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An Independent Tank Battalion in World War II:How It Was Used......And Sometimes Misusedby Marvin G. Jensen

Most Americans think of World War IItank warfare in terms of long thrusts byarmored divisions, probably led by Pat-ton. To his credit, he did lead such thrusts,

just as planners had envisioned whenthey created the 1st and 2d Armored Di-visions as the principal components of theArmored Force of the United States inJuly, 1940. Modeled after German blitz-kreig forces, armored divisions had enor-mous power and mobility. Tanks set the

pace for their own motorized infantry.

However, for tanks to use their maneu-verability and speed, terrain and condi-tions had to be right. When they were not,such as in the hedgerows of Normandy,or in the forests of Germany, regular in-fantry with close tank support had to slugit out with the enemy at close quarters.

To provide this support, the 70th TankBattalion was included in the originalArmored Force as the first of the inde-

pendent tank battalions. Called independ-ent because they were not part of a div i-sion, these battalions were available to beattached to an infantry division when theneed arose. It is believed that GeneralAdna R. Chaffee, the first commander ofthe Armored Force, insisted upon thecreation of independent tank battalions soinfantry divisions wouldn’t constantly be

breaking up armored divisions by bor-rowing tank battalions from them everytime tank support was needed.

As always in the Army command struc-ture, a division controlled all attachedunits, including an independent tank bat-talion. This, at times, presented difficul-

ties for tankers. It was a wise infantrycommander who used tankers’ advice onhow best to use tanks. Most of them didso, but not all.

During the course of their combat, mostindependent tank battalions were attachedto a number of infantry divisions. In itseight campaigns (the most for an inde-

pendent tank battalion), the 70th wasattached to the U.S. 1st Infantry Division(twice), the 9th, the 4th, the 63rd, CCompany to the 45th in Sicily, and ACompany to the French in Tunisia.

Because it was not always possible toforesee needs, an infantry division and itsattached tank battalion often had little orno prior joint training. This could lead toa lack of coordination. Combat is a poor

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place for one unit to get to know the ways,styles, and idiosyncracies of the other.

In preparation for invasions, however,the infantry that would lead an assaultand their tank support usually trainedtogether. As the first independent tank

battalion, the 70th was selected to be thefirst to undergo amphibious training withan infantry division, the 1st. Training wasstill in progress when Pearl Harbor was

bombed on December 7, 1941.As the only only tank battalion and in-

fantry division with joint amphibioustraining, the 70th, the 1st, along with the1st Marine Raider Battalion, were sent ona mission to Martinique on January 9,1942. Control of this Caribbean island inour own backyard by pro-Nazi, VichyFrance was intolerable. Seeing the forceagainst him, the Vichy governor capitu-lated without a shot being fired.

In early March, the 70th and the 9th In -

fantry Division began training for “Op-eration Torch,” the invasion of French North Africa. On November 8, 1942, BCompany and the 47th Infantry Regimentlanded at Safi, French Morocco, C Com-

pany and the 60th at Port Lyautey,French Morocco, and A Company andthe 39th at Algiers, Algeria. Combat wasover in a day except at Port Lyauteywhere it lasted three days.

The 70th was soon detached from the9th, which meant A Company was aloneand available in Algiers. It was sent toTunisia in late December, 1942. The restof the battalion set up a training school in

Tlemcen, Algeria, to teach “Free French”cadres the use of M5 light tanks.In Tunisia, A Company was attached to

the “Free French” XIX Corps. Not onlywas there no prior training, but the com-

pany found itself providing tank supportfor French, Senegalese, and Ghoumierinfantry, all speaking a different languageand with different military traditions.Even worse, French commanders at firstdeployed A Company tanks as sentinelsand mobile pillboxes, out ahead of infan-try in exposed positions and ineffectivefor an assault. On another occasion, thelight tanks were used as bait, parading infront of heavier German tanks to drawthem within range of French big guns andthe 75s of U.S. 601st T.D.s and BritishChurchill tanks. Such misuse of tanksended only when the A Company com-mander, Atlee Wampler, insisted that he

be involved in all planning when com- pany tanks were employed. In time, theFrench and A Company developed agood, solid relationship which lasted untilthe end of hostilit ies on May 13th.

In Sicily, the 70th again supported the1st Infantry Division. For the first time in

combat, the entire battalion was together. Now, Lt. Col. John Welborn, battalioncommander, was involved in all plan-ning. He was highly regarded and a goodfriend of Brig. Gen. Theodore Roosevelt,Jr., 1st Division Assistant Commander.Relations and coordination between the1st and the 70th were excellent through-

out the campaign.Light tanks had proved to have limited

value. Sent to England to train for theinvasion of France, the 70th became a“standard tank battalion” with three com-

panies of 17 Sherman medium battletanks, and one company of 17 lights, used

primarily for screening, roadblocks orreconnaissance. Mediums had crews offive, lights of four.

Roosevelt, now in the 4th Infantry Divi-sion, was reputed to have said that for theinvasion, the untried 4th would need the

battle-tested 70th more than would the

experienced 1st. Roosevelt prevailed, andthe 70th was assigned to the 4th just priorto the invasion maneuvers, code-named“Exercise Tiger.” Joint infantry-tanktraining was only for the landings, andonly for a few days.

Yet on Utah Beach, the 4th immediatelyshowed that tankers would be involved in

planning tank-infantry operations. The4th assigned Franklin Anderson and tworadio men to land with engineers at H-Hour minus three minutes. As a 70th tankofficer, Anderson designated for engi-neers places to blow holes in the seawallwhere tanks could best operate.

Four DDs (amphibious tanks) sankwhen their LCT hit a mine, but the other28 DDs landed in time to support infantryacross causeways over land inundated byGermans. C Company Commander JohnAhearn and his regular Shermans pro-tected both infantry flanks. D Companylight tanks helped link scattered 101stAirborne troops on D+1.

Inland, the first of the hedgerows whichdominated the Norman landscape wereencountered. These were earthen banks

perhaps six or seven feet high encrustedwith bushes and trees bringing the totalheight to 10 or 12 feet. Each was a natu-ral defense line protecting a farm field.Movement was from field to field, andinfantry with tank support had to do it. Itwas a badly chosen place to conduct war-fare, and high command had not toldfront line troops about hedgerows nor

prepared anyone to fight in them.

It took individual iniative to find a way.As early as D-day, dozer tank com-mander Owen Gavigan and his temp orar-ily assigned engineer tank driver learnedto use the bulldozer type blade to push

through hedgerows, making an openingfor assault tanks to get into a field.

Once, Gavigan recalls, his dozer tankwas the only tank in a field with a platoonor more of infantry. A good deal of smallarms fire was coming in, so Gavigan usedthe dozer blade to build mounds of earth,enabling infantry to hold their grounduntil more help arrived.

It was in these conditions that the 4thand the 70th learned to work together.Tanks needed infantry protection orwarning of anti-tank guns, panzerfaust(German bazookas), and heavier Germantanks. The German Tiger and Pantherexceeded the Sherman in both the powerof the main gun and in armor thickness.One on one, the Sherman didn’t stand achance, and that is what happened asGerman tanks simply waited behindhedgerows for American tanks to come tothem. Infantrymen needed the protectiontanks offered, and especially the fire-

power of two machine guns (or some-times a third firing out of the turret) and a75mm cannon. Tanker Clarence Mc-

Namee believes the 4th and the 70th“were a perfect fit. Infantry would saywhat they wanted, but control was really

between our platoon leader or companycommander and an infantry officer. Itwas crucial that tanks work alongsideinfantry, in conjunction, not out in frontand not behind.”

Often, as in Normandy, a single tank battalion was insufficient to meet infantrytank needs. Then all or parts of a secondindependent tank battalion would be at-tached to an infantry division. When a sin-gle tank battalion sustained losses on theline day after day for prolonged periods,it was almost always understrength. Theratio of tanks to infantry did not allowtank companies or platoons to be alter-nated as frequently on the line and in re-serve as was the case with infantry units.

Medium tank companies seldom sawone another during a campaign. Each wasassigned to an infantry regiment. Eventhe three platoons of a company normallyfought in different actions with a battal-ion or company. When a platoon wassplit, they were likely supporting a com-

pany or less. Single tank missions wereconducted at the request of an infantryofficer or noncom who would direct thetank to the target.

If the enemy was behind a hedgerow inunknown strength, Ed Gossler remem-

bers, “We would spray it like hell withmachine-gun and 75mm fire to keep theGermans down. I guess they were just asscared as we were and we had a lot offirepower!”

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The attachment of the 70th to the 4thwas unusual as it lasted until the end ofthe war for all but three days when the70th was with the 63rd Infantry Division.The more the 70th and the 4th workedtogether, the better their operations be-came. It should have been that way withall independent tank battalions and theinfantry divisions they supported. That itwasn’t led to untold consequences.

When a tank battalion became attachedto an infantry division, the question ofauthority for use of tanks became signifi-cant. Tankers knew what tanks could and

could not do. Yet in the hierarchicalstructure of the Army, orders from one ofhigher rank must be obeyed, even if aninfantry officer put tankers in needless

jeopardy.

The worst case occurred late in the war.Company Commander Franklin Ander-son attended a meeting at infantry regi-mental headquarters. There was to be anattack the next morning into a shallowvalley with a high ridge on the oppositeend still held by the Germans. “That wasa perfect place to put 88s, hidden by trees

and looking right down on us,” Andersonrecalls. He had examined the ground andfound tank traps which would force tanksto go the way the Germans wanted. Atthe meeting, the regimental commander,a colonel, planned the attack. He said hecould visualize tanks “barreling over thecrest of a small hill into the valley.” In-fantry would rush in when tanks reachedtheir objective. With his tanks in theopen, in front of infantry, and with noartillery barrage against the ridge, Ander-son knew they would be in serious trou-

ble. Yet he could not question the colo-nel’s authority. He did ask for the attackto begin at 0630, hoping for a morningmist. The colonel said no, it will begin at0800. An infantry major gave the orderfor four tanks to move out. Within 50yards 1-2-3-4-all were knocked out. Sixtankers were killed, more were injured.

Such a decision would likely not have been made by infant ry and tank platoonleaders or company commanders together

planning an action at the point of attack.This is where infantry and tankers haddeveloped a relationship built upon ex-

perience and trus t.

When I arrived home in September,1945, the 70th patch was on one upperarm of my “Eisenhower jacket,” the IvyLeaf of the 4th on the other. I am proud toread that the 4t h is considered among the

best infant ry divisions in the EuropeanWar. I know one of the reasons was theexcellent relationship it had with the 70th.

This article is in part extracted from the author’sbook, Strike Swiftly: The 70th Tank BattalionFrom North Africa to Normandy to Germany, Presidio Press, 1997. It was reviewed in AR-MOR Magazine, May-June 1998.

Marvin G. Jensen served as acook with the 70th Tank Battalionin five European campaigns dur-ing World War II. He holds a BAwith honors in history from SanJose State College, Calif., and anMA from Stanford University. Hetaught U.S. history in schools andcolleges in the San FranciscoBay Area for 25 years and is nowretired.

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