ANALYSIS CENTER PAPERS Ground Moving Target Indicator · PDF fileGround Moving Target...

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Charles A. “Bert” Fowler

February 2004

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

I. INTRODUCTION: GROUND MOVING TARGET INDICATOR RADAR AND TRANSFORMATION . . . . . . . 5

II. GMTI RADAR TECHNOLOGY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

III. THE HISTORY OF GMTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11COLD WAR MILITARY REQUIREMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11GMTI TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11POST-COLD WAR EMPLOYMENT OF GMTI . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The Gulf War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13Kosovo . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15Iraq . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

IV. TRENDS FROM RECENT CONFLICTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19POSITIVE TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19NEGATIVE TRENDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20TREND IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

V. FUTURE GMTI CAPABILITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

VI. OPERATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF GMTI’S POTENTIAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23FASTER MANEUVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23MORE EFFECTIVE FIRES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24FASTER AND BETTER DECISION MAKING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25FASTER, LOWER-LEVEL JOINT INTEGRATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25RESULT: TRANSFORMED, HIGH TEMPO OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

VII. CONCLUSION: GMTI AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF U.S. WARFIGHTING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

VIII. GMTI PERFORMANCE METRICS APPENDIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

GMTI Radar and the Transformation of U.S. Warfighting


Contents

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by

Richard J. Dunn, IIIPrice T. Bingham

Charles A. “Bert” Fowler

February 2004

Ground Moving TargetIndicator RadarAnd the Transformation of U.S. Warfighting

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Introduction: Ground Moving Target Indicator Radar andTransformation (p. 5) Among the technological advantages U.S. forces have

enjoyed in recent conflicts, information superiority stands out as the capability

that truly differentiates U.S. forces from all other militaries. The purpose of this

paper is to examine one of the key technologies contributing to U.S. information

superiority—Ground Moving Target Indicator (GMTI) radar—and its

implications for the transformation of the way the United States fights its wars.

GMTI can help transform Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

(ISR), a mission area essential to the U.S. battlefield information advantage,

because it can depict vehicular movement of enemy forces in near-real time

throughout a large area, regardless of weather. This unprecedented capabil-

ity reduces uncertainty, clearing the Clausewitzian “fog of war” that has hung

over land battles for centuries, thereby multiplying the capability of the com-

bined force and transforming the execution of air-land operations.

GMTI Radar Technology (p. 7)

The asymmetrical advantage modern GMTItechnology provides U.S. forces results from itsunique ability to distinguish targets moving onland or water from surface clutter over a largearea. This is possible even in bad weather anddarkness by virtue of the Doppler radar return ofthe moving targets. The GMTI picture showsmoving vehicles as dots overlaid on a digital map.

The History of GMTI (p. 11)

Cold War Military Requirements

The propelling force behind development of thecapability to track moving forces in near-real timewas Cold War military necessity. After the 1973Arab-Israeli War, senior U.S. Army leaders real-ized that to defeat the Soviets under the highlylethal conditions of modern warfare, field com-manders would have to know the enemy’s situa-tion beyond the front lines.

GMTI Technology Development

Modern GMTI radar technology evolved fromthe U.S. Army’s Stand-Off Target AcquisitionSystem (SOTAS) and the U.S. Air Force/DefenseAdvanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA)Assault Breaker/Pave Mover programs developedin the 1970s. When it became clear that neitherthe Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) norCongress would fund separate GMTI programsfor the two services, Army and Air Force leadersagreed to a single program, Joint STARS(Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System),that would provide battle management of strikeaircraft for the Air Force and wide area surveil-lance for the Army.

Post-Cold War Employment of GMTI

When the end of the Cold War eliminated theSoviet threat, some defense experts suspected thatJoint STARS was no longer needed. However,GMTI platforms have played key roles in almostall subsequent conflicts.

The Gulf War — Two developmental JointSTARS aircraft supported Coalition forcesengaged in Operation Desert Storm. Early in the

War, during the Battle of Al Khafji, they locatedadvancing Iraqi ground forces that had attackedat night in an effort to avoid detection. WhenIraqi forces began withdrawing from Kuwait,GMTI was again the source of timely, reliableinformation that enabled air attacks to disruptthe Iraqi retreat.

Kosovo — Despite the magnitude of its contribu-tion in the Gulf War, GMTI was not fullyexploited in planning for Operation Allied Forcein Kosovo. However, operational experience withGMTI soon led commanders, their staffs, andaircrews to appreciate its capabilities—recogniz-ing, for example, that its ability to detect, locate,and track vehicular movement reduces the needfor inefficient visual searches. When the KosovoLiberation Army (KLA) began its offensive, JointSTARS’ GMTI helped create a dilemma for Serbforces. If the Serbs attempted to maneuver, themovement made their forces visible to GMTIand thus vulnerable to NATO air attack. If theSerbs did not move, they handicapped their abil-ity to achieve the force ratios and position neededto defeat the lighter KLA forces.

Afghanistan — Joint STARS operations duringOperation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan hadmany similarities to previous conflicts. As inKuwait and Kosovo, Joint STARS was notdeployed in sufficient numbers for persistent cov-erage. Like Kosovo, the presence of civiliansrequired positive target identification by anunmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) or manned air-craft. However, Joint STARS enhanced othersurveillance assets by cueing UAVs with high-resolution but restricted field-of-view sensors.Northern Alliance units supported by U.S.Special Operations Forces (SOF) threatenedTaliban and al Qaeda forces sufficiently to causethem to move in vehicles, allowing GMTI todetect, locate, and track them.

Iraq — U.S. and British forces in OperationIraqi Freedom benefited from the Joint STARSlessons learned from previous conflicts. For thefirst time, sufficient aircraft were deployed tomeet the GMTI requirement for a major portionof the operational area. Because GMTI wascapable of detecting vehicular movement, Iraqicommanders and their forces faced the same

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operational and tactical dilemma the Serbs facedin Kosovo. If they moved, they were seen byGMTI and attacked by air or artillery. If theydispersed and remained camouflaged and dug in,they were either bypassed or defeated in detail byground forces.

Trends from Recent Conflicts (p. 19)

Positive Trends

By revealing battlefield movement in near-realtime regardless of weather or light conditions,GMTI has begun to transform U.S. ISR capabili-ties, contributing to a “new American way ofwar” in which information and precision reducethe amount of time and mass required, signifi-cantly speeding up military operations. Near-realtime, dynamic GMTI targeting information cou-pled with weather-independent precision guidedmunitions, such as JDAMs, has also redefinedboth close air support and battlefield air interdic-tion by allowing these tasks to be performedeffectively by high-altitude bombers.

Because it has continuous wide-area coverage,GMTI provides a battlefield picture that can beused for airborne command and control, to pro-vide near-real time situational awareness to com-manders, and to cue other ISR systems. Byfocusing the efforts of other ISR elements, GMTIhas increased the effectiveness and efficiency ofthe entire ISR network.

Because it provides an identical “ground truth”picture to air and ground users alike, GMTIhelps joint, air, and ground commanders share acommon understanding of the battlefield, itsdangers, and opportunities for exploitation.

Negative Trends

In the first three conflicts GMTI capability wasinsufficient to provide the desired 24/7 coverageof all major operational areas. Planners havebeen slow to incorporate GMTI or deploy it earlyenough in a conflict to take advantage of its capa-bilities. Terrain, foliage and opportunities forenemy ground forces to disperse or avoid maneu-ver can hinder detection and tracking by GMTI.GMTI lessons also have had to be relearned from

conflict to conflict, indicating that both doctrinaland organizational development have yet to capi-talize on GMTI’s capabilities.

Trend Implications

The superior situational awareness provided inpart by GMTI approached its transformationalpotential only in the latest Iraq conflict. Here,the most transformational characteristic ofOperation Iraqi Freedom was that its concept ofoperations appeared to depend upon the over-whelming information superiority that ISR sys-tems, including GMTI, afforded the Coalition.In a sense, General Tommy Franks’ operationalconcept substituted information, precision, andspeed for mass and firepower. However, itremains to be seen if this will become the normin U.S. operational concepts.

Future GMTI Capabilities (p. 21)

New technological advances are now being incor-porated into a second-generation GMTI systemknown as the Multi-Platform Radar TechnologyInsertion Program, or MP-RTIP, to be deployedon more advanced manned and unmanned air-craft. The improved range, resolution, and accu-racy of this new active electronically scannedarray radar, combined with automatic targetrecognition software, add the capability to classify targets by types, to tag them with aunique target designator, and to track them much more precisely.

Because space, the “ultimate high ground,” logi-cally provides the best location for obtaining thegreatest coverage from a GMTI system, the AirForce is currently investigating orbiting versionsof GMTI. However, space systems also requiresignificantly longer range, which in turn requiressignificantly greater power and antenna size.

Operational Implications of GMTI’sPotential (p. 23)

The unprecedented level of situational awarenessthat U.S. forces supported by GMTI enjoy todayhas the potential to significantly enhance bothmaneuver and fires. In coordination with otheradvanced ISR systems, GMTI can enable a new,

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more effective approach to warfighting where sit-uational awareness and precision weaponryreduce both the time and mass required to exe-cute operational tasks. This allows:

Faster Maneuver

The more uncertainty a commander faces, thegreater the mass of units he needs to hedgeagainst surprise. Conversely, the more informa-tion he has about the situation, the less mass heneeds. Thus, the battlespace situational aware-ness enabled in large measure by GMTI allowsfaster maneuver by reducing uncertainty.

More Effective Fires

Enhanced situational awareness can also help tosubstitute for mass in air and ground deliveredfires. For example, with GMTI-provided infor-mation, strike aircraft search less and are able toengage more targets per sortie.

Faster and Better Decision Making

The more uncertain a commander is about the enemy, the slower and more cautious his decision-making must be to avoid stumbling intodisaster. The opposite is also true—the moreinformation he has and the greater its precision,the faster he can make good decisions.

Faster, Lower-level Joint Integration

GMTI gives both air and ground users an identi-cal “ground truth” picture, helping them share acommon understanding of the battlefield, itsdangers, and opportunities. This same commonpicture is shared not only among joint headquar-ters and the service components but also downthe different echelons of command, thereby creat-ing not only a horizontal but also a vertical com-mon understanding of the battlefield andenhancing the ability to conduct integrated jointoperations at lower levels more quickly and moreeffectively.

Conclusion: GMTI and theTransformation of U.S. Warfighting (p. 27)

Only time will tell if GMTI and its related ISRtechnologies will permanently transform the waythe U.S. military fights. To paraphrase SecretaryRumsfeld, all the GMTI systems in the worldwill not transform our forces unless we first trans-form the way we think about warfighting. WhileGMTI generally was not used to its full potentialin recent conflicts, the 2003 campaign in Iraqshowed promising signs that U.S. forces haveaccepted GMTI as a key technology for modernwarfare.

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Fed by the unblinking eyes of GMTI radars onJoint STARS1, the computer screens fillingCoalition command posts during OperationIraqi Freedom provided a “God’s eye view” ofmoving vehicles throughout the area of opera-tions, despite the dark of night, the smoke of oilfires, or the dust of sandstorms. What was seencould also be destroyed with responsive, highlyaccurate, and lethal munitions.

The ability to precisely and accurately strikeenemy forces from the air—sometimes when inclose contact with friendly forces in near-zero

visibility—is certainly impressive, but the GMTIradars provided much more than rapid and pre-cise targeting data. U.S. commanders and staffofficers in command posts from tactical groundunits to theater levels only had to glance at theircomputer screens to observe the fluid movementof the land battle throughout most of the opera-tional area.

This ability to see moving vehicles in near-realtime contributed significantly to the decisive U.S.battlefield information advantage. Properlyexploited, advantages of such magnitude can

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1 Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System. The E-8C Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System (Joint STARS) is an airborne battle man-agement and command and control (C2) platform. This system uses advanced Ground Moving Target Indicator radar to conduct ground surveil-lance, enabling commanders to develop an understanding of the enemy situation, and to support attack operations and targeting. From a standoffposition, the aircraft—a modified Boeing 707/300 series commercial aircraft—detects, locates, classifies, tracks and targets hostile ground move-ments, communicating near-real time information through secure data links with U.S. Air Force and U.S. Army command posts.

I. Introduction The fortunes of war have always favored those commanders having better and more timely information on whatwas happening on the battlefield, even if on the other side of the hill. This has certainly been true of our mostrecent conflicts, where the accomplishments of U.S. forces have been truly remarkable and unprecedented.

• Operation Desert Storm in Kuwait, our first major conventional war against an armored/mechanized enemysince World War II, defeated the world’s fifth-largest armed forces with a 38-day devastating air campaign fol-lowed by a 100-hour air-ground offensive.

• Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was the first-ever use of air power in isolation to defeat an enemy field army.

• Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan used precision airpower and U.S. SOF supporting an indige-nous ally over a few weeks to collapse an enemy in remote Central Asia far from established U.S. bases.

• Operation Iraqi Freedom saw a regime that controlled a country of 23 million people defeated in 21 days bymassive, precise, and responsive airpower and a smaller ground force that attacked over unprecedented distanceswith previously unseen speed.

Many factors, such as high quality personnel, innovative leadership, well-trained units, and advanced technology,have provided the tremendous jump in U.S. military capabilities evidenced by these conflicts. In the technologicaldimension one factor truly differentiates U.S. forces from all others: information superiority. The purpose of thispaper is to examine one of the key technologies providing our forces this information superiority—Ground MovingTarget Indicator (GMTI) Radar—and its implications for the transformation of the way the United States fightsits wars.

Ground Moving Target Indicator Radar andTransformation

sometimes lead to a major shift—a transforma-tion—in the conduct of warfare. Such a transfor-mation is one of the top goals of the Departmentof Defense (DoD), which defines transformationas:

a process that shapes the changing nature of mili-tary competition and cooperation through newcombinations of concepts, capabilities, people andorganizations that exploit our nation’s advantagesand protect against our asymmetric vulnerabili-ties... Shaping the nature of military competitionultimately means redefining standards for militarysuccess by accomplishing military missions thatwere previously unimaginable or impossible [empha-sis added] except at prohibitive risk and cost.2

GMTI can help transform Intelligence,Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), a mis-sion area essential to the U.S. battlefield informa-tion advantage, because it can detect movementof enemy (and friendly) forces in near-realtime—a previously impossible capability.Historically, commanders had to assume thatinformation on opposing mobile forces “on theother side of the hill” (beyond direct line of sight)of friendly forces would be unreliable, often dan-gerously so, because of the many constraints ontheir ability to collect, process, exploit, and dis-seminate information. Available sensors in theform of human eyesight and, later, cameras notonly had very constrained fields-of-view butwere limited to daylight and good visibility. Thepersistence of the coverage most sensors providedwas also limited by human fatigue, weather,smoke, and light conditions.

Even as technology increased sensors’ capabilities,information available to warfighters remainedlimited because of the extensive time that couldpass between data collection and information dis-semination. Enemy movement occurring duringthis time made information increasingly unreli-able.3 Therefore, commanders could use move-ment to create the advantages of superior force

ratios, favorable position, and surprise. Napoleonput it best when he proclaimed, “Aptitude forwar is aptitude for movement….”4

As a result, commanders were often forced to relyon having friendly troops in contact with enemyforces to know enemy locations. This reliancedoes much to explain why the close battle longdominated the organizational and employmentconcepts for land warfare. However, the intro-duction of GMTI renders obsolete the underly-ing assumption that accurate information onenemy mobile forces depends on military contact. For forces equipped with such radars,the Clausewitzian “fog of war”5 that had hungover land battles for centuries lifts as they enjoy atremendous advantage in situational awareness.

GMTI radars provide a foundation forInformation Age warfare. The near-real time,precise data they collect on ground operationsacross the full sweep of an operationally signifi-cant area, together with the ability to link thatinformation to multiple air and ground force ele-ments throughout the entire theater, can multiplythe capability of the combined force and trans-form the execution of air-land operations.

GMTI radar technology can provide the type ofknowledge-based transformational capability thatDoD envisions exploiting to execute new andmore effective operational concepts. Therefore,analysis of the history of GMTI radar develop-ment, its contributions to the past several con-flicts, and its future potential is useful in severalways. This paper tells the history of GMTI tech-nology and, with that history, traces the develop-ment of an essential element in the transform-ation of the U.S. military. As a case study of atransformational technology, it describes the evo-lution of GMTI, explains the impact of the tech-nology on modern warfighting and suggests thetransformation GMTI represents for the future.

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2 Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance, April 2003, pp. 3-4.3 Theoretically, when unconstrained by geography, friendly uncertainty of an enemy unit’s location increases in proportion to the square of the time

that has passed since the last sighting. If a military unit can move distance “r” in a given time, then it can be anywhere in a circular area “A” equalto π r2 in that time.

4 Le Comte de Dervieu, quoted in JFC Fuller, The Conduct of War, 1789-1961 (New York: Minerva Press, 1968), p. 50. 5 “Like most useful military concepts, ‘fog of war’ normally is attributed to [Carl von] Clausewitz, who receives the credit for the alliterative “fog and

friction”— friction referring to a physical impediment to military action, fog to the commander’s lack of clear information.” Eugenia C. Kiesling,“On War Without the Fog,” Military Review, Sept./Oct. 2001, page 85.

It is helpful to begin an analysis of GMTI withan understanding of the radar technologiesinvolved and how they operate.

The asymmetrical advantage modern GMTItechnology provides U.S. forces results from itsunique ability to distinguish targets moving onland or water from surface clutter over a largearea, even in bad weather and darkness, by virtueof the Doppler6 return of the moving targets.The “picture” GMTI provides is similar toDoppler radar pictures of weather features, suchas thunderstorms, familiar to viewers of televisionweather programs. Rather than the moving greenmasses on weather radar, the GMTI pictureshows moving vehicles as moving dots overlaidon a digital map.

These dynamic GMTI vehicle “tracks” displayvehicle locations in real time and can correlatewell with imagery and signals intelligence data toprovide a real-time Common Operating Picture(COP) of the dynamic battlefield. By its verynature GMTI provides a true picture of enemy,friendly, and civilian movement. Because of itsrelatively low data rate requirements, this GMTIpicture can be transmitted to ground stationsover a wide area.

There are two types of GMTI radars: static (orsnapshot) radars and dynamic (or continualobservation) radars. Static radar provides amomentary picture of what was moving at apoint in time with infrequent updates depictingmoving target density. The Army OV-1Mohawk’s7 radar was an example of a static or snapshot GMTI radar. Developing radarscapable of continual observation was key to the immense operational value of GMTI

information. The E-8C Joint STARS’ radar is anexample of a dynamic GMTI radar system thatprovides periodic updates and allows precisetracking of a moving target.

A radar system’s ability to provide detailed, near-real time information on vehicular move-ment depends on its ability to reliably detect,accurately locate, and precisely track slow movingground targets. GMTI can provide target infor-mation, such as vehicle length and the order ofspecific vehicles within a convoy, essential toensuring track accuracy, even when terrainscreening or aircraft turns temporarily interruptradar returns.

To provide precise, near-real time information onvehicles moving within a given area, a GMTI sys-tem must be able to generate and maintainnumerous automatic tracks. The ability to dothis depends on the system’s performance interms of the following metrics:

• Probability of Detection (Pd) — the probabil-ity of detecting a given target at a given rangeany time the radar beam scans across it

• Target Location Accuracy — a function of platform self-location performance, radar-pointing accuracy, azimuth resolution, andrange resolution

• Minimum Detectable Velocity (MDV) — therate of movement determining whether themajority of military traffic, which often movesvery slowly especially when traveling off-road,will be detected

• Target Range Resolution — the fidelity determining whether two or more targets

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6 Doppler [Effect]: a change in the frequency with which waves (as sound or light) from a given source reach an observer when the source and theobserver are in motion with respect to each other so that the frequency increases or decreases according to the speed at which the distance isdecreasing or increasing.

7 First produced in 1959, this U.S. Army observation and reconnaissance aircraft served widely in every conflict (especially Vietnam) and operationuntil it was retired in 1996.

II. GMTI Radar Technology

moving in close proximity will be detected as individual targets

• Stand-off Distance — the distance separatinga radar system from the area it is covering

• Coverage Area Size — the area the system cankeep under continuous surveillance from aspecific orbit. [See Figure 1 below.]. Theearth’s curvature and screening from terrain,foliage, and buildings cause system altitude to be a key factor determining coverage area—the higher the altitude, the greater thecoverage.

• Coverage Area Revisit Rate — the frequencywith which the radar beam passes over a givenarea

If performance in even one of these GMTI met-rics is degraded, the system will lose tracking per-formance and compromise the accuracy andtimeliness of the ground picture.8

The ability of GMTI radar technology to inte-grate these performance metrics and track slow-moving vehicles precisely provides the detailed,near-real time information needed for high qual-ity intelligence and pinpoint targeting. Trackingvehicular movement defeats many of the camou-flage, concealment, and deception measures effec-tive against other collection methods. GMTIcoverage makes using decoys difficult because thedecoys must be able to move, and orchestratingdecoy movement on a large scale, such as for anarmy battalion, can quickly become cost prohibi-tive, if not dangerous. This is not to say thatGMTI cannot be spoofed. In fact, the OpposingForce at the Army’s National Training Centerclaims significant success in deceiving JointSTARS radar by dragging concertina wire behindvehicles.10 However, such deception operationsbecome more difficult on a large scale and can becountered by cross-cueing UAVs to provide posi-tive target identification and by better radar oper-ator training.

The GMTI system’sability to concur-rently collect high-resolution,photo-like SyntheticAperture Radar(SAR)11 still imagesis also vital to reli-ably tracking mobileforces. Collection ofSAR images withassociated GMTIinformation is essen-tial for quickly locat-ing vehicles thathave stopped mov-ing. Most GMTIradar systems cancollect either GMTIor SAR information

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8 For technical descriptions of each of these metrics, see the GMTI Performance Metrics Appendix.9 Brigadier General Robert H. Scales, Jr., Certain Victory: The United States Army in the Gulf War (Washington, DC: Office of the Chief of Staff,

United States Army, 1993), p. 169.10 Briefing by Colonel John D. Rosenberger, U.S. Army, “The Inherent Vulnerabilities of Technology: Insights from the National Training Center’s

Opposing Force.”11 Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR) is a coherent radar system that generates high-resolution remote sensing imagery that can be photo-like in appear-

ance and resolution. Signal processing uses magnitude and phase of the received signals over successive pulses from elements of a synthetic apertureto create an image. As the line-of-sight direction changes along the radar platform trajectory, signal processing having the effect of lengthening theantenna produces a synthetic aperture.

Capabilities

• Direct Real-Time Downlink

• All Moving Targets• 11 Hours Coverage

Every Night

Total Coverage

Area Shown On Operator's Screen (Can Be Shifted to Any Portion of the Total Coverage)

Ground Support Orbit

0 150 300

km

Figure 1. Joint STARS Coverage In Operation Desert Storm9

but not both simultaneously.12 Since collecting asingle SAR image for a small area takes severalseconds, collecting numerous SAR images quicklyleads to frequent interruptions in GMTI opera-tion. However, the concurrent collection of SARimages with GMTI information means there isno mission compromise when both forms ofimagery are needed. The radar can also makeInverse SAR13 images which use a moving vehi-cle’s motion to speed collection of a high-resolution image. Coupled with high-resolutionSAR pictures, these allow target characterization by Automatic Target Recognition14 (ATR) algorithms.

GMTI radar with a high revisit rate and high-resolution vehicle feature information is signifi-cantly different from pixel-based imagery likephotographs or SAR images. Finding stationaryenemy targets in large areas with high-resolutionpixel imagery can be an overwhelming taskrequiring large numbers of highly trained humanimage analysts and significant computer process-ing power. On the other hand, automatic analy-sis of GMTI-derived moving target informationis significantly easier and faster because itincludes data on movement as well as an image.As every hunter knows, a moving target attractsthe eye and it is easier to separate moving objectsfrom their backgrounds.

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12 Several different aircraft are capable of both GMTI and SAR: Joint STARS, U-2s, and Global Hawk. The Global Hawk, manufactured byNorthrop Grumman, is a high-altitude UAV used for collecting imagery. The U-2, manufactured by Lockheed Martin, has been the Air Force’sprimary, acknowledged, high-altitude intelligence gathering platform for more than 40 years and can simultaneously collect signals intelligence andimagery. U-2s and Global Hawk are currently optimized for high resolution SAR, but their GMTI capability is more rudimentary. Joint STARShas an excellent GMTI capability, but its SAR resolution is more limited.

13 Inverse SAR (ISAR) is a SAR system that uses the target’s motion to achieve the equivalent of a large synthetic aperture. The ISAR signature of astationary radar imaging a rotating target is mathematically equivalent to the SAR signature of a moving radar imaging a stationary target.

14 Automatic Target Recognition (ATR) uses a computer to analyze individual target features to allow recognition of the target.

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GMTI makes it possible for the first time totrack moving forces in near-real time.Development of these capabilities required tech-nological breakthroughs in radars, processingcapabilities, and software, advances all impressivein their own right. However, the propelling forcebehind their development was not transforma-tion. It was Cold War military necessity.

Cold War Military Requirements

When U.S. Army fact-finding teams visited thebattlefields of the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, theygrimly noted that, in the course of the six-dayconflict, Arab and Israeli forces collectively hadlost more tanks and other major combat equip-ment than the U.S. had deployed in Europe atthat time. General William DePuy, then com-manding the Army’s Training and DoctrineCommand (TRADOC), understood what thisnew battlefield lethality meant to the NATOdefense of Europe against the Warsaw Pact. Indeveloping new operational concepts to winunder these highly lethal conditions, he recog-nized that “field commanders would have toknow the enemy’s situation beyond the frontlines, to include his successive echelons, artillery,support troops, headquarters, and possible courseof action.”15

Taking over TRADOC from General DePuy in1982, General Donn Starry expanded these oper-ational concepts to include attacking Soviet sec-ond-echelon forces through the concept of “deepbattle” as part of the Army’s new AirLand BattleDoctrine. This doctrine recognized the need tosynchronize ground and air power at the opera-tional (campaign) level. This necessary unitybrought the Army and Air Force to agreement

and enhanced the close working relationshipbetween Army TRADOC and Air Force TacticalAir Command (TAC), the agencies responsiblefor developing the two services’ future warfight-ing concepts. This led to a 1983 agreementbetween Army Chief of Staff General JohnWickham and Air Force Chief of Staff GeneralCharles Gabriel to explore 31 specific initiativessupporting air-ground operations. Developmentof a surveillance target and attack radar system(Joint STARS) was among them.16

GMTI Technology Development

Modern GMTI radar technology is the result ofthe Army’s Stand-Off Target Acquisition System(SOTAS) and the Air Force/Defense AdvancedResearch Projects Agency (DARPA) AssaultBreaker/Pave Mover programs developed in the1970s. The evolution of digital-based radars withmuch greater processing capability than analogradars made these programs technically practical.With the added development of clutter-rejectionalgorithms, these radars allowed operators todetect even slow moving targets against heavyclutter backgrounds.

Demonstrations of the helicopter-mountedSOTAS technology led to growing Army supportfor the program as commanders became aware ofthe value of seeing opposing forces’ movement.With this information, Army division command-ers believed they would have the capabilityneeded to defeat the numerically superior WarsawPact. However, a major cost overrun and thetransition to a new administration in 1980 led tothe program’s cancellation despite strong supportfrom the Army’s field commanders and seniorleaders.17

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III. The History of GMTI

15 Paul H. Herbert, Deciding What Has to Be Done: General William E. DePuy and the 1976 Edition of FM 100-5, Operations. Leavenworth PapersNumber 16 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 1988), pp. 30-31.

16 Richard G. Davis, Office of Air Force History, The 31 Initiatives: A Study in Air Force-Army Cooperation (Honolulu, HI: University Press of thePacific, 2002), p. 114.

17 Charles A. Fowler, “The Standoff Observation of Enemy Ground Forces—From Project PEEK to Joint STARS,” IEEE Aerospace and ElectronicsSystem Magazine, June 1997, pp. 7-9.

While the Army was working on SOTAS, the AirForce sponsored MIT Lincoln Laboratory’s devel-opment of advanced radar capabilities, includingthose needed to permit GMTI operation on afast-moving fixed wing aircraft—a key require-ment for the DARPA/Air Force Pave Mover sys-tem.18 Another relevant effort, started in 1975,was the Grumman/Norden development of aRadar Guided Weapon system (RGWS) thateventually led to a GMTI radar.

A 1976 Defense Science Board Summer Study,also examining the challenge of countering aWarsaw Pact offensive, proposed a system tolocate and attack the Warsaw Pact’s second andthird echelon attacking forces. The system woulduse GMTI radars to detect and locate vehicles inthese echelons that would then be attacked withair- and ground-launched missiles deliveringsmart, terminally guided submunitions. DARPAadopted this idea and sponsored a programknown as Assault Breaker.19 In support of thismission, Grumman/Norden changed RGWS’emphasis to a side-looking GMTI radar, givingthem a head start in meeting Pave Mover andsubsequently Joint STARS requirements.

Early studies of the radar required for AssaultBreaker led to the DARPA/Air Force Pave Movertarget acquisition and weapon delivery system,which used an electronically scanned radarmounted on an F-111 aircraft. The Pave Moverradar could shift between GMTI and SyntheticAperture Radar (SAR) mode, allowing high-reso-lution imaging of areas of interest, includingthose where vehicles had stopped. Pave Movertests in 1981-83 successfully demonstrated all therequired modes, including the ability to locatetargets over long distances and guide weaponsagainst those targets.20

Having realized the revolutionary potential ofGMTI, the Army searched for a replacement for

SOTAS. However, when it became clear thatneither the Office of the Secretary of Defense(OSD) nor Congress would fund separate GMTIprograms for the two services, Army and AirForce leaders were forced to meld their divergentrequirements into a single program. Selectingone system to meet both the Army’s desire forsurveillance of the entire operational area and theAir Force’s requirement for battle management ofstrike aircraft created tensions that required reso-lution. Joint STARS was conceived as a theaterasset, like Pave Mover, providing both GMTI andSAR information for attacking the second andthird echelons while also, like SOTAS, providingthe Army with moving target information oncloser forces. Because the Air Force would operate Joint STARS and given the intrinsic con-flict in the two service missions, the Army wasconcerned that the close battle might be neg-lected as the program developed. However, aMemorandum of Agreement signed by the serv-ice chiefs laid out an equitable plan for prioritiz-ing Joint STARS missions and assuaged theArmy’s concerns.21 In 1985 the contract for theJoint STARS system was awarded to Grumman/Norden with Motorola winning a separate con-tract for the Army’s ground support module.Initial planning called for a 10 aircraft programwith four development aircraft.22

In sum, GMTI was very much a child of ColdWar requirements, conceived from the need tolocate and attack the Warsaw Pact’s armored fol-low-on forces before they could break throughNATO’s defenses. Insightful leaders in both theArmy and Air Force understood the potential ofnew technology to meet this requirement by pro-viding superior battlefield situational awareness.This would allow their forces to fight smarter andfaster and operate inside the decision cycle oftheir more massive but less situationally awareenemies.

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18 Fowler, p. 9.19 John N. Entzminger, Jr., Charles A. Fowler, and William J. Kenneally, “Joint STARS and GMTI: Past, Present and Future,” IEEE Transactions on

Aerospace and Electronics Systems, April 1999, pp. 752-753. For additional relevant background information see Fowler, reference 17, pp. 9-10.20 Entzminger et al., p. 753. Also see Fowler, reference 17, pp. 9-10.21 Davis, p. 78.22 Congress subsequently reduced the number of development aircraft to two. “Joint USAF/Army JSTARS System Set for Airborne Test in 1988,”

Aviation Week & Space Technology, December 9, 1985, pp. 91-99. William H. Gregory, “U.S. Army, Air Force Continue Development of JointSTARS,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 5, 1986, pp. 113-116.

Joint STARS, the first operational system provid-ing wide-area, high performance GMTI, was alsoa product of the bureaucratic process of the U.S.Department of Defense and the services. Despiteits significant promise, the Army was never ableto bring SOTAS to fruition, and funding con-straints would not allow the Air Force to moveforward independently with Pave Mover.Consequently, the services agreed to a single,joint program to meet their requirements.

Post-Cold War Employment of GMTI

When the end of the Cold War eliminated thethreat posed by a massive, multi-echelon WarsawPact land offensive, some defense experts sus-pected that Joint STARS was no longer needed.However, as the following brief histories ofGMTI employment in post-Cold War conflictsshow, GMTI platforms have played key, if nottransformational, roles in all of them.

The Gulf War

Occurring shortly after the fall of the Berlin Wall,Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 provided anearly opportunity to test GMTI’s value. ArmyLieutenant General Fred Franks, whose VIICorps deployed from Europe to Saudi Arabia inNovember of 1990, had been tremendouslyimpressed by the Joint STARS prototype aircraft’sperformance in tests in Europe the previousSeptember. He convinced the Army senior lead-ership to insist on deploying both prototype air-craft to the Persian Gulf over the objections ofthe Air Force, whose leaders were concernedabout risking and supporting the developmentalaircraft in theater.23 However, a special CENT-COM-sponsored Defense Science Board TaskForce strongly supported the Army position24 andon January 12, 1991, two developmental JointSTARS aircraft arrived in Saudi Arabia to supportCoalition forces engaged in Operation DesertStorm. Since the system was still in developmentwhen the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait occurred, the

Coalition leadership’s lack of Joint STARS knowl-edge was a serious handicap. The Gulf War aircommander, General Chuck Horner, later noted,“…we who were responsible for planning andorchestrating air operations had little appreciationof the system’s capabilities and limitations.”25

Lack of familiarity extended to the Joint STARScrews, which had to be formed and then trained.In a somewhat unprecedented move, these crewsincluded civilian systems experts from GrummanCorporation to assist in aircrew training while thesystems were en route to the theater. Even thesystem’s concept of operation had not been fullydeveloped. But thanks to significant “on-the-job”training on the system’s abilities, the Coalitionquickly began to exploit GMTI’s ground surveil-lance and targeting capabilities.

Early in the Gulf War, during the Battle of AlKhafji, Joint STARS’ GMTI information made itpossible to locate advancing Iraqi ground forcesthat had attacked at night in an effort to avoiddetection. The Coalition’s air forces used GMTIcues to locate, target, and destroy these forcesbefore the majority of them could close withCoalition land forces. Besides significantlyenhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of airattacks against Iraqi forces, GMTI providedCoalition leaders valuable threat information by assuring them that the Al Khafji attack wasnot a deception supporting a major Iraqi attackelsewhere.26

Later, during the Coalition’s ground offensive,which took place during the worst weather of thewar, Joint STARS surveillance revealed Iraqiefforts to reposition their forces, providingadvancing Coalition forces with the informationthey needed to defeat the maneuver. When Iraqiforces began withdrawing from Kuwait, GMTIwas again the source of timely, reliable informa-tion that enabled air attacks to disrupt the Iraqiretreat.27

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23 Scales, p. 167.24 Fowler, p. 11.25 General Chuck Horner (Retired), “An Information Superiority Lesson: Airborne Ground Surveillance Offers an Effective New Way of Fighting

Enemy Ground Forces,” The ISR Journal, 2002/Issue 1, p. 17.26 Lt. Col Price Bingham, USAF (Retired), The Battle of Al Khafji and the Future of Surveillance Precision Strike, (Arlington, VA: Aerospace Education

Foundation, undated), p. 9.27 Scales, pp. 237, 248, 275, 277, 315, and 320.

Joint STARS contributed significantly to the GulfWar’s victorious outcome by supporting thedefeat of Iraqi land forces despite numerousmajor handicaps. Deploying just two aircraftmeant that it was not possible to provide persist-ent GMTI coverage. For extended operations,three aircraft are required to maintain a single,continuous orbit because of the need for crewrest, aircraft maintenance, etc. Persistence wasfurther reduced because Coalition commandershad many urgent requirements for using the sys-tem. Commanders would often task the one air-borne Joint STARS to conduct surveillanceduring a single mission extending from the farwestern portion of Iraq to the coastal area ofKuwait.

After the war many U.S. military leaders recog-nized the magnitude of the contribution GMTIand Joint STARS had made. Brigadier GeneralJohn Stewart, the Army’s senior theater intelli-gence officer, stated that, “Joint STARS was thesingle most valuable intelligence and targetingsystem in Desert Storm.”28 General MerrillMcPeak, Air Force Chief of Staff, told a sympo-sium, “Never again will we want to go to warwithout some kind of Joint STARS capability.”29

Years later during a conference on the war,General Walter E. Boomer, CommandingGeneral, 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, notedthat during the war, “Intelligence began toimprove with information that came fromJSTARS.… As JSTARS information was comingto me, we could see that the Iraqis were indeedescaping from Kuwait. From that point, wepushed as fast as I believed possible.”30 In DesertStorm GMTI had hinted at its ability to changethe conduct of warfare.

Despite Joint STARS’ success during the GulfWar, the DoD acquisition system did not treat it kindly thereafter. After performing well in

combat, Joint STARS was returned to theOperational Testing and Evaluation (OT&E)process to prove it could do in testing what it hadalready done in combat.31 Nor did the systemfare well in the post-Gulf War resource battles.The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)reduced the size of the fleet from 19 to 1332 (ithas since increased to 17), despite early studiesthat projected a need for 32 aircraft, while con-tradicting the QDR’s own premise that “modern-ization of our forces depends on a strong C4ISRbackbone.”33

Kosovo

Despite the magnitude of its contribution in theGulf War, there was little appreciation shown forthe value of GMTI in U.S. planning forOperation Allied Force in Kosovo. To someextent the failure to fully exploit the system’s tar-geting capabilities from the very beginning ofhostilities could be explained by major differencesbetween the two conflicts. Unlike Kuwait andIraq, Kosovo’s rugged terrain and foliageincreased the amount of radar screening, makingit more difficult for Joint STARS’ GMTI surveil-lance to detect, locate, and track mobile forces.

Initially, another key difference was the lack offriendly ground troops to threaten Serb units.This allowed the Serbs to disperse and limit theirmovement to avoid providing the large numberof moving targets that Joint STARS had beenable to detect in the Gulf War. Serb use of civil-ians as “human shields” and commingling ofunits with civilian traffic required NATO airforces to visually identify targets, thereby limitingthe value of GMTI.34

Basing also had an impact on Joint STARSemployment. Limited near-by basing and therefusal of the Swiss and Austrian governments topermit overflight made it necessary for Joint

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28 Brigadier General (Promotable) John F. Stewart, Jr., U.S. Army, G-2, 3rd U.S. Army, Operation Desert Storm The Military Intelligence Story: A Viewfrom the G-2, April 1991, p. 31.

29 USAF Tactical Air Command Symposium, Orlando, Florida, January 31, 1991.30 General Walter E. Boomer, USMC (Ret.), Lieutenant General John J. Yeosock, USA (Ret.), Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, USN (Ret.), General

Charles A. Horner, USAF (Ret.) “Ten Years After,” Proceedings, January 2001, p. 62.31 Fowler, pp. 13-14.32 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, Section 7.33 Robert P. Haffa and Barry D. Watts, “Brittle Swords: Low-Density, High-Demand Assets,” Strategic Review, Fall 2000, p. 47. 34 Benjamin S. Lambeth, NATO’s Air War for Kosovo: A Strategic and Operational Assessment (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), pp. 139, 205,

and 213.

STARS aircraft to fly to their operating orbitsfrom their base in Germany, reducing on-stationtime.

As in the Gulf War, the paucity of available air-craft also limited Joint STARS’ initial contribu-tion to Operation Allied Force. Even thoughJoint STARS was no longer a prototype, the fleetat that time consisted of only four operationalsystems; for most of the operation, only two sys-tems were in theater. Even with a high sortierate,35 the limited number of aircraft and the dis-tance they had to fly from their base to theirorbit again combined to prevent Joint STARSfrom providing 24-hour coverage. The lack ofpersistent GMTI coverage gave Serb forces valu-able opportunities to move without the risk ofbeing detected, located, or tracked.

But Joint STARS might have been used moreeffectively in Kosovo had its capabilities and limi-tations been more fully understood by U.S.European Command (USEUCOM) personnelwhen it was first deployed. This lack of familiar-ity may help explain why USEUCOM did notrequest the system’s deployment early in the crisiswhen it could have revealed the magnitude of theSerb movement into Kosovo. Once the systemwas deployed, it was placed in an orbit that didlittle to minimize screening. This also causedJoint STARS to be used, initially, only for surveil-lance and not to support targeting. Further, thecommand did not request the right equipment toexploit GMTI information. All of these short-comings improved once the Joint STARS wingsent liaison officers and the proper equipment tothe EUCOM command and control nodesrequiring live Joint STARS data.36

Just as in the Gulf War, operational experiencewith GMTI eventually generated a greater appre-ciation for its capabilities among commanders,their staffs, and aircrews. With this knowledgecame a growing understanding that GMTI could

make a valuable contribution to the effectivenessof NATO air operations. Fighter pilots came torecognize that the system “changes the rules”because its ability to detect, locate, and trackvehicular movement reduces the need for an inef-ficient visual search that decoys and camouflagecan easily overcome.37 Soon Joint STARSassumed the role of an airborne command andcontrol asset, providing crucial data that helpeddirect the air war and cueing airborne forward aircontrollers and UAVs on locations where move-ment was occurring. This allowed such assets tobe much more effective and efficient at finding,identifying, and targeting Serb forces.

Later in the conflict, when the weather beganimproving and the Kosovo Liberation Army(KLA) began its offensive, Joint STARS’ GMTIdemonstrated its contribution to joint air-groundoperations by allowing NATO to create adilemma for Serb forces. If the Serbs attemptedto maneuver in response to the KLA’s offensive,the movement made their forces visible to GMTIand thus vulnerable to NATO air attack. But ifthe Serbs did not move for fear of being detectedand attacked, they handicapped their ability toachieve the force ratios and position needed todefeat the lighter KLA forces.

Afghanistan

Joint STARS operations during OperationEnduring Freedom in Afghanistan again saw lessthan optimal use of GMTI. However, there wereencouraging signs that its capability was increas-ingly valued. As in Kuwait and Kosovo, JointSTARS was not deployed in sufficient numbersfor persistent coverage. The presence of civilianson the battlefield was also similar to Kosovo,making positive target identification a keyrequirement.38

Afghanistan’s rugged terrain also made screeninga problem. In Afghanistan, however, the rugged

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35 93rd Air Control Wing Briefing, Robins AFB, Georgia, July 18,1999. As in the Gulf War, the Joint STARS Team excelled in generating effectivesorties, flying 83 effective sorties between February 22 and June 28, 1999, for a total of 730.7 on-station hours.

36 E-mail Interview with Marc Lindsley, Director, Northrop Grumman Washington Office Operations for Air Combat Systems. During OperationAllied Force he served as commander of the 93rd Air Control Wing that provided Joint STARS support.

37 “Allied Force pilots say improved training key to strike operations,” Inside the Air Force, October 13, 2000, p. 8.38 Elaine M. Grossman, “Key Command Banned Nearly All Attacks on Afghan Roads, Bridges,” Inside the Pentagon, January 9, 2003, p. 1.

terrain that screened Joint STARS’ radar alsorestricted the Taliban’s mobility. Here, JointSTARS’ radar surveillance was more effectivewhen the terrain channeled vehicular movement,particularly when orbits were well planned andother surveillance capabilities, such as UAVs, U-2s, and SOF complemented GMTI.39

As previously seen in Operation Allied Force,Joint STARS’ GMTI information was used tocue UAVs. This enhanced the capabilities ofJoint STARS as well as the UAVs with their high-resolution but restricted “soda straw” field-of-view sensors. Although Joint Stars was highlyreliable,40 the distance Joint STARS had to fly toreach an orbit and the impact of altitude on ter-rain screening reduced on-station time andincreased refueling requirements as in Kosovo.

As in the Gulf War and during the final days ofoperations in Kosovo when the KLA offensiveoccurred, Joint STARS operations in Afghanistanwere enhanced by the presence of friendly groundforces. Northern Alliance units supported byU.S. SOF threatened Taliban and al Qaeda forcessufficiently to cause them to move and concen-trate. Because the enemy relied upon vehicles toprovide their forces with mobility, heavy fire-power, and armored protection, GMTI couldoften detect, locate, and track them. By waitinguntil they moved out of populated areas beforeattacking them, CENTCOM reduced collateraldamage.

Joint STARS deployment to Afghanistan wasdelayed and the system did not arrive in theateruntil after combat operations had been underway for weeks. This may have been due to a fail-ure during planning to recognize GMTI’s abilityto support the types of operations planned forAfghanistan.41 By the time the system was avail-able, much of the vehicular movement that hadinitially characterized Taliban and al Qaeda operations was no longer occurring, and many

of the lucrative targeting opportunities that could have been exploited with GMTI no longerexisted.

Despite this oversight, Operation EnduringFreedom provided GMTI an opportunity todemonstrate what it could contribute to combatoperations, even in the remote reaches of CentralAsia against an unanticipated enemy in adynamic combat environment. As Chairman ofthe Joint Chiefs of Staff Air Force GeneralRichard Meyers explained, “I think one of themost innovative ways we have used our assets canbe seen in the Joint STARS. That was designedduring the Cold War for a very linear battlefieldwith the bad guys on one side and the good guyson another. Here it was being used to cue GlobalHawk, which in turn could cue other systems.”42

Iraq

U.S. and British forces in Operation IraqiFreedom benefited from the lessons learned fromJoint STARS deployments in previous conflicts.For the first time, nine aircraft were deployed,providing coverage for three orbits (one continu-ous), essentially meeting the GMTI requirementfor a major portion of the operational area.Additionally, these aircraft were deployed into thetheater early enough to collect baseline data onIraqi forces before the conflict began. Earlydeployment also helped ensure that combatantcommanders and their staffs were familiarenough with GMTI technology to employ iteffectively when combat operations commenced.

During the major combat phase of the war, theprimary mission of Joint STARS was to supportair and ground forces directly engaged in combatoperations by providing them near-real timeinformation on enemy (and sometimes friendly)movement throughout the theater. At timesthese surveillance missions were combined withattack support missions.

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39 Price T. Bingham, “Targeting Systems Are Critical in Mountain Ops,” Proceedings, April 2002, pp. 91-3.40 Northrop Grumman, Enduring Freedom Metrics. Between November 7, 2001, and April 27, 2002, Joint STARS flew 249 missions, 100% of those

scheduled. Of these, 245 missions were effective, for a 98.4% effectiveness rate. Of the final 189 missions, 188 were effective for a 99.5% effec-tiveness rate.

41 Amy Butler, “Roche Backs Boeing’s 767, Wants to Boost JSTARS Requirement,” Inside the Air Force, October 22, 2001, p. 142 Hunter Keeter, “Lessons Learned in Afghanistan May Shape Military Transformation,” Defense Daily International, December 14, 2001.

Because GMTI was capable of detecting vehicularmovement, Iraqi commanders and their forcesfaced the same operational and tactical dilemmathe Serbs faced in Kosovo. If they moved, theywere seen by GMTI and attacked by air orartillery. If they dispersed and remained camou-flaged and dug in, they were either bypassed ordefeated in detail by ground forces. In manycases entire units (including Republican Guardunits) abandoned their tanks and armored vehi-cles rather than face almost certain detection anddestruction from the air.43

GMTI information was key to the rapid maneu-ver of Coalition ground forces. It not onlyallowed direct targeting of Iraqi forces based onprecise knowledge of their locations but also pro-vided the “protective overwatch” that allowedcommanders to maneuver with confidence eventhough their flanks and supply lines were unpro-tected. Although Coalition situational awarenesswas imperfect along the supply lines where con-voys were attacked by dismounted Iraqi forcesand others mounted in civilian vehicles, the

Coalition was able to respond effectively to Iraqithreats of any significant size. Wide area surveil-lance detected developing Iraqi threats to vulnera-ble areas early enough for decisive Coalitionresponse, including repositioning of forces orair/artillery attack. Although Iraqi ground forcesgreatly outnumbered those of the Coalition, theywere unable to achieve surprise or to mask theirmovements, even by moving under cover of amassive sandstorm. Consequently, Coalitionforces consistently operated so much faster thanthe Iraqis could track them and respond that anIraqi general enroute to work blindly ran intosome of the first U.S. forces to enter Baghdad.44

Joint STARS also played a significant role intime-sensitive targeting (TST). Using precise,near-real time radar location data, the immedi-ately available on-board battle management capa-bility directed strike aircraft onto quick-reactiontargets. Because their fields of view are both verybroad and persistent, Joint STARS systems oftencued UAVs and other sensors to time-sensitivetargets as well.

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43 Terry McCarthy, “What Ever Happened to the Republican Guard?: A Time investigation suggests most of the elite Iraqi forces survived the U.S.bombardment,” Time Magazine, May 12, 2003, pp. 38-43.

44 Michael R. Gordon, “U.S. flexes muscle in capital: U.S. Tests Baghdad’s defenses—Armoured column on three-hour raid,” The Toronto Star, April 6, 2003, p. AO1.

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Analysis of the two Iraq wars and operations inKosovo and Afghanistan reveals both positive andnegative trends related to GMTI technology andthe U.S. ability to employ it effectively.

Positive Trends

Operational Advantage — GMTI technology hasdelivered on its promise. After each conflict, sen-ior leaders identified GMTI as one of their mostimportant ISR capabilities. GMTI in combina-tion with the other sensor systems it often cuedhas provided U.S. forces an immeasurable infor-mation advantage. The U.S. military is able toanalyze the data collected and produce a near-realtime, virtually complete picture of the battlefieldfor distribution to air and ground users through-out the theater. Stripping away much of the “fogof war” and uncertainty that surrounds combatoperations has allowed U.S. commanders to bemuch faster and more precise in their applicationof both air and ground combat power. By reveal-ing battlefield movement in near-real time,GMTI has helped begin a transformation of U.S.ISR capabilities. GMTI and other advanced ISRsystems can enable a “new American way of war”in which information and precision reduce theamount of time and mass required, significantlyspeeding up military operations.

In that context it should also be noted that near-real time, dynamic GMTI targeting informationcoupled with weather-independent precisionguided munitions, such as JDAMs, have rede-fined both close air support and battlefield airinterdiction, air power’s two major ground sup-port roles. By allowing these functions to be per-formed very effectively (regardless of weather andvisibility conditions) by high-altitude, long dura-tion, survivable air platforms with large weaponsinventories, GMTI and JDAMs open up majoropportunities to rewrite the book on integratingaerial fires with ground maneuver.

GMTI as an “ISR Quarterback” — Joint STARSGMTI capability has allowed it to assume a com-mand and control role. Because it has continu-ous wide area coverage, it provides a broad andcomplete battlefield picture to component com-manders. GMTI can also cue other ISR systemsto provide a more detailed picture of specificareas of interest. By focusing the efforts of otherISR elements, GMTI has significantly increasedthe effectiveness and efficiency of the entire ISRnetwork.

Increasing Jointness — GMTI capability has donemuch to enhance joint warfighting. Because itprovides an identical “ground truth” picture to airand ground users alike, it helps joint, air, andground commanders share a common under-standing of the battlefield, its dangers, andopportunities that can be exploited through inte-grated and synchronized application of air andground combat power.

For example, these wars demonstrated thatGMTI’s unique capability to detect moving vehi-cles could place an enemy ground commander ina deadly dilemma. If he keeps his ground com-bat systems dispersed, camouflaged, and static toavoid detection and destruction from the air,attacking ground forces can destroy his forcespiecemeal. If he maneuvers and concentrates hisforces to respond to ground attack, GMTI candetect his forces and air power can destroy them.

Because air and ground commanders can share acommon real-time battlefield picture showingmovement of friendly, enemy, and civilian vehi-cles, GMTI can also help to avoid fratricide orthe inadvertent attack of innocent civilians. Thisability will be enhanced by the future improve-ments in GMTI (described in the following section) that can provide greater target categorization.

IV. Trends from Recent Conflicts

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Negative Trends

Insufficient GMTI Coverage — In the first threeconflicts GMTI capability was insufficient toprovide the desired 24/7 coverage of all majoroperational areas. In Kosovo and Afghanistan theJoint STARS aircraft had to fly extensive dis-tances to reach their operational orbits, com-pounding the limitations imposed by the smallnumber of available systems. Only in OperationIraqi Freedom were enough GMTI systemsdeployed to provide coverage of most opera-tionally significant areas.

GMTI Lessons Had to be Relearned from Conflictto Conflict — While it is understandable thatDesert Storm commanders and staffs would haveto learn the system’s capabilities and limitationsfrom the ground up, U.S. forces should havebeen able to do better during the subsequentconflicts. However, in both Kosovo andAfghanistan, Joint STARS was brought into the-ater late. In Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq manyof the lessons identified in Desert Storm regardingorbits, command and control functions, UAVcueing, etc, had to be rediscovered. This indi-cates that both doctrinal and organizationaldevelopment have yet to fully reflect and capital-ize on GMTI’s capabilities.

Another reason for relearning past lessons is thelack of joint training exercises employing GMTIassets. Although the Army does a good job ofrepresenting GMTI collection capability in itsformal command post exercises at division andcorps level, field exercises normally focus at bat-talion level and below; and Joint STARS andother systems are rarely, if ever, involved in jointfield exercises. Consequently, field trainingopportunities for both crews and GMTI informa-tion users as part of the larger air-ground combatoperations team are insufficient to develop andmaintain top proficiency in GMTI employment.However, recent Army initiatives to make ArmyCombat Training Center field training exercises

fully reflective of joint capabilities would do wellto include either actual GMTI platforms, if avail-able, or a surrogate representation of GMTIcapability through distributed simulation systems.

Trend Implications

In each of the four major post-Cold War con-flicts, GMTI contributed to the unprecedentednear-real time, wide area situational awarenessenjoyed by the U.S. and its allies. Despite thesometimes conflicting requirements of the Armyfor broad area surveillance and Air Force for bat-tle management, the shortage of Joint STARS,and the pre-conflict lack of familiarity withGMTI capabilities, U.S. forces appear to beimproving their ability to exploit the advantagesit provides. In particular, GMTI capabilities haveenhanced U.S. ability to conduct joint operationsbecause of the common operational picture theyprovide to both air and ground forces. However,the superior situational awareness that GMTIhelped provide approached its transformationalpotential only in the latest Iraq conflict.

From the GMTI perspective the most transfor-mational characteristic of Operation IraqiFreedom was that its concept of operationsappeared to depend upon the overwhelminginformation superiority that GMTI and the fullset of ISR systems afforded the Coalition. Thisallowed ground commanders to accept risk andconduct rapid operations with smaller, fast, butlethal forces that relied upon their informationadvantage and speed to outmaneuver the enemy.Coalition ground forces were supported by pre-cisely targeted, highly responsive precision air-delivered munitions that often reduced Iraqiforces to “combat ineffective” levels. In a sense,General Tommy Franks’ operational concept sub-stituted information, precision, and speed formass and firepower. It remains to be seen if thisbecomes the norm in U.S. operational concepts.

As noted in The History of GMTI section, thetechnologies that combined to provide the trans-formational GMTI capabilities debuted by JointSTARS in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 wereinitially developed in the 1970s and 80s. Sincethen radar and computer technologies haveadvanced significantly, and some have been inte-grated into existing platforms. In particular,older computers are being replaced with new,commercial-off-the-shelf processors that will sig-nificantly improve on-board computationalcapacity.45

Other technological advances are now beingincorporated into a second-generation GMTI sys-tem known as the Multi-Platform RadarTechnology Insertion Program, or MP-RTIP,that was initially intended to be a productimprovement to Joint STARS but will now bedeployed on more advanced manned andunmanned aircraft. The improved range, updaterate, resolution, and accuracy of this new activeelectronically scanned array radar, combined withautomatic target recognition software, will addthe capability to classify targets by length and (insome cases) types (e.g., tanks, missile launchers,civilian buses), to tag them with a unique targetdesignator, and to track them much more pre-cisely. This, plus its higher range resolution, willallow better target recognition and track mainte-nance, speeding the targeting of time critical tar-gets. MP-RTIP will also have the potential totrack low-flying cruise missiles. This may beexpanded in future development to include a fullair moving target indicator (AMTI) capability.The new radar will be both modular and scalable,meaning that it can be deployed in different con-figurations on different aircraft.46

Rather than just slowly updating moving dots,advanced GMTI radar systems will be able toprovide high revisit rate moving target detectionalong with individual moving target recognitionfeatures. This will provide significantly moreinformation about the nature and dynamics ofthousands of moving targets over large areas.Such information would generate a dynamic pic-ture compiled from vehicle characteristics, speed,vehicle origin and destination, and the number ofvehicles moving in specified areas. Vehicle fea-tures, coupled with high location updates, wouldprovide much higher tracking reliability as well assignificant information concerning types of mili-tary units and their activities.

While most of the enhanced GMTI capabilitiesof MP-RTIP radar represent major performanceimprovements over existing systems, it is thecapability to classify and tag targets that is newand transformational. Today’s systems can onlytell that a vehicle (tracked or wheeled) is movingalong a particular path in a given location. Withits greater resolution, MP-RTIP could providemuch more specific information on targets, fur-ther classifying them into potential enemy,friendly, or civilian sets. This might reduce thenumbers of targets of interest that require cross-cueing of other sensors for positive identification,further speeding the prosecution of time-sensitivetargets.

With its impressive performance in all four of ourmost recent conflicts and demonstrated potentialto transform the way the U.S. fights wars, GMTIshould have a prominent place in future conceptsof operations and force structure. However,

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V. Future GMTI Capabilities

45 Honorable James G. Roche, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, Tuesday, February 12, 2002, p. 29.46 Jonathan Bernhardt, “Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program,” Northrop Grumman Integrated Systems Briefing, August 28, 2003.

Also see Sandra I. Erwin, “Air Force To Run Wars From Sensor-Packed Jets,” National Defense Magazine, July 2003, and Department of the AirForce, Fiscal Years 2004/2003 Biennial Budget Estimates, Research, Development, Test and Evaluation Descriptive Summaries, Volume III, BudgetActivity 7, February 2003, p.2.

current programs only provide for completing the17 authorized Joint STARS aircraft (15 havealready been delivered). Eventually, the Air Forcehopes to deploy MP-RTIP radar in the newMulti-sensor Command and Control Aircraft(MC2A) where, as Secretary of the Air ForceJames G. Roche testified, it would “provide fiveto ten times the air to ground surveillance capa-bility of current JSTARS.”47 However, even opti-mistic estimates place initial deliveries of theseaircraft in the 2010-2012 timeframe.48

For the future, efforts to capture GMTI’s fulltransformational advantage in advanced systemscontinue. Recognizing GMTI’s potential, the AirForce plans to incorporate a highly sophisticatedversion in the fourth (and final) development spi-ral of the Global Hawk ISR UAV. Scheduled tobegin flying around 2009, the 12 aircraft of thisspiral will have an appropriately scaled version ofthe MP-RTIP radar.49 Combining the ISRpotential of MP-RTIP with the Global Hawk’srange and flight endurance promises to opennew, unprecedented opportunities to exploitGMTI’s capabilities.

As noted earlier, the earth’s curvature and screen-ing by terrain, foliage, and buildings makeGMTI system altitude a key factor in determin-ing depth of coverage. Therefore, space, the“ultimate high ground,” logically provides thebest location for obtaining the greatest coveragefrom a GMTI system. However, orbiting GMTIsystems also require significantly longer range,which in turn requires significantly greater powerand antenna size. The Air Force is currently con-ducting a DoD-directed Analysis of Alternativesthat addresses the complementary roles for airand space-based radar systems in meetingnational needs for GMTI, SAR, and HighResolution Terrain Information (HRTI).50

Interim results support the Space-Based Radar(SBR) requirement, and current baseline fundingcould lead to a 2012 initial launch capability.51

The SBR program has recently been approved tomove into the concept definition stage.52 Even ifeventually fielded in the 2012 timeframe, SBRalone will not be able to satisfy the ISR require-ments of operational commanders; a cost-effec-tive combination of space-based and airbornesystems will therefore be required for purposes ofubiquity, timeliness and resolution.

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47 Roche, p.31. 48 At this writing, the future of the E-10A MC2A appears to be somewhat uncertain. According to current U.S. Air Force plans, it would be the ulti-

mate airborne GMTI ISR system and will also be equipped with the MP-RTIP radar. Employing a Boeing 767 airframe with space for up to 60operators, the E-10A has been envisioned as a “flying air operations center” serving as the “hub” of a “constellation of manned and unmanned air-craft and satellites conducting ISR missions and providing command and control.” Global Security.org, “E-767-Multi-Mission Command andControl Aircraft (MC2A),” Jan 8, 2003. Amy Butler, “Sources Question Need to Fly Large BMC2 Staff on Aircraft,” Inside the Air Force, May 16,2003.

49 Amy Butler, “Aldridge Approves Next Two Global Hawk Development Spirals,” Inside the Air Force, January 6, 2003, p. 1.50 High Resolution Terrain Information (HRTI) can have postings as dense as one meter, absolute accuracy on the order of a few meters and relative

accuracy in the sub-meter range. National Geospatial Intelligence Agency website,[www.nima.mil/cda/article2/0,2421,3104_10573_128077,00.html].

51 Lt. Col. Alan Davis, “Space Based Radar Update to General Officer Steering Group,” Headquarters U.S. Air Force Briefing, January 9, 2003.52 Thomas Duffy, “Industry Briefing Marks Next Step for Space-Based Radar Program,” Inside the Air Force, August 15, 2003, p. 1.

Looking at GMTI’s contribution in the past fourconflicts and extrapolating to account for theenhanced and new capabilities of the next genera-tion of GMTI systems suggests GMTI’s potentialimpact on future military operations. In eachconflict GMTI has demonstrated its ability togenerate near-real time, highly accurate, broadarea pictures of most moving vehicles throughouta large area of operations, even in darkness andbad weather. This information has beenexploitable for intelligence, battle management,and targeting at multiple levels of command. Ithas also been used extensively to cue UAVs andother elements of the ISR constellation withmore limited fields of view. Such cross cueingenhances effectiveness of the entire ISR system bygetting other sensors onto targets of interest fasterand by providing positive identification of GMTItargets.

GMTI has also shown its unique ability to pro-vide critical battlefield information to multipleechelons of command without a requirement forfusion. A GMTI sensor platform provides anear-real time, detailed (targeting level of resolu-tion), single distributable picture of an entireoperationally significant area without the need tointegrate inputs from multiple, smaller-scale sen-sors. For example, Joint STARS data can be dis-tributed through links to common groundstations and presented on a “zoom in/out” mapoverlay simultaneously available to all users. Thisprovides joint, air, and ground commanders andstaffs at multiple echelons a common, near-realtime understanding of what is occurring on thebattlefield.

This common operational picture contributes in large measure to the unprecedented level of situational awareness that U.S. forces supported

by GMTI enjoy today. Such a high level of situational awareness (one that will increase con-siderably when future GMTI systems are fielded)has the potential to significantly enhance bothmaneuver and fires and enable a new, more effec-tive approach to warfighting where situationalawareness and precision weaponry reduce boththe time and mass required to execute operationaltasks. Such reductions can increase the pace ofoperations, allowing U.S. forces to attack andcollapse enemy centers of gravity before they canrespond effectively. Specifically, GMTI-enhancedsituational awareness can enable faster maneuver,more effective fires, faster and better decision-making and lower-level joint integration. Takentogether, these enhanced capabilities make it pos-sible to conduct decisive operations faster withsmaller forces.

Faster Maneuver

One of the most influential forces in warfare isuncertainty, Clausewitz’s famous “fog of war.”Uncertainty results from a lack of information orunclear information about such critical battlefieldfactors as the location, number, and capability ofthe enemy. To avoid being surprised by theenemy, commanders must take precautions todeal with uncertainty. These can include main-taining a continuous front against the enemy,assigning units to protect flanks, keeping a por-tion of the force in reserve, maintaining favorableforce ratios, and building “iron mountains” ofsupplies in case they are needed. Additionally,every combat unit committed to an operationrequires even more support units to provide sup-plies (e.g., fuel and ammunition) and services(e.g., medical and maintenance support). All thiscan require a large amount of mass, and mass isboth slow to deploy and slow to employ, given

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VI. Operational Implications of GMTI’sPotential

finite land, sea, and air transportation resourcesand infrastructure.

The more uncertainty a commander faces, thegreater the mass of units he needs to hedgeagainst surprise. Conversely, the more informa-tion he has about the situation, the less mass heneeds and the faster he can move. Thus, the bat-tlespace situational awareness enabled in largemeasure by GMTI allows faster maneuver byreducing uncertainty.

The U.S. Army’s advance on Baghdad duringOperation Iraqi Freedom shows how reduceduncertainty can shrink the amount of massrequired for decisive operations. Traditionally,ground commanders arrayed their forces to pres-ent a continuous front to the enemy. This pro-tected vulnerable flanks and supply lines fromsurprise enemy attack. During its dash toBaghdad, the U.S. Army’s 3rd Infantry Divisionadvanced directly on the city with no groundforces on either flank, leaving its flanks and sup-ply lines exposed for hundreds of miles. TheArmy commanders apparently felt they couldaccept this risk in part because they were confi-dent GMTI and other ISR assets could immedi-ately detect any significant Iraqi attempt tomaneuver, allowing a timely counter blow bystrike aircraft, attack helicopters, or groundmaneuver forces if necessary.53 This allowed asingle division to advance on a narrow front byitself against a much larger enemy force.

This is not to suggest that GMTI-supported ISRcan substitute for ground forces. It does suggest,however, that enhanced situational awarenessallows more effective and efficient use of groundforces.

More Effective Fires

The enhanced situational awareness provided in large part by GMTI can also allow precisecommand and control at the individual combatsystem level of resolution to achieve preciseeffects at the desired time and place. This cansignificantly improve effectiveness of fires in thebattle space, including precision fires. Whilesome have cited the revolution in precision firesover the past several decades as a quantumimprovement in warfighting capability, they for-get that precision fires must be enabled by preci-sion information that shows what targets arewhere and when they should be engaged.Without precise information, precision fires onlyrepresent an improvement in weapons accuracy—not a transformation in warfighting.

Enhanced situational awareness can also help tosubstitute for mass in air and ground deliveredfires. For example, during Operation DesertStorm, Joint STARS significantly increased theeffectiveness of the strike aircraft it controlled byreducing the amount of time spent searching fortargets.54 With GMTI-provided information,these strike aircraft were able to engage more tar-gets per sortie.

Following Operation Desert Storm, duringOperations Allied Force and Enduring Freedom,GMTI platforms were also used to direct strikeaircraft and other sensors to targets. However, onseveral occasions in Iraqi Freedom, GMTI andSAR-derived target coordinates were passeddirectly to strike aircraft and loaded into theJDAMs they were carrying. By logical extension,this could eventually allow airborne battle man-agement to use targeting data derived from aGMTI platform to direct a weapon launched

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53 This confidence was proven on several occasions. In once instance, the Iraqi Republican Guard Medina Division virtually surrounded the 3rd

Infantry Division’s cavalry squadron, which was leading the advance through a major sandstorm. However, radar and other ISR assets imperviousto weather detected this Iraqi maneuver and provided precise targeting information for air attacks that reduced the Medina Division to an esti-mated 20% combat effectiveness. William M. Arkin, “Fliers Rose to Occasion; In Iraq, a pause refreshed ground troops and let planes inflict majordamage,” Los Angeles Times, June 1, 2003, Opinion; Part M, p. 1.

54 Joint STARS controlled strike aircraft typically had a 90-percent success rate in finding and engaging assigned targets on their first pass.Consequently, they consistently ran out of munitions before they ran out of fuel. Thus they were significantly more effective than aircraft that werenot controlled by Joint STARS. David A. Fulghum, “Desert Storm Success Renews USAF Interest in Specialty Weapons,” Aviation Week and SpaceTechnology, May 13, 1991, p. 85.

from another platform, enabling net-centric air-delivered fires.55

Faster and Better Decision Making

The more uncertain a commander is about theenemy, the slower and more cautious his deci-sion-making must be to avoid stumbling into dis-aster. The opposite is also true—the moreinformation he has and the greater its precision,the faster he can make sound decisions.

GMTI provides air and ground commanders andstaffs not only the ability to see enemy andfriendly forces moving in near-real time but alsothe ability to recognize and comprehend theimplications of that movement. Joint STARS’debut during Iraq’s attempted counterattack at AlKhafji during the 1991 Gulf War is an excellentillustration of this effect. Writing about the bat-tle after the war, General Horner (the AirComponent Commander) stated,

…Joint STARS told me where and when theenemy was moving... you could make the casethat my information superiority and my increasedcapacity to analyze and decide what that informa-tion meant gave me the means to thwart an attackbefore I even knew I was being attacked.56

Faster, Lower-level Joint Integration

GMTI gives both air and ground users an identi-cal “ground truth” picture, helping joint, air, andground commanders share a common under-standing of the battlefield, its dangers, and

opportunities that can be exploited through inte-grated and synchronized application of air andground combat power. This same common pic-ture is shared not only among joint headquartersand the service components but also down thedifferent echelons of command, thereby creatingnot only a horizontal but also a vertical commonunderstanding of the battlefield and enhancingthe ability to conduct integrated joint operationsat lower levels more quickly and more effectively.

In the past, information had to flow from a sen-sor to a decision-maker to a strike unit to a strikeplatform. In joint operations the informationoften had to flow across different service compo-nents, adding hours (if not days) to the sensor-to-shooter time. However, shared, near-real timesituational awareness at lower echelons allowslower-level joint forces to operate moreautonomously within the context of the jointcommander’s intent, essentially achieving“dynamic self coordination”57 without dependingupon the time-consuming flow of informationfrom higher echelons.

A good example of this occurred duringOperation Iraqi Freedom, when a Joint STARSaircraft passed critical enemy information to anair controller with an Army cavalry troop thatwas about to be overrun by massing Iraqi forces.The air controller used the Joint STARS targetingdata to direct JDAMs onto the approachingIraqis, destroying dozens of vehicles and killinghundreds of enemy troops—in the midst of ablinding sandstorm.58 This was a joint operation

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55 In fact, DARPA’s precision, all-weather Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE) project has already shown that GMTI informa-tion makes it possible to engage moving targets precisely from stand-off ranges in all-weather conditions using seekerless weapons. On September30, 2002, AMSTE technology passed GMTI target information triangulated from two GMTI sensors to a Joint Standoff Weapon (JSOW)launched from an F/A-18 at 30,000 feet, hitting a tank moving at 15 miles per hour some 35 miles from the weapon release point. That same dayAMSTE technology successfully guided two JDAMs launched from a F-14 at 20,000 feet against two different moving targets within a convoy.Press Release, “DARPA Demonstrates Affordable Moving Surface Target Engagement Using Both JDAM and JSOW Weapons,”[http://www.darpa.mil/body/NewsItems/pdf/AMSTE1002.pdf ] October 9, 2002, p. 1.

56 Tom Clancy with General Chuck Horner (Retired), Every Man a Tiger: The Gulf War Air Campaign (New York, NY: Berkley Books, 2000), pp.348-349.

57 Dynamic self-coordination–increased freedom of low-level forces to operate near-autonomously and re-task themselves through exploitation ofshared awareness and commander’s intent. Department of Defense, Transformation Planning Guidance, p. 31.

58 An e-mail sent from Baghdad International Airport dated April 17, 2003 by an Air Force tactical air controller supporting Army forces of the 3rd

Squadron 7th Cavalry graphically described the consequences of combining the near-real time, precise targeting information provided by GMTIwith the ability to quickly act upon the information at low levels:

JSTARS saved our ass a couple of times! At one point we had a troop of the Cav with a 1C4 [Tactical Air Controller] holding anintersection near An Najaf. It was during the horrible sandstorm and you couldn’t see 50 yards in daylight let alone anything atnight. The crunchies [Iraqis] kept trying to drive fuel trucks into the intersection trying to blow up the Bradleys [Army trackedInfantry Fighting Vehicles]. JSTARS was able to pick the vehicles up, relay that to the 1C4 we had at the intersection and he was able to call in JDAMs [Joint Direct Attack Munitions] on all the roads and vehicles leading to their position. Middle of the night in a blinding sandstorm and we still nailed them with CAS [Close Air Support].

conducted at the lowest level as quickly as possible.

Result: Transformed, High TempoOperations

The aforementioned enhanced capabilities of aGMTI-supported force are a direct consequenceof increased situational awareness that is diffusedhorizontally and vertically throughout the force.Taken together they have the potential to increasethe tempo of friendly operations, a phenomenonnoted several years ago during the U.S. Army’sseries of advanced Army After Next Wargames.This series discovered that when the informationadvantage between two adversaries increased by afactor of four or better,

the velocities of maneuver increased arithmeti-cally, and formations began to spread out and dis-perse to the point where familiar linear battlefieldgeometry disappeared. Freed from the need to

fight in lines, the game players consistently swepttactical units across vast distances without regardto fronts or flanks. As a consequence, the tempoof battle accelerated considerably. Engagementsthat normally took days to culminate were over inhours. As time compressed, the size of the battle-field expanded—in some cases as much as anorder of magnitude or more over conventionalmechanized warfare.59

The recent Iraq campaign provided convincingproof for this theory. Enjoying an informationadvantage of the magnitude posited in thewargames, Coalition forces moved an unprece-dented 358 miles from Kuwait to Baghdad anddecisively defeated Iraq’s armed forces in 21 days.The tempo of their decisive operations over-whelmed Iraq’s attempts to respond.

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59 Major General Robert H. Scales, Jr. (U.S. Army, Retired), Yellow Smoke: The Future of Land Warfare for America’s Military (New York, NY:Rowman & Littlefield, 2003), p. 11.

GMTI provides the capability to comprehend innear-real time what is happening throughout thedepth and breadth of the battlespace and to exertprecise command and control to achieve preciseeffects at the desired time and place. These aretruly transformational capabilities that potentiallycan raise the tempo of U.S. combat operations tonew, previously unachievable levels well above anenemy’s ability to respond. Is the U.S. militaryready to realize this potential—to go beyondemploying GMTI to using it to transform the wayit fights? Do our forces recognize the transforma-tional potential of GMTI?

Writing in Foreign Affairs, Secretary of DefenseDonald Rumsfeld noted that “we must changenot only the capabilities at our disposal, but alsohow we think about war. …All the high-techweapons in the world won’t transform the U.S.armed forces unless we also transform the way wethink, train, exercise, and fight.”60

In the most recent four conflicts U.S. forces havemade good use of GMTI—but in the first threethe systems were brought in late and in all fourtheir full potential was not recognized until theconflict was well underway. The fact that leadersand staffs have experienced significant learningcurves in employing GMTI in each conflict is astrong indication that our thinking has not yetbeen transformed to incorporate the full implica-tions of GMTI technology. That said,CENTCOM’s Iraq campaign and the substitu-tion of information, precision, and speed formass may indicate a broadening understanding ofGMTI’s potential. Only time will tell if the U.S.military will be able to leverage GMTI and itsrelated ISR technologies to permanently trans-form the way it fights. To paraphrase SecretaryRumsfeld, all the GMTI systems in the worldwill not transform our forces unless we first trans-form the way we think about warfighting.

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VII. Conclusion: GMTI and theTransformation of U.S.Warfighting

60 Donald H. Rumsfeld, “Transforming the Military,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 18 No. 3, May/June 2002, p. 29.

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The following factors determine the performancelevels of GMTI radar systems:

• Probability of Detection (Pd) — The probabil-ity of detecting a given target at a given rangeany time the radar beam scans across it, Pd isdetermined by factors that include the size ofthe antenna and the amount of power it radi-ates. A large antenna radiating at high powerprovides the best performance. For high qual-ity information on moving targets the Pdmust be very high.

• Target Location Accuracy — Location accu-racy is a function of platform self-location per-formance, radar-pointing accuracy, azimuthresolution, and range resolution. A longantenna or very short wave length can providefine azimuth resolution. Short antennas tendto have a larger azimuth error, an error thatincreases with range to the target because signal-to-noise ratio varies inversely withrange. Location accuracy is vital to trackingperformance because it prevents track corrup-tion when there are multiple targets andmakes it possible to determine which road avehicle is on if it is moving in an area withmany roads.

• Minimum Detectable Velocity (MDV) —MDV determines whether the majority of mil-itary traffic, which often moves very slowly,especially when traveling off-road, will bedetected. A GMTI radar must distinguish amoving target from ground clutter by usingthe target’s Doppler signature to detect the

radial component (see Figure A-1 below) ofthe target’s velocity vector (i.e., by measuringthe component of the target’s movementdirectly along the radar-target line). To cap-ture most of this traffic, even when it is mov-ing almost tangentially to the radar (i.e.,perpendicular to the radar-target line), a sys-tem must have the ability to detect very slowradial velocities. As the radial component of atarget’s velocity approaches zero, the target willfall into the clutter or “blind zone.”

• Target Range Resolution (High RangeResolution or HRR) — Target range resolutiondetermines whether two or more targets mov-ing in close proximity will be detected as indi-vidual targets. With higher performanceradars, target range resolution—known asHigh Range Resolution (HRR)—can be soprecise that it may be possible to recognize aspecific target (i.e., one that has been seenbefore) and to place it in a specific class (e.g.,“a T-80 tank”). This would allow more reli-able tracking of specific vehicles or groups ofvehicles, even when they are moving in densetraffic or “disappear” for a period due toscreening.

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VIII. GMTI Performance MetricsAppendix

Radial ComponentMeasured by GMTI Radar

Actual TargetMovementVector

TangentialComponent

Figure A-1. Target Movement Vector Components

• Stand-off Distance — Stand-off distance is thedistance separating a radar system from thearea it is covering (see Figure A-2 below).

• Coverage Area Size (breadth and depth) —Coverage area size is the area that the systemcan keep under continuous surveillance from aspecific orbit (see Figure A-2 below). Well-known design principles cause a radar’s maxi-mum detection range to depend on the size ofits antenna (radar aperture), the amount ofpower radiated from the antenna, and theeffectiveness of its clutter cancellation mecha-nism. The earth’s curvature and screeningfrom terrain, foliage, and buildings cause sys-tem altitude to be another key factor deter-mining depth of coverage. The ability to

cover an area the size of an army corps com-mander’s area of interest61 from a safe stand-offdistance is the hallmark of an effective,advanced GMTI system.

• Coverage Area Revisit Rate — This equates tothe frequency with which the radar beampasses over a given area. Frequent revisits arevery important to the radar’s ability to achievetrack continuity and contribute to anincreased probability of target detection bylessening the chance of obscuration fromscreening by trees, buildings, or other objects.A fast revisit rate becomes critical to providingan uncorrupted track when a target moves indense traffic or is temporarily obscured, if onlyby trees along a road.

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Breadth of Coverage Area

Stand-OffDistance

Depth ofCoverage Area

RadarCoverageArea (RCA)

Figure A-2. Stand-off Distance and Radar Coverage Area

61 “Area of interest” is a geographical area from which the commander requires information and intelligence in order to execute successful tacticaloperations and to plan for future operations. This varies based upon several operational factors but may be several hundred kilometers deep by sev-eral hundred kilometers wide for a U.S. Army corps.

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Price T. Bingham Mr. Bingham is a manager for busi-ness development for NorthropGrumman Corporation’s AirborneGround Surveillance & BattleManagement Systems, Melbourne,Florida, which he joined in 1993. Aretired Air Force Lieutenant Colonel,he is a graduate of the U.S. AirForce Academy and holds a Mastersin military history from the Universityof Alabama. He was chief of theCurrent Doctrine Division; AirpowerResearch Institute; Center forAerospace Doctrine, Research, andEducation; Maxwell A.F.B., Alabama,at the time of his retirement inAugust 1992. A command pilot, heflew fighters in the United States,Europe, and Southeast Asia.Colonel Bingham also served as afighter and tanker duty controller inthe Military Assistance Command,Vietnam/United States SupportActivities Group, Thailand, tactical aircontrol center, and as an air opera-tions officer in the doctrine divisionat Headquarters U.S. Air Force.

Richard J. Dunn, IIIMr. Dunn is a Senior Analyst at theNorthrop Grumman Analysis Center,where he is responsible for preparingin-depth assessments of military,political, technological, and eco-nomic developments worldwide.Prior to joining Northrop GrummanCorporation, Mr. Dunn spent overfour years at SAIC, where he devel-oped new approaches for under-standing the future of warfare.Before joining SAIC, Mr. Dunn com-pleted a 29-year U.S. Army careerthat included brigade command andstaff positions of significant respon-sibility that culminated with serviceas director of the Chief of Staff ofthe Army’s Staff Group. At the U.S.Military Academy at West Point, Mr.Dunn taught Chinese language,international relations, and Chinesepolitics and government. Mr. Dunn’seducation includes a B.S. in CivilEngineering from Bucknell Universityand a Master of Public Affairs degreefrom Harvard University. He alsostudied international relations inTaiwan as the first Olmsted Scholarto study in Chinese. Mr. Dunn is a1991 graduate of the National WarCollege.

Charles A. “Bert” Fowler Mr. Fowler, a Northrop GrummanCorporation consultant, is a formermember and past Chairman of theDefense Science Board and theDefense Intelligence Agency (DIA)Advisory Board and a former mem-ber of the Air Force ScientificAdvisory Board. He is a member ofthe National Academy of Engineeringand a Fellow of several professionalsocieties. For his contributions inelectronics and military systems, hereceived the 1998 IEEE PioneerAward (with John Entzminger andWilliam Kenneally) for early workleading to the Joint STARS systemand the 2001 Department of DefenseEugene G. Fubini Award for “provid-ing significant contributions to DoDand National Security through out-standing scientific and technicaladvice.” He has held managementpositions at AIL Systems, OSD,Raytheon and Mitre and received aB.S. in Engineering Physics from theUniversity of Illinois.

AcknowledgementsThe authors deeply appreciate the contributions of many in the Washingtondefense community, members of the armed services, public policy organiza-tions, and government agencies who offered valuable insights when this paperwas being developed. In particular we would like to thank John Entzminger,one of the true “fathers” of GMTI, for reviewing the paper and providing sub-stantial comments for inclusion. We would also like to thank Barry Watts, JimCarafano, and General (Retired) George Joulwan for providing detailed andhelpful comments on our draft. Within the Analysis Center, Mary Hubbell,Laura Barrett-Oliver, and Adam Cushing provided essential research, editing,and proofreading. Thanks also to our external editor, Kimberly Burger Capozzi,for her efforts in making our somewhat tortured prose less painful for thereader.

About the Authors

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The Northrop Grumman Corporation established the

Analysis Center in 1977 to conduct objective analyses of

strategic trends, defense policy, military doctrine, emerging

threats and operational concepts, and their implications for

the defense industry. The Analysis Center Papers present ongo-

ing key research and analysis conducted by the Center staff

and its associates.

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Analysis Center Papers are available on-line at the NorthropGrumman Washington Office Web site, Capitol Source, at www.capitol.northgrum.com. For substantive issues related to this paper, please contact Richard J. Dunn, [email protected], or call him at 703-875-0007. For copies,please call 703-875-0054.

Northrop Grumman Corporation is a global defense company headquartered in Los Angeles,California. Northrop Grumman provides technologically advanced, innovative products, servicesand solutions in systems integration, defense electronics, information technology, advanced air-craft, shipbuilding and space technology. With more than 120,000 employees, and operations inall 50 states and 25 countries, Northrop Grumman serves U.S. and international military, govern-ment and commercial customers.

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