AMA-An Empirical Test of the Consequences of Behavior- And Outcome-Based Sales Control Systems 1994

An Empirical Test of the Consequences of Behavior- and Outcome-Based Sales Control SystemsAuthor(s): Richard L. Oliver and Erin AndersonReviewed work(s):Source: The Journal of Marketing, Vol. 58, No. 4 (Oct., 1994), pp. 53-67Published by: American Marketing AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1251916 .Accessed: 27/01/2012 16:39

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Richard L. Oliver & Erin Anderson

An Empirical Test of the Consequences of Behavior-

and Outcome-Based Sales Control Systems

In a previous volume of this journal, the authors presented a behavior versus outcome sales control continuum based on methods of monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating the salesperson's efforts and results. They empirically test their propositions about how control system perceptions influence salespeople on a diverse sample of sales representatives. They find that the predicted effects of control philosophy on affective and motivational states are generally supported whereas the effects on sales strategies or performance outcomes are not. Or- ganizational culture differences are also observed.

The notion of a sales personnel governance structure (control system) is a fairly recent phenomenon when com-

pared with the role of elements of governance structure taken singly, such as the compensation plan, supervision, or evaluation procedures. As stated in our previous work (An- derson and Oliver 1987, hereafter A&O) a control system is "an organization's set of procedures for monitoring, directing, evaluating, and compensating its employees" (p. 76). In this work, we proposed that control systems can be characterized as points along a continuum anchored by two "alternative" and polar managerial strategies labeled "outcome control" and "behavior control." In this formulation, an outcome-based control system involves relatively little managerial involvement with salespeople, reliance on straight- forward, objective results measures (e.g., sales), and use of compensation methods that shift risk to the salesperson (i.e., commission or bonus).

In contrast, a behavior-based control system is typified by high levels of supervisor monitoring, direction and inter- vention in activities, and subjective and more complex methods of evaluating performance, typically centered on the salesperson's job inputs (e.g., personal qualities, activities, sales strategies). Inputs are not themselves indicators of

Richard L. Oliver is the Valere Blair Potter Professor of Management, Owen Graduate School of Management, Vanderbilt University. Erin An- derson is Professor, INSEAD, Fontainebleau, France. The authors grate- fully acknowledge the financial support of the Manufacturers' Representa- tives Educational Research Foundation (MRERF) and thank Richard Bagozzi, the editor, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful suggestions. The first author thanks the Dean's Fund for Faculty Research of the Owen Graduate School of Management for providing partial support for this project. The second author was a visiting professor at the European Institute for Advanced Management Studies (EIASM, Brussels, Belgium) and the Facultes Universitaires Catholiques de Mons (FUCAM, Mons, Bel- gium) while working on this project.

results (outputs) but are expected to generate future results. Performance evaluation on inputs is necessarily more subjective because the manager must decide if and to what degree inputs generate outputs. Moreover, inputs do not lend themselves to objective measurement, because they are not always readily countable or observable. To enable the manager to monitor, direct, and impose subjective judgments, the company assumes risk through reliance on salary.

We argued that output and behavior control are polar op- posites and that management may elect to position its strategy at various levels between these extremes. We offered a propositional inventory based on the notion that the position management selects for a salesperson along the behavior- outcome continuum has numerous managerially significant consequences in terms of the salesperson's affect, cognition, behavior, and performance. Here, we offer a test of these propositions. We believe an attempt at empirical verification of the A&O framework is necessary to address the increas- ing level of discussion in the literature (e.g., Cravens et al. 1993; Jaworski 1988; Ouchi 1979) regarding the merits of alternative control systems.

A Propositional Inventory: The Nature and Consequences

of Control Systems In this section, we offer a brief recapitulation of the A&O propositions and reasoning, referring the reader to the original source for details. The heart of our argument is that sales management should present a coherent governance structure (Williamson 1985) that signals to salespeople how they are expected to perform their jobs. Because selling is a relatively entrepreneurial and unstructured function, management must decide to what degree it will gain and exert control over sales employees (its agents) versus delegate au-

Journal of Marketing Vol. 58 (October 1994), 53-67 Sales Control Systems / 53

thority to salespeople, while holding them accountable for the results of their actions.

We argue that this choice is analogous to the vertical in- tegration decision of where to locate along a continuum anchored by the options of make or buy (integrate or contract out). Although make and buy are opposite philosophies, intermediate combinations, or "hybrid governance," can be created by adopting intermediate levels of ownership, monitoring, direction, subjective evaluation, and results sharing. In sales management, John and Weitz (1989) have applied it to the issue of what proportion of compensation should be delivered in fixed (salary) versus variable form (bonus/ commission).

The A&O arguments also address the sales management domain but generalize beyond the compensation issue to include monitoring, directing, and evaluating. We argue that these elements of governance structure work in concert to send powerful signals to salespeople and serve to motivate them to think, feel, believe, and behave in manners consistent with each structure. Hence, we make the argument that levels of monitoring and direction, as well as methods of evaluating and compensating salespeople, should be treated as interrelated decisions that collectively describe management's control system. We further argue that the net effect of control systems is perceived by salespeople and is a critical influence on their job-related cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors. This perspective, as illustrated in Figure 1, assumes that diverse elements of control strategies combine in a uni- fied manner to influence salespeople.

Although behavior and outcome control have similar goals (i.e., that salespeople contribute profitably to the organization), they reflect very different managerial philosophies. Outcome control is essentially a laissez-faire ap-

FIGURE 1 Operation of the Perceived Control System

Outcome Control |

Strategies \

Behavior I Control

t Strategies

Perceived Control System

Cognitions Affects Behavior

proach that assumes that salespeople are best able to deter- mine their direction and level of effort and that the resulting level and mix of sales will achieve the firm's goals. Outcome control is administered with a "carrot and stick" remunera- tion plan, such as straight commission compensation. As such, environmental risk is shifted from the firm to the salesperson, because no financial commitment is made unless and until sales occur (Basu et al. 1985). Simply put, outcome control is a minimalist system of governing salespeople wherein financial incentives keyed to observable outcomes are substituted for active management involvement.

In contrast, behavior control is, in some sense, a pater- nalistic approach whereby managers dictate that salespeople provide what they believe are "correct" inputs to achieve the firm's goals. This allows for nonsales goals, such as account maintenance and service, to be pursued. A longer time perspective can be assumed because immediate results can be balanced with long-term sales relationships and outcomes. Straight salary is frequently the compensation plan of choice with this philosophy, because it encourages salespeople to accept as legitimate the authority of management (John and Weitz 1989), thereby encouraging compliance with managerial directives. Simply put, behavior control is the philosophy of empowering managers to guide the way salespeople carry out tasks, shifting responsibility for outcomes from the salesperson to the management of the firm.

We argue that these control systems have numerous consequences for the salesperson, which are presented here as propositions in Table 1. Generally, the propositions are based on the argument that behaviorally based systems are nurturant, providing guidance and feedback. Salespeople do not have to "perform" in output terms (e.g., show high current sales) as long as they carefully follow the organization's formula for success. Thus, this system can tolerate salespeople with a risk-averse nature. Time can be taken to learn company products and procedures, as well as appropriate sales techniques. A bad sales period in output terms can be diagnosed while salary payments continue. The prototypical salesperson in this system is, as a result, committed, satisfied, and a team player.

The outcome-control salesperson is quite the opposite. Left on his or her own to succeed, this person is believed to be motivated by immediate self-interest. The firm's role is to provide a product line to sell and commissions to reap in return. Those who are more risk-prone are thought to do well in this organization. As a result, sales techniques may be compromised as short-run goals are pursued. Long-term sales strategies with uncertain outcomes may be avoided because low commitment to the firm can result in a job change before these strategies bear fruit. The prototypical salesperson in this system is, as a result, a less-satisfied individualist with little attachment to one employer. Although exag- gerated, these descriptions illustrate the extreme contrasts implied by our earlier propositions.

Although we suggest that managers may select intermediate positions on the behavior-outcome continuum (e.g., moderate supervision and balanced salary/commission plans), we also argue that combinations of opposing philosophies (e.g., straight salary but little supervision) are

54 Journal of Marketing, October 1994

i

TABLE 1 Behavior Versus Outcome Control: Propositional Inventory

Managerlal Philosophy Dimension Outcome < Behavior

Control system elements (classification criteria) Properties Nature of supervision Looser Closer Nature of evaluation More objective More subjective Compensation plan Higher % incentive Higher % fixed

Cognitions/capabilities Consequences Product/company knowledge Less More Sales expertise/competence Less More

Affects/attitudes Organizational commitment Less More Accepting of authority/direction Less More Accepting of cooperation/teamwork Less More Accepting of performance reviews Less More Risk preference Seeking Averse

Motivation Nature of motivation Higher extrinsic Higher intrinsic Direction of motivation Priority to self Priority to agency/firm Behavioral strategy Planning Less More Call activity More Less Sell/nonsell time ratio Higher Lower Selling technique Closed ("Harder") Open ("Smarter") Performance Outputs Higher Lower Inputs Lower Higher Additional predictions Job satisfaction Less More Participative decision-making Less More Pay as a control mechanism More Less Organizational culture:

Innovative Less More Supportive Less More Bureaucratic Less More

internally contradictory. This is a normative argument, however. Our first proposition is that practice will conform to prescription; that is, few if any managers will create "inconsistent" combinations. At the same time, we acknowledge that a control system is defined as the combination of supervisory style (monitoring and direction), evaluation, and compensation, regardless of whether management is "consistent" by these normative criteria.

An empirical test of the A&O propositions requires that management philosophy be identified as to the degree to which it is perceived as primarily behavior- or outcome-control oriented. We develop a continuous index from salespeople's perceptions of the governance modes under which they work. Differences in the affective, cognitive, motivational, and behavioral dimensions are then tested across reported types of sales control systems.

Evidence for the A&O Framework

To date, only one published study addresses the validity of the sales control framework. In a sample of 144 sales managers from a diverse set of industries, Cravens and colleagues (1993) tested several of the A&O propositions.

Their perspective differs somewhat from that presented here, however, because they view managerial control and the control implicit in the compensation scheme as independent control mechanisms. Despite this difference, they find evidence for one or the other of the control mechanisms scored in the direction of behavior control in determining competence, teamwork, risk aversion, intrinsic motivation, recog- nition, planning, sales support, and customer orientation- all in accord with the A&O propositions. Weaker support and, in some cases, no support were found for behavioral strategies.

Of interest is that Cravens and colleagues (1993) specifically call for research that (1) controls for environmental variation by "studying multiple sales organizations in the same industry" (p. 56) and (2) investigates the A&O phe- nomena at the level of the salesperson. In addition, they suggest that the key relationships be tested with the control system defined as a "blend" of management and compensation control and not as isolated activities.

The present research answers this call. In addition to studying sales control at the level of the salesperson within multiple firms in a single industry, we attempt to develop an

Sales Control System / 55

index of sales control that incorporates compensation as a constituent component. Our approach, detailed in the fol- lowing discussion, provides an alternative perspective to the measurement and testing of the A&O propositions and per- mits a comparison of results of our study with that of Cravens and colleagues (1993).

Proposed Indicators of Governance Modes

We sought to develop an index of behavior and outcome control. In pursuing this task, the literature on formative indicators, as frequently used in social policy, was consulted. This literature is not widely cited in marketing, so some background information may be helpful to the reader.

In common practice a latent construct is reflected in manifest variables to which the construct gives rise. The manifest variables are "reflective indicators" (Bagozzi 1984) or "effects indicators" (Bollen and Lennox 1991), so called because the indicators are effects of the latent construct. Hence, if the latent construct increases, each indica- tor should also increase. In contrast, the approach required to test the A&O propositions is one of "causal" or "formative" indicators (Bollen and Lennox 1991; MacCallum and Browne 1993; Pedhazur and Schmelkin 1991). The indicators are formative in the sense that they are necessary but separate conditions for the emergence of the construct. Be- cause the indicators form the construct, rather than being generated by the construct, they need not be highly (or even moderately) correlated with each other as would be the case with effects indicators.

Within the A&O framework, this approach allows for potential inconsistency in the degree of use of the indicators. Thus, even if managers are inconsistent, their supervisory style can still be characterized as to a predominant degree of behavior versus outcome control, and this degree of behavior- or outcome-control dominance will influence salespeople.

In the present context, we identified three defining elements of behavior- versus outcome-control sales philosophies. Specifically, more behavior-oriented (outcome-oriented) control systems have (1) a higher (lower) level of management involvement-that is, greater (lesser) supervision, direction, and contact between salespeople and their managers, (2) more subjective (objective) evaluation methods based on an emphasis of process behaviors over outcome (e.g., "bottom-line") results, and (3) as an implementation procedure, a greater proportion of salary (commission and bonus) in the pay package. Thus, the specific indicators in our framework are measures of the extent of supervision, contact, and direction (i.e., manager involvement), subjective versus objective evaluation procedures, and the percentage of salary in the compensation plan. We attempt to represent this system of component indicators, as described in the "Measures" section.

Proposed Consequences of Governance Modes Our previous work proposed a series of control system effects on salespeople. As we view control systems on a continuum, the propositions are expressed as continuous hypotheses. Subsequently, we recap high points of our reason-

ing briefly, referring the reader to the original article for detail.

Cognitions and capabilities. As a control system moves closer to the behavior-control pole, salespeople are thought to be better informed about their company and products and have better training. The reasoning is that salespeople have the security of a salary base, and the encouragement-indeed pressure-of management to take the time to train, learn, and experiment with selling the product line. In contrast, outcome-control salespeople view time to train and learn as time out of the field (with a high opportunity cost) and are relatively unwilling to experiment with new products and approaches because their reliance on commission income pressures them to gain quick results.

Job affects and attitudes. The more a system approaches behavior control, the more salespeople are thought to feel committed (and grateful) to the employer who assumes risk for them and gives them a more nurturant climate (Eisen- berger et al. 1986). They are also considered more accepting of management's power, which is manifested as greater acceptance of authority, performance reviews, and the man- date to work in teams. Salespeople are thought to be more risk averse in a behavior-control setting, which causes them to prefer the security of a salary system coupled with heavy direction.

Motivational direction. The luxury of financial security (a guaranteed salary) and the encouragement of management to focus on behavior, with less concern for results, is thought to permit and encourage salespeople to pursue intrinsic goals and consider their employer's well-being. In contrast, salespeople operating closer to the outcome-control pole are compensated for the risk they assume by the opportunity to gain high levels of extrinsic rewards, a major focus of such organizations. Given the relatively low level of day-to-day contact with and support from management, they may become more self oriented and less employer oriented.

Behaviors. Salespeople are thought to behave different- ly depending on the control system they face. At the extreme, outcome-control salespeople, left to their own de- vices and pressured to book orders quickly, may neglect activities with a long-term payoff such as planning and spend- ing time on nonselling activities. They may move more quickly and decisively to close an order and may "knock on more doors," motivated by the prospect of more orders. In contrast, when moving toward the behavior-control extreme, salespeople are encouraged, trained, and permitted to take more of a problem-solving approach; work smarter; rely on expertise appeals; and spend a greater proportion of time on planning and other nonselling activities.

Performance. Finally, we proposed that each system ex- cels at what it emphasizes-and suffers on those attributes it treats as being of secondary importance. Hence, all else con- stant, salespeople working under behavior control will out- perform their outcome-control counterparts when "performance" is measured on inputs. The reverse is expected to occur when performance is assessed on outputs.

56 / Journal of Marketing, October 1994

Other Predictions

Although not specifically hypothesized, several other predictions are evident from our prior work. For example, one can infer from extensive findings on the correlates of organizational commitment (Mathieu and Zajac 1990; Johnston et al. 1990) and the discussion of the nurturant environment of a behavior-control philosophy that job satisfaction should be higher in settings closer to behavior control. This would derive from the more "considerate" aspect of behavior control, the more extensive supervisory feedback (Jaworski and Kohli 1991), and the reduced uncertainty facing the salesperson in this same organization (Basu et al. 1985).

In addition, behavior control is more likely to involve the salesperson in goal setting, particularly for nonsales goals. This element of participative decision making should further distinguish the behavior- and outcome-control environ- ments. In contrast, the sales representative under outcome control may believe that the only "guidance" provided by management is channeled through the pay system. Thus, we predict that salespeople operating under behavior control will see greater participative decision making and put less emphasis on compensation to guide salesperson behaviors.

Lastly, different levels of control systems should reflect different organizational cultures. It is not possible to causal- ly position culture as antecedent or consequent to the control philosophy, because the two may emerge jointly (Desh- pande and Webster 1989). However, it is reasonable to ex- pect that culture correlates will be evident (Wilkins and Ouchi 1983). One framework that may display such differences is based on Margerison (1979) and operationalized by Wallach (1983). Margerison proposed three dimensions of managerial culture-namely, innovativeness, supportiveness, and bureaucracy. We believe that these dimensions effectively tap important elements of control system philosophy in that a system closer to behavior control, because of its nature, can display greater innovativeness over both management style and specification of behavioral strategy. In addition, it is naturally more supportive and, paradoxically, more bureaucratic in its implementation. Consequently, these organizational culture dimensions are offered as illus- trative and predictive of those likely to be found in early studies of sales-control philosophies.

Method

Sample Data were obtained from salespeople employed by a diverse set of independently owned and operated sales agencies, re- ferred to as manufacturers' representatives or "rep" firms, in the electronic components industry. Electronic components is a large and diverse industry of approximately 2000 firms, which is fortunately characterized by homogenous terminol- ogy with regard to sales force issues. However, the product lines carried by these agencies were sufficiently diverse that the sales population could not be considered homogeneous with regard to salesperson product portfolios. This enhances

the generalizability of the results and increases the opportunity to observe multiple control systems.1

Managements of sales firms that are members of the primary national trade organization representing this industry were invited to participate. Letters of solicitation bearing the trade association's endorsement and promising individu- alized reports of the findings of a study of "compensation practices" were sent to the managements of 350 trade-association member firms selected by random sampling. Of these, 299 (85%) expressed interest in participating.

Managers of interested firms were sent an instruction packet. This packet included a numbered "manager's survey" asking for classification data about the sales office and three like-numbered salesperson surveys with separate indi- vidualized postage-paid return envelopes. Managers were asked to distribute all three surveys to reps in their firm. To ensure variability in performance, managers were instructed to select one "above-average rep," one "mid-range rep," and one "below-average rep."2 The performance designations were embedded in the surveys and were not known to the reps. To motivate participation, reps were guaranteed confi- dentiality and were given the chance to win one of five $100 prizes in a raffle of respondents.

Of the original 299 interested firms, 216 (72%) returned their management survey. An informal phone sampling of nonresponding managements indicated that nonrespondents either (1) believed that their operation did not qualify as a sales office (e.g., a consulting firm) or (2) were one-person operations. Thus, of a theoretical maximum of 648 potential rep respondents, 356 surveys were received from 194 firms. Follow-up notices mailed to the 22 participating sales offices with no rep respondents revealed that 8 were one-person operations; the remainder did not respond to the follow- up.

When based on comparison with the managers' reports of sales office size (i.e., accounting for sales force sizes of less than three), the 356 surveys represented 66% of dis- tributed surveys.3 Of these, 347 provided complete data on the control system classification criteria, a requirement for inclusion in the study. The average respondent was male (92%), 39 years of age, and a college graduate (64%); had been in sales for 12 years and the present job for 5.5 years; and received $49,500 in total compensation in the past year.

Measures: Classification Criteria

As described subsequently, measures were either adapted from past research or generated for this study. Preliminary versions of the questionnaire were administered to conve- nience samples of sales reps at trade association functions. Results were used to purify measures and suggest appropri-

IThe manufacturers' representative, as a company, is paid by its principals (suppliers) on a commission basis. However, the employees (i.e., salespeople) of the company are not necessarily paid on the same basis. Rather, the rep firm's management selects the compensation plan for individual salespeople.

2For sales offices with fewer than three reps, managers were instructed to use only the above or above and mid-range survey packets.

3As expected, more surveys were received from above average producers (41%) than either mid-range (33%) or below average (26%) producers due to the incidence of one- and two-rep sales offices.


TABLE 2 Factor Structure of the Behavior-ControVOutcome-Control

Index Classification Criteria

Variable/Factor SUPERa SUBINP NOTBL SALRY PAPINP OBJOUT

SUPER1a .546 - - SUPER2 .684 - - - - SUPER3 .546 -- - SUPER4 .780 - SUPER5 .559 - - - SUPER6 .772 -- - SUPER7 .793 - - SUPER8 .730 - - - NOTBL1 - - .491 - - NOTBL2 - .753 - - NOTBL3 -.784 - - NOTBL4 - .754 - - OBJOUT1 .- 744 OBJOUT2 - - .663 OBJOUT3 - - - .709 PAPINP1 - - .784 PAPINP2 .558 PAPINP3 - - .758 SUBINP1 - .811 SUBINP2 - .860 SUBINP3 - .806 - SALRY1 - -.960 - SALRY2 - - -.965 -

Cumulative variance explained (%) 24.5 36.1 44.8 53.2 59.3 64.0

aVariable abbreviations refer to the control index scale items in Appendix A. Note: Cross loadings omitted for clarity. None exceeded .355. Factor loadings shown are after varimax rotation.

ate structure. The perceptions of salespeople about the control systems they face were measured at the level of the individual so that salesperson-specific governance mechanisms akin to the micro control systems explored by Ja- worski and Maclnnis (1989) and Kohli (1989) would be obtained.

Control system classification criteria. The A&O framework defines behavior-oriented systems as having greater management involvement (i.e., supervision, contact, and direction), more subjective evaluation methods based on process behaviors rather than outcome results, and a greater proportion of salary in the pay package. As determined by analysis of the classification sections of the survey, these elements were tapped by six scales that were combined as formative indicators of the control system. Scale items were factor analyzed from slightly longer lists of items and "trimmed" to reveal a stable structure. In all cases, scoring was in the direction of behavior control (see Appendix A for the final scales).

One section of the survey measured salesperson perceptions of management's control philosophy, as aided by the typology of Buzzotta and Lefton (1982). Two factors emerged: management involvement and reliance on outcome evaluation. On the basis of the resulting items in these factors, greater management involvement with salespeople was measured with a traditional Likert 7-point agree/disagree scale tapping perceptions of extent of supervision (SUPER, 8 items). The second scale, basing evaluation on

outcome results rather than process behaviors, was reversed in meaning to conform to the behavior-control scoring scheme. Assessed in Likert format, it reflected the absence of a "bottom-line" orientation (NOTBL, 4 items).

To complement this overall assessment of management philosophy, a section of the survey on criteria used in evaluation measured the degree to which reps reported that management collected various performance measures.4 Three factors emerged: (1) paper or call-related inputs (PAPINP, 3 items), (2) subjective "effort/attitude" inputs (SUBINP, 3 items), and (3) objective outcome methods (e.g., sales), scaled as to how much these output measures were not used (OBJOUT, 3 items). The third element of the domain of control systems, proportion of fixed compensation, was measured with the previous and current year percentages of salary in the pay package. The resulting measures were sub-

jected to a confirmatory factor analysis to reveal a final "behavior-control" factor structure before constructing the index.

Table 2 shows the factor structure of the six scales used here as indicators of behavior control. All loadings exceeded .5, with one marginal exception, and no cross loadings exceeded .36. The six scales explained 64% of the variance in the data set. This demonstration of discriminant validity

4Items are abbreviated from the extensive lists provided by Jackson, Keith, and Schlacter (1983).

58/ Journal of Marketing, October 1994

provides the basis for operationally defining a behavior-control index.

Because each salesperson faces a control system that is the totality of its parts, we use a formative indicators approach to represent the rep's control system as consisting of the six control system scales, two tapping management philosophy, three representing reports of management behavior, and one of compensation reports. To accomplish this task, items within each of the five supervision and evaluation scales and the two annual percentages of salary in the pay plan were averaged into single scores. Because we had no a priori basis for differentially weighting the components and so as not to implicitly weight the six components, each was converted to its standard score equivalent (mean = 0; standard deviation = 1) across respondents. In accordance with the literature on formative indicators, these were added to form an index of behavior control (versus outcome control-represented by lower scores). Using Nunnally's (1978, p. 246-55) formula for combining linear combinations of variables from different domains of content, this behavior- control versus outcome-control index yielded a reliability coefficient of .81.5

To assess the consistency of governance mode within agencies, the control index scores within an agency were correlated across agencies. Here, the agency is used as the level of analysis. High correlations would indicate consistent governance across reps within an agency and low correlations would indicate rep-specific governance. This analysis could be performed for only those agencies for which surveys were received from two (n = 63) or three (n = 48) reps. The correlation between index scores in the two-rep agencies was .22 (p = n.s.) and those between scores in the three-rep agencies were .23, .25, and .28 (allp = n.s.). Thus, although there is some tendency for reps to share consistent governance, the relations are not significant and the correlations are very modest.

Analysis of background factors was performed to discover sources of variation in the index scores. Inspection of information on the rep's gender, age, education, sales experience, and current job experience revealed significant correlations for age (r = -.11, p < .05) and current job tenure (r = -.14, p < .01), suggesting that younger, less experienced reps are put under behavior control. Correlations with agency data supplied by the sales manager showed larger agencies engaging in less behavior control as follows: number of sales reps (r = -. 13, p < .05), support staff (r = -.24, p < .01), managers (r = -.13, p < .05), and sales offices (r = -.19, p < .01). Apparently large rep firms are more im- personal and distant in their dealings with reps, thereby fos- tering a perception that only outcomes matter.

5Note that this is not a coefficient alpha reliability estimate, which is used when the items are from the same domain, but rather is a different estimate altogether. The apparent anomaly-that near independent scales have high reliability when combined into an index-is due to the high reliabilities of the components. In fact, index components can be uncorrelated and yield a high index reliability if their individual reliabilities are high. This is so because perfectly reliable components will yield the same index estimate on repeated trials. See Nunnally (1978) for a clear exposition of these different reliabilities.

Measures: Consequences of the Governance Mode

Measures of the hypothesized consequences of a behavior- versus outcome-control philosophy are discussed subsequently. Each is described in Appendix A along with reliability estimates. Scales developed expressly for this study are reported in full; others are noted as to their source.

Cognitions/capabilities. Product and company knowledge is measured in terms of information needs ("I need to know more about...") on a 7-item scale designed around Behrman and Perreault's (1982) "technical knowledge" performance factor. In this context, the items measure knowledge deficiencies and are therefore reversed for use in this scale. The 5-item sales expertise/competence scale is adapted from the Curry and colleagues (1986) work involvement scale-the degree to which an employee is committed to high standards of occupational performance. We assume that items tapping "perfectionism" and "professionalism" indicate high levels of attention to expertise and competence.

Affects/attitudes. The organizational commitment measure is a 7-item agree-disagree scale adapted from that proposed by Still (1983) and Mowday, Steers, and Porter (1979) and widely used by organization theorists, who find reliability estimates ranging from .82 to .93 (Randall 1990). Scales measuring acceptance of authority/direction, cooperation/teamwork, and performance reviews were written specifically for this study. Consisting of three, five, and four items, respectively, they measure how willingly the salesperson accepts management authority and direction, cooper- ates as part of a team, and welcomes performance reviews. Lastly, the risk preference measure is a 4-item Likert scale about "taking chances" and fiscal conservatism. As adapted from items in MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985), it is general in tone.

Motivation. Two dimensions of motivation are tapped. The first is based on the internal versus external nature of motivation (e.g., intrinsic versus extrinsic), and the second is based on the object of the motivational effort (i.e., to place serving oneself or one's agency/firm first). To measure the first dimension, intrinsic and extrinsic motivation scales were written for this study. For the second, respondents were asked to allocate 100 points to their work-related effort put in to serve (1) principals, (2) agency, (3) customers, and (4) oneself. Presumably, a firm-oriented motivational hierarchy should reflect higher percentages allocated to principals and agency, rather than to customers and self. The agency motivation score is based on the points attributed to both agency and principals as a percentage of the total number of points (see Appendix A).

Behavioral strategy. Several dimensions of behavioral sales strategy are measured: planning, call prospecting (new account generation) as a percentage of work hours, selling (including new account generation) as a percentage of work hours, and an "open" or "smarter" versus "closed" or "harder" (Weitz, Sujan, and Sujan 1986; Spiro and Weitz 1990) selling technique. Planning is measured with a four-item scale used in Avila and Fern (1986). Prospecting (call activ-


ity) and selling percentages are obtained in a self-report fashion (explanation is provided in Appendix A). Selling technique is measured using the Oliver and Weitz (1991) motivation to work "hard" scale; the motivation to work "smart" scale was written for this study.

Performance. Performance outcomes are measured in two forms and cross-validated against the managerial performance designation used in the distribution of surveys. A relative measure is obtained by asking each salesperson to rate his or her performance "compared with other reps in your agency" on three summed self-report performance in- dices (achieving agency sales goals, effort, and overall performance) as well as on a percentile ranking of annual sales. These self-reports were cross-validated against the sales manager's designation of the rep as either above average, average, or below average. Group comparisons showed consistent differences between self-reported performance and manager's ratings of overall revenue-based performance in the expected direction (F = 22.09, p < .001 for the summed scale and F = 70.17, p < .001 for the percentile ranking), thus providing convergent validity for the self-report measures.6 This lends confidence to other performance data reported by salespeople, as described subsequently.

Items from four Behrman and Perreault (1982) job performance scales that specifically tap sales outcomes and inputs and are measured on a "needs improvement"-"out- standing" continuum, were used to provide further evidence of effects on performance. The first of these sets of items tapped the outcome performance dimension of meeting sales and profit objectives, whereas the latter three categories- keeping the company informed by providing paperwork (gathering information), using expense accounts responsibly (controlling expenses), and communicating effectively with customers through sales presentation skills-are not themselves results but may be expected to contribute to eventual results.

Other consequences of behavior versus outcome control. Job satisfaction was measured on an abbreviated version of INDSALES (Churchill, Ford, and Walker 1974; Comer, Machleit, and Lagace 1989), consisting of 13 items. The participative decision-making measure is a 4-item scale written for this study measuring the degree to which management considers the reps' inputs in decisions affecting them. Based on the work of Deci and Ryan (1985), the measure of pay as a control mechanism is a 4-item scale tapping the degree to which reps perceive pay as the sole mechanism for reward and punishment.

Our measure of organizational culture is the three-part organizational culture index (OCI) from Wallach (1983). The OCI purports to tap bureaucracy-the degree to which authority is delineated in hierarchical fashion and work is organized and systematic; innovativeness-the degree to which the environment is stimulating (and hence stressful) and encourages risk taking; and supportiveness-the degree

6This suggests that salesperson reports are not biased upward in a manner that invalidates their usefulness and is consistent with Behrman and Perreault (1982) and Churchill and colleagues (1985), who find that contrary to popular belief, salespeople do not claim to be top performers when they are not.

to which the environment is harmonious and humanistic. These dimensions figure prominently in discussions of organizational climate (O'Reilly 1989). This instrument was selected because it was thought to reflect the rule-oriented but innovative and supportive nature of behavior control systems.

Table 3 shows the correlation matrix of the independent and classification criteria variables used in this study. These correlations provide some evidence of discriminant validity in that none is higher than .62 and most are in the .2 range. Yet, appropriate correlations are high enough to suggest convergent validity. For example, the two measures of reported performance outcomes (P and Q) correlate positively at .59. Nomological validity is also present. For example, job satisfaction and organizational commitment should be related (Mathieu and Zajac 1990); they do correlate at .44.

Comparison With the Work of Cravens and Colleagues (1993) The philosophical and methodological details of our study can now be compared with those in the study by Cravens and colleagues (1993) (see Table 4). With the exception of a common framework to guide hypothesis generation, the differences between the two studies are noteworthy and will provide substantially different tests of the A&O framework.

Results Table 5 shows the zero-order correlations between the index of behavior control scores and the variables hypothesized to respond to a behavior-control orientation. The table shows that the correlations are in the hypothesized direction and are statistically significant for most predictions involving affective and motivational consequences. Moreover, the control system perceived by the salesperson is also related in the expected directions to the innovativeness and supportiveness dimensions of organizational culture, satisfaction, and participative decision making and negatively to the use of pay as a control mechanism. Mixed results were obtained for the two cognitive variables and performance, in which only half of the predictions were supported. Contrary to expectations, perceived control systems do not appear, for the most part, to affect the salesperson's behavioral strategy.

In terms of magnitudes, the larger effects show that behavior-control philosophies are related to commitment, acceptance of authority, teamwork and review, a lack of extrinsic motivation, a greater interest in serving the agency, participative decision making, less use of pay as a control mechanism, and an innovative and supportive culture. Weaker results in the hypothesized direction were found for sales competence, job satisfaction, less risk-seeking propen- sity, selling smarter (but not harder), expense control, presentation planning, and a self-ranking of performance. Nonetheless, these results do suggest that control systems have an impact on a salesperson's thoughts and feelings and certain behaviors. Behavioral strategy, however, does not appear to be strongly influenced by the nature of the control system.

601 Journal of Marketing, October 1994

TABLE 3 Correlation Matrix of Study Measures

Var A B C D E F G H I J K L M N 0 P Q R S T U V W X Y Z AA AB AC AD AE AF AG

A 100 -03 -01 -08 -06 -11 05-08 -05 -11 -03 -01 05--05 -08 02 01 06 03 04-02 03-06 -11 -06 -05 -06-03 03 11 -12 -04 -12 B 100 18 30 35 17 -11 35 -12 02 31 04 -06 28 24 28 19 27 28 14 29 35 11 -01 28 13 25 12 14 -05 03 30 -10 C 100 26 28 -01 -01 32 -37 11 13 03 -00 14 16 08 02 11 06 12 16 44 43 -22 44 -13 54 33 27 -14 -01 34 -00 D 100 48 26-11 17--09 04 28 06-03 21 11 05-00 05 16 21 24 26 28-06 31 11 33 27 16--06 00 21-00 E 100 19-09 26-15 05 30 00 00 20 21 15 07 14 25 24 30 34 19-02 30 11 26 21 14-13 07 21 03 F 100 -01 11 -02 -02 13 -04 -05 12 21 -02 -08 04 10 09 07 11 -02 11 10 23 05 11 11 -07 14 12 09 G 100 05 01 03-08 05-10 12 10--00 02 06-13 -13 -06 05-01 09 15-11 03-05 -08 -07 -08 05-13 H 100 -52 06 24 02-01 31 42 18 11 19 14 13 21 48 09-04 23 02 16 05 07-11 06 12--08 I 100 -10 -01 02 01 -19 -13 -08 00--06 -07 -11 -12 -44 -14 24 -25 05 -20 -18 -22 03 00 -14 -06 J 100 -05 -01 -00 05 06 01 01 03-00 -03 02-04 13-05 11 02 16 12 16--02 08 07 16 K 100 09 07 30 21 21 08 19 34 23 21 25 03 09 21 17 15 09 01 -14 06 13--07 L 100 -56 08 03--07 -03 -09 -02 12 04-02 07 01 -02 -19 05 05 06-04 -03 -00 02 M 100 -07 -05 06 01 09 07-06 02 03-05 -04 -04 10-07 04-10 -05 03 01 -01 N 100 09 13 01 16 04 13 26 37 12-05 26 05 21 09 12-05 -03 24-07 0 100 18 06 19 10 08 12 27 06 14 22 07 08 02 03--07 12 12-09 P 100 59 61 24 15 41 37 06 01 25 14 15 04-04 -14 08 09-15 Q 100 51 06 00 22 14 06-00 04-02 -00 01 -09 -11 10--00 -21 R 100 17 12 55 32 08 05 22 14 12 03-07 -27 18 18-15 S 100 30 24 16 05 07 14 18 10 02-03 -05 08 13 02 T 100 31 13 01 -02 06 15 12 07 07-00 10 14 04 U 100 37 12-04 27 12 20 13 06-20 15 25-07 V 100 24 -15 51 05 37 18 18 -13 01 29 -15 W 100 -30 35-31 58 51 45-06--06 36 09 X 100 -02 17 -19 -17 -20 -16 09 -03 -14 y 100 11 58 31 16-27 09 47-16 Z 100 -05 03-10-10 28 02-06

AA 100 44 36-19--02 41--01 AB 100 40-13 13 39 13 AC 100 06--00 34 14 AD 100 -35 -28 03 AE 100 19 12 AF 100 02 AG 100

A = Product/company knowledge L = Call activity as a percentage of other activities W = Participative decision making B = Sales expertise/competence M = Ratio of selling/nonselling time X = Pay as a control mechanism C = Organizational commitment N = Motivation to work smarter Y = Innovative organizational culture D = Accepting of authority/direction 0 = Motivation to work harder Z = Bureaucratic organizational culture E = Accepting of cooperation/teamwork P = Relative performance AA = Supportive organizational culture F = Accepting of performance reviews Q = Performance percentile AB = Extent of supervision G = Risk aversion R = Performance on sales and profit objectives AC = Absence of a bottom-line orientation H = Intrinsic motivation S = Gathering information AD = Infrequent use of objective outcomes I = Extrinsic motivation T = Controlling expenses AE = Use of paper inputs J = Motivation to serve agency rather than self/customers U = Sales presentation skills AF = Use of subjective inputs K = Amount of planning V = Job satisfaction AG = Percentage of salary in the compensation plan

Note: Decimals omitted; n = 347; minimum pairwise n = 318. All correlations of 1 1101 or greater significant at p < .05

co

(/3 0

(A3 0

a_ (/3

3r

0

0

Bo 0)

TABLE 4 Comparison of the Present Study to Cravens and

Colleagues' Study (1993)

Philosophical/ Cravens and Methodological The Present Colleagues Detail Study (1993)

Control system Two orthogonal dimensionality Unidimensional dimensions

Underlying control factors Six Two

Unit of analysis Salesperson Sales force

Informant Salesperson 'Top level" sales executive

Reporting perspective Descriptive Normative

Firm sampling frame One industry Various industries

TABLE Correlations Between the Behavior-/Outcome-Co

Discussion The set of findings presented here provides early support for the behavior- versus outcome-control consequences proposed in the A&O framework. Perceptions of a behavior- control governance structure indeed appear to be related to greater affect and acceptance among reps, as well as to suggest some tendency for more professional competence, intrinsic motivation, and attendance to agency goals (at the expense of other goals). Outcome-control perceptions appear to coincide with bottom-line and extrinsic motivation.

The fairly consistent finding that behavior control relates to greater affect and acceptance of company procedures is consistent with the findings on a supportive organizational culture, a willingness to pursue agency as opposed to self goals, and a more risk-averse orientation. In effect, behavior-control reps appear to respond to the more certain and nurturant environment of a behavior-control sales office by adhering to company policy, pursuing company goals, and remaining committed to the firm.

E5 ntrol Index and Hypothesized Consequences

Behavior-Control Dimension Prediction Correlation

Cognitions/capabilities Product/company knowledge More -.06 Sales expertise/competence More .15b Affects/attitudes Organizational commitment More .27c Accepting of authority/direction More .20 Accepting of cooperation as part of a sales team More .18C Accepting of performance reviews More .17c Risk seeking preference Less -.12a Motivation Nature of motivation More Intrinsic .04

Less Extrinsic -. 1 c Direction of motivation Agency .20c Behavioral strategy Planning More .03 Call activity Less .02 Sell/nonsell time ratio Less -.03 Selling technique "Smarter" .10a

"Harder" .05 Performance Relative performance scale (outcome) Lower -.04 Relative performance rank (outcome) Lower -. 1 a Meeting sales/profit goals (outcome) Higher -.03 Information gathering (input) Higher .06 Sales expense control (input) Higher .5b Sales presentation planning (input) Higher .11a Job satisfaction More 13b

Participative decision-making More .44c Pay as a control mechanism Less -.21c Organizational culture More Innovative .21c

More Bureaucratic .02 More Supportive .34c

ap < .05, bp < .01, p < .001 One-tail tests are applied as the direction of effect is implied in the hypotheses.


One of the strongest findings in the study is that behavior-control organizations enjoy more organizational commitment from their salespeople. This is consistent with data from Eisenberger and colleagues (1986), who relate perceived organizational support to a reciprocal commitment on the salesperson's part, and with Michaels and colleagues (1988), who show that a salesperson's job commitment increases with the level of formalization in the sales force. The reason is that formalization reduces role stress. Behavior- control organizations appear to be more formalized than outcome-control systems, suggesting that these systems provide the salesperson more role clarity and less role conflict.

The organizational culture findings clearly show that behavior-control managerial styles are perceived by salespeople as more innovative and supportive, though not necessarily more bureaucratic. These findings are consistent with the argument that perceived corporate culture need not be unrelated to a control system philosophy but can be used to "re- inforce whatever approach is used and mitigate any of the problems created by specific control system components" (Lebas and Weigenstein 1986, p. 270).

Unfortunately, we were unable to demonstrate clear and consistent effects on performance or reported time alloca- tion behaviors, given the measures and methods used here- although specific types of input behaviors appear to be linked to a behavior-control philosophy (e.g., sales expense control). Recognizing that it is difficult to measure such effects in survey work, it may also be the case that no sub- stantial performance effects are warranted. As Churchill and colleagues (1985) point out, it is unusual to see correlations greater than .2 in absolute value between performance and any single performance predictor. This suggests that performance relationships are situation specific. This speculation is consistent with Lusch and Jaworski (1991), who find, in the context of managers of retail stores, that control systems do not have direct effects on performance; these effects are mediated by intervening states (e.g., job tension).

In some respects, the lack of behavioral strategy and performance effects is consistent with other literature on corporate culture (Saffold 1988). Notably, participative cultures do not appear systematically more productive, although they often exhibit higher employee satisfaction (Locke, Schweiger, and Latham 1986). This is consistent with the finding here that salespeople under behavior-control systems are more satisfied with their jobs and view their organizations as more participative yet do not perform at higher levels than do salespeople in outcome-control systems.

To sum up at this point, the results presented here suggest that behavior control is an "affect" strategy that correlates with a more accepting or receptive sales representative. It might also foster greater intrinsic motivation as well as the pursuit of agency goals unrelated to personal gain or remu- neration. Alternatively, outcome control is an uninvolved strategy, one in which salespeople can be expected to be more self oriented and less accepting of managerial direction. For certain sales organizations, it may nevertheless be the best strategy in that outcome control demands lower overhead than does behavior control; hence, it may be more robust to downturns and more profitable. Moreover, the

highly motivated individualist who flourishes in such organizations may be an excellent salesperson who refuses to accept behavior control.

As noted previously, Cravens and colleagues (1993) examine the (separate) effects of supervisory and compensation control and test sales managers' perceptions of what salesperson behaviors are effective as a function of supervision methods and compensation plans. Although this varies somewhat from the issues addressed in our previous work, Cravens and colleagues imply that such effects follow as normative derivations from the A&O propositions. Although the present study and that of Cravens and colleagues address alternative sets of consequences of behavior versus outcome control, there is some overlap between the sets. Within this overlap, the Cravens and colleagues findings are in accord, in general, with the findings here.

Specifically, both studies find associations between a behavior-based supervisory style (which is closer to our behavior-control index than is simple compensation) and how important it is perceived to be that the sales force be profes- sionally competent, team oriented, and intrinsically motivated. Moreover, Cravens and colleagues (1993) focus on performance outcomes, examining these in more detail than is done here. They find that behavior-based sales forces perform better in terms of expense control and presentation planning, which parallels our findings at the individual level. However, Cravens and colleagues also examine and find support for a greater range of performance effects, particularly with respect to how effectively the sales force uses inputs. They find no direct effect of supervisory style on the more outcome-oriented performance measures (financial effectiveness and achieving the firm's sales objectives), though they do detect indirect effects. The lack of a direct effect is consistent with the results presented here, leading us to concur with the Cravens and colleagues suggestion that performance effects be considered in a more contingent fashion.

Limitations and Further Research Suggestions In this early effort to investigate the behavior- versus outcome-control governance process, several limitations apply. In particular, this study uses salesperson perceptions of the mechanisms operating in their organizations in one (albeit broad) industry. Now that some empirical evidence is available to suggest what the underlying dimensions of the governance are, researchers are encouraged to survey manager reports of the control activities they use, so as to contrast this information with that provided by the reps under the manager's supervision. Researchers should also seek manager perceptions of their salespeople's attitudes, motivations, and behaviors or, at a more causal level, investigate parallel organizations known to employ specific control mechanisms.

Although several meaningful findings emerged from this investigation, it is acknowledged that the overall level of findings is of a modest order of magnitude. In part, this could have resulted from use of the single framework we present. One next step would be to expand on the determinants or "markers" of behavior control and outcome control so that others can construct a richer and broader conceptual

Sales Control System /63

structure surrounding the control concept. This may lead to new dimensions not yet fully reflected in the descriptions that we and others have provided.

A fascinating issue for further research is the divergence that can exist between a normatively correct governance structure (i.e., where all elements are in balance) and what managers may actually do. For example, Cravens and colleagues (1993) found that in managers' reports of their com- panys' control systems, compensation methods were largely independent of supervision styles. These findings are consistent with the results of this study, which finds that many salespeople are not facing control system elements combined in the manner that we argue to be normatively correct. It is quite likely that control systems are not designed as systems but assembled and modified as pieces. The decision makers may well vary from decision to decision and may respond to different information sets, constraints, and internal political pressures when tinkering with (or overhauling) their control system elements. Our framework would suggest that inconsistent systems should confuse and demoral- ize salespeople by virtue of sending inconsistent signals. Thus, a research agenda in the future could include discov- ering what types of inconsistency are most common and what effects they have on salespeople.

Another interesting research issue is the question of how control systems come to have their effects. The process by which the proposed consequences occur is likely to involve a combination of self-selection (in which salespeople ini- tially select specific job types), adaptation (in which salespeople change to fit the system in which they find themselves), and relocation (in which salespeople change jobs until they discover a compatible system). This, combined with the inevitable changes that occur as salespeople progress through career stages (Cron 1984), suggests that managers must be alert to what control system is appropriate at what point in time for which salespeople. For example, fledgling salespeople may prefer behavior control until they become experienced and confident, at which point at least some of them may have come to prefer a greater degree of freedom and may be willing to assume a greater degree of risk with outcome control.

A related question addresses the type of salesperson most effective in each system. It is to be expected that a given governance mode or culture will not suit everyone. For example, Koberg and Chusmir (1987) note that cultures are more appealing to some types of managers than to others. Similarly, O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell (1991) demonstrate that cultures differ substantially in the degree of appeal they hold for different individuals, with attendant consequences in terms of job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and turnover.

This line of reasoning underlies Cravens and colleagues' study (1993), which takes the control system as given. How- ever, rather than asking what salespeople operating under a control system would be like if they stay in the system, Cravens and colleagues (1993) ask what a salesperson under each system should be like to be successful in the system. Operating at the level of a sales force (rather than a salesperson), Cravens and colleagues (1993) find that many of the A&O propositions about what salespeople under various

control systems are like coincide with managers' perceptions of what makes a successful salesperson under different control regimes, particularly in the domains of affect, knowledge, attitudes, and motivation. These findings are consistent with the results of this study, which suggests that the A&O propositions are more accurate when describing affect, knowledge, attitudes, and motivation but less accurate when describing behavior or performance.

A reasonable extension of control system research is the effect of control on the customer's perception of the salesperson's performance. This topic is not well represented in the sales literature. One starting point is the framework of Evans and Grant (1992), who investigate incentive effects on customer satisfaction. To this end, we look forward to efforts to conceptualize and operationalize the governance concept beyond the early test here. It is clear additional progress awaits further analysis.

APPENDIX A Study Measures with Reliability Estimates

Behavior-Control/Outcome-Control Index Scale Items Extent of supervision: SUPER (8 items, a = .856) 1. My supervisor makes sure everyone knows what to do

and how to do it. 2. My supervisor stays in close contact with me. 3. My boss rarely asks me for information on how I'm doing. (R) 4. I don't have much contact with my company's manage-

ment. (R) 5. Management here stays very well informed of salespeo-

ple's activities. 6. I feel isolated from management. (R) 7. I don't get much day-to-day contact with management. (R) 8. We are subject to very little direction from our company's

management. (R) Absence of a bottom-line orientation: NOTBL (4 items, a =

.762) 1. When management rates my performance, they take a lot

of things into consideration. 2. Management decides who's good by looking strictly at

each salesperson's bottom line. (R) 3. Only tangible results matter to my manager. (R) 4. My manager doesn't care what I do as long as I produce.

(R)

Infrequent use of objective outcomes: OBJOUT (3 items, a = .618)

How heavily do you think your manager relies on these kinds of measures in evaluating your performance?

1. Sales volume (R) 2. Market penetration (R). 3. Achievement of quota (R). Use of paper inputs: PAPINP (3 items, a = .595) 1. Number of calls. 2. Sales expense. 3. Quality and completeness of call reports. Use of subjective inputs: SUBINP (3 items, a = .843) 1. Attitude. 2. Ability. 3. Effort.

Percent salary in compensation plan: SALRY (2 items, a = .962)

1. Present pay period. 2. Last pay period.


Hypothesized Con-sequences of Behavior/Outcome Control All response scales are 1-7 (Strongly Disagree - Strongly

Agree) unless otherwise noted.

Product/company knowledge (7 items, a = .781) Adapted from Behrman and Perreault's (1982) "Technical

Knowledge" performance factor.

Sales expertise/competence (5 items, a = .698) Adapted from the Curry et al. (1986) work involvement scale.

Organizational commitment (7 items, a = .837) Adapted from Still (1983) and Mowday, Steers, and Porter

(1979)

Accepting of authority/direction (3 items, a = .774) 1. When I'm given advice or instructions, I accept it willingly. 2. I generally accept the authority of management in this

firm. 3. I am quite receptive to feedback I receive from superiors.

Accepting of cooperation/teamwork (5 items, a = .748) 1. I am known as a team player when performing in groups. 2. I always fulfill my obligations to others I work with. 3. I am willing to do my part for the good of the group. 4. Working with others is a hassle I prefer to avoid. (R) 5. Teamwork is something I've always enjoyed doing.

Accepting of performance reviews (4 items, a = .807) 1. It is a definite plus to have a thorough review of my per-

formance by management. 2. 1 like my company to give me frequent, detailed perfor-

mance feedback. 3. I want to know at all times what management thinks of my

performance. 4. I'm the kind of person who needs lots of feedback from my

boss.

Risk-seeking preference (4 items, ao = .707) Adapted from items in MacCrimmon and Wehrung (1985) Intrinsic motivation (6 items, a = .816) 1. When I perform well, I know it's because of my own desire

to achieve. 2. I don't need a reason to sell; I sell because I want to. 3. Becoming successful in sales is something that I want do

for me. 4. If I were independently wealthy, I would still sell for the

challenge of it. 5. I wish I didn't have to retire someday so I could always

continue selling for the pleasure of it. 6. I sell because I cherish the feeling of performing a useful

service.

Extrinsic motivation (3 items, a = .826) 1. If it weren't for the money, I would not be in a selling job. 2. I sell because I get paid to sell. 3. After a long hard day, I realize that if it weren't for the

money, I wouldn't put up with this job. Motivation to serve agency more than self/customers As you know, representatives in sales organizations must di-

vide their efforts across various activities. Please allocate 100 points in the column below to reflect the work-related effort you put in to serve the principals you represent, the agency you work for, your customers, and yourself (your own needs).

I divide my efforts like this: Your principal points Your agency points Your customers points Yourself points

Measure: (Principal+Agency)/Total 100 points

Planning (4 items, a = .495) From Avila and Fern (1986) Call activity: prospects versus other activities In a typical week, how many hours do you put into the fol-

lowing activities? Letters/phone calls to prospects hrs per wk Calling on prospects hrs per wk Letters/phone calls hrs per wk Preparing paperwork and reports

to management hrs per wk Dealer (principal) meetings hrs per wk Training meetings hrs per wk Calling on present accounts hrs per wk Service/installation calls hrs per wk Planning hrs per wk Other hrs per wk Measure = (Hours on letters and phone calls to

prospects + Calling on prospects)/Total hours worked

Selling time/nonselling time (Use format above) Measure = (Hours spent on prospects + Hours spent on let-

ters/phone calls to present accounts + Calls on present accounts)/Total hours worked

Selling smarter (5 items, a = .461) 1. I am always experimenting with new sales approaches. 2. There really isn't much to learn about selling. (R) 3. Selling requires that I put more thought into how I sell

rather than more time. 4. I believe the best salespeople are those who know how to

sell, not those who put in long hours. 5. Every time I lose an order, I analyze what went wrong in

great detail.

Selling harder (5 items, a = .757) From Oliver and Weitz (1991) Relative performance (3 items, a = .862) Response scale: 1-9 (Below Average-Above Average) 1. How would you evaluate your performance on your agen-

cy's sales goals? 2. Compared with other salespeople working for your com-

pany, how would you evaluate your effort? 3. Compared with other salespeople working for your com-

pany, how would you evaluate your overall performance? Sales performance percentile When you compare your annual sales with the sales of other

salespeople in your agency, are you in the... 5 D Upper 10% of all reps 4 L] Upper 1/3 of all reps 3 I Middle 1/3 of all reps 2 r Lower 1/3 of all reps 1 I Lowest 10% of all reps

Meeting sales and profit objectives (7 items, a = .872) From Behrman and Perreault's (1982) "Sales Objectives"

performance factor.

Information gathering (4 items, a = .821) Adapted from Behrman and Perreault's (1982) "Providing In-

formation" performance factor.

Sales expense control (6 items, a = .853) Adapted from Behrman and Perreault's (1982) "Controlling

Expenses" performance factor.

Sales presentation planning (5 items, a = .836) Adapted from Behrman and Perreault's (1982) "Sales Pre-

sentations" performance factor. Job satisfaction (13 items, a = .913) From the Comer, Machleit, and Lagace (1989) abbreviated


version of INDSALES (Churchill, Ford, and Walker 1974)

Participative decision making (4 items, a = .754) 1. Decisions are made at the top around here. (R) 2. Salespeople and management tend to hammer out issues

together in this organization. 3. My boss actively seeks my ideas all the time. 4. Management makes decisions without much regard for

what salespeople think. (R)

Pay perceived as a control mechanism (4 items, a = .645) 1. The main reason for pay in this organization is to get me

to do what supervisors and managers want me to do. 2. I feel that the company uses pay to try to control every-

thing I do.

3. The compensation system really influences what I do on my job.

4. The main reason for pay in this organization is to give me concrete feedback on what I do here.

Innovative culture (7 items, a = .829) The innovativeness scale of the Wallach (1983) organiza-

tional culture scale (OCI)

Bureaucratic culture (7 items, a = .739) The bureaucracy scale of the Wallach (1983) OCI

Supportive culture (8 items, a = .782) The supportiveness scale of the Wallach (1983) OCI

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AMA-An Empirical Test of the Consequences of Behavior- And Outcome-Based Sales Control Systems 1994

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