Alvarez vs. Commonwealth of the Philippines

5/11/15, 2:25 PMPHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 065

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[No. 45315. February 25, 1938]

PRAXEDES ALVAREZ ET AL., plaintiffs and appellants,vs. THE COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHILIPPINES ETAL., defendants and appellees. MUNICIPALITY OF SANPEDRO, LAGUNA, interpleader and appellant.

CIVIL PROCEDURE; INTERPLEADER.Under section120 of the Code of Civil Procedure the remedy provided formay be availed of by bringing an "action", for no othermeaning may be deduced from the phrase "such person maybring an action against the conflicting claimants" used toindicate the procedure to be followed by one who wouldavail himself of its provisions. The word "action" means theordinary action defined in section 1 of the same Code andshould be commenced by complaint which may be demurredto as provided in section 91 and upon the grounds thereinstated. The pleading which commences an ordinary actioncannot be correctly called an application or petition becausethese, generally, are the pleadings used only to commencespecial proceedings. (Sec. 1, Part II, Chapters XXV to XLII,Code of Civil Procedure.)

ID. ; ID. ; NATURE OF REMEDY.The action ofinterpleader, under section 120, is a remedy whereby aperson who has personal property in his possession, or anobligation to render wholly or partially, without claimingany right in both, comes to court and asks that the personswho claim the said personal property

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Alvarez vs. Commonwealth of the Philippines.

or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance



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with the obligation, be required to litigate amongthemselves, in order to determine finally who is entitled toone or the other thing. The remedy is afforded not to protecta person against a double liability but to protect himagainst a double vexation in respect of one liability. Whenthe court orders that the claimants litigate amongthemselves, there arises in reality a new action and theformer are styled interpleaders, and in such a case thepleading which initiates the action is called a complaint ofinterpleader and not a cross-complaint.

ID ; ID. ; COMMONWEALTH OF THE PHlLIPPINES.Itis a fundamental principle that the Government of thePhilippines, now the Commonwealth of the Philippines, asthe supreme authority which represents in this country theexisting sovereignty, cannot be sued without its consent.The prohibition holds true both in a case where it is joinedas a defendant as well as in that where, as in the present, itis being compelled to litigate against other persons withoutits consent. There is no substantial difference betweenmaking it defend itself against its will in a case where it is adefendant and compelling it, without its consent, tointerplead in an action commenced by another person. Inone and the other case it is compelled, without its consent,to maintain a suit or litigation, and this is what the legalprinciple prohibits.

ID.; ID.; TENABILITY OF THE ACTIONWith theexclusion of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, becauseof its unwillingness to litigate or engage with anyone in asuit over an hacienda the ownership of which is clearlydefined and recognized, it becomes evident that the action ofinterpleader is indefensible from any standpoint for lack ofthe basis or reason relied upon by the plaintiffs in theircomplaint, namely, that there are two entities, theCommonwealth of the Philippines and the Colegio de SanJose, contending over the hacienda and claiming to beentitled to collect the rent or canon coming therefrom.

ID. ; ID. ; AMENDMENT.The amendment of a pleading,after a demurrer is sustained, is not an absolute right of thepleader; the amendment rests rather in the sound discretionof the court. Generally when a demurrer is sustained, theparty who presented the defective pleading is afforded anopportunity to amend it under conditions which the court



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may fix; and this should be done when it appears clearlythat the defect 13 remediable by amendment. But when it isevident that the court has no jurisdiction over the personand the subject matter, that the pleading is so fatallydefective as not to be susceptible of amendment, or that topermit such amendment

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would radically alter the theory and the nature of theaction, then the court may refuse the amendment of thedefective pleading and order the dismissal of the case.

ID. ; ID. ; ID.Section 101 authorizing the amendment of adefective pleading should be liberally construed and thecourts, whenever possible, should incline in favor of theamendment; but when it appears patent that the pleading isnot susceptible of amendment upon the grounds above setout, the appellate courts should not hold that the formerhave abused their discretion in not permitting theamendment and in dismissing the case.

APPEAL from a resolution of the Court of First Instance ofLaguna. Ocampo, J.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.Juan S. Rustia and Feliciano Gomez for appellants.Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee Commonwealth of

the Philippines.Araneta, Zaragoza & Araneta for appellee Colegio de

San Jose, Inc.Ramon Diokno for appellee Young.No appearance for other appellee.

IMPERIAL, J.:

It is asked in this appeal interposed by the plaintiffs andthe municipality of San Pedro that we reverse theresolution entered by the Court of First Instance of Lagunaon May 29, 1936, dismissing the complaint of the former,with costs against them; holding premature and also



dismissing the so-called cross-complaint of the municipalityof San Pedro; ordering the striking out of the motion of -Attorney Rustia of May 1, 1936 and that of Attorney Gomezof the 15th of the same month, and denying the motionsfiled by the aforesaid municipality; and it is asked furtherthat the case proceed to final judgment, with the costs ofthis instance to the appellees.

In the complaint by which the case was commenced, theplaintiffs allege: that they appear and bring the action forthemselves and in the name of other five thousand persons;that all of them and their predecessors-in-interest fromtime immemorial, are in possession for many years

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of many lots, where they now have their houses, and manyagricultural lands which they have continuously cultivated,lots, improvements and agricultural lands which are foundwithin the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan, situated in.the municipality of San Pedro, Province of Laguna; thatthey do not claim to be the owners of said lots andagricultural lands, but only of the improvements on theformer, consisting of houses; that they are entitled tooccupy the lots and agricultural lands, the first becausethey have their houses thereon wherein they and theirpredecessors-ininterest have always lived, and the latterbecause they as well as their predecessors-in-interest havealways cultivated the same; that they recognize in favor ofsomeone their obligation to pay reasonable rent or canonfor their occupation of the lots and agricultural lands, rentand canon which they are willing to pay to the person orentity which the court may determine; that theCommonwealth of the Philippines is the true owner of theentire Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasan by the right ofescheat; that this title was acquired by the Commonwealthof the Philippines because of the death of Don EstebanRodriguez de Figueroa. the original owner of the hacienda,and his two minor daughters without leaving any heir; thatthe Provincial Government of Laguna may have an interestin the hacienda, for the benefit of the plaintiffs and theresidents of the municipality of San Pedro; that this



municipality, the plaintiffs are given to understand, willclaim the ownership of the hacienda also by the right ofescheat; that the Colegio de San Jose, without any right,also claims to be the owner of the hacienda; and that CarlosYoung, without any known right. claims to have an interestin the same hacienda. And the plaintiffs conclude by askingthat the court order the defendants or interpleaders tolitigate among themselves over the ownership or dominionof the hacienda and thereafter determine by judgment whois the rightful owner thereof entitled to collect the rentalfrom them.

In the complaint are joined as defendants the Common-

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wealth of the Philippines, the Provincial Government ofLaguna, the municipality of San Pedro, the Colegio de SanJose, and Carlos Young. The municipality of San Pedrofiled its complaint of interpleader wherein it is stated: thataccording to the history of the Philippines, so it alleges, theHacienda de San Pedro Tunasan originally belonged to one,Don Esteban Rodriguez de Figueroa, who held the office ofGovernor and Captain General of the Island of Mindanaoand who executed a will transferring in trust and foradministration the entire hacienda aforesaid to acharitable institution of learning which was subsequentlycalled the Colegio de San Jose, governed by the Fathers ofthe Company of Jesus, otherwise known as the JesuitFathers; that Rodriguez de Figueroa died sometime inApril, 1596, leaving as heirs his two minor daughters, whoalso died without leaving any heirs; that since then theColegio de San Jose, through the Jesuit Fathers, had heldand administered the hacienda and through the practicecalled "sustitucin pupilar" by the claimant, the JesuitFathers succeeded in appropriating the same, consideringit from then on as their property-and as a part of thetemporal properties of the church; that the Jesuit Fatherswere expelled from the Philippines in 1768 and theirproperties, together with the hacienda, were confiscated bythe Spanish Government; that by virtue of the Treaty ofParis, the Organic Law of the United States Congress of



July 1, 1902, the Jones Law, and finally the Tydings-McDuffie Independence Law, the aforesaid hacienda passedto the ownership of the Commonwealth of the Philippinesand the latter is at present the owner thereof, which shouldbe administered and conserved for the benefit andadvantage of the inhabitants of the Philippines,particularly those of the municipality of San Pedro; that bythe right of escheat the Commonwealth of the Philippineshas likewise become the owner of the hacienda because ofthe death of the daughters of Rodriguez de Figueroawithout leaving any heirs and because there is no one whois legally entitled thereto; that the munic-

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ipality of San Pedro has a right to the hacienda for theexclusive benefit of its inhabitants; and that the Colegio deSan Jose should render an accounting of the rentals whichit has been collecting from the hacienda, which should notbe less than P60,000. And for prayer it asks that it bedeclared the owner of the Hacienda de San Pedro Tunasanand that the Colegio de San Jose render an accounting andpay it the aforesaid sum of P60,000.

Carlos Young appeared and interposed a demurrer to thecomplaint of the plaintiffs on the ground that it does notstate facts constituting a cause of action and that itsallegations are vague, ambiguous, and unintelligible; andurged that said complaint be finally dismissed inasmuch asit is not susceptible of amendment. Immediately thereafterthe same Carlos Young filed a motion to dismiss thecomplaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedro,on the ground that the latter entity has no standing tobring the action, that the complaint of interpleader ispremature because the court has not yet ordered theparties therein to litigate among themselves, and that theattorney who represents the said municipality hasappeared and is acting as such in favor of two differentparties with conflicting interests.

The municipality of San Pedro filed another motionasking that the prayer of its complaint be deemed amendedin the sense that in the decision it be ordered that the



rentals and income produced by the hacienda be paid to it.In another motion the same municipality opposed thedemurrer and motion to strike filed by Carlos Young.

The acting Solicitor-General, in behalf of theCommonwealth of the Philippines, appeared specially by amotion wherein it is asked that the complaint of theplaintiffs be dismissed. As ground he alleged that the courtlacked jurisdiction over the said entity because, it being therepresentative of sovereignty, it cannot be sued orcompelled to litigate without its express consent, a consentwhich the complaint alleges has not been previouslyobtained.

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In other motions the municipality of San Pedro asked thatthe Colegio de San Jose and Carlos Young be declared indefault, in connection with its complaint of interpleader, forfailure to file either demurrers or answers within theprescribed period.

The Colegio de San Jose, Inc., interposed a demurrer tothe plaintiff's complaint, upon the same grounds advancedby Carlos Young in, his demurrer. In another motion filed itasked to strike out certain allegations contained inparagraph IX, subparagraph (3), pages 14 to 21 of thecomplaint of interpleader of the municipality of San Pedrobecause they are immaterial and offensive. Subsequently itfiled its answer to the complaint of interpleader of themunicipality of San Pedro, wherein it denied the materialallegations thereof and put up the defense that theHacienda de San Pedro Tunasan is its exclusive propertyand that its title has been recognized by the governmentand the courts.

The provincial fiscal, in behalf of the acting Solicitor-General, presented a motion, to strike out certainimmaterial, unnecessary and improper allegations in theanswer of the plaintiffs to the motion to dismiss filed by theacting Solicitor-General.

The municipality of San Pedro filed another motion tostrike out the demurrer and motion filed by Carlos Youngand the motion to strike filed by the acting Solicitor-



General.The plaintiffs filed their answer to the demurrer

interposed by the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. And on thesame date they filed another motion asking that the courtsuspend the proceedings in the case on the ground that themunicipality of San Pedro commenced in the same courtcivil case No. 3052, wherein it is asked that the Haciendade San Pedro Tunasan be escheated to It.

Finally the court, on May 29, 1936, entered the appealedresolution dismissing the plaintiffs'" complaint, with thecosts against them, holding further that the complaint ofinterpleader of the municipality of San Pedro is pre-

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mature, overruling all the motions filed by the latter andordering the striking out from the record of the pleadingsfiled by Attorneys Rustia and Gomez on May 1 and 5, 1939,respectively.

The provincial government of Laguna has neitherappeared nor filed a demurrer or answer in the case. Fromwhat appears, it has shown indifference and lack of anyinterest to intervene.

The foregoing' is the contents in abridged form of all thepleadings presented in the case and reflects the theories ofthe parties as well as the legal questions raised in theassignments of error which shall hereafter be resolved. Wehave omitted other pleadings of minor importance whichwill have no influence on the resolution of the appeal.

The appellants assign in their joint brief the followingerrors: "First. In not abstaining from deciding any incidentin this case, and, consequently, in entering the appealedresolution charged with prejudice and partiality whichJudge Buenaventura Ocampo had against the attorney forthe applicants, which resolution is partial and unjust.Second. In considering, without any ground, that theapplication for interpleading is equivalent to a complaint inan ordinary action which may be demurred to, andconsequently, in sustaining the demurrers of Carlos Youngand of the Colegio de San Jose, Inc. Third. In holding thatthe application (not complaint) of interpleading is



insufficient, and, consequently, in dismissing it summarilyand finally, with the costs. Fourth: In sustaining the specialappearance of the Solicitor-General, and, consequently, inordering the striking out of the motion of May 1, 1936 inreply to said special appearance. Fifth. In declaring thecross-complaint of the municipality of San Pedropremature, and, consequently, in not holding Carlos Youngand the Colegio de San Jose (unincorporated) in default asdefendants in the said cross-complaint. Sixth. And inordering the striking out from the record of pages 14 and21 of the answer of the municipality, corresponding to

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subparagraph (3), paragraph IX, of the cross-complaint ofthe municipality of San Pedro, page 31 to 41 of the bill ofexceptions. Seventh. In not overruling the said demurrersand petitions to strike but; and in not granting the petitionto suspend the proceedings until the final resolution of thepetition for escheat Exhibit A."

1. In the first assignment of error the appellantsquestion the integrity and impartiality of the judge whoentered the appealed resolution and contend that he shouldhave abstained from taking cognizance of the. case andfrom entering any resolution therein,

The appellants concede that they have not dulyquestioned, at any time, the judge who decided this case.The facts of record do not furnish any evidence in supportof the appellants' contention. The circumstance pointed outby the appellants that one of their attorneys filed acomplaint and administrative charges against the judge,and that this naturally created an enmity between them, isnot a sufficient ground for concluding that the judge actedpartially. As we have stated, aside from this possibleanimadversion, there is nothing from which it may beinferred that the said judge acted partially in this case.

The appellants also assert that the appealed resolutionwas drafted not by the judge but by the attorney for Young,and that the former merely signed it. The assertion isbased entirely on the circumstance that the theories andreasoning of Attorney Diokno are reproduced and sustained



as good and sound in the resolution. It is true that thetheories of said counsel are accepted in the resolution, butfrom this it does not inevitably follow that the entireresolution was drafted by another, and not by the judge,and that the latter merely stamped his signature thereon.We hold that the first assignment of error is without merit.

2. In the appealed resolution the court sustained boththe demurrer of Carlos Young and that of the Colegio deSan Jose, Inc., to the complaint of the plaintiffs. The lattercontend in their second assignment of error that the

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resolution is consequently erroneous since the pleadingwhich the court styles and considers a complaint is, underprocedural law, a petition and as such cannot be demurredto.

The plaintiffs commenced the case under the provisionsof section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Englishtext of which reads:

"SEC. 120. Interpleading.Whenever conflicting claims are or maybe made upon a person for or relating to personal property, or theperformance of an obligation or any portion thereof, so that he maybe made subject to several actions by different persons, unless thecourt intervenes, such person may bring an action against theconflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interest in thecontroversy, to compel them to interplead and litigate their severalclaims among themselves, and the court may order the conflictingclaimants to interplead with one another and thereupon proceed todetermine the right of the several parties to the interpleading to thepersonal property or the performance of the obligation incontroversy and shall determine the rights of all parties ininterest."

Pursuant to this section, the remedy provided for may beavailed of by bringing an "action", for no other meaningmay be deduced from the phrase "such person may bringan action against the conflicting claimants" used to indicatethe procedure to be followed by one who would availhimself of its provisions. The word "action" means theordinary action defined in section 1 of the same Code and



should be commenced by complaint which may bedemurred to as provided in section 91 and upon thegrounds therein stated. The pleading which commences anordinary action cannot be correctly called an application orpetition because these, generally, are the pleadings usedonly to commence special proceedings. (Sec. 1, Part II,Chapters XXV and XLII, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The action of interpleader, under section 120, is aremedy whereby a person who has personal property in hispossession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,

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resolution is consequently erroneous since the pleadingwhich the court styles and considers a complaint is, underprocedural law, a petition and as such cannot be demurredto.

The plaintiffs commenced the case under the provisionsof section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Englishtext of which reads:

"SEC. 120, Interpleading.Whenever conflicting claims are or maybe made upon a person for or relating to personal property, or theperformance of an obligation or any portion thereof, so that he maybe made subject to several actions by different persons, unless thecourt intervenes, such person may bring an action against theconflicting claimants, disclaiming personal interest in thecontroversy, to compel them to interplead and litigate their severalclaims among themselves, and the court may order the conflictingclaimants to interplead with one another and thereupon proceed todetermine the right of the several parties to the interpleading to thepersonal property or the performance of the obligation incontroversy and shall determine the rights of all parties ininterest."

Pursuant to this section, the remedy provided for may beavailed of by bringing an "action", for no other meaningmay be deduced from the phrase "such person may bringan action against the conflicting claimants" used to indicatethe procedure to be followed by one who would availhimself of its provisions. The word "action" means the



ordinary action defined in section 1 of the same Code andshould be commenced by complaint which may bedemurred to as provided in section 91 and upon thegrounds therein stated. The pleading which commences anordinary action cannot be correctly called an application orpetition because these, generally, are the pleadings usedonly to commence special proceedings. (Sec. 1, Part II,Chapters XXV and XLII, Code of Civil Procedure.)

The action of interpleader, under section 120, is aremedy whereby a person who has personal property in hispossession, or an obligation to render wholly or partially,

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raised is already settled in this jurisdiction. It is afundamental principle that the Government of thePhilippines, now the Commonwealth of the Philippines, asthe supreme authority which represents in this country theexisting sovereignty, cannot be sued without its consent(Merritt vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil.,311; L. S. Moon & Co. vs. Burton Harrison, 43 Phil., 27;Compana General de Tabacos vs. Government of thePhilippine Islands, 45 Phil., 663; Belarmino vs. Hammondand Director of Public Works, 56 Phil., 482), Theprohibition holds true both in a case where it is joined as adefendant as well as in that where, as in the present, it isbeing compelled to litigate against other persons withoutits consent. There is no substantial difference betweenmaking it defend itself against its will in a case where it isa defendant and compelling it, without its consent, tointerplead in an action commenced by another person. Inone and the other case it is compelled, without its consent,to maintain a suit or litigation, and this is what the legalprinciple prohibits.

As to the other ground of the court, we have indicated, insummarizing the allegations of the complaint, that theplaintiffs maintain the view that the Commonwealth of thePhilippines has become the owner of the Hacienda de SanPedro Tunasan by transfer or conveyance under theTydings-McDuffie Law and by way of escheat upon thedeath of the daughters of Rodriguez de Figueroa without



leaving any heirs. On the other hand, they allege that theColegio de San Jose, which for the purposes of this case isthe same El Colegio de San Jose, Inc., who has appearedand is the appellee, likewise claims to be the owner of thehacienda thereby enjoying rights of ownership adverse tothose of the Commonwealth of the Philippines. With theexclusion of the Commonwealth of the Philippines, becauseof its unwillingness to litigate or engage with anyone in asuit over an hacienda the ownership of which is clearlydefined and recognized, it becomes evident that the actionof interpleader is indefensible from any standpoint for lackof the basis of reason relied upon

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by the plaintiffs in their complaint, namely, that there aretwo entities, the Commonwealth of the Philippines and theColegio de San Jose, contending over the hacienda andclaiming to be entitled to collect the rent or canon' comingtherefrom. We do not include Carlos Young, becauseaccording to his own admissions, he is a mere lessee of theColegio de San Jose, Inc., and does not claim any right ofownership adverse to the latter.

In reaching this conclusion we have not lost sight of thefact that the municipality of San Pedro has already filed itscomplaint of interpleader wherein it alleges a certaininterest in the hacienda and in its rents; but apart from thefact that in resolving the demurrers only the allegations ofthe plaintiffs' complaint should be taken into account (sec.91, Code of Civil Procedure), because the former aredirected only against it, it appears from the allegations ofsaid complaint of interpleader that the municipality of SanPedro also admits that the Commonwealth of thePhilippines is the owner of the hacienda by transfer andright of escheat.

Another question raised by the appellants has to do withthe holding of the court that the complaint of interpleaderof the municipality of San Pedro is premature inasmuch asthere:has been no order yet that the defendants litigateamong themselves. In the opinion of the court it isnecessary that there be a declaration to this effect before



the defendants may litigate among themselves and file acomplaint of interpleader. Section 120 of the Code of CivilProcedure in truth requires such step and good practicedemands that the defendants be not permitted to fileclaims or complaints of interpleader until after the courthas ordered that they should litigate among themselves.This procedure will do away with groundless suits, and willsave the parties time, inconvenience, and unnecessaryexpenses.

Finally, it remains to be decided whether, the demurrershaving been sustained, the plaintiffs are entitled to amendtheir complaint, or whether the case should be dismissed.

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Section 101 of the Code of Civil Procedure, prescribing theprocedure to be followed in cases where a demurrer hasbeen interposed, reads:

"SEC. 101. Proceedings on demurrer.When a demurrer to anypleading is sustained, the party whose pleading is thus adjudgeddefective may amend his pleading within a time to be fixed by thecourt, with or without terms, as to the court shall seem just; but ifthe party fails to amend his pleading within the time limited orelects not to amend, the court shall render such judgment upon thesubject matter involved in the pleading and demurrer as the lawand the facts of the case as set forth in the pleadings warrant. If thedemurrer is overruled, the court shall proceed, if no answer is filed,to render such judgment as the law and the facts duly pleadedwarrant. But after the overruling of a demurrer to a complaint, thedefendant may answer within a time to be fixed by general rules ofcourt; and alter the overruling of a demurrer to an answer theplaintiff may amend his complaint, if necessary, to meet new factsor counterclaims set forth in the answer."

Under this section the amendment of a pleading, after ademurrer is sustained, is not an absolute right of thepleader; the amendment rests rather in the sounddiscretion of the court. Generally when a demurrer issustained, the party who presented the defective pleadingis afforded an opportunity to amend it under conditionswhich the court may fix; and this should be done when it



appears clearly that the defect is remediable byamendment (Molina vs. La Electricista, 6 Phil., 519;

Serrano vs. Serrano, 9 Phil., 142; Segovia vs. ProvincialBoard of Albay, 13 Phil., 331; Balderrama vs. CompaaGeneral de Tabacos, 13 Phil., 609; Macapinlac vs. GutierrezRepide, 43 Phil., 770). But when it is evident that the courthas no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter,that the pleading is so fatally defective as not to besusceptible of amendment, or that to permit suchamendment would radically alter the theory and the natureof the action, then the court may refuse the amendment ofthe defective

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pleading and order the dismissal of the case (49 (C. J., sec.663, pp. 456, 457; San Joaquin etc., Canal, etc., Co. vs.Stanislaus County, 155 Cal., 21; Bell vs. California Bank,153 Cal., 234; Ridgway vs. Bogan, 2 Cal Unrep. Cas., 718;Schiecnt vs. Schiecnt, 211 P., 1065; Beal vs. UnitedProperties Co., 46 Cal. A., 287; Demartini vs. Marini, 45Cal. A., 418; Lentz vs. Clough, 39 Cal. A., 430; Burki vs.Pleasanton School Dist., 18 Cal. A., 493; Patterson vs.Steele, 93 Neb., 209; Cox vs. Georgia R., etc. Co., 139 Ga.,532; Peo. vs. MeHatton, 7 111., 731; Higgins vs. Gedney, 25Misc., 248; 55 N. Y. S., 59; Wood vs. Anderson, 25 Pa., 407).Section 101 authorizing the amendment of a defectivepleading should be liberally construed and the courts,whenever possible, should incline in favor of theamendment; but when it appears patent that the pleadingis not susceptible of amendment upon the grounds aboveset out, the appellate courts should not hold that theformer have abused their discretion in not permitting theamendment and in dismissing the case,

In the present case the plaintiffs' complaint is fatallydefective because its allegations are insufficient toconstitute a cause of action, and to permit the amendmentthereof the plaintiffs would have to change their theory aswell as the nature of the action which they havecommenced. For this reason the court did not commit theerror assigned in not permitting the amendment and in



finally dismissing the case.4. In their fourth assigned error the appellants contend

that the court erred in sustaining the special appearance ofthe Commonwealth of the Philippines, in excluding thelatter from the complaint, in dismissing it with respectthereto, and in striking out from the record the reply of theplaintiffs of May 1, 1936, to the special appearance.

In passing upon the third assignment of error, wealready said that the Commonwealth of the Philippinescannot, without its consent, be compelled to litigate in thisaction of interpleader. This being so, the conclusion isinevitable that the court did not err in sustaining the spe-

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cial appearance of the Commonwealth of the Philippinesand in ordering the dismissal of the complaint with respectto this party. As to the striking out of the reply of May 1,1936, we agree with the court that the step is justified inview of the fact that it is in truth a motion replete withallusions and statements reflecting on the actingSolicitorGeneral and Assistant Attorneys Quisumbing andBuenaventura, and it seems that it was filed for the solepremeditated purpose of molesting these governmentofficials.

5. In their fifth assigned error the appellants assert thatthe filing of the complaint of interpleader of themunicipality of San Pedro should not have been declaredpremature and, consequently, the Colegio de San Jose andCarlos Young should have been declared in default.

In resolving the third assignment of error we alreadyexpressed the opinion that, in accordance with section 120and good practice the court should order that thedefendants litigate among themselves before any of themmay file a complaint of interpleader. Applying this rule, itis evident that the first part of the assignment of error iswithout merit. With respect to the default of the Colegio deSan Jose and Carlos Young, it suffices to state that the firstand El Colegio de San Jose, Inc., are the same entity and it,as well as Young, interposed demurrers within the legalperiod. For these reasons, we hold that the fifth assignment



of error is untenable.6. We find no merit in the sixth assignment of error

impugning the striking out of pages 14 to 21 of the answerand complaint of interpleader of the municipality of SanPedro. We have already ruled that the complaint ofinterpleader was prematurely interposed, at least beforethe court had ordered that the defendants litigate amongthemselves, and it appears that the pages stricken out forma part of the former, wherefore, the exclusion or strikingout of the said pages was not error.

7. In the seventh and last assignment of error, theappellants contend that the court erred in not overrulingthe demurrers and petitions to strike out, and in notsuspend-

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Municipal Council of San Pedro Laguna vs. Colegio deSan Jose

ing the proceedings in this case until the final resolution ofthe escheat case.

In resolving the third and fourth assignments of errorwe already had occasion 10 state that in our opinion thecourt correctly sustained the demurrers and petitions tostrike out, and as the appellants advance no new reasons,we do not feel bound to discuss extensively what is restatedupon the same points in the last assigned error.

We stated at the beginning that before rendering theappealed resolution, the municipality of San Pedro askedfor the suspension of the proceedings in this case for thepurpose of first obtaining final judgment in the otherescheat case (Special Proceedings No. 3052) commenced bythe same municipality. The denial of the suspension is theobject of the second part of the last assigned error. In viewof the result reached in deciding the whole case, we holdthat the said denial is not error. Moreover, there was nogood reason to suspend the proceedings and to put off theresolution or decision, when at any rate the same resultwould be reached, and this is the more convincing in viewof the decision rendered by this court in the aforesaidescheat case (G. R. No. 45460, Feb. 25, 1938). At all events,the appellants do not cite the violation of any law, and the



suspension of the proceedings rests entirely in a soundjudicial discretion, a discretion which the court exercisedadversely to the municipality of San Pedro.

For all the reasons stated herein, the appealedresolution is affirmed, with the costs of this instanceagainst all the appellants. So ordered.

Avancea, C. J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Diaz, Laurel,and Concepcion, JJ., concur.

Resolution affirmed.

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Alvarez vs. Commonwealth of the Philippines

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