Islam and Democracy: An Analysis of Muslim-Majority Democracies with an Eye to the Arab

Spring

Paul Kubicek

Oakland University

kubicek@oakland.edu

Paper for the biennial meeting of the International Political Science Association, Religion and

Politics Section

Montreal, Canada

July 2014

Draft of larger work forthcoming work; please do not cite without author’s permission

Abstract

Many commentators have noted the dearth of democracy in the Muslim world and suggested

a link between Islam and democracy. The latter point, of course, is hotly contested. One

problem is that it overlooks the fact that democracies are well-established in several Muslim-

majority states. This paper, part of a larger comparative project, explores common themes and

"lessons" that can be derived from the most successful of the Muslim democracies--Turkey,

Indonesia, Senegal, and Mali--and applies them to the dynamic political situation in the the

post- 'Arab Spring' cases of Tunisia and Egypt. Factors to be examined include secularism,

local Islamic traditions, institutional arrangements, political culture, and the strength and

orientation of 'Islamist' political actors. The goal is to suggest whether the relatively

successful experience of Muslim democracies gives us any purchase on assessing prospects

for democratic change after the Arab Spring.

1

The uprisings across the Arab world in 2010-2011—optimistically dubbed the ‘Arab

Spring’—unleashed not only a torrent of pent-up frustrations from populations long-subjected

to authoritarian rule, but also a vast literature that speculated on what these dramatic events

might produce. Some works were celebratory and fundamentally optimistic1; others were

more guarded, warning against facile comparisons to the collapse of communism or the

‘Colored Revolutions” of the early 2000s;2 and still others, mostly those published later, were

decidedly pessimistic about what they sometimes dubbed the ‘Arab Winter.’3 At the heart of

much of the concern was the question of political Islam, one made all the more relevant by the

electoral victories of Islamic-oriented parties in elections in Tunisia in 2011 and in Egypt in

2012.4 One primary question—one that continues to played out across the region amid

popular mobilization, military coups, constitutional debates, and civil war—is whether

Muslim countries, either by virtue of simply having a population professing Islam as a faith or

by having political parties using Islam to gain support and potentially inaugurate Islam as a

basis for governance (at times the two arguments are not completely made distinct) can

become democratic.5 Looking at many countries in the Middle East three years after the ‘Arab

Spring,’ it is indeed hard to be optimistic.

However, this judgment may both be pre-mature, particularly, as explored later, with

respect to Tunisia, and short-sighted, as it overlooks the fact that many Muslim countries

have, in fact, established relatively successful democracies.6 In other words, while it may be

true that we have yet to witness democracy in the Arab world, we have witnessed it in the

Muslim world in countries such as Turkey, Indonesia, and Senegal. This paper, part of a

larger comparative research project7, seeks to apply findings or lessons from the democratic

experiences of Muslim-majority countries to the post-Arab Spring environment in order to

provide some insight on prospects for democracy in the contemporary Middle East. In this

vein, the obvious question is whether those facilitating factors found elsewhere, particularly

those that engender interpretations of Islam that are more pluralistic, tolerant, and “liberal,”8

are present in countries such as Tunisia and Egypt.

This paper is organized in four parts. First, it establishes a set of countries for

comparative analysis, namely Muslim-majority countries with significant democratic

experience. Secondly, it elucidates common factors in these states that have helped fashion

interpretations of Islam and institutions that are more compatible with democracy. Third, it

applies the findings from the more successful cases of democracy in the Muslim world to the

contemporary cases of Tunisia and Egypt. It concludes with a brief discussion.

Identifying Democracy in the Muslim World

There are numerous indices that purport to measure “democracy” or the level of

political freedom in a given country. While these indices generally indicate that democracy or

political freedom is less common in the Muslim world than elsewhere, both can be found.

Consider, for example, the “democracy” scores in 2010—the year before the Arab Spring

2

began in Tunisia—from the Polity IV dataset, which places countries on a ten-point

democracy and autocracy scale, which can be combined into a single score ranging from -10

to +10. Polity IV adopts a fairly rudimentary definition of democracy, focusing mostly on the

degree of contestation and competition for political office.9 In 2010, only 12 of the 44 (27%)

Muslim-majority countries10

included in the Polity dataset met the minimum threshold of six

to be considered “democratic.”11

Freedom House’s (FH) measurements of political rights and

civil liberties embrace a more inclusive, liberal concept of “democracy” or even “good

governance”, including factors such as religious freedom, corruption, gender equality, and

protection of private property.12

FH rates a country on an integer scale of one to seven (with

one being “most free”) on respect for political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL), with each

concept broken down into numerous elements. An average of the PR and CL scores of 2.5 or

lower marks a country, according to FH, as “Free.” In its 2010 data, only six of the 46 (13%)

Muslim-majority countries surveyed scored a three or lower—only two, Indonesia and Mali,

squeezed into the “Free” category with a 2.5 average—and only 12 (26%) scored four or

under.

On both datasets, as well as that of the World Bank’s Voice and Accountability (VA)

Index13

, the average score of Muslim countries was well below that of non-Muslim countries,

and statistical analyses, controlling for factors such as GDP per capita, oil revenues, ethnic

heterogeneity, and extent of globalization, find that “Islam,” defined either as a continuous

variable as the percentage of Muslim population or as a dichotomous variable, remains a

statistically significant factor. In other words, there appears to be a relationship between Islam

and democracy. Some observers have taken to mean that the democratic deficit in the Muslim

world “appear[s] to have something to do with the nature of Islam itself.”14

This conclusion, of course, is hotly contested. One problem is that by treating “Islam”

the same way across numerous cases, it fails to recognize that Islam manifests itself

differently in different contexts. Furthermore it is, like all religions, “multi-vocal,” with

concepts that can be both harmful and beneficial to democracy.15

The question, as Bayat

notes, is not whether “Islam” is inherently compatible or incompatible with democracy but

under what conditions can is it used or interpreted in ways that can contribute to

democratization.16

In order to answer this, we can utilize the experience of those Muslim-majority states

that have or have had significant democratic experience. Going beyond the snapshot data

presented above, one can look back in the datasets to establish when and where democracy

and political freedoms were established. Table 1 identifies those cases, using the cutoff of six

to define “democracy” on the Polity index and a 3.5 average on the FH indices to define

“free”, a more generous definition than FH’s threshold of 2.5 or lower. Data are through 2012

and countries and time periods with at least ten consecutive years of democracy are bolded.

While there are some differences across the datasets, eight of the nine “relative success

stories” are in both —Pakistan is the exception, whereas the years that Malaysia is counted as

“free” or “democratic” significantly vary, in part because FH scores do not extend to the most

democratic period in the country’s first decade of independence.

3

Table 1 about here

Of these nine cases, seven constitute the comparative cases for this study—Albania

and Gambia shall be excluded.17

Furthermore, based upon each country’s performance since

1980, including its “top score” since that date and longest length of time attaining that score,

as well as average score on several datasets since 2000, one can distinguish among these

seven countries those that have been “more successful” with respect to democratic

development and stability. Data used to make this determination are presented in Table 2,

remembering that a lower number is a better score on the FH scale. Here one sees that

Indonesia, Senegal, Turkey, and Mali18

clearly stand out, especially in the contemporary

period, from the other cases. The distinction between Muslim-majority democracies with

“more success” and those with “limited success” will be useful in the analysis below,

allowing one to have some differentiation in the dependent variable19

and draw sharper

contrasts between factors that facilitate the emergence and endurance of democratic politics.

Table 2 about here

Islam’s Role in Muslim-Majority Democracies

The seven Muslim-majority countries that serve as the cases for comparison are all

non-Arab and, with one exception (Indonesia), are not oil exporters. In many other respects,

such as wealth, ethnic and religious diversity, colonial experience, form of government, and

the role of the military, they are quite diverse, as seen in Table 3. Aspects of these variables,

separate from any relationship to Islam, may, of course, help account for the timing of

democratization and/or the democratic performance in a particular case, but, based on this

table, it would be hard to posit any of these factors as common “causes” for observed

democratic outcomes across all cases. This study, one might add, by no means purports to

examine each of these factors (as well as numerous other possible variables such as

international factors or political culture) in order to answer definitely why democracy emerges

in a particular country at a particular time.

Table 3 about here

However, it makes two key assumptions. First, “Islam,” broadly defined, can be a

powerful political force, both in terms of social mobilization “from below” and legitimization

of state policies “from above.” This has been seen in numerous countries across the Muslim

world. Islam, in other words, can—and often does—matter politically. Secondly, whether and

how Islam matters will vary based upon particular contexts. In some cases, Islamic-oriented

actors will enphasize concern for social justice or invoke notions such as shura (consultation)

or ijtihad (independent reasoning) that may foster or, at least, not impede democratization.20

In other cases, Islam may be used by state and non-state actors to demand obedience, maintain

hierarchies, and legitimize suppression of alternative political views, thereby working against

democracy. The advantage of a comparative study is that rather than simply concluding that

Islam in a more democratic context is somehow “unique,” one can find common factors that

hold across all or most of the countries being compared.

4

As noted, this paper is part of a larger comparative study, which includes detailed

information on each of these countries. It employs qualitative historical analysis and draws

upon numerous secondary and primary sources.21

Space considerations preclude detailed ex

ante presentations of hypotheses and their theoretical bases. In lieu of that, this paper will

present those factors found in most or all of the democratic cases, in particular the “more

successful” ones, and briefly document and explain their role in the cases. In short, they are:

1) a more syncretic, less dogmatic, flexible form of Islam; 2) de-centralized, non-hierarchical

religious institutions and authorities; 3) secularism; 4) incorporation of Islamic-oriented

political actors; and 5) timing, meaning democratization precedes large-scale Islamic-

oriented political mobilization.

The first factor concerns the predominant nature of Islam as it emerges and develops

within a given polity. In short, there is no one single “Islam” across the Muslim world; there

are various “zones” that reflect history and local conditions.22

All successful Muslim-majority

democracies lie on the periphery of the Muslim world, in contrast to the “core” in which Islam

arrived early and eliminated much of what preceded it, making it easier to impose a singular

version of Islam.23

This argument is not intended to essentialize Islam or suggest that would-

be Islamic-oriented democrats, particularly in the Middle East, cannot find anything in the

Quran or traditional sources and traditions to advance a more liberal or more pluralistic

interpretation of the faith. However, because they are relying on the same textual sources as

those who might deny such traditions, they are at a relative disadvantage compared to those in

the periphery, where more syncretic practices (often centered on Sufism) took hold,

facilitating rise of a “local” Islam that was more flexible, inclusive and tolerant. Although

some would later try to bring Arab or Persian interpretations of Islam into these areas, they

failed to gain a significant following as they could be dismissed as “foreign” imports

incompatible with local traditions.

This is best captured by Sheikh Cherif Haidara, the most popular Muslim preacher in

Mali, who, reacting to more fundamentalist, violent groups in Mali’s north, stated that, “We

do not know this Islam…Those who kill and say they want to act in the name of Islam are not

really [Muslims]…Islam is a religion of peace and tolerance.”24

In neighboring Senegal,

leaders of various Sufi orders, to which most Senegalese Muslims belong, de-legitimize those

endorsing more orthodox or fundamentalist views by labelling them “Wahhabis,” which

suggests both extremism and foreign providence. Instead, they emphasize that Islam should

support diversity, tolerance, and free choice.25

In Turkey, “Turkish Islam” as espoused by

many thinkers such as Said Nursi (1877-1960) and Fethullah Gülen (1941-) as well as

Islamic-oriented parties, draws upon Sufism and multicultural Ottoman-Turkish traditions and

tries to reconcile Islam with modernity and democracy. It rejects more “fundamentalist” Arab

or Persian influences that are anti-Western, insist on a single way to be Muslim and are

centered on demanding an Islamic state. Disagreement is not over Islamic doctrines per se

but “Islamicate”, puting the universal principles of Islam to work in a manner most

appropriate for local conditions.26

In Southeast Asia, figures such as Abdurrahman Wahid,

former chairman of the Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of Religious Scholars) and later (1999-

2001) president of Indonesia, and Anwar Ibrahim, former leader of the Malaysian Islamic

5

Youth Movement, former Deputy Prime Minister and current leader of the opposition, have

rejected the politicization of Islam as well as a purely scriptural approach that seeks to create

a monocultural environment. Such an Islam, they argue, is not appropriate given their

countries’ history and multiculturalism.27

The second factor is less ideational and concerns the institutional form Islam takes.

Although at present there is no overarching, pan-Islamic hierarchy (as there is for the Catholic

Church), there have been and are more centralized and hierarchical local structures, in which

there is a vertical “chain of command” or a “state ulama” that may impose one interpretation

of Islam as well as attach itself to state power. On the other hand, there may be more de-

centralized systems that are amenable to both diversity of thought and dispersal of power.

These structures may arise organically in a given society or be imposed or constructed by

rulers or colonial powers. A good example would be the Sufi orders in Senegal, which were

supported both by French colonial authorities and by the post-colonial Senegalese state as a

form of “good Islam” that would serve as an “antidote” to “bad Islam” that might more

directly challenge the state.28

Although each order may be hierarchically structured, insofar as

a disciple pledges his/her allegiance to a sheikh (marabout), there are many Sufi orders and

no national-level office that controls them. Indeed, the Sufi orders have resisted such an

institution, leaving Islam in Senegal quite de-centralized. With respect to this factor one

contrast Indonesia, a more successful case of democratization, with Malaysia, a relatively less

successful one that has seen significant state-sponsored Islamization. In the former case, there

is no strong central institution that can “speak” for Islam. Instead, there are two large mass

organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah, that represent different approaches to

Islam, but are neither part of the state nor empowered to define Islam for Indonesian

Muslims. In Malaysia, however, the British gave local sultans sole control over religious

affairs—including the power to issue legally binding fatwas—and this practice carried over

once Malaysia became independent. One consequence is that the Malaysian state has taken

advantage of the fact that there are designated individuals to speak for Islam to use Islam to

further a statist and often less-than-democratic agenda.29

In Turkey, under the Ottomans there

was a centralized religious authority—the Sultan served as both the temporal leader and the

caliph—and under Atatürk the republican state created a new, centralized institution, the

Directorate of Religious Affairs (Diyanet Işleri Başkanlığı). However, the latter was designed

to de-politicize Islam and propagate a version of Islam compatible with Atatürk’s priorities of

secularism and Westernization. It does not issue fatwas or empower ulama to “speak” for

Islam. Furthermore, like the centralized Ottoman structure centered on the imperial court, it

co-exists (at times uneasily) with a host of other religious or religiously-inspired groups and

movements (e.g. Sufi orders, Gülen’s Hizmet movement). In short, in all of the more

successful cases of democracy in the Muslim world, one does not see the state-ulama alliance

that has featured elsewhere, a coupling that gives greater potential for centralization of

political power and/or the ability to use religion to augment state authority.

The third factor concerns the strength of secularism, particularly as it applies to the

legal and political system. In most of the cases under consideration, secularism (or, at least,

some secular practices) was introduced by colonial powers; republican Turkey, which adopted

6

secularism on its own, is the exception. Secularism, however, did not “stick” in all cases; in

Pakistan, Malaysia, and Bangladesh, Islam became the sole state religion, and in Indonesia

belief in God is part of Pancasila, the official ideology, with Islam as one of several

recognized faiths. Lack of secularism, however, both with respect to how adherents of non-

recognized faiths will be treated and potential adoption of shari’a as a source of law can be a

real problem for democracy. With respect to the latter, the issue is not only the content of the

law itself, which can be (it does not have to be) discriminatory towards women and used to

repress those who subscribe to a different version of Islam, as seen in Pakistan, Malaysia and

in the Indonesian province of Aceh.30

It is also the fact that use of shari’a can take the power

to make laws away from democratically-elected bodies and empowers others—often

unelected religious scholars—to specify what shari’a requires.31

This is not to say that

secularism must in all cases be necessary for democracy—Stepan for example emphasizes

that many Western democracies have officially established churches32

—or that secularism is

sufficient for democracy (e.g. in the Muslim world officially secular Chad and Turkmenistan

are hardly democracies and many of the democratic shortcomings in Turkey have been linked

much more to authoritarian secularism than political Islam).

What is striking is that all of our “most successful” Muslim-majority democracies are

the most secular and three of them—Turkey, Senegal, and Mali—adopted the French laicité

model, a more “assertive” form of secularism.33

True, in these countries governments have

used Islam as a cultural reference and as a means to gain support and secularism has

“mellowed” over time, meaning there is now greater public space for religion and movement

toward more “passive secularism” (e.g. Turkey now allows female students and state

employees to wear the Islamic headscarf). In part, this is a reaction to democratization, as

seen in Mali in debates over changes in family law.34

However, certain things—formation of

explicitly religious-oriented parties or adoption of shari’a—are off the table.35

The point is

that secularism in these states has compelled Islamic-oriented actors to temper their demands

and has protected more moderate voices from “extremists.” For example, Donal Cruise O-

Brien suggests that in Senegal the secular state is the “the Sufis’ secret love” insofar as it is

buttress against the rise of other manifestations of Islam that might challenge them.36

In

contrast, in a country such as Pakistan or Malaysia, Islamist groups are free to organize and

campaign for more doctrinaire versions of Islamic law and can challenge state authority on

the grounds the fact is not sufficiently protecting Islam. Consequently, democracy may be

compromised by state-led Islamization, as has been the case in both of these countries.37

The fourth factor is how extensively Islamic-oriented actors are incorporated into the

political system, the so-called “moderation-inclusion hypothesis.”38

It has generated various

debates, particularly with respect to demonstrating the sincerity of observed “moderation”

among Islamic-oriented actors. The core of the argument is that incorporating Islamic-

oriented actors into governance or giving Islamist-oriented actors a chance to participate in

politics tends to moderate their ideology and/or behavior by giving them a stake in the

system, a chance to pursue their goals through peaceful means, and/or an opportunity to work

with other political actors and broaden their constituencies. However, one should emphasize

that inclusion need not be only through democratic or electoral politics; Islamic-oriented

7

actors can be incorporated by various means into the state machinery (e.g. establishment of

religious affairs departments), have a say in policy-making or be given oversight in areas that

are, for them, high-priority (e.g. religious education, family law).

This hypothesis finds some support among our cases, although “moderation” occurs

through various means. In Senegal, the Sufi orders were incorporated into the political

economy by virtue of their land holdings and developed to ties individual politicians,

including Leopold Senghor, a Catholic and the country’s first president (1960-1980). Later, as

other Islamic-oriented groups emerged, especially in urban areas, they too were incorporated

into the Senegalese “jeu politique,” at times suspending activities that might be deemed

challenging to the state once they had secured state resources or appointments.39

In Mali,

Islamic-oriented actors were given seats and participated actively at the National Conference

in 1991 that established the bases of Mali’s democracy, although they found little support for

proposals such as ending secularism or allowing religious-based political parties.40

Nonetheless, in democratic Mali they have been involved in policy debates, including

successfully changing Malian family law to incorporate some of their concerns (e.g. state

recognition of religious marriages). The moderation-inclusion hypothesis has been

extensively examined with respect to several Islamic-oriented parties in Turkey, although

some of the ostensible “learning” and subsequent development and moderation of the

currently ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) occurred not via inclusion but after its

Islamist predecessors were repressed by the government and it realized it needed to change

course (e.g. emphasizing its “conservative democratic” as opposed to its “Islamic” nature) to

do better at the polls.41

In Indonesia, President Suharto (1966-1998), although no democrat,

reached out to various Muslim intellectuals and organizations, including patronizing

exponents of more moderate Islam such as the scholar Nurcholish Madjid. However, not all of

these Islamic-oriented figures moderated or became pro-democratic; some defended Suharto

as his regime began to weaken and attacked moderates such as Madjid and Wahid, both of

whom by the mid-1990s had become critical of the regime.42

Similarly in Malaysia, the Pan-

Malaysian Islamic Party (PAS) was incorporated into the government in the early 1970s, but

split with the ruling party and became more radical in the early 1980s. Its subsequent

moderation came when it was in the political opposition and realized that it needed to broaden

its base and work with non-Islamic parties in order to have political influence.43

Like the

AKP, PAS’s ostensible moderation is thus connected to a desire to improve its electoral

fortunes, but also to an electorate that has repeatedly demonstrated a limited appetite for

Islamist positions, a feature that may not be found universally. As for Pakistan and

Bangladesh, there have been intermittent efforts to incorporate Islamic-oriented actors into the

state and, in Pakistan under General Zia (1978-1988), the government oversaw an extensive

Islamization program. This, however, was done through openly authoritarian means—

dissimilarly to “semi-democratic” Malaysia—working against rationales for moderation and

the subsequent back-and-forth between civilian and military governments has not fostered the

moderation or cross-cutting alliances one sees in countries such as Turkey and Malaysia.

The final factor is one of timing, namely that successful democratization is more likely

if democratization precedes significant Islamic-oriented popular mobilization, as opposed

8

merely to the incorporation of Islamic-oriented actors (discussed above) who may or may not

be able to or be interested in mobilizing the larger public for their cause. This argument rests

on a couple of grounds. First, democratization in many successful democracies, including

most Western countries, was not immediate and total. Basic rights, including that of franchise,

expanded over time, and in many cases democracy emerges more as a compact between elites

than as a result of popular pressure. Indeed, the “transitology” perspective in the

democratization literature plays down the importance of political mobilization, suggesting that

too much of it can undermine elite bargaining and the formation of democratic “pacts.” In the

Muslim world, popular mobilization of Islam—meaning primarily mass-based parties or

social movements—may alarm existing elites and those who oppose or are fearful of

Islamization. Moreover, if these movements emerge in a non-democratic environment or one

with a weak or young democracy, they may not, as in a case where they are not incorporated

into the political system, have much opportunity to work first-hand with democratic principles

or forge ties with more secular-forces. In such an environment, they may be forcibly put

down by existing authorities as too threatening (as has been seen in Algeria and both pre- and

post-Arab Spring Egypt) or their power may destabilize a nascent democracy by overloading

the system and generating political polarization.44

Such has been the experience of Pakistan and Bangladesh, both of which have long

histories of Islamic-oriented mobilization and where the military has stepped in on multiple

occasions to restore order because of political instability and extremism. The case of Malaysia

is also instructive, as arguably its most democratic period—its first decade of independence—

was one in which there was comparatively little Islamic-oriented mobilization, allowing more

secular-oriented elites to manage a multi-ethnic and multi-cultural consociational system.

Malaysia’s subsequent transition into a “semi-democracy” has coincided with policies to

promote ethnic Malays and Islam, although many of the country’s shortcomings (e.g. lack of

free press, restrictions on political opposition) are arguably grounded more in a concern for

order than Islamic tenets.45

In contrast, in Turkey, Senegal, and Mali, significant Islamic-

oriented mobilization occurred primarily as a result of democratization and did so in an

environment in which there was widespread support for democracy. It was therefore largely

channeled through democratic institutions. Indonesia has also witnessed greater Islamic-

oriented mobilization since it democratized in the late 1990s, although it has long had mass

Islamic organizations and political parties. Since the 1950s, they were constrained in an

authoritarian system, but by the 1990s organizations such as Nahdlatul Ulama and

Muhammadiyah were important actors in civil society and lobbied for great democracy.46

Before moving on, two caveats are in order. First, no claim is made that any of these

factors in isolation is necessary or sufficient for democratization. They are thus best

understood as probabilistic features rather than “causes,” although in some cases—most

notably Senegal—they are all present and form a rather cohesive narrative. This leads to the

second caveat, insofar as one could argue that these factors are not completely independent.

Indeed, one could suggest they feed upon and build on each other, perhaps even in a

chronological manner in that a “positive score” on one variable leads to a “positive score” on

the next one, generating a “model” for democratization in an Islamic country. If so, of course,

9

this gives coherence to the argument, as seen in a modular case like Senegal. However, it does

have to work this way; the factors that help shape “democratic” manifestations of political

Islam do not necessarily evolve in a linear or historically deterministic manner. For example,

prior to the creation of the secular Turkish Republic, the Ottoman Empire was not secular and

had a largely hierarchical Islamic religious structure, and in the case of Malaysia, British

policy helped bolster the hierarchical religious role of the sultans in a region with syncretic

Islamic traditions. Furthermore, as suggested above, the findings with respect to the inclusion-

moderation hypothesis vary, as not all actors behave or change in the same fashion.

Assessing Prospects for Democracy in Contemporary Tunisia and Egypt

One purpose of comparison is to uncover general patterns or common factors which

can then be utilized to explain and analyze other cases. Such is one goal of this paper, namely

to use the historical experience of relatively successful Muslim-majority democracies—

particularly how Islam has been interpreted and utilized—to shed light on prospects for

democracy in the contemporary Middle East, specifically post-Arab Spring Tunisia and

Egypt. Of course, any such comparison is fraught with numerous difficulties, including that

each country has its own unique circumstances and a given case may emerge as an outlier

from the general pattern. However, it is worth noting that some actors in the Middle East wish

to draw upon the experience of countries such as Turkey, Malaysia, and Indonesia in building

their own democratic systems. One might therefore ask how countries such as Tunisia and

Egypt rate with respect to the factors that are associated with more successful democratic

outcomes in the Muslim world?

In short, neither fares particularly well. Both countries have a rich, multicultural

history, but this is not featured prominently in current political discourse, particularly with

respect to Islam. “Liberal” or “modern” Islam is associated, locally and globally, with the

work of Egyptian scholar Muhammad Abduh (1849-1905), himself a disciple of the Afghan-

born and peripatetic Jamal al-Din Al-Afghani (1838-1897).47

Abduh, while a critic of the

West, struggled with the issue of reconciling Islam with modernity. The answer, he believed

was to detach Islam from harmful traditions it had accumulated over time and return, with

fresh eyes, to the basic texts and fundamental principles by applying principles of ijtihad.

This was, at the time, controversial, but Abduh inspired a host of Muslims to seek renewal

(islah), both in Egypt (including in leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood [MB], founded in

1928) and abroad, including in many of today’s Muslim-majority democracies. Abduh,

however, left a complex legacy. Indeed, aspects of his thought, particularly the emphasis on

the foundational texts and principles and the belief that the Quran should serve as the source

of legislation, would inspire some Islamists, especially in the Middle East, that had little

interest in being “liberal” or “modern.”48

Even though Abduh was influenced by Sufi orders,

these espoused “reform Sufism” that was critical of “popular religion” and argued for closer

adherence of teachings and practices of the earliest Muslim communities.49

It was thus not

“syncretic” in the same way as Sufi-based Islam in Senegal or Mali. Abdush’s impact on the

Egyptian MB was filtered through his Syrian follower Rashid Rida (1865-1935), who, while

critical of the ulama and of blind imitation of tradition (taqlid), staunchly advocated adoption

of shari’a and creation of an Islamic state, views that were largely supported by the religious

10

authorities. The jurist Ali Abd Al-Raziq (1888-1966) and others who expressed contrary

views represented the “rejected alternative.” They were condemned by the authorities and

subject to sanction.50

Furthermore, although Abduh and most of his followers could be

described as Egyptian nationalists insofar as they campaigned against Western domination

and influence in Egypt51

, they did not fashion an “Egyptian Islam” that drew upon the

country’s rich history. Faraj Fuda (1946-1992), a thinker who tried to do so by calling for a

separation of religion and politics and Muslim-Coptic unity—a perspective that would be

rather uncontroversial in democratic Senegal, Mali, or Indonesia—was labelled an apostate by

the religious authorities and assassinated by extremists.52

This was indicative of Bayat calls

the “stagnation of socioreligious thought” in Egypt, in which the impact of liberals and

modernists “remained negligible” and “textualist dogma” prevailed over the reformist

inclinations of Abduh.53

Hassan Hanafi (1935-), an Egyptian scholar associated with the idea

of an “Islamic left,” pessimistically contended that the “Arab-Islamic heritage” (turath) had

been ossified, impervious to diverse interpretations amenable to free thought and

democratization.54

As for Tunisia, the influence of “liberal Islam” was modest prior to its obtaining

independence in 195655

, and its most significant post-independence Islamic-oriented

movement—formed first as the Harakat al-Ittijah al-Islami (Islamic Tendency Movement) in

1981 and in 1989 renamed Harakat En-Nahda (Renaissance Movement, hereafter

Ennahda)—was inspired by the MB and has traditionally appealed more to the general Arab-

Islamic heritage of the people and unity of the Muslim community (umma) than anything

specifically “Tunisian.”56

In both countries, Islamic-oriented movements have also been, in

large part because of state repression but also because of their dogmatism, more anti-system

oriented than, for example, those which emerged in Turkey or Indonesia, where Islamic-

oriented actors developed, often with state encouragement, a more “national” conception of

Islam that opposed more “fundamentalist” versions—including those inspired by Abduh—

that were viewed to have foreign providence.

With respect to the organization of Islam, one sees more efforts at centralization and

state control in both Tunisia and Egypt than in most of the other cases. Both countries were

part of the Ottoman Empire, in which the state formed an alliance with the Sunni ulama to

maintain stability and combat threatening or “deviant” interpretations of the faith. Each had

their own muftis empowered to “speak” for Islam and both also had prestigious mosques—

Zaytuna in Tunisia and al-Azhar in Egypt—that were unquestioned centers for religious

scholarship and, for the most part, bastions of conservatism. There were, of course, various

efforts to alter this system, but success was limited. In Ottoman-era Tunisia the greatest

reform project was under Vizier Khayr al-Din al-Tunsi (1873-1877), who endorsed a more

modern vision of Islam and advocated ideas such as a legislative council to fulfill the Islamic

requirement of shura (consultation), but also relied upon the ulama to ensure the Islamic

character of the state and created a centralized Habus Council.57

Both the French—who

formally took control of Tunisia in 1881—and its post-independence government kept this

structure, which in 1956 was re-named the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This body oversees

mosques and hires and licenses all prayer leaders. The president also appoints the Grand

11

Mufti, who is empowered to issue fatwas (legally non-binding) and “speak” for Islam in

Tunisia. The overall impact of this system, however, has not been to empower Islam, but, as

in Turkey, subordinate it to the state and inhibit it from playing an independent role in civil

society.58

In Egypt, there is also an “official Islam” centered around the state and al-Azhar, a

center of global Islamic scholarship that in the past two centuries has increasingly come under

state control as various moves have stripped it of autonomy over finances and personnel

decisions. In the late twentieth century, Egyptian leaders relied upon it to issue fatwas to

legitimate their policies and de-legitimize more “radical” Islamic elements, thereby “virtually

incorporating it as an arm of the state.”59

While al-Azhar did challenge the state in the 1990s

on policies such as birth control, it did so from a more conservative perspective and did not

agitate for political change. However, “official Islam” is but one of many “Islams” in Egypt,

which, compared to Tunisia, has more diversity and space for more “independent” voices,

including both the MB and jihadist groups who employ violence.60

The MB, of course, has a

long and complicated history, officially banned since 1948 but, at times, tolerated by and even

cooperating with the state, whereas at other times it worked with secular-oriented groups

against the regime. However, this by itself does not mean that they have played, with respect

to democracy, a constructive role in civil society, as, for example, Muhammadiyah did in

Indonesia or Sufi orders did in Senegal. Writing in the 1990s, Wickham noted that the issue

is the agenda of these actors, which, in the case of the MB, was often not to “establish a civil

sphere separate from and coexistent with the secular state, but gradually to extend the Islamic

domain until it encompasses the state itself.”61

After 2012, when it gained power, critics

suggested that the MB in fact was far more interested in “state capture” and strengthening

centralized Islam, such as empowering al-Azhar be give its imprimatur to legislation to ensure

compliance with shari’a, than in dismantling the state apparatus.62

Prior to the uprisings in 2010-2011, neither country was secular in a strict sense, as the

constitutions of both countries (Tunisia 1959, Egypt 1971) specified Islam as the state

religion. However, in terms of government practices, Tunisia, influenced by the French laicité

tradition, has been far more secular-oriented. Its founding president, Habib Bourguiba (1957-

1987), like Atatürk in Turkey, favored cultural Westernization. He abolished shari’a courts,

pushed through a Personal Status Law that banned polygamy and gave women rights of

divorce, closed religious endowments, restricted wearing of the headscarf, and “debilitated the

ulama” by placing them under state control.63

Islam remained a cultural marker and, under

both Bourguiba and his successor, Zine El Abindine Ben Ali (1987-2011), it was occasionally

employed by the state to bolster its legitimacy. However, “state Islamiziation” did not go as

far as it did in Egypt, both under President Anwar Sadat (1970-1981), who changed the

constitution in 1980 to establish shari’a as the source for law and under Hosni Mubarak

(1981-2011), who enhanced the role of ulama from al-Azhar in cultural politics and public

morality, expanded funding and personnel for the Ministry of Religious Endowments, and

allowed conservative clergy to play a prominent role in the judiciary, education, and the

media. The result was “Islamic penetration of the state apparatus,” albeit in a form that

ensured that pro-regime elements were promoted and more autonomous or threatening groups

12

were excluded.64

The mufti of al-Azhar, Shaykh Muhammad Tantawi, even declared in 2001

that “Egypt has an Islamic state.”65

Both countries, however, remained too secular or

insufficiently Islamic for actors such as the MB and Ennhada. For example, the Rashid

Ghannoushi, the latter’s leader, declared in 1988 that the Tunisian Constitution had two main

defects: no statement that laws must be compatible with shari’a and no Islamic Council to

ensure said compatibility.66

The question of secularism has been revisited in each country since 2011. However,

all indications are that secularism has taken greater hold in Tunisia. This is evidenced, inter

alia, in the fact that in October 2011 elections for a Constituent Assembly Ennadha received

only 37 per cent of the vote, a plurality, but not the majority received in 2012 by Islamist

parties in Egypt. While the declaration of Islam as a state religion (kept in Article 1 of the

constitution approved by the Constituent Assembly in 2014) gives some room for Islamist

actors to push for measures such as shari’a—Ghannoushi himself suggested in October 2011

that a “mild form” of shari’a was desirable67

—he and other Ennadha leaders backed away

from this as it proved polarizing and unpopular. Draft versions of the constitution that

included shari’a were dropped, and the document approved in 2014 largely retained the status

quo with respect to Islam, although provisions in Article 6, in which the state pledges both to

spread “values of moderation and tolerance” as well as “protect religion” and “to prevent the

sacred from being attacked” could be used to limit freedom of expression. In Egypt the MB

won both the presidency and the legislative majority in 2012 and thereby faced fewer

constraints. Moreover, the status quo was one that already included mention of shari’a as a

source of law. In this case, the debate revolved less around shari’a itself than in finding a

mechanism that could best ensure, perhaps in a manner akin to the Council of Guardians in

Iran, that all laws and actions were sufficiently “Islamic.” In the end, the MB-dominated

Constituent Assembly not only retained shari’a as the source of legislation but stipulated that

scholars from al-Azhar were to be consulted on matters pertaining to it.

With respect to inclusion/political incorporation, again neither country fares well in

accordance with the theory. In Tunisia, with a brief exception in the late 1980s, Islamic-

oriented actors were suppressed. Candidates from Ennadha did compete in elections in 1988,

but afterwards, the movement was banned and many of its leaders were driven into exile. In

Egypt, the MB has had a varied relationship with the state, tolerated in the 1980s and several

times fielding “independent” candidates for elections, allowing it to emerge in the 2000s as

the strongest “opposition party.” It was also active in the media and in Egyptian professional

associations. In contrast to Ennadha, maintained a much more active and visible presence in

society.68

If the inclusion-moderation hypothesis is correct, one might therefore expect Islamic-

oriented groups in Tunisia to be more “radical” than those in Egypt. While there are, in both

countries, Islamist groups that employ violence and demonstrate little fealty to democracy, a

comparison of Ennadha and the MB shows more moderation in the former. As early as 1993,

Ghannoushi suggested while in exile that if democracy means free elections, alternation of

different groups in power, and respect for freedom and human rights, then “Muslims will find

nothing in their religion to oppose democracy.”69

While he did endorse shari’a as an

13

institution that “transcends all [human] laws,” he also maintained that Islamic-oriented actors

could work with secular groups on common goals (e.g. removing a dictator).70

Significantly,

in 2005, Ennadha joined forces with secular dissidents in the pro-democratic 18 October

(2005) Collectif, 71 and it joined with two secular parties in 2011 to form a majority in the

Constituent Assembly. As noted, Ennadha backed away from insisting on adoption of shari’a,

and Ghannouchi has spoken favorably of the “Turkish model,” upheld women’s rights and

keeping Tunisia’s Personal Status Laws, and claimed that “democracy is the only way to

reach power and to stay in power.”72

To be sure, not all are convinced that Ghannoushi or

Ennadha are, to invoke the title of one study, “democrats within Islamism.” Critics accuse

Ennadha of conducting a “double discourse,” and cite examples such as calls for jihad of a

“new caliphate” from some Ennadha officials and a leaked videotape in which Ghannouchi

gives advice to Salafist activists and appears to endorse gradual creation of an Islamic state.73

However, despite numerous problems in Tunisia, including political violence, government

resignations, and delays in producing a constitution, Ennadha continued to work with secular

parties to produce a democratically-oriented constitution.

Egypt’s situation is quite different. The question of the MB’s moderation remained

unsettled prior to Mubarak’s fall. While there were some positive signs—the MB renounced

violence (in contrast to more extreme groups in Egypt), adopted idioms of democracy, rights,

and civil society, and some from the MB cooperated with leftists and secularists—the MB did

not fully “moderate” in the sense of moving away from Islamism. Wickham, for example, in a

study that is, in many ways, sympathetic to the MB, notes in the early 2000s that its members

had “yet to reconcile their call for Islamic law with the full commitment to democracy and

political pluralism.”74

Bayat pointedly does not label the MB as “post-Islamist,” noting that its

leadership remained committed to shari’a over democracy and establishing religious authority

as a check over the will of the people.75

As for why this is so, Gumuscu, comparing the MB

with Turkey’s AKP, suggests that the former’s supporters were largely “losers” of the states

economic policies, whereas the latter included large segments of the rising Anatolian

bourgeoise. The MB thus continued to appeal to outsider or more marginal groups who

remained committed to Islamism as opposed to a more pragmatic, less ideological conception

of Islam.76

Bokhari and Senzai label the MB as “participatory Islamist,” suggesting it was

willing to play democratic politics while keeping its core agenda.77

However, after contesting

elections and coming to power, the MB displayed little of the moderation of Ennadha: it

deployed armed supporters to monitor public morality and break up protests; it derided its

critics as enemies of Islam; its backers mounted demonstrations praising al-Qaeda; and it

pointedly excluded secular and liberal representatives from the process of drafting the

constitution, which, as noted, ultimately contained provisions to strengthen the role of Islam

in Egyptian politics.

Finally, the clearest difference between Tunisia and Egypt and the more successful

cases concerns timing, as the former were largely police states and lack meaningful

experience with democracy.78

After their long-ruling authoritarian leaders were ousted both

have attempted to democratize from scratch amid mobilization from numerous political

groups. This is not akin to the gradual or elite-led democratization as in Turkey, Mali or

14

Senegal. This is not to say that countries cannot democratize under these conditions—Poland,

Lithuania, the Czech Republic, and Estonia did so after the collapse of communism. However,

in all of these countries there was a strong consensus about the country’s future course and

new authorities moved quickly to dismantle the previous system. In post-communist countries

lacking such consensus—Romania, Ukraine, Russia—democratization was delayed or failed

to take root. In Tunisia and Egypt, not only are Islamist and Islamic-oriented actors new to

democratic politics (as are all actors in these countries), but they are profoundly distrusted by

other, more secular groups. This is obviously seen in the case of Egypt—where the 2013 coup

to remove the Muslim Brotherhood from power did enjoy substantial support—but also, as

noted, in Tunisia, where many are not fully convinced of Ennadha’s commitment to

democracy and fear the emergence of Salafist groups. While various parties could agree on

getting rid of the ancien regime—although significant elements of it remains, especially in

Egypt—there was little or no consensus on what comes next, including policies on core

issues of state identity itself, including those that touch on religion that, compared to purely

economic issues, may be less amenable to compromise. Groups have mobilized their

supporters to press their agenda, meaning that the politics of the street—again mostly clearly

seen in Egypt—can overwhelm the capacity of nascent institutions to manage popular

demands. Political leaders as well as the public at large do not have infinite patience, and thus

the temptation is to sidestep or do away with these ineffective institutions.

Conclusion

The above discussion of Tunisia and Egypt is admittedly cursory, and the situation in

both countries continues to evolve. It is also not intended to be deterministic, as countries can

overcome poor legacies or lack of alleged pre-requisites and develop in unexpected ways.

Neither country, however, fits the “pattern” found in other Muslim-majority democracies. Of

course, writing in 2014, it is all too easy to be pessimistic about Egypt. Not only does it

largely lack, according to this analysis, cultural and institutional bases for development of a

more “liberal” or tolerant Islam, but it is clear that the main political agents on both sides of

the secular-religious divide have yet to moderate and build the trust necessary for democracy.

The country also lacks effective channels to manage political mobilization, creating instability

and giving the army the opportunity to seize power in the name of preventing chaos and

further violence. In other words, the scenario suggested immediately prior to this section of

the paper has already played out. The army, of course, has not proven itself to be a friend of

democracy. At present, Egypt’s lack of democracy can be attributed far more to its actions

than the MB and other Islamic-oriented and Islamist groups, who are now the target of

reprisals.

There is more reason to be guardedly optimistic about Tunisia. As with Egypt, the

historical deck seems largely stacked against it, although, significantly, it can draw upon a

stronger condition of Westernization and secularism. Indeed, the fact that secularism has,

relatively speaking, taken hold has given incentives to Islamic-oriented actors to back away

from more maximalist positions that would fundamentally change the position of Islam in the

state (e.g. adoption of shari’a or change of Personal Status Laws). Tunisia also has some

other advantages that were not discussed above. It is, compared to Egypt, in relatively good

15

economic shape; it lacks a military keen to involve itself in politics; and its small size may

make it more susceptible to positive international influences, particularly from the European

Union.79

With respect to political Islam, the emergence of Salafist groups alarms many, but

other Muslim-majority democracies (e.g. Indonesia, Malaysia) have witnessed similar

developments and been able to manage groups who employ violence and whose commitment

to democracy is highly questionable. The key player remains Ennadha, which, unlike the

Muslim Brotherhood, was unable to win a majority of votes in the initial post-Arab Spring

elections and thus from 2011-2014 has shared power with secular-oriented parties. The

importance of this can hardly be overstated, as it created different incentives and opportunity

structures. Although Ennadha does not, like Turkey’s Islamic-oriented parties or the Sufi

orders in Senegal, have a history of inclusion in the structures of power—indeed, its “path to

moderation” occurred while it was banned and exiled and remained confined to rhetoric—it is

now included in the emerging democratic system and has demonstrated an ability to make

democratic compromises, including those that have angered its Islamist members and

supporters. Despite all the country’s difficulties, various parties agreed in 2014 to a

constitution that guarantees basic freedoms, establishes a democratic structure, and does not,

on paper at any rate, expand the role of Islam.

However, looking ahead, it remains to be seen if Ennadha’s leaders will continue

along the path of moderation and compromise. Unlike in Turkey or Senegal, Islamist parties

will compete with it for the votes of pious Muslims, and their commitment to democracy may

be far more questionable. Ennadha may not want to lose votes on this flank and could be

tempted to try to play the religion card more aggressively in future elections. It could also,

depending upon the outcome, find working in a coalition with these Islamist parties an

attractive option. These scenarios have played out elsewhere in the Arab world where there

has been some political competition (Algeria, Lebanon, Egypt, post-Qaddafi Libya). Tunisia,

of course, is not destined to follow this path, and, by itself, a party or government that is more

explicitly Islamic-oriented need not compromise Tunisia’s fledgling democracy. However, it

would be politically polarizing and risk instability.

Democracy clearly remains a possibility for Tunisia. Its success hinges on the ability

of Islamic-oriented and non-Islamic oriented actors to work together, which presupposes a

commitment on the part of both to tolerance and moderation, something clearly not seen in

post-Mubarak Egypt. However, as developed in this paper, this commitment has been central

to the story of Muslim-majority democracies elsewhere. Tunisia, compared to some of them,

may possess certain disadvantages, but they (like most countries) did not become democratic

overnight. Tunisia’s political and religious leaders, if they are committed to democracy,

would be wise to learn from their experiences.

16

Table 1 Muslim-Majority Democracies

Muslim-Majority Democracies

as Measured by Polity* (1945-

2012)

“Free” Muslim-Majority States

as Measured by FH* (1972-

2012)

Albania (2002-2012) Bangladesh (1972-1973)

(1992-2006)

Comoros (2004-2012)

Gambia (1965-1993)

Indonesia (1999-2012) Kosovo (2008-2012)

Kyrgyzstan (2010)

Lebanon (2005-2012)

Malaysia (1957-1968) (2008-

2012)

Mali (1992-2011)

Niger (1992-1995) (2004-2008)

(2011-2012)

Pakistan (1956-1957) (1973-

1976) (1988-1998) (2010-2012)

Senegal (2000-2012)

Sierra Leone (1961-1966)

(2007-2012)

Somalia (1960-1968)

Sudan (1956-1957) (1965-1968)

(1986-1988)

Syria (1954-1957)

Turkey (1946-1953) (1961-

1970) (1973-1979) (1983-2012)

Albania (1992-1995) (2001-

2010)

Bangladesh (1972) (1979-

1980) (1991-2001) (2010-2012)

Burkina Faso (1972-1973)

(1978-1979)

Comoros (1975) (1991-1992)

(2006) (2008-2012)

Djibouti (1977)

Gambia (1972-1993)

Indonesia (2000-2012) Jordan (1992)

Kuwait (1973-1975)

Kyrgyzstan (1992) (1994)

Lebanon (1972-1974)

Malaysia (1972-1983)

Maldives (1972-1974) (2009-

2011)

Mali (1992-2011)

Niger (1993) (2004-2008)

(2011-2012)

Pakistan (1988-1989)

Senegal (1984-1992) (2000-

2010)

Sierra Leone (2003-2012)

Tunisia (2011-2012)

Turkey (1972-1979) (1986-

1992) (2002-2012)

*Countries that rate six or better on Polity IV or average 3.5 or better on

Freedom House’s measures of political rights and civil liberties. Sources: Polity IV dataset

from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm and FH from www.freedomhouse.org

17

Table 2 Comparison of Muslim-Majority Democracies

Country Years Rated

“democratic”

(> 6) by

Polity, 1980-

2012

Top Polity

Score

Since

1980

(Years)

Top FH

Score

Since

1980

(Years)

Average

Polity

Score

(2000-

2012)

Average

FH Score

(2000-

2012)

Average

VA Score

± 2.5

(2000-

2012)

More

Success

Turkey 30 9 (1989-

1992)

3 (2004-

2011)

7.31 3.35 -.16

Mali 20 7 (2002-

2011)

2 (2003-

2006)

6.31 2.62 .12

Indonesia 14 8 (2004-

2012)

2.5 (2005-

2012)

7.38 2.88 -.17

Senegal 13 8 (2000-

2006)

2.5 (2002-

2007)

7.54 2.81 -.05

Limited

Success

Bangladesh 15 6 (1992-

2006)

2.5 (1991-

1992)

3.85 3.81 -.47

Pakistan 13 8 (1988-

1996)

3 (1988-

1989)

-.54 5.12 -1.02

Malaysia 5 6 (2008-

2012)

3.5 (1980-

1983)

4.15 4.27 -.42

Sources: Polity Dataset, available at http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm; FH at

www.freedomhouse.org; World Bank VA scores from

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports

18

Table 3 Profiles of Muslim-Majority Democracies

Country Democracy

in 2012?

(Polity

and/or FH)*

GDP/capita

2012

(current $,

PPP)

%

Muslim

/%

largest

ethnic

group

Colonial

power

Violent

Struggle at

Foundation

Form of

Government

Military

coups

since

1960

Turkey Yes 18190 98.6/70 None Yes Semi-

Presidentiala

Several

Mali Yes 1140 92.4/50 French No Semi-

Presidentialc

Several

Indonesia Yes 4730 88.1/41 Dutch Yes Presidential One

Senegal Yes 1880 95.9/43 French No Semi-

Presidentialc

None

Bangladesh Mixed 2030 90.4/98 UK Yes Parliamentary Several

Pakistan Mixed 2880 96.4/45 UK Yes Parliamentaryb

Several

Malaysia Mixed 16270 61.4/50 UK No Parliamentary None

Sources: World Bank, Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life; CIA World Factbook. * Threshold is 6 or above

for Polity, 3.5 or below for FH, as in Table 1. a President not popularly elected but retains important powers;

b

Role of president has varied over time; c President has traditionally played dominant role

1 Examples include Tariq Ramadan, Islam and the Arab Awakening (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) and

Hamid Dabashi, The Arab Spring: The End of Post-Colonialism (London: Zed Books, 2012). 2 See Lucan Way, “The Lessons of 1989,” Journal of Democracy 22 (2011): 13-23, and Laura Landolt and Paul

Kubicek, “Opportunities and Constraints: Comparing Tunisia and Egypt to the Colored Revolutions,”

Democratization, published on-line, April 2013. 3 An early work in this vein is John Bradley, After the Arab Spring: How Islamists Hijacked the Middle East

Revolts (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2012). 4 Terminology is important but at times imprecisely employed. Bayat distinguishes between Islamism, an

ideology that holds Islamic principles of governance must be formally enshrined in the state, and “post-

Islamism,” which seeks inspiration from Islam but is open to democracy by “fus[ing] religiosity with rights, faith

and freedom, Islam and liberty.” See Asef Bayat, Making Islam Democratic: Social Movements and the Post-

Islamist Turn (Stanford CA: Stanford University Press, 2007), especially pp. 8-11. My own preference is to refer

to those who use Islamic references in any significant sense as “Islamic-oriented,” employing terms such as

“Islamist” to those who embrace “Islamism” as defined above. 5 There is a vast literature on this topic, which pre-dates the Arab Spring. For more negative assessments, see

Bassam Tibi, Islamism and Islam (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012), and Eric Chaney, “Democratic

Change in the Arab World, Past and Present.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 42(1), 2012: 363-414. In

contrast, see John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996);

Khaled El Fadl, Islam and the Challenge of Democracy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004),

Muhammad Ayoob, The Many Faces of Political Islam (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2007), and

Bayat, Making Islam Democratic and Bayat, ed. Post-Islamism: The Many Faces of Political Islam. (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2013). 6 I define democracy mainly in a procedural sense, meaning that the holders of political power are subject to the

vote of the people in free and competitive elections and that the people retain civil and political freedoms to

express their views and organize to contest for power. By “relatively successful,” I acknowledge that these states

(like all states, for that matter) have democratic shortcomings, particularly if one thinks of democracy in a more

liberal sense. These shortcomings include issues of rule of law, women’s and minority rights, politically-

involved militaries, and constraints on media and free expression. Whether these have anything to do with

“Islam” per se and (more controversially, perhaps) whether one might be able to speak of “Muslim democracy”

are interesting questions, but not ones pursued in this paper. 7 Paul Kubicek, Political Islam and Democracy in the Muslim World: A Comparative Examination,

forthcoming.

19

8 Numerous variables, of course, can affect prospects for democracy. This paper generally sidesteps discussion

of structural “pre-requisites” or choices (agency) that lack a direct tie to Islam, although I have analyzed them

elsewhere. See Landolt and Kubicek, “Opportunities and Constraints.” 9 Specifically, Polity IV measures openness, competitiveness, and regulation of executive recruitment,

constraints on executive authority, and the regulation and competitiveness of participation. See the home page

of the Polity IV project, http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. 10

The twelve countries were Albania, Kosovo, Mali, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Comoros, Turkey, Lebanon,

Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia. My source of data for Muslim-majority countries is estimates

made by the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, available at http://features.pewforum.org/muslim-

population. (accessed April 19 2013). 11

Directors of the Polity IV project suggest a score of 6 to 10 would qualify as a “democracy,” with a 10

signifying “full democracy”. 12

Scores are based on a checklist of 10 political rights and 15 civil liberties categories. Freedom House claims

to be assessing “political rights” and “civil liberties,” not democracy per se. Its 2010 composite scores do

correlate highly (.861, p < .001) with those of Polity. Many object to Freedom House on both conceptual and

methodological issues, but I find value in them insofar as Freedom House adopts a more “liberal” notion of

democracy that might capture a more pronounced tension between Islam and liberal democracy, an issue

explored in the fuller study. 13

The VA Index was developed in the 1990s. Scores range from -2.5 to +2.5, but the World Bank does not

define a threshold marking a country as “free” or “democratic.” The average score in 2010 for the same set of

Muslim-majority states captured in the Polity dataset was -.92 compared to .04 for the other countries. Data from

http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#countryReports. 14

Charles Rowley and Nathanael Smith, “Islam’s Democracy Paradox: Muslims Claim to Like Democracy, So

Why Do They Have So Little?” Public Choice 139:3 (2009): 273-299, at p. 298. See also M. Steven Fish,

“Islam and Authoritarianism.” World Politics 55: 1 (2002): 4-37; Nicholas Potrafke, “Islam and Democracy.”

Public Choice 151:1 (2012): 185-192; and Kubicek, Political Islam, Chapter 1. 15

Alfred Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations’,” Journal of Democracy 11:4 (2000): 37-57. 16

Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 4. 17

Neither would lend much to comparative analysis. The majority of Albanians are nominally Muslim, but

Albania was officially an atheist country under communism and religious belief among Albanians is low. Islam

is not a central factor in the country’s politics. Gambia, the smallest country in Africa and surrounded by

Senegal, was nominally democratic after gaining independence, but it was dominated by one party, which

pursued more a pan-Africanist than Islamic-oriented agenda. Islam in general did not play a significant role in its

politics. 18

The 2012 coup in Mali ended over twenty years of democratic government. Mali had competitive presidential

elections in 2013 and power was handed over to an elected government, creating hope that it may, despite

significant problems in the north of the country, be able to quickly re-establish democracy. 19

While all of these cases are “democratic” for some period of time, they are also undemocratic at times,

providing further differentiation. The larger study from which this paper derives also includes Iran as a counter-

example. 20

These concepts are discussed, inter alia, in Esposito and Voll, Islam and Democracy; El Fadl, Islam and the

Challenge, and in numerous contributions to M. A. Muqtedar Khan, ed. Islamic Democratic Discourse: Theory,

Debates, and Philosophical Perspectives (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006). 21

The most significant scholarly monographs or edited volumes for the countries under review include Robert

Hefner, Civil Islam: Muslims and Democratization in Indonesia (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000);

Seyyed Vali Reza Nasr, Islamic Leviathan: Islam and the Making of State Power (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2001); M. Hakan Yavuz, Islamic Political Identity in Turkey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003);

Joseph Chinyong Liow, Piety and Politics: Islamism in Contemporary Malaysia (Oxford: Oxford University

Press, 2009); Banu Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2010); and Mamadou Diouf, ed. Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis in Senegal (New York: Columbia

University Press, 2013).

22 M. Hakan Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus,” Journal of

Muslim Minority Affairs 24:2 (2004): 213-232. 23

For a perspective rooted in “deep history,” see Chaney, “Democratic Change,” 2012. For a perspective that

ties a singular version of Islam to modernity and state power, see Ernest Gellner, Muslim Society (Cambridge:

Cambridge University Press, 1983). 24

Brian Peterson, “Mali ‘Islamisation’ Tackled: The Other Ansar Dine, Popular Islam, and Religious

Tolerance,” African Arguments, 25 April 2012, available at http://tinyurl.com/nzp6dcj

20

25

Alfred Stepan, “Rituals of Respect: Sufis and Secularists in Senegal in Comparative Perspective.”

Comparative Politics 44:4 (2012): 379-401. 26

Yavuz, “Is There a Turkish Islam?”, p. 218. 27

Both are discussed in John Esposito and John Voll, Makers of Contemporary Islam (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 2001). See also Mujiburrahman, “Islam and Politics in Indonesia: The Political Thought of

Abdurrahman Wahid,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 10:3 (1999): 339-352, and Anwar Ibrahim,

“Universal Values and Muslim Democracy,” Journal of Democracy 17:3 (2006): 5-12. 28

Mamadou Diouf, “Introduction: The Public Role of ‘Good Islam’: Sufi Islam and the Administration of

Pluralism,” in Diouf, ed. Tolerance, Democracy, and Sufis. 29

Vedi Hadiz and Khoo Book Teik, “Approaching Islam and Politics From Political Economy: A Comparative

Study of Indonesia and Malaysia,” The Pacific Review, 24:4 (2011): 463-485. See also Nasr, Islamic Leviathan,

and Julian Lee, Islamization and Activism in Malaysia (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2010). 30

For Malaysia, see Lee, Islamization and Activism. Since the early 2000s, Aceh has been allowed to implement

shari’a, which has led to a host of restrictions on activity and creation of a “shari’a police.” See Human Rights

Watch, “Policing Morality: Abuses in the Application of Sharia in Aceh Indonesia,” December 2010, available

at http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2010/12/01/policing-morality-0. 31

See, for example, Abdullah Ahmed An-Na’im, Islam and the Secular State (Cambridge MA: Harvard

University Press, 2008), and Tibi, Islam and Islamism. 32

Stepan, “Religion, Democracy, and the ‘Twin Tolerations’.” 33

For more on different types of secularism, see Ahmet Kuru, Secularism and State Policies Toward Religion:

The United States, France, and Turkey (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009). 34

Benjamin Soares, “The Attempt to Reform Family Law in Mali.” Die Welt des Islams 49 (2009): 398-428 35

Some groups do campaign for this, sometimes using cloaked language to avoid sanctions, but they have not

won substantial support. 36

Donal Cruise O’Brien, Symbolic Confrontations: Muslims Imagining the State in Africa (London: Hurst), p.

63. 37

Nasr, Islamic Leviathan. 38

For a review of this theory and several works that employ it, see Jillian Schwedler, “Can Islamists Become

Moderates? Rethinking the Inclusion-Moderation Hypothesis,” World Politics 63:2 (April 2011): 347-376. 39

Roman Loimeier, “The Secular State and Islam in Senegal,” in David Westerlund, ed. Questioning the Secular

State: The Worldwide Resurgence of Religion in Politics (New York: St. Martin’s, 1996), p. 195. 40

Julia Leininger, “The Diverse Role of Muslim Actors in Mali’s Democratic Consolidation: Fostering

Plurality to Inhibiting Strong State Institutions,” Paper prepared for the Workshop on Religious Actors in

Democratization Processes: Evidence from the Five Muslim Democracies, Princeton University, 2010, available

at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1780470 41

See Gamze Cavdar, “Islamist New Thinking in Turkey: A Model of Political Learning,” Political Science

Quarterly 121:3 (2006): 477-497, and various contributions in M. Hakan Yavuz, ed. The Emergence of a New

Turkey: Democracy and the AK Parti (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 2006). 42

Hefner, Civil Islam. 43

Liow, Piety and Politics, and Liow, “Islamist Ambitions, Political Change, and the Price of Power: Recent

Success and Challenge for the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, PAS,” Journal of Islamic Studies 22: 3 (2011): 374-

403. 44

The classic source on the risks of mobilization in a system with weak institutions is Samuel Huntington,

Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 45

Arend Lijphart, the scholar most associated with the idea of consociationalism, upheld pre-1969 Malaysia as a

relative success, but later suggested that the country was no longer democratic due to “limitation of freedom of

expression and the interesting political and economic discrimination in favor of the [ethnic] Malays.” See

Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977),

p. 153. 46

Greg Barton, “Islam and Democratic Transition in Indonesia,” in Deborah Brown and T.J. Chen, eds.

Religious Organizations and Democracy in Contemporary Asia (Armonk NY: M.E. Sharpe, 2006). 47

For a basic primer on Abduh, see Yvonne Haddad, “Muhammad Abduh: Pioneer of Islamic Reform,” in Ali

Rahnema, ed. Pioneers of Islamic Revival (London: Zed Books, 2005). 48

This would include figures such as Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966) in the MB and contemporary Salafi groups,

although his connection with the latter is much more dubious. See Henri Lauziere, “The Construction of

Salafiyya: Reconsidering Salafism from the Perspective of Conceptual History,” International Journal of Middle

Eastern Studies 42:3 (2010): 369-389. 49

Vincent Cornell, “Muhammad Abduh: A Sufi-inspired Modernist,” in David Marshall, ed. Traditional and

Modernity: Christian and Muslim Perspectives (Washington: Georgetown University Press, 2013), p. 108.

21

50

Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988). Al-Raziq, wrote in 1925

that Islam did not prescribe any particular form of government. Rida (among others) criticized this view, and Al-

Raziq lost his position at al-Azhar. 51

See Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: Civil Society vs. the State (Boulder

CO: Lynne Rienner, 1999), pp. 10-11. 52

Meir Hatina, Identity Politics in the Middle East: Liberal Thought and Islamic Challenge in Egypt (London:

IB Tauris, 2007). 53

Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 174, 178. 54

Charles Kurzman, “Introduction: Liberal Islam and Its Context,” in Kurzman, ed. Liberal Islam (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 12. 55

Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism, and Human Rights (London: IB Tauris, 2007), pp. 155-160. 56

Stefano Maria Torelli, “The ‘AKP Model’ and Tunisia’s al-Nahda: From Convergence to Competition?”

Insight Turkey 14(3) 2012: 65-83. 57

Mohamed El-Tahir El-Mesawi, “Muslim Reformist Action in Nineteenth-Century Tunisia,” The American

Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 20:2 (2008): 58

For more on Islam in Tunisia, see Mohamed Elhachmi Hamdi, The Politicization of Islam: A Case-Study of

Tunisia (Boulder CO: Westview, 1998). 59

Tamir Moustafa, “Conflict and Cooperation Between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary

Egypt,” International Journal of Middle East Studies 32:1 (2000): 9. 60

This is well captured in Sullivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, 1999 and Bayat, Making

Islam Democratic. 61

Carrie Rosefsky Wickham, “Beyond Democratization: Political Change in the Arab World,” PS, September

1994, p. 508. 62

Hazem Kandil, “Sisi’s Turn,” London Review of Books 36(4), February 20, 2014: 17-19. 63

Esposito and Voll, “Makers of Contemporary Islam,” p. 92. 64

Wickham, Mobilizing Islam, pp. 211-212. 65

Quoted in Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 167. 66

Hamdi, “The Politicization,” p. 126. 67

Quoted in Torelli, “The ‘AKP Model’,” p. 76. 68

Wickham, Mobilizing Islam. 69

Quoted in. Esposito and Voll, “Makers of Contemporary Islam,” , p. 114. 70

Rachid Ghannouchi, “The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic Government,” in John Donohue and

John Esposito, eds. Islam in Transition: Muslim Perspectives 2nd

edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press,

2007), pp. 271-278. 71

Rikke Haugbølle, and Francesco Cavatorta, “Will the Real Tunisian Opposition Please Stand Up? Opposition

Coordination Failures under Authoritarian Constraints,” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2011):

323-341. 72

See Torelli, “The ‘AKP Model’,” Oguzhan Göksel, “Perceptions of the Turkish Model in Post-Revolutionary

Tunisia,” Turkish Studies, forthcoming, and Mark Lynch, “Rached Ghannouchi: the FP Interview,” Foreign

Policy, December 5, 2011. 73

Azzam Tamimi, Rachid Ghannouchi: A Democrat within Islamism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).

Doubts about Ennadha’s intentions from various Tunisian actors are discussed in Göksel, “Perceptions.” 74

Wickham, Mobilizing Religion, p. xi. 75

Bayat, Making Islam Democratic, p. 177. 76

Sebnem Gumuscu, “Class, Status, and Party: The Changing Face of Political Islam in Turkey and Egypt.”

Comparative Political Studies 43:7 (2010): 835-861. 77

Kamran Bokhari and Farid Senzai, Political Islam in the Age of Democratization (New York: Palgrave 2013). 78

Both states had elections, but opposition parties were restricted and limits on freedom of expression and use of

emergency laws and security police (mukhabarat) disqualify them as democratic. 79

For more on these factors, see Landolt and Kubicek, “Constraints and Opportunities.”