An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and...

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Psychological Review 1985, Vol. 92, No. 4, 548-573 Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0033-295X/85/S00.75 An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion Bernard Weiner University of California, Los Angeles A theory of motivation and emotion is proposed in which causal ascriptions play a key role. It is first documented that in achievement-related contexts there are a few dominant causal perceptions. The perceived causes of success and failure share three common properties: locus, stability, and controllability, with intentionality and globality as other possible causal structures. The perceived stability of causes influences changes in expectancy of success; all three dimensions of causality affect a variety of common emotional experiences, including anger, gratitude, guilt, hope- lessness, pity, pride, and shame. Expectancy and affect, in turn, are presumed to guide motivated behavior. The theory therefore relates the structure of thinking to the dynamics of feeling and action. Analysis of a created motivational episode in- volving achievement strivings is offered, and numerous empirical observations are examined from this theoretical position. The strength of the empirical evidence, the capability of this theory to address prevalent human emotions, and the potential generality of the conception are stressed. In 1645, Miyomota Musashi was contem- plating the causes of his past success as a war- rior. In A Book of Five Rings he mused, When I reached thirty I looked back on my past. The pre- vious victories were not due to my having mastered strategy. Perhaps it was natural ability, or the order of heaven, or that other schools' strategy was inferior. (1645/1974, p. 35) About 275 years later, and approximately 11,000 miles away, the editors of Scientific American were wondering why America was flourishing. They reasoned, "The wealth and general prosperity of the country are largely due to the intelligence and energy of its people, but it can hardly be disputed that it is equally due to the natural wealth of the country" (Staff, 1926, p. 228). Unfortunately, battles are lost as often as they are won, and countries undergo economic decline as well as enrichment. Dur- ing our recent financial recession the Los An- geles Times reported, Timber industry experts blame high interest rates, the housing slump, tough logging regulation, and expansion This article was written while the author was supported by Grant MH38014 from the Public Health Service, National Institute of Mental Health. The author wishes to thank Sandra Graham for her helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. Requests for reprints should be sent to Bernard Weiner, Department of Psychology, University of California, Los Angeles, California 90024. of the Redwood National Park for their sorry state. Tim Skaggs, the union business agent, shrugged. 'You could spend a lifetime fixing blame,' he said. (Martinez, 1982, Pt. 5, p. 1) And even the former coach of my favorite football team found it necessary to soul search about causality following a series of losses. Again from the Los Angeles Times: Here it is Thanksgiving week, and the Los Angeles Rams are looking like the biggest turkeys, in town. Coach Ray Malavasi has eliminated bad luck, biorhythms, and sun- spots as the reasons why his football team has lost 9 of its last 10 games. Now he's considering the unthinkable pos- sibilities that: (a) he has lousy players or (b) they aren't really trying. (Robert, 1982, Pt. 3, p. 3) Why this constant pursuit of "why"? A number of explanations come to mind (see Forsyth, 1980; Weiner, 1985). We might just want to know, that is, to understand the en- vironment, to penetrate ourselves and our sur- roundings. This familiar motivational inter- pretation is known as the principle of mastery (White, 1959). In addition, it clearly is func- tional to know why an event has occurred. As Kelley (1971) stated, "The attributor is not simply an attributor, a seeker after knowledge; his latent goal in attaining knowledge is that of effective management of himself and his en- vironment" (p. 22). Once a cause, or causes, are assigned, effective management may be possible and a prescription or guide for future action can be suggested. If the prior outcome 548

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Psychological Review1985, Vol. 92, No. 4, 548-573

Copyright 1985 by the American Psychological Association, Inc.0033-295X/85/S00.75

An Attributional Theory of Achievement Motivation and Emotion

Bernard WeinerUniversity of California, Los Angeles

A theory of motivation and emotion is proposed in which causal ascriptions playa key role. It is first documented that in achievement-related contexts there are afew dominant causal perceptions. The perceived causes of success and failure sharethree common properties: locus, stability, and controllability, with intentionalityand globality as other possible causal structures. The perceived stability of causesinfluences changes in expectancy of success; all three dimensions of causality affecta variety of common emotional experiences, including anger, gratitude, guilt, hope-lessness, pity, pride, and shame. Expectancy and affect, in turn, are presumed toguide motivated behavior. The theory therefore relates the structure of thinking tothe dynamics of feeling and action. Analysis of a created motivational episode in-volving achievement strivings is offered, and numerous empirical observations areexamined from this theoretical position. The strength of the empirical evidence,the capability of this theory to address prevalent human emotions, and the potentialgenerality of the conception are stressed.

In 1645, Miyomota Musashi was contem-plating the causes of his past success as a war-rior. In A Book of Five Rings he mused,

When I reached thirty I looked back on my past. The pre-vious victories were not due to my having mastered strategy.Perhaps it was natural ability, or the order of heaven, orthat other schools' strategy was inferior. (1645/1974, p. 35)

About 275 years later, and approximately11,000 miles away, the editors of ScientificAmerican were wondering why America wasflourishing. They reasoned, "The wealth andgeneral prosperity of the country are largelydue to the intelligence and energy of its people,but it can hardly be disputed that it is equallydue to the natural wealth of the country" (Staff,1926, p. 228). Unfortunately, battles are lostas often as they are won, and countries undergoeconomic decline as well as enrichment. Dur-ing our recent financial recession the Los An-geles Times reported,

Timber industry experts blame high interest rates, thehousing slump, tough logging regulation, and expansion

This article was written while the author was supportedby Grant MH38014 from the Public Health Service,National Institute of Mental Health.

The author wishes to thank Sandra Graham for herhelpful comments on an earlier draft of this article.

Requests for reprints should be sent to Bernard Weiner,Department of Psychology, University of California, LosAngeles, California 90024.

of the Redwood National Park for their sorry state. TimSkaggs, the union business agent, shrugged. 'You couldspend a lifetime fixing blame,' he said. (Martinez, 1982,Pt. 5, p. 1)

And even the former coach of my favoritefootball team found it necessary to soul searchabout causality following a series of losses.Again from the Los Angeles Times:

Here it is Thanksgiving week, and the Los Angeles Ramsare looking like the biggest turkeys, in town. Coach RayMalavasi has eliminated bad luck, biorhythms, and sun-spots as the reasons why his football team has lost 9 of itslast 10 games. Now he's considering the unthinkable pos-sibilities that: (a) he has lousy players or (b) they aren'treally trying. (Robert, 1982, Pt. 3, p. 3)

Why this constant pursuit of "why"? Anumber of explanations come to mind (seeForsyth, 1980; Weiner, 1985). We might justwant to know, that is, to understand the en-vironment, to penetrate ourselves and our sur-roundings. This familiar motivational inter-pretation is known as the principle of mastery(White, 1959). In addition, it clearly is func-tional to know why an event has occurred. AsKelley (1971) stated, "The attributor is notsimply an attributor, a seeker after knowledge;his latent goal in attaining knowledge is thatof effective management of himself and his en-vironment" (p. 22). Once a cause, or causes,are assigned, effective management may bepossible and a prescription or guide for futureaction can be suggested. If the prior outcome

548

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was a success, then there is likely to be an at-tempt to reinstate the prior causal network.On the other hand, if the prior outcome orevent was undesired—such as exam failure,social rejection, political loss, or economic de-cline—then there is a strong possibility thatthere will be an attempt to alter the causes toproduce a different (more positive) effect.

Desire for mastery and functional search,two of the generators of causal exploration, donot seem to specifically characterize one geo-graphical area or one period of human history.The Japanese warrior in the Middle Ages andtoday's union representative are engaged in thesame endeavor: attempting to assign causality.Indeed, one might argue that adaptation is notpossible without causal analysis. The warriorneeds to know why he is winning battles so hecan survive the next one, just as the union rep-resentative needs to explain why the industryis doing poorly in order to urge wiser actionsin the future. Because of the apparent pan-cultural, timeless aspect of causal search andexploration, and because of the evident adap-tive significance of this activity, causal ascrip-tions are proposed to provide the buildingblocks for the construction of a theory of mo-tivation and emotion.

This article advances an attributional theoryof motivation and emotion, with achievementstrivings as the theoretical focus. Initially, themost salient causes of success and failure inachievement-related contexts are identified.The basic properties of these causes, or thestructure of causal thinking, is then deter-mined from both a dialectic and an empiricalperspective. Three causal dimensions are dis-covered: locus, stability, and controllability.The structure of causal thinking is next relatedto emotion and motivation. Thus, this articleprogresses from a description of causal per-ceptions to causal structure, and then fromcausal structure to an examination of the dy-namics of action. It is documented that causalstability influences changes in goal anticipa-tions, while the three causal dimensions de-termine the emotional experiences of anger,gratitude, guilt, hopelessness, pity, pride, andshame. Guided by Expectancy X Value theory,I presume that expectancy and affect directmotivated behavior. Examples of research onthe disparate topics of parole decisions, smok-ing cessation, and helping behavior suggest the

generalizability of the theory beyond theachievement-related theoretical focus.

Perceived Causes of Success and Failure

In the opening paragraphs of this article,far-ranging examples of causal search are pro-vided. Many investigations have been con-ducted that more systematically examinecausal perceptions, particularly the perceivedcauses of success and failure in achievement-related situations. Two appropriate researchprocedures have been followed. In one, subjectsare provided only with outcome information,namely, that success or failure has taken place.The outcome might be imagined, induced, orhave occurred in a real setting, and might per-tain to the subject or to another who is beingjudged. The subjects are then asked to explainthe outcome, using a free-response procedurewhere the possibilities that come to mind arelisted. In a related methodology, participantsare provided with a large list of causes and ratethe contribution of each cause to the outcome.These causes often were ascertained in pilotresearch using a free-response methodology,and represent the dominant perceptions orembracing categories.

A summary of 10 pertinent studies is pre-sented in Table 1. Table 1 reveals the sourceof the data, the characteristics of the sampleand task, and the four most dominant causalascriptions for success. The data for failure re-veal an identical story and are not presented.The message of Table 1 is clear, particularlyinasmuch as the research investigations madeuse of a variety of types of subjects judging avariety of achievement situations, and involv-ing the self or another. A virtually infinitenumber of causal ascriptions are available inmemory. However, within the achievementdomain, a relatively small number from thevast array tend to be salient. The most domi-nant of these causes are ability and effort. Thatis, success is ascribed to high ability and hardwork, and failure is attributed to low abilityand the absence of trying. This holds true forthe majority of cultures that have been ex-amined (see Triandis, 1972). The economy orsimplicity in causal thinking evident in theachievement domain appears in the explana-tion of other outcomes, such as wealth andpoverty (Feather & Davenport, 1981; Furn-

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ham, 1982a, 1982b) and affiliative acceptanceand rejection (Anderson, 1983a; Sobol & Earn,in press). However, relatively few studies havebeen conducted outside of achievement-relatedcontexts.

The Structure of Perceived Causality

I now turn from causal description andidentify the underlying structure of perceivedcausality. A reasonable initial question to raiseis why does one want to determine causalstructure? What purpose or role does this playin the goal of theory construction? In responseto this query, consider that, within any partic-ular activity, a myriad of distinct causal ex-planations are possible. Furthermore, for ex-ample, the causes of success and failure at

achievement-related activities, such as abilityand effort, may be quite unlike the perceivedcauses of social acceptance and rejection, suchas personality or physical attractiveness. Onepuzzle that arises is the relation or the com-parability between the various causal expla-nations—in what way(s) are ability and effort,or ability and physical beauty, alike and inwhat way(s) do they differ? A taxonomic struc-ture enables this question to be answered, forby finding the underlying properties of causes,or their common denominators, previous in-comparable qualitative distinctions can be re-placed with quantitative causal comparisons.For example, rather than merely being differ-ent, both ability and physical beauty may beconsidered properties of the actor and thus aresimilar, whereas they both differ from a cause

Table 1Investigations of the Perceived Causes of Success and Failure

Experiment Subjects Perspective Task Dominant attributions

Frieze (1976) College students Self and Hypothetical schoolother and game

performance

Elig & Frieze (1979) College students Self

Frieze & Snyder (1980) 1 st-5th graders Other

Cooper & Burger (1980) Teachers

Burger, Cooper, & Good Teachers(1982)

Anderson (1983a)

Willson& Palmer (1983)Study 1 College students

Study 2

Bar-Tal, Goldberg, &Knaani(1984)

Study 1

Study 2

College students

7th graders

Advantagedstudents

Anagrams

Hypotheticalacademic test, artproject, sports, andgame

Other School performance ofstudents

Other

College students Other

Self

Self

Self

Disadvantaged Selfstudents

School performance ofstudents

Variety of hypotheticalsituations

School exam

School exam

Academic test

Academic test

Effort, ability, luck, and otherpersons

Task, ability, stable effort, andmood

Unstable effort, ability, interest,and task

Typical effort, academic ability,immediate effort, andattention

Ability, immediate effort, stableeffort, and attention

Behavioral preparation,experience and skill, effortlevel, and general knowledge

Effort, luck/chance, taskcharacteristics, and interest

Effort, ability, taskcharacteristics, and interest

Test preparation, effort forstudy, concentration duringstudy, and teacher's ability

Test preparation, concentrationduring study, effort for study,and self-confidence

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that is not a property of the actor, such as theobjective ease or difficulty of a task. This typeof analysis facilitates empirical study so thatother associations may be discovered that con-tribute to the meaning and significance of acause.

Logical Analysis of Causal Structure

The first systematic analysis of causal struc-ture was proposed by Heider (1958). Rightlycalled the originator of the attributional ap-proach in psychology, Fritz Heider has beenin the background of much of the present the-ory. The most fundamental causal distinctionmade by Heider (1958) was stated as follows:"In common-sense psychology (as in scientificpsychology) the result of an action is felt todepend on two sets of conditions, namely, fac-tors within the person and factors within theenvironment" (p. 82).

Since the early 1950s, psychologists haveembraced an internal-external distinction (seeCollins, Martin, Ashmore, & Ross, 1974). Butthe domination of internal-external compar-isons in psychology arrived with the work ofRotter (1966), for his classification of individ-uals into internals and externals became a fo-cus for research. Thus, the analysis of thestructure of causality logically began with aninternal-external (locus) dimension.

The argument was then made by Weiner etal. (1971) that a second dimension of causalitywas required. The reasoning was that, amongthe internal causes, some fluctuate, whereasothers remain relatively constant. For example,ability (or, more appropriately, aptitude) isperceived as a constant capacity; in contrast,other causal factors including effort and moodare perceived as more variable, changing frommoment to moment or from period to period.Among the external causes the same reasoningapplies. For example, success in rowing acrossa lake may be perceived as due to the un-changing narrowness of the lake or because ofthe variable presence of wind. Weiner et al.(1971) thus characterized the causes theythought were most dominant in achievement-related contexts, namely, ability, effort, taskdifficulty, and luck, within a 2 X 2 categori-zation scheme. Ability was classified as internaland stable, effort as internal and unstable, taskdifficulty was thought to be external and stable,and luck was considered external and unstable.

It is now realized that there are many short-comings of this classification (see Weiner,1983). Ability may be perceived as unstable iflearning is possible; effort often is perceived asa stable trait, captured with the labels of lazyand industrious; tasks can be changed to bemore or less difficult; and luck may be thoughtof as a property of a person (lucky or unlucky).Thus, the causes within the four cells did nottruly represent the classification system (i.e.,they did not conform to the phenomenologyof the naive attributor). Less ambiguous entriesmight have been aptitude, temporary exertion,objective task characteristics, and chance (seeWeiner, 1983). Hindsight, however, is betterthan foresight, and the problems so evidentnow were not fully recognized in 1971.

A third dimension of causality was then es-tablished with the same deductive reasoningthat led to the identification of the stabilitydimension. Rosenbaum (1972) recognized thatmood, fatigue, and temporary effort, for ex-ample, all are internal and unstable causes.Yet they are distinguishable in that effort issubject to volitional control—an individualcan increase or decrease effort expenditure.This is not typically true of mood or the onsetof fatigue, which under most circumstancescannot be willed to change. The same distinc-tion is found among the internal and stablecauses. Some so-called traits such as laziness,slovenliness, or tolerance often are perceivedas under volitional or optional control, whereasthis is not characteristic of other internal andstable causes such as math or artistic aptitudeand physical coordination.

The identification of this property, nowcalled controllability (Weiner, 1979), enlight-ened and solved some issues while creatingother difficulties. Among the illuminated topicswas the distinction by Rotter (1966) betweeninternal versus external perceptions of controlof reinforcement. Within the three-dimen-sional taxonomy, two of the proposed causalproperties are labeled locus and control. Acause therefore might be internal yet uncon-trollable, such as math aptitude. If failure isascribed to poor aptitude, then the perfor-mance is perceived as determined by skill andability. According to Rotter, this indicates thatthe outcome is perceived as subject to internalcontrol. Yet a genetically determined aptitudewill not be perceived as controllable by a failing

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math pupil. Thus, confusion is evident in theRotter one-dimensional taxonomy. Locus andcontrol, not locus of control, describe causalperceptions. To avoid confusion, the locus di-mension should be labeled locus of causality.

Empirical Analysis of Causal Structure

The logical analysis of causal structure hasan inherent limitation: Causal dimensions arederived from attribution theorists, rather thanfrom their subjects. It is conceivable that eachtheorist might have his or her own rationalscheme of causal organization and that thesepostulated structures will not be identical be-tween theorists nor the same as those of thelayperson. Empirical evidence therefore isneeded concerning the organization or the in-terrelations in causal structure. Three math-ematical techniques have been used to analyzethe responses of research participants for un-derlying causal structure: factor or clusteranalysis (Foersterling, 1980; J. Meyer, 1980;J.Meyer &Koelbl, 1982;Wimer&Kelley, 1982),multidimensional scaling (Falbo & Beck, 1979;Lee, 1976; Michela, Peplau, & Weeks, 1982;Passer, 1977; Passer, Kelley, & Michela, 1978;Stern, 1983), and correlations with a priorischemes (Stern, 1983).

A brief summary of the empirical researchconcerning causal structure is shown in Table2. Table 2 includes 7 of the 10 pertinent in-vestigations already cited. The research ofFoersterling (1980) and Lee (1976) is omittedbecause they only examined the ratings of fourcauses (they did find the locus and stabilitydimensions). In addition, the study by Falboand Beck (1979) is excluded because of meth-odological flaws (see Michela et al., 1982; Wei-ner, 1983).

It is evident from Table 2 that all studies,with the possible exception of Passer et al.(1978), identify a locus dimension of causality.Given the prominence of this psychologicalproperty, perhaps this finding increases one'sbelief in the entire set of data. Turning to thestability dimension, investigators with the ex-ception of Passer (1977), and perhaps Passeret al. (1978) and Wimer and Kelley (1982),find a temporary-enduring property of cau-sality. Finally, all of the investigations savethose by Michela et al. (1982) and Wimer andKelley (1982) describe a dimension called ei-

ther control or intent (a possible distinction be-tween these labels will be examined). In threeinvestigations other dimensions have emerged,but they are not manifest in more than onestudy.

The data therefore strongly support thecontention that there are three dimensions orproperties of perceived causality, which is con-sistent with the causal properties derived fromthe logical analysis (although it must be rec-ognized that even in the empirical studies thedimensions require a subjective or experi-menter labeling, and at times the empiricalmethodologies have imposed constraints onthe causal perceptions of the subjects). Theempirical dimensions that have emerged arereliable, general across situations, and mean-ingful. Other suggested dimensions are eitherunreliable (perhaps intimating that they arespecific to a particular context) and/or are notclearly meaningful, as the unnamed factor iso-lated by J. Meyer and Koelbl (1982).

It also seems to be the case that the structureof causality is not merely a convenient classi-fication system imposed by attribution theo-rists (see Schiitz, 1967, p. 59). The scaling andthe correlational procedures, as well as thoseof factor analyses, yielded comparable dimen-sions corresponding to those that evolved fromthe logical thinking of attribution theorists.The dimensions, therefore, may be consideredpart of lay psychology. Finally, there is a rel-ative simplicity in the organization of causalthinking, just as there is in the selection of spe-cific causes.

Causal Comparisons

Recall that one of the purposes of creatinga causal taxonomy is to enable the investigatorto compare and contrast causes. Consider, forexample, low math aptitude and physical un-attractiveness as respective causes of achieve-ment failure and social rejection. Both appearto be internal, stable, and uncontrollablecauses. Similar correspondence can be foundbetween other causes of achievement and socialfailure such as "the school has hard require-ments" versus "religious restrictions on dat-ing" (both being external, stable, and uncon-trollable). This demonstrates that the struc-tural analysis is not limited to achievement

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contexts, which is an important considerationin the search for theoretical generality.

Issues Concerning Causal Structure

Although the rational (deductive) and em-pirical (inductive) approaches converged and

identified the same three causal properties, anumber of pertinent questions neverthelessremain to be addressed. Definitive answers canbe provided only to some of these questions.

Might there be less than three dimensions?This question is guided by a reliable findingthat the dimensional ratings of causes are cor-

Table 2Empirical Studies of Causal Dimensions

Experiment

Meyer, J.( 1980)

Meyer, }. & Koelbl(1982)

Wimer & Kelley(1982)

Procedure

Factor analysis

Factor analysis

Factor analysis

Domain

Achievement(hypotheticalexam of others)

Achievement(examinationperformance)

All

Dimensions

ControlLocus Stability (intent) Other

X X X

X ' X X Unnamed

X' X? Good-bad; complex-simple; motivation

Passer (1977) Multidimensional Achievementscaling (hypothetical

examperformance)

FailureSuccess

XX

XX"

Passer, Kelley, &Michela(1978)

Michela, Peplau,& Weeks (1982)

Stern (1983)

Multidimensionalscaling

Multidimensionalscaling

Correlation witha priorischemeusingconceptformationtasks

Free-sortSort-resortSequential sortGraph

buildingM ultidimensional

scaling

Marital conflict(hypotheticalother)

Actor

Partner X? or X?

Loneliness X X(hypotheticalother)

Achievement(academic &sports)

X XX XX XX X

X X

X Attitude towardpartner

Attitude towardpartner

XXXX

X

* Unipolar.b Only internal causes.

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related. Consider, for example, a representativestudy by Anderson (1983a). Anderson hadsubjects generate causes for success and failurein both achievement and social contexts. The63 most dominant causes were then rated byother subjects on the three causal dimensions.These ratings were highly intercorrelated, sug-gesting that the dimensions are not indepen-dent and that there may be less than three un-derlying causal properties.

A number of arguments can be marshaledagainst this position. Many causal perceptions,particularly in social contexts, implicate traits.Traits tend to be perceived as both internaland stable. Inasmuch as a preponderance ofcausal ascriptions then fall within an internal-stable quadrant, the locus and stability dimen-sions will be correlated in the causal ratings.

However, as also noted by Anderson(1983a), a failure of orthogonality at the em-pirical level does not invalidate separation atthe conceptual level. For example, height andweight are positively correlated but nonethelessare distinct characteristics; certainly tall, lightindividuals as well as those who are short andheavy can be identified. As Passer et al. (1978)state, "There is no necessity that the elementsused in multidimensional scaling be distrib-uted evenly over the space identified by theanalysis. In fact, there may be psychologicalreasons . . . for certain regions of the spacenot to contain any elements" (p. 961).

Might there be more than three dimensions?Two other properties of causes have been sug-gested, intentionality (Weiner, 1979) and glob-ality (Abramson, Seligman, &Teasdale, 1978).These are discussed in turn.

The logical analysis of causality stronglyhints that intentionality is a causal property,and this label also was suggested in some ofthe empirical investigations. Consider, for ex-ample, a logical examination of effort versusstrategy as perceived causes of success andfailure. One might succeed because of hardwork or because of proper strategy whilestudying, or fail because of insufficient effortor poor strategy. Failure due to lack of effortmeets the criteria to infer personal responsi-bility, inasmuch as not trying is carried out"purposively, knowingly, recklessly, and/ornegligently" (see Fincham & Jaspers, 1980).But these criteria are not met given poor strat-egy as a cause of failure. One does not pur-

posively or knowingly use bad strategy. Theproperty that perhaps best describes the con-trast between effort and strategy has been la-beled intentionality (Werner, 1979).

Intent and control generally covary highly,with reported correlations near r = .90 (seeAnderson, 1983a). Individuals intend to dowhat is controllable, and can control what isintended. But there are important instanceswhere intent and control are distinguishable.For example, an overachiever might state thathe or she intends to take some time off fromwork, but cannot control his or her workinghabits. Or, one might not have intended to killa pedestrian, but should have controlled his orher speeding. The differentiation between in-tent and control lies at the heart of the dis-tinction between murder and manslaughter.

It seems reasonable, then, to separate con-trol from intent and consider them both di-mensions of causality. A difficult conceptualproblem, however, is created. A cause is notintentional—intent describes an action, or amotivational state of an organism. One mightrefer to aptitude as internal, or stable, but canit be described as unintentional? It seems not;intent does not appear to be a characteristicof a cause. But solving this difficult philosoph-ical problem is beyond the scope of this articleand, even further, beyond the capability of thiswriter. Thus, the possibility that intentionalityis a dimension of causality is put aside for now.

The contention of Abramson et al. (1978)is that some causes are specific to a situation,whereas others generalize across settings. Forexample, an individual may perceive failure atmath as due to low math aptitude (specific) orto low intelligence (general). Intelligence isperceived as influencing performance in agreater variety of situations than is math ap-titude.

The argument in favor of a distinction be-tween general and specific causes certainlycannot be faulted on grounds of face validity.To elevate this distinction to a dimension,however, does pose some problems. A general-specific property has not emerged in a singleempirical investigation. Thus, it is not knownwhether this distinction held by some attri-bution theorists also is perceived or unknow-ingly made by the layperson.

When personality psychologists discusstraits, both temporal aspects (consistency over

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time) and generalizability (consistency acrosssituations) are considered. In a similar manner,causes can logically be construed in terms ofthose two characteristics. Globality thereforemight be a basic property of causes, but moreevidence is needed before this possibility is ac-cepted.

Is the dimensional location of a cause con-stant? Attributional decisions represent phe-nomenal causality—the causal world as per-ceived by the viewer. Perceived causality cer-tainly will differ from person to person andwithin an individual over occasions. This istrue not only for a specific causal inference,but also for the meaning or dimensional lo-cation of the cause. For one individual, luckmay be perceived as an external, unstable causeof success; for another, luck is conceived as anenduring personal property. Indeed, a causemight convey different meanings in disparatecontexts (e.g., effort ascriptions connote greaterstability given success than given failure; seeDalai, Weiner, & Brown, 1985). But althoughthe interpretation of specific causal inferencesmight vary over time and between people andsituations, the underlying dimensions on whichcauses are "understood" or given meaning re-main constant. That is, dimensions are con-ceived as invariant, whereas the location of anyspecific cause on a dimension is variable (seeWeiner, 1983).

Motivational Dynamics of PerceivedCausality: Expectancy Change

Thus far it has been suggested that individ-uals search for causality and that a relativelysmall number of causes are particularly salient.In addition, causes share three properties (lo-cus, stability, and controllability) and perhapscan be characterized according to intention-ality and globality. I now turn from causal de-scription and causal structure to the dynamicsof behavior. Two topics are of special impor-tance in the understanding of action tenden-cies: expectancy and value.

Goal expectancies is a concern that keepsreappearing in the study of motivation. Everymajor cognitive motivational theorist includesthe expectancy of goal attainment among thedeterminants of action. If one hopes to con-struct an attributional theory of motivation, itwould therefore seem necessary to search for

some connection, some linkage, between at-tributional thinking and goal expectancy.

Two possibilities come to mind. On the onehand, the influence of causal variables on theabsolute expectancy of goal attainment couldbe ascertained. Heider (1958), for example,reasoned that goal expectancies in achieve-ment-related contexts are determined by per-ceived ability and planned effort expenditure,relative to the perceived difficulty of the task.This is an enticing analysis to follow, inasmuchas attributional concepts already are intro-duced.

But other theorists have had completely dif-ferent notions about the antecedents of goalexpectancy. Tolman (1925), for example, stip-ulated that expectancy is a function of the fre-quency, primacy, and recency of reinforce-ment. According to Rotter (1966), expectanciesare determined by the percentage of reinforce-ments of a particular response in a particularsetting, the percentage of reinforcements of thisresponse in similar situations, and individualdifferences in the belief that reinforcements areunder personal control. And for Atkinson(1964), expectancy is influenced by the num-ber of individuals against whom one is com-peting, prior reinforcement history, and com-munications from others concerning the like-lihood of success. It therefore is evident thatconsensus does not exist about the antecedentsof goal expectancy, although all theorists wouldagree that past reinforcement history does playsome important role.

A second possibility is initially to find re-lations between attributions and changes inexpectancy, and then use this information todetermine the relation between causal ascrip-tions and absolute expectancy of success. In-asmuch as attributional search is initiated fol-lowing an outcome—so that change can be ex-amined—this seems to be a promising lead.In addition, perhaps change in goal expectancy,as opposed to absolute expectancy level, ismore amenable to a general law that transcendsthe situational context.

Investigations of Expectancy Change

Three psychological literatures are directlyrelated to changes in goal expectancy, andagain the pertinent research has primarily beenconducted in achievement-related contexts.

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One set of investigations is associated with levelof aspiration; the second concerns the effectsof outcomes at chance tasks on probabilitiesof future success; and the third research en-deavor is linked with resistance to extinctionand beliefs about locus of control.

Level of aspiration. A number of quite rep-licable findings emerged from level of aspira-tion research. Among the most important forpresent purposes is that subsequent aspirationlevel is in part dependent on the prior outcome.In the vast majority of instances, aspirationincreases after goal attainment and decreasesif a prior aspiration has not been fulfilled.These so-called goal discrepancies are referredto as "typical" aspiration shifts.

It has been assumed that aspiration level ingood part reflects the subjective expectancy ofsuccess: The higher the expectancy, the higherthe aspiration level. Hence, the aspiration lit-erature can be interpreted as revealing that in-crements in expectancy follow success, whereasexpectancy decrements follow failure. Thisconclusion also has been documented exten-sively in contexts where expectancy is directlymeasured, rather than inferred from state-ments about goal aspiration (see, e.g., Diggory,Riley, & Blumenfeld, I960; Montanelli & Hill,1969; Zajonc & Brickman, 1969).

This is not the complete story, however, forin games of skill "atypical" reactions also aresometimes observed. In these instances, thereis a decrease in aspiration level following suc-cess and an increase after failure. For example,Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, and Sears (1944)noted,

In the case of nonachievement which is linked, for instance,to outside disturbances, the subject is not likely to lowerhis aspiration in a way that he would if he believed thatthe nonachievement reflected a genuine decrement in hisperformance ability, (p. 367)

Chance tasks. A divergent pattern of dataemerged from research on the subjective prob-ability of success at games of chance. Here thegambler's fallacy often is observed. That is,after winning, a loss is expected, and after los-ing, a win is anticipated (see Cohen & Hansel,1956). A related phenomenon at games ofchance is labeled the negative recency effect.This is illustrated in the increased expectancyof a heads after the appearance of a tails on acoin toss. That is, atypical shifts are frequent

at games of chance. There are, however, someexceptions to this general rule. At times, gam-blers exhibit the belief that they are on a win-ning or losing streak and anticipate repetitionsof the prior win or loss. Thus, typical shiftsalso are observed in chance settings, but withless frequency than are atypical shifts. Notethat this is the mirror image of the data patterngiven skill tasks.

Social learning theory integration. Theproblem is to create a conceptual frameworkable to incorporate the observations of typicaland atypical shifts in situations of skill andchance. Social learning theorists attempted todo just that, primarily examining resistance toextinction while manipulating skill and chancetask perceptions. They contended that expec-tancy change following success or failure is in-fluenced by the perceived locus of control ofthe outcome, with internal or personal beliefsabout causality (skill tasks) producing typicalshifts, while external perceptions of causality(chance tasks) generate atypical shifts. In ad-dition, given that some individuals might per-ceive skill tasks as determined by chance, andchance tasks as determined by personal factors,occasional reversals in the usual pattern of datawould be observed. In sum, social learningtheorists were the first to relate the structureof perceived causality (the locus dimension) toexpectancy change (see Rotter, 1966).

Attributional Approach toExpectancy Change

In this article I have reasoned, however, thatRotter and his colleagues gave insufficient at-tention to the richness of causal explanationand confounded dimensions of causality.Ability (skill), in addition to being internal,also is perceived as relatively stable. On theother hand, in addition to being external, luckis perceived as relatively unstable. Hence, abil-ity and luck differ in subjective stability andnot merely on the locus dimension of causality.The observed differences in expectancy shiftsgiven skill versus chance tasks may thereforeeither be attributed to the locus or to the sta-bility dimension of causality.

The attributional position is that the stabilityof a cause, rather than its locus, determinesexpectancy shifts. If conditions (the presenceor absence of causes) are expected to remain

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the same, then the outcome(s) experienced inthe past will be expected to recur. A successunder these circumstances would produce rel-atively large increments in the anticipation offuture success, and a failure would strengthenthe belief that there will be subsequent failures.On the other hand, if the causal conditions areperceived as likely to change, then the presentoutcome may not be expected to repeat itselfand there is likely to be uncertainty about sub-sequent outcomes or a belief that somethingdifferent will result. A success therefore wouldyield no increments in subsequent expectancyand could give rise to decrements in the sub-jective probability of future success. Similarly,a failure will not augment the belief that therewill be future failures.

These principles are able to explain the datain level of aspiration research and in studiesinvolving chance tasks. Success and failure atskill tasks most usually are ascribed to abilityand effort. Ability is thought to be a relativelyfixed property, and the belief that success wascaused by hard work usually results in the in-tent to again work hard in the future (Dalai etal., 1985). Inasmuch as the causes of a priorsuccess are perceived as relatively stable givenskill-related tasks, future success should beanticipated with greater certainty and there willbe increments in aspiration level and expec-tancy judgments. Occasionally, however, out-comes at skill tasks are ascribed to unstablefactors, such as the "disturbances" noted byLewin et al. (1944). In addition, if failure isascribed to low effort, then the failing personmay anticipate working harder in the future.In these circumstances there would be atypicalor minimal shifts in expectancy followingfailure.

Conversely, success at chance tasks tends tobe ascribed to an unstable factor. The actor islikely to reason, "I had good luck last time,but that probably will not happen again." Ex-pectancy therefore should not rise and indeedcould drop following a positive outcome. But,occasionally, one might conclude that he orshe is a lucky or an unlucky person or is on awinning or losing streak. In these instances,the cause of the outcome is perceived as stable,so that typical shifts will be displayed. In sum,the attributional position can account for theobserved typical and atypical shifts in chanceas well as in skill settings.

These ideas gave rise to a wealth of pertinentresearch, primarily in achievement-relatedcontexts. Two research strategies were repre-sented—correlational, and the manipulationof causal ascriptions. In the correlational re-search, subjects were induced to succeed orfail at some laboratory task and their expec-tancies of future success as well as causal as-criptions were assessed. In the causal manip-ulation procedure, perceptions of task out-comes as caused by ability, effort, luck, andso forth were induced, and expectancy of suc-cess was ascertained following success or fail-ure. Table 3 includes a considerable (but farfrom complete) sample of investigations re-porting that stable, relative to unstable, as-criptions are related to high expectancies ofsuccess after goal attainment and to low ex-pectancies of success following a failure. Noneof the studies are definitive in that often otherpossible interpretations of the data have notbeen ruled out; nonetheless, the consistency ofthe findings is quite compelling.

In addition to the data reviewed in Table 3,a number of "real-life" behaviors without ap-parent phenotypic overlap have been shown tobe genotypically comparable and explainablegiven an attributional perspective. These stud-ies have taken place in nonachievement as wellas in achievement-related contexts. More spe-cifically, for example:

1. Parole decisions are in part based on theperceived stability of the cause of the crime(Carroll, 1978; Carroll & Payne, 1976, 1977).A criminal perceived as committing a crimebecause of stable causes (e.g., a psychopathicpersonality) is considered more of a risk thanis one perceived as committing a crime becauseof unstable causes (e.g., temporarily unem-ployed). In a similar manner, criminals as wellas prison officials believe a crime due to stablecauses is more likely to be repeated when theoffender is released than is a crime perceivedas due to unstable causes (Saulnier & Perlman,1981). Criminals judge the causes of theircrimes to be more unstable than do prison-related officials; they also are less likely to ex-pect recidivism.

2. Rejection when soliciting blood frompotential donors that is ascribed to unstablecauses (poor soliciting strategy, lack of effort)results in higher expectancy of success andgreater persistence at solicitation than does re-

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jection attributed to stable factors such as aninability to persuade others (Anderson, 1983b;Anderson & Jennings, 1980).

3. Intentions to reenter school after drop-ping out, to enroll in another psychologycourse although doing poorly in one, or to re-submit a rejected manuscript for publicationare greater when the prior "failures" are as-cribed to unstable causes (e.g., need a breakfrom school, poor manuscript reviewers) ratherthan to stable causes (e.g., cannot benefit from

school, poor research training; see Day, 1982;Pancer, 1978; Grittended & Wiley, 1980).

4. When product failure is perceived as dueto stable factors (e.g., a bad company), con-sumers anticipate future product dissatisfac-tion and express a desire for a monetary re-fund; if the failure is perceived as due to un-stable causes (e.g., bad shipment of goods),then subsequent product satisfaction is ex-pected and there is a preference for productexchange (Folkes, 1984).

Table 3Research Relating Attributions to Expectations

Experiment

Meyer, W. (1973)

McMahan(1973)

Weiner, Nierenberg,& Goldstein(1976)

Inagi(1977)

Kovenklioglu &Green haus(1978)

Ronis, Hansen, &O'Leary(1983)

Subjects

German highschool students

Americangrammar, highschool, &college students

American collegestudents

Japanese collegestudents

American collegestudents

American collegestudents

Task

Correlational studies

Digit-symbolsubstitution

Anagrams

Block design

Puzzle

Test performance

Unspecifiedachievementstories

Attributionmeasurement

Percentage rating

Paired comparison

Within-dimensionscale rating

Percentage rating

Paired comparison

Dimension scalerating

Expectancymeasure

Probability offuture success

Confidence offuture success

Anticipated per-formance

Probability offuture success

Anticipated per-formance

Confidence inoutcomerepetition

Research manipulating attributions

Rosenbaum(1972)

Neale & Friend(1972)

Fontaine (1974)

Valle(1974)

Pancer & Eiser(1977)

Heilman & Guzzo(1978)

American collegestudents

American collegestudents

Australian collegestudents

American collegestudents

British collegestudents

American collegestudents

Unspecified "project"(hypothetical)

School exam(hypothetical)

Unspecified "tasks"

Sales (hypothetical)

Anagrams

Job performance(hypothetical)

Causes given indescription

Causes given indescription

Fictitious ascriptionsof others

Causes given indescription

Fictitiousinformation fromothers

Causes given indescription

Expected projectoutcome

Anticipated grade

Expected score

Anticipated per-formance

Performanceprediction

Predicted per-sonnel action

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Summary and Conclusions

Individuals classify their thoughts into broadcategories. Hence, phenotypic dissimilaritiesmight be connotatively, or genotypically, sim-ilar. Failure in athletics because of lack ofheight, failure in math because of low aptitude,failure in politics because of poor charisma,and social rejection because of unattractivefeatures are phenotypically different eventswith diverse specific causes. Yet the causes arelikely to be similarly categorized as enduringor stable. Hence, future hopes in these heter-ogeneous contexts will be minimized. On theother hand, failure in athletics because of in-sufficient practice, failure at math because oftemporary illness, failure in politics becauseof a current recession, and interpersonal re-jection because the desired partner is ill arediverse events that are likely to be categorizedas due to unstable causes. Hopes for the futuretherefore are likely to be maintained.

The amount, extensity, and consistency ofthe empirical findings, in conjunction with thelogical analysis, documents a fundamentalpsychological law relating perceived causalstability to expectancy change:

Expectancy Principle. Changes in expec-tancy of success following an outcome are in-fluenced by the perceived stability of the causeof the event.

This principle has three corollaries:Corollary 1. If the outcome of an event is

ascribed to a stable cause, then that outcomewill be anticipated with increased certainty, orwith an increased expectancy, in the future.

Corollary 2. If the outcome of an event isascribed to an unstable cause, then the cer-tainty or expectancy of that outcome may beunchanged or the future may be anticipatedto be different from the past.

Corollary 3. Outcomes ascribed to stablecauses will be anticipated to be repeated in thefuture with a greater degree of certainty thanare outcomes ascribed to unstable causes.

Motivational Dynamics of PerceivedCausality: Affective Reactions

It has been rather definitively documentedthat causal attributions influence expectancyof success. This is a necessary linkage for thedevelopment of an attributional theory of mo-tivation, inasmuch as goal anticipations cer-

tainly affect other thoughts and actions. But italso is quite evident that goal expectancies arenot sufficient determinants of action. After all,there are an infinite number of actions not un-dertaken in which expectancy of the goal isabsolutely certain.

Both cognitive and mechanistic conceptionsof behavior have identified another class ofvariables with motivational impact. They arecalled goal incentives, or the properties of thegoal object. Motivation is believed to be de-termined by what one can get (incentive) aswell as by the likelihood of getting it (expec-tancy). This is the essence of the position ofExpectancy X Value theorists.

There seems to be no blatant reason to be-lieve that objective value (i.e., the inherentproperties of a goal object) is influenced byperceived causality—the reason why the goalwas reached. A dollar has the value of one dol-lar whether it is attained because of good for-tune, hard work, or as a gift from another. Onthe other hand, instead of conceiving incentivevalues in terms of the objective properties ofthe goal, consider incentive to mean the con-sequences of goal attainment for the actor, orthe subjective value of the goal. We prefer adollar to a nickel because the anticipated con-sequences will make us happier, give greatersatisfaction, and the like. Although causal as-criptions do not influence the objective prop-erties of goal objects, they do determine orguide emotional reactions, or the subjectiveconsequences of goal attainment. For example,a dollar attained because of good luck couldelicit surprise; a dollar earned by hard workmight produce pride; and a dollar receivedfrom a friend when in need is likely to begetgratitude. In a similar manner, a gift from abeloved will have different affective significancethan does this same gift from an enemy (Hei-der, 1958). These diverse affective reactionscould generate quite disparate actions. For ex-ample, gratitude but not pride might give riseto reciprocal helping behavior. It thereforeseems reasonable to pursue the idea that causalascriptions influence emotions, and that emo-tional reactions play a role in motivated be-havior.

The Attribution-Emotion ProcessThe field of emotion is vast and complex;

the formulation of a complete theory of emo-

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Outcome • -Outcome evaluation

.General positive or negative emotions

Causal attribution and dimensions -

Figure I. The cognition-emotion process.

-Distinct emotions

tion is not my goal. Rather, the aims of thissection of the article are to offer an attribu-tional view of the emotion process and to pro-pose and document laws linking attributionalthinking and specific feelings (for a discussionof the assumptions guiding this approach toemotion see Weiner, 1982; Weiner & Graham,1984).

Most emotion theorists with a cognitivepersuasion conceive of emotional experienceas a temporal sequence involving cognitionsof increasing complexity. Arnold (1960) andLazarus (1966), for example, contend that theperception of a distal stimulus gives rise to aprimary appraisal and to a rather primitiveemotional reaction. Primary appraisal is be-lieved to be followed by a secondary appraisalthat often involves ego-related or more ad-vanced psychological mechanisms such as egodefenses. The elicitation of these processes canintensify or modulate the emotional experi-ence or alter the quality of the emotion.

Schachter and Singer (1962) proposed themost oft-cited emotion sequence. They hy-pothesized that the initial step in this sequenceis the experience and recognition of nondif-ferentiated internal arousal. Then the sourceof the arousal is determined on the basis ofsituational cues, and this cognitive labelingplus the arousal give rise to emotional states(although the cognition of the arousal and thecognition of the source of the arousal oftentake place simultaneously).

The attributional framework advanced herealso assumes a sequence in which cognitionsof increasing complexity enter into the emo-tion process to further refine and differentiateexperience. It is contended that, following theoutcome of an event, there is a general positiveor negative reaction (a "primitive" emotion)based on the perceived success or failure of theoutcome (the "primary appraisal"). Theseemotions, which include happy for success andfrustrated and sad for failure, are labeled asoutcome dependent-attribution independent,for they are determined by the attainment or

nonattainment of a desired goal, and not bythe cause of the outcome.

Following outcome appraisal and the im-mediate affective reaction, a causal ascriptionwill be sought. A different set of emotions isthen generated by the chosen attribution(s).For example, success perceived as due to goodluck produces surprise, whereas success fol-lowing a long-term period of effort expenditureresults in a feeling of calmness or serenity.Emotions such as surprise and serenity are la-beled attribution dependent, inasmuch as theyare determined by the perceived cause of theprior outcome. Note that increasing cognitiveinvolvement generates more differentiatedemotional experience (for somewhat relatedconceptions see Abelson, 1983; Roseman,1984; C. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985).

Additionally, causal dimensions play a keyrole in the emotion process. Each dimensionis uniquely related to a set of feelings. For ex-ample, success and failure perceived as due tointernal causes such as personality, ability, oreffort respectively raises or lowers self-esteemor self-worth, whereas external attributions forpositive or negative outcomes do not influencefeelings about the self. Hence, self-relatedemotions are influenced by the causal propertyof locus, rather than by a specific cause per se.

The cognition-emotion process suggested inthe above paragraphs is depicted in Figure 1.It is evident from Figure 1 that this approachto emotions assumes that feelings arise fromhow an event is construed or evaluated. Thefigure also indicates that general and distinctemotions are independent, but this remains tobe fully resolved (see, e.g., McFarland & Ross,1982).

The cognition-emotion process that hasbeen proposed provides the focus and outlinefor the following pages. I first briefly examineoutcome-related affects and then consider indetail the associations between causal dimen-sions and affects, ignoring here the relationsbetween specific causes and emotional reac-tions (see Weiner, Russell, & Lerman, 1978,

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1979). I focus on dimension-linked affects be-cause they have had the most extensive em-pirical support. These associations, just as theone between causal ascription and expectancychange, form powerful and general laws.

Outcome-Generated Emotions

Two research paradigms, one simulationaland reactive, the other retrospective and op-erant, were first used to document the asso-ciations between outcomes and emotions.Again these studies were conducted inachievement-related contexts. In the formerparadigm, participants were asked to imaginethat a student succeeded or failed an exam fora particular reason, such as hard work or badluck. The subjects then reported the intensityof the affective reactions that they thoughtwould be experienced in this situation (Weineret al., 1978). Intensity was indicated on ratingscales for a number of preselected affects. Inthe second paradigm, participants were askedto recall a time in life when they succeeded orfailed for a specified reason. They also re-counted the affects they experienced at thattime (Weiner et al., 1979).

These studies revealed that one determinantof affect is the outcome of an action: Successat achievement-related activities was associatedwith the affect of happy regardless of the causeof that outcome, and failure seemed to be re-lated to frustration and sadness. Thus, for ex-ample, given athletic competition, one tendsto experience happiness following a victorywhether that win was due extra training, thepoor play of the competitor, or good luck.Outcome-dependent affects also have beendocumented in quality of life research. Inves-tigators have reported that satisfaction, un-happiness, and frustration are related to ob-jective life outcomes, such as income level, in-dependent of attributions (see Bryant & Veroff,1982; E. Smith & Kluegel, 1982). In addition,outcome-dependent affects have been postu-lated in the interpersonal domain. Kelley(1983) stated,

I am pleased or displeased by the more specific and concretethings I experience [in close relationships]. So when mywife prepares a picnic lunch for the afternoon's outing,my pleasure-displeasure comes partly from the quality ofthe lunch itself, and also (as a partly separate matter) fromthe quality of love and thoughtfulness I attribute to hereffort, (p. 15)

Dimension-Related Emotions

As previously indicated, the bulk of the per-tinent attribution-emotion research relatescausal dimensions, rather than specific causes,to affects. The emotion of pride and feelingsof self-esteem are linked with the locus di-mension of causality; anger, gratitude, guilt,pity, and shame all are connected with thecontrollability dimension; and feelings ofhopelessness (hopefulness) are associated withcausal stability. These relations are describedhere, but without detailed documentation (seeWeiner, 1982, and Weiner & Graham, 1984,for fuller discussions).

Pride (self-esteem). A relation betweencausal locus and self-esteem has been long rec-ognized by many well-known philosophers.Hume, for example, believed that what one isproud of must belong to the person; Spinozareasoned that pride consists of knowing one'smerits; and Kant nicely captured the locus-pride union by noting that everyone at a mealmight enjoy the food, but only the cook of thatmeal could experience pride.

It is therefore reasoned that pride and pos-itive self-esteem are experienced as a conse-quence of attributing a positive outcome tothe self and that negative self-esteem is expe-rienced when a negative outcome is ascribedto the self (Stipek, 1983; Weiner et al., 1978,1979). The relation between causal locus andfeelings of self-worth also is part of naive psy-chology and is used by the layperson to influ-ence the emotions of others. Thus, individualstend to communicate ascriptions external tothe requester when rejecting that person for asocial engagement so that "feelings of self-es-teem are not hurt" (e.g., they indicate that theyare ill rather than truthfully telling the re-quester that he has a poor personality; seeFolkes, 1982). Children as young as 5 years ofage have demonstrated an understanding of therelation between causal locus and hurt feelings,given a rejection (Weiner & Handel, 1985). Avoluminous attributional literature also doc-uments existence of a hedonic bias, or a ten-dency for individuals to ascribe success to in-ternal factors and failure to external factors.As Harvey and Weary (1981) noted, "By tak-ing credit for good acts and denying blame forbad outcomes, the individual presumably maybe able to enhance or protect his or her self-

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esteem" (p. 33). Pride and personal esteemtherefore are self-reflective emotions, linkedwith the locus dimension of causality.

Anger. A large survey study by Averill(1982, 1983) illustrates the attributional an-tecedents of anger. Averill asked his respon-dents to describe a situation in which they weremade angry, and then examined the charac-teristics of these situations. He concluded,

The major issue for the person in the street is not the specificnature of the instigating event; it is the perceived justifi-cation for the instigator's behavior. Anger, for the personin the street, is an accusation . . . Over 85% of the episodesdescribed by angry persons involved either an act that theyconsidered voluntary and unjustified (59%) or else a po-tentially avoidable accident (e.g., due to negligence or lackof foresight, 28%) . . . More than anything else, anger isan attribution of blame. (Averill, 1983, p. 1150)

Many others have reached a similar conclu-sion. For example, among the very first of thepertinent investigations, Pastore (1952) dem-onstrated that aggression (and, by implication,anger) is not merely the result of nonattain-ment of a desired goal, but rather follows whena barrier imposed by others is arbitrary (e.g.,"Your date phones at the last minute andbreaks an appointment without adequate ex-planation") rather than nonarbitrary (e.g.,"Your date phones . . . and breaks an ap-pointment because he (she) suddenly became.ill)." To summarize, the attributional anteced-ent for anger is an ascription of a negative,self-related outcome or event to factors con-trollable by others (see Weiner, 1980a, 1980b;Weiner, Graham, & Chandler, 1982).

Pity. In contrast to the linkage betweencontrollability and anger, it is hypothesized thatuncontrollable causes are associated with pity.It is said that when Helen Keller began hertraining, her teacher stated to Ms. Keller'sfamily: "We do not want your pity," thus con-veying that a target of pity is associated withan uncontrollable deficit. This analysis is sim-ilar to Hoffman's (1982) conception, for hestated, "It is only when the cues indicate that. . . the victim had no control that the . . .partial transformation of empathic into sym-pathic distress may apply" (p. 296).

A number of research studies support thiscontention. Another's loss of a loved one be-cause of an accident, or difficulties because ofa physical handicap, are prototypical situationsthat elicit pity (see Graham, Doubleday, &

Guarino, 1984; Weiner, 1980a, 1980b; Weiner,Graham, & Chandler, 1982). Note, therefore,that the perceived controllability of a cause fora negative outcome in part determines whetheranger or pity is directed toward another. Wefeel anger toward the lazy and therefore punishlack of effort, but we feel pity toward the un-able and therefore do not punish lack of ability(Weiner & Kukla, 1970).

The relations between controllability-angerand uncontrollability-pity also are part of na-ive psychology and are used in everyday life tocontrol or manipulate the emotions of others.Thus, when providing an excuse (ex = from;cuse = cause) for failing to appear at a socialengagement, uncontrollable causes tend to becommunicated (e.g., "My car had a flat tire")rather than controllable ones (e.g., "I decidedto watch TV"; see Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes,& Wachtel, 1985). One hopes that this com-munication defuses anger and perhaps evenalters the reaction to pity. Similar interpersonalstrategies are understood and used by childrenas young as 5 years of age (Weiner & Handel,1985).

Guilt and shame. Philosophers and socialscientists have devoted considerable attentionto the experience of guilt, its antecedents, andits consequences. Reviewing the guilt litera-ture, Wicker, Payne, and Morgan (1983) con-cluded, "In general, guilt is said to follow fromacts that violate ethical norms, principles ofjustice . . . or moral values. Guilt is accom-panied by feelings of personal responsibility"(p. 26). In a similar manner, Izard (1977) con-cluded that "Guilt occurs in situations inwhich one feels personally responsible"(p. 423), and Hoffman (1976) more preciselyreasoned, "Blaming oneself becomes possibleonce one has acquired the cognitive capacityto recognize the consequences of his action forothers and to be aware that he has choice andcontrol over his own behavior" (p. 139). Insupport of these interpretations, my colleaguesand I have found that the most prevalent guilt-eliciting situations among college students in-volve lying to parents, cheating on an exam,or being disloyal to a dating partner (Weiner,Graham, & Chandler, 1982), although it is ev-ident that guilt may be evoked by either thecommission or the omission of particular ac-tions (see Hoffman, 1970).

Guilt and anger therefore are elicited by

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controllable causes, but guilt is directed in-ward, whereas anger is typically (but not nec-essarily) directed outward. Thus, for example,we tend to feel guilty when we have lied toothers, but angry when we have discovered thatsomeone has lied to us (see Weiner, Graham,& Chandler, 1982). In a similar manner, lackof effort toward an important goal tends toelicit anger from others (such as teachers) andalso generates personal guilt.

Shame frequently is contrasted with guilt,although both involve "negative self-evalua-tions that are painful, tense, agitating. . . de-pressing" (Wicker et al., 1983). Although thereappear to be different kinds of shame, it is be-lieved that one antecedent is an attribution forfailure that is self-related and uncontrollable,such as lack of ability. In studies testing un-controllability-shame and controllability-guiltassociations, Brown and Weiner (1984), Cov-ington and Omelich (1984), and Jagacinski andNicholls (1984) have reported that shame-re-lated affects (disgrace, embarrassment, hu-miliation, and/or shame) are linked with fail-ure due to low ability, whereas guilt-relatedaffects (guilt, regret, and/or remorse) are as-sociated with failure due to lack of effort. Italso has been documented that shame-relatedemotions give rise to withdrawal and motiva-tional inhibition, whereas guilt-related emo-tions promote approach behavior, retribution,and motivational activation (Hoffman, 1982;Wicker et al., 1983). Hence, there are linkagesbetween low-ability-shame-inhibition and be-tween lack-of-effort-guilt-augmentation. Italso is of interest to repeat that anger tends tomotivate aggression, so that three patterns ofbehavior noted by Horney (going toward, goingaway from, going against) are related to causalcontrollability and the respective affects of.guilt, shame, and anger.

Gratitude. There is relatively little researchconcerned with gratitude, but the evidencesuggests that gratitude toward another is elic-ited if and only if the act of the benefactor wasunder volitional control and was intended tobenefit the recipient. For example, Tesser,Gatewood, and Driver (1968) presented sub-jects with scenarios that involved a benefactorand asked the subjects how grateful they wouldfeel under the various circumstances that wereportrayed. They found that reported gratitudewas maximized when the gift was intended to

benefit only the receiver (as opposed to a sit-uation in which the gift enhanced the repu-tation of the giver). In other supporting re-search it has been documented that reciprocityis more likely when a gift is given deliberatelyrather than accidentally (Greenberg & Frisch,1972) and when help is voluntary rather thancompulsory (Goranson & Berkowitz, 1966).

Hopelessness. It has been convincinglydocumented that causal stability in part de-termines expectancies regarding future successand failure. Thus, any emotion involving an-ticipations of goal attainment or nonattain-ment will likely be influenced by causal sta-bility. One such affect has been labeled hope-lessness. It has been found that hopelessnessand resignation are elicited given an attributionfor a negative outcome to stable causes (Weineret al., 1978, 1979). That is, if the future is an-ticipated to remain as bad as the past, thenhopelessness is experienced. In addition, affectssuch as pity are exacerbated when the causeof the negative state is stable rather than un-stable (e.g., we tend to pity the blind more thanwe pity those with temporary eye problems).Similarly, we tend to be more angry at otherswhen perceived controllable behavior, such aslack of effort, is stable (a trait) rather than anunstable state (Weiner, Graham, & Chandler,1982).

Summary and conclusions. Attributionsplay a key role in affective life. Seven emotionswere briefly examined that relate to causalstructure: pride (self-esteem), anger, pity, guilt,shame, gratitude, and hopelessness. These areamong the most frequently reported and writ-ten-about affective experiences (see Botten-berg, 1975; Davitz, 1969). Sociobiologists havespecified that four of these emotions—anger,pity, guilt, and gratitude—are of special im-portance in promoting gene survival (see Triv-ers, 1971). These four emotions are related tothe causal dimension of controllability, whichis consistent with the sociobiological positionthat emotions are used to aid in maintainingthe social order. Finally, although the bulk ofthe supporting data have been generated inachievement-related contexts, the relationsspecified above do not seem to be confined toa particular motivational domain. As previ-ously suggested, aptitude as a cause of achieve-ment success, and physical attractiveness as acause of social success, are conceptually similar

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in that both are internal, stable, and uncon-trollable. Thus, success or positive outcomesdue to these factors should enhance pride andpositive self-esteem, just as negative outcomesbecause of their absence should lower esteem.But nonattainment of a goal for these reasonsshould provoke neither anger from others norpersonal guilt. Rather, failure given both thesespecific ascriptions is likely to elicit pity fromothers and produce feelings of shame andhopelessness in the frustrated individual.

A word of caution, however, is needed aboutthe preceding discussion. Given a causal as-cription, the linked emotion does not neces-sarily follow. For example, one may not haveput forth effort at something important, yetstill be free from guilt. Or one may attributesuccess to help from others, yet not feel grate-ful. Furthermore, an emotion may be experi-enced in the absence of its linked antecedent.For example, one may not be responsible foran outcome, but will experience guilt (seeHoffman, 1976). Hence, the position being es-poused is that the dimension-affect relationsare not invariant, but are quite prevalent inour culture, and perhaps in many others aswell. This position is similar to the argumentthat there is a linkage between frustration andaggression, although frustration elicits reac-tions other than aggression, and aggression hasother antecedents in addition to frustration.

The Complete Theory

It is now possible to present an attributionaltheory of motivation and emotion based onthe prior discussion of the theoretical com-ponents. The theory is presented in Figure 2.In contrast to other Expectancy X Value ap-proaches, this conception is represented as ahistorical or temporal sequence; motivation isnot conceived as an "ahistorical problem"(Atkinson, 1964, p. 146). In addition, the the-ory to be proposed departs from prior Expec-tancy X Value conceptions by linking value tothe affect elicited following goal-directed ac-tivity. Other theories of motivation have beenremiss by virtually ignoring the emotions, savefor an acceptance of the general pleasure-painprinciple. The sequence depicted in Figure 2will be used to discuss the following contrived(but surely extant) scenario: "A Little Leaguebaseball player performs very poorly during a

game. Instead of appearing for the next con-test, the boy stays at home." Other scenarios,such as the boy taking extra batting practicefollowing failure (rather than missing the game)or taking extra batting practice after playingwell (success), could have readily been used toportray how the theory shown in Figure 2 con-ceptualizes an achievement-related motiva-tional episode. This is followed by an exami-nation of achievement change programs, forthese therapeutic attempts illustrate both howthe theory has been used and document itsincomplete utilization. After these analyses, Iconsider the generality of the theory beyondthe achievement domain.

Figure 2 reveals that a motivational se-quence is initiated by an outcome that indi-viduals interpret as positive (goal attainment)or negative (nonattainment of the goal). In-asmuch as affects are directly linked with out-comes (the primary appraisal), Figure 2 in-cludes a connection between outcome and thereactions of happy (for success) and frustratedor sad (if the outcome was interpreted as afailure). These associations are designated witha 1 in the figure. In the baseball scenario, theboy performed poorly at the game and thiswill elicit general negative reactions.

A causal search is then undertaken to de-termine why the outcome occurred (Linkage2). Some of the conditions that particularlypromote this search, which were not discussedin the present article (see Weiner, 1985), areindicated in the figure. In our example, failureat a subjectively important act should resultin the boy overtly or covertly wondering, "Whydid I perform so poorly?" A large number ofantecedents influence the causal explanation(s)reached. This popular topic also was not dis-cussed in the present article. Some of theknown attributional antecedents are includedin Figure 2, such as specific information (e.g.,past personal history, performance of others;see Kelley & Michela, 1980). The blanket et-cetera at the bottom of the antecedents merelyconveys that there are many unlisted deter-minants of the selected attribution.

The causal decision is biased toward a rel-atively small number of causes such as abilityand effort in the achievement domain (see Ta-ble 1). Again Figure 2 is not complete, as de-noted by the etcetera at the bottom of thecausal lists. In our example, assume that the

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566 BERNARD WEINER

boy has played quite poorly in the past andthat other children on the team are playingwell. The boy also practiced many hours. Onthe basis of the past outcome history, socialcomparison, and effort expenditure, the boydecides that he is low in baseball-playing abil-ity. That is, he thinks, "I failed because I amnot any good at baseball" (Linkage 3). Aunique affective reaction may be elicited bythis causal decision (Linkage 4).

The cause is then located in dimensionalspace. This is depicted as Linkage 5 in the fig-ure. As documented in Table 2, the three mainproperties of causes are locus, stability, andcontrollability, with globality and intention-ality considered possible causal properties (andtherefore accompanied by question marks).The Little Leaguer ascribed his performanceto lack of ability, which is likely to be perceivedas internal, stable, and uncontrollable (al-though that placement must be analyzed fromthe phenomenology of the perceiver). It alsomight be unintentional and global ("I am poorat sports").

Causal dimensions have psychological con-sequences, being related to both expectancyand affect (which is presumed in this concep-tion to be the value of goal attainment). Thestability of a cause influences the relative ex-pectancy of future success (Linkage 6). Thisassociation is documented in Table 3. In ourscenario, the boy anticipates repeated failureinasmuch as low ability is perceived as a stablecause. He also might have increased expec-tancy of failure in other sporting activities ifthe cause is perceived as global. That is, sta-bility influences temporal aspects of expec-tancy, whereas globality influences cross-situ-ational expectancies.

Turning to affective consequences, the locusof a cause exerts an influence on self-esteemand pride—internal ascriptions elicit greaterself-esteem for success and lower self-esteemfor failure than do external attributions (Link-age 7). The boy in our story failed because ofa cause considered internal, and therefore heshould be experiencing low self-esteem. Thestability of the cause, by affecting expectancy,also fosters feelings of hopelessness (or hope-fulness); this is indicated in Linkage 8. TheLittle Leaguer, with a history of failure andascription of the current failure to low ability,should be feeling hopeless. Finally, controlla-bility influences social emotions; controllable

causes of personal failure promote feelings ofguilt, whereas uncontrollable causes generatesham,e (Linkage 9). These are represented inthe figure as self-directed affects, as are thespecific attribution-linked emotions of relax-ation and surprise. Among the affects directedtoward others are anger (given a cause of failurecontrollable by others), pity (given an uncon-trollable cause of failure), and gratitude (givena controllable cause; Linkage 10). The failingLittle Leaguer is likely to be feeling ashamedof himself and humiliated (but not guilty),whereas his coach or his mother feels pity orfeels sorry for him (but not angry).

Finally, expectancy and affect are presumedto determine action (Linkages 11,12, and 13).The actions can be described according to theirintensity, latency, and so on. In the baseballscenario, the boy has a low expectancy of fu-ture success and is feeling sad, low self esteem,ashamed, and hopeless. These conditions pro-mote withdrawal and behaviors that are notinstrumental to the attainment of the desiredgoal. He then stays home from the next game.

Although Figure 1 appears to depict an ex-haustive conceptual analysis, even greatercomplexity has been documented. The link-ages in the figure all are unidirectional, al-though it is known that this is not the case.For example, expectancy of success influencesattributions (see Feather & Simon, 1972).Thus, if our baseball player succeeded, his lowexpectancy of success would foster an attri-bution to an unstable cause such as good luck.In addition, affects such as pity and anger areimportant attributional cues (Graham, 1984;Weiner, Graham, Stern, & Lawson, 1982). Forexample, directing pity toward the Little Lea-guer will increase his belief that personal failurewas due to low ability. And feelings of happi-ness and sadness influence outcome percep-tions (see Bower, 1981). Hence, the boy in thestory might perceive an ambiguous outcomeduring the game as a failure because of hisunhappiness and other negative affective ex-periences initiated prior to the outcome inquestion. These added intricacies are neglectedhere, but deserve full incorporation into thetheory.

Achievement Change Programs

I now turn from the devised scenario to anongoing topic of research. There is an increas-

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ingly popular therapeutic treatment that in-duces participants to alter their attributionsfor success and failure (see Foersterling, inpress). Often the participants in these pro-grams were selected because they ascribe per-sonal failure to low ability. The main empiricalfinding in these studies is that persistence inthe face of failure is enhanced when attribu-tions for failure are changed from low abilityto lack of effort (Andrews & Debus, 1978;Chapin & Dyck, 1976; Dweck, 1975; Zoeller,Mahoney, & Weiner, 1983), to poor strategy(Anderson, 1983b; Anderson & Jennings,1980), or to temporary external barriers (Wil-son & Linville, 1982, 1985).

To alter attributions, in the treatment tech-niques the experimenter often directly com-municates to the participants the attributionthat is desired to be induced (e.g., "You failedbecause you did not try hard enough" or"Success depends entirely on finding the rightstrategy"). Following the logic of Figure 2, theparticipants use this information to reach acausal conclusion. Furthermore, they appar-ently accept the communicated ascription,rather than attributing induced failure to lowability. Attributions thus are altered from sta-ble to unstable, which should (and does) resultin the maintenance of goal expectancy (seeAnderson, 1983b; Anderson & Jennings,1980). This sequence is depicted in Linkages3, 5, and 6 in the figure. The investigators allreported increments in persistence of achieve-ment strivings in the face of failure followingthe treatment and assumed that the behaviorchange was mediated, in part, by shifts in thesubjective expectancy of success, as indicatedin Linkage 11 (although Wilson & Linville,1982, questioned the consciousness of this es-timate, and Dweck, 1975, stressed the con-trollability rather than the stability of the in-duced causal ascription).

It is therefore evident that the researchershave focused attention on expectancy of suc-cess. Although consistent with the theory, italso is clear that the conceptualization is notfully brought to bear on the phenomena, in-asmuch as emotions are entirely neglected. Aspreviously revealed, ascriptions to ability, ef-fort, strategy, and external barriers have dis-parate affective consequences. For example, aprogram that induces effort rather than abilityascriptions for failure theoretically is altering

reactions of shame and humiliation to guilt.This new emotional reaction, rather than (inaddition to) a change in expectancy, may beresponsible for the increments in motivatedbehavior. On the other hand, a program thatpromotes task difficulty ascriptions (Wilson &Linville, 1982, 1985) theoretically is enhancingthe self-esteem of the participants, for the at-tribution is being shifted from internal to ex-ternal (in contrast to the controllability alter-ation that precedes the hypothesized affectiveshift from shame to guilt). Perhaps incrementsin self-esteem rather than (in addition to) ex-pectancy maintenance is responsible for theaugmented achievement strivings. In sum, theattributional conception in Figure 2 suggeststhat the change programs may be more com-plex, and less similar to one another, than hasbeen recognized.

Theoretical Generality

It has been intimated throughout this articlethat the theory shown in Figure 2 is conceivedas a general conceptual framework, althoughit has been acknowledged that the vast amountof supporting data has been generated inachievement-related contexts. Thus, althoughthe focus of the theory concerns achievementstrivings, it is tentatively believed that the con-ception has a wide range of applicability. Thisis similar to the position espoused by Atkinson(1964), who also assumed that he was devel-oping a general theory of motivation, althoughachievement settings provided the site of theexperimental research.

The foundation for generality in the presentapproach is provided by two conceptualmechanisms. First, it is proposed that a mo-tivational episode is initiated following anyoutcome that can be construed as attainmentor nonattainment of a goal. Achievement suc-cess and failure clearly capture this require-ment, but acceptance and rejection in the af-filiative domain provide a ready parallel (seeAnderson, 1983a; Sobol & Earn, in press). Inaddition, the conception has been used to ex-amine a number of social and personal "fail-ures," including, for example, alcoholism(McHugh, Beckman, & Frieze, 1979); crime,and parole decisions (Carroll, 1978); depres-sion (Abramson et al., 1978); deprivation(Mark, 1985); loneliness (Peplau, Russell, &

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Helm, 1979); need for help (Betancourt, 1983;Reisenzein, in press; Weiner, 1980a, 1980b);maladaptive reactions to rape (Janoff-Bulman,1979); smoking (Eiser, Van der Pligt, Raw, &Sutton, in press); and wife battering (Freize,1979). It is especially worth noting that thepopular attributional analysis of depressionadvanced by Abramson et al. (1978) and theoft-cited distinction between characterologicalversus behavioral self-blame (Janoff-Bulman,1979) both have the present attributional ap-proach as their source.

In these analyses, the authors first determinethe perceived cause of the outcome, such asthe cause of a crime or the cause of depression.Although these causes vary widely, both withinand between the domains under consideration,they can be described according to their struc-tural properties of locus, stability, and con-trollability. The dimensional analysis furnishesthe second key mechanism for theoretical gen-erality, for once the structure of the cause isascertained, then its impact on expectancy, af-fect, and action can be tested. Consider, forillustrative purposes, the application of thetheory to the disparate areas of criminal be-havior (parole decisions), smoking cessation,and help giving. The latter two research topicshave been subject to examination by means ofpath-analytic techniques, thus providing a fullor partial test of the proposed temporal se-quence outlined in Figure 2,

Parole decisions. According to Carroll(1978) and Carroll & Payne (1976, 1977), pa-role decision makers search for a cause of acrime when reaching their decision, utilizingand integrating a variety of available infor-mation such as the past criminal record, cir-cumstances at the time of the crime, and soon. According to Figure 2, the perceived sta-bility of the cause determines the risk of thecriminal to society, that is, the expectancy thatanother crime might be committed. The con-trollability and/or intentionality of the crimeinfluence(s) the anger at the criminal. Risk andanger (expectancy and affect), in turn, are hy-pothesized to affect the parole judgment.

Carroll (1978) and Carroll and Payne (1976,1977) furnished evidence that this analysis doescapture the parole decision process. It wasfound, for example, that an individual with arecord of conviction who committed a long-planned crime is less likely to be paroled than

is one without a previous history who impul-sively committed the same crime. This is inpart because criminal history is a cue used todetermine the stability of the cause of thecrime; an extensive history results in the per-ception of the cause of the current crime asstable and recidivism is therefore anticipated.Parole board members do consider nonattri-butional factors in their decisions and, as op-posed to college students simulating parole of-ficials, base their decisions entirely on risk fac-tors. However, the decisions made by judgesand by college students also take into accountbeliefs regarding "deserved" punishment.Crimes committed because of intentional and/or controllable factors are believed to be moredeserving of punishment than are crimesdue to unintentional and/or noncontrollablecauses.

In this research, as in the work on achieve-ment change programs, the full theory has notbeen applied because of the neglect of emo-tions. This is not the fault of the researchers,for the introduction of emotion into this theorycame well after their studies. Hence, a reason-able direction for these investigations is to in-corporate feelings, particularly anger and pity,into the determinants of sentence and paroledecisions.

Cessation of smoking. A great deal of at-tention has been devoted by psychologists toan examination of why people do not give upsmoking, given the known negative conse-quences of this behavior. Eiser and Sutton(1977) argued that the decision facing a would-be quitter is not whether to smoke or to quit,but whether to smoke or to try to quit. Thisshifts the theoretical focus from the determi-nants of quitting to the subjective expectancythat an attempt at quitting will be successful.

In a large survey study, Eiser et al. (in press)examined the attributions that smokers givefor the failure of others to give up smoking, aswell as the reasons for their own personal fail-ure at cessation attempts. Path analyses re-vealed that the perceived stability of the causeof prior failure attempts of both others andoneself was related to personal confidenceabout giving up smoking in the future. Con-fidence, in turn, was related to the behavioralintention to try and quit, and intention wasassociated with actual abstinence attempts.Hence, the temporal sequence of cause, causal

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stability, expectancy of success, and behaviorwas confirmed in this health-related context.Again, the role of emotions was neglected, andthe possibility arises that affects such as shameor guilt might also be predictive of attemptsat quitting (also see Goldstein, Gordon, &Marlatt, 1984).

Helping behavior. According to the presentattributional analysis, when a person is in needof aid, the potential helper attempts to deter-mine why help is needed. If the cause is un-controllable, then pity is experienced and helpshould be offered. On the other hand, if thecause is perceived as controllable, then theperson is held responsible, anger is experi-enced, and help should be withheld. Extensiveresearch has revealed positive associations be-tween perceived controllability-anger-neglectand between perceived uncontrollability-pity-help (see J. Meyer & Mulherin, 1980). For ex-ample, it has been documented that individ-uals on a subway are more likely to help a fall-ing person who is ill (uncontrollable) ratherthan drunk (controllable; Piliavin, Rodin, &Piliavin, 1969; Reisenzein, in press; Weiner,1980a); that students are more likely to lendanother student their class notes if the otherstudent has an eye problem (uncontrollable)rather than if the student needs notes becausehe or she went to the beach (controllable; Be-tancourt, 1983; Reisenzein, in press; Weiner,1980b); and that teachers are more likely tohelp a shy (uncontrollable) rather than a hy-peractive (controllable) student (Brophy &Rohrkemper, 1981). Note that the attribu-tional approach points out the similarity, andlike consequences, between drunkenness andgoing to the beach, or between illness and shy-ness, by indicating their comparable subjectiveplacements on the causal dimension of con-trollability.

This research, in direct opposition to thestudy of achievement change programs, paroledecisions, and attempts to quit smoking, hastypically ignored the role of causal stability andexpectancy in the motivational sequence andhas focused on affect. Thus, the entire theorydepicted in Figure 2 again has not been en-gaged. Aid may be more likely to be extendedif the cause of the need is perceived as stableas well as uncontrollable, so that there is rel-ative certainty that the needy person will beunable to help him- or herself in the future.

Thus, students may be more likely to lend theirnotes to a blind person rather than to a personwith a temporary eye problem. In addition,stable uncontrollable causes of need elicitgreater pity than do unstable uncontrollablecauses.

Concluding CommentsDuring the decades between 1930-1950 the

field of motivation was central in psychology.At present, this field is not particularly active.I suggest that one reason for the relative demisein the perceived importance of motivationalthinking has been the unreliability of the "ref-erence experiments," that is, the basic inves-tigations that provide the empirical founda-tions for the theories. For example, regardingthe unequal recall of incompleted versus com-pleted tasks, or what is known as the Zeigamikeffect, Lewin (1935) stated, "All later experi-mental investigations were built upon this"(p. 240). But the differential task recall ob-served by Lewin and Zeigamik is not a reliablefinding. In a similar manner, Atkinson (1964)contended that individuals classified as highversus low in achievement needs exhibit op-posing risk preferences, given tasks differingin perceived difficulty. This central predictionfrom Atkinson's conception is not reliablyfound (see W. Meyer, Folkes, & Weiner, 1976);one suspects this is partially responsible forthe lessening influence of this conception. Anddifferences in expectancy shifts between peoplelabeled as internal and external in perceptionsof control has not been reliably demonstrated,although this is a fundamental prediction ofRotter's (1966) conception.

The empirical foundation for the theorypresented here—the existence of causal search,the dominant causal perceptions, the structureof perceived causality, the relation betweencausal stability and expectancy change, and theassociations between causal structure and theemotions of pride, anger, pity, guilt, gratitude,shame, and hopelessness, is robust. I believethat these facts and relations will survive, in-dependent of the fate of the entire theory. Inaddition, the present conception has other vir-tues perhaps less evident in prior motivationalconceptions: A full range of cognitions andemotions are incorporated and there is an ex-plicit concern with the self. Furthermore, anattempt has been made to relate the structure

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of thought (in this case, causal thinking) to thedynamics of feeling and action. This is one ofthe basic tasks that motivational theorists mustsolve.

In conclusion, I believe that some attentionalso must be paid to the "nothing but commonsense" criticism leveled at times against attri-butional approaches. When critics charge thatan attributional approach is "mere" commonsense, they are exclaiming that the relationspointed out or predicted by the theory repre-sent shared knowledge (see Fletcher, 1984). Iagree that the linkages in Figure 2 between,for example, stable causes and repeated effects,internal locus and self-esteem, and causal con-trollability and anger, gratitute, and guilt, gen-erally are known or at least will be positivelyacknowledged when presented to the lay pub-lic. What is not shared knowledge, however, isthe conceptual analysis—the linking of various"understood" empirical relations and the useof similar principles to explain a vast array ofphenotypic observations. The layperson doesnot appreciate that expecting to be rejectedfor a social engagement because of prior attri-bution to lack of attractiveness and feelinggrateful and returning a favor because of a vo-litionally given gift are part of the same con-ceptual network. It is this systemization, thatis, the higher order relations between associ-ations realized in everyday life, that representsmuch of this attributional contribution. Thatthe individual parts or components are naivelyshared underscores their veridicality, thus fur-ther supporting the certainty of the empiricalrelations and thereby providing a strong foun-dation for theory building.

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Received January 9, 1985Revision received April 11, 1985