An Attributional Analysis of Social Accounts: Implications of Playing the Blame Game

An Attributional Analysis of Social Accounts: Implications of Playing the Blame Game1

FIONA LEE^ Departmenr of Psychology

and School of Business

University of Michigan

ROBERT J. ROBINSON Harvard Business School

These studies proposed that effective social accounts should contain external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions. In Study I , managers provided accounts for a negative event. The accounts contained highly unstable and specific attributions but, contrary to original predictions, they also contained highly internal and controllable attributions. In Study 2, managers rated the effectiveness of the account. Account effectiveness was positively related to unstable attributions, but was negatively related to external and uncontrollable attributions. These relationships were stronger (more negative) for accounts communicated downward than upward. These results indicate that blaming others or deflecting personal responsibility for negative events may be ineffective, especially when one is in a high-status role.

Forming explanations for social events is an integral part of our behavior. By forming explanations, individuals can better make sense of the world, guide their behaviors, and predict future events (Fiske & Taylor, 1991). There has been extensive research examining the content of causal explanations and the process by which they are formed. This research has predominantly been conducted in two separate literatures.

Research on organizational justice and social accounts focuses on how explanations of negative events are publicly communicated to others, and shows that these explanations affect outcomes such as trust in the organization (Brockner, Wiesenfeld, & Martin, 1995); or feelings of anger, dissatisfaction, and stress (Friedman & Robinson, 1993). The social psychological literature, on the other hand, emphasizes how individuals privately form explanations about observed persons and behaviors, focusing on attributional biases as well as cognitive

'Portions of this article were presented at the Academy of Management Conference in Cincin- nati, Ohio, August 1996. The authors give special thanks to Nalini Ambady, Jane Dutton. Jasook Koo, participants of Wharton's third annual Organizational Behavior Mini-Conference. and two anonymous reviewers.

2Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Fiona Lee, Department of Psy- chology, University of Michigan, 525 E. University, Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1 109.

Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 2000, 30, 9, pp. 1853-1879 Copyright 0 2000 by V. H. Winston & Son, Inc. All rights reserved.

1854 LEE AND ROBINSON

processes that underlie attribution making (Gilbert, 1989; Jones & Nisbett, 1972; Ross, 1977; Snyder & Jones, 1974).

Although both the organizational and psychological literatures examine explanations-one focusing on explanations publicly communicated to others, and the other on explanations privately held by oneself-there have been few attempts to link these two research traditions (e.g., Brockner, DeWitt, Grover, & Reed, 1990). We suggest that attribution theory is a useful conceptual tool for describing the content of social accounts and for predicting how social accounts affect organizational outcomes.

Causal Accounts: A Response to Organizational Injustice

Organizational scholars have typically examined publicly communicated explanations, or social accounts, in the context of understanding perceptions of injustice. Decisions are often made in organizations that are perceived as unjust by organizational members. These perceptions can stimulate actions that are dis- ruptive to individuals and the organization. For example, perceptions of injustice cause stress for the individuals involved, increase the chance of accidents or sab- otage (Halbrooks, 1979; Ivancevich, Matteson, & Richards, 1985; Lauerman. 1985), inhibit participation and commitment (Steil, Tuchman, & Deutsch, 1978), and can result in legal actions against the organization and top management (Leap & Smeltzer, 1984).

Perceptions of injustice need to be actively managed in a way that minimizes damage to the organization (Robinson, 1995). Organizations do not want large groups of people to feel angry and disenfranchised, or their managers to be targets of resentment and retaliation. It is therefore common for managers to try to explain their actions in a way that reduces perceptions of injustice. These explanations are called causal accounts. Causal accounts tell the audience that the real cause of one’s actions was not one’s own preferences and intentions. Rather, mit- igating circumstances forced the person to take those unfair actions, and, as such, one had no choice in the matter (Bies & Shapiro, 1987; Shapiro, 1991).

Causal accounts affect perceptions of injustice in several ways. First, accounts provide information about how and why the unjust decision was made, which in turn reduce perceptions of injustice (Bies, 1987; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes, & Verette, 1987). For example, understanding that a decision to lay off employees was caused by an economic downturn may lead one to perceive the decision as more just. Brockner et al. (1990) found that under conditions of high uncertainty and importance, such as organizational layoffs, the clarity of the attributions in the account was positively related to account effectiveness. In short, by giving organizational members information about the decision-making procedure, causal attributions change the evaluations of the damage caused (Bies & Moag, 1986; Cohen & Greenberg, 1982; Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Tyler &

ATTRIBUTIONS AND SOCIAL ACCOUNTS 1855

Bies, 1990). Second, causal accounts reduce disapproval ratings of the harm doer by placing the blame for the harmful act on others. For example, by attributing layoffs to a poor economy, employees might not think ill of their managers, even though they suffered as a result of their decision. In other words, causal accounts can restore the harm doer’s image and can return the harm doer to social acceptability (Schlenker, 1980, 1982). Third, causal accounts are used to minimize the severity of the situation. A causal account acknowledges that social norms were violated, and assures the victim that such violations will not recur (Scott & Lyman, 1968). For example, by attributing the layoffs to an economic downturn, the account-giver implicitly suggests that things will get better when the economy improves, and that the unjust act may thereby be corrected.

Attribution Theory and Causal Accounts

While past research has shown that attributions do predict account effectiveness, currently missing from this literature is any deeply disciplinary-based understanding of the types of attributions that reduce perceptions of injustice. Psychology has a long tradition of examining the content of attributions using a dimensional approach. We suggest that applying this approach to social accounts may help us to more clearly understand the role of attributions in social accounts.

Describing Attributions: Dimensional Approach

Psychologists have developed several frameworks for describing the process by which individuals arrive at causal explanations about other people’s behaviors. Kelley (1967) developed an ANOVA model where individuals arrive at causal decisions by asking three questions: (a) consensus (Does everyone behave similarly in the same situation?); (b) distinctiveness (Does this person behave like this across all situations?); and (c) consistency (Does this person behave the same way every time he or she encounters the same situation?). For example, if consensus is low (only the actor behaves in this way), and distinctiveness and consistency are high (actor behaves like this across all situations at all times), we conclude that the behavior is caused by the actor’s internal disposition.

Seligman extended the ANOVA model, showing that causality can be described using three attributional dimensions: internal-external, stable- unstable, and global-specific (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale, 1978; Peterson & Seligman, 1984; Schulman, Castellon, & Seligman, 1989; Seligman, 1982). These dimensions correspond closely to Kelley’s (1967) ANOVA model. Znter- nality measures whether the cause originates from the actor alone and not others (consensus); stability measures whether the cause persists over time (consistency); and globality measures whether the cause affects a wide range of


situations (distinctiveness). Other theorists have extended this framework by adding a fourth critical attributional dimension: controllable-uncontrollable, which measures whether the cause is controllable by the actor (Anderson & Deuser, 199 1 ; Anderson, Jennings, & Arnoult, 1988; Weiner, 199 1 ). For example, if a failure on a test is attributed to the test taker’s stupidity, the attribution is internal (stupidity is a characteristic internal to the test taker), stable (stupidity is a trait that remains relatively stable over time), global (stupidity affects performance on a wide range of tasks), and uncontrollable (stupidity is an aptitude that is, by and large, beyond the control of the test taker).

Attributional Content of Causal Accounts

The social-accounts literature begins with the assumption that causal accounts, by definition, have very specific attributional content. While there is research showing that clear attributional content relates to account effectiveness (Brockner et al., 1990), we know very little about the type of attributions contained in accounts. Specifically, the dimensional approach to measuring attributions has not been used to examine the content of social accounts. Assuming that causal accounts are used to minimize the severity of the situation and return the harm doer to social acceptability, causal accounts should contain external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions for the unjust event. External attributions place the cause of the event on external factors, absolving the account giver from personal responsibility; unstable attributions suggest that the cause of the event is unlikely to persist over time, and as such mitigate the severity of the predicament; specific attributions suggest that the event would only affect a narrow domain of tasks and activities affecting the account receiver, and as such its negative impact would not be far reaching; and, finally, uncontrollable attributions suggest that the cause of the event is not within the control of the attributor, further removing any blame or responsibility for the unjust act from the account giver.

In short, assuming that account givers are trying to mitigate against the negativity of the unjust act and to reduce negative perceptions directed toward them, we expect them to make the following set of attributions:

The event in question happened because of the situation and not because of me (external). I t was an unusual incident, which will only affect a small part of your work (specific), and it is unlikely to ever be repeated (unstable). There was nothing I could have done to prevent the incident from occurring (uncontrollable). Therefore you should not blame me for what happened, nor should you feel outraged and angry at this incident.

Overall, we hypothesize the following:


Hypothesis 1 . Social accounts for negative events contain highly external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions.

Attributions and Account Effectiveness

Making external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions for negative events has been shown to predict various outcomes. First, there is evidence that this pattern of attributions is positively related to individual outcomes. Psy- chologically, external and uncontrollable attributions for negative events limit the influence of the event on the account giver’s self-esteem, while unstable and specific attributions lead to short-lived, nonpervasive deficits in motivation (Lee & Peterson, 1997). The benefits of these attributions have been shown to translate into improved physical outcomes as well. For example, individuals who make external, unstable, and specific attributions about negative events are less likely to suffer from depression, anxiety, substance abuse, eating disorders, and a variety of other negative health and wellness outcomes (Peterson, Maier, & Seligman, 1993; Peterson & Seligman, 1984). Second, external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions used to explain negative events affect organizational outcomes. For example, organizations using external attributions to explain lower than expected performance were better perceived internally by their own managers, and externally by their shareholders (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw, McKechnie, & Puffer, 1983). Third, external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions predict relational outcomes, such as social impressions, interpersonal affect, and strength of a relationship. For example, in a study of excuses, Weiner et al. (1987) found that external attributions offered for a broken social contract (e.g., being late for an appointment) reduced feelings of anger directed at the speaker, increased positive impressions about the speaker, and led to higher desire for continued social interaction.

Overall, there is evidence that the four dimensions of attributional framing- external/internal, unstable/stable, specific/global, and uncontrollable/controllable-predict individual, organizational, and relational outcomes. This paper suggests that making external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions for a negative event will be related to account effectiveness. These attributions should reduce the perceived severity of the negative event, rehabilitate the image of the account giver, and repair damaged working relationships. The following is hypothesized:

Hypothesis 2. External, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions are positively related to account effectiveness.

Two studies were conducted to examine the hypotheses. In Study I , we collected social accounts of an “unjust” action in an organizational context and


examined the attributional content of these accounts. In Study 2 , we measured the effectiveness of these accounts and examined the relationship between attributional content and account effectiveness.

Study 1

Method

Participanfs. Accounts were generated by 30 managers ( 15 male, 15 female) in the Boston area. Managers were solicited from a newspaper advertisement asking for individuals with at least 2 years’ managerial/supervisory business experience. The average age of the participants was 38.2 years, and the average length of supervisory experience was 4.2 years. These managers were paid $8 for their participation.

Procedure. Managers were tested individually. Each manager was asked to think of two specific target persons from their work; one fitting the description of a boss, and the other fitting the description of a subordinate. A boss was defined as “someone you report to, who supervises you,” and a subordinate was defined as “someone who reports to you, whose work you supervise.” To make their targets more salient, managers were asked to write down the targets’ names, and to rate each target on (a) the extent to which each target had power over the participant, and (b) the extent to which the participant felt close to each target.

Managers were then shown a message about a negative event; the event involved overhearing that management has decided to put a freeze on anticipated salary increases because of poor organizational performance. This event was cho- sen because it was relevant to most managers, regardless of organizational type or position. Next, managers were asked to role-play how they would actually tell each target person about the negative event. Overall, each manager role-played two different scenarios: communicating the negative event upward to a boss, and communicating the negative event downward to a subordinate. The sequence in which participants role-played the scenarios was counterbalanced. After the participants completed both role-play scenarios, they were debriefed and the experi- ment was terminated. There were 30 participants and they each generated two accounts, yielding a total of 60 accounts.

Coding attributional content ofthe accounts. There are several ways in which attributions have been measured in the psychological literature. One strategy involves classifying attributions into categories such as luck, effort, or ability and then mapping these categories into attributional dimensions. For example, luck is an external and uncontrollable attribution; effort is an internal and controllable attribution; and ability is an internal and uncontrollable attribution (Weiner, 1985; Weiner et al., 1987). A second, more frequently used strategy is to rate each attributional dimension separately (Abramson et al., 1978; Peterson, Schulman,


Castellon, & Seligman, 1992). Although each strategy has its strengths and weak- nesses, the latter is more suitable for examining how each attributional dimension contributes uniquely to the effectiveness of social accounts (Carver, 1989; Carver & Scheier, 1991 ; Dykema, Bergbower, Doctora, & Peterson, 1996).

The 60 accounts were videotaped and then transcribed. Three coders were told that the accounts were given to explain a salary freeze and were asked to rate the reasons offered in the account. If more than one reason was offered, coders were instructed to rate the general gist of the reasons given. Using a 9-point Likert scale, coders rated the accounts on four attributional dimensions: (a) external (in the situation or the environment)/internal (in or about the person who is speaking)3; (b) unstable (transient and not always present)/stable (persistent and will always be present); (c) specific (influences just this particular situation and domain)/ global (influences all situations and domains); and (d) controllable (within the control of the person speaking)/uncontrollable (not within the control of the person speaking). Overall, the reliability between coders was high ( R = .89).4

Results

Each manager generated two accounts: one when speaking upward (to a boss), and one when speaking downward (to a subordinate). These two conditions were analyzed separately. Intercorrelations between the four attributional dimensions are listed in Table I . Table 1 shows that for both upward and downward conditions, external attributions were highly correlated with uncontrollable attributions. This makes sense; causes that originate from outside the actor are typically not controllable by the actor. For example. causes such as economic conditions or competitive pressures are both external and uncontrollable.

We expected accounts to contain high levels of external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable ratings (Hypothesis 1). The means for the attributional ratings are listed in Table 2 for both upward and downward conditions. We first compared whether these means were significantly above the scale midpoint of 5. As Table 2 shows, unstable and specific ratings were high, significantly exceeding the scale midpoint. The unstable and specific ratings provide support for Hypothesis 1. However, contrary to Hypothesis 1, external and uncontrollable

-1External and internal are opposite anchors along the same dimension. Thus. high ratings on this dimension indicate high externality, and low ratings indicate high internality. Some psychologists measure this variable as two separate dimensions, allowing raters to code an attribution as both highly internal and highly external. However, past research has found the two dimensions to be highly correlated, and they are routinely collapsed to form a single attributional dimension (Lee, Hallahan, & Herzog. 1996).

4Reliability between coders ( R ) was computed using the Spearman-Brown formula (Guilford, 1954; Rosenthal & Rosnow. 1991; Walker & Lev, 1953). R is interpreted like other measures ofreli- ability, such as Cronbach’s alpha and Kuder and Richardson’s KR-20.


Table 1

Intercorrelations Between External. Unstable. Specific, and Uncontrollable Attributional Accounts

Uncon- External Unstable Specific trollable

Specific -.01 .25 Uncontrollable .87*** -.07

Downward (speaking to a subordinate)

External 1 .oo Unstable -.29 1 .oo Specific -.23 .36

Upward (speaking to a boss)

External 1 .oo Unstable -.02 1 .oo

1 .oo -.09

1 .oo

1 .oo

Uncontrollable .90* * * -.37, -.29 00

tp<.lO. ***p<.OOl.

Table 2

Mean Ratings for External, Unstable. Spec& and Uncontrollable Attributions When Subjects Are Communicating Upward (Speaking to a Boss) and Downward (Speaking to a Subordinate)

Upward Downward

t (vs. t (vs. t (up vs. M midpoint)a A4 midpoint)a down)a

External 3.8 -2.56* 4.1 - 1.36 0.65 Unstable 7.2 75.31*** 7.1 11 S O * * * -0.50

Specific 6.8 61.52*** 6.6 6.08*** -0.85

Uncontrollable 3.4 -3.03* * 3.7 -2.20* 0.65

Note. df = 28. aMeans compared with scale midpoint of 5 (on a 9-point scale). * p < . 0 5 . * * p < . O l . ***p<.001.


Table 3

Number of High and Low External, Unstable, Specific, and Uncontrollable A ttributional Accounts

Attributional dimensions


Upward (speaking to a boss) High 9 26 26 I Low 21 4 4 23

x2 4.8* 16.1*** 16.1*** 8.5** Downward (speaking to a subordinate)

High 9 25 24 7 Low 21 5 6 23

X 2 4.8* 13.3*** 10.8** 8.5**

*p< .O5 . * * p < .01. ***p< ,001.

ratings were low. Except for external ratings in the downward condition, all of the means were significantly below the scale midpoint. This suggests that accounts contained predominantly internal rather than external attributions, and contained predominantly controllable rather than uncontrollable attributions. Using matched-paired t tests, we found no significant differences in external, unstable, specific, or uncontrollable ratings between the upward and downward conditions.

Table 3 presents another way of illustrating the same data. External, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable ratings were categorized as high or low based on whether they were above or below the scale midpoint. In the upward condition (subject speaking to a boss), there were significantly more high than low unstable accounts, and significantly more high than low specific accounts. However, contrary to Hypothesis 1, there were significantly more low than high external accounts, and significantly more low than high uncontrollable accounts. The identical trend was observed in the downward condition (subject speaking to subordinate). In summary, Hypothesis 1 was supported only for unstable and specific attributions.

Although we did not hypothesize about interactions between the different attributional dimensions, the present study shows that account givers preferred certain combinations of attributions over others. Table 4 illustrates the number of accounts with high or low external and uncontrollable attributions. The most


Table 4

Number of High and Low External and Uncontrollable Attributional Accounts

Upward (speaking to a Downward (speaking to boss) a subordinate)

High Low High Low

Uncontrollable (external) High 6 3 Low 1 20

Uncontrollable (external) High 7 2 Low 0 21

frequently used attributions were low external and low uncontrollable attributions. This was significant for upward conditions, x2(1, N = 30) = 1 3 . 5 , ~ < .001; and downward conditions, x2(1, N = 30) = 2 1 . 3 , ~ < .001.

Discussion

The results show that, as predicted, account givers used more unstable and specific attributions when communicating negative events. This makes sense; unstable and specific attributions mitigate against the severity of unjust events by suggestipg that the negative consequences would be limited in duration and domain. However, contrary to our prediction, account givers used more internal and controllable attributions in their accounts. In short, the account giver was more likely to blame oneself for the negative event, and also more likely to attribute the negative event to something within his or her personal control. This contradicts our original argument that attributions contained in social accounts should absolve the account giver from blame and responsibility for the negative event.

Any explanation for these results is post hoc and necessarily speculative, but one possible explanation might be that, within realistic working relationships, account givers are motivated to make internal and controllable attributions to appear to be in control. In organizational settings, exhibiting control over valued resources is considered a sign of one’s power and indicative of whether one can “get things done” within the organization (French & Raven, 1968; Katz & Allen, 1985; Salancik & Pfeffer, 1977). However, external attributions imply that someone else besides the account-giver is responsible for important outcomes, and uncontrollable attributions imply that the account giver has no control over valued resources. In short, the account giver appears powerless in front of


another, severely undermining his or her credibility, as well as perceptions about his or her ability to get things done in the future (Lee, 1997).

The finding that account givers prefer making internal and controllable attributions rather than external and uncontrollable attributions for negative events contradicts results from past research. This may be because the present study examines accounts communicated within realistic, long-term working relationships. Although the accounts were produced via managerial role-play, these role- plays were directed at actual individuals with whom the account givers maintain ongoing working relationships. Within the context of these relationships, account givers might be motivated to adhere to certain roles and expectations created by the relationship, such as appearing in control or appearing powerful. In contrast, past studies of attributional effectiveness focused primarily on attributions communicated within “pseudo” working relationships. This includes attributions from corporate annual reports where account givers (the organization) and account receivers (the shareholders) do not have a genuine social or working relationship with one another (Salancik & Meindl, 1984; Staw et al., 1983), as well as laboratory studies where attributions were communicated between strang- ers who had no preexisting or expected future relationship with one another (Weiner et al., 1987). In both lines of research, the “relationships” between the account giver and the account receiver were devoid of any meaningful relational roles, expectations, history, or context, and therefore pressures to appear powerful or in control may be less salient.

If account givers do not make external and uncontrollable attributions for negative events because they undermine impressions of power and control, then these attributions should negatively relate to positive impressions of the account and the account giver. This, in fact, contradicts Hypothesis 2, which suggests that external and uncontrollable attributions would positively relate to account effectiveness. Indeed, given the results of Study 1, i t makes sense to revise this hypothesis:

Revised Hypothesis 2. Accounts with more unstable and specific attributions will be positively related to measures of account effectiveness; and accounts with more external and uncontrollable attributions will be negatively related to measures of account effectiveness.

If external and uncontrollable attributions actually undermine impressions of power and control, the negative relationship between these attributions and account effectiveness should be stronger when the account giver is a high-status individual. High-status individuals are expected to be in control of critical resources and outcomes (Aguinis, Nesler, Quigley, & Tedeschi, 1994; Depret & Fiske, 1993). To the extent that a high-status account giver violates these role


expectations through using external and uncontrollable attributions, these accounts will be especially ineffective. In short, the direction of communication (upward or downward) should moderate the relationship between external attributions and account effectiveness, and the relationship between uncontrollable attributions and account effectiveness. Specifically, when the account is communicated downward, the relationship between these attributions and account effectiveness should be more negative than when the account is communicated upward. However, because unstable and specific attributions have no implications for impressions about power, we would not expect the direction of communication to moderate the relationship between unstable/specific attributions and account effectiveness. Overall, we hypothesize the following:

Hypofhesis 3. The direction of communication moderates the negative relationships between external attributions and account effectiveness, and between uncontrollable attributions and account effectiveness. These relationships are stronger (more negative) when the account is communicated downward (from high status to low status) than upward (from low status to high status).

Results from Study 1 further show that account givers preferred making attributions that are both internal and controllable. Indeed, there are many types of internal attributions; internal and uncontrollable attributions (e.g., attributing the negative event to one's disposition or aptitude) are qualitatively very different from internal and controllable attributions (e.g., attributing the negative event to one's effort). There is evidence that while internal and uncontrollable attributions for negative events may have negative effects, internal and controllable attributions can be adaptive (Abramson, Dykman, & Needles, 1991). For example, Janoff-Bulman ( 1979) differentiated between characterological self-blame (attributing a negative event to one's disposition, thus uncontrollable) and behavioral self-blame (attributing a negative event to one's behavior, thus controllable) and found that, although both types of attributions are internal in nature, behavioral self-blame actually did not lead to lowered self-esteem. In short, internal attributions offered for negative events in and of themselves may not be particu- larly maladaptive, but their impact on individual and relational outcomes may depend on the controllability of the attribution (Anderson & Deuser, 1991). Indeed, there may be an interaction between internal and controllable attributions in predicting account effectiveness. Internal attributions are only detrimental to account effectiveness when they are also uncontrollable. We hypothesize the following:

Hypothesis 4. There will be an interaction between external and uncontrollable attributions in predicting account effectiveness.


Attributions that are both internal (low external) and controllable (low uncontrollable) will have higher levels of account effectiveness than will attributions that are internal (low external) and highly uncontrollable (low controllable).

Study 2

Method

Participants. Forty-six managers (18 males, 28 females), solicited from a newspaper advertisement asking for individuals with at least 2 years’ managerial/ supervisory business experience, participated in this study. Participants’ average age was 39.3 years, with an average of 4.3 years of manageriallsupervisory work experience. These managers were paid $8 for their participation.

Procedure. From Study 1, 60 accounts were generated from 30 managers (each manager gave two accounts; one to a boss and one to a subordinate). Since the 60 accounts collected in Study I represented some redundancy (i.e., some accounts had similar attributional content), only a sample of the 60 accounts was included in Study 2. Specifically, 20 accounts were selected based on the following three criteria: (a) high intercoder reliability on all attributional dimensions; (b) accounts with identical attributional ratings on the attributional dimensions were eliminated-in short, if there were two accounts with identical external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable ratings of attribution, one would be randomly eliminated; and (c) independence (accounts generated by the same manager were eliminated).

Participants were given the 20 transcribed accounts in counterbalanced order and were told that they were explanations for a salary freeze. Participants were then randomly assigned to a high- or low-status condition. In the high-status condition, participants were told,

You will read transcripts of managers telling their bosses or supervisors about a salary freeze. Imagine that you are this person’s boss, and he or she is actually telling you about this salary freeze. Then rate your impressions of the message, as well as the person delivering this message.

In the low-status condition, participants were told,

You will read transcripts of managers telling their subordinates about a salary freeze. Imagine that you are this person’s subordinate, and he or she is actually telling you about this salary freeze. Then rate your impressions of the message, as well as the person delivering this message.


When account givers (managers in Study 1) assumed high-status roles and account receivers (managers in Study 2) assumed low-status roles, the status relationship was coded as downward communication (the account was communicated downward from high status to low status). When account givers (managers in Study I ) assumed low-status roles and account receivers (managers in Study 2) assumed high-status roles, the status relationship was coded as upward communication (the account was communicated upward from low status to high status).

Using a 9-point Likert scale, participants first rated their perceptions of the overall quality of the account (perception that the account was true, and perception that the account was adequate). Second, participants rated their impressions of the account giver (warm, knowledgeable, confident, competent, likable, introverted, resourceful, stupid, submissive, dependent). These ratings were subjected to a principal-components analysis. Using a step-up-by-one procedure with vari- max rotation, two factors emerged: impressions of the account giver’s ability (competent, confident, resourceful, knowledgeable, submissive [reverse-scored], dependent [reverse-scored], and stupid [reverse-scored]), and impressions of the account giver’s likability (likable, warm, and introverted [reverse-scored]). Two composite variables-impressions of ability and impressions of likability-were formed by averaging across the ratings in each composite. Finally, participants rated the quality of the future working relationship with the account giver (desire to work with the account giver, and trustworthiness of account giver).

Results

Table 5 lists the correlations between the attributional dimensions and the measures of account effectiveness. Accounts were used as the unit of analysis; ratings were averaged across the 46 participants. Overall, external attributions appear to be negatively related to account effectiveness; unstable attributions appear to be positively related to account effectiveness; specific attributions do not show a strong relationship with account effectiveness; and uncontrollable attributions show negative relationships with account effectiveness.

A general linear model procedure was conducted to examine the relation-ship between the attributional dimensions and account effectiveness, and the moderating effects of status. Separate regressions were conducted for each attributional dimension (external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable), and for each account-effectiveness measure (true, adequate, impressions of ability, impressions of likability, desirability as a colleague, and trustworthiness). Account- effectiveness measures were used as dependent variables. Attribution, direction of communication (upward or downward), and the interaction between direction and attribution were entered as independent variables. Participant number was also entered in the model to account for the repeated-measures design (each


Table 5

Correlations Between External, Unstable, Spec$c, and Uncontrollable Attributions and Account-Effectiveness Measures

~ ~~~~


Quality of account True Adequate

Ability Likability

Future working relationship Desirability as a colleague Trust

Impressions of account giver

Quality of account True Adequate

Ability Likability

Future working relationship Desirability as a colleague Trust

Impressions of account giver

Upward

- . I1 -.03

-.12 -.03

-.09 - . I 1

Downward

-.46** -.37*

-.26 -.33t

-.34t -.33t

.19

.I6

. I 1

.26

.26

.12

.39*

.22

.27

.36*

.32t

.29t

.02

.03

-.02 -.03

.02

.o 1

.04

.I0

-.07 .08

-.04 -.09

-.I8 -.04

-.07 -.09

-. 1 1 -.04

-.52** -.50**

- .35* -.36*

-.29t -.20

t p < . I 0. *p < .05. * *p < .O 1 .

participant rated all 20 accounts). All of the independent variables were entered simultaneously into the model. The results are shown in Table 6.

Originally, Hypothesis 2 predicted that external, unstable, specific, and uncontrollable attributions would be positively related to account effectiveness. After Study I , this hypothesis was revised to suggest that external and uncontrollable attributions imply lack of power and control, and therefore would be negatively related to account effectiveness. The effects of external, unstable, specific,


Table 6

Standardized Regression Coefficients From Regression Analyses

Account-effectiveness measures

Ade- Lik- esis Hypoth-

True External -. 17t

(.03) Directiona .09t

(.05) External x -. 13**

Direction (.03) Unstable . I 1 ***

(.03) Direction .04

( 4 5 ) Unstable x .23t

Direction ( . I 1 ) Specific .09

(.06) Direction .06

(.08) Specific x .04

Direction (.03) UncontroIIa- - .48* * *

ble (.14) Direction .02

(.05) Uncontroll-

able x -.26* Direction (. 10)

External -.29 (.25)

Uncontrolla- -.35

External x

ble (26)

Uncontrol- .01 lable (.04)

quate Ability -.20** -.26* (.02) ( . lo) .14t .09

(.07) (.05) -.39*** -.37t (.07) (.17) .06t .09t

(.03) (.05) .08* .I6

(.04) (.07) .07 .05

(.07) (.02) .02 .I0

(.12) (.lo) .07 .09

(.04) (.05) .09 .I9

(.07) (.17)

(.07) (.09) .I4 .I0

(.17) (.lo)

- 36*** -.34***

-,53** -.40* (.15) (.05)

(.19) (.19) -.12 -.25

-.40t -.48** (.21) (.20)

.03 .03 (.06) (.03)

ability Desire Trust -.34*** -.22* -.23t (.lo) (.09) ( . 1 1 ) .21* .06 .10

( . lo) (.05) (.lo) -.36*** -.21* -.13* (.05) (.lo) (.05) .12*** .17*** .07t

(.02) (.04) (.03) .I2 . I 1 .10

(.08) (.05) ( . l o ) . I 1 .08 .20**

(.12) (.05) (.02) .02 . I2 .09

(.05) (.lo) (.07) . I8 .16 .09

(.14) (.18) (.05) .06 .I9 .08

(.07) (.15) (.08)

(.08) ( . 2 5 ) (.03) .o 1 .33 .06

(.01) (.30) (.04)

-.12t -.55* -.08*

-.13* -.13* -.23t (.05) (.05) (.13)

(.07) (-23) (.19)

(.08) (.11) (.16)

-.03 -.29 -.I6

-.17* -.22t -.28t

.02 .o 1 .o 1 (.03) (.04) (.03)

tested H2

H3

H2

H2

H2

H2

€12

H3

H4

Note. Standard errors are presented in parentheses.

nicated downward from high to low status. t p < . lo. * p < .05. **p < .O l . ***p < ,001.

= account is communicated upward from low to high status; 0 = account is cornmu-


and uncontrollable attributions on account effectiveness test this hypothesis. The results show that, indeed, external attributions were negatively related to account effectiveness-the betas for external attributions were negative and were significant for account adequacy, impressions of ability and likability, and desirability as a colleague. The betas for account giver’s trustworthiness and the perception that the account was true were in the predicted direction, but were only marginally significant. The results for uncontrollable attributions show a similar trend. The betas for uncontrollable attributions were negative and significant for all measures of account effectiveness, except for impressions of likability, which was in the predicted direction and was only marginally significant.

Hypothesis 2 also predicted that unstable attributions would be positively related to account effectiveness. The betas for unstable attributions were all positive, showing that, as predicted, accounts with more unstable attributions were viewed as significantly more true and more adequate, and the account giver was perceived as more likable. The account giver was also perceived as more able, more desirable as a colleague, and more trustworthy, although these effects were only marginally significant. Specific attributions did not show any significant relationships with account effectiveness; none of the regression coefficients reached conventional levels of significance. Thus, the revised Hypothesis 2 was supported for external, uncontrollable, and unstable attributions.

Hypothesis 3 predicted that external and uncontrollable attributions would more strongly predict account effectiveness when the account is communicated downward than upward. Table 6 shows that the interactions between external attributions and direction of communication were significant for all account- effectiveness measures. Similarly, the interactions between uncontrollable attributions and direction of communication were also significant for all account- effectiveness measures. As Table 5 shows, the relationships between external/ uncontrollable attributions and account effectiveness were significantly stronger (more negative) when the account was communicated downward than upward, supporting Hypothesis 3.

We did not expect direction of communication to moderate the relationship between unstable attributions and account effectiveness. However, as Table 6 shows, the interactions between unstable attributions and direction were significant for predicting trustworthiness, and were marginally significant for predicting perceptions that the account was true. The positive relationships between unstable attributions and these effectiveness measures were stronger in the downward than the upward conditions.

To examine whether there was an interaction between external and uncontrollable attributions in predicting account effectiveness, we conducted regression analyses with account-effectiveness measures as dependent variables, and external attributions, uncontrollable attributions, and the interaction as independent


variables. General linear modeling was used, and all of the variables were entered into the model simultaneously. The results are shown in Table 6. External attributions did not show a significant relationship with account-effectiveness measures after controlling for uncontrollable attributions. On the other hand, uncontrollable attributions remained significantly or marginally significantly predictive of account effectiveness even after controlling for externality. The results also show that none of the interactions between external and uncontrollable attributions reached conventional levels of significance. We created high and low external and uncontrollable attributional groupings using a split along the scale midpoint, and performed a 2 x 2 ANOVA with high and low external, and high and low uncontrollable as independent variables, and account effectiveness as dependent variables. Similar to the regression analysis, none of the interactions between external and uncontrollable attributions reached conventional levels of significance. Thus, there was no support for Hypothesis 4.

In summary, Study 2 found that accounts with external and uncontrollable attributions were rated as less true and less adequate, generated more negative impressions of the account giver, and created more negative judgments about a future working relationship. These relationships were stronger in the downward communication than in the upward communication. Accounts with unstable attributions were perceived as more positive, more true, and more adequate; generated more positive impressions for the account giver; and created more positive judgments about a future working relationship. Specific attributions were not predictive of account effectiveness.

General Discussion

The present paper began with the premise that social accounts have specific and measurable attributional content. The four attributional dimensions used in the social psychological research to measure privately held attributions (external-internal, unstable-stable, specific-global, uncontrollableecontrollable) could also be used to examine the attributional content of accounts. Accounts were meant to reduce perceptions of negativity and to return the account giver to social acceptability. As such, we argued that accounts should contain external attributions that deflect blame from the account giver; unstable attributions that imply that the negative consequences will be short-lived; specific attributions that suggest that the negative consequences will be nonpervasive; and uncontrollable attributions that absolve the account giver from personal responsibility.

Attributional Content ojAccounts

The results of Study 1 show that, as predicted, accounts contained highly unstable and specific attributions. However, contrary to predictions, accounts


contained more internal than external attributions, and contained more controllable than uncontrollable attributions. In other words, account givers were more likely to attribute the negative event to themselves than to other people or to the situation, and were more likely to attribute the negative event to factors that they could control rather than factors that they could not control. Further, account givers did not equally prefer all types of internal attributions; they over- whelmingly used highly internal and controllable attributions to explain the negative event. Rather than blaming their own disposition, character, aptitude, or ability, they were most likely to blame their own behaviors or efforts.

These findings were surprising, given past research showing that external and uncontrollable attributions for negative events effectively deflect blame away from the account giver (Weiner et al., 1987) and restores the account giver’s self- esteem (Bradley, 1978; Zuckerman, 1979). We argued that one reason why account givers in this study preferred internal and controllable attributions is that, within realistic organizational relationships, individuals have multiple motivations.

Account givers, though undoubtedly motivated to deflect blame and to enhance self-esteem, were also motivated to assume power and to project control (Lee, 1997). This motivation to appear in control might lead the account giver to use internal and controllable attributions in their accounts. Two findings provide support for this argument. First, account givers did not simply prefer just any kind of internal attributions, but only favored internal and controllable attributions. Results from Study I show that account givers were most likely to make highly internal and controllable attributions, and least likely to make highly internal and uncontrollable attributions. In fact, of the 60 accounts collected in Study 1, 41 of them contained highly internal and controllable attributions, and only 1 contained both internal and uncontrollable attributions. In short, only controllable internal attributions were preferred, while uncontrollable internal attributions were rarely given. Second, external attributions did not significantly predict account effectiveness after holding uncontrollable attributions constant. Given that externality and uncontrollability were highly correlated in the first place, it appears that uncontrollability, rather than externality, was the key variable that predicted account effectiveness.

Overall, this suggests that within the context of a realistic, long-term working relationship, account givers are pulled by multiple, sometimes conflicting motivations. Motivation to enhance self-esteem might lead the account giver to use external and uncontrollable attributions to deflect blame, but motivation to appear in control might lead the account giver to use internal and controllable attributions. This point raises important questions about how these conflicting motivations are reconciled. First, individuals may manage these conflicting motivations by differentiating between private and public attributions (Weiner et al., 1987). Organizational members may trade off conflicting motivations by making


external attributions privately, while communicating internal attributions via the accounts they offer. Second, different motivations might be salient in different situations. When an individual is in a role where power and control are expected (e.g., a high-status role), motivations to appear powerful and in control might be more salient (Lee, 1997; Lee & Tiedens, in press), leading to a stronger preference for internal and controllable attributions for negative events. Conversely, when an individual’s self-esteem is threatened, the motivation to enhance self- esteem might be higher, which might lead account givers to prefer external and uncontrollable attributions. Third. the type of negative event might affect the salience of the different motivations. For example, negative events such as a salary freeze entail a high level of uncertainty; people might feel in the dark about why one’s salary was frozen, how one should improve performance, or whether worse events such as demotion or termination might be forthcoming. This uncertainty might invoke a higher need to assume control, leading to a preference for internal and controllable attributions over external and uncontrollable attributions. In contrast, other negative events, such as receiving a lower rank than com- petitors in the industry, might invoke a higher need to enhance self-esteem (Elsbach & Kramer, 1996), leading to a preference for external and uncontrollable attributions.

Attributions and Account Effectiveness

The results further show several surprising findings. First, specific attributions did not predict account effectiveness at all. In other words, suggesting that the cause of the negative event was constrained and nonpervasive seemed to have no relation with how the account or account receiver were perceived. This surprising finding may be explained by the content of the negative event used in the present study. The negative event that account givers were asked to communicate involved having one’s salary frozen because of poor performance. Salaries have broad-ranging effects on an individual’s well-being, and they are one of the most important channels for rewarding individuals in organizations (Donnellon & Scully, 1994). As such, the implications of a salary freeze might always be highly negative, far-reaching, and pervasive, regardless of the attributions offered, con- tributing to the weak relationship between specific attributions and account effectiveness.

We further found evidence that external and uncontrollable attributions were negatively related to account effectiveness. We argued that these effects could be understood by considering what it meant to offer these attributions. By blaming someone else and asserting that one has no control, the account giver might be perceived as powerless. Besides conferring a negative impression on the account giver, this could negatively affect perceptions of the account giver’s ability to enact specific interventions to correct the unjust event. This is consistent with


past research showing that victims of negative events (ranging from cancer to marital abuse to rape) who blamed others had poorer recoveries, adjustments, and performance (Janoff-Bulman, 1982; Madden & Janoff-Bulman, 198 I ; Timko & Janoff-Bulman, 1985). Tennen and AMeck ( 1 990) suggest that individuals who blame others for negative events lose a sense of self-control, shatter their benign world views, and alienate themselves from important sources of social support. Also, external and uncontrollable attributions might make the account giver appear irresponsible and unwilling to admit his or her own mistakes. Excessive use of such attributions suggests that the account giver must have “something to hide,” and creates the impression that the account giver must be lying or dishon- est (Bies & Moag, 1986; Cohen & Greenberg, 1982).

Although we found that external and uncontrollable attributions predicted account effectiveness separately, there were no significant interactions between these attributional dimensions in predicting account effectiveness. Thus. although internal and controllable attributions (e.g., behavioral self-blame) were more preferred than were internal and uncontrollable attributions (e.g.. characterological self-blame), they were not necessarily perceived as more effective. However, because so few accounts with internal/uncontrollable attributions were generated from Study 1, it was impossible to conduct direct comparisons of account effectiveness between internal/controllable attributions and internall uncontrollable attributions. The interactions we reported in this study are therefore suspect as a result of the small and uneven sample size, and this relationship needs to be hrther examined in future research.

We reasoned that if external and uncontrollable attributions contribute to impressions of powerlessness and lack of control, they should have an especially strong negative impact on account effectiveness when the account giver is expected to be powerful and in control. Indeed, the results show that direction of communication significantly moderated the relationship between external and uncontrollable attributions and account effectiveness, such that when the account giver was high status and the account receiver was low status, external and uncontrollable attributions for the negative event were especially ineffective.

It is important to note that there are alternative explanations to account for the moderating effects of direction. For example, high-status individuals have more credibility and more control over valued resources, and therefore individuals in low-status positions pay more attention to high-status individuals than vice versa (Aguinis et al., 1994; Berger, Webster, Ridgeway, & Rosenholtz, 1986; Depret & Fiske, 1993). As such, downward communication may generally have more of an impact on the listener than upward communication, regardless of the content (Ilgen, Mitchell, & Fredrickson, 1981). The present results suggest that this effect may partially explain the moderating effects of direction of communication. We found that although unstable attributions have no implications for impressions of power, direction of communication significantly moderated the relationship


between unstable attributions and trustworthiness, suggesting that downward communication may indeed generally have more of an impact than upward communication. However, direction of communication did not moderate the relationships between unstable attributions and any other account-effectiveness measure besides trustworthiness, nor did it moderate the relationships between specific attributions and account effectiveness. Thus, the moderating effect of direction was considerably stronger and more consistent with external and uncontrollable attributions than with unstable and specific attributions. This suggests that expectations that high-status individuals appear powerful and in control do play a role in the effectiveness of attributions in accounts.

Regardless of the underlying mechanisms, the finding that direction of communication moderated the relationship between attributions and account effectiveness has particular implications for practitioners. Much effort IS made by organizations to “craft” their accounts in a variety of settings; for example, explaining organizational performance to shareholders (Bettman & Weitz, 1983; Staw et al., 1983). or negotiating with different groups within or outside the organization (Friedman & Robinson, 1993). The present findings show that the same account might have different effects for different groups, depending on the status relationship between the account receiver and the account giver (Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Robinson & Friedman, 1995). It is important for managers to be aware that their supervisors and their subordinates react to the same account dif- ferently. and that a standardized “form” account (much like a form letter) sent out to all groups may not be generally effective across all constituents.

Perhaps the most important theoretical implication from this study is that attributional theory and methodology are useful for understanding social accounts. Work on social accounts has described accounts as strategies to minimize negativity associated with unfair acts, or to excuse the account giver from blame or responsibility (Bies, 1987). The attribution literature provides a way to describe how accounts actually work to produce such outcomes. This paper is one attempt to apply theoretical models and methodologies from the attribution literature to understanding social accounts. However, attribution researchers also have much to gain by taking on the perspective of social-account scholars. Psy- chologists who study attributions have focused heavily on the processes by which individuals gather and distill information to make causal decisions. Implicit in this research is the assumption that individuals are primarily motivated to be accurate perceivers and pinpoint the “right” cause for the observed event or behavior (Kelley, 1971; Kelly, 1955), or improve one’s own self-esteem and competence (Sherman, Skov, Hervitz, & Stock, 1981). Yet, absent in this literature is the idea that sometimes individuals may also be motivated to manage others’ attributions, reduce moral outrage (Bies, 1987), preserve social relationships (Schlenker, 1982), enhance one’s public image (Sheppard & Arkin, 1989), or be consistent with the demands of their social roles (Tjosvold, 1977). Sometimes,


these goals may surpass the goal of being accurate or improving self-esteem. These different motivations conceivably could have an effect on the content of causal attributions, as well as on the process of how causal decisions are made.

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An Attributional Analysis of Social Accounts: Implications of Playing the Blame Game

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