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Obama's War and Anthropology: Ethical Issues and Militarizing AnthropologyMountcastle, Amy;Armstrong, JamesSocial Justice; 2010/2011; 37, 2/3; ProQuestpg. 160

Obama's War and Anthropology: Ethical Issues and Militarizing Anthropology

Amy Mountcastle and James Armstrong·

Introduction

THE QUESTION OF WHETHER ANTHROPOLOGISTS SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT BRING THEIR

expertise and anthropological knowledge to the service of the war in Afghanistan, or any war for that matter, has touched a nerve and raises ethical,

political, and ideological questions that are likely to beset the discipline for some time to come. Anthropologists have been debating and discussing this question in public forums for the past several years, but since around 2007, when the military began to actively recruit anthropologists to participate in the Human Terrain System (HTS), the urgency of the question has heightened. The HTS is part of the new war doctrine that places priority on cultural knowledge in the prosecution of counterinsurgency warfare. As part of five-person Human Terrain Teams (HIT), anthropologists and other social scientists, "embedded" in combat units, go out and, through observation and interviewing of villagers, assess the "human terrain" and report the information they have gleaned to military commanders. HIT members face the same dangers as any military personnel would. Three civilian social scientists have died in the line of duty so far. Michael Bhatia, a doctoral candidate in politics and international relations at Oxford University and a published author assigned to Afghanistan HIT AF1, died in May 2008 when the vehicle he was traveling in hit a roadside bomb. Nicole Suveges, a doctoral candidate in political science at Johns Hopkins University and a member of the Iraq HIT IZ3, was killed June 24,2008, while attending a meeting in Sadr City, Iraq. The third was Paula Loyd, a Wellesley college graduate in anthropology who died in January 2009 from bums received after an Afghan villager doused her with gas and set her on fire in November 2008. Immodesty is sometimes punished in this way in Afghanistan. The Taliban took credit for the deaths of Bhatia and Loyd. I

* AMY MOUNTCASTLE is Associate Professor at SUNY Plattsburgh. She teaches courses in cultural anthropology and is pursuing research in the areas of identity and human rights. Her field research took place among Tibetan refugee populations and in Croatia. JAMES ARMSTRONG is Distinguished Teaching Professor of Anthropology and Director of the Honor Center at SUNY Plattsburgh (e-mail: [email protected]). He teaches courses in cultural anthropology with a research and teaching focus on Israeli culture and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

160 Social Justice Vol. 37, Nos. 2-3 (2010-2011)


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In this article, we explore the debate and attempt to untangle or tease out some of the concerns that have been raised and offer additional insights, or at least food for thought, as American anthropologists and other social scientists grapple with this issue. It is probably one of the most significant debates in anthropology of the decade.

Some Questions

As the debate unfolds, multiple issues are becoming apparent.2 Chief among them is that the move to increase the involvement of anthropologists in America's current wars reverses over40 years of collecti ve "soul-searching" over the historical role of anthropology, first as the "handmaiden of colonialism" and later in service of two world wars, the Vietnam War, and covert CIA operations around the world. The formal delinking of anthropology from the military occurred during the tumultuous Vietnam War period, when the American Anthropological Association adopted a code of ethics that outlined the basic rules by which anthropological research is to be conducted. Research should be open and transparent, individuals must be able to freely opt out of being researched if they want to, and anthropologists are accountable to their research communities and must assure that no harm comes to them because of the research, directly or indirectly. The Commission on the Engagement of Anthropology with the U.S. Security and Intelligence Communities (CEAUSSIC) reiterated these principles in its report on the problems associated with the current involvement of anthropology with the military in Mghanistan and Iraq.

The wars in Iraq and Mghanistan have raised the stakes on anthropological ethics. Is all engagement with the military problematic? How are we to judge what roles are or are not appropriate? What roles, if any, should anthropologists play in furthering military objectives, or more broadly, the strategic objectives of the state? Do we treat the state and its agents as a monolithic entity and do we assume that individuals within that structure have no independent agency? These questions touch upon ideological and political orientations that are often quite personal, such as one's stance on war, the military, and issues of patriotism and nationalism.

In his Anthropologists in Arms: The Ethics of Military Anthropology, George R. Lucas, Jr., addresses many of these issues. He makes a useful distinction between anthropology of the military and anthropology in the military. For Lucas, "security anthropology" or "military anthropology" is a collection of distinct activities, including the controversial role of anthropologists embedded in military units in the field within the U.S. Army's "Human Terrain Systems" project. Military anthropology also includes anthropologists who serve as advisors on cultural aspects of the populations affected by military operations. The aim is to craft more effective strategies and tactics. Military anthropologists also conduct cultural sensitivity training with military personnel, consult with war planners, and engage in postwar "peace"-building operations. Lucas terms these activities "anthropology for the military." Military anthropology also includes ethnographic


162 AMY MOUNTCASTLE AND JAMES ARMSTRONG

research on the military itself, or anthropology of the military (Lucas, 2009: 85-89). Many anthropologists are uncomfortable with some or all of the roles that involve anthropology for the military. Those who do not distinguish between "of and for" may find all anthropological engagement with the military problematic. For us, the anthropological study of the military is no more morally objectionable than most other academic anthropology.

Questions of patriotism and nationalism implicate the global geopolitical structure of nation-states, where states are privileged over sub-state, often politically marginalized groups- the kinds of groups that U.S. anthropologists typically study. Many anthropologists prefer to think in terms of global citizenship rather than national citizenship, identifying with humanity as a whole, rather than with the constructed polities outlined by national borders. Serving a national military is in some ways contrary to our understanding of the constructed nature of national borders. Moreover, how are we to reconcile working for, or within, the deep power structures that target the very groups whose struggles we, as academic anthropologists, often find ourselves defending?

With respect to championing the causes of our research communities, the question of advocacy, activism, and engagement comprises a third prong in the unfolding debate. In recent years, anthropologists have been collectively thinking about how our work can be made more public, how to use anthropological knowledge and understanding to affect policy, and to bring about positive changes that will benefit the people we have come to know. One of the ironies of the present debate on anthropology and the military is that it presents an opportunity to influence policy in a potentially significant way: anthropologists can "make a difference" in matters of life and death. That is the implied and explicit promise the directors of the Human Terrain System initiative make. For many anthropologists, however, assisting in the prosecution of warfare is not what they have in mind when they think about the impact anthropology can have.

Is anthropology done for the military substantially different from doing it for other less noble causes, such as selling products that are at best unnecessary and at worst harmful? Some of us photocopy news stories and highlight the successes of anthropology graduates who are "using" anthropology in their everyday work lives. Some students go into education, law, union organizing, and public health, while others apply their skills as telemarketers or ethnographers who help businesses persuade whimsical teenagers that they need the next "cool" product. Is providing data to the military substantially worse than providing data to the state so that it can "develop" a tourist industry that will probably contribute to the slow death of the cultural life of indigenous and native peoples? Isn't the potential for misusing anthropological knowledge always present, be it by government agencies, corporations, or other scholars?

Beyond the ideological, political, and ethical aspects of the debate is the practical question of employment. Graduating with a bachelor's or an advanced


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degree in anthropology does not segue easily (or as easily as some other degrees) into meaningful employment. The lure to heavily indebted new graduates of working directly or under contract to the military is strong. There are promises of career-building opportunities, skills acquisition, and "making a difference." Besides the Human Terrain System, the Department of Defense funds the Minerva Project, which, according to one critic, entails analyzing documents seized during the U.S. invasion of Iraq and researching the links between Islam and violence, among other initiatives viewed as strategically important to the United States (el Gusterson, 2007; 2009a). Such wooing of anthropologists may be flattering, but until now these opportunities have been unavailable to young scholars, graduates, and even seasoned anthropologists. Should anthropology graduates pass up these opportunities and sacrifice the development of their careers over a potential ethical dilemma? The need for employment and the chance to put anthropological training and knowledge into practice was, at least in part, the reason one anthropologist brought her ideas to the military and security establishment and set the course for the creation of Human Terrain Teams.

Out of a Cocktail Napkin Is Born .••

One of the main champions of the idea of using anthropological expertise in military campaigns is Montgomery McFate, who earned a Ph.D. in anthropology from Yale and a law degree from Harvard. McFate found her calling neither in academic anthropology nor in law. After completing her J.D., she did not find her niche in a number of substantial positions, including a "clinical internship on the United States Attorney's Office Organized Crime and Drug Enforcement Task Squad, a fellowship at Human Rights Watch, and experience as a litigation associate at the law firm of Baker & McKenzie in San Francisco, CA." Sometime after September 11, she sat in a bar one night reflecting on her life as an "unemployed, overeducated Army wife." On a cocktail napkin,3 she jotted a note: "How do I make anthropology relevant to the military?"4

Several years later, the answer appeared in the March-April 2005 edition of Military Review. In the article, McFate tells how American military leaders have come to see the importance of cultural knowledge in the prosecution of insurgencybased wars. In wars in which culturally similar adversaries match up against one another with technology, she argues, culture does not matter. "In a counterinsurgency operation against a non-Western adversary," however, "culture matters" (McFate, 2005: 24). Our present military leaders have learned these lessons from theirexperiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Using historical and contemporary examples, she attempts to show how cultural misunderstandings and a lack of cultural knowledge have degraded the effectiveness of soldiers in the field. The piece, which is obviously directed at the military community, is mildly critical of the national security establishment. An understanding of the role of culture and cultural knowledge has been lacking in the "national-security enterprise" because the training of defense



personnel excludes it; moreover, the military hierarchy, suffering from its loss in Vietnam, had chosen to "put their heads in the sand" and prefers conventional wars that call for overwhelming force (p. 26). McFate next outlines the current state of anthropology as a discipline and offers a rough history of anthropology's association with the military, from the colonial era to the present. Despite the superficiality of her analysis of the uses and misuses of anthropological research and cultural knowledge, it is reasonably clear why anthropologists might wish to avoid having their expertise co-opted by the military establishment. She then refers to the American Anthropological Association's guidelines on professional ethics, stating that "these guidelines reflect a widespread view among anthropologists that any research undertaken for the military is de facto evil and ethically unacceptable" (p. 37).

McFate then shifts her attention to anthropologists, arguing that they should, in the interest of the state, sideline their ethical code and pull themselves out of the "mire of postmodernism" to provide the military with accurate knowledge. Because cultural knowledge is essential to successful counterinsurgency operations, it is important for the military to receive accurate knowledge that only professional anthropologists have, or can obtain. If the military is not to resort to inferior sources and incomplete knowledge, anthropologists will have to step up to the plate. McFate thus concludes with a call to arms for anthropologists: "And, unfortunately, anthropologists, whose assistance is urgently needed in a time of war, entirely neglect U.S. forces. Despite the fact that military applications of cultural knowledge might be distasteful to ethically inclined anthropologists, their assistance is necessary" (p. 37).

McFate's reading of anthropological history is unusual, to say the least. Some argue that it is revisionist (Sluka, 2010). It is easy to see why. "Once called 'the handmaiden of colonialism,'" she argues, "anthropology has had a long, fruitful relationship with various elements of national power, which ended suddenly following the Vietnam War" (p. 24). She next characterizes anthropology as "a warfighting discipline" that lost its edge and will in the aftermath of the Vietnam War. For most anthropologists, being the handmaiden of colonialism is not a "fruitful" relationship. Rather, it is something to be scrutinized and critiqued, with lessons learned and amends made. These lines suggest that McFate intends to tum 60 years of post-World War II anthropology on its head. She emerges as the handmaiden of the military's counterinsurgency (or COIN) campaign and the darling of the popular press. Touted as number five in Wired Magazine's "2008 Smart List of the 15 people that the next president should listen to" (Shachtman, 2008a) and one of The Atlantic's "Brave Thinkers of 2009,"5 McFate has been featured in major newspapers, popular magazines, and on radio and television.6 She was instrumental in the formation of the Human Terrain System, for which an active recruitment campaign for anthropologists and other social scientists was initiated in 2006. She also co-authored the recent and controversial (among academics, at


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least) U.s. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Field Manual, which was released in December 2006 and published in trade form in 2007 by the University of Chicago Press.7

Perhaps McFate cannot be faulted for the fortuitous coincidence between her career reflections and the emergence of the new counterinsurgency doctrine. Nor can one fault her entrepreneurship in leveraging her skills and knowledge. However, McFate's uncritical acceptance of military imperatives and her unabashed embrace of the language of statist power and nationalism places her at odds with the liberal anthropological canon. It comes as no surprise that the response to this initiative to militarize anthropology has been swift and resolute. In October 2007, the Executive Board of the American Anthropological Association (AAA) issued a statement that disapproved of the participation of anthropologists in the Human Terrain System program because of its inherent ethical problems. Yet opinions from within the ranks of the AAA are not singular and monolithic. The open discussions during meetings and in places such as the AAA blog spot hosted by CEAUSSIC (formed by the AAA Executive Board in 2005) make clear that anthropologists see the dilemmas and questions surrounding these issues. In November 2007, the commission issued a final report. But its mandate was extended and the commission continues to debate the complex ethical and political questions related to doing anthropology for the military.8

Some Concerns

The extent to which working for the military poses an ethical dilemma varies from person to person. For McFate, no such dilemma apparently exists. The nation, national citizenship, and U.S. security issues trump the security and safety of research subjects and concerns for social justice. For her, serving the needs of the military in the "global war on terrorism" is one's patriotic duty. For others, such as members of the Network of Concerned Anthropologists, duty to country does not present a dilemma; duty lies in protecting the safety and integrity of those whose trust has allowed anthropologists to practice their trade. Most anthropologists are loathe to conduct research where informed consent is not likely to occur, where research will be conducted clandestinely, or where the basic tenet of doing no harm is likely to be forsaken or impossible to fulfill (Gonzalez, 2009; Gusterson, 2003, 2009b; Price, 1998,2002; Gonzalez et aI., 2009). That would be counter to the imperatives of ethical research and moral behavior, particularly when, as many believe, it would support a questionable foreign policy reminiscent of colonial and imperial occupations of the past.

For some , however, there are shades of gray and a true dilemma.Anthropologists can have a sense of duty and loyalty to country and nation, but nevertheless find it untenable to compromise (or potentially compromise) their research communities, or vice versa. Furthermore, the dichotomy between national or research community interests can hide other equally important dimensions of the issue. The dilemma



may lie elsewhere. One may be reluctant to aid the military establishment, fear that anthropological knowledge might be misused, seek to educate, reduce suffering or the potential for suffering,counter ethnocentrism or a sense of otherness, or promote a sense of global citizenship. One might lay aside personal convictions and misgivings in the hope that serving the military as an anthropologist could contribute to a more enlightened institution or serve the greater good (or the potential for it). These dilemmas open up to the terrain of motives. It is no more possible to separate the ethical and political dimensions of the issue (Price, 2009a) than it is to consider ethics apart from motives and motives from action. The motives alluded to range from a sense of duty to nation and patriotism to the wish to help by reducing the likelihood of more lives being lost (out of cultural ignorance), or simply seeking employment or career advancement. Career advancement and the wish to serve the greater good cannot be equally weighted, although most people probably have multiple motives for deciding to work for the military.

Another concern is the erosion of trust between ethnographic researchers and the populations they study. Anthropology for the military, especially at the operationallevel, will make it even more difficult to gain that trust. Mter decades of distancing ourselves from the arms of covert state power, anthropologists do not want to lose the ground that has been gained. The protection of our research territories (making them off-limits to one type of researcher so that our own access is more secure) is a concern, of course, but it is not in itself a reason to disallow someone from serving as an anthropologist in the military. Mter all, trust in research communities is always earned; it is never assured and it is not necessarily evenly distributed across a community. Whether we are distrusted as government spies or simply as nosey, annoying, prying strangers, we are not assured of gaining access. However, being suspected of being a spy can make our work much more difficult and possibly dangerous. The same would be true if anthropology were to develop the reputation of being in cahoots with the U.S. security apparatus.

Given the structure of the military and the national security state, can even well-intentioned military personnel be trusted? This thread runs through a set of essays published in 2009 by the Network of Concerned Anthropologists. Some authors believe that the dangers of anthropological knowledge being misused and misappropriated are too great. Close reading and examination of the language used in military documents and by military personnel substantiates this risk and belies the "human face" that anthropologizing the military gives to war operations (Vine, 2007).

The present "war on terror" poses particular dangers to the native, indigenous, and minority populations that anthropologists typically work with. They frequently fall outside a state's structure of power and may also stand in opposition to it. Thus, they would be prime targets for counterinsurgency or anti-terror operations. "There is a present danger," wrote David Price (2002), "ofthe wholesale categorization of people who resist domination as 'terrorist' - thereby sidestepping all the issues that


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an in-depth cultural and historical analysis would raise .... There are contentious battles for power that will rapidly become even more lopsided if the currently illdefined anti-terrorism campaign continues." Anthropologists must avoid becoming unwitting collaborators in the subjugation of the people whose lives they have come to learn about, understand, and respect. An ethical firewall does not protect anthropologists who proffer advice without direct contact with native populations while working at headquarters. Once advice is given, the anthropologist loses control over how it is used. As military personnel or as a contracting consultant, anthropologists in these contexts cannot serve two masters. The legacies of the colonial period, the two world wars, Vietnam, etc., provide sufficient reason for anthropologists to tread carefully -or, for some, not at all- where the U.S. military would lead us. Price points to the complexities of the issue and to the decision individual anthropologists must make: "The ethical issues embroiled in the commingling of anthropology and warfare are both simple and complex. Simple, in that anthropologists' primary ethical duty must be to protect and serve those studied; and complex because when the drums of nationalism call, anthropologists at times find themselves conflicted (or compromised) between their duties to country, and to the culture which hosted them and their research" (2002: 4).

The Softer Side, or Why Not Sign up for Obama's War?

The well-publicized fact that President Obama's mother was a cultural anthropologist who spent the better part of her career in rural Indonesia lends a poetic symmetry to the idea of anthropologists drawing close to the Obama administration. The president's intellectual approach to the issues, both foreign and domestic, is a welcome contrast for many academics to the rough-riding, gun-slinging approach toward foreign policy that characterized George W. Bush's presidency. Might Obama's war, then, be a kinder, gentler, more culturally sensitive war? Not likely, say anthropologists (e.g., Gonzalez, 2009). What stories do the military tell?

In Kandahar, Mghanistan, reconstruction efforts overshadow military action and even the language of war has changed. "The very word 'offensive' has been banished," New York TImes reporter Rod Nordland (2010) writes with reference to the new strategy. The original Kandahar offensive was renamed to Operation Hamkari, allegedly because it implies "cooperation" (Ibid.). Civilian operations in and around Kandahar were increased. Reconstruction teams from the U.S. Agency for International Development were deployed and the number of civilian personnel in the area increased from eight to 110 Americans. Nordland quotes a senior official from the U.S. Embassy as saying, "the government at the most basic level, the district level, is able to provide some services so that people who are sitting on the fence are able to say, well, the government has something to offer" (Ibid.).

On the ground, operations in Kandahar follow the Petraeus Doctrine, which is spelled out in the new counterinsurgency (COIN) manual. The summary of Chapter One states:



COIN is an extremely complex form of warfare. At its core, COIN is a struggle for the population's support. The protection, welfare, and support of the people are vital to success. Gaining and maintaining that support is a formidable challenge. Achieving these aims requires synchronizing the efforts of many nonmilitary and HN [host nation] agencies in a comprehensive approach (Petraeus and Amos, 2006).

A recent article in the Small Wars Journal (Gaydon and Pan, 2010) gives an account of the close relationship that developed between a mujahedeen commander, Haji Abdul Jabar, and Americans stationed in the village, including the writers, and Captain Jon Burton, the civil-military officer of the 1st Battalion, 17th Infantry Regiment, who was rotated out of Arghandab in December 2009. Jabar was instrumental in rallying village elders to work with U.S. civilians to solve everyday problems, develop jobs, and improve agricultural production. Burton came to be viewed as family during his tour there. Family is a metaphor that crops up several times in the article. "As we formed a bond with Jabar, our relationship evolved beyond being just partners; we were now family," state the authors.

According to the authors, Jabar, who died after his vehicle struck an lED (improvised explosive device) on June 15,2010, told a local newspaper that "security problems are now solved in Arghandab ... ten thousand jobless people are given job opportunities by US AID ." As Arghandab became the model for counterinsurgency operations in southern Afghanistan, Jabar hosted ambassadors, congressional delegates, and generals almost daily to give them a glimpse of what proper projects looked like. "We must remember," the authors say, "thatJabar was assassinated and Nangahan was attacked because stabilization was working in Arghandab. While we grieve for our Afghan friends, we must strive to continue the momentum of progress in Arghandab and Kandahar .... Haji Abdul Jabar will not only be mourned by his people but by all of us, who consider him a father, a brother, a friend, and a fellow warrior."

Gaydon and Pan cite Three Cups a/Tea, Greg Mortenson's bestseller, in their title and in the article. Like Mortenson, their "relationship with Jabar was forged over chai (tea) during the late summer and fall of 2009." Mortenson is likely also the source for the family metaphor used by those working in cooperative development operations with local popUlations as part of COIN. The title derives from a proverb, "The first time you share tea with a Balti, you are a stranger. The second time you take tea, you are an honored guest. The third time you share a cup of tea, you become family .... "

Mortenson, the celebrated former rock-climber turned school-builder,9 is an excellent example of how to distinguish between working/or rather than with the military. His book, coauthored with David Relin, documents his efforts to build schools for girls in rural Pakistan and Afghanistan. He had been working there for about seven years when the September 11 attacks on the U.S. occurred. His intimate


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knowledge of the geographic landscape and the "human terrain" -the villagers and local leaders who closely collaborated with him on school-building projects sponsored by his Central Asian Institute-caught the attention of the military.

After briefing a Pentagon audience sometime in 2002,10 Mortenson was approached by a military man who asked him if he could "draw us a map of all the Wahhabi madrassas ."These Saudi-funded extremist training schools were cropping up all over the hillsides in Afghanistan and Pakistan .In the conversation that ensued, Mortenson responded, "Not if I want to live." The officer pressed on: "Could you put up a school next to each of the madrassas?" "Sort of like a Starbucks? To drive the jihadis out of business?" "I'm serious," Mortenson countered, but the officer then said, "We can get you the money. How about $2.2 million? How many schools could you build with that?" Mortenson replied, "About one hundred."

"Isn't that what you want?" the officer asked. "People there would find out the money came from the military and I'd be out of business," Mortenson replied. "Not a problem," said the officer. "We could make it look like a private donation from a businessman in Hong Kong."

Mortenson, then running on a shoestring budget, gave the idea some thought, but knew from the outset that he could not accept. "I realized my credibility in that part of the world depended on me not being associated with the American government, especially its military."l1

Earlier, Mortenson had gone to the American diplomatic mission in Kathmandu, Nepal, to secure a passport to replace the one disfigured at an Afghan border crossing.At the mission, he was interrogated-in fact, pumped for information. At one point, he was asked to write down the names and phone numbers of his contacts in Pakistan. Mortenson refused and asked to call his attorney.

I wasn't trying to be difficult. These guys had a serious job to do, especially after 9/11 .... But I also knew what could happen to innocent people who got put on that kind of list. And if these guys were who I think they were, I couldn't afford to have anyone in Pakisan think I was working with them, or the next time I went there I'd be a dead man (Mortenson and Relin, 2006: 272).

It is widely known that Mortenson's book, Three Cups o/Tea, became mandatory reading for military personnel being sent to Afghanistan. Mortenson is a strong proponent of putting a human face on the war there. On numerous occasions, he has arranged face-to-face time between military commanders, including the recently fired General Stanley McChrystal, and Afghan village leaders. The role of U.S. commanders in such situations was to listen to what Afghans have to say. Mortenson's rationale, in part, stems from a belief that the war cannot be won militarily. Mostly, it derives from his dedication to the people ofthe boney hills of Afghanistan and Pakistan. He is not naIve: doing good works for Afghans is not compatible with doing good works forthe military. The military's mission and that



of the Central Asian Institute are not the same. Mortenson recognizes that even a loose association with the military compromises his humanitarian efforts. Duty to his mission - improving the Ii ves of people in Afghanistan and Pakistan - cannot be confused and conftated with the military's security mission. Anthropologists should take note.

Price, quoted earlier, recognizes how complicated the ethical issues become when trying to balance duty to discipline and duty to country. The question of where duty lies is central and must be answered on an individual basis. A soldier's duty clearly lies with the oath taken in service of country. The Oath of Enlistment is a swearing or affirmation to defend the U.S. Constitution "against all enemies, foreign and domestic." It requires that the enlistee obey the orders of the president of the United States and the officers appointed over him or her.12 This supersedes any other discipline-based ethical codes. The uniform negates the identity of an "anthropologist." She may, however, use her anthropology training to execute her job as a soldier, should her assignment so demand. Her previous training in anthropology and anthropological ethics should assist her in determining the ethical risk posed by offering her expertise and knowledge to the military.

Unlike someone who has enlisted in the military, allegiance and accountability are less clear for contracted services. Most anthropologists and other social scientists came to work for Human Terrain Teams in that way. Sometime in 2009, the U.S. military apparently took over the program of hiring and training Team members. Perhaps anthropologists can avoid this sticky ethical terrain by contracting their services through a corporation. Still, contracting raises several issues and does not even remotely disassociate the anthropologist from the military or from ethical considerations. What is the chain of command for contracted personnel or civilians in the military? Does one's contract oblige one to divulge all information, even if the HIT member has concerns about the safety of her informants? Can we pick and choose which information we will turn over or keep to ourselves? Do our contracts allow that? Even if one technically has the freedom to withhold information, can one do so in a combat situation, or in the face of peer pressure or possible reprobation? Withstanding such pressures would be quite difficult, especially if one wants to be viewed as a good team player. Moreover, soldiers do not take kindly to a team member whom they perceive to be withholding information vital to their safety and success.

Thus, to simultaneously wear a military uniform and the identity of an anthropologist is to mix incompatible roles. If duty calls one to uniform, one must shed the mantle of "anthropologist," for the anthropologist must defend the interests of the people who allow us to conduct research on them.

Mortenson's handling of the situation at the U.S. Embassy in Kathmandu reveals appropriate lessons for anthropologists. Cooperating with the embassy or the military by sharing useful '~intelligence" would have jeopardized his mission of building schools in remote areas of Afghanistan and Pakistan, as well as his


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own safety. In short, involvement in or for the military potentially jeopardizes the mission of helping people and the safety of anthropologists, present and future. Mortenson works with the military,13 which has its hazards, since it strains his credibility with the Mghans and Pakistanis he works with, as well as with funders who contribute money to his organizations. Yet Mortenson works with the military on his own terms. He maintains his sights on his school-building mission, especially for girl children in remote areas.

Mortenson exchanges e-mails with the former commander in Mghanistan, General Stanley A. McChrystal. He broke red several meetings between McChrystal and the Mghan village leaders, or shuras, he has come to know over the last 16 years. Next he met with General Petraeus when he took command in Mghanistan, and he will surely meet the new appointee when Petraeus takes the helm at the CIA. High-ranking military officers and their wives have read his Three Cups of Tea. The list includes Petraeus, McChrystal, Colonel Christopher D. Kolenda, who in 2007 served as a lieutenant colonel on the Pakistan border, and Admiral Mike Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. When Petraeus read the book, he sent Mortenson an e-mail message with three bulleted ideas that he had gleaned from its pages: "Build relationships, listen more, and have more humility and respect."14

Mortenson, who referred to the U.S. military as "laptop warriors" after his encounter with the Pentagon in 2002, has been surprised that contemporary generals seem to be paying attention to cultural issues, are listening more, and are interested in building relationships. These must be viewed as positive influences attributable to humanitarians like Mortenson, and perhaps the social or human sciences, in an otherwise dismally protracted war.15 Optimism overthe current winning-the-heartsand-minds doctrine is not universal. In an opinion piece for the Los Angeles TImes, one scholar writes that the level of cultural misunderstanding is so profound that these efforts are doomed to fail (Dorronsoro, 2009) .16 Nevertheless, if anthropology and anthropologists can help the military take a more humanitarian approach to war, then that should happen. But what is the best way to do this? Becoming part of the military machinery is not likely the best way; it jeopardizes our independence, ability to exercise free will,objectivity, and scientific and personal integrity. Alternatively, we could ask whether wedding anthropology to the military is the most effective way of using our anthropological knowledge and skills to influence the world.

Wrapping Up, Tentatively

The "conclusion" we have arrived at l7 is that anthropologists cannot simultaneously serve the U.S. military, the interests of the discipline, and our research communities. The potential for conflicts of interest is far too great. Even a kinder, gentler military, one tamed by cultural knowledge and understanding, must by definition maintain its sights on its objectives-national security and "winning" wars. Helping people and gaining insight into their way of life and needs is a byproduct, albeit an important one, in the new war doctrine. Other avenues exist for activist



anthropologists to meaningfully contribute to society. The military is not the only way, and notthe best one. One could join various NGOs, United Nations organizations, or other peace,justice, aid, and humanitarian groups whose main purpose is service to people. Even a "patriotic" or nationalistic anthropologist can recognize that working for such groups is in the national interest, probably more so than service in or for the military. The death of three social scientists embedded in HTTs is tragic and poignant because they believed they were doing good - working for a better world, not a stronger America. That they willingly and knowingly put their lives on the line to do so does not detract from the terrible sense of loss of human potential and talent. If we choose to enter the military, let us do so with eyes wide open. In the military, we can do our patriotic duty, gain skills and knowledge, and build our careers. But the mandate to help build a better world lies elsewhere. As teaching anthropologists, educators, and professionals, we need to do more about directing students at all levels toward other avenues. For once one dons a uniform, it is disingenuous, if not outright dishonest, to identify oneself as an anthropologist first and a soldier second.

NOTES

1. The official Human Terrain System website (http;llhts.armymill) has a tab, Memoriam, from which this information comes.

2. For a succinct discussion of some of these key issues, see Hugh Gusterson 's "The U.S. Military's Quest to Weaponize Culture," Bulletin o/the Atomic Scientists (June 20, 200S).

3. The story of the fateful cocktail napkin query has been repeated in numerous articles featuring McFate, including Wired Magazine (September 22, 200S, at www.wired.com/printlpolitics/lawlmagazinell6-JOlsCmc/ate).

4. This is how Noah Shachtman (200Sa) described her in his short piece on her membership in the "2OOS Smart List."

5. The list, from November 2009, can be found at www.theatlantic.com/magazinelprintI20091 II I brave-thinkersI76921.

6. A partial listing of some of this media coverage can be found on McFate's website at http;/! montgomerymc/ate .com/press .html.

7. The press and the Field Manual have come under fire for plagiarism. Significant chunks of it were liberally "borrowed" from anthropology and sociology texts without appropriate academic attribution. See David Price (2009b).

S. See commission links athttp;llaaanet.orglcmteslcommissionsICEAUSSIClindex.cjm, including a set of blog posts, articles, and other resources.

9. We wrote this article before the controversy arose over inaccuracies in Mortenson's book. Even if the charges leveled against him prove to be true, we believe that they do not affect our arguments in this section.

10. Mary Bono Mack, a Republican congresswoman from California, heard Mortenson speak some years earlier and became one of his supporters. She brought him to Washington to present his ideas and work to members of Congress. This is how Mortenson carne to visit the Pentagon.

11. These quotations are taken from Mortenson and Relin (2006: 295).


Obama S War and Anthropology 173

12. Entries on the Oath of Enlistment and the Oath of Office can be found at About.com (hnp:// usmilitary.about .comlod/joiningthemilitary/a/oathofenlist .htm) and at Wi kipedia (http://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/ United_States_ Uniformed_Services_Oath_of_ Office).

13. Elisabeth Bumiller's (2010) New York Times article provides insight into this relationship, as do Mortenson and Relin (2006). See also NPR broadcasts of "On Point Radio," with Torn Ashbrook, at www.onpointradio.org/2009/J2/greg-mortenson-building-peace, and the blog of U.S. Catholics on helping in Afghanistan at www.uscatholic .org/blog/20lO/06/its-not-about-general-mcchystal.

14. Mortenson often cites those points in news interviews and public talks. See, for example, Laura Bly's article of January 2,2009, in USA Today at www.usatoday.comltravellnews/2009-OI-OI

three-cups-of-tea_N .htm. 15. A Christian Science Monitor article provides details on the more enlightened approach of the

U.S. military to its mission in Afghanistan. See Wilkinson (2009). 16. Gilles Dorronsoro is a visiting scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. 17. This was not at all a foregone conclusion, at least for one of the authors.

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AMY MOUNTCASTLE AND JAMES ARMSTRONG

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