Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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Reference: Allison, Graham T. 1969. “Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis.” The American Political Science Review 63, 3:689-718 Case study: October 1962 - 13 days when almost 300 million humans would have died Analysts think the governmental and military problems in terms of largely implicit conceptual models

1. In terms of the Rational Policy Model (Model I) To use this model, the outputs are categorized as acts and choices, not outputs

Unified national governments They do what is best for the nation Model I must be balanced with ideas of

Monoliths are black boxes Large acts are consequence of conflicting smaller actions at various levels of bureaucracy

How it applies to the Cuban crisis The soviets were deciding to increase their missiles at the same time they were befriending America

The analyst assume that the actor is the government and the decisions are rationally calculated

Analytic paradigm I Policy as national choice II Organizing concepts

National actor - The nation The problem - Strategic problem Static selection - The solution choose by the nation Action as a rational choice

Goals and objectives Options Consequences Choice

Choice - Highest rank III Dominant inference pattern

Nation has ends and optimal means IV General propositions

Value- maximizing behavior Relevant values and objectives Perceived alternative courses of action Estimates of various sets of consequences

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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Net valuation of each set of consequences Increase of cost or reduction of probability of attaining consequences reduces the likelihood of that alternative being chosen A decrease in cost or an increase in probability of attaining desired consequences, increases the likelihood of that action being chosen

V Specific propositions Deterrence

Stable balance reduces the possibility of an attack Stable balance increases probability of limited war

Soviet Force Posture Assuming that they were going to strike first

The US Blockade of Cuba: A first Cut Six major categories of action were considered

Do nothing Diplomatic pressures Secret approach to Castro Invasion Surgical air strike ("Pearl Harbor in reverse") Blockade

More attractive Middle course The only real option

The blockade was the only real option! It was middle course between inaction and attack Placed on Khrushcev the burden of the next step (the ball in his court) A naval confrontation in the Caribbean was the ideal possible war for USA US could explore alternatives to the use of its nuclear superiority (hence not destroying the planet where the USA happens to have its permanent address (!))

Variants Framework always the same: place the action within a value-maximizing framework The analyst proceeds predominantly with this paradigm, but acknowledge that there is a margin for error

2. Organizational process model (Model II) To use this model, identify the relevant organizations and display its patterns of behavior

When we apply this model to the Cuban crisis, the result is a very different explanation than in Model I The government is not only one person that knows everything. It is a conglomerate of sub-organizations, alliances, etc.

Each sub-organizations has it own goals and all intentions amount to tendencies

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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On the other hand, the behavior of the complete organization is more complex than the behavior of its sub-sets (he calls them solids)

How it applies to the Cuban crisis Analytic paradigm

I Basic unit of analysis: Policy as organizational output The actual occurrences are organizational outputs. Example: The actions of men who are soldiers in platoons Effective options to confront a problem: Routines for employing present physical capabilities Outputs structure the situation (raise the problem, provide information, make the initial moves)

II Organizing concepts A. Organizational actors: A constellation of loosely allied organizations B. Factored problems and fractionated power

Power must accompany responsibility, but the organizations should not have a lot of power However, there is quasi-independence

C. Parochial priorities, perceptions and issues. Tendency to parochialism has enhancing factors:

Selective information available to the organization Recruitment of personnel into the organization Tenure of individuals small group pressures distribution of rewards

D. Action as organizational output 1. Goals: Constraints defining acceptable performance

Seldom formal Central among the constraints is the organization health

Constraints = mix of expectations and demands of other organizations Conflict among goals is always latent

2. Sequential attention to goals In order of relevance for the interested organization or sub-unit

3. Standard Operating Procedures Used to perform the "lower" tasks so the organization can then perform its "higher" function Helps doing certain vital things, but sometimes make the organization look sluggish or inappropriate

4. Programs and Repertoires Large coordination is a must Each predicted behavior requires a program (in both senses: computer and drama) - People will "dance" according to the program The number of programs is always limited (not possible to be prepared for everything)

5. Uncertainty Avoidance (Negotiated environment) Budgetary splits Alliances, "club relations",

Rules of the "Precarious status quo" between enemies

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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Standard scenarios 6. Problem directed search

Focus on avoiding discomfort First search the neighborhood of the symptom, then the neighborhood of the current alternative

7. Organizational Learning and Change (Occur more likely in situations like:) Periods of Budgetary feast (shopping sprees) or famine (within a year everything changes) Dramatic performance failures (major disasters)

E. Central coordination and control There are advocates for both extremes Total centralization is not possible The relation depend on structural variables such as:

The nature of the job The measures and information available to leaders The system of rewards and punishments for members The procedures by resources and humans get committed

F. Decisions of Government Leaders III Dominant inference pattern

The actions of today must be very much similar to actions made in the past The best explanation of an organization's behavior at t is t-1 the prediction of t+1 is t (from breakfast, you can tell what lunch is going to be!) Power of this model: uncovering the organizational routines and repertoires

IV General propositions A. Organizational action (Determined by routines, not leader's directions)

1. SOP Routines for dealing with standard situations Good for average performance

2. A Program Complex action chosen from a short list in the repertoire

3. Repertoires are developed by parochial organizations, then they are frequently ill-suited

B. Limited flexibility and incremental change 1. Budgets change incrementally 2. Once undertaken, an investment is not dropped easily

C. Administrative Feasibility (Considerable gap between what leaders choose and what organizations implement)

1. Organizations are blunt instruments. Precision and coordination are not likely to succeed 2. Projects that demand doing things differently, are not likely to succeed 3. Leaders can expect each organization will do its "part" in terms of what it knows to do 4. Leaders can expect incomplete and distorted information 5. If an assignment is contrary to the goals of the organization, that assignment will encounter resistance

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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V. Specific Propositions 1. Deterrence

If the attack occurs, it will result from organizational activity Alert status determine probabilities for accidental firing Repertoires fix the range of effective choice open to enemies Training in nuclear weapons is crucial

2. Soviet Force Posture Determined by organizational factors (goals and processes) Review of the training and practice activities of the Soviet Union

The US Blockade of Cuba: A second Cut Organizational intelligence

October 22 1962 7 am: President Kennedy said to the Russians that they must halt and eliminate their clandestine, reckless and provocative threat to the world peace This decision was reached after a week of critical deliberation

The missiles were discovered in October 14 (it is crucial because if it were later, more aggressive actions would have taken place) They were discovered not earlier or later as a consequence of established routines and procedures.

On Set 19 there have been a meeting to consider several factors and reports about missiles There was a 10 day delay between the suspicions and the flight to take the pictures and see if there were any missiles (due to two facts)

Many jobs won't fall into precise jurisdictions Vigorous organizations are imperialistic

The CIA and the air forces engaged in discussions about how to make the flights, and delayed the actual flight

Organizational options (Quickly narrowed to two options) Air strike (impossible) Blockade (thus, the choice) The choice of the blockade turned on two points

Morality and tradition (US won't perpetrate a "Pearl Harbor" in reverse (A problem of morality) A "Surgical" air strike was impossible (A problem of capability)

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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Organizational implementation Types of blockade

Offensive weapons only Strategic goods

The details were left to the navy But then they decided to intercept the ships much closer to Cuba so the Soviets would have time to think. The navy didn't like that

The navy was emotional, but had to say "yes, sir" to the orders Not clear what happened, but the ships entered Cuba and seemed not to have been intercepted !

Suspicious started over the Navy doings One day (oct 18) one ship stopped in the middle of the ocean, the government was happy, but the Navy wasn't

The government leaders were happy: "the blockage is working!" The navy was suspicious: "They are picking up submarine escort

Finally, the Navy leader shouted to the government leader "go back to your desk, the Navy will take care of the blockade!"

3. Bureaucratic politics model (Model III) To use this model, the analyst displays the perceptions, motivations, position, power and maneuvers of the principal players

Each leader pulls to his own end Contrast with Model I: Several actors instead of an unitary actor Power is shared

How it applies to the Cuban crisis Analytic paradigm

I Basic unit of analysis: Policy as a political outcome Happenings are results from compromise, coalition, competition and confusion among government officials National behavior can be conceived as outcomes of wittgensteinian games

II Organizational concepts A. Players in Positions (men in jobs)

Positions define what players may and must do Players are also people

B. Parochial Priorities Perceptions and Issues C. Interests, Stakes and Power (The three elements of power)

Bargaining advantages Skill Will

D. The problem and the problems Each solution to a smaller problem affects the bigger problem

E. Action channels

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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F. Actions as politics The context of shared power determines the mechanisms of choice Players end up using strategies to "make the government do whet is right"

G. Streams of outcomes Understanding of the outcome requires that it be disaggregated All the little streams of outcomes feed up the bigger outcome

III Dominant inference pattern The action of the nation is the outcome of the bargainings between sub-organizations

IV. General propositions 1. Action and intention

Cannot presuppose intention Sometimes the result (action) is the sum of different courses and no-one's intention

2. Where you stand depends on where you sit It is easy to predict the responses if you know the positions of the actors

3. Chiefs and indians Different chiefs must build a coalition of the relevant powers There are fights against indians (departments)

Issue looking down: Options = How to preserve my leeway until time clarifies uncertainties The issue looking sideways is commitment: how to get others committed to my coalition The issue looking upwards is confidence: how to give the boss confidence

V. Specific propositions 1. Deterrence

Which players can decide an attack? Though model I, an attack is not realistic because it would be a suicide and governments don't commit suicide Questions considered

Could any member of the government solve his problem by attack What stream of outcomes might lead to an attack? How might miscalculation and confusion generate foul-ups that yield attack as an outcome?

The US Blockade of Cuba: A third Cut The politics of discovery

Discovery of the missiles and when it happened can be explained by a series of bargaining games Cuba was Kennedy's Achiles's heel He was campaigning, and wanted to solve the Cuba problem soon

The politics of issues Khrushchev had caught the US "with the pants down" Kennedy was angry with Khrushchev "He can't do that to me!"

Doing nothing or taking a diplomatic approach would not solve Kennedy's problem There was a lot of advising and they wanted to show the president how the russian guy was provoking him

The politics of choice Initially, the President wanted the surgical air strike Fortuitous coincidences prevented the air strike

Notes on Conceptual Models and the Cuban Missile Crisis 

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McNamara's vision of holocaust Robert Kennedy didn't want his brother to become a "Tojo" (another Pearl Harbor maker) McNamara had time to convince Robert of the blockade because the President traveled on campaign activities. A coalition was made and they advised the President This coalition gave the President a moment to pause and consider why other guys wanted the attack Inaccurate information was given to the President: they told him that a surgical air strike was not possible and that was false

Further investigation: Why no-one probed this estimate during the first week? Why the so-called "experts" so conveniently made a mistake in appreciation? With a strong coalition and the President in it, the blockade was the way to go

Conclusion Four intended implications of the argument

Formulation of alternative frames of reference and how it affects the analysis, should make the analyst more self-conscientious The argument implies a position on the problem of "the state of the art" Foreign and military policy problems should subject of reexamination. They are typically treated in Model I, but as we saw, Models II and III reveal (and demand!) large amounts of information

Model I would have concluded that Soviets were going to attack Model II would have considered other aspects and reduced the probabilities returned by Model I Model III would suggest the political subtext and return a better understanding of what happened

The present formulation of paradigms is simply an initial step. There are many questions open

Model I: Does a statement of reasons why a rational actor would choose an action constitute an explanation of the occurrence of that action? Model II: The explanation of T in terms of T-1 is weak in a contiguous and changeable world Model III is fascinating, but really complex

The three models are not exclusive alternatives. They can be used at the analyst convenience :-)

Model I concentrates in Market factors Nations quit when costs outweigh the benefits

Models II and III focus on internal mechanisms But require considerable amounts of information

Exercise for the reader: Apply these three models to the US decision of surrender in Vietnam