America’s Useless Attack on Colombia:

Plan Colombia and Why It Is Dangerous

Sam Gellman

Ethics in Development in a Global Environment

June 02, 2004

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I. Introduction

When the Clinton Administration committed itself to a multi-billion dollar aid

package to Colombia in order to fight the War on Drugs it was pretty big news. After all,

as part of his “Plan Colombia,” Clinton was committing the United States to $1.3 billion

dollars in aid to Colombia and its neighbors as part of “Plan Colombia.” Of the money,

over half of it—$645 million would go to the Colombian military and police force, in

effort to “strengthen democracy, the rule of law, economic stability, and human rights in

Colombia1.” With this package, Colombia became the third largest recipient of American

aid, only behind Israel and Egypt.

Critics, however, knew that there was reason to doubt the efficacy of the plan.

Senator Paul Wellstone of Minnesota warned “History has repeatedly shown—especially

in Latin America—just think of Nicaragua and El Salvador—that the practical effect of

this strategy now under effect is to militarize, to escalate the conflict, not to end it2.”

These critics recognized that the exorbitant amount of money being given to Colombia in

foreign aid—well over the total amount given to every other country in Latin and Central

America combined—could lead to counter-productive results, putting us in the center of

conflict that has endured decades of corruption and brutality3.

Four years after Plan Colombia was proposed, critics such as Wellstone prove to

have had it right. Colombia has not ceased to produce drugs, and American objectives

have not been met. In fact, many claim that fighting between two leftist guerilla groups,

1 United States Congress, Conference Report 106-710 on Public Law 106-246 (Washington: Library of Congress: June 29, 2000)2 2 United States Senate, Speech by Sen. Paul Wellstone, Congressional Record (Washington: June 21, 2000): S5492 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgibin/query/B?r106:@FIELD(FLD003+s)+@FIELD(DDATE+20000621)>.3 Chomsky 1

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the right-wing paramilitary, and the government has only worsened4. In the year 2002,

around 4,000 people were murdered and more than 350,000 people were forced from

their homes. Estimates show that the conflict now claims the life of 19 civilians per day,

as opposed to just 12 civilians per day in 20005. Drug production has continued to

accelerate and the human rights situation has continued to get worse6. Needless to say,

the “democracy, rule of law, economic stability, and human rights” that the Clinton

Administration claimed would improve have not seen much improvement.

In this report, I examine the United States’ “War on Drugs” in Colombia, and

show how American involvement in Colombia has been a dangerous and

counterproductive use of money. First, I look into the details of the Colombian conflict,

which has been going on for decades. In doing so, I examine the multiple players who

make up the conflict. I then look at how America has involved itself in the conflict and

conclude by discussing where the American plan has gone wrong.

II. A Look at the Players in the Colombian Conflict

Before we delve into a discussion of the American role in the Colombian

quagmire, it’s necessary to look at who the main actors are in the national civil conflict.

As the US is entering a struggle that has lasted for years, it is impossible to get a full

understanding of the situation at hand without discussing how the past has formed the

groups that are involved today. It is an established fact that there are few “good guys” in

the Colombian conflict and that all parties commit human rights abuses and other

violations of international law7. In this section, I examine the specific groups and how

they came into existence.4 Vacius 15 Bouvier 16 Vacius 17 http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm

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A. The Guerillas

a. The FARC

The FARC (Fuerzas ArmadasRevolucionarias de Colombia – Revolutionary

Armed Forces of Colombia) was an unofficial group of united Colombian peasants who

were guided by Communist and Marxist doctrines long before the organization’s official

formation in 1964. Prior to 1964, peasants led multiple uprisings in response to violent

expulsions of from their farms at the hands of the government military and rich

landowners8. The official formation of the FARC came after the US-sponsored

Marquetalia Raid, in which 16,000 military personnel were pitted against a community of

1,000 unarmed peasants. The survivors of the raid were led my Manuel Marulanda, a

peasant guerilla who had actively fought with the guerilla movement since 1948.

Together, they founded the FARC shortly after the raid. The FARC’s ideology is highly

nationalist and anti-capitalist, with its rhetoric rooted in early progressive ideology9.

In the 1980s, when the government tried to end the guerilla war through peace

talks, the FARC created its own political party, the Patriotic Union, which the group

hoped to use as a non-violent means to negotiation. Journalist Liz Harper claims that

“The UP party -- comprised of disarmed guerrillas, former Communists, and progressive

Liberals -- espoused anti-corruption policies, harsh penalties against narco-traffickers and

progressive land and economic reforms10.” As the UP gained popularity, however, it

became a major target of right wing paramilitaries. Over the years that followed its

creation, at least 3,000 of the party’s member were assassinated or disappeared at the

hands of the paramilitaries, and the FARC retreated back into the jungle as guerillas.

8 Meza np9 Harper np10 Harper np

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Still headed by Marulanda, the FARC currently has more than 17,000 members in

more than 70 fronts, making it the largest guerilla group in the western hemisphere.

Currently, much of the narcotics produced in Colombia are grown in areas under the

control of the FARC. Though the FARC’s link to the drug trade is rather controversial, it

is widely accepted that FARC members receive funds in the way of taxes placed on coca-

growers in the areas it controls in exchange for protection from paramilitary and

government groups11.

The FARC further finances itself through kidnapping for ransom and extortion.

Together with the ELN (see below), the FARC is responsible for a majority of the

kidnappings in Colombia. According to the Center for International Policy, “The FARC

and ELN are responsible for about 15 percent of killings associated with Colombia’s

conflict, many of them civilian non-combatants. The FARC regularly carries out

massacres, and has claimed many innocent lives through indiscriminate use of inaccurate

gas-cylinder bombs12.” Due to its reputation as a communist threat during the Cold War

and its current status as the “root of the drug problem,” the FARC has been a primary

target of American involvement in Colombia for decades. Currently, the US government

sees the FARC as a terrorist organization, and as such has given itself a green light to

mobilize against the FARC even with regards to issues unrelated to narcotics. In a

rhetorical stunt, the Bush Administration often refers to FARC members as narco-

terrorists. The Bush Administration’s efforts to justify attacks on the FARC as part of its

War on Terror will be discussed in more detail in section III

b. The ELN

11 http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm12 http://www.mediaisland.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=40

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The ELN (Ejército de Liberación Nacional -- The National Liberation Army),

also founded in 1964, was created by a group of Colombian students who underwent their

political and guerilla training in Cuba. Following the Cuban model of rural rebellion, the

ELN attracted many radical students and priests who believed in the communist

doctrine13. The ELN, whose mission is “to incite a Marxist revolution to oust the

Colombian government, replacing the current capitalist economy with a socialist system,”

currently has 3,500 members14.

During the Cold War, the ELN depended largely on financial and military

assistance from the Soviet Union and Cuba. Attracted to the ELN’s commitment to

peasant welfare, many radical priests joined the group during the 1960s as well. When

the Cuban and Soviet aid declined in the 1980s, the ELN turned to kidnapping and

extortion for funding.

Largely due to its religious ties, the ELN historically has not turned to drugs as a

primary source of revenue. Recently, however, under new leadership, the group has

loosened its prohibition on involvement in the drug trade. A primary goal of the ELN is

the sabotage of the energy industry—oil pipelines, and electricity infrastructure—as it

claims that the industry is dominated by foreign interests15.

Although the ELN spoke for years of potential peace talks with the Colombian

government, in early June of 2002, the Colombian government officially terminated talks

that were taking place in Havana, Cuba, claiming that “the guerillas were not committed

to the objectives of their peace agreement16.” By turning the War on Drugs into a “War

on Terror,” the Bush Administration has increased stepped up the efforts to shut down the 13 http://www.mediaisland.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=4014 Harper b np15 http://www.mediaisland.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=4016 Harper b np

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ELN. As the ELN gets in the way of American oil interests, their new label as

“terrorists” has allowed the American army to wage fronts against them, even though

they are not very involved in the drug trade.

B. Paramilitary Groups

The guerillas, in their efforts to protect themselves and the nation’s natural

resources have often targeted the wealthier land owners and oil producers. As such, ever

since the guerilla groups entered the scene in Colombia, wealthy landowners, ranchers,

and businessmen have banded together to protect themselves and their assets from the

guerilleros17. In the 1950s, these land owners began commissioning militias to protect

their assets and take revenge when necessary. These defense militias grew drastically

during the 1980s, with the financial support of the drug cartels that had bought a majority

of Colombia’s land.

Over the course of the late 20th century, multiple paramilitary groups were set up,

often in response to the deaths of family members of drug cartel leaders. Because of the

exorbitant wealth of the drug lords, paramilitary groups have been very wealthy and

powerful. The groups threatened anyone suspected of supporting guerilla groups,

ranging from unionists to religious leaders to journalists18. As the drug trade grew,

paramilitaries such as the MAS (Death to Kidnappers) were established to protect cartel

leaders’ interests in cities19. They used abusive tactics such as selective assassinations,

forced disappearances, massacres, and forced displacements of entire communities in

effort to eliminate guerilla groups.

17 Heeres 118 Harper c np19 Heeres 1

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The AUC (Autodefensas Unidades de Colombia: The United Self-Defense Force

of Colombia), led by Carlos Castaño is currently the umbrella organization for these

right-wing paramilitaries. In the year 2000 alone, the group was responsible for 804

assassinations, 203 kidnappings, and 57 massacres20. Using “extreme brutality” toward

civilian populations, the group continues to weaken guerrillas and establish a terrorizing

presence throughout Colombia21. Castaño has recently admitted that the UAC benefits

largely from taxes received from coca growers who pay for protection from guerillas.

The groups appear to be directly involved in processing cocaine as well22. Due to the

immense profits as a result of drug production, the UAC has grown nine-fold since 1992,

now claiming more than 8,000 members. Paramilitary groups commit around 80 percent

of the murders in Colombia’s conflict.

Although it is very controversial, paramilitary groups are often involved with the military

that the United States is funding. Because of their common interest in the repression of

guerillas, the government and the paramilitaries have been able to unite in effort to fight

the guerilla war. As such, much of the American dollars spent on the Colombian conflict

are indirectly reaching the hands of the paramilitary organizations.

c. Government Military Forces

In the wake of all the civil unrest caused by paramilitary and guerilla groups, one

must ask, “Where is the law enforcement during all this?” Historically, it has been either

absent or contributing to the commotion. The military consists of roughly 250,000

members—145,000 military and 105,000 policy officers. Slightly less than one fifth of

20 Harper c np21 http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm22 http://ciponline.org/colombia/infocombat.htm

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Colombia’s municipalities have no state security presence; this contributes largely to the

paramilitaries’ ability to do as they please in various regions in Colombia.

In 1989, the Colombian Minister of Defense publicly stated that the military was

to embark on a “total war” to “control the popular elements and manipulate the masses23.”

This declaration gave the military the green light to target anyone they felt was under any

sort of control of the “subversive elements” of society24. As a result, many organizations,

such as indigenous organizations, environmental organizations, peasant movements,

religious groups, etc. became potential military targets25.

As the violence of the military grew worse and American ties with Colombia

strengthened, the pressure for reform increased. A revised military penal code was

implemented in 1999, increasing the likelihood that those committing human rights

abuses be tried and brought to justice. It also guarantees protection for militiamen who

refuse to violate human rights while serving. Although this was considered by many to

be a step in the right direction, there has been very little effort to enforce any of the

policies set forth in this code.

The Colombia military has had very positive relations with the United States

government since the beginning of the Cold War (even sending a battalion to fight with

the United States in the Korean War). As part of the war on drugs, the US has provided

the Colombian military with equipment through the international narcotics control

program, military assistance programs, and foreign military sales. As the US trains many

Colombian soldiers, the US has had opportunities to push further reforms on the

Colombian military. In 2000, the Colombian government spent 3.4% of its GDP, $3

23 Heeres 124 Heeres 125 Heeres 1

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billion dollars, on its military in effort to combat the insurgency that has gone on over the

past 40 years. Much of the remainder of this paper focuses on the relationship the

United States government and the Colombian military have had over the past decade.

FARC | ELN | AUC

Zones of greatest illegal armed group activity

FIGURE 1: Guerillas, Paramilitaries, and Government illegal murder rates

d. Conclusions

After looking at the groups that are playing large roles and examining figure 1, it

is certainly apparent that Colombia is not a nation of exclusively “good guys” and “bad

guys.” Regardless, however, of who the victims are and who the perpetrators are, this

section has clearly laid out that Colombia is a weakly governed nation with a stark

history of corruption, animosity, and vengeance. As we will see, the United States’

decision to focus great amounts of money on the police and military to fight illegal drugs

—what many call a symptom of other nation problems—was not a recipe for success in

this incredibly complex conflict.

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III. American Involvement in Colombia

a. Before “Plan Colombia”

The United States and the Colombian military have had a positive

relationship for centuries. As mentioned above, Colombia was the only

Latin American nation to support American efforts in the Korean War.

During the Cold War, the primary motivation for American involvement in

Colombia was the ideological clash with the guerillas. This pinned

American forces against the guerilla movements’ communist mission.

Incidentally, just as the Communist threat began fading from the

American security radar screen, the American people began seeing drugs

as a large international threat. A 1988 New York Times poll showed that

“48 percent of the US public considered drugs to be the principal foreign

policy challenge facing the United States26.” In response, George Bush Sr.

began a counter-narcotics effort, beginning in Bolivia and extending it to

Peru and Colombia in 1989. His counter-narcotics effort continues today.

Although the stated motives for supporting the Colombian military have

changed, America has supported it for decades.

Throughout the 1990s, the Clinton Administration provided the

Colombian military with more than $100 million per year, claiming that

the money would only go towards counter-narcotics efforts. Although

administrators admit that in some areas, the counter-narcotic efforts often

crossed into counterinsurgency actions, the Clinton Administration

ignored this contradiction with policy. Furthermore, the US military was

26 Baron 1

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often engaged in military training in Colombia, preparing Colombian

soldiers who were explicitly oriented towards fighting the guerillas27.

Clearly, thus, as early as the 1990s, the American forces were already

involving themselves in far more than a Drug War, wetting their hands in

a Civil War they pledged to be keeping out of.

b. Since the late 1990s

The American involvement in Colombia continues to increase rapidly. The

Embassy in Bogotá has recently passed the embassy in Cairo as the largest American

Embassy in the world28. Since Plan Colombia came into effect in 2000, the United States

has appropriated $2.44 billion for Colombia, with $1.97 billion going to Colombia’s

police and military forces. On average, that equals $1.35 million per day for four years.

Another $688 million will go to Colombia in 2004, and there are requests that even that

quantity increase29.

The majority of American aid goes to Colombian counter-narcotics army

brigades. More than half of all aid has gone to create and maintain a 2,300 man brigade

in the far south of Colombia, an area fiercely contested by both the FARC and the

paramilitaries. This new battalion’s original mission was to eradicate drug-processing

labs, apprehend traffickers, and clear armed groups from areas of drug-cultivation30.

The U.S. funds not only pay for the 2,300-man army brigade, but also for dozens of

helicopters, naval and air force support, radar sites, base construction, “and a police-run

27 Youngsters 228 Bouvier 129 Isacsen 230 Viacius 4

12

aerial drug-crop fumigation program that has sprayed herbicides over nearly 400,000

hectares of Colombian territory, an area larger than the state of Rhode Island31.”

In 2002, however, the Bush Administration upped the ante in American

involvement in Colombia. As part of the administration’s “War on Terror,” it was made

permissible to use American sponsored equipment and training for “counter-terrorist”

purposes. As a result, “some of the brigade’s operations may legally resemble the U.S.-

supported counter-insurgency efforts commonplace in Latin America during the Cold

War32.” A result of this new green light on non-narcotic affairs is a $99 million project to

help Colombian forces take on guerillas near the Venezuelan border. Another 93 million

dollars has gone towards funding a pipeline protection brigade, which trains Colombian

31 Isacsen 232 Viacius 4

13

soldiers to fight off ELN guerillas in protection of the Araunca region’s pipeline33.

FIGURE 2: US Aid to Colombia 1997-200334

As can be seen in figure 2, around 1 in 6 dollars given to Colombia has gone to

humanitarian relief. Some of the money has gone towards helping illicit drug farmers

find legal crops to produce, some has given emergency assistance to displaced citizens,

some has gone to Non-Governmental Organizations. The money proportioned to human

rights relief work at least indicates that Washington understands that this problem cannot

be solved through military alone.

33 Bouvier 434 Diagram taken from Viacius 5

14

Despite the kind gesture behind the humanitarian relief aid, however, the 5/6 of

the money given in military aid neglects many of the most basic tenants of counter-

insurgency35. The massive herbicide being sprayed across peasant fields by counter-

narcotic militants is fueling anti-American and anti-government sentiment in areas

controlled by guerilla forces36. According to journalist Eric Isacson, “The social and

economic component of Washington’s aid has been overshadowed, particularly in most

Colombians’ perceptions, by the far larger military-aid outlay37.” Even the aid that is

reaching targeted populations is only having a marginal effect. According to US

Ambassador to Colombia Anne Peterson, “[The aid programs that have been successful]

only represent a drop in the bucket in relation to the real needs of Colombia’s displaced

persons38.”

IV. Plan Colombia Results

The previous paragraph examined aspects of Plan Colombia’s humanitarian side.

This section will look into the successes and failures of the remainder of Plan Colombia.

The media have built up the successes of Plan Colombia, generally pointing to

declines in levels of coca being produced, increased macroeconomic growth, and declines

in violence levels in Colombia39. The Washington Post claimed that “Though Plan

Colombia still hasn’t achieved many of its goals, there can be little question that the $2.7

billion invested by the United States so far has gotten results40.” As has been and will be

pointed out, these claims are overly-optimistic. Critics of Plan Colombia are not so sure

of the positive outcomes. According to Representative Janice Schakowsky (D-Illinois),

35 Isacson 536 Viacius 737 Viacius 538 Viacius 839 Isacson 340 Isacson 3

15

“Plan Colombia has made a bad situation in Colombia even worse and has not provided

any measurable benefit to the American people41.”

a. Problems with Current American Policy

As mentioned in the introduction, there have been many counter-productive

results from the War on Drugs. In the year 2002, around 4,000 people were murdered

and more than 350,000 people were forced from their homes, despite the new American

presence. The conflict led to 19 civilian deaths per day in 2002, as opposed to just 12

civilians per day in 200442. Drug production has continued, drug prices in the United

States have not increased, and the human rights situation has continued to get worse43.

US-supported counter-narcotic programs are exacerbating the already depleted situation.

US fumigation projects have destroyed crops, made water undrinkable, displaced

thousands of farmers, and harmed the health of farmers and animals in contact with the

herbicides44. These harmful effects led to a Colombian court ruling making it illegal to

spray glyphosate on coca and poppy plates; a government court overruled the decision,

and the spraying has resumed45.

One of the largest problems with current American policy in Colombia is its great

dependency on the Colombian military, a historically corrupt and ineffective

organization. A recent senate report admitted that the Colombian military is a

“particularly weak link in the fight against narcotics.46” The weakness manifests itself in

a long tradition of human rights abuses, of collaborating with brutal paramilitaries, a

41 Isacson 342 Bouvier 143 Vacius 144 Bouvier 545 Bouvier 546 Senate Report 108-106-Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriation Bill, 2004, online athttp://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/?&dbname=cp108

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history of corruption, and a lack of accountability for the human rights abuses it

perpetuates47.

As a result, the United States policy gives insufficient priority to protecting the

democratic institutions of Colombia and finding a peaceful result to their 40-year-old

war. Instead of seeking an end to the war by attacking the conditions that give rise to

such a conflict, American energy has focused largely on alliances with political and

economic elites; such alliances are unfavorable for long-term peace in Colombia, which

would certainly be in American interests.

The Colombian government, though distancing itself from any peace agreement

with the guerilla groups, is advancing negotiations with right wing paramilitary groups.

The AUC has committed itself to gradual demobilization as well. Though this seems like

a promising inroad to peace, any agreement would most likely include an amnesty

granting to the perpetrators of the crimes against humanity48. Furthermore, it would side

the American aid with the leaders of the drug cartels who have committed 80 percent of

the murders in Colombia over the past few decades! The hypocrisy is almost startling.

We support a regime that has taken sides with the drug traffickers profiting from the drug

networks, while attacking the poor peasants who have little control over what they

produce. This is all our effort to stop drugs from getting to America.

From a more economic standpoint, supply-side drug policy is unlikely to bring in

the effects that the government is hoping for. Despite any decreases that may have taken

place in Colombian coca fields, the drug prices in America have remained constant

throughout49! This implies that drugs have remained equally accessible. Furthermore,

47 Bouvier 448 Isacson 849 http://www.wola.org/publications/Citizen_Action_Guide.PDF 2

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history has proven that if one country produces less of any drug, other countries begin

producing more. See figure 3 for an example of how Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru have

maintained the drug market, despite changes in quantity produced by individual nations.

This is known as the bubble effect. In the words of the Washington Office on Latin

America: “Steady demand – and the immense profits it produces – ensures that even if

drug cultivation and production are suppressed in one area, they will emerge in

another50.”

FIGURE 3: The Balloon Effect (as one country’s production decreases, others increase)

V. Suggestions for Future and Conclusions

American efforts to reduce the flow of drugs into our country have proven

ineffective. Our government has spent more than 25 billion dollars in the past decade on

anti-drug programs, but more illegal drugs are currently available at prices cheaper than

ever before51. In the process of spending all this money, the US government has

50 http://www.wola.org/publications/Citizen_Action_Guide.PDF 251 Citizen Action Guide 1

18

strengthened an abusive military in Colombia and stepped into a quagmire of civil

conflict. Three years after Plan Colombia was passed, the aid Clinton granted has

expanded well beyond the simple realm of the War on Drugs. Isacson explains the

situation: “Counter-terrorism is now the principal rationale, though policymakers are still

trying to figure out what that term means in a country whose terrorist groups are armies

that control territory and have tens of thousands of members52.”

So what comes next for our relations with Colombia? In a completely ideal

world, violence declines, coca moves away, and guerillas lose steam. Some government

reports have claimed that these results are currently being realized. Current Colombian

President Uribe, however, does not expect American aid to leave anytime soon. “An exit

strategy now is a disaster strategy,” he told Washington Post reporters53. The US

Congress General Accounting Office agrees that it’s unlikely that Colombian forces

could handle an American removal of forces: ““Neither the Colombian Army nor the

Colombian National Police can sustain ongoing counter-narcotics programs without

continued U.S. funding and contractor support for the foreseeable future54.” If we cut off

our aid, thus, whatever progress might be made will be retracted quickly. It’s also

noteworthy that these quotes are in response to our ideal world scenario.

In a more realistic world, the drug world will maintain it’s demand-meeting

resilience and the guerillas will hold strong in the Colombian jungle, much like was the

case in Vietnam. In today’s political climate, it will be nearly impossible for the US to

52 Isacson 853 Wilson np54 United States, General Accounting Office, “Financial and Management Challenges Continue toComplicate Efforts to Reduce Illicit Drug Activities in Colombia: Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director,International Affairs and Trade” GAO-03-820T (Washington: 3 June 2003).

19

pull out of Colombia, and the forces pulling the US towards more military action could

be too strong to resist. Isacson fears, “Whether the result is a new Vietnam, a large-scale

El Salvador, or something new, it could be quite painful55.”

It is imperative, however, for Washington to realize that military escalation is

NOT the only available option. Many have found that drug treatment domestically is one

of the most effective methods for reducing its use at home. Decreasing narcotic demand

in the States would serve as a more fruitful option than the multi-billion dollar supply

side war the US Government is currently waging. Economic aid to Colombia could be

part of a larger strategy to bring to life Colombia’s downtrodden and attacked labor

sector. The basic human rights of nearly a million internal Colombian refugees require

immediate attention. And lastly, the domestic judicial system of Colombia will not be

able to maintain any order if it cannot enforce the rules of society.

While pulling out may not be the answer, the least the US can do is try to address

the root causes of the problems as laid out in the previous paragraph. Tokatlian expresses

that the various wars being waged in Colombia, “the war on drugs”, “the

counterinsurgency war”, “the war against the establishment”, are just oversimplifications,

euphemisms “for the an inability of any individual or organization to understand the

crisis that has multiple actors, where there is no specific, identifiable source of blame.56”

We must end this overly simplified approach. One step would be to abandon fumigation

in favor of an eradication strategy that actually strengthens the Colombian government.

The current system of spraying fields with destructive chemicals only harbors distrust

among peasants who have very little contact with their government. The US must view

55 Isacson 1256 Tokatlian np

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human rights and security as inseparable and necessary for the common good. Lastly and

most importantly, the US must realize that the problems Colombia faces “are complex

and inter-related, and that focusing too much on one aspect courts failure57.” As Viacius

claims, “A genuine U.S. and Colombian effort to address these ‘deeply-rooted problems’

would be a radical break with historic patterns and policies, more revolutionary than

anything Colombia’s insurgents claim to be fighting for.”

57 Viacius 15

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