs of DRR across a

series of case areas in India, Nepal and Pakistan. It develops methods and analytical cases that

both illustrate how the benefits and costs of different risk reduction strategies can be evaluated

under different climate scenarios and also generates analytical results for the risk reduction

strategies evaluated.

20. Feinstein International Center (FIC) - Tufts University, Examining Linkages between Disaster Risk

Reduction and Livelihoods: Literature Review. The purpose of this review is to establish baseline

definitions and trends of DRR programming, review existing literature and suggest gaps in

knowledge that will help to focus the content of the subsequent field case studies. The study

concludes with seven recommendations on issues that should be given greater attention in the

DRR literature, research and programming.

21. UNISDR, Linking Disaster Risk Reduction and Poverty Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons

Learned. This publication outlines initiatives that have successfully linked poverty reduction and

DRR in various parts of the world. It provides examples of several projects and initiatives showing

how DRR can be integrated into poverty reduction (or vice versa) to help reduce the vulnerability

of the poor and protect their livelihoods and development gains.

22. UNDP, Gender, Climate Change and Community-Based Adaptation. This publication serves as a

guidebook for designing and implementing gender-sensitive community-based adaptation

programmes and projects. The guidebook provides simple tools and practical advice on how to

take a gender-sensitive approach to planning and implementing adaptation projects and

programmes. It will be a useful reference for development practitioners and/or policymakers

working in this field.

23. UNISDR, Risk Returns. This book was published for launch at the third Session of Global Platform

for Disaster Reduction (GPDR) and it is the latest in a series of volumes addressing natural

disasters, and how their impact can be reduced by effective capacity building and prevention

strategies. The book presents a selection of examples and experiences of disaster reduction that

respond to the need for identifying good practices and sharing experiences and information,

identified by many - including governments - during the preparatory process for the GPDR.

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Reduction, 2007. http://www.proventionconsortium.org/?pageid=32&projectid=1.

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prevention-screen.pdf.

DIFID and DEV. Disaster Risk Reduction: a Development Concern. A Scoping Study on Links between

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Tearfund. Turning Practice into Policy: Linking Good Practice CBDRM with Government Policy and

Practice, 2007.

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2927_2927PracticeintoPolicyD5Tearfund.pdf.

UNDP. Gender, Climate Change and Community-Based Adaptation, 2010.

http://www.beta.undp.org/content/dam/aplaws/publication/en/publications/womens-

empowerment/gender-climate-change-and-community-based-adaptation/Gender Climate

Change and Community Based Adaptation (2).pdf.

UNISDR. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2009), 2009.

http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/report/index.php?id=9413.

———. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction (2011), 2011.

http://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/2011/en/home/index.html.

———. Global Assessment Report on Disaster Risk Reduction: Summary and Recommendations

(2009), 2009. http://www.preventionweb.net/files/9414_GARsummary.pdf.

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———. HFA Progress in Asia Pacific: Regional Synthesis Report 2009-2011, 2011.

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/21158_hfaprogressinasiapacific20092011.pdf.

———. Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015 Mid-Term Review, 2011.

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/18197_midterm.pdf.

———. Linking Disaster Risk Reduction and Poverty Reduction: Good Practices and Lessons Learned,

2008.

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/3293_LinkingDisasterRiskReductionPovertyReduction.pdf

———. Risk Returns. Tudor Rose, 2011. http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/publications/20253.

———. The Hyogo Declaration and the Hyogo Framework for Action 2005-2015: Building the

Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters, 2007.

http://www.unisdr.org/eng/hfa/docs/Hyogo-framework-for-action-english.pdf.

UNISDR, and Graduate School of Global Environmental Studies - Kyoto University. A Guide for

Implementing the Hyogo Framework for Action by Local Stakeholders, 2010.

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/13101_ImplementingtheHFA.pdf.

UNISDR-OCHA. Disaster Preparedness for Effective Response: Guidance and Indicator Package for

Implementing Priority Five of the Hyogo Framework, 2008.

http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2909_Disasterpreparednessforeffectiveresponse.pdf.

UNOCHA. Emergency Preparedness Forum III Final Report, 2010.

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United Nations (UN). Yokohama Strategy and Plan of Action for a Safer World: Guidelines for Natural

Disaster Prevention, Preparedness and Mitigation. Mobilization. Yokohama, 1994.

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World Bank. Natural Hazards, UnNatural Disasters, 2010.

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World Health Organization (WHO). Risk Reduction and Emergency Preparedness: WHO Six-Year

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http://www.preventionweb.net/files/2023_VL206720.pdf.

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Annex 5: List of people consulted/interviewed Name Organisation Position

Abdessalam Ould Ahmed

FAO Liaison Office, Geneva Director

Amy Horton WFP Deputy Chief, Emergency Preparedness and Response

Arman Aardal Norway Senior Advisor, Humanitarian Affairs Section, Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Asbjorn Wee OECD Administrator for the OECD-DAC International Network on Conflict and Fragility

Ben Reese AusAID Nepal Nepal Consortium Manager

Cinthia Diaz Herrera WHO External Relations

Daniel Kull GFDRR Senior Disaster Risk Management Specialist

Daniel Longhurst FAO Liaison Office, Geneva Humanitarian Affairs Officer

Denise Brown WFP Senior Donor Relations Officer

Eltje Aderhold German mission First Secretary

Esther Kuisch OCHA FTS Manager

Etienne Labande WFP Deputy Chief Preparedness and Response Branch

Giuseppe Angelini ECHO Nepal Bhutan/Nepal desk

Grant Morrison AusAID Manager, Disaster Risk Reduction

Haakon Gram-Johannessen

Permanent Mission of Norway in Geneva

Counsellor

Hemang Karelia GFDRR Disaster Risk Management Analyst

Isabel Gomes World Vision International Director, Humanitarian Strategy and Initiatives

Jakob Hallgren Sweden's Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Deputy Director

Johan Carlsson Permanent Mission of Sweden First Secretary

John Harding ISDR Secretariat Programme Officer

Johnathan Abrahams WHO Coordinator, Risk Reduction & Emergency Preparedness

Katarina Toll OCHA Emergency Services Branch

Kristin Hedstrom ECHO Policy Officer

Lis Christensen Embassy of Denmark in Nepal First Secretary, Human Rights and Good Governance

Mateusz Buczek OCHA CAP Section

Maxx Dilley UNDP BCPR Chief of Disaster Risk Reduction and Recovery

Michel LePechoux UNICEF Chair of Sub-working Group (SWG) on preparedness

Moira Reddick UNDP NRRC coordinator

Pankaj Mishra IFRC Senior Officer, Preparedness, Disaster Services Department

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Pascal Desbiens Permanent Mission of Canada, Geneva

Counsellor

Patrick Dupont European Union Delegation in Geneva

Humanitarian Affairs (First Secretary)

Per Byman Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida)

Humanitarian Team Director

Philip Smith DFID Nepal Team Leader, climate change and disaster risk

Piush Kayastha ECHO Nepal Programme Officer

Robert MacIver DFID Conflict humanitarian, and security department (CHASE)

Robert Piper UNDP Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator in Nepal

Robert Smith OCHA Chief CAP Section

Rudolf Muller OCHA Emergency Services Branch

Sajal Gupta UNHCR Senior Donor Relations Officer

Samuel Fanon ECHO Nepal Rapid Response Coordinator

Sandra Aviles FAO Liaison Office, Geneva Chair, IASC Task Team Funding for Preparedness and Senior officer, FAO Geneva office

Satoko Toku Permanent Mission of Japan in Geneva

First Secretary (Political Section)

Saurabh Dani GFDRR Nepal Disaster Risk Management Specialist

Scott Gardiner DFID, Conflict, Humanitarian, and Security Department (CHASE)

Humanitarian Advisor

Shoko Arakaki OCHA Chief of Funding Coordination Section

Simon Lawry White IASC Secretariat Chief

Steve O’Malley UN OCHA Chief of CERF

Sunita Gurung AusAID Nepal Country Director

Sylvie Wabbes-Condotti

FAO Liaison and Operations Officer

Tim Waites DFID Conflict, Humanitarian, and Security Department (CHASE)

Victoria Bannon IFRC Nepal IFRC representative in Nepal

Yasuhiro Nomura Embassy of Japan in Nepal Second Secretary

Yvonne Klynman IFRC Senior Officer, Disaster Policy

Edouard Jay Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation SDC

Programme Manager

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Annex 6: Definitions124: Adaptation

The adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or

their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities.

Capacity development

The process by which people, organisations and society systematically stimulate and develop their

capacities over time to achieve social and economic goals, including through improvement of

knowledge, skills, systems, and institutions.

Climate change

(a) The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) defines climate change as “a change in

the state of the climate that can be identified (e.g., by using statistical tests) by changes in the

mean and/or the variability of its properties, and that persists for an extended period, typically

decades or longer. Climate change may be due to natural internal processes or external forcings,

or to persistent anthropogenic changes in the composition of the atmosphere or in land use”.

(b) The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defines climate

change as “a change of climate which is attributed directly or indirectly to human activity that

alters the composition of the global atmosphere and which is in addition to natural climate

variability observed over comparable time periods”.

Contingency planning

A management process that analyses specific potential events or emerging situations that might

threaten society or the environment and establishes arrangements in advance to enable timely,

effective and appropriate responses to such events and situations.

Disaster

A serious disruption of the functioning of a community or a society involving widespread human,

material, economic or environmental losses and impacts, which exceeds the ability of the affected

community or society to cope using its own resources.

Disaster risk

The potential disaster losses, in lives, health status, livelihoods, assets and services, which could

occur to a particular community or a society over some specified future time period.

Disaster risk management

The systematic process of using administrative directives, organisations, and operational skills and

capacities to implement strategies, policies and improved coping capacities in order to lessen the

adverse impacts of hazards and the possibility of disaster.

Disaster risk reduction

The concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and

manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened

vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved

preparedness for adverse events.

Early warning system

The set of capacities needed to generate and disseminate timely and meaningful warning

information to enable individuals, communities and organisations threatened by a hazard to prepare

and to act appropriately and in sufficient time to reduce the possibility of harm or loss.

124

This list is taken from that of ISDR, http://www.unisdr.org/we/inform/terminology.

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Hazard

A dangerous phenomenon, substance, human activity or condition that may cause loss of life, injury

or other health impacts, property damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic

disruption, or environmental damage.

Mitigation

The lessening or limitation of the adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.

Natural hazard

Natural process or phenomenon that may cause loss of life, injury or other health impacts, property

damage, loss of livelihoods and services, social and economic disruption, or environmental damage.

Preparedness

The knowledge and capacities developed by governments, professional response and recovery

organisations, communities and individuals to effectively anticipate, respond to, and recover from,

the impacts of likely, imminent or current hazard events or conditions.

Comment from ISDR: Preparedness action is carried out within the context of disaster risk

management and aims to build the capacities needed to efficiently manage all types of emergencies

and achieve orderly transitions from response through to sustained recovery. Preparedness is based

on a sound analysis of disaster risks and good linkages with early warning systems, and includes such

activities as contingency planning, stockpiling of equipment and supplies, the development of

arrangements for coordination, evacuation and public information, and associated training and field

exercises. These must be supported by formal institutional, legal and budgetary capacities. The

related term “readiness” describes the ability to quickly and appropriately respond when required.

Prevention

The outright avoidance of adverse impacts of hazards and related disasters.

Recovery

The restoration, and improvement where appropriate, of facilities, livelihoods and living conditions

of disaster-affected communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.

Resilience

The ability of a system, community or society exposed to hazards to resist, absorb, accommodate to

and recover from the effects of a hazard in a timely and efficient manner, including through the

preservation and restoration of its essential basic structures and functions.

Risk

The combination of the probability of an event and its negative consequences.

Risk assessment

A methodology to determine the nature and extent of risk by analysing potential hazards and

evaluating existing conditions of vulnerability that together could potentially harm exposed people,

property, services, livelihoods and the environment on which they depend.

Risk management

The systematic approach and practice of managing uncertainty to minimise potential harm and loss.

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