FROM “STAR WARS” TO THE WAR ON TERROR

American Public Opinion Polarizationon

Defense Policy

Donald M. Gooch

Political Polarization

Public Perception: Red vs. Blue Academic Debate: Social Issues Polarization Puzzle: Myth or Madness? Gaps in the literature:

Non-social issues (i.e. economic, foreign policy, etc.)

Empirical definition of polarization Determinants of polarization

Defense Policy Polarization

Define Polarization Theoretically Empirically

Examine the Polarization of Public Opinion on Defense Spending

Assess the relationship between Polarization on Defense Spending Public Opinion and trends in actual Defense Spending

Assess other factors that could cause polarization in the distribution of opinion on Defense Spending

Polarization: Concepts

Polarization is not divisiveness or “angry” politics. Polarization is not an increase in “heated rhetoric.” Polarization as a concept is the relative distribution

of opinion in the American electorate along either single or multiple issue dimensions.

A “polarized” opinion distribution is the distribution of opinion relative to a “theoretical maximum” (DiMaggio, 1996).

Polarization as a process refers to the change in the distribution of opinion relative to this maximum or a prior distribution of opinion over some specified period of time.

Relatively Polarized

Polarized vs. Normal Voter Distributions

Figure 2.1: Polarized Elites? Are Elites Located Distant from Median Voter and the Mass of Voters?

XMED

POLICY

Republican Party Elites Democratic Party Elites Fiorina’s Normal Distribution of voter ideal points Bi-Modal Distribution of voter ideal points Median Voter Position

If the distribution of voters is normal and centrist, then the party elites have moved away from voters

If the distribution of voters is bimodal, then the party elites are located with their respective constituents

Polarization: Measures

Variation (Standard Deviation)

Central Tendency (Means)

Bimodality (Kurtosis)

Polarization Measures

TABLE 3.1: ILLUSTRATION OF POLARIZATION NOT REFLECTED IN AVERAGE POSITIONS IN A HYPOTHETICAL POPULATION Population (n=8)

TIME PERIOD 1 Distribution of Pop. Opinion on X Issue

TIME PERIOD 2 Distribution of Pop. Opinion on X Issue

TIME PERIOD 3 Distribution of Pop. Opinion on X issue

Citizen 1 0 0 5

Citizen 2 0 1 5

Citizen 3 0 2 5

Citizen 4 0 5 5

Citizen 5 10 5 5

Citizen 6 10 8 5

Citizen 7 10 9 5

Citizen 8 10 10 5

MEAN STAND. DEV.

5.000 5.345

5.000 3.780

5.000 0.000

Source: Compiled by the Author.

Foreign Policy Periods: The Cold War

The Cold War “Let me share with you a vision of the future

which offers hope. It is that we embark on a program to counter the awesome Soviet missile threat with measures that are defensive. Let us turn to the very strengths in technology that spawned our great industrial base and that have given us the quality of life we enjoy today…a shield that could protect us from nuclear missiles just as a roof protects a family from the rain“ - Ronald Reagan, 1983

Foreign Policy Periods: The New World Order

The New World Order Now, we can see a new world coming into view. A world

in which there is the very real prospect of a new world order… A world where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfill the historic vision of its founders. A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a home among all nations. - George H. W. Bush, 1991

"I know…that the United States cannot--indeed, we should not--be the world's policeman, and I know this is a time, with the Cold War over, that so many Americans are reluctant to commit military resources and our personnel beyond our shores." -William J. Clinton, 1994

Foreign Policy Periods:The War on Terror

The War on Terror States like these, and their terrorist allies,

constitute an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. - George W. Bush, 2002

Theoretical Models Partisan Model. Public opinion polarization on issues is conditioned by

the reactions of the electorate to the partisanship of those in control of government policy. In particular, partisans of the opposite party are more likely to polarize in response to the other party in control of the policy agenda.

Policy Model. Public opinion polarization is responsive to the actual implemented policy and changes in the levels or status of that policy. If, for example, defense spending increases, then the public polarizes or depolarizes relative to the change in the status quo and their preferred level of defense spending.

Events Model. Public opinion polarization is responsive to exogenous shocks to the system, relatively independent of the current policy makers or their policy prescriptions. These events independently affect the average issue positions of the public. For example, the September 11th attacks could produce a significantly higher preferred level of defense spending.

Variables

Actual Defense Spending, % GDP

Average Defense Spending Public Opinion

Bimodality of Defense Spending Public Opinion

Foreign Policy Periods

Z-ScoresEquation 7.2: Z-Score for Defense Spending

ZDS =

Where: = the ith observed value of defense spending for year. = the ith mean value of defense spending for year.

= the ith standard deviation of defense spending for year.

Bimodality Trends in Defense Spending PO, 1980 – 2008

FIGURE 7.6: BIMODALITY TREND IN MASS OPINION ON DEFENSE SPENDING, 1980-2008

-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008

DEFENSE KURTOSIS

Clinton Administration

War in Iraq

Berlin Wall Comes Down

Reagan’s ‘Star Wars’

Speech

Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’

Speech

Bush’s ‘New World Order’

Speech

G.W. Bush’s ‘Axis of Evil’

Speech

Defense Spending: % GDP, 1980-2003

FIGURE 7.7: DEFENSE SPENDING AS A PERCENTAGE OF GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, 1980-20031

1 “Table 3.1: Outlays by Superfunction and Function: 1940--2003," in Office of Management and Budget, Historical Tables, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2005 (2004), Washington, pp. 45--52

00.5

11.5

22.5

33.5

44.5

55.5

66.5

7

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

Defense Spending % GDP

Clinton Administration

Berlin Wall Comes Down

September 11th Attacks

Public Opinion Defense Spending Bimodality & Actual Defense Spending

FIGURE 7.10: BIMODALITY TREND (-Z-SCORE) & DEFENSE SPENDING (Z-SCORE) IN WAR & PEACE, 1980-2008

-3

-2

-1

0

1

2

3

1980

1981

1982

1983

1984

1985

1986

1987

1988

1989

1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

DEFENSE SPENDING - %GDP (Z) DEFENSE BIMODALITY KURT (-Z)

COLD WAR IRAQ WAR

Glasnost Perestroika

NEW WORLD ORDER

Berlin Wall Comes Down

September 11th Attacks

Persian Gulf War

Average Public Opinion on DS, DS Bimodality, & Actual DS

FIGURE 7.11: BIMODALITY TREND (-Z-SCORE) ACTUAL DEFENSE SPENDING % GDP (Z-SCORE), PUBLIC OPINION ON

DEFENSE SPENDING (Z-SCORE), 1980-2008

- 3

- 2

- 1

0

1

2

3

1 9 8 0

1 9 8 1

1 9 8 2

1 9 8 3

1 9 8 4

1 9 8 5

1 9 8 6

1 9 8 7

1 9 8 8

1 9 8 9

1 9 9 0

1 9 9 1

1 9 9 2

1 9 9 3

1 9 9 4

1 9 9 5

1 9 9 6

1 9 9 7

1 9 9 8

1 9 9 9

2 0 0 0

2 0 0 1

2 0 0 2

2 0 0 3

2 0 0 4

2 0 0 5

2 0 0 6

2 0 0 7

2 0 0 8

DEFENSE SPENDING - %GDP (Z) DEFENSE MEAN (Z) DEFENSE BIMODALITY KURT ( - Z)

Status Quo on Defense Spending

Status Quo on Defense Spending

Polarization Hypotheses

Defense Spending Public Opinion tracks with actual defense spending.

Defense Spending Public Opinion is responsive to presidential administrations.

Defense Spending Public Opinion is determined by actual Foreign Policy events.

Models (Mean & Kurtosis)

Basic Models: Defense Spending Public Opinion Polarization on Defense Spending Defense Spending +Party Public Opinion Polarization on Defense

Spending

Full Model DS + P + Foreign Policy Period POP on DS

Full Model w/ Interactions: DS + P + DS*P + FPP*P + FPP*DS POP on DS

Coding

CODING SCHEME FOR FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD & PRESIDENTIAL PARTY VARIABLE CATEGORIES VALUE

PARTY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATION

REPUBLICAN 1

DEMOCRAT 0

FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD

COLD WAR 0

NEW WORLD ORDER -1

WAR ON TERROR 1

Defense Spending Polarization Models

VARIABLES

Basic Model Basic Model 2 Full Model Full Model w/ Int Defense

Spending (M) Defense

Spending (K) Defense

Spending (M) Defense

Spending (K) Defense

Spending (M) Defense

Spending (K) Defense

Spending (M) Defense

Spending (K)

ADS - 23% + 74% - + - + - +

PPA + 47% - 78% + - +

FPP + 67% + 82% --- --- --- ---

ADS*FPP + +

ADS*PPA

PPA*FPP + 78% + 85%

Regression Tables

TABLE 7.2: DEVIATION MODELS REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING LEVELS (%GDP) ON DEF. SPENDING PUBLIC OPINION.

MODEL:

Intercept

(S.E.)

Parameter Estimate

(S.E.)

R2

N DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) 0.000

(0.166) -0.478

(0.169)

*** .229 29

DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) 0.000 (0.859)

0.859 (0.099)

*** .737 29

* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level

Regression Tables

TABLE 7.4: D. M. REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING & PARTY OF PRESIDENTIAL ADMIN ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION.

MODEL:

Intercept

DEFENSE

SPEND

PARTY

R2

N DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) -1.029

(0.333) -0.810

(0.173)

*** 1.356 (0.398)

*** .467 29

DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) 0.435 (0.213)

0.999 (0.111)

*** -0.573 (0.256)

*** .780 29

* significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level

Regression TablesTABLE 7.5: D. M. REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING, PARTY & FOREIGN POLICY PERIOD ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION.

MODEL:

Parameter Estimate

Standard Error

DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) Intercept -0.357

0.320

Actual Defense Spending -0.826

*** 0.140

Party of Presidential Administration 0.626

* 0.372

Foreign Policy Period 0.687

*** 0.178

PR > |F| <.0001 R2 .666 N 29 DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) Intercept 0.736

*** 0.235

Actual Defense Spending 0.992 *** 0.103

Party of Presidential Administration -0.899

*** 0.274

Foreign Policy Period 0.307

** 0.131

PR > |F| <.0001 R2 .820 N 29 * significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level

Regression Tables

TABLE 7.6: REGRESSING DEFENSE SPENDING, PARTY & FPP ON D.S. PUBLIC OPINION WITH INTERACTIONS

MODEL:

Parameter

Estimate

Standard

Error DEFENSE SPENDING (MEAN) Intercept -2.014

*** 0.489

Actual Defense Spending -1.283

*** 0.506

Party of Presidential Administration 2.197

*** 0.504

Foreign Policy Period

--- ---

ADS*PPA

0.606 0.508

ADS*FFP 0.533

** 0.217

FPP*PPA 0.850

*** 0.167

PR > |F| < .0001 R2 .775 N 29 DEFENSE SPENDING (KURTOSIS) Intercept 0.270

0.397

Actual Defense Spending 1.218

*** 0.410

Party of Presidential Administration -0.484

0.409

Foreign Policy Period

--- ---

ADS*PPA

-0.158 0.412

ADS*FFP 0.387

** 0.176

FPP*PPA 0.427

*** 0.135

PR > |F| <.0001 R2 .852 N 29 * significant at .10 level ** significant at .05 level ***significant at .01 level