AMERICAN TRAGEDY - Hood College
Transcript of AMERICAN TRAGEDY - Hood College
AMERICAN TRAGEDY
'Kennedy, Johnson, and the Origins of the Vietnam War
DAVID KAISER
THE BELKNAP PRESS OF HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England
2000
VID KAISER
of the Second World War
se of Sacco and Vanzetti ung)
from Philip II to Hitler
_eague Pennant Race
I
;
No W
ar in L
aos *
37
No W
ar in Laos January—
June 1961
"Let the w
ord go forth," John E K
ennedy declared in his inaugural ad-dress on January 20, 1961, ". . . to friend and foe alike, that the torch has been passed to a new
generation of Am
ericans, born in this century, tem
pered by war, disciplined by a hard and bitter peace, proud of our
ancient heritage, and unwilling to w
itness or permit the slow
undoing of those hum
an rights to which this nation has alw
ays been comm
it-ted." A
nd indeed, Kennedy's cabinet and staff w
ere composed alm
ost entirely of m
embers of w
hat is corning to be called the "GI generation,"
born roughly between 1901 and 1924, and shaped by the critical de-
cades of their youth.' Having fought the S
econd World W
ar as soldiers, they looked forw
ard to taking over the strategic direction of the Cold
War. K
ennedy himself had begun a calculated pursuit of the presidency
imm
ediately after the Second W
orld War, in 1946, w
hen he ran for C
ongress in metropolitan B
oston. In Novem
ber 1960 he had narrowly
defeated another GI, R
ichard Nixon, despite N
ixon's advantage of rep-resenting the incum
bent party in an era of peace and prosperity. 2 K
ennedy's father, a highly successful businessman and a prom
inent m
ember of the R
oosevelt administration, had originally prom
oted his son's political career. H
aving failed himself to achieve high elected of-
fice, Joseph P. K
ennedy had initially put his hopes in his oldest son, Jo-seph Jr., but Joe Jr. had died on a highly dangerous m
ission in Europe
during the Second W
orld War. H
is second son, Jack, had abandoned thoughts of an academ
ic career and stepped into his brother's shoes af-ter the w
ar. Elected to the H
ouse in 1946 and the Senate in 1952, he
emerged after 1956 as a leading presidential contender. H
e had traveled w
idely and spoken often on foreign policy, most notably in 1957, w
hen
a Senate speech expressing sym
pathy for the cause of the Algerian re-
bels had won w
orldwide attention, especially am
ong emerging nations
in the Third W
orld. Kennedy had announced a sw
eeping domestic pro-
gram during the 1960 cam
paign, but he certainly came into office m
ore concerned w
ith foreign than domestic affairs, and he im
mediately
found himself facing crises on several fronts.
Although K
ennedy was P
resident for only three years, he remains the
most com
pelling Am
erican political figure of the second half the twen-
tieth century. The atm
osphere of his presidency; his shocking and still hotly debated assassination; a steady stream
of revelations about his personal life; an apparently inexhaustible m
arket for fantastic rumors
about his life, his death, and his career; and the subsequent lives of his brothers, his w
idow, his children, and his nieces and nephew
s have all kept his m
ystery alive, but they have also obscured the man, and the
President, that he actually w
as. Only in the last ten years has the relea
— —
of extensive docum
entation enabled us to follow his foreign policy in
detail.' The picture that em
erges is far more com
plex than the image
most older A
mericans rem
ember. O
n the one hand, Kennedy, as m
any observers im
mediately understood, w
anted great things both for him-
self and for his country. On the other hand, he w
as a brilliant natural diplom
at who enjoyed the details of foreign policy and w
ho was fre-
quently more sensitive to the dangers of rash action than the contem
po-raries he chose as his leading subordinates. N
owhere w
as this differ-ence m
ore apparent than with respect to S
outheast Asia.
During the first four m
onths of the Kennedy adm
inistration the Lao-
tian crisis competed for center stage w
ith the crisis in the Congo, w
here P
remier P
atrice Lum
umba's death w
as announced on February 13, and
the worsening confrontation w
ith Cuba, w
hich climaxed in the disas-
trous invasion at the Bay of P
igs in the third week of A
pril. Meanw
hile, Y
uri Gagarin m
ade the first orbital flight around the Earth; F
rench gen-erals in A
lgeria tried and failed to overthrow C
harles de Gaulle; free-
dom riders w
ere beaten in Alabam
a; and the United S
tates, the Soviet
Union, and B
ritain failed to make any progress on a nuclear test ban.
Despite an initial flurry of interest, V
ietnam rem
ained a relatively mi-
nor issue throughout this period and rarely intruded upon the horizon of the A
merican public, but L
aos brought the nation to the brink of w
ar and raised critical issues about Am
erican goals and strategies in S
outheast Asia.
Publicly the clim
ax of the Laotian affair occurred at K
ennedy's tele-
AM
ER
ICA
N T
RA
GE
DY
* 2
54
fully
explain
ed, b
ut S
tate info
rmed
Lodge o
n S
eptem
ber 1
2 th
at it w
ou
ld co
ntin
ue."
In a press conference on Septem
ber 12 the President took hum
orous dig
s at his tw
o m
ain p
rosp
ective cam
paig
n o
pponen
ts, Govern
or N
el-son R
ockefeller and Senator B
arry Goldw
ater, expressed opposition to lo
ng-ran
ge sch
ool b
usin
g to
achiev
e racial balan
ce, and p
ush
ed fo
r ratificatio
n o
f the test b
an. T
hen
he to
ok a n
ew an
d b
alanced
line to
-w
ard the Diem
government, m
aking clear that he still believed it had to change:
What helps to w
in , the war, w
e support; what interferes w
ith the war ef-
fort, we oppose. I have already m
ade it clear that any action by either governm
ent which m
ay handicap the winning of the w
ar is inconsistent w
ith our policy objectives. This is the test w
hich I think every agency and official of the U
nited States governm
ent must apply to all of our actions,
and we shall be applying that test in various w
ays in the coming m
onths, although I do not think it desirable to state all of our view
s at this time.
... In some w
ays I think the Vietnam
ese people and ourselves agree: we
want the w
ar to be won, the C
omm
unists to be contained, and the Am
eri-cans to go hom
e.
Ken
ned
y h
ad p
ut h
is finger o
n th
e critical issue: w
heth
er South
Viet-
namese—
Am
erican agreement on objectives could also lead to agree-
ment on strategy sufficient to continue an allied effort." L
odge, who im
mediately refused yet again to open talks w
ith Diem
until D
iem had to ask him
for something, 2 ° w
as now engaged in an all-
out war w
ith MA
CV
and the Saigon C
IA station. H
arkins now argued
that the war w
as being won, not lost, and, echoing D
iem, characterized
both the Buddhist and student m
ovements as "w
ell-organized, covertly led
Co
mm
un
ist trick[s]" u
nd
ertaken
in resp
on
se to C
om
mu
nist m
ili- tary
failure." T
he am
bassad
or an
d th
e gen
eral also arg
ued
ov
er the
significan
ce conversatio
ns in
which
both
Thuan
and B
ig M
inh ex
- pressed
their d
espair o
ver th
e situatio
n, an
d th
e Em
bassy
indep
end-
ently expressed the opinion that the political crisis was bound to affect
the w
ar effort." L
odge o
n F
riday
Sep
tember 1
3 also
wro
te Rusk
con-
fiden
tially, ask
ing
for th
e replacem
ent o
f CIA
Statio
n C
hief R
ichard
-son, w
hom he now
regarded as a symbol of A
merican support for D
iem
and N
hu, b
y L
ansd
ale, who co
uld
superv
ise a chan
ge o
f govern
men
t. M
cCone violently rejected this suggestion, offering to replace R
ichard-
The C
oup *
255
son, but arguing that the agency had no confidence in L
ansdale what-
ever, an
d co
mplain
ing th
at "this w
hole th
ing w
as built u
p b
y h
im
[Lansdale] through R
ufus Phillips."" H
alberstam reported serious dis-
agreem
ents am
ong th
e Am
erican co
mm
unity
on S
unday
, Sep
tember
15.24 The S
tate Departm
ent, at Kennedy's request, had asked L
odge to keep disagreem
ents out of the papers, but Lodge regarded leaking as an
amb
assado
rial prero
gativ
e." Mean
wh
ile, Mad
ame N
hu
's attacks o
n
the United S
tates made daily new
s, and Monday's papers reported that
she planned to visit the United S
tates. B
y Monday, S
eptember 16, H
ilsman had prepared drafts of tw
o al-ternative cables for L
odge, one a "reconciliation track" and the other a "p
ressures an
d p
ersuasio
n track
," and a d
raft letter from
Ken
ned
y to
D
iem." A
fter two m
ore d
ays o
f ExC
om
meetin
gs, a teleg
ram d
rafted
by Bundy gave L
odge authority to suspend Am
erican aid to use as he saw
fit to try to bring about a long series of changes. These included a
forthcoming attitude by D
iem tow
ard those who had opposed him
, the release and toleration of B
uddhist and student activists, "full latitude of expression" for the press, an end to police operations against the non-C
omm
unist opposition, cabinet changes, the surfacing of the Can L
ao party, the repeal or am
endment of D
ecree Law
10, and, if possible, the departure of both N
hus from S
aigon or Vietnam
. Lodge prom
ptly com-
men
ted th
at nearly
every
one o
f these su
ggestio
ns w
ould
certainly
strike D
iem as politically suicidal, but R
usk and McN
amara w
anted a fin
al try."
The P
resident, who had refused sim
ply to decide between L
odge and H
ilsman
on o
ne sid
e and M
cNam
ara and T
aylo
r on th
e oth
er, still hoped to bridge the gap betw
een them, and also to deal w
ith growing
doubts about the military situation. O
n Septem
ber 16, Halberstam
had once again reported that recent V
iet Cong attacks show
ed that the stra-tegic ham
let program w
as overextended in the Ca M
au peninsula and q
uo
ted an
Am
erican th
at the g
overn
men
t refused
to co
rrect the situ
a-tio
n. K
enned
y h
ad im
med
iately ask
ed M
cNam
ara how
accurate th
e story w
as." Then, rather than bring L
odge home for consultation, K
en-ned
y o
n S
eptem
ber 1
7 ask
ed M
cNam
ara and T
aylo
r to v
isit Saig
on
themselves to survey the situation, both "in term
s of actual progress of operations and of need to m
ake effective case with C
ongress for contin-ued
pro
secutio
n o
f the effo
rt." Lodge co
mplain
ed th
at the m
ission
would
underm
ine A
merican
policy
and later fo
und it "in
conceiv
able
Note
s to P
ages 2
42-2
52 * 5
30
port p
robably d
id n
ot p
rove
anyth
ing b
eca
use
no o
ne tru
sted h
im. S
ee
ibid
., 22.
85.
Ibid
., 32, 3
3.
86.
Ibid
., 46. F
or so
me re
aso
n th
e te
legra
m d
escrib
ing th
ese
conve
rsatio
ns
did
not g
o o
ut u
ntil S
epte
mber 2
. 87.
FR
US, 1961-63, 11, 35.
88.
This co
mes fro
m K
rula
k's reco
rd, U
.S.-Vietnam
Relations, X
I, pp. 5
40-
544. S
ee a
lso F
R U
S, 1
961-6
3, IV
, 37.
89.
Gib
bons, T
he U.S. G
overnment a
nd the V
ietnam W
ar, II, p. 1
61.
90.
FR
US
, 1961-6
3, IV
, 43.
91.
Chase
and L
erm
an, K
enned
y and th
e Press, p
p. 4
85-4
86 (e
mphasis
added).
9. T
he C
oup, A
ugust–
Nove
mber 1
963
1. U
.S.-Vietnam
Relations, III, IV
.b.4
, p. 4
2.
2. F
R U
S, 1961-63, IV, 5
4, 5
6, 5
7, 6
3, 6
6, 7
0. H
ilsman su
ggeste
d to
Lodge
that h
e u
se th
e th
reat o
f a c
ongre
ssio
nal a
id c
ut-o
ff in h
is ta
lks w
ith
Die
m.
3. Ib
id., 4
4. A
lthough G
eoffre
y Warn
er, in
"The U
nite
d S
tate
s and th
e F
all
of D
iem
, Part II: T
he D
eath
of D
iem
," Austra
lian O
utlo
ok 2
8, n
o. 4
(1
974), p
p. 3
-17, p
ublish
ed a
n a
ccount o
f this co
nve
rsatio
n b
ase
d u
pon
d'O
rlandi's d
iary, th
e F
RU
S edito
rs have
still dele
ted th
eir n
am
es.
4.
FR
US
, 1961-6
3, IV
, 58, 60.
5. Ib
id., 7
2.
6. Ib
id., 7
7.
7. Ib
id., 7
6.
8.
New
York T
imes, S
ept. 9
, p. 1
; Chase
and L
erm
an, K
enned
y and th
e P
ress, pp. 4
87-4
88; F
RU
S, 1961-6
3, III, 8
0.
9. R
eports b
y Col. B
ryce F
. Denno, Ju
ly 19; L
t. Col. R
ichard
Pow
ell, S
ept.
9; B
rig. G
en. D
elk O
den, S
ept. 9
; and C
ol. W
ilbur W
ilson, III C
orp
s ad-
viser, S
ept. 1
1, a
ll in N
ew
man p
apers, JF
K.
10. F
R U
S, 1
961-6
3, IV
, 82 (K
rula
k's report) a
nd 8
3 (m
eetin
g o
f Sept. 1
0).
See a
lso K
rula
k's ow
n re
cord
of th
is meetin
g, T
aylo
r papers, N
DU
, box
50.
11.
Acco
rdin
g to
Kru
lak's re
cord
, Mendenhall w
ent fu
rther, sa
ying th
at h
e
and T
rueheart a
gre
ed th
at th
e w
ar co
uld
not b
e w
on u
nder th
e D
iem
gove
rnm
ent.
12. N
one o
f the th
ree n
ote
-take
rs at th
e m
eetin
g re
cord
ed th
is rem
ark, b
ut it
has fo
und its w
ay in
to se
vera
l subse
quent h
istorie
s and w
as re
cently co
n-
firmed b
y P
hillip
s h
imself. It m
ay b
e s
ignific
ant th
at K
rula
k's
record
om
its Harrim
an fro
m th
e list o
f particip
ants. T
he n
ext d
ay K
rula
k, coun-
tera
ttackin
g, g
ave
Bundy a
rath
er u
nco
nvin
cing m
em
o a
ttem
ptin
g to
re-
fute
what P
hillip
s had sa
id a
bout th
e situ
atio
n in
Long A
n p
rovin
ce. JF
K,
Note
s to P
ages 2
52-2
57 * 5
31
NS
F, V
N, b
ox 1
99. K
rula
k's mem
o a
cknow
ledged 3
8 a
rmed a
ttacks a
nd
256 to
tal in
cidents in
volvin
g stra
tegic h
am
lets in
Long A
n p
rovin
ce.
13. F
RU
S, 1
961-6
3, IV
, 85.
14. Ib
id., 9
3. O
n R
usk's ro
le in
the C
hin
a W
hite
Paper se
e W
arre
n I. C
ohen,
Dean R
usk (Toto
wa, N
.J., 1980), p
p. 3
9-4
1.
15. FR
US, 1
961-6
3,1
11,8
6.
16. Ib
id., IV
, 88, 8
9; N
ew Y
ork Tim
es, Sept. 1
1, p
p. 1
, 42.
17. FR
US, 1
961-6
3, IV
, 93, 9
4.
18. Ib
id., 9
7.
19. C
hase
and L
erm
an, K
ennedy and the Press, p
p. 4
90-4
96.
20. F
RU
S, 1961-6
3, IV
, 102, 1
11.
21. F
RU
S, 1961-6
3, IV
, 96.
22.
Ibid
., 130, 1
34, 1
36, 1
38, 1
39.
23.
Ibid
., 104, 1
20. T
his re
al-life
incid
ent a
ppears to
be th
e o
rigin
of S
ey-
mour H
ersh
's fanta
stic story th
at K
ennedy a
sked L
ansd
ale
to g
o to
Sai-
gon a
s CIA
statio
n ch
ief to
arra
nge D
iem
's assa
ssinatio
n—
a sto
ry which
th
e re
cord
make
s clear is w
ithout fo
undatio
n. I in
form
ed H
ersh
—w
ell
befo
re th
e p
ublic
atio
n o
f his
book—
that th
e W
hite
House c
ale
ndar
show
s that L
ansd
ale
neve
r saw
Kennedy d
urin
g 1
963. S
ee H
ersh
, The
Dark Side of C
amelot, p
p. 4
26-4
28.
24. N
ew Y
ork Tim
es, Sept. 1
5, p
p. 1
, 4.
25.
See M
ccklin, M
ission in Torm
ent, pp. 2
22-2
23.
26. See F
RU
S, 1961-6
3, IV
, 114, fo
r cable
s th
at g
enera
lly fo
llow
ed
Hilsm
an's p
apers.
27.
The te
legra
m is ib
id., 1
25; o
n th
e m
eetin
gs, se
e 1
13, 1
15, 1
20n.
28. N
ew Y
ork Tim
es, Sept. 1
6, p
. 2; F
RU
S, IV, 1
17. H
alb
ersta
m se
em
ed to
quote
from
Phillip
s's June re
port o
n th
e stra
tegic h
am
let p
rogra
m a
s a
whole
, which
no o
ne in
the W
hite
House
had e
ver se
en.
29.
Ibid
., 124, 1
25. T
o H
arrim
an's
horro
r, Rusk in
itially
desig
nate
d n
ot
Hilsm
an b
ut U
. Ale
xis Johnso
n, th
e D
eputy U
nderse
creta
ry for P
olitica
l A
ffairs a
nd R
usk's rig
ht-h
and m
an, a
s the S
tate
Departm
ent re
pre
senta
-tive
. 30.
See FR
US, 1
961-6
3,1
V, 1
26, a
nd S
aig
on 5
57, S
ept. 2
2, N
ew
man p
apers,
JFK
. 31.
McN
am
ara
mem
o, D
D, 1
982, 4
46B
; US
OM
mem
o, S
ept. 1
, JFK
, NS
F,
VN
; Halb
ersta
m a
rticle, S
ept. 1
6, 1
963.
32.
Also
p a
lso to
ok a
partin
g sh
ot a
t the yo
ung S
aig
on p
ress co
rps b
efo
re h
is departu
re, b
lam
ing th
em
, in p
art, fo
r Die
m a
nd N
hu's
unfo
rtunate
view
s. See A
lsop's columns, W
ashington Post, S
ept. 1
6, 1
8, 2
0, 2
3.
33. F
RU
S, 1961-6
3, IV
, 143.
34.
See M
aneli, W
ar of the Vanquished, p
p. 1
40-1
52.
35.
About s
ix m
onth
s la
ter M
ichael F
orre
sta
l told
his
ora
l his
tory
inte
r-vie
wer th
at K
ennedy h
ad a
lways h
oped th
at D
iem
mig
ht m
end h
is ways.
JFK
•
Notes to
Pag
es 25-3
6 *
506
rigged. Phoum
i referred to his cousin Sarit by the courtesy title "U
ncle," w
hich many A
mericans erroneously interpreted literally.
41. Ibid., 354, 355. 42. Ibid., 373, 375, and m
.s., pt. 2, 476. 43. S
ee ibid., 367, 377, 379, 384, 391, and m.s., pt. 2, 438, 505.
44. Ibid., 396, 397, 398, 399, 400. 45. Ibid., 415, 416, 418. 46. Ibid., 421, 426, 429, 430, 431, 432, 434, 444. 47. Ibid., 438, 349, 440, 446, 447, 448, 450. 48.
Ibid
., 462, 463, 464. 49. Ibid., 467, 469, 472, 473, 474, 476. 50. Ibid., 486, and m
.s., pt. 2, 675. 51. Ibid., 487. 52. Ibid., 485, 490. 53. Ibid., 492. 54. Ibid., 493, 495. 55.
Ibid., 497. 56. Ibid., m
.s., pr. 2, 690. 57. A
deletion occurs at this point in the record. 58. Ibid., 498 (em
phasis added). 59.
FR
US, 1961-63, X
XIV
, 1, 2. 60. ibid., 3. 61. A
ccounts of the meeting by K
ennedy himself; G
en. Wilton P
ersons, and H
erter are ibid
., 7, 8
, 9. S
ee also F
red I. G
reenstein
and R
ichard
H.
Imm
erman, "W
hat Did E
isenhower T
ell Kennedy about Indochina? T
he P
olitics of Misperception," Journal of A
merican H
istory, Sept. 1992,
pp. 5
68-5
87, w
hich
inclu
des n
otes b
y C
lark C
lifford
and R
obert
McN
amara.
62. See S
trauss and How
e, Generations, pp. 247-260.
63. See the recent book by M
arc Trachtenberg, A
Constructed P
eace: The
Makin
g o
f the E
uro
pea
n S
ettlemen
t, 1945-1
963
(Princeton, 1999),
pp. 146-200. 64. S
ee Eisenhow
er's mem
o to Dulles, S
ept. 8, 1953, FR
US, 1952-54, II, pt.
1, pp. 460-463, and many com
ments by E
isenhower during N
SC
meet-
ings reported in the same volum
e. 65. G
eorge F. K
ennan, Mem
oirs, 1950-1
963 (B
oston, 1972), pp. 185-187.
2. N
o W
ar in L
aos, Janu
ary—Ju
ne 1961
1. S
trauss and How
e, in Generations, pp. 261-278, date the birth years of
this generation as 1901-1924, but in my opinion m
any Am
ericans born in the 1901-1904 period are m
ore typical of the previous Lost genera-
tion. 2. T
he accusation that Dem
ocrats actually stole the election—now
a tenet
Notes to
Pag
es 37-4
3 *
507
of Republican dogm
a—has little evidentiary basis. A
detailed study of th
e voting in Illinois in 1960 concluded that Kennedy w
on that state fairly, and even a shift of Illinois to the R
epublican column w
ould not have changed the result. S
ee Edm
und F. K
allina Jr., Courthouse over
White H
ouse: Chicago and the P
residential Election of 1960 (O
rlando, 1988).
3. T
he author of the most recent sensational best-seller devoted to K
ennedy m
ade a calculated and avowed decision to ignore that docum
entation, w
ith results of predictably dubious validity: Seym
our Hersh, T
he Dark
Side of Cam
elot (Boston, 1997); see also H
ersh, "May-Z
elikow C
on-fidential," D
iplomatic H
istory 22, n
o. 4
(Fall 1
998), p
p. 6
54-6
61, in
w
hich Hersh explicitly discounts archival sources.
4. FR
US
, 1961-63, XX
IV, 10, 12; V
III, 11; and see CM
-85-61, JFK
, NS
F,
Countries, L
aos: General, 2/16/61-2/19/61.
5. H
arold W. C
hase and Allen H
. Lerm
an, eds., Kennedy and the P
ress: T
he New
s Conferences (N
ew Y
ork, 1965), p. 25. 6. F
R U
S, 1961-63, XX
IV, 13. K
ennedy apparently kept no record of this talk in the W
hite House. T
he farcical aspects of Laotian politics and the
peacefu
l character of the people im
mediately struck m
ost observers in L
aos, and also emerged in various press reports, even those of T
ime m
ag-azine, despite its generally tough line against A
sian Com
munism
. See,
e.g., Tim
e, Feb. 3, 1961.
7. Isaiah B
erlin oral history, JFK
. 8. F
RU
S, 1960-6
3, X
XIV
, 14, 1
5. D
eptel 8
40 to
Vien
tiane, ib
id., 1
5.
Charles "C
hip" Bohlen, the form
er ambassador to M
oscow w
ho had be-com
e a special assistant to Rusk, proposed the approach to M
oscow.
9. ibid., 17, 20.
10. Ibid., 19.
11. P
rince Sihanouk of C
ambodia had refused even a personal appeal from
K
ennedy, leading the New
York T
imes of F
eb. 26 (sec. 1, p. 16) to brand the P
resident's "first serious venture into personal diplomacy" a failure.
12. E
dward J. M
arolda and Oscar P
. Fitzgerald, T
he United States N
avy and the V
ietnam C
onflict, ❑ (W
ashington, 1986), p. 60. 13. T
he March 9 m
eeting is FR
US, 1960-63, X
XIV
, 25; see also a March 3
meeting and its results, ibid., 22. T
he agreed military m
easures included an airlift of 14 M
arine helicopters, their crews, and m
aintenance person-nel to U
dorn, Thailand, on the L
aotian border. See M
arolda and Fitzger-
ald, The N
avy and Vietnam
, II, pp. 60-61. 14. F
RU
S, 1960-63, XX
IV, 31.
15. N
o contemporary m
inutes of this meeting have com
e to light, but see Ar-
thur M. Schlesinger Jr., A
Thousand D
ays (Boston, 1965), pp. 332-333,
and Edw
in 0. Gu
thm
an and Jeffrey S
hulman, eds., R
obert Kennedy: In
His O
wn W
ords (New
York
, 1988), pp
. 246-248. 16.
On
Rostow
's role see Mon
tague K
ern, P
atricia W. L
evering, and Ralph