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An experience-based viewof co-opetition in R&D networks

Francesco Schiavone and Michele SimoniDepartment of Business Studies, Faculty of Economics,

University Parthenope, Naples, Italy

Abstract

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between prior experience oforganisations and their co-opetitive behaviours in forming research networks when a R&Dprogramme is launched in order to fund future research projects.

Design/methodology/approach Drawing on both resource-based writings and socialembeddedness studies, the paper posits that two types of co-opetition namely the intra-networkand inter-network co-opetition should be clearly distinguished in order to understand co-opetitive

behaviours of organisations. These two types of co-opetition arise as a consequence of the differentlevels of firms prior experience in forming successful co-opetitive networks with their competitors.

Findings A reverse U-shape trade-off between the two types of co-opetition is hypothesised: themaximum level of intra-network co-opetition and the lowest of inter-network co-opetition are expectedfor low and highlevels of prior experience; the minimum level of intra-network co-opetition and thehighest of inter-network co-opetition are expected for moderate levels of prior experience.

Originality/value This paper sheds light on how co-opetitive relationships emerge in R&Dnetworks and under which circumstances competition prevails on cooperation.

Keywords Organizational innovation, Research and development, Competitive strategy

Paper type Conceptual paper

1. IntroductionCo-opetition is the phenomenon by which firms in the same industry complete eachother in creating markets but compete in dividing up markets (Chesbrough et al., 2006,p. 87). Within the last 15 years, it became a rising subject of investigation for industrialorganisation (Esty and Geradin, 2000) and management scholars (Brandenburger andNalebuff, 1996; Chesbrough, 2003; Luo, 2004; Dagnino and Rocco, 2009). Much effortshave been spent to find a rationale for this firms behaviour. Relying on differenttheoretical perspectives, scholars have pointed out that co-opetition arises for manystrategic reasons. Transaction cost theorists argue that co-opetition is a firms responseto additional costs in realising exchanges created by markets imperfections (Madhok,2000). Game theory scholars advance the idea that competitors may decide to collaborateas a means to escape the well-known prisoner dilemma (Brandenburger and Nalebuff,

1995; Loebbecke et al., 1998). A large literature stream suggests that co-opetition shouldbe conceived as a network embeddedness phenomenon (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001;Gimeno, 2004). Finally, resource based view (RBV) scholars explain co-opetition as theneed for firms to access resources otherwise difficult to obtain (Hamel et al., 1989; Hamel,1991; Lavie, 2006).

The current issue and full text archive of this journal is available at

www.emeraldinsight.com/1460-1060.htm

Although this paper expresses the common ideas of both the authors, Francesco Schiavone wroteSections 2, 3 and 4. Michele Simoni wrote Sections 1, 5, 6 and 7.

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But while these perspectives provide a comprehensive view of the strategic reasons forco-opetition, they left co-opetition dynamics in the shadow. Namely, how co-opetitiverelationships form and how organizations choose among different form of co-opetitionremain still little explored.

To fill in these gaps, we investigate these two research questions in the field of R&Dprogrammes. These programmes are policy instruments through which institutions fund(or more often co-funds), within a specific technological or scientific area, R&D projectssubmitted by firms and other types of organisations. Therefore, firms act in an ecology ofcompetition that pits organizations against each other in pursuit of scarce environmentalresources and opportunities. In addition, it is not uncommon that R&D programmesassign a preferential evaluation to projects presented by allied partners (e.g. consortia)pushing firms to form networks with other organizations and eventually competitors toincrease their probability of success. Thus, co-opetition is quite often to occur and differenttypes of co-opetitive relationships emerge (Arranz and Arroyabe, 2007; Breschi andCusmano, 2004; Hernan et al., 2003; Roediger-Schluga and Barber, 2008).

In this paper, we propose a theoretical model which accounts for two different typesof co-opetition among firms engaged in these R&D programmes (intra-network andinter-network co-opetition) and suggests that prior experience in successfulco-opetitive efforts affects the organizations decisions about the preferred form ofco-opetitive relationships.

This paper has a theoretical nature and is organised as follows. Section 2 reviewsthe literature on co-opetition and focuses on the network embeddedness and RBV thatare perspectives essential to support our theoretical hypothesis. Section 3 defines theconcept of prior experience and how it should be interpreted according to networkembeddedness and RBV theories. Section 4 introduces R&D programmes. Sections 5and 6 advance our main hypothesis by contextualising it in R&D programmes field.Section 7 summarises the main conclusions of the study, points out its relevant

implications, and identifies limitations and further improvements.

2. Different perspectives in co-opetition studiesCo-opetition emerges when two or more firms simultaneously compete and co-operateeach other. This phenomenon is quite common in mature and/or high-tech industries, inwhich competitiveness and market positions are hard to keep or acquire just withstand-alone strategies (Lado et al., 1997). Co-opetition can emerge between firms atboth dyadic and/or network levels and relate to one level (simple co-opetition) or morelevels (complex co-opetition) of firms value chains at the same time (Dagnino andPadula, 2002). Scholars recognised and studied co-opetition in several industries:biotechnology (Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco, 2004), automobile (Dagninoand Padula, 2002), airlines (Gimeno, 2004), steel (Gnyawali et al., 2006), microprocessors

(Chesbrough et al., 2008), aircraft manufacturing (Nishiguchi and Caspary, 2001).The main theoretical approaches in economics and management studies give

different explanations about the rationale of co-opetition[1] (Lado et al., 1997).According to transaction cost economics theorists, co-opetition rationale lies into theinefficiencies of market transactions, which produce transaction costs (Madhok, 2000).Firms organise their activities opting for strategies minimising transaction costs.Inter-firm collaborations (as joint-ventures or strategic partnerships) are hybridgovernance mechanisms occasionally reaching this goal since they match the benefits

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and limits of both market and hierarchy. For instance, co-opetition between rivals firmsmay facilitate the learning of tacit knowledge between partners. However, this is arisky strategy somehow since it may stimulate opportunistic behaviours of rivals,especially if the intensity of their direct competition is high.

Game theory scholars suggest the foundations of co-opetition are in the well-knownprisoners dilemma model (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1996; Loebbecke et al.,1998). They differ with transaction costs economics theorists in the interpretation ofthe notion of opportunism. In the game theory approach, opportunism is not solely arisk but also a potential strategic driver for firms. Co-opetition defines a gamestructure based on partially overlapped interests (Padula and Dagnino, 2008) betweenmore players, each one bringing its own-added value into the market. These playersare tied together by some interdependencies, which create a value net between thecompany and the other market organisations (complementors and substitutors)playing the game. The key principle of game theory is that every action of a firmcauses a reaction of its competitors that may delete the achieved advantages. This riskshould lead firms to implement win-win strategies (as co-opetition) rather than win-losestrategies since the former are more likely to maximise the acquisition of the value thatpartners put into the market and to reduce competition costs for every market player(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 1995). Adopting this view, Loebbecke et al. (1998)proposed a framework, based on knowledge synergies and leveragability, in order tomanage the inter-organisational knowledge transfer during co-opetition.

The embeddedness perspective is another traditional approach for scholars ofco-opetition (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Gimeno, 2004). The basic assumption ofthis approach is networks are loci of resources within which firms, competing andcollaborating each other, exchange assets and information. The structural properties ofa firm determinate its centrality and embeddedness within its network and orient theco-opetitive behaviours of the other network nodes. The more a firm is powerful and

embedded within its network, the more its co-opetitors are likely to be interested in itscollaboration, the more its competitive strategy is affected. The study of Gnyawali et al.(2006) on global steel industry confirms this showing that the position of a firm withina co-opetitive network affects its competitive activity and variety. Recent studies(bridging together embeddedness perspective and RBV) underscore that the scope ofco-opetition is not limited solely to a dyadic (firm-to-firm) dimension. Co-opetitiverelations may emerge also between networks of firms (Gulati, 1999; Gimeno, 2004). Forinstance, Gimeno (2004, p. 825) shows that in global airline industry companies engagewith rivals co-specialised alliances[2] in order to implement a competitive exclusionstrategy against third rivals that could benefit of partners resources. This strategyencourages third rivals to establish countervailing alliances that replicate the networkbenefits by enlisting similar (but not the same) partners.

All these theoretical frameworks explicitly (as transaction cost economics andembeddedness theory) or implicitly (as game theory) point out the profile of resourcesand capabilities of a firm greatly affects:

. the extent of its participation to the co-opetitive dynamics of its market; and

. the choice of its co-opetitive approach (intra- or inter-networking).

RBV stresses more than other theoretical perspectives stressing more the centralityof resources and capabilities for the competitive behaviours and strategies of firms.

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This approach rose in strategic management studies over the last 25 years (Penrose,1959; Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991; Mahoney and Pandian, 1992). According to theseminal work of Penrose (1959), a resource is a stock firm uses to implement itsactivities. A capability is a flow created over time through complex path-dependent

processes (Penrose, 1959). In this light, Barney (1991) defines a resource as any tangibleor intangible asset of an organisation that allows its owner to create and implement astrategy. Das and Teng (2000) distinguish between property-based (as patents andtrademarks) and knowledge-based resources (as organisational culture). Grant (2002)considers three different categories of corporate resources: tangible (physical andfinancial), human (skills/know-how, motivation, capacity for communication andcollaboration), and intangible resources (technology, reputation and culture). An akinapproach to RBV is the capabilities-based view (Leonard-Barton, 1998; Teece et al.,1997). This approach empathises the importance of processes, paths and dynamiccapabilities that firms accumulate and regenerate over time (and without whom firmscould not exploit effectively their resources) in order to achieve a competitive advantage.

Few assumptions summarise the core of the resource-based thinking. First, resourcesand capabilities are the bases of the firm competitive advantage and economic rentswithin its market. Second, firms implement strategies in order to exploit their internalresources. However, firms usually need also some complementary partners resources, towhich they have partial access through their inter-organisational alliances, in order toimplement effectively their strategies. Third, the contribution of a resource to the firmgeneration of a sustainable advantage is highly dependent on the extent of itsheterogeneity and mobility and on the specificities of the industry in which the firmcompete. Barney and Clark (2007) argue a firm resource or capability should respect theVRIO framework in order to achieve this goal. The more a resource/capability isvaluable, rare, costly to imitate and exploitable, the more it is a source of sustainedcompetitive advantage and economic performances above normal market levels for the

firm controlling it. Social complexity and causal ambiguity are conditions affectingpositively resource imperfect mobility and thus are critical to strengthen or to buildfirms competitive advantage (Barney, 1991).

Over the last years, various resource-based and capability-based works analysedthe co-opetitive strategies of firms. In general, RBV scholars noted that collaborationbetween competitors may be a critical (but risky) way to increase their rents since thisphenomenon is always, somehow, a form of competition. The main benefit ofco-opetition for a focal firm refers to the learning of units of competitors knowledge.Hamel (1991) in his well-known study on nine international alliances betweencompetitors reports that the primary objective (of firms) was the internalisation ofpartner skills. Nevertheless, the managers fear of giving more than what they get back(due to asymmetries in learning between partners) risks to undermine the partnership

success and to change the bargaining power within the competitive collaboration(Hamel et al., 1989). Similarly, Lavie (2006) notes horizontal strategic alliances mayprovide both appropriated relational rents and inbound spillover rents. The formerare rents intentionally transmitted between partners since they relate to the resourcesshared within the alliance. The latter, instead, are rents stolen from partners as theycome from the partner resources non-shared within the collaboration. A focal firmacquires partners skills since their inter-firm collaboration weakens some typicalconditions of the imperfect mobility of resources, as social complexity or casual

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ambiguity, between firms (Lavie, 2006). The extent of the acquisition of the inboundspill-over rents depends on the focal firm specificities. The more the absorptivecapacity of the focal firm is high, the more such firm is likely to extract and gain rentsfrom its co-opetitors. Thus, firm-specific resources and capabilities are determinant for

the acquisition of network resources[3] (Gulati, 1999).

3. Prior experience in co-opetitionA large amount of works in organisation, entrepreneurship and management studiesstresses the relevance of the experience that a firm accumulates over time in order toimprove its present performances and achieve critical competitive advantages.This corporate attribute refers to existing individual units of knowledge availablewithin the organisation (Nonaka and Nishiguchi, 2001, p. 271). RBV intrinsically giveswide relevance to firm-specific prior experience. In fact, the Penrose (1959) keyassumption that each firm is a unique bundle of resources implies its past experienceis a critical element in order to orient its behaviour, shape its opportunity set and

sustain its competitiveness (Lockett and Thompson, 2001). In line with this view,the scholars of the dynamic capabilities-view assert prior experience can trace deeplythe present and the future of an organisation since the firm current position is oftenshaped by the path it has travelled (Teece et al., 1997, p. 522). For instance, variousstudies stressed how past experience of managers is critical to the success of theinternationalisation of the small firms in which they work (Westhead et al., 2001).

Prior experience provides to firms several benefits having a large impact on theirinternal and external dynamics. Within firms, experience is acknowledged to givea cultural mindset to managers through which they interpret the external environment,understand better the industry evolution, and take their decisions. Experience affectsthe technological search of firms and their capability of recognising new opportunitiesand developing new products (Baron, 2004). Experience increases the firm productivity

due to learning by doing. Finally, experience shapes greatly the organisational routines(or capabilities) of a firm.

The benefits of experience are clear and critical for the external activities anddynamics of firms. For instance, firm prior experiences affects positively its networkcentrality, the key condition determining the firm likelihood to have access to networkresources (Gulati, 1999). Prior experience is critical to firms to develop an absorptivecapacity[4] of knowledge from their external environment and partners (Cohen andLevinthal, 1990). A large amount of studies showed prior firm experience may affectpositively the management of future alliances since this corporate attribute increases thealliances capabilities of the firm (Sampson, 2005). Furthermore, the amount of firmshistorical multi-market contacts with present partners increases their likelihood tominimise the risk of partners non-cooperation and, thus, to maximise the performances

of partnerships (Shipilov, 2009). RBV and the network embeddedness perspectivesexplain theoretically the benefits of experience on firm internal and external dynamics.According to RBV, benefits of firm past experience emerge from the increased value offirm resources and capabilities (due to experience). For instance, experience intensifiesthe specificity and idiosyncrasy of firm knowledge. Besides, experience may notablyincrease the resource/capabilities heterogeneity and hamper the resources/capabilitiesmobility within an industry (in accordance with the VRIO paradigm). Prior experienceincreases the value of knowledge-based resources of firms and may be critical in order to

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maximise the economic rents deriving from their property-based resources. Accordingto the network embeddedness perspective, benefits of firm past experience emerge fromthe increased firm capability to acquire resources from its external networks (in otherwords, the Gulati (1999) network resources). Prior experience increases the firm

centrality in its inter-organisational networks. Furthermore, this corporate attributeaffects positively firm capacity to absorb external information and knowledge andexploit them for commercial or managerial ends.

Prior experience, thus, is a notion theoretically effective in order to analyse andunderstand co-opetitive dynamics within an industry. This is likely to be a criticalfactor of co-opetitive attraction among organisations within the same industry fortwo reasons:

(1) experience gives to firms a competitive advantage which affects positively thelikelihood of success of their further activities; and

(2) experience gives to firms a powerful (central) position within their inter-firmnetworks, due to the amount of ties, knowledge and information that

experienced companies achieved over time.

Therefore, an experienced firm is likely to be a partner worth of the interest for otherindustry companies willing to establish a fruitful strategic alliance. The presence ofone (or more) experienced companies within an inter-firm network, thus, is likely toshape and orient strongly the co-opetitive patterns and behaviours of all the networknodes.

4. R&D programs: key concepts and dynamicsCo-opetition and innovation are often interconnected phenomena. Rival firms co-operatein R&D for various motives, generally related to basic and applied research, innovationprocesses or market access and search opportunities (Hagedoorn, 1993). Reciprocal

learning of partners is a common expected benefit from a R&D co-operation (Teece et al.,1997). In one industry, the emergence of co-opetitive behaviours in R&D is closelyrelated to the firms adoption of open innovation strategies[5]. For instance, in themicrochip industry the intensity of market competition between small entrants (Inteland AMD) and an established larger incumbent firm (IBM) affected the patentingstrategies of these firms and stimulated technology co-opetition over the last 30 years.Intel and AMD competed successfully with IBM in the market product while they wereco-opetiting in the market of technology and patents (Chesbrough et al., 2008).

Some scholars found interesting evidences in the study of R&D co-operative networksof rival firms (Medcof, 2000; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). For instance, technologicalresources are critical to firms in order to acquire partners high-quality complementaryresources (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). There is a rich literature about the benefits of

firms prior experience in R&D collaborations on their future R&D partnerships.Schmiele and Sofka (2007) found that prior international experience of about 1,000German innovative firms greatly affected their capability in engaging international R&Dco-opetition. Sampson (2005) found that firms may learn how to manage R&D allianceswith experience in former similar inter-firm relationships. Another recent study shownthat the extent of general alliance experience of a partner affects the likelihood of successof the R&D partnerships engaged (Hoang and Rothaermel, 2005). Similarly, other studiesanalysed the effects of firms prior experience in international R&D networks on their

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likelihood to participate in further inter-firm R&D complex networks. Strategic efficiencyin choosing partners and strategic, centrality-based network capabilities of firms(developed through their prior experiences in former R&D networks) affect positivelytheir probabilities to be members of future R&D inter-firm consortia much more than

their generic experience-based partnering capabilities (Hagedoorn et al., 2006).R&D programmes funded by public institutions often provide an opportunity of

collaboration among competing organisations and firms. A valid example of suchprogrammes is the framework programme (FP) of the European Commission (EC)[6].Since 1984, these programmes fund the R&D projects of consortia composed by a varietyof organisations coming from all the countries members of European Union (and, in somecases, also of non-European Union countries). The topics of the researches founded areseveral and, in practice, they embrace all the European critical industries (e.g. energy,biotechnology, healthcare, transports and many others). Each project proposal submittedto a FP call generates a simple network of co-opetition (Dagnino and Padula, 2002), since itclusters more than two actors[7] at a single phase of the value chain.

Some common features characterise all the FPs launched over the time.Every organisation can apply to the same call with more proposals and participate tomore R&D consortia. In each consortium, one organisation plays the role of projectco-ordinator and the others are its partners. The largest organisations with moretechnological capabilities are used to diversify their effort in more technological areas andR&D projects. Financial resources are critical to get involved within these consortia. FPco-finances just a part of the costs of the project: the network of partners working on theR&D project has to cover the remaining part of costs. Calls usually do not specifyparticular restrictions and/or limitations to consider in the formation of the network ofpartners submitting a research proposal. EC documentation aimed at supporting theresearch proposals preparation and submission suggests proposals evaluators take intoaccount two main criteria:

(1) the scientific and technological excellence of the research project; and(2) the quality of the consortium submitting the proposal.

This second condition implies experts do not evaluate a project through a blind reviewprocess. Evaluators know which organisations compose the consortia submitting theproposal. The reputation of R&D departments and capabilities, prior experience in theco-ordination of similar project, thus, are conditions likely to influence largely the finaldecision of proposals reviewers.

Each call for proposals produces both competitive and co-operative relationshipsbetween a number of organisations of various type (firms, universities, researchcentres, national agencies) operating in the same industry. In these calls at the sametime, every organisation is both an attractor and a searcher of other partners

organisations. Prior experience gives a critical co-opetitive strength to organisationAlpha coordinating a research project in order to attract other partners organisationsinside its project. Indeed, an experienced organisation is a suitable project co-ordinatorsince its projects are likely to be evaluated more positively by EC reviewers.But the same organisation Alpha may even search other research projects proposed byother organisations (that now act as co-ordinators) and try to participate to them aspartner. The extent of prior experience of projects co-ordinators is likely to affect thischoice of Alpha. What is no clear, however, is if prior experience of Alpha and prior

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experience of Alphas partners may affect in some way its choice of entering in morenetworks (inter-network co-opetition) at the same time or focusing just on one networkof usual partners (intra-network co-opetition).

The prior experience in R&D programmes of an organisation might be measured in

many modes. For instance, useful dummy variables of the organisation experience inR&D programmes are both the submission of a R&D proposal and the achievement offinancial support in the previous programme edition (Barajas and Huergo, 2010).Non-dummy variables of this corporate experience might be the number of submittedproposals, financed projects and R&D partners (this latter in order to measure the oldnetworks size of the organisation) in previous programme editions.

Firms can establish a dyadic or a multi-partners R&D alliance autonomously or inorder to apply for public or private research funds. In the latter case, firms along withother types of organisations (e.g. universities) are likely to create an ad hoc consortiumin order to submit a research project proposal to a R&D programme launched by apublic or private institution (e.g. a national government or a foundation). From thepoint of view of the single firm, the critical problem of its R&D strategy is to chose,

when a R&D programme is launched, to which R&D co-opetitive consortia, it is morevaluable to participate and in which R&D co-operative networks its participation is notadvisable (Hakansson and Helman, 1984). The determinants affecting the participationof an organisation to R&D programmes are various. A first critical variable is the levelof firm innovativeness. Firms most engaged in R&D networks are high-profileinnovators. These organisations tend to set up partnerships with other firms withstrong complementary resources and research orientation (Miotti and Sachwald, 2003).Also absorptive capacity can direct this choice. A recent study about the participationof Spanish firms to European R&D programmes points out their absorptive capacity ispositively related to their export orientation and size (Busom and Ferna ndez-Ribas,2008). The heterogeneity of capabilities among partners of R&D consortia financed bypublic programmes affects their motivations of participation (cost-sharing or skillssharing) and their intensity of spending. Cost-sharing is the key rationale whenprojects are large and homogeneity of capabilities between partners is high, while theskill-sharing motive increases with capabilities heterogeneity (Sakakibara, 1998).

Hernan et al. (2003) found prior experience (along with firm size) affects positively thelikelihood of firms to participate to further European R&D programmes afterwards.However, prior experience is not the unique factor affecting this choice. Also thegeographical distance between participants, knowledge about research theme, relationalfactors and network characteristics affect the R&D collaboration choices of organisationsparticipating in European R&D programs. Geography and relational effects(predominantly a joint collaborative history) are some of the most important factorsaffecting the collaboration choices of these organisations (Paier and Scherngell, 2008). The

position of each firm in the network affects also the probability of collaboration. Otherauthors argue social distance between partners is more important than geographicaldistance in determining their willingness in joining to a given consortium developing aproposal for an European R&D programme (Autant-Bernard et al., 2007).

Therefore, the critical conditions to fulfil in order to stimulate the participation of acompany to a R&D consortium are likely to be:

. a prior R&D collaboration with the consortium partners;

. an adequate extent of prior experience of the other consortium members;

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. a low social distance with other companies (network embeddedness is relevant);and

. a low geographical distance from the other organisations.

5. Intra- and inter-network co-opetition in R&D programmesBy mimicking competitive markets and by fostering collaboration, R&D programmescan be interpreted as an imperfect market driven by both competitive and collaborativedynamics (Wernerfelt, 1984). Firms and organizations can be engaged in this marketwith two possible roles: coordinator and research partner. Coordinators are in charge ofbuilding the researchs network, stimulating the collaboration among members,assembling the project and submitting it; in case of positive projects evaluation, theyhave to coordinate the following research activities. Research partners are involved inthe network with their specific competences, participate to the projects development;once the project is funded they collaborate with the other partners and the coordinatorin the researchs deployment. Thus, on the one side, coordinators act in the attempt to

form the most competitive network to sustain their projects; on the other side, researchmembers struggle to find coordinators to deal with in order to take part in a potentiallywinning initiative.

In this dynamics, two types of co-opetition problems arise. The first is a within thenetwork problem. A participant to a project may be asked to collaborate with one ormore of its usual competitors. That is, firms and organizations have to decide whetherthey will accept this situation and how they will eventually cope with the simultaneouspresence of competitive and collaborative relationships within the network. We termthis type of co-opetition intra-network co-opetition (Figure 1(a)).

The second is a between the networks problem. Given the possibility fora participant to be involved in more than one initiative (responding for instanceto different bids), firms and organizations have to decide whether they will accept to

partner with participants that in other projects, belong to competing network or whetherthey will preserve the composition of one single partnership. By choosing not to spancollaborative relationships across multiple networks firms and organizations try to savethe uniqueness of their partnership and to fully exploit its potential in multipleresearchs initiatives; on the contrary, by choosing to be part, at the same time, of manydifferent networks, participants try to maximise and diversify opportunities even at the

Figure 1.The difference betweenintra- and inter-networkco-opetition

Area of co-opetition

Competitive relation

Alfa firm

(a) (b)

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cost of diluting the advantages deriving from a specific and particularly successfulnetwork. In that, they establish co-opetitive relationships not only within the networkthey belong to but also among different networks since competing initiatives maybenefit from the sharing of the competences of common partners. The larger the number

of common partners is the higher the collaborative dimension among competingnetworks becomes. We term this type of co-opetition inter-network co-opetition(Figure 1(b)).

Figure 1(a) shows the case of intra-network co-opetition. Three networks exist thatdevelop different R&D projects. These networks compete to get their own projectapproved. Alfa firm belongs to only one of these networks in which it collaborates withsome competitors. Therefore, co-opetition is bounded within the single network whilecompetition characterises inter-network relationships.

Figure 1(b) shows the case of inter-network co-opetition. The starting situation issimilar to the previous case but Alfa firm is now part of two different projects. As aconsequence, the two projects share the resources and the competences provided by theircommon partner. Therefore, co-opetition spans across two networks while competitiverelationships still persist with the third project. It is worth noticing that the higher thenumber of sharedpartners is the higherco-opetition among multiple networks tends to be.

But what does drive the firms choices in adopting an intra- or an inter-networkco-opetitive behaviour?.

Even if not explicitly related to the intra- and inter-network co-opetition, somepropositions of the network embeddedness perspective may provide an insight toanswer this question. By suggesting that the firms position in the network structureshould affect its relational choices, scholars of this stream advance the hypothesis thatfirms that are already central and well-embedded in their network are more interestedin fully exploiting the advantages of this position and, therefore, less interested inexpanding collaborations to firms of other networks. On the contrary, peripheral firms,

by being less embedded in their network, try to span their relationships across multiplenetworks, in the attempt to eventually occupy a structural hole and get a benefit fromthis brokerages position (Burt, 1992; Gulati, 1999; Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001).This idea implies that in R&D programmes, coordinators that represent the centralorganization of each research network should be more interested in sustaining thesame partnership across multiple initiatives, while research partners should be moreprone to multiply opportunities by participating in many, even competing, differentnetworks. Accordingly, coordinators should prefer an intra-network co-opetitivebehaviour, research partners an inter-network co-opetitive behaviour.

Other interesting insights come from the RBV scholars who suggest that the firmschoice to span its relationships beyond the boundaries of an already establishednetwork depends on the complementarities of the firms assets with those of other

firms. Namely, within a network of complementary partners, firms invest in assets thatbenefit from other firms assets (i.e. relationship specific investments), co-specialisingin this way their respective activities. This represents a powerful incentive for allnetwork members to maximise the exploitation of the already established partnershipavoiding to disrupt the value of the co-specialization through relationships with firmsthat belong to other networks. On the contrary, firms free from the co-specializationsconstraints may opt for an approach that multiplies opportunities even at the cost of aless effective exploitation of the already established partnership. Thus, they form

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multiple relationships with competitors of other networks. In the field of R&Dprogrammes, it means that two different types of initiatives have to be distinguished.Those in which firms and organizations partner to complement each other and toco-specialise their respective activities, and those in which partners try to benefit from

the overlap of their resources as in the case, for instance, of organizations seeking foreconomies of scale (Sakakibara, 1998; Miotti and Sachwald, 2003). In the first type ofnetwork, all members should be strongly committed to the specific partnership, tryingto eventually replicate it in different projects but avoiding to put it at risk throughrelationships that span across multiple networks. On the contrary, the second type ofnetwork should be characterised on the one side by the presence of many partnersshared with other competing networks and on the other side, by organizations strivingto multiply outside the network the opportunities for a successful project.

6. Prior experience and co-opetition in R&D programmesAs noted in Section 3 of this paper, prior experience refers to the knowledges units that

organizations are able to accumulate over time. Summarising, it plays a role on threelevels. First, by shaping firms routines, prior experience enhances the firms ability toexploit its resources (Penrose, 1959; Teece et al., 1997). Second, by providing theabsorptive capacity needed to deal with the business environment, it allowsorganizational learning (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Nonaka and Nishiguchi, 2001).Finally, it is a pre-requisite for firms relational activities since it acts as a road map formanager in choosing the appropriate partners and in establishing with them a propercollaborations agreement (Sampson, 2005). Thus, in a field like R&D programmes inwhich firms have to set up complex projects as well as large collaborating networks,prior experience may prove precious. In particular, by reducing the causal ambiguitytypical of complex projects, the experience acquired during past firms participationto R&D programmes, on the one side, affects participants ability to exploit the

programme; on the other side, it signals the likelihood that each partner can give apositive contribution to the success of the initiative (Hernan et al., 2003). In that, priorexperience serves as a means for coordinators to select the best partnersand to promote asuccessful initiative; for research partners, it serves as a means to reduce errors inchoosing the partnership more suitable to accomplish their R&D needs. On the contrary,a lack of prior experience exposes both coordinators and research partners to the risk ofbeing ineffective in developing a new project, making it difficult for coordinators torecruit partners and for partners to have access to the more promising networks.

In the formation of co-opetitive relationships within R&D programmes, this hasmultiple implications. In trying to set up the best possible network, poorly experiencedcoordinators lack both the required knowledge to act in an appropriate manner and areputation strong enough to attract the best research partners. Thus, they are in fierce

rivalry, especially with the more experienced coordinators to develop a promisingproject and, what is more relevant, to build a successful partnership. As a consequence,they will accept to collaborate with a competing firm or organization, especially, if it is aresearch partner that may provide substantial value to project, but they will refuse topartner with coordinators of competing networks, to avoid the risk of sustaining a rivalin attracting partners. Moreover, once they have found a valuable research partner theywill act to reinforce the collaboration with him in the attempt to prevent the partner frombeing involved in other coordinators initiatives. Therefore, a poorly experienced

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coordinator will focus on few selected and successful organizations to build its networkand will tend to replicate the same partnership in different initiatives. We can assumethis behaviour as equivalent to an intra-network co-opetitive behaviour.

Also poorly experienced research partners may face problems in participating to an

R&D programme. Even if they possess the required R&D competences to access theprogramme, they lack both the knowledge to understand the programmes dynamicsand the experience to evaluate alternative proposals of participation. In addition, bybeing not confident in their own ability to exploit the existing opportunities, they areexposed to a strong competitive pressure stemming from the more experienced firmsthat have a better ability to disentangle the programmes complexity. It implies that onthe one side, poorly experienced organizations will accept the risk of collaborating withtheir competitors only if they are confident that the project will be successful; on theother side, they will avoid to join other competing partnerships to reduce the risk ofsplitting their effort among many uncertain initiatives. Furthermore, once they have meta successful coordinator, they will try to prevent other competitors from accessing thesame network by participating to the same partnership in the largest number of possibleprojects. Also this behaviour resembles our definition of intra-network co-opetition.

We turn now to experienced coordinators and researchpartners. The former are thosewho have a track record of successful initiatives in developing research projects and inbringing together the required research partners. They possess both the knowledge andthe reputation to attract the organizations and firms that are better equipped to sustainan initiative. It is likely that they do not need to search for partners since are participantsto the programme that will seek for them. In addition, they have the ability to clearlyunderstand the requirements that other organizations should possess to enhance theprojects probability of success and the skills to select among different alternativepartners. Therefore, they are essentially interested in creating their own network at theexpenses of other coordinating organizations that may eventually subtract valuable

partners. On the one side, they will never accept to bring their experience into anothercoordinators network. On the other side, they will try to force their best partners not toshare their competences with other firms outside the network. In that they may push thesame partnership to be replicated in a large number of possible projects. This type ofbehaviour can be conceived as an intra-network co-opetition.

Experienced research partners are those who participated in many successfulprojects. On the one side, they have the knowledge to understand the R&D programmesmechanisms; on the other side, they are able to fully exploit a given opportunity.In that, their interest is to find the best coordinator to join in a potentially winningproject. Thus, once they have created a successful partnership, they have the incentive toboth sustain it and avoid that other networks that comprise their competitors becomestronger. That is, they eventually accept co-opetition with other firms and organizations

of the same network, but do not participate in competing partnerships. Instead they aremore prone to replicate the successful network in other initiatives. Also this type ofbehaviour can be considered as a form of intra-network co-opetition.

Differently from non-experienced and strongly experienced firms andorganizations, participants to an R&D programme that possess a moderate level ofprior experience act according to a different logic. Both coordinators and researchpartners are along the path of building their capability to exploit an R&D programme.On the one side, they have enough ability to see and evaluate different opportunities;

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on the other side, they do not possess enough reputation and experience to aspire to thebest of all possible projects. Therefore, coordinators strive to rapidly increase theirexperience in developing successful projects and in forming proper research networks;research partners strive to increase their ability of getting in the most successful

partnerships. Accordingly, coordinators have the incentive to multiply opportunities tosucceed, even by collaborating with several networks eventually guided by othercoordinators. Research partners do not fear to share their competencies among manywell-selected projects, tough this may lead them to collaborate with many differentcompetitors. Variety and opportunities diversification are intensively sought by bothtypes of organizations, i.e. coordinators and research partners in order, on the oneside, to benefit from the prior experience already accumulated, on the other side, toimprove the track record of successes. That is, firms and organizations with amoderate level of prior experience are likely to be found in several competing networkswhere they collaborate with different competitors. This type of behaviour fullymatches our idea of inter-network co-opetition.

The theoretical framework that emerges is a model in which prior experience affectspositively abilities and cognitive resources of R&D programmes participants, i.e. skillsand know-how required to exploit R&D programmes opportunities, reputation in termsof positive contribution to a future partnership, ability in searching valuable partnersand joining a winning network that, in turn, influence their approach to co-opetitionand their choice between intra- and inter-network co-opetition (Figure 2). In particular,for low level of prior experience firms and organizations that have few skills, a poorreputation and difficulties in searching the right partners are likely to limit theirengagement in R&D programmes and to adopt a conservative approach. Consequently,they prefer to collaborate with their competitors within a specific network of proven

Figure 2.Relation between priorexperience andco-opetition

Experiment R&D

programmes

Co-optition

High

Low

Low HighModerate

Co-opetitive approach

Intra-network co-opetition

Inter-network co-opetition

Prior experience

Exploitation ability

Reputation

Search capability

Multiply

opportunities

Focus on winning

partnership

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reliability instead of multiply their efforts in several networks built by other competingorganizations. In that, they embrace an intra-network co-opetitive approach.

Increasing levels of experience in forming successful co-opetitive relationshipsenhance skills, reputation and relational capabilities of firms and organizations engaged

in forming co-opetitive consortia. On the one side, players are able to distinguishpromising from unpromising initiatives; on the other side, they are eager to furtherincrease their track record of successful projects in order to become leading players inthe co-opetition game. Based on this different approach, these players start to considerthe advantages of a simultaneous participation in competing partnerships and tend toshift from an intra-network co-opetitive approach to an inter-network co-opetitiveapproach.

High levels of prior experience reinforce skills, reputation and capabilities offirms and organizations even further making them confident in their ability to set upa successful project and to assemble a network that comprises the best competitors.Thus, players are likely to adopt an approach that focuses on forming the best possibleconsortium and to commit to a single partnership, seen as superior, while avoiding tobe involved in other possible networks. The incentives to inter-network co-opetitionlowers and, in turn, those to an intra-network co-opetition start rising again.

According to this view, we suppose that a reverse U shape trade off may existbetween the two types of co-opetition.

7. ConclusionsIn this paper, we advance the hypothesis that firms and organizations engaged inR&D programmes adopt different co-opetitive behaviours according to their priorexperience. This perspective has implications for both theory and practice.

From a theoretical point of view, this idea shifts the focus of the debate from thestrategic issues of co-opetition to the learning mechanisms and the evolutionary paths

of the competitors involved in a collaborative effort. In particular, we suggest thatopportunities related to a specific contingent situation (in our case, an R&Dprogramme) only partially account for the co-opetitive choices. The story of eachplayer, the ability to learn how to exploit a network of competitors, the results achievedin previous attempts all affect the decisions about the appropriate behaviour to partnerwith other competing organizations and firms. This expanded view of co-opetitionleads to several questions related to the knowledge accumulation dynamics and thepath dependency of organizations evolution. How do firms learn to collaborate withtheir competitors and under which circumstances does this learning process prove tobe more effective? Does it exist a typical evolutionary path that shapes the co-opetitivebehaviours of firms and organizations or is each story contingent? Which types ofskills are involved in the evaluation of an opportunity to collaborate with competitors

and which are relevant to manage this type of relationship?From a managerial point of view, our idea points to some relevant issue for both

policy makers involved in the management of R&D programmes, and mangers of firmsand organizations that participate to these programmes.

Policy makers define rules and mechanisms to participate in R&D programmes withlittle attention to firms and organizations prior experience and to the consequences ofthis dimension on the programmes success. A programme to account for the differentlevels of participants prior experience should address two competing needs. On the one

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side, programmes should favour the most experienced coordinator and partners, in orderto enhance the qualitative level of partnerships and improve the manageability ofco-opetitive consortia. On the other side, they should facilitate the access to programmesof newcomers that by definition, are less experienced and prepared to a co-opetitive

dynamics, but could bring variety and innovative R&D knowledge to other participants.The management of this tension among competing objectives should be explored byanswering to many relevant questions. Which types of policy based on the priorexperience/lack of experience are most effective to enhance R&D programme results?Should these policies be based on rules and incentives or on real servicesprovided to R&D participants? How can policy makers monitor the effectiveness ofsuch policies?

The managers of firms and organizations involved in R&D programmes seldomconsider co-opetition as a specific area of learning and experiencing. Instead ofbuilding specific managerial capabilities on co-opetitive projects, they tend to deal withR&D programmes as part of their R&D development and partnering strategy. This

approach leads to managerial practices that are unaware of the full implications ofco-opetition and to behaviours that are suboptimal in the exploitation of R&Dprogrammes opportunities. In order to explore this topic, some further questions needto be answered. How can managers of firms and organizations fully benefit from theprior experience in R&D co-opetitive initiatives? Is it possible to develop managerialpractices specific for co-opetition? Do they exist organizational solutions suited tomanage R&D co-opetitive networks as coordinator or as partner?

This paper suffers from many limitations. First, given its theoretical nature, the workinevitably misses an empirical test of our core hypothesis. We will perform this test infuture research. With the present work, we just attempted to stimulate a theoreticaldebate on the inner nature of co-opetitive behaviours and their relations with experienceand learning. Second, our core idea has been developed in the field of R&D programmes.

Even if we consider this field, a valid template for a more general understanding ofco-opetitive behaviours, our hypothesis may be reasonable only for R&D programmes.In this case, this paper contribution should be considered just as a deepening of a specifictype of co-opetition dynamics shaped by a particular institutional setting. Finally, ourtheoretical model represents only a very small step in the analysis of the relationbetween prior experience and co-opetition. Many relevant questions descend from thisrelation, which are relevant for scholars and practitioners, but further efforts arerequired to capture the evolutionary nature of the phenomenon.

Notes

1. See Quintana-Garcia and Benavides-Velasco (2004) for a brief but valuable comparativereview of co-opetition under transaction cost economics, game theory and resource-basedview.

2. Co-specialized alliances, which involve investments in partner-specific assets and activitiesand sharing of sensitive or proprietary knowledge can create value by exploiting efficienciesof mutual specialization (Gimeno, 2004, p. 822).

3. Network resources are those assets that firms achieve through the inter-firm networks inwhich they are embedded (Gulati, 1999).

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4. Absorptive capacity is the firms ability to value, assimilate, and apply new knowledgetowards commercial ends. The other key condition is the intensity of effort (Cohen andLevinthal, 1990).

5. Open innovation is the use of purposive inflows and outflows of knowledge to accelerate

internal innovation, and expand the markets for external use of innovation, respectively(Chesbrough et al., 2006, p. 1).

6. FPs became a fruitful field of study for academics of various subjects (e.g. Hernan et al., 2003;Breschi and Cusmano, 2004; Arranz and Arroyabe, 2007; Roediger-Schluga and Barber,2008). In general, these studies found that over time FP created a dense inter-organisationalnetwork with an oligarchic core of highly central and connected nodes.

7. A typical EC call requires that only a network of minimum three organisations can submita research proposal.

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About the authorsFrancesco Schiavone is an Assistant Professor in General Management at University Parthenopeof Naples (Italy). He received his PhD in Network Economy and Knowledge Managementfrom University Ca Foscari of Venice (Italy). His main research interests are entrepreneurshipand innovation, high-tech clusters and technological change. Francesco Schiavone is thecorresponding author and can be contacted at: [email protected]

Michele Simoni is an Associate Professor in General Management at University Parthenopeof Naples (Italy). He received his PhD in Management from University of Catania (Italy).His main research interests are social networks, board interlocks and tourism marketing.

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