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ANALISYS OF CONSEQUENCES OF A

DESIGN BASIS EARTHQUAKE FOR

THE REGION AROUND A NUCLEAR

POWER PLANT

András Vilimi

Senior Technical Advisor, MVM Nuclear Power Plant Paks Ltd, Hungary

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Design concept for NPPs

• Evaluation of the external hazards,

• Characterization of the hazards with a specific parameter

which can occur with a probability,

• Define the probability level which should be taken into

account in the design basis (for normal civil structures 0,1

non-exceedance probability, for nuclear power plants 0,005

which means 475 years return period time for normal building,

10.000 years for old NPPs and 100.000 years for new NPPs),

• Proper design, which ensures the structural integrity and

function,

• Quantification of the margin above the design basis loads.

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Design basis loads for external hazards (10-4/a)

External hazard Design loads

Wind 41,5 m/s

Snow 1,5 kPa

Rain 10-minute rainfall event 42 mm,

60-minute rainfall event 93 mm,

24-hour rainfall event 132 mm

Maximum temperature momentary temp. 45,3 °C

Minimum temperature momentary temp. -47,9 °C

Lightning 200 kA

Danube flooding (dry site!) Icy flooding and ice-free flooding levels are

96.07 m and 95.51 m respectively. The site level

is 97.15 m while the Danube East-bank dyke

crown height is 95.9 m. (Height given above

Baltic-sea)

Low water level 84.65 m

Earthquakes 0,25 g horizontal, 0,2 g vertical acceleration

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Could it happen in Hungary?

Stormy wind on the Hill

Kab 165 km/h (45 m/s!)

and 100 km/h at low-

lying areas.

The temperature

decreased to -180C in

Vásárosnamény which

was the lowest data

ever measured.

Date: 15th March 2013.

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Could it happen in Hungary?

Date: 11th June 2013. Báta, Hungary

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Could it happen in Hungary?

Date: 8th July 1911. Kecskemét, Hungary

Magnitude: 5,6 ; Maximum intensity: VIII;

28% of the buildings (1269 pieces) damaged

Nobody died

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Date: 12th January 1956. Dunaharaszti, Hungary

Magnitude: 5,6 ; Maximum intensity: VIII;

90% of the buildings (3144 pieces) damaged

Some casualties

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Date: 28th June 1763. Komárom, Hungary

Magnitude: 6,3 ; Maximum intensity: IX;

30% of the buildings destroyed

63 casualties, more than 120 injuries

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Seismic zone map

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Intensity scale

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What if an EQ like in Komárom would happen?

Number of EQs in Hungary due to magnitude Of course the

probability of a given

magnitude EQ at a

given place is much

lower. (For example

the occurrence of

M=6,3 EQ at Paks

NPP has 10-4/a

frequency)

BUT!

The nature of the random events are, that the 10-4/a frequency event can

happen in the next second.

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The scenario

The radius of VIII

and VII intensity

areas are:

RVIII ≈ 10 km,

RVII ≈ 20 km

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European Macroseismic scale (EMS)

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EMS to different structures

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Consequences in Bács-Kiskun county

Affected approximately 5000-7000 people. The

infrastructure is damaged to a similar extent.

Walling In the radius of EMS

VIII

Damaged

(%)

Damaged

(number of buildings)

brick, stone, masonry

hand 1018

moderate structural damage

at 50%, heavy structural

damage at 20%

713

medium or large

block, cast concrete 151

moderate structural damage

at 50% 75

panel 2 Not significant 0

wood 7

Adobe, mud with

foundation 826

heavy structural damage

≈80%,

very heavy structural damage

(total or near total collapse)

≈20%

826

Adobe, mud without

foundation 450 450

others 34 Not significant 0

In all: 2487 2064

Data by the census 2011.

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What happens to the infrastructure?

Pylons

not

designed

for EQ!

Designed

for wind

and ice

loads.

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Conclusions

• The nuclear power plant withstand the examined earthquake

event, no damages at the critical safety infrastructure.

• The grid connections at Paks nuclear power plant fails with

high probability.

• The failure of the grid cause the network crash.

• Because of failure of the roads the work of the disaster

management is more complicate.

• The affected people and their relatives and interested people

with the huge number of phone calls will cause the crash of

the mobile communication systems.

• The psychological effects with these consequences give a

huge work and responsibility on the disaster management

people in the country.

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András VILIMI, László TÓTH, Tamás János KATONA, Analysis Of Consequences Of Design Basis

Earthquake For The Region Around a Nuclear Power Plant, POLLACK PERIODICA, An

International Journal for Engineering and Information Sciences, DOI: 10.1556/606.2016.11.2.4; Vol.

11, No. 2, pp. 43–54 (2016); www.akademiai.com;