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North Korean nuclear & missile experts assist mullahs’ concealment plan in dealing with IAEA inspections

Protracted presence of several North Korean nuclear & missile experts in Iran

A number of North Korean experts are currently in Tehran

September 4, 2015

The network of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) has obtained information from within the Iranian regime according to which Tehran has been working on a secret plan to deceive the IAEA’s inspectors when they visit suspect sites in Iran.

For some time, the clerical regime has been working on ways to conceal the military dimension of its nuclear projects from the IAEA.

To do so, it has sought the advice and expertise of North Korean experts by engaging in serious and continuous consultations with them.

Based on this information, a number of North Korean experts are currently based in Tehran. Their stay has continued after the July 14 agreement without any changes in their agenda, and they are working inside Iran.

While other North Korean experts come to Tehran for limited durations, this group has been based in Tehran for several months.

They have expertise in ballistic missile and nuclear work areas, particularly in the fields of warheads and missile guidance.

This specific group is a six-member team and is joined by other groups as well. The North Korean project and the section in charge of their work in Hemmat Industrial Complex (responsible for development of ballistic missiles) is designated as code 9000. This demonstrates the systematic nature of the regime’s relationship and its collaboration with North Koreans in the missile and nuclear field. It also underscores its significance as far as the regime is concerned.

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This six-man team is only one group of North Korean experts stationed in Tehran. Specifically, the team collaborates with Nouri Industries, which is concentrating on the production of ballistic missile warheads for Shahab-3 and Ghadr missiles. Both missiles can carry a nuclear payload. Nouri Industries is identified with code 8500.

Nouri Industries actively and systematically cooperates with the “Center for Research and Design of New Aerospace Technologies,” which is one of the seven sub-divisions of the "Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research" (known by its Farsi acronym SPND). Experts of SPND are in constant liaison with the Nouri Industries.

The Iranian Resistance first exposed the formation and operation of SPND in July 2011 in Washington, DC.1 The US Department of State placed SPND on its sanctions list on August 29, 2014 as an “entity that is primarily responsible for research in the field of nuclear weapons development.”2 Fakhrizadeh was placed on the UN sanctions list in 2007.3

Sections that deal with North Korean experts To facilitate their systematic and continuous presence in Tehran, the North Korean teams have a separate office building set up for them at the Hemmat complex.

The command headquarters of Hemmat Industries (codenamed 8000), in particular the officer in charge of Protocol, handles issues related to the North Korean teams.

Until recently, an officer in the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps, named Khanzadeh was in charge of the command Headquarters of Hemmat. He has now been replaced by another IRGC officer named Zarei. Officer Aligou is in charge of protocol and handles the day-to-day issues related to the North Koreans’ stay in Tehran.

Keeping the presence of the North Koreans in Tehran is top secret and only a handful of pertinent officials are aware of the situation. The North Korean experts are transported to and from work in tinted-glass vehicles and the drivers are vetted by the IRGC’s counter-intelligence.

Housing and office facilities for the North Korean teamTwo specific guesthouses are designated for the North Koreans.

An eight story guest house is located in the Imam Khomeini complex (Block 1 of Yas Alley, No. 5). The Iranian Resistance revealed this location in May 2015. The other guest house is located adjacent to the command headquarters of Hemmat site in Tolou road (off of Damavand road.)

1 Opposition: Iran consolidates nuclear bomb effort, The Associated Press, July 23, 2011;

http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/washington/2011-07-23-iran-nuclear-program_n.htm2 Additional Sanctions Imposed by the Department of State Targeting Iranian Proliferators, US Department of State, August 29, 2014, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/231159.htm;3 Security Council Toughens Sanctions Against Iran, Adds Arms Embargo, With Unanimous Adoption Of Resolution 1747 (2007), March 24, 2007, http://www.un.org/press/en/2007/sc8980.doc.htm

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North Korean team’s tasksOne of the major tasks of the North Korean teams was to advise the regime on how to conceal and sanitize potential suspect sites which the IAEA might inspect or take samples to clarify the military dimensions of the nuclear program, including work on warheads.

According to newly obtained intelligence, over the past two years the North Korean teams have been sharing their experiences and tactics necessary for preventing access to military nuclear sites. This was especially the case during three trips to Tehran by North Korean missile and nuclear directors in 2015, in which they had detailed and extensive discussions with directors of SPND and the Iran’s Aerospace Industries Organization (AIO).

The North Koreans specifically told their Iranian counterparts how they had managed to deny IAEA inspectors access to their nuclear sites under the pretext that the facilities were military in nature.

The North Korean experts advised the Iranian regime on the construction of tunnels and underground nuclear sites, and trained Iranian experts on the design of tunnels and underground sites. Many of these sites and facilities have been built with cooperation of North Korean experts. As such, North Korean advice and expertise was critical in enabling the regime to construct secret underground sites.

Cancellation of a June trip to Tehran by a North Korean military team Following a revelation made by the Iranian Resistance on May 28, 2015 about Iran-North Korea nuclear/missile cooperation, a trip scheduled last June by a North Korean delegation was cancelled, as was a short-term visit by a nine-man team, which would have been the fourth such visit to Tehran in 2015. This delegation was in addition to those already stationed in Iran.

Background – Basic Information:Strategic relations between North Korea & the Iranian regime on nuclear and ballistic matters

According to reports from inside the regime, Tehran-Pyongyang ties go far beyond routine diplomatic relations. They are strategic, and many senior regime officials such as Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, former President and head of the Expediency Council Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, current President Hassan Rouhani, and former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaie have already visited that country.

Based on reports from the regime’s foreign ministry, Tehran’s ambassadors in North Korea have ceremonial roles in their bilateral relations because IRGC commanders act as the main liaison between the two countries. The regime’s foreign ministry and ambassadors are not informed of the direct negotiations between the IRGC and the regime’s Ministry of Defense with the North Korean military. In return for the delivery of military, nuclear, and ballistic equipment from Pyongyang, Tehran is providing crude oil. The Foreign Ministry has no control over these exchanges.

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Main liaisons with N. Korea in past decadesUntil 1997, then-IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaie was the main liaison between Tehran and Pyongyang. Prior to the end of the Iran-Iraq war in 1988, Rezaie pursued the manufacturing of nuclear payloads for ballistic missiles.

IRGC Brig. Gen. Ahmad Vahidi Dastjerdi, the first Quds Force commander, succeeded Rezaie as the main liaison with North Korea. He was subsequently appointed as the director of the AIO and deputy defense minister in which capacity he served until 2012). Ahmad Vahidi Dastjerdi was listed and sanctioned under UN Security Council Resolution 1773.

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh, the key official in charge of the regime’s nuclear weapons projects in recent years, has also been a major official involved in the Iranian regime’s relations with North Korea.

Additional information:The Iranian Resistance exposed the activities and work on a nuclear warhead in Khojir area back in February 2008.

It is worth reiterating that in its May 2008 report on the subject of a missile re-entry vehicle, the IAEA cited a March 3, 2003 document from Dr. Mohsen Fakhrizadeh to Hemmat Industrial Group management referring to the “Amad Plan” and seeking assistance with the prompt transfer of data for “Project 111.”4

Mohsen Fakhrizadeh is a Brigadier General of the IRGC, with whom the IAEA has requested interviews. He is the key figure in the activities concerning the military dimensions of the regime's nuclear program. Amad was the organ in charge of planning and supervising nuclear weapons production in the 1990s and early 2000s. It has evolved into SPND over the years. Fakhrizadeh was in charge of Amad at the time and is currently in charge of SPND.

Annex

4 Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA, GOV/2008/15, 26 May 2008, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2008-15.pdf; GOV/2008/4, 22 February 2008, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2008-4.pdf; also, GOV/2011/65, 8 November 2011, https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2011-65.pdf, “Mohsen Fakhrizadeh (Mahabadi) was the Executive Officer of the AMAD Plan,”

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Methods of collection and sources of information regarding the presence of North Koreans in Iran

Intelligence regarding the presence of North Korean experts in Tehran has been compiled by the network of the People's Mojahedin Organization of Iran (PMOI/MEK) inside Iran. In the recent round, the first reports regarding the presence of North Korean experts in Tehran were received two years and nine months ago. The latest reports were received in late August 2015.

This information is based on 70 reports by the social network of the People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran and from several organs within the regime.

Sources within the regime for this report were in the following entities: Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Atomic Energy Organization Organization of Defensive Innovation and Research" (known by its Farsi acronym

SPND) Ministry of Defense Aerospace Industries Organization (affiliated to the Ministry of Defense) Ministry of Foreign Affairs

_________________________________________________________________________________________________These materials are being distributed by the National Council of Resistance of Iran-U.S. Representative Office. Additional information is on file with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

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Map of the Area

The guesthouse near Hemmat Missile Industries at Khomeini Complex used by North Korean experts

Map showing Hekmatiyeh region where Hemmat Missile Industries is located, as well at the Khojir area where major underground facilities and nuclear and missile sites are located.

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