ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Transcript of ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
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ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIESMANAGING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN ARMED CONFLICT TO REDUCE THE HUMAN COST OF WAR
ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIESMANAGING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN ARMED CONFLICT TO REDUCE THE HUMAN COST OF WAR
CONTENTSAbout this publication ............................................................................................................................. 4
Acknowledgements ................................................................................................................................. 4
Foreword ..................................................................................................................................................5
List of abbreviations ................................................................................................................................ 6
Icons ........................................................................................................................................................7
Executive summary ..................................................................................................................................8
Part A – Problem analysis .......................................................................................................................11
1. Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 121.1 Navigating this document .................................................................................................................................................121.2 Definingsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflict ....................................................................................................141.3 Internationalhumanitarianlawandprotection .......................................................................................................151.4 Complexconflictcharacteristics ....................................................................................................................................16
1.4.1 Putting support relationships in context ........................................................................................................... 19
2. Risks and opportunities in support relationships ..............................................................................202.1 Theneedforcoherencebetweenpartners ................................................................................................................202.2 Riskstociviliansandothersnotfighting ...................................................................................................................212.2.1 Diffusionofresponsibility .................................................................................................................................. 21
2.2.2 Aspectrumofresponsibilities .............................................................................................................................22
2.2.3 Interconnected support relationships ................................................................................................................24
2.3 Theopportunityforsupportrelationshipstoimprovetheprotectionofcivilians andothersnotfighting ....................................................................................................................................................242.3.1 Influencingpartnerbehaviour ...........................................................................................................................25
2.3.2 Towardscoherentlyresponsiblesupportrelationships ..................................................................................26
Part B – Specific factors in support relationships ...................................................................................29
3. Understanding support relationships ................................................................................................303.1 Typeofconflict .....................................................................................................................................................................303.1.1 Internationalarmedconflict ..............................................................................................................................30
3.1.2 Non-internationalarmedconflict ......................................................................................................................31
3.1.3 Parallelarmedconflicts .......................................................................................................................................31
3.2 Actorsinvolved .................................................................................................................................................................... 323.2.1 States .....................................................................................................................................................................32
3.2.2 Multinational coalitions ...................................................................................................................................... 33
3.2.3 Peaceforces ........................................................................................................................................................... 35
3.2.4 Non-State armed groups .................................................................................................................................... 37
3.2.5 Privatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies ..........................................................................................................39
3.3 Militaryoperationsandassociatedactivities...........................................................................................................403.3.1 Weapons and ammunition management ......................................................................................................... 41
3.3.2 Theconductofhostilities.....................................................................................................................................42
3.3.3 Capture, arrest and detention ............................................................................................................................44
3.3.4 Lawenforcementoperations ..............................................................................................................................45
3.4 Formsofsupport .................................................................................................................................................................463.4.1 Political support ....................................................................................................................................................47
3.4.2 Armstransfers .......................................................................................................................................................49
3.4.3 Partneredmilitaryoperations ............................................................................................................................ 51
3.4.4 Otherformsofsupport ......................................................................................................................................... 57
4. The protection of civilians and others not fighting .......................................................................... 604.1 Personsdeprivedoftheirliberty ....................................................................................................................................614.2 The dead ..................................................................................................................................................................................634.3 Internallydisplacedpersons ...........................................................................................................................................654.4Missingpersons ...................................................................................................................................................................674.5 Accesstomedicalcareinarmedconflict ...................................................................................................................684.6Essentialservices .................................................................................................................................................................704.6.1 Schoolsandothereducationalfacilities ............................................................................................................71
4.7 Thenaturalenvironment ..................................................................................................................................................724.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar ...............................................................................................................74
Part C – Framework of practical measures ............................................................................................. 77
5. Framework overview..........................................................................................................................785.1 Managingsupportrelationships ....................................................................................................................................785.2 Contextualization ................................................................................................................................................................825.3 Overarchingquestions .......................................................................................................................................................83
6. Considerations for decision makers .................................................................................................. 846.1 Preparation.............................................................................................................................................................................84
6.1.1 Internal readiness to engage ..............................................................................................................................84
6.1.2 Normativeengagement .....................................................................................................................................88
6.1.3 Assessmentandframingoftherelationship ................................................................................................... 91
6.2 Implementation ....................................................................................................................................................................986.2.1 Institutionalcapacitybuilding ...........................................................................................................................98
6.2.2 International humanitarian law training .....................................................................................................102
6.2.3 Assistance in international humanitarian law compliance ........................................................................ 107
6.2.4 Monitoringandevaluation ..............................................................................................................................109
6.2.5 Internaloversight ............................................................................................................................................... 114
6.3 Transition ............................................................................................................................................................................. 1176.3.1 Structured disengagement .................................................................................................................................117
6.3.2 Learning............................................................................................................................................................... 123
7. Questions for decision makers ......................................................................................................... 1267.1 Preparation........................................................................................................................................................................... 127
7.1.1 Internal readiness to engage ............................................................................................................................ 127
7.1.2 Normativeengagement .................................................................................................................................... 130
7.1.3 Assessmentandframingoftherelationship ................................................................................................. 132
7.2 Implementation .................................................................................................................................................................. 1387.2.1 Institutionalcapacitybuilding ......................................................................................................................... 138
7.2.2 International humanitarian law training ...................................................................................................... 141
7.2.3 Assistance in compliance with international humanitarian law ............................................................... 145
7.2.4 Monitoringandevaluationofthepartner ..................................................................................................... 147
7.2.5 Internaloversight ............................................................................................................................................... 150
7.3 Transition ............................................................................................................................................................................. 1527.3.1 Structured disengagement ................................................................................................................................ 152
7.3.2 Learning............................................................................................................................................................... 155
Glossary ............................................................................................................................................... 156
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................................ 159
ABOUT THIS PUBLICATIONStates,multinationalcoalitions,peaceforces,non-Statearmedgroups,privatemilitaryandsecuritycom-paniesandotherprivate-sectorentitiesthatprovidesupporttopartiestoarmedconflictshavethepotentialtopositivelyinfluencethesepartiesinordertoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thispublicationpresentsananalyticalframeworkfortacklingthecomplexityofsuchsupportrelationships,highlightstherisksandopportunitiesbroughtaboutbysupportrelationshipsintermsofprotectingcivil-iansandothersnotfighting,andoffersdecisionmakersawidearrayofpracticalquestionsthatcanhelptoguidethemastheydesignandimplementtheirsupport.Thecontentofthispublicationisbasedonbilateralconsultationsheldinseveralcountries,theexpertiseoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC)andexistingliteratureonthesubject.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTSTheresearchunderpinningthispublicationcameoutoftheICRC’sSupportRelationshipsinArmedConflictsproject.Butthisdocumentwouldnothavebeenconceptualized,draftedandpublishedwithoutthegenerouscommitmentofcolleaguesinvariousICRCunits,divisionsanddelegations.InadditiontotheleadauthorClementineRendle,wewishtothankDominiqueLoyeandMaryWerntzfortheiroversightandguidance,andJulienChassany,TimothyFrench,ThomasHallier,PatrickHamilton,SnowyLinternandRubenStewartfortheircontributiontothedraftingprocess.Wewouldalsoliketoexpressourgratitudetonumerousotherindividualswhodrewontheirrespectivefieldsofexpertisetoprovidecommentsandinput.Thisincludesthemembers oftheproject’scoregroup–MayaBrehm,AbbasDaiyar,NettaGoussac,IrénéeHerbet,CarinNaikeKohl, ElpidaPapachatzi,PaulPeugnet,GuiveRafatianandThomasdeSaintMaurice–aswellasthefollowinghead-quartersanddelegationcolleagues:VincentBallon,CarolineBaudot,AlexanderBreitegger,FrancescoBruscoli, Gilles Cerutti, Angela Cotroneo,TristanFerraro,OranFinegan, SusanneGentz, PilarGimeno Sarciada, Eirini Giorgou, Laurent Gisel, Pete Giugni, Gilles Hansoul, Georgia Hinds, Ken Hume, Trevor Keck, NamitaKhatri,JoelleKuhn,GeoffLoane,LouisMaresca,DanielMesserli,VanessaMurphy,MoniqueNanchen,JanNinckBlock,AndreasNotter,HelenObregónGieseken,JelenaPejic,ChristopherPoole,TilmanRödenhauser,FilipaSchmitzGuinote,GuelaSekhniachvili,ShahrokhShakerian,MichaelTalhami,CléaThouin,ErikTollefsen andWenZhou.WearealsogratefultoAriadnaAndreuVillasevilandDigvijayRewatkarfortheirinvaluableresearch.
Thispublicationwaslargelyinformedbytheperspectives,expertiseandexperienceofarangeofprofes-sionals,policymakers,academics,experts,militarycommandersandotherweaponbearers,whoareorwereinvolvedindesigningandimplementingsupportrelationshipsinvariousconflictsituations.WearegratefulforthetrusttheyextendedtotheICRCduringourconsultationsandfocusgroups,andwehopetodeepenourdialoguewiththemonthebasisofthispublication.OurspecialthanksgotoJamesChiswellandCarstenSvenssonfortheirdetailedcommentsandguidance.Lastly,wearegratefultothecommitteeofoutside professionalsandexpertsfortheirtimeinreviewingthispublicationandprovidingtheirfeedback.
FOREWORDWardisruptscommunities,tearsfamiliesapartandcrushespeopleinwaysthatnoothertypeofcrisiscan.ThesearethereasonsthatledtothecreationoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross(ICRC),inspiredthedevelopmentofinternationalhumanitarianlaw,anddrivehumanitarianeffortstopreventsufferingandprotectthelivesanddignityofvictims.
ArmedconflictsandothersituationsofviolencehaveevolveddramaticallysincethebirthoftheICRCalmost160yearsago.Warslastmuchlongertodaythaninthepast,resultinginadevastatingandlong-lastingimpactonessentialinfrastructureandservicessuchashealthcare,waterandeducation.Protractedconflictsaffectsocietiesforgenerationsandunderminethestabilityofentireregions.
Warshavealsobecomemorecomplex.Theyinvolveanever-growingnumberofactorsorganizedinover-lappingwebsofalliances,proxiesandothertypesofsupportrelationships.Thistrendhasconsequencesontoday’sconflictdynamicsandpresentsclearriskstocivilians.Thegreaterthenumberofactorsinvolvedinaconflict,themoredifficultitcanbetoachieveapoliticalsolution.Andwhenarmedactorsfightalongsideeachotherinloosecoalitionswithunclearcoordination,thiscanleadtoadiffusionofresponsibilitythatheightensthevulnerabilityofcivilians.Yetsupportrelationshipsbetweenarmedactorsalsoofferopportun-itiestostrengthentheprotectionofcivilians:actorscanleveragetheirinfluenceovereachothertopromoterespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw.
Toaddressthechallengesthatariseinsupportrelationships,theICRChaslaunchedaglobalinitiativetoworkwithawiderangeofinterestedactorsandidentifymeasuresthatcanimprovecivilianprotection.Thispublication–Allies,PartnersandProxies:ManagingSupportRelationshipsinArmedConflicttoReducetheHumanCostofWar–ismeanttoserveasthebasisfortheICRCtobuildaconstructivedialoguewithgovernments,armedforcesandbothmultinationalandnon-Stateactorsinordertofindpracticalwaysforward.
TheICRCaimstogetdecision-makersthinkingabouttherisksinherentinprovidingsupporttoapartytoanarmedconflictand,perhapsmorefundamentally,abouttheopportunitiesthatwell-directedinfluencecancreatetoreducethehumancostofwar.Everytimeapartnershipissignedandanallianceisformedinawarzone,abondiscreatedthathasthepotentialtoworsen–orlessen–humansuffering.Thepointofthispublicationistogenerateafullerunderstandingofthestakesinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsandguidethedecision-makingprocesswithabroadsetofthought-provokingquestions.
Myhopeisthatthiswillresultinapositivechangeforthewomen,menandchildrenwhoselivesaredis-ruptedbyconflict.IinviteallreaderstosharetheirexperienceinthisareawiththeICRCandthuscontributetotheemergenceofaglobalbodyofpracticalknowledge,bestpracticesandrecommendationsaimedatpreservingthelifeanddignityofvictimsofarmedconflicts.
PeterMaurerICRCPresident
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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONSDDR Disarmament,demobilizationandreintegrationERW ExplosiveremnantsofwarIAC InternationalarmedconflictIDP InternallydisplacedpersonIHL InternationalhumanitarianlawNIAC Non-internationalarmedconflictNSAG Non-StatearmedgroupPMO PartneredmilitaryoperationPMSC PrivatemilitaryandsecuritycompanyPSSM PhysicalsecurityandstockpilemanagementTAAA Train,advise,assist,accompanyWAM Weaponsandammunitionmanagement
ICONS 7ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES 7
ICONS
The dead
Detention
Essentialservices
General questions General
Healthcare
Internallydisplacedpersons
Keyquestions
Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar
Missing
Missingpersons
Thenaturalenvironment
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARYTheICRCestablishedtheSupportRelationshipsinArmedConflictInitiativeinresponsetothescaleofhumansufferingresultingfromarmedconflictsinwhichpartiestotheseconflictsreceiveexternalsupport.
Asupportrelationshipinarmedconflictisdefinedhereasoneinwhichthesupportincreasesthecapacityofapartytoconductarmedconflict.TheICRCbelievesthatsupportrelationshipshavethepotential,exercisedornot,topositivelyinfluencetheprotectionaffordedtothosenotfighting.Recognizingthestrengthoflong-termcooperationandtheroleofnon-militarystakeholders,theICRCencouragesactorsinsupportrelationshipstotakeabroadviewoftheirinfluenceoverhowconflictsarefoughtandhowtheiraftermathismanaged.
Throughcontinuedengagementandsharingofexperienceswithactorsinsupportrelationships,theICRCaimstofacilitateanunderstandingofgoodpracticestoreducethehumancostofwar.Tothatend,thisdocu-mentasksdecisionmakerstoconsiderpragmaticwaystomitigatetheriskofnegativehumanitarianconse-quencesandenhancetheprotectionofthosenotfighting,includingthroughbetterrespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL).
Withthisdocument,theICRCseekstocontinueitsengagementwithactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationshipswithafocusonhowtofurtherimprovepracticesoastoreducetheimpactofwaronpeople.
Whilewarisneversimple,theICRChasseenthreekeyinterconnectedtrendsemergeoverthelast20yearsthatmakeconflictsevenmorecomplex.Ithasobservedthatconflicts:
• areincreasinglynon-internationalinnature
• involveanincreasingnumberofpartiesandotheractors
• increasinglyfeaturesupportrelationshipsbetweenmanyactorsandthepartiesthemselves.
Thesecomplexitiesposechallengesforactorsoperatinginthesesituationstoensuretheprotectionofcivil-iansandothersnotfighting,includingforhumanitarianactorssuchastheICRC.Thescaleofthehumanitar-ianconsequencesofthoseconflictsinwhichsupportrelationshipsareadistinctivefeatureisimpossibletoignore.Reducingthehumancostofwarisnotonlyahumanitarianimperative:itcanalsoshapetheprospectsforrecoveryandreconstruction–twokeyfactorsthatcontributetolong-termstability.
TheICRCisawarethatconflictdynamicsareever-shiftingandthatimportanttrendsobservedoverthepast20yearsmaynotlastforever.Yetthereiseveryreasontobelievethatsupportrelationshipswillremainanenduringfeatureofarmedconflict.
SupportrelationshipspresentbothrisksandopportunitiesintermsofcompliancewithIHLandthehumani-tarianconsequencesofarmedconflictmorebroadly.
TheICRCbelievesthatactorsshouldseektomanagetheirrelationshipsresponsibly,individuallyandcollect-ively,inviewofthoserisksandopportunities.Thisrequirestheseactorstobecoherentwitheachotherwhenitcomestointent,leadershipandcapacity.Theycantakearangeofpracticalmeasurestoalignthemselveswith,andpositivelyinfluence,theirpartners. Incontrast,alackofcoherencebetweenactorsinasupportrelationshipresultsinadiffusionofresponsibility,astherespectiveactors’rolesandcommandingauthorityarenotclearlydefined.Inotherwords,gaps,reductionsoralackofclarityintheresponsibilitiesassumedbyactorsinasupportrelationshipcaninadvertentlyor,worse,deliberatelydiminishtheprotectionaffordedtopeopleaffectedbyarmedconflictandotherviolence.
TheICRCbelievesthatactorspreparingtoprovideorreceivesupportshouldbedoingmoretofactortheriskstoaffectedpeopleintotheirdecision-making.However,theICRCwouldalsoencouragethemtoexploreoppor-tunitiestoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingthroughtheirsupportrelationships.
EXECuTIvE SuMMARy 9ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES 9
TheICRCasksactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsto:1. integrateananalysisoftherisksandconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfightingintohowtheymanagetheirsupportrelationships
2. takegreaterindividualandcollectiveresponsibilityforensuringthatciviliansandothersnotfightingareprotected
3. intheeventofallegationsofIHLviolationsorotherproblematicbehaviourbyapartnerinasupportrelationship,takemeaningfulactiontoaddressthebehaviourofconcern.
Inconsideringtherangeofrisksandopportunitiesthatmayariseinasupportrelationship,decisionmakersshouldtakeintoaccountthebasicfeaturesoftherelationship,namelythetypeofconflict,theactorsinvolved,themilitaryoperationsandassociatedactivitiestobeundertakenbythoseactors,andtheformofsupporttobeprovided.Thesefactorshavethepotentialtoeitheraggravateoralleviatethehumanitarianconsequencesofanarmedconflict.Thisdocumentprovidessomepreliminaryindicationsofthepotentialaggravatingoralleviatingimpactofvariousrisksandopportunities;theseexamplesarenotmeanttolimitthefactorsadecisionmakermayneedtoconsiderinagivencontext.
TheICRCencouragesallactorstomanagetheirsupportrelationshipsresponsibly,withafocusonthepro-tectionofthosenotfighting.Thisrequiresactorstoplacegreateremphasisonthespecificrisksandoppor-tunitiesthesupportrelationshipmaypresent.Thisgoalshouldguidedecisionmakersastheyweighandimplementvariousmeasuresthroughoutthesupportrelationship.
Therearenumerouspracticalstepsthatactorsinsupportrelationshipscantaketomaximizetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thosestepsshouldbeconsideredandappliedwhilepreparingandimple-mentingthesupportrelationshipandduringthesubsequenttransition.
Basedonitsinitialworkonthetopic,theICRChasidentifiedpracticalmeasuresthatcanbetakenintern-allyorwithinaspecificsupportrelationshipandgroupedthemintenbroadfunctionalareas.Althoughthoseareasarenotionallychronological,inpracticetheyshouldbetakenintoconsiderationthroughouttherelationship.
TheICRCencouragesactorstoconsiderpossiblemeasuresineachareafromalegal,policyandoperationalperspectiveandatalllevelsofdecision-making.Thisrequiresdecisionmakerstolookaheadandtotakeintoaccountthespecificrisksoropportunitiesthatmayariseinthecontextofagivensupportrelationship.Thatassessmentwilldeterminewhetherpracticalmeasuresshouldbetakeninanyorallofthosetenareas.
Byexploringeachofthetenareas,decisionmakerswillidentifykeyfactorsthatwillhelpthemtomanagetheirsupportrelationships.Drawingonitsoperationalexperience,theICRCprovidessomemorespecificlinesofthinkinginthisdocumentasexamples,withoutprejudgingtheapproachtobetakeninanyindividualcontext.
Buildingontheaboveframework,theICRCsetsfortharangeofquestionsthatcanhelptoguidedecisionmakersinagivensituation.Thequestionscoverspecificformsofsupport,activitiesoractorsandtouchonaspectsoflegal,policyandproceduralissues.Decisionmakerscanusethesequestionstofactortheconse-quencesforciviliansandotherprotectedpeopleintotheirstrategicandoperationaldecisionsateachstageofthesupportrelationship.
Thisdocumentrepresentsapreliminaryframeworkandisdesignedtopromptfurtherreflectionandengage-mentonissuesrelatedtosupportrelationshipsinarmedconflict.TheICRClooksforwardtoworkingwithauthoritiesinordertofurtherrefineitsanalysisandrecommendationsinthisarea.
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PART A
PROBLEM ANALYSIS
12 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
1. INTRODUCTIONOverthepast20years,thescaleofhumansufferingresultingfromarmedconflictshassurged,challengingtheabilityoftheICRC–aswellasthatoftheentirehumanitariansector–toaddressit.Inthattime,theprovisionofsupporttowarringpartiesbyexternalactorshasemergedasaprominentfeatureofwarfare.Assuch,itpresentsbothrisksandopportunitiesrelativetorespectforinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL)andtheconsequencesofarmedconflictmorebroadly.
Actors are encouraged to reduce thehuman cost of conflicts in the short and long termbymanagingtheirsupportrelationshipsinordertobetterprotectthosenotfighting.
Supportrelationshipsareawayforactorstosharetheburdenofthewareffort.Yettheseactorsshouldremainattentivetotheimpactofthewaronthosenotfighting.FromtheICRC’sobservations,thedegreetowhichIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofaffectedpeoplearefactoredintosuchsupportrelationshipsseems,alltoofrequently,insufficient.TheICRCseesaneedforactorstotakeacriticallookatthemselves,inadditiontoworkingwiththeirpartners,inordertomanagetheirsupportrelationshipsmoreresponsibly.
IntheICRC’sview,arangeofpracticalmeasurescanbeimplementedwithinasupportrelationshiptoreducethenegativeimpactofarmedconflictonaffectedpeople.Infact,manyactorsalreadyputinplacesuchmeasures,andtheICRChasbegunconsultingwithsomeoftheminordertolearnfromtheirexperience.Thispublicationthereforereflectstheinitialfindingsfollowingseveralyearsoffocuseddialoguewitharangeofactorsandexpertsinvolvedinsuchsupportrelationships.ItisalsobasedonaliteraturereviewofopensourcesandonarchivalcontentaccumulatedbytheICRCoverthelasttwodecadesofbilateralandconfiden-tialdialoguewithbelligerentsaroundtheglobe.
Farfrombeingadefinitivepronouncement,thispublicationpresentsaninitialframeworkdevelopedbytheICRCtoaddressthephenomenonofsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictandtheirpotentialhumanitarianshortcomings.Italertsdecisionmakerstosomeoftherisksandopportunitiesofengaginginsupportrela-tionshipsinarmedconflict.Inadditiontoidentifyingarangeofpracticalmeasures,thisdocumentprovidesdecisionmakerswithaseriesofquestionsthatcanhelptoguidethemastheydeveloptheirownpracticalmeasurestomanagetheirsupportrelationshipsresponsibly.
Throughcontinuedengagementandthesharingofexperiences,theICRCaimstopromotegoodpracticesinanattempttoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingfromadverseconsequencesinsupportrelationships.Inthehopethatthispublicationwillpromptfurtherreflectionandengagementonthetopic,theICRClooksforwardtorenewinganddeepeningitsinteractionswithactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationships,andtoassistingthemwhereverpossibleinidentifyingmeasuresthatcanbeadaptedtotheirspecificsituation.
1.1 NAVIGATING THIS DOCUMENTThispublicationisdesignedasareferencetoolforadiverserangeofreaders.Inparticular,itismeantforpeopleandentitiestakingdecisionsthataffecthowasupportrelationshipismanaged.Giventhebreadthofsupportrelationships(seeSection 1.2),thosedecisionmakersmayworkatanyofanumberoflevelsinthehierarchyandacrossthespectrumofdefence,diplomacy,nationalsecurityanddevelopmentbodiesinStatesandtheirequivalentswithinotheractors.Decisionmakerscanusethisdocumentasaroadmaptoaddressthecomplexinterplayofrisks,choicesandopportunitiesthatsupportrelationshipsentailrelativetoaffectedpeople.
1. INTRODuCTION 13
Thefartheralonginthedocument,themoredetailedtheconsiderations.Similarly,theguidingquestionsraisedthroughoutthedocumentevolvefrombroad,overarchingquestionstomorefocusedquestionstowardstheend.Thedocumentalsocombinesconsiderationsrelevanttoavarietyofcircumstances,therelevanceofwhichwilldependonthecontext.Forthesereasons,differentsectionsmayinterestdifferentreaders.
Part AofthisdocumentexplainstheICRC’sinterestinsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflicts.Section 1 definessupportrelationshipsandframestheroleofIHLwithinbroadereffortstoprotectaffectedpeopleandreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofwar.Thesectionendswithadescriptionoftheplaceofsupportrelationshipsincontemporaryandfuturearmedconflicts.Section 2outlinestheICRC’sviewoftherisksandopportunitiespresentedbysupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictintermsoftheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting:ononehand,adangerousriskofdiffusionofresponsibility,ontheotherhand,anopportunityforpartnerstopositivelyinfluenceeachother.
Part Bunpackskeyelementsthatshouldinformdecisionsabouthowtomanagesupportrelationshipsinsuchawayastoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Section 3identifiesthemainfactorsshapingsupportrelationshipsaswellastherelatedrisksandopportunities,namely:thenatureoftheconflict(internationalornon-international),theactorsinvolved(States,multinationalcoalitions,peaceforces,non-Statearmedgroups(NSAGs)andprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies(PMSCs)),theactivitiesinvolved(e.g.conductofhostilities,arrest,captureanddetention,lawenforcementoperationsandweaponsandammunitionmanagement(WAM)),andtheformsofsupporttobeprovided(e.g.politicalsupport,armstransfersandpartneredmilitaryoperations(PMO)).AstheICRCurgesgreaterconsiderationofthehumani-tarianimpactofsupportrelationships,somekeyconcernsintheprotectionofaffectedpeoplearehighlightedin Section 4(e.g.personsdeprivedoftheirliberty,thedead,internallydisplacedpersons(IDPs),missingpersons,accesstomedicalcare,essentialservices,thenaturalenvironmentandlandminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar(ERW)).Decisionmakerscanadaptthegeneralobservationsfoundinthisparttotheirowncircumstances.
Part Cfocusesonarangeofpracticalmeasuresthatcouldbeusedtomanagesupportrelationshipsresponsi-bly.Section 5givesanoverviewoftheICRC’sframeworkofpracticalmeasuresfordecisionmakerstobetterprepare,implementandtransitionsupportrelationships.Section 6describesthetenareasfordecisionmakers toconsiderinmanagingtheirsupportrelationshipsinordertoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Tohelpdecisionmakerstocontextualizetheframework,Section 7containsaseriesofpracticalquestionsthattheyshouldaskthemselvesaspartoftheirefforttoengageinsupportrelationshipsresponsi-bly.Thesequestionsaddresslegal,policyandproceduralissuesaswellasanumberofconsiderationsspecifictogivenformsofsupport,activities,actorsorhumanitarianconcerns.TheaimistoenabledecisionmakerstointegratetheriskstociviliansandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHLintotheirstrategicandoperationaldeci-sions at each stage.
Throughoutthisdocument,thereaderwillfindreferencestolegalprovisionsandotherresources.Thesearenotexhaustiveand,uponrequest,theICRCcanprovidedecisionmakerswithfurthersupportintheirefforttoadaptpracticalmeasurestotheirowncircumstances.
AglossaryoftermsusedbytheICRCtodescribesupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictcanbefoundattheendofthisdocument(page156).Whilemanycommonlyusedtermsandconceptsdescribeelementsofsupportrelationships,theICRCdoesnotadoptorendorsethelanguageofanyparticularactor,doctrineororganizationalscheme.Itshouldthereforenotbeassumedthatatermusedherehasthesamemeaningattributedtoitbyotheractors.
14 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
1.2 DEFINING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN ARMED CONFLICT
1 ICRC, InternationalHumanitarianLawandtheChallengesofContemporaryArmedConflicts,ICRC,Geneva,2019,p.75:https://shop.icrc.org/international-humanitarian-law-and-the-challenges-of-contemporary-armed-conflicts-recommitting-to-protection-in-armed-conflict-on-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-geneva-conventions-pdf-en;ICRC, InternationalHumanitarianLawandtheChallengesofContemporaryArmedConflicts,ICRC,Geneva,2015,pp.22–23:https://www.icrc.org/en/document/international-humanitarian-law-and-challenges-contemporary-armed-conflicts.
TheICRCdefinesasupportrelationshipasoneinwhichthesupportincreasesthecapacityofapartytoconductarmedconflict.
Supportrelationshipshavethepotential,exercisedornot,topositivelyinfluencetheprotectionaffordedtociviliansandothersnotfightinginanarmedconflict.
Theconceptof“supportrelationshipsinarmedconflict”seekstocapturethebreadthofrelationshipsasso-ciatedwithriskstociviliansandothersnotfighting.
ThedynamicsobservedinrecentyearsshowthatthisconceptincludessupportprovidedbyortoStates,internationalorganizationsandNSAGs.ThosewhosupportpartiestoarmedconflictsmaybeboundbytheIHLrulesregulatingsucharmedconflicts,notablywhencontributingtothecollectiveconductofhostilitiesbyanotherpartyagainstanarmedgrouporbyexertingoverallcontroloveranarmedgroup.1 That is not a definingfeatureofasupportrelationship,however:inothercases,partnersprovideatypeofsupportthatincreasestherecipient’scapacitytoengageinarmedconflictwithoutthemselvesbecomingpartytoit.
Withthisdefinition,therealmofpotentialsupportrelationshipsisvastanddiverse.Thispublicationisnotmeanttocapturethediversityofallpresentandfutureiterationsofsupportrelationships,asactorsanddynamicsofrelevancegobeyond“proxy”and“surrogate”relationships.Somearrangementsmaydirectlyheightenthehumanitarianrisk,whileothershaveamoreindirectimpact.Theaimhereistoprovidealensthroughwhichbothsupportingandsupportedactorscanbetterexaminethehumanitarianimpactoftheirchoices,whateverthecircumstances.
SUPPORT
POLITICAL
OTHER
ARMS TRANSFERS
PARTNEREDMILITARY
OPERATIONS
1. INTRODuCTION 15
Thesupportprovidedcouldbeintheformofpoliticalsupport,PMOsorarmstransfers,ortakeotherformssuchasinstitutionalcapacitysupport,financialsupport,or“hosting”(allowinganexternalmilitarypresenceortransitrights).Astrendsinwarfareshift,sotoomaytheformsofsupportobserved(seeSection 1.4.1).ForthepurposesoftheICRC’sanalysis,itisnottheformofsupportthatiskeybutratheritseffectonthecapacityofthesupportedpartytoengageinarmedconflict.Whilenotadefiningfeature,somerelationshipsaremutualinthatthesupportingactoralsoreceivessomeformofsupportbackfromitspartner.
Twoobservationsillustratetheimportanceoftakinganexpansiveviewofsupportrelationshipsandtheirroleintheconductandhumanitarianimpactofarmedconflict.
Firstly,manysupportrelationshipsinarmedconflictoccuragainstthebackdropofbroadertiesbetweenthepartners.Amongthosetiesarelong-termsecuritycooperationorassistanceagreementsthatarenotdirectlylinkedtothebeginningorendofaspecificconflict.Stepstakeninthecontextofthoserelationshipscanneverthelesspositivelyinfluencebehaviourifconflictslaterarise.
Secondly,theactionsofpartiesandtheirpartnershaveeffectsthatcontinuetobefeltlongaftertheendofmilitaryoperations,includingforthosewhoremainindetention,displacedfromtheirhomesormissing.IHLrulesstillapplytothesegroupsandcontinuetoprotectthemevenaftertheconflicthasended.Importantly,managingtheaftermathofconflictinvolvesnon-militarystakeholders,fromcivilianauthoritiestoexternal“stabilization”ordevelopmentagencies.
Actors insupportrelationshipsshouldtakeabroadviewof therole theycanplay inhowaconflictisfoughtanditsaftermathismanaged.
1.3 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND PROTECTION
IHLreflectsthesameprinciplesthatexist inmanyculturesandsystems,namelytheneedtominimizetheharmcausedbyarmedconflict.Throughtreatiesandcustom,theseruleshavebecomeincreasinglydetailed,constantlybalancingbetweentheprincipleofhumanityandmilitarynecessity.TherulesofIHLworktogetherwithotherapplicabledomesticandinternationallegalframeworks,includinginternationalcriminallaw,humanrightslawandrulesonarmsandammunition.
AstheguardianofIHL,theICRCseekstoensurethatthisbodyoflawisfaithfullyapplied,effectivelydis-seminatedandproperlyunderstood.TheICRCrecognizesthatchangesinthenatureofarmedconflictovertimegiverisetonewchallengesintheinterpretationandapplicationofIHL.Indeed,itispartoftheICRC’smandatetostimulatediscussionsofsuchchallengesandpossiblesolutions,includingwithbelligerentsthatmaycontesttheapplicabilityorapplicationofIHLtotheiractions.SomearguethatIHLasawholeorspe-cificrulesorelementsthereofdonotapplytotheirconduct,incaseswheretheICRCwouldarguethattheydo.Additionally,someactorsdisagreeontheinterpretationofIHLrulesortheirapplicationtogivencir-cumstances,suchaswhoisprotectedasa“civilian”.Theseargumentsmaybebasedonoperational,legal,ideologicalorpoliticalconsiderations.AlackofclarityontheapplicabilityandinterpretationofIHLplaysaroleinthediffusionofresponsibilityinsupportrelationships(seeSection 2.2.1).TheICRCisconcernedthatsuchsituationsmayleadtotheweakeningofprotectionsowedtociviliansandothersnotfighting,bothinthecaseathandandasaprecedentforfuturecases.
Inviewofcontemporarychallenges,theICRC’sworkonsupportrelationshipsisfocusedonpragmaticwaysforpartnersinsupportrelationshipstosecuregreaterprotectionforthosenotornolongerfightinginarmedcon-flict.PartiestoanarmedconflictandthosethatsupportthemmustfaithfullyimplementtheIHLobligationsincumbentupontheminordertoreduceharmtocivilians,thosehorsdecombatandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHL.ThisincludestakingstepstoincreasethecapacityofpartiestoupholdtheletterandspiritofIHL.
16 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Inthispublication,theICRCasksdecisionmakerstotakeabroadperspectiveintheirsupportrelationshipsandconsiderhowtheywillmitigatetheriskofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesandenhancetheprotec-tionofthosenotfighting,includingthroughbetterrespectforIHL.Arangeofpracticalmeasuresissuggestedthatcanhaveapositiveimpactforaffectedpeoplebothduringaconflictandinitsaftermath,whetherthesemeasuresareimplementedasamatteroflaworpolicy.
Key legal rules
Four Geneva Conventions of 1949
Additional Protocols of 1977
Customary international humanitarian law, as identified in the ICRC Customary IHL Study
For further information on IHL rules, see the ICRC IHL databases
Further reading
International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction (N. Melzer)
IHL in Action: Respect for the law on the battlefield (ICRC)
1.4 COMPLEX CONFLICT CHARACTERISTICS Whilewarisneversimpleintermsofthesituationsitcreatesandthedecisionsitrequires,theICRChasseenthreekeyinterconnectedtrendsemergeoverthelast20yearsthatmakeconflictsevenmorecomplex:1. anincreaseinthenumberofarmedconflicts,drivenbytheproliferationofnon-internationalarmedconflicts(NIACs)
2. agrowingnumberofactorsengagedinarmedconflict3. anincreasedprevalenceofsupportrelationshipsinarmedconflict.
Thesefactorsofcomplexityposechallengestoactors–includinghumanitarianactorssuchastheICRC–workingtoensureciviliansandothersnotfightingareprotectedinsuchsituations.
Number and character of armed conflictsTheoverallnumberofarmedconflictshasbeenrisingconstantlysincethelate1990s.ThisincreasehasbeenprimarilydrivenbythemorethandoublinginthenumberofNIACs,inwhichatleastonepartyisnotaState.
ThemostcommontypeofNIACinthepasttwodecadesisbetweenaStateandoneormoreNSAGs,wherethereisanasymmetryinthemilitarycapacitiesoftheparties.Owingtothisasymmetry,botharmedgroupsandtraditionalmilitarieshavemovedtodevelopnewmeansandmethodsofcombatingtheenemy.
AlongwiththegrowthinthenumberofNIACs,civiliansincreasinglyfindthemselvesatthecentreofcon-temporaryconflicts.Popularsupportisincreasinglycentraltotheperceivedlegitimacyandongoingsecurityofboththeauthoritiesandarmedgroups.Whenhostilitiestakeplaceinpopulatedareas,civiliansandcivilianobjectsaremorelikelytobeharmed,andtheeffectswillbefeltlongaftertheconflicthasended.
Furthercomplexitycomeswhennumerousarmedconflictstakeplaceatthesametimeinthesameterritory.Moreover,thelinesseparatingconflictandothersituationsofviolencearesometimesdifficulttodraw.Asaresult,responsibilitiesareoftendiffuse,andactorsencounterpracticalchallengesthatunderminetheabilitytoprotectaffectedpeople.
1. INTRODuCTION 17
Protractedconflictandinstabilityareotherfactorscontributingtotheconstantriseinthenumberofarmedconflicts.Eachwaveofconflictanditsaftermathcreatetheconditionsforthenextconflict,whichmeanscomprehensiveandlastingpeaceremainselusive.Asanindicationofthis,theICRChasbeenrunningitstenlargestoperationsuninterruptedforanaverageof42years.
Multiplication of actors Thesecondtrendofthelast20yearshasbeenamultiplicationofthenumberofpartiestoarmedconflicts.ICRCdatashowthatStatesexperiencingNIACsarelikelytohavemorethantwoNSAGspresentontheirter-ritory,andmanyStatesexperiencemultipleconflictsontheirterritorysimultaneously.Thistrendispartlyexplainedbythefragmentationandmultiplicationofgroupsinthesamecontext.TheotherdrivingfactoristhelargenumberofStatesinterveninginNIACsabroad.
So,theimageofwarhasprogressivelyshiftedfromoneoftraditionalconfrontationbetweenthemilitariesoftwoopposingStates(seethefigurebelow)toonewheremultipleactorsareoperatinginthesamebattlespace(seethefigurebelow):
BATTLEFIELD STATESTATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
PMSC
MULTINATIONALCOALITION
HOST STATE
PEACEFORCES
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATE
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
STATE
STATE
BATTLEFIELD
18 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Prevalence of support relationships Inthethirdtrend,asthenumberofactorsandconflictshasgrown,ithasbecomethenormforactorstoworktowardstheirstrategicobjectivesinpartnershipwithotheractors.Forexample,asjustasubsetoftherangeofsupportrelationships,morethanone-thirdofNIACstodayinvolve“coalitions”ofStatesorNSAGsthatarepartiestotheconflict.2ThesecomplexwebsofsupportrelationshipshavebecomeincreasinglyprevalentandareakeyfeatureofalmosteverymajorconflictinwhichtheICRCoperates.3
Thus,contemporaryarmedconflictsarecomplexenvironmentsfeaturingmultipleactorsengagedinvariousrelationshipsofsupportorconfrontation:
PMSC
HOST STATE
PEACEFORCES
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
STATE
STATE
STATE
STATESupport relationship
STATE
STATE
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
NON-STATEARMED GROUP
STATE
STATE
BATTLEFIELD
STATE
STATE
STATE
MULTINATIONALCOALITION
Contemporaryarmedconflictsarefuelledbyasteadysupplyofsmallarms,lightweapons,majorconven-tionalarmsandammunition.Despiteadvancesinregulatingtheinternationalarmstrade,weaponsandammunitioncontinuetobesuppliedinlargenumberstopartiestoarmedconflicts–StatesandNSAGsalike–andtobedivertedtounauthorizedendusersandenduses.Theglobaltradeinsmallarmsandlightweaponsinparticularconsistsofbothnewlyproducedweaponsandsurplusarmsthatarerecycledfromoneconflicttothenextoverdecades.4Thewidespreadavailabilityofweaponsfollowingaconflictoftencontrib-utestocontinuedtensionandviolenceandjeopardizeseffortstoestablishlastingpeace.5
Whilesupportrelationshipsmayreduceeachpartner’sindividualcostandrisk,theICRC’sconcernisthatthisreductionisnotazero-sumgameandmayleadtoadiffusionofresponsibilityforwhichthepriceisultimatelypaidbyciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thespecificrisksandopportunitiesassociatedwithsup-portrelationshipsarediscussedfurtherinSections 3 and 4.
2 Thetermcoalitionisusedhereinitsbroadestsense,i.e.whenanarmedconflictinvolves,atleastononeside,twoormorepartiesfightingtogether.
3 SeeC.DroegeandD.Tuck,“Fightingtogetherandinternationalhumanitarianlaw:Settingthelegalframework”,2017:https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2017/10/12/fighting-together-international-humanitarian-law-setting-legal-framework-1-2/,allwebaddressesaccessedDecember2020.
4 SeeSmallArmsSurvey:http://www.smallarmssurvey.org/weapons-and-markets/transfers.html;ICRC,Targeting theWeapons:ReducingtheHumanCostofUnregulatedArmsAvailability,ICRC,Geneva,2005:https://shop.icrc.org/targeting-the-weapons-reducing-the-human-cost-of-unregulated-arms-availability.
5 Targeting the Weapons(seenote4above).
1. INTRODuCTION 19
1.4.1 PUTTING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS IN CONTEXTSupportrelationshipsareaprevalentfeatureofarmedconflictsand,basedontheICRC’sobservations,areassociatedwithasignificantscaleofhumanitarianconsequences.TheICRCstronglysuspectsapositivecor-relationinthisregard,althoughitdoesnotseektodemonstratedirectcausationinthispublication.
Escalating and prolonging conflictSupportrelationshipsincreasetheresourcesandcapabilitiesavailabletosupportedpartiestoaconflict.Theythereforeriskescalatingand/orprolongingtheseconflictsandthelackofsecuritythatfollows.Insomecases,theICRCseesescalationspiral,assupportbysomeexternalactorspromptsanincreaseinexternalcounter-supportfortheopposingparty.Theescalationand/orprolongationofarmedconflicthaveimportantimplicationsforaffectedpeoplethatcontinuelongaftertheconflicthasended.Evenwherethesupportisseenasameanstoshortentheconflictorasbeingintheinterestofthecivilianpopulation,actorsshouldstillconsiderthepotentialhumanitarianconsequences.
Humanitarian consequencesAsconflictshavebecomemorecomplexandprotracted,sotoohavethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesforaffectedpeople.Inthesame20-yearperiodwheresupportrelationshipshavebecomeacommonfeatureofarmedconflict,theICRChaswitnesseddevastatinghumanitarianconsequencesinconflictsituations.
Engaginginrelationshipsofsupportinarmedconflicthasconsequences.Whileindividualactorsmayseethemselvesasplayingarelativelyminorroleinpartnershipwithothers,thereisnonethelessaquestionastowhetherthecumulativeeffectoftheirandtheirpartner’sactionsexposesaffectedpeopletogreaterriskintheshortandlongterm.Thehumanitarianconsequencesofwarcan,inturn,shapetheprospectsforrecoveryandreconstruction–twoimportantcontributingfactorstostability.
Supportrelationshipsinarmedconflictallowactorstosharethefinancial,politicalandoperationalburdenofpursuingtheirstrategicobjectives.Thisadvantageislikelytoremainrelevantintheyearsahead.
Theaforementionedtrendsseenoverthepast20yearshavebeensignificantlyshapedbytheconfrontationbetweenself-describedjihadigroupsandtheiradversaries.ThatconfrontationaffectsroughlyhalfoftheStatesexperiencingNIACswithintheirterritory,andthevastmajorityofforeigninterventionsaredirectedagainstthiscategoryofarmedgroups.Ascomprehensivepeaceremainselusiveinthosesituations,itseemslikelythatthesetrendswillcontinueoverthecomingyears.
TheICRCisawareoftheresurgenceofstrategiccompetitionbetween“greatpowers”astheprimarysecuritythreatperceivedbysomeStates.Inanincreasinglycomplexglobalsecurityenvironment,thisshiftinprior-itiesislikelytohavemajorconsequencesforthenatureofwarfare.Theriskofinternationalarmedconflict(IAC)between“peer”Statesloomslargeandwouldhavepotentiallydevastatinghumanitarianconsequences.Againstthatbackground,theuseofsupportrelationshipstosecurebroaderstrategicobjectiveswilllikelycontinue,ifnotincrease.Existingbilateralandmultilateralsupportrelationshipswillprobablybedeepened,andnewsupportrelationshipswillform.Theymayfeaturegreatermaritimeandcyber,andpotentiallyevenspace,components.Developmentsinweaponstechnology,includingarmeddronesandautonomousweapons systems,influencehowwarfareisconductedandthusthedynamicsofsupportrelationships.Insofarastheyraiseuniquechallenges,thehumanitarianconsequencesofsuchconflictswouldbeamatterforfurtherconsideration.
Supportrelationshipswillremainanenduringfeatureofarmedconflict.
20 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
2. RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES IN SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Thissectionlooksinmoredetailattheriskofadiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenactorsinasupportrela-tionship,aswellasattheopportunityforthemtoworktogethertoenhancetheprotectionof,andreducethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesfor,affectedpopulations.TheICRCasksdecisionmakerstoconsiderhowtheywillmitigatetheriskofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesandenhanceprotectionofthosenotfighting,includingthroughbettercompliancewithIHL.Morespecifically,actorsareaskedtointegrateananalysisoftherisksandconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfightingintohowtheymanagetheirsup-portrelationships,totakegreaterresponsibilityfortheirprotection,andtotakemeaningfulactiontoaddressanybehaviourofconcern.
AsexplainedinSection 1.2,itisimportanttotakeabroadviewoftheroleofactorsinasupportrelationshipwithregardtotheconductofconflictanditsconsequences.Inkeepingwiththisapproach,thenotionof“responsibility”isnotlimitedtolegalresponsibilitybutratherreferstoabroaderconceptthatalsoincludesethical,moralandpoliticalaspectsofresponsibility.Thus,unlessotherwisestated,referencestoresponsi-bilityarenotastatementoftheinternationallegalobligationsanactormayhaveinagivensituation.
Whiletheconsiderationsapplicabletoeachmaydiffer,bothsupportingandsupportedactorshavearoletoplayinmanagingtheirrelationshipresponsibly.Theyshouldseektoexerciseresponsibilityindividuallyandcollectivelyfortheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
2.1 THE NEED FOR COHERENCE BETWEEN PARTNERS
IntheICRC’sview,threefactorsarecentraltowhetherasupportrelationshipwillaccentuatetherisksofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesoropportunitiestoimprovethesituation:1. intent2. leadership3. capacity.
Eachactorshouldassess itsownpositionandthatof itspartnerwithrespecttothesethreefactors.Thedegreeofalignmentbetweentheactorsacrossthesefactorsisanindicatoroftherisks or opportunities associated with their support relationship. This understanding should informhowactorspreparefor,implementandtransitiontheirsupportrelationship.
ThesethreefactorsareintroducedbrieflybelowanddiscussedfurtherinSection 6.1.3.
IntentIntentisdefinedhereasthesumtotaloftheobjectivesorgoalsofeachpartner.ThisincludespoliticalormilitarygoalsaswellasthepriorityplacedoncompliancewithIHLandotherinternationalstandardsandtheprotectionofcivilians,othersnotfighting,andbothcivilianandspecificallyprotectedobjects.
Thestrengthofaprospectivepartner’sintentionorwillingnesstocomplywithIHLandpromotetheprotectionofaffectedpopulationswillbeakeyfactor intherelationshipachievingthatoutcome.
2. RISkS AND OPPORTuNITIES IN SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 21
Twopartnersinasupportrelationshiprarelysharepreciselythesameintentbecausetheirstrategicobject-ivesandvaluesdivergetosomedegree,particularlyovertime.TheircommitmenttoIHLandotherprotectivenormsmaywellalsodiverge.Understandingthesefactors,andtheirunderlyingdrivers,iskeytoassessingandmanagingtherisksassociatedwiththesupportrelationshipandtheopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencethepartner.
LeadershipLeadershipreferstotheorganizationalstructureofanactoranditsabilitytoensurethattheactor’sintentanddirections(instructionsorguidance)areunderstood,respected,andfaithfullyexecutedthroughoutthechainofcommand.Thisindicatesthepartners’capacitytoeffectchangeandthelikelihoodthatanintenttocomplywithIHLandprotectaffectedpeoplewillbeproperlyimplementedattheoperationallevel.
Asrolesareallocatedinasupportrelationship,itisimportantforeachactortounderstandtheextenttowhichitcanrelyonitspartner’sleadershipatvariouslevels,andanycountervailinginfluences.
CapacityCapacityreferstothematerialassets,humanresourcesandskillsavailabletoanactortoachieveitsobject-ives.Itconcernsboththescaleandqualityofthoseresources,aswellastheirsuitabilitytotheactivitiestobeundertaken.Apartnermayhavestrongleadershipbutlacktheresourcestoachieveitsobjectives.
Inadditiontoensuringthateachpartnerhasthecapacitytoperformitsagreedrole,itisimportantforthepartners’ capacities tobe complementary.A support relationship inwhichboth intent and leader-shiparestrongmayneverthelesspresentrisksifthepartners’resourcesarenotappropriatelyalignedandinteroperable.
2.2 RISKS TO CIVILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING
NumerousfactorsinasupportrelationshiphavethepotentialtoeitheraggravateoralleviatethespecificriskstociviliansandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHL.Principalamongthemarethetypeofconflict,actorsandactivitiesinvolved,andthetypeofsupportprovided.TheseissuesareexploredfurtherinSections 3 and 4.
Decisionmakerswithinauthoritiesengaginginsupportrelationshipsshouldconsiderthesespecificrisksandtakepracticalmeasurestomitigatethemwhenmanagingthesupportrelationship.
However,theICRCbelievesthattheoverarchingriskisthatofadiffusionofresponsibility.
2.2.1 DIFFUSION OF RESPONSIBILITY Supportrelationshipspresentariskofdiffusionofresponsibilitybetweentheactorsinvolved.Whileactinginpartnershipwithothers,eachactor’sresponsibilitiescanbecomeunclearorminimized,whetherinten-tionallyornot.Thisdiffusioniscloselylinkedwiththedegreeofalignmentbetweenthepartners’intent,leadershipandcapacity(seeSection 2.1).
The diffusion of responsibility weakens the protection of affected people and thereforerepresentsthemostsignificantriskassociatedwithsupportrelationships.
22 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Practicalindicatorsofthedegreetowhichresponsibilitiesarediffusedinclude:
• Ownership of the cumulative impact of the relationship
Whilenotinherentlyproblematic,burdensharingthroughsupportrelationshipsrisksreducingonepartner’sunderstandingandsenseofownershipoftheconsequencesoftherelationshipforaffectedpeople.Responsibilityformanagingthecumulativeeffectsofsupportrelationshipsdoesnotliesolelywiththesupportedpartytoaconflict.
• Common understanding of IHL obligations
Clarityabouteachpartner’sobligationsunderIHLisanecessaryconditionforensuringrespectbyitsownforcesandbyitspartner.Ambiguityastothescopeormeaningofapartner’sobligationsorthedenialofresponsibilitycanleavegapsthathaveknock-oneffectsontheotherfactorslisted.
• Clarity in roles and responsibilities
Intheabsenceofclearlydelineatedrolesandresponsibilities,supportrelationshipsarefrequentlymarredbypracticalcoordination-relatedchallengesthatincreasetheriskofharmtoprotectedpopulations.Suchchallengescanresultindirectorindirectharm.Theycanalsocreateconfusionamongthelocalpopulation,preventingpeoplefromreportingissuessuchaspossibleIHLviolations.
• Internal accountability and accountability between partners
Accountabilityinternallyandwithintherelationshipcanrangefromdiplomatictolegalmeasures,dependingontheconduct.Theindicatorsabove(ownership,obligations,andclarityofrolesandresponsibilities)affectactors’accountabilityfortheiractionsandtheconsequencesinarmedconflict.Thiscanbeduetofactualcircumstancesbeingobscured,ambiguityaboutresponsibility,orinadequatesystemsandprocesses.Additionally,actorsarenotalwayswillingandabletoholdthemselvesandtheirpartnersaccountableforerrorsormisconduct.Thispreventstheactorsfromtakingthenecessarycorrectivestepstopreventthoseerrorsfromrecurringandmaycontributetoacultureofimpunity.
• The scale and severity of the humanitarian impact
Thenatureandextentofnegativehumanitarianconsequencesmayindicateadiffusionofresponsibility.Thosenegativehumanitarianconsequencesmayberelatedtotheintentofeitherorbothactors,theircapacityandleadershiptosecurecompliancewithIHLandotherstandards,orotherpracticalchallenges.
Theabove indicatorsmaypoint toan increased severityof thehumanitarianconsequencesof conflict,althoughtheywillnotoccurineverysupportrelationship.Theindicatorsareinterdependent,meaningthatweaknessacrossnumerousindicatorsmultipliestherisksassociatedwiththerelationship.
2.2.2 A SPECTRUM OF RESPONSIBILITIESTheextentofanydiffusionofresponsibilitydependsontheinteractionofnumerousfactorsandcannotbemeasuredinabsoluteterms.Itisnonethelessusefultodifferentiatebetweensomecommonscenarios:
SUBVERTEDRESPONSIBILITY
REDUCEDRESPONSIBILITY
MINIMIZEDRESPONSIBILITY
UNCLEARRESPONSIBILITY
COHERENTRESPONSIBILITY
HIGH RISK LOW RISK
Thegreatestdiffusionofresponsibility–andthushighestrisk–occurswhereresponsibility(whetheritderivesfromlaw,ethicsorothersources)issubvertedbyeitherorbothactorsinthesupportrelationship.Supportrelationshipsthatpresentthelowestriskarethosewhereresponsibilityisclearlyestablishedandcoherentbetweenthepartners.
2. RISkS AND OPPORTuNITIES IN SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 23
Subversion of responsibilitySomeactorspursuesupportrelationshipstoavoidlegalorpoliticalresponsibilityformisconductinarmedconflict.Whenrelationshipsareestablishedtodeliberatelyoperateoutsidetheboundsofthelaw,thisoftenresultsinseriousviolationsofIHLandhumanrights.ThepartnersundermineIHLandweakentheprotectionofvictims,notjustinthatrelationshipbutalsowithrespecttootherpartiesandfutureconflicts.
Insomecases,actorstakeadvantageofanunequalsupportrelationshiptoviolateIHLintheknowledgethatitspartnercannotorwillnotholditaccountable.Inothercases,theychoosetoengagewithapartnerknowingthatthepartnerisnotboundbythesamelegalobligationsorwillnotcomplywithitslegalobliga-tions,orboth.Inmoreproblematicsituations,actorssupporttheestablishmentofseparateforcespreciselyforthispurpose.
Somesupportingactorsmaybreachtheirownlegalobligationsbyprovidingsupport(e.g. underArticle1commontotheGenevaConventions,thelawofStateresponsibilityorarmscontrolordisarmamenttreaties).
Minimized responsibility Deliberateeffortsbyeitherorbothpartnerstominimizetheirresponsibilitiesarelikelytoresultinproblemsofcoordination,complianceandaccountability.
Oneformofminimizedresponsibilityiswhereresponsibilityisdelegatedfromoneactortoanother.Thereisadelegationofresponsibilityinrelationshipswherethesupportedpartyiseffectivelyaproxyorsurrogateforitssponsor.Althoughanactormaynotintendtosubvertthelaw,aproblemariseswhenthepartytowhichresponsibilityisdelegateddoesnothavethetraining,resourcesorwillingnesstofulfilitsobligationsunderIHLandotherinternationallaws.Emboldenedbytheabsenceofoversightandaccountabilitybetweenpartners,partiestotheconflictmayfeellessrestrainedintheirconductorgobeyondtheagreedobjectivesofthesupportrelationship.Thus,theremaybeariskofthesupportedpartycommittingviolationsofIHL,eventhoughthiswasnottheintentofthesupportingactor.
Besidessurrogaterelationships,actorsmayseektominimizetheirresponsibilitiesinthewaytheyframetheirroleintherelationship.Forexample,anactormayconsciouslychoosetoprovidesupportthatwouldkeepitsactionsbelowthelegalthresholdofbecomingapartytothearmedconflict(seeSection 3.1).
Minimizingresponsibilityinsupportrelationshipshampersthepartners’combinedcapacitytoprotectthosenotfighting andtoenhancecompliancewithIHL.Thepartnersareoftenunableorunwillingtomonitorandevaluatetheirpartner’sconduct,resultinginalackofaccountabilityandhinderinglearningcycles.
Reduced responsibility Whilenotdeliberatelyseekingtominimizeresponsibility,partnersthatareeffectivelyoperatinginparallelwithouthavingpreparedandimplementedthesupportrelationshiptogethertopreventharmtociviliansandothersmayseegapsinadvertentlyemergeintheiractualorperceivedresponsibility.Theactorsmayhavedivergingintentsorgapsbetweentheircapacityandleadershipthathavenotbeenmitigated.Evenifeachactorhasgoodoversightofitsownactions,theabsenceofmechanismstoliaisewithitspartnermeansthatneitherhasafullandaccuratepicture.Thiscanresultincoordinationissues,alackofoversightandaccountability,andalimitedunderstandingofthecollectiveimpactoftherelationshiponaffectedpeople.
Unclear responsibility Evenbetweenpartnersthatarewellaligned,adiffusionofresponsibilitycanoccurwheretheirrespectiverolesandresponsibilitiesarenotclearlydefinedorthereisambiguityabouthowtheyapplyIHL.Similarly,havingparallel rather than jointreportingmechanismsmayhamperaccountabilityand learning.Thesestructuralfactorscanresultincoordinationproblems.
Coherent responsibilityTherisksthatsupportrelationshipsposeforpeopleprotectedbyIHLaresignificantlylowerwhenthepart-nersclearlyidentifytheirrespectiverolesandtakeindividualandjointresponsibilityforensuringcompliancewithIHLbytheirpersonnelandfortheprotectionofpeoplenot,ornolonger,participatinginhostilities.Thisistheoptimalstateforasupportrelationship,inwhichthereislimitedornodiffusionofresponsibility.
24 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
2.2.3 INTERCONNECTED SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPSWherearelationshipiscomposedofseveralpartners,orthereisachainofsupportrelationships,theriskofadiffusionofresponsibilityismultipliedacrossthoserelationships.
Ifthesamepartytoaconflictreceivessupportfrommultipleexternalactors,thereislikelytobedifficultycoordinatingthosesupportrelationships.Thesupportingactorswilleachhavedivergingintents,capacitiesandleadershipfeaturesthatwillshapetheirrelationshipwiththeparty.Thegreaterthedivergences,themoresignificantthebarrierstocoordinatedaction,includingeffortstominimizecivilianharm.Thiscanbethecaseevenwherethesupportisintendedtobecomplementary.
Providingsupporttomultiplepartiesinthesameconflictrunsahighriskofinconsistentoutcomes,whichmayresultinunnecessarydestructionandharm.Supportingactorsmayalsoneedtoconsidertheriskthatsupportprovidedinoneconflictwillhaveaknock-oneffectinanother,forexamplethroughthemovementoffightersorweapons.Decisionstoprovidesupportshouldthereforebetakenatawhole-of-governmentlevel,takingintoconsiderationthepossiblelong-termconsequences.
Asupportingactormayprovideparallellinesofsupport,underseparatemanagement,toasinglepartytoaconflict.Itmaydosoforseveralreasons:whereitneedstodistinguishbetweendifferenttypesofsupport,wheretheagenciesprovidingorreceivingthesupportdiffer,orwhereitisactinginconjunctionwithothersupportingactorsforonecomponentofthesupport.Additionally,formalandpracticalbarrierstocommu-nicationbetweenpersonnelactingunderseparatemandatescreateariskofleaderstakingdecisionsbasedonimperfectorincompleteinformation.
2.3 THE OPPORTUNITY FOR SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS TO IMPROVE THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING
Instrivingforcoherentresponsibilitywithinasupportrelationship,actorsshouldbeawareoftheoppor-tunitiestomanagetheirrelationshipsinsuchawayastoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandthosenolongerfighting.
Actorsinasupportrelationshipareinauniquepositiontoinfluencetheirpartners’behaviour.InvestingintherelationshipwithapartnertopreventIHLviolations,operationalizethelawandreducethedangersfacedbythosenotfightingcancontributetoreducingthenegativehumanitarianconsequencesofconflict.Stepscanandshouldbetakentothisendbybothsupportingactorsandsupportedpartiestoaconflict.
Legal reminder
Actors shall, to the extent feasible, exercise their influence with their partners to promote compliance
with IHL and the protection of civilians, those hors de combat and other people protected by IHL.
TheICRCbelievesthatactorscanachievethisbyseekingtoidentifyandproactivelyaddressgapsinalign-mentbetweentheirrespectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity.TheICRChasidentifiedten broadcategoriesofmeasuresforachievingthisandfosteringcompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Theseareexploredinthechaptersthatfollow.
Below,thisdocumentlooksathowsupportrelationshipscreateanopportunitytohaveapositiveinfluenceonpartnersinpursuitofbetterprotectionofthosenotfighting.
2. RISkS AND OPPORTuNITIES IN SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 25
2.3.1 INFLUENCING PARTNER BEHAVIOURPartners inasupportrelationshiptypicallyhavethepotentialto influenceeachother.Thescaleofthatpotentialwillbedeterminedbyseveralfactors,includingthequantityandqualityofsupport,thedegreeofdependencyeachactorhasontherelationship,andthestrengthofanyothertiesbetweentheactors.Owingtoitsmandate,theICRCisfocusedontheinfluencerelatedtothesupportrelationshipinarmedconflict,eventhoughanactor’stotalinfluencewillbeaffectedbythoseotherties.
Anactor’spotentialinfluencewillvarybetweenpartnersandsupportrelationships,basedonacombinationoftheabovefactors.Asthosefactorschangeovertime–particularlyinresponsetotheevolutionoftheconflictandtherelationship–sowilleachactor’sinfluence.Importantly,evensupportrelationshipsthatmayseemrelativelyminorholdsomepotentialinfluence.Theremayalsobeagapbetweenanactor’spotentialandactualinfluence,dependingonitswillingnesstoexerciseitandtheeffectivenessofthemeasuresemployedtodoso.
Whateverthebalancebetweenthepartners,thereisastilladegreetowhicheachcaninfluencetheotherbyvirtueofwhattheybringtotherelationship.Bothsupportingandsupportedactorscanexercisetheirinfluencebyadaptingtheircontributiontotherelationshiptofosterbetterprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
Theneedtoexercisethisinfluencebecomesallthemoreacutewheretherearespecificproblemswithapartner’sbehaviour,suchaspossibleviolationsofIHLorsystemicissuesthatmayleadtoIHLviolationsinfuture.However,choosinghowtoexercisethatinfluencemaywellrepresentachallenge.
Ifanactorinasupportrelationshipbecomesawareofproblematicbehaviourbyitspartner,itfacesachoice:tolimitorhaltitsengagementuntiltheproblemisappropriatelyaddressed,ortoincreaseitsengagementtofosterbetterprotection.
Althoughalong-termreductioninsupportmayaltertheactor’spotentialinfluence,short-termmeasurestohaltorwithdrawsupportcanbeanimportantwaytoexerciseinfluenceorpreventhumanitarianprob-lemsfromoccurring.Moreover,choosingnottoadjusttherelationshipmaybeseenastacitacceptanceoftheproblematicbehaviour,possiblyreinforcingit.Yet,increasedsupportcouldeitherenhancethepotentialinfluenceordirectlyimprovetheoverallcapacitytoprotectaffectedpeopleandcomplywithIHL.
Paradoxically,someofthestepstakenbyanactortopositivelyinfluenceapartner’scompliancewithitslegalobligationsmayalsoincreasetheactor’sownlegalresponsibility.However,notallpracticalmeasureswillhavethisresult.Moreover,actorsshouldalsoconsidertheirbroaderresponsibilitytoexercisetheirinfluence,withinthelimitsofinternationallaw.
Legal reminder
under IHL:
• all parties to an armed conflict must respect IHL
• all States must ensure respect for IHL in all circumstances
• all States must do everything reasonably in their power to prevent violations of IHL by the
parties to an armed conflict and bring such violations to an end6
• all States must refrain from encouraging, aiding or assisting in violations of IHL
• all States have a duty to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute serious violations of IHL.7
6 See ICRC, CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention,2016,paras.164–173:https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl/full/GCI-commentary;IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above):https://shop.icrc.org/international-humanitarian-law-and-the-challenges-of-contemporary-armed-conflicts-recommitting-to-protection-in-armed-conflict-on-the-70th-anniversary-of-the-geneva-conventions-pdf-en.
7 SeeJ-M.HenckaertsandL.Doswald-Beck(eds),CustomaryInternationalHumanitarianLaw,VolumeI:Rules(hereafterICRCCustomaryIHLStudy), ICRC,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2005,reprinted2009,Rule156andexplanation,pp.568–603:https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl.
26 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Actorshaveawiderangeofmeasuresavailabletopositivelyinfluencetheirpartnersinsupportrelation-ships.Dependingontheissue,decisionsaboutwhichmeasurestotakewillbemadeacrossagenciesandateverylevel.Itwillbefordecisionmakerstodeterminewhatapproachwillbemosteffectiveatsecuringtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightinginthecircumstances.TheICRCstandsreadytoassistactorsinapplyingthisdocumenttotheirownsituationwithintheboundsofitslongstandingconfidential,bilateralapproach.
2.3.2 TOWARDS COHERENTLY RESPONSIBLE SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPSManagingsupportrelationshipsisacomplextopicinwhichthechoiceofhowtopositivelyinfluencepartnersmightnotbeobvious.ThepracticalmeasuresandquestionsdetailedinSections 6 and 7setoutsomekeyconsiderationsthatwillhelpguidedecisionmakerstowardsthemostpertinentpracticalmeasuresintheirrespectivecircumstances.
Inadditiontoanylegalobligationstheymayhave,theICRCasksactorsinvolvedinsupportrelationships to:1) integrateananalysisoftherisksandconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfightingintohowtheymanagetheirsupportrelationships
2) takegreaterindividualandcollectiveresponsibilityforensuringthatciviliansandothersnotfightingareprotected
3) intheeventofallegationsofIHLviolationsorotherproblematicbehaviourbyapartnerinasupportrelationship,takemeaningfulactiontoaddressthebehaviourofconcern.
Part Cofthisdocumentlooksathowthesegoalsmaybeachieved.
28 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
PART B
SPECIFIC FACTORS IN SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
30 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
3. UNDERSTANDING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
8 IHLChallengesReport2015,pp.22–23(seenote1above).9 Otherformsofsupportmaynonethelesshaveimplicationsintermsofthelawofinternationalresponsibility.
Thissectionexplainsthekeyfactorsinasupportrelationshipthatcanpresentspecificrisksandoppor-tunitiesforaffectedpeople,namely:1. thetypeofconflict2. theactorsinvolved3. theassociatedoperationsoractivitiesthatthesupportedpartywillundertake4. thetypeofsupportprovided.
Eachoftheabovefactorsisrelevanttounderstandingasupportrelationshipinarmedconflictand,there-fore,howitcanbemanagedsoastoimproveprotectionandreduceharmtoaffectedpeople(seeSection 5.1).Belowaresomeoftheconsiderationsrelevanttoeachoftheabovefactors.However,actorsengaginginsupportrelationshipsshouldundertaketheirowncomprehensiveassessmentoftherisksandopportunitieswithoutlimitingthemselvestotheissuesdetailedbelow.
3.1 TYPE OF CONFLICTInternationallawrecognizesonlytwotypesofarmedconflict:internationalarmedconflict(IAC)andnon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC).Amongstothercriteria,situationsofviolencemaybeclassifiedaseitherIACorNIACdependingonthenatureoftheactorsinvolved.AsdescribedinSection 1.4,theICRChasobservedamarkedriseinthenumberofconflicts,drivenbyanincreaseinthenumberofNIACs.Ithasalsoobservedagrowingnumberofpartiestoconflicts,eithertothesameconflictortoparallelconflictstakingplaceinthesameterritory.
Dependingonwhichactorsbecomeinvolvedinsupportrelationships(Section 3.2),thetypeofsupporttheyprovide(Section 3.4)andtheirdegreeofcontroloverthesupportedpartytoaconflict,asupportingactormaybecomeapartytoanIACand/oraNIAC.8Althoughsupportprovidedtopartiesdoesnotalwaysreachthisthreshold,9itmayneverthelessincreaseorreducethehumansufferingresultingfromtheconflict.
ItisalsotobenotedthatothersituationsofviolencenotrisingtothelevelofIACorNIACcantakeplacebefore,afteroralongsideaconflict.Theseothersituationsofviolencenormallyinvolvelawenforcementper-sonnelratherthanthemilitary,althoughsuchdistinctionscanprovechallengingincomplexenvironments.
Further reading
“The ICRC’s legal position on the notion of armed conflict involving foreign intervention and on
determining the IHL applicable to this type of conflict” (T. Ferraro)
3.1.1 INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTAnIACoccurswhenoneormoreStateshaverecoursetoarmedforceagainstanotherState,regardlessofthereasonsortheintensityofthisconfrontation.Noformaldeclarationofwarorrecognitionofthesituationisrequired.TheexistenceofanIACand,consequently,theapplicabilityofIHLtothissituationdependonfactualconditionsontheground.
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 31
Key legal rules
Geneva Conventions of 1949
Additional Protocol I of 1977
Customary international humanitarian law
3.1.2 NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTNIACsarearmedconflictsbetweengovernmentalarmedforcesandNSAGsorbetweensuchgroupsonly.
TworequirementsarenecessaryforsuchsituationstobeclassifiedasNIACs.First,thefightingmustreachacertainlevelofintensity,amountingtohostilities.Second,anNSAGinvolvedintheconflictmustpossessasuf-ficientdegreeoforganization,soastobeconsidereda“party”totheconflict.ThismeansforexamplethatitsforcesmustbeunderacommandstructureandhavethecapacitytosustainmilitaryoperationsandrespectIHL.
Key legal rules
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
Additional Protocol II of 1977
Customary international humanitarian law
Further reading
Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts (M. Mack)
3.1.3 PARALLEL ARMED CONFLICTS ManyStatesexperiencetwoormoresimultaneousconflictsontheirterritory.This,togetherwiththegrow-ingnumberofpartiestoaconflict,isakeyfactorinthediffusionofresponsibilityandheightenedhumani-tarianconsequences(seeSection 1.4).
Supportrelationshipsinsuchcomplexsituationsmaybeparticularlyaffectedbychallengesinpracticalcoord-ination.Thepresenceofotheractorsoperatingontheterritorymayalsoimpedetraditionalapproachestomonitoring,evaluationandoversight,forwhichalternativesolutionswillneedtobefound(seeSection 6.2.4).
Inconsideringtherisksandopportunitiesassociatedwiththeiractivities(seeSection 2),actorsshouldcon-siderwhethertheeffectsoftheiractivitiescombinedwiththeeffectsofotheractors’activitiescouldharmtheaffectedpopulationmorethaniftheeffectsoftheiractivitiesoccurredinisolation.
Notwithstandingthefactualcomplexityofthesituationontheground,theapplicablerulesofIHLremainclear.Actorsshall,totheextentfeasible,exercisetheirinfluencewiththeirpartnerstopromotecompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Difficultydistinguishingbetweenfightersandcivilians
• Militarizationoflawenforcement
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Leverageindustrialandtechnologicalcapacityinordertoreducethenegativeeffectsofconflict
32 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
3.2 ACTORS INVOLVED
10 IHLChallengesReport2015,pp.22–23(seenote1above).11 IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above);CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.164–173 (seenote6above).
12 Article1commontotheGenevaConventions;AdditionalProtocolItotheGenevaConventions;ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rules139and144(seenote7above).SeealsoCommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.164–173 (seenote6above);IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above).
Oneofthekeyfactorsfordecisionmakerstoconsideriswhoisinvolvedinasupportrelationship.Thetypeandnumberofactorsinvolvedwillhavesomebearingontherisksandopportunitiesarisingfromtherela-tionship.Arguably,themoreactors,thehighertheriskofadiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenthoseactors.
Asupportrelationshipmaybebilateral,withsupportbeingprovidedbyoneactortoanother,orconsistofconstellationsofactorsandrelationshipsthataresignificantlymorecomplex.SupportrelationshipscaninvolveStates,multinationalcoalitionsoralliances,PMSCsandNSAGs,orpeaceforces(seeSection 1.2).Someconsiderationsspecifictoeachtypeofactoraredetailedbelow.However,thereisgreatvariancebetweenindividualactorsandrelationships,hencetheimportanceofassessingtheintent,leadershipandcapacityofeachactorinagivensituation(seeSection 6.1.3).
3.2.1 STATES Asasupportingactor,aStatemayprovidesupporttoanotherStateortoanNSAG.AStatemightalsojoinamultinationalcoalition,contributetroopstoapeaceoperation,orhireaPMSCtoprovidesupporttoanotheractor.Dependingonthetypeofsupporttheyprovide,theseStatesmaybecomepartiestotheconflict– notablybycontributingtothecollectiveconductofhostilitiesbyanotherpartyagainstanarmedgrouporbyexertingoverallcontroloveranarmedgroup.10
AStatemayalsoreceivesupportasapartytoanarmedconflict.ThemostcommonscenarioiswhenoneState(thehostorterritorialState)engagesinaNIAConitsterritoryagainstoneormoreNSAGsandreceivessupporttodosofromoneormoreotherStatesindividuallyorincoalition.
WhereStatesconductPMOs(seeSection 3.4.3),itcanbecomeunclearwhichofthem,ifany,isapartytotheconflict.ItislesslikelythatasupportingStatewillbeapartytotheconflictwhenprovidingotherformsofsupport,butitwillstillhavelegalobligations.
Stateshaveaparticularstatusandlegalobligationsunderinternationallaw.EnsuringrespectforIHLincludesanobligationnottoencourage,aidorassistinviolationsofIHL,aswellasaduediligenceobligationtotakeproactivestepstoinfluencepartiestoconflictandbringthemtoanattitudeofrespectforIHL.11Theobliga-tiontoensurerespectforIHLisanobligationofmeansandnotofresult,andStateshaveverybroaddiscre-tioninchoosingmeasureswithwhichtoexerciseinfluence(seeSection 2.3).
Legal reminder
under IHL, States must:
• respect IHL
• refrain from providing any support that would encourage, aid or assist in violations of IHL
• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent violations of IHL by the parties to an armed
conflict and bring such violations to an end.12
Inaddition,supportingStatesmayhaveobligationsunderotherprovisionsofinternationallaw.Forinstance,partiestotheArmsTradeTreatymustrefrainfromauthorizingweaponstransfersifthereisaclearorsub-stantialriskofthearmsbeingusedtocommitorfacilitateseriousviolationsofIHL(seeSection 3.4.2).
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 33
Aterritorial(host)StatereceivingexternalsupportforanIACorNIACwillneedtomanageitssupportrela-tionships.Issuesthatmayariseincludedefiningthescopeofauthorityforforeignarmedforcestooperateonitsterritory(seeSection 6.1.3),ensuringcompliancewithdomesticlaw,andmonitoringandaccountabilityfortheconductofsupportingactors(seeSection 6.2.4).
HowaStatechoosestoframethecontestwithitsadversaryandhowitlabelsitsadversaryaffectitsdecisionsandpracticesrelativetotheuseofforce,forexampleinapplyingtheprincipleofdistinctioninattack,orinthetreatmentofpersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty(seeSections 3.3.3 and 4.1).
Inadvertentlyordeliberatelyimprecisetermsusedtocategorizetheadversaryarelikelytoincreasecivilians’exposuretotheuseofforce.Thishasproventobeanimportantissueoverthelast20yearswiththepreva-lenceofNIACsbetweenStatesandNSAGs,wheretheStatecontrolsdomesticlegalframeworks.
Stigmatizing entire communities as an extension of the adversarymay legitimize permissive attitudestowardstheuseofforceorotherwisenegativelyaffecthowciviliansaretreated.Suchtreatmentmaythenreinforcethesentimentsofexclusion,injusticeanddisenfranchisementthatcontributedtotheconflictinthefirstplace.
Whiletheincreasedmilitarycapacityprovidedbyexternalsupportmaybeanadvantageintheconflict,anover-relianceonthatkineticadvantagemayresultinincreasedorevendisproportionatecivilianharm.ThisisparticularlytruewhereexternalsupportisprovidedtoaterritorialStateagainstanNSAGifthereisalreadyanasymmetryofmeansbetweentheparties.Alternatively,asupportingStatemightprovideweaponsthatarenotsuitedfortheterrainorthesituation,suchasexplosiveweaponswithwideareaeffectsthatareill-adaptedforuseinpopulatedareas.
Byharnessingcross-governmental,military,securityandcivilianinstitutionalcapacity,supportrelation-shipsmaypresentanopportunitytoachieveamoreintegratedapproachtoprotectingciviliansandothersnotfightingduringhostilitiesandintheiraftermath.
Additionally,theremaybeanopportunitytoleverageStates’industrialandtechnologicalcapacitiestoreducethenegativeoveralleffectsofconflict.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Inadequate/imprecisedistinctionbetweenfightersandcivilians
• Militarizationoflawenforcement
• Choiceofmeansandmethodsnotadaptedtomilitarynecessity
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Harnesscross-governmentalcapacitytointegratetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingthroughouttherelationship
• Leverageindustrialandtechnologicalcapacitytoreducethenegativeeffectsofconflict
3.2.2 MULTINATIONAL COALITIONSTheconcernsthatapplytosingleStatesassupportingactorsaremultipliedwhenthesituationincludesacoalitionorallianceofStates.
Typically,eachStateinthecoalitionmaintainscommandandcontrolofitsownarmedforces,whichthenneedtobecoordinated.EachStatewillberesponsiblefortheconductofitsarmedforcesandwillalsobeobligatedtoensureitspartnersrespectforIHL.
WhenaninternationalorganizationhascommandandcontrolovertheoperationconductedbyStatearmedforces,theinternationalorganizationwillbepartytotheconflict,eitherinadditiontoorinsteadoftheStates.Inthatcase,theinternationalorganizationwouldalsohavemutatis mutandisobligationsunderIHLsimilartothoseofStates.
34 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Fromoneperspective,StatesinamultinationalcoalitionmaybeseenascollectivelyprovidingsupporttoanotherState(usuallytheterritorialState).Insuchcases,thecoalitionmemberswillneedtoworktogethertoensurethatthesupportrelationshipismanagedinawaythatfosterscompliancewithIHLandprotectionforthosenotfighting.Althoughthecontributionsofindividualcoalitionmembersmaydiffer,eachmemberwillhaveobligationsunderinternationallawandthecapacitytoinfluencethesupportrelationshipinawaythatwillminimizethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesoftheconflict(seeSection 2.3).
Fromanotherperspective,theremayberelationshipsofsupportwithinacoalition,i.e.betweencoalitionmembers.Thisisapplicablewhereoneormoreofthecoalitionmembersisapartytotheconflictandreceivessupportfromothersforthispurpose.Onthisview,Statesalsohaveresponsibilitieswithrespecttotheirsupportforothercoalitionpartners.
Legal reminder
under IHL, States and international organizations must:
• respect IHL
• refrain from providing any support that would encourage, aid or assist in violations of IHL
• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent the parties to an armed conflict from
violating IHL and to bring such violations to an end.
InadditiontothefactorsrelevanttoStates’bilateralsupportrelationships(seeSection 3.2.1),somerisksandopportunitiesariseincoalitionsituations.
Keyconsiderationsincludehowthemandateofacoalitionisestablished(ifany)andhowthecoalitionframestheadversaryasdistinctfromcivilians.Mandatesaregenerallynegotiatedamongstnumerouscoalitionpart-nerswithvaryinginterestsandvaryingdegreesofknowledgeandunderstandingofthesituation.Theriskisthat,innegotiatingthecoalition,theactorslosesightoftheinterestsoftheaffectedpeople.Attentionmaybefocusedonreachingagreementratherthanoptimizingthemanagementoftherelationshiptoreduceharm.Moreover,theprocessofnegotiatingmayleadthecoalitiontoadoptthe“lowestcommondenominator”instandardsandpracticesrelatingtotheprotectionofaffectedpeople.
WhilethecombinationofStateswithdifferingcommitmentsallowsthoseStatestosharetheburdenoftheengagement,theyriskhavingdivergentinterestsandapproachesthatresultindiffusedresponsibility.Atanoperationallevel,theywillfacechallengesofcoordinationrequiringspecificmeasurestoimproveinter-operability(seeSection 2.2.3).Therefore,coalitionsneedtobecarefullymanagedtoensurecoherentrespon-sibilitythroughouttherelationship.
Acoalitionthatisunder-resourcedortowhichsomeofitscontributorsareinsufficientlycommittedmayfinditselfunabletodedicatetheresourcesneededtoadoptgoodpracticestoimprovehumanitarianprotection,suchasinrelationtotraining,monitoringandevaluation.Similarly,significantlyvaryingcapabilitieswithinacoalitionmayalsopresentchallengesinalignmentandcoordination.
Itisimportantthatthelocalcontext–includingtheculture,values,demographicsandpolitics–becon-sideredbythecoalitioninthepreparationphase.Aswithbilateralsupportrelationships,coalitionalignmentagainstaparticularpartytoaconflictmayinflatelocalstigmatizationrhetoricandpracticeswithsignificantconsequencesforcivilians,thewoundedanddetaineesduringandafterhostilities.Stepscouldbetakenbycoalitionmemberstoavoidthis,forexamplebyreinforcingnormsofrestraintandensuringequitableaccesstoanyhumanitarianassistance.
Multinationalcoalitionshaveanopportunitytooptimizenotonlythecollectivecapacityformilitaryactivity,butalsomeasurestoenhancetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingbypoolingcollectiveexpert-iseandresources.
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 35
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Confusionofrolesandresponsibilities
• Mandatesnotalignedwiththeneedsoftheaffectedpeople
• Lackofalignmentinreportingprocedures,hinderingoversight,accountabilityandlearningprocesses
• Accountabilitygaps
• Lackofalignmentofcapacitybetweenpartners,resultinginadiffusionofresponsibilityandpracticalchallengesofcoordination
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Promotehigheststandards,e.g.throughnormativeengagement,institutionalcapacitybuilding andIHLtraining
• Increasedavailabilityofexpertiseandresourcestoreducetheimpactonaffectedpeople
• Collectiveimprovementthroughlearningprocesses
Further reading
“Multinational Operations and the Law” (IRRC)
See also: – Section 3.2.3Peaceforces – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations
3.2.3 PEACE FORCES13
Thescaleofpeaceoperationshasincreasedinthepast20years,althoughdeploymentshavedeclinedslightlyinrecentyears.14Theseoperationsaremadeupmostlyofmilitarypersonnelbutalsoincludesomepoliceandothercivilianstaff.UnitedNationspeaceoperationsaccountfornearlytwo-thirdsofallpersonneldeployedinpeaceoperations.15
Itisthefactsonthegroundthatdeterminewhetherpeaceforcesbecomeapartytoaconflict,irrespectiveofthemandateassignedtothembytheUNSecurityCouncilandthetermusedfortheirpotentialopponents.As noted in Section 3.2.2,wherearmedforcesareoperatingunderthecommandandcontrolofamultilateralorinternationalorganizationwithinternationallegalpersonality,theorganizationitselfwillgenerallybeconsideredapartytotheconflict,notthetroop-contributingcountries.
Regardlesswhetherthepeaceforcesbecomeapartytotheconflict,theywilloftenbeinarelationshipofsupportwiththeterritorialState.Aswithmultinationalcoalitions,onemightalsocharacterizetherela-tionshipbetweentheinternationalorganizationandtroop-contributingcountries,oramongstthosetroop-contributingcountries,asrelationshipsofsupport.Theconsiderationsspecifictopeacekeepingforcesarethereforesimilartothoseofmultinationalcoalitions(seeSection 3.2.2).
13 Theterm“peaceforces”isusedgenericallytodescribemilitaryandcivilianpersonneldeployedonmultilateraloperationsbytheUnitedNationsorotherwiseauthorizedbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilforpeace-enforcementorpeacekeepingpurposes.
14 Forvariousestimates,see:SIPRI,“Globaldevelopmentsinarmedconflicts,peaceprocessesandpeaceoperations”,SIPRIYearbook2020,OxfordUniversityPress,Oxford,2020:https://www.sipri.org/yearbook/2020/02;InstituteforEconomics & Peace, TheEconomicValueofPeace2018:MeasuringtheGlobalEconomicImpactofViolenceandConflict, IEP, Sydney,October2018,p.10:https://www.economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Economic-Value-of-Peace-2018.pdf.
15 “Globaldevelopmentsinarmedconflicts”(seenote14above).
36 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Legal reminder
under IHL, States and international organizations must:
• respect IHL
• refrain from providing any support that would encourage, aid or assist in violations of IHL
• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent the parties to an armed conflict from
violating IHL and to bring such violations to an end.
Asthedecisiontoestablishapeaceoperationisseparatefromtheprocessforresourcingthatoperation,thererisksbeingadisconnectbetweentheaimsoftheoperationandthecapacity(personnel,materialassetsandexpertise)placedatthedisposaloftheinternationalorganization.
Theriskthatamandaterepresentsthe“lowestcommondenominator”ofnegotiationsismoresignificantforaninternationalorganization,giventheneedforconsensus,thanforacoalitionintowhichStatesexpresslychoosetoenter.Thus,thenegotiatedmandatemaynotbewell-tailoredtothegroundrealityawaitingthepeaceforces.Thismightmeanthatagivenpeaceforcedeploysintoanactiveconflictinwhichitmaynothaveamandateenablingittoprotectciviliansfromattack.OritmaymeanthatthesupportitprovidestoaStateincreasinglydrawsitintohostilitiesitself,orthatthesupportprovidedisill-tailoredtothesupportedState.
Havingdecision-makingpowersspreadacrossmultipleactorsandagenciesmayposechallengesforpracticalcoordinationandcoherentresponsibility.Thereisafurtherpossibilityofconfusionaroundmandatesandtheblurringoflineswhenpeaceforcesareoperatinginsituationsinwhichthereareotheractors.Theseissuescantranslateintoconcreterisksforcivilians,detaineesandothers.
Intheory,boththeinternationalorganizationandthetroop-contributingcountrieshavelegal,ethicalandmoralresponsibilities for thepeaceforces.16 Inreality,adiffusionofresponsibilitybetween internationalorganizationsandtroop-contributingcountriesmaycreateconditionsinwhichownershipofthoseforces’performanceisweakened,withresultantrisksforthepeopleaffectedbytheiractivities.AccountabilityforthebehaviourofthoseforcesmayalsofalluneasilybetweentheorganizationalheadquartersandtheindividualState,withthepossibilityofimpunityforIHLviolationsandothermisconduct(seeSections 2.2 and 6.2.4).
Thatbeingsaid,theprotectionofciviliansisincreasinglyanexplicitgoalofpeaceforces.Thisgivesthemincreasedlatitudetoconsiderandimplementmeasurestodecreasecivilianharm.Thereisalsoanopportunityfortheforcestocomeintobroadalignmentonaclearmandatethatconsiderstheprotectionofcivilianstotheconflictinarealistic,contextualizedway,takingintoaccountthesupportprovidedtoapartytothecon-flict.Themandatecanbesecuredbytheinvestmentneededtomeaningfullyensuretheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Ideally,thereareasenseofownershipinboththeinternationalorganizationandtroop-contributingcountries,clarityoverreportingandaccountabilityresponsibilities,andmeaningfulactiontakentoensurerespectforIHLandreducethepotentialnegativehumanitarianconsequencesoftheconflict.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Unclearresponsibility
• Mandatesnotalignedwiththeneedsoftheaffectedpeople
• Leadershipnotharmonized
• Lackofalignmentinreportingprocedures,hinderingoversight,accountabilityandlearningprocesses
• Accountabilitygaps
• Lackofcapacityalignmentbetweentroop-contributingcountries,resultinginadiffusionofresponsibilityandpracticalchallengesofcoordination
16 ForpeaceforcesoperatingundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNations,seeUNSecretary-General(UNSG),UNHuman RightsDueDiligencePolicyonSupportforNon-UnitedNationsSecurityForces(“HRDDP”),5 March 2013,A/67/775-S/2013/110:https://www.refworld.org/docid/537dd44a4.html.
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 37
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Adopttheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingasastrategicpriority
• Cross-fertilizationofIHLtraining,frameworks,systemsandprocesses
• Normativeengagement,includingthesharingofgoodpractices
• Collectiveimprovementthroughlearningprocesses
• Meaningfulownershipofresponsibilitiesinthecommunityandindividualtroop-contributingcountries
• Comprehensiveplanforstructureddisengagement
Further reading
kigali Principles on the Protection of Civilians in Peacekeeping Operations
3.2.4 NON-STATE ARMED GROUPSNSAGsareorganizedarmedgroupsthatqualifyasapartytoaNIACandarethereforeboundbyIHL.17 In the ICRC’sestimate,66millionpeopleliveundertheState-likegovernanceofanNSAG.Reachingthesepeopleandrespondingtotheirneedsareamassivechallengeintoday’sconflictenvironment.
SupportrelationshipsinvolvingNSAGsarenotunlikesupportrelationshipsbetweenStates,wheremajorpowerssupporttheirallieswithcapacity(i.e.materialassets,humanresourcesandskills).18StudiesshowthatNSAGswithsupportrelationshipssurvivelonger,recoverfromalossofleadershipmoreeasilyandacquirebettercapabilitiesthanthosewithout.19
LikeStates,NSAGsmayfindthemselvessimultaneouslyinsupportingandsupportedroles.Themainex-amplesofsupportrelationshipsinvolvingNSAGsaresupportrelationshipsbetweenNSAGs,StatesupporttoNSAGs,NSAGsupporttoStates,andPMSCandNSAGrelationships.
Support relationships between non-State armed groupsAlthoughcommonlyperceivedandportrayedasasingleunitedfightingforce,manyoftoday’sNSAGsare,infact,shiftingalliancesofdistinctgroups20rangingfromintegratedcoalitionstoopportunisticschemespoolingresourcesforalimitedobjective.ClustersofNSAGsmakinglocaldecisionsbasedontheirownstra-tegicassessmentcanremainresponsivetoacentralleadershipinpursuingacommongeopoliticalagenda.Thistrendhasemergedasadominantfeatureofthepost-ColdWarconflictlandscape.Thelargernetworkscomprisebetweenadozenandseveraldozenconstituententitiesspanningmultipleregionsandcontinents.Despitecommonfeaturesorclosevariationsofthesamename,thesegroupscanbeorganizedquitedif-ferently.Insuchmovements,thereisacentralizedcorewithavaryinglevelofauthorityoveranumberofsmaller,decentralizedgroups.Theymayoperateasamovementoflooselyconnectednodeswithacommonidentityandideologybutdemonstratesignificantvariationintheirpatternsofviolenceandorientationtoexternalentities.
Support between States and non-State armed groupsInadditiontothesupportrelationshipsbetweenNSAGs,therearealsonumerousinstancesofsupportpro-videdbyStatestoNSAGs.AccordingtotheresultsoftheICRC’s2020mappingexercise,approximately37%(230)ofarmedgroupsreceivesupportfromaStateorfromanotherNSAG.21SupportfromNSAGsforStatesislessprevalent,butdoesoccur.
17 NSAGsareamongthebroadrangeofarmedgroups–withvaryinggoals,structures,doctrines,fundingsources,militarycapacityanddegreeofterritorialcontrol–thatarenotrecognizedasStatesbuthavethecapacitytocauseviolencethatisofhumanitarianconcern.
18 K.Oots,A Political Organization Approach to Transnational Terrorism,GreenwoodPress,Westport,1986.19 T.Bacon,“IstheEnemyofMyEnemyMyFriend?”,SecurityStudies,Vol.27,January2018,pp.345–379.20 ICRC, TheRootsofRestraintinWar,ICRC,Geneva,2018,p.24:https://shop.icrc.org/the-roots-of-restraint-in-war-pdf-en.21 ThisstatisticcomesfromtheICRC’sannualmappingofarmedgroups,acategorydefinedasgroupscausinghumanitarianconsequencesthatareofconcernfortheICRC.Withinthisbroaddefinition,NSAGsaregroupsthatareconsideredpartiestoanarmedconflict.
38 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
SupportfromorforNSAGs,whichattimestakesplaceoutsideofestablisheddomesticandotherlegalframe-works,canraiseverydifferentconsiderationstothoseapplicabletosupportfromorforStates.Forexample,Statesmay seek to engagewithNSAGs in order to subvert or delegate responsibility (see Section 2.2).Conversely,aStatemayexertoverallcontrolovertheNSAG(whichwillmaketheStateresponsibleforitsactions).Asthegroup’sorganizationalstructure,cultureandpersonnelmaydifferfromthoseoftheState’sarmedforces,sotoomaythepracticalmeasuresimplementedtopromotebettercompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
Legal reminder
All parties to armed conflict, including NSAGs, must respect IHL in accordance with their
obligations.22
Leadership, intent and capacity of non-State armed groups Anarmedgroup’sorganizationalstructureisanimportantdeterminantofitsbehaviour.Itinfluencesmili-tarycapability,thetypeofcontrolexercisedbyleaders,andhowcombatantslearntopracticehonourablebehaviour.
Thisstructureisshapedbyseveralinternalfactors,includingideologyanddoctrine;leadershippreferences;recruitmentstrategies;fundingsources;grouphistory,includinginternecinecompetition;andpre-existingsocialnetworks.Structure isalsoshapedbyexternal factors,suchas theopposingforce’sstrengthandeffectiveness,thetopographyofthegroup’soperatingterrainand–mostimportantly–externalpoliticalormilitarysupport.Forexample,armedgroupshostedinaneighbouringcountrycanorganizecompletelydifferentlyfromthoseoperatingentirelyontheterritoryoftheStateitopposes(seeSection 3.4.4).
Accesstoresourcesstronglyinfluencesthegroup’srecruitmentstrategyand,therefore,relationsbetweenfightersandthecommunity.23Atbothanindividualandgrouplevel,theavailabilityofexternalresourcesdiminishesrelianceoncommunitysupportandthusaffectstheirpropensityforviolenceorrestrainttowardsthelocalpopulation.24Therevenuestreamsavailabletosustainanarmedgroupalsoaffectthetypeofcontrolleadersexert.
Thegroup’sstructuredetermineshowleadership isexercised.Fordecentralizedgroups,sharedcombatexperienceisthemainglueunitinggroupmembers.Theydonotalwayshavewrittencodesofconduct,drawinginsteadonsharedvaluesandtraditions.Centralizedmilitarystructuresfosterloyaltybyforginganidentitybasedongroupnarrativesandcollectiverituals,suchasnationalistidealsorideologywhicharetranslatedintopractices.Theyrelyonclearlyestablishedrulesandvalues,whicharelikelytobeimpartedtotherankandfilethroughindoctrinationandtraining.
SomespecificriskscanbeassociatedwithNSAGsaspartiestoaconflictandinsupportrelationships.TheasymmetryoftenfoundinNIACsbetweenaStateandanNSAGmaypromptthegrouptoresorttomeansandmethodsthathaveagreaterimpactoncivilians.Thereisariskofthegroupnotfulfillingitsdutytoprotectciviliansasitconductshostilities(seeSection 3.3.2),whetherfortacticalreasonsoronthebasisofrhetoricthatframesciviliansastheiradversary.Thiscanmanifestinattacksthataredirectedagainstciviliansandcivilianobjectsorareindiscriminateandintheuseofacivilianpresencetoshieldthemselvesfromattack.AnothersignificantriskisthattheNSAGdoesnotdetainandtreatcaptureddetaineesappropriately,whetherduetoalackofintent,capacity,orleadership(seeSections 3.3.3 and 4.1).
22 ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rule139(seenote7above).23 J.Weinstein,InsideRebellion:ThePoliticsofInsurgentViolence,CambridgeUniversityPress,Cambridge,2007,ascited
in RootsofRestraint,p.22(seenote20above).24 A.Wennmann,“Graspingthefinancingandmobilizationcostofarmedgroups:Anewperspectiveonconflictdynamics”,ContemporarySecurityPolicy,Vol.30,No.2,2009,pp.265–280,ascitedinRootsofRestraint,p.22(seenote20above).
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 39
Furthermore,NSAGsmayhavelittle,ifany,awarenessofIHL,andsomemayrejectitsapplicabilityaspartofabroaderrejectionoftheprevailinginternationalorder.ComplexsituationsfeaturingnumerousNSAGscom-petingforresources,localandglobalconstituenciesorexternalsupportersmayalsofuela“racetothebot-tom”,wheretheNSAGstrytoprovetheirrelevancebyout-doingeachotherintermsofspectacularattacks.
WhenanNSAGhasemergedorgrownrapidly,itmaynothavehadsufficientopportunitytoimplementrobustframeworks,systemsandprocessescapableofpromotingtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Forexample,itmaybuildupitsforceswithoutindividuallyvettingthem.ItmaydeploythoseforceswithoutprovidingrobustIHLtraining,suchasinthechoiceanduseofmeansandmethodssoastoreducerisksforcivilians,orintheadministrationofplacesofdetention.TheseconcernswouldalsoextendtohowthedeadanddisplacedaredealtwithbyNSAGs.
TheguidanceprovidedinthisdocumentiswithoutprejudicetotheprudenceorlegalityofsupporttoNSAGsinanyspecificcontext.TheaimwithNSAGsistoleveragethethreekeyareasofconcernidentifiedabove–resources,recruitmentandcontrol–inordertopositivelyinfluencetheirbehaviourtowardsciviliansandothersnotfighting.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Lackofalignmentbetweenactors’leadership,resultinginadiffusionofresponsibility
• Capacitynotaligned,resultingincoordinationissuesanddiffusionofresponsibility
• Limitedwillingness,resourcesorexpertisetooperationalizeIHLinhostilities(e.g.principlesofprecautions,distinctionandproportionality)andotheractivities(e.g.detention,managingdisplacement,managingthedeadandclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofmissingpersons)
• Groupbecomespredatoryonthecommunity
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• HaveapositiveimpactonNSAGsbyleveragingtheirneedsintermsofresources,recruitment andcontrol
• EngageonculturalandotherIHL-compatiblenorms
Key legal rules
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
Additional Protocol II of 1977
Further reading
The Roots of Restraint in War (ICRC)
Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts (M. Mack)
3.2.5 PRIVATE MILITARY AND SECURITY COMPANIESPMSCshavebecomeanimportantpartofthelandscapeinconflict-affectedsituations.
PMSCsmaybecomeinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsinanyofatleastthreeways.Firstly,theymaybe contractedtoprovidespecializedservicestoasupportedparty,suchasmilitarytrainingandeducationormaintainingandoperatingtechnologicallyadvancedweaponsystems.Secondly,inpractice,PMSCsmaytakeamoreactiveroleinmilitaryoperationsonbehalfofapartytoaconflict.Insomecases,theirtasksincludedirectlyparticipatinginhostilities.Inothercases,workingnearmilitaryobjectivesmayputthematgreaterriskofexchangingfirewithapartytoaconflict,whetherinself-defenceorforotherreasons.Thirdly,aPMSCmightinfactbecomeapartytoaconflictasanNSAGthatprovidesorreceivessupport(seeSection 3.2.4).
40 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Inallcases,thequestionstobeansweredaretheextenttowhichcompliancewithIHLandotherbodiesofapplicablelawareincorporatedintothePMSC’sactivities,andthedegreeofcontrolandoversightthatareexercisedoveritsoperations.TheStatedirectlycontractingaPMSC(contractingState),theStateinwhichitoperates(territorialState)andtheStateinwhichthePMSCisregistered(homeState)mayeachhaveresponsibilitieswithrespecttoaPMSC,notablytoensurerespectforIHL.
ThecontractingofPMSCswithoutappropriatevettingprocedures,robustcontracts,andcontrolandover-sightcouldleadtoadiffusionofresponsibility,potentiallyresultinginviolationsofIHLeitherbythePMSCsorbythosewithwhomtheywork.
TheMontreuxDocumentrecallstheinternationallegalobligationsofStatesintheirrelationswithPMSCsandpresentsaseriesofgoodpracticestohelpStatesimplementtheseobligations.25
SPECIFIC RISkS
• DiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenPMSCsandactorsinthesupportrelationship
• Confusionbetweenregulatoryapproaches
• Absenceofrobustvetting
• Rulesofengagementdonotadequatelydelimittheuseofforce
• Inabilitytomonitorconductandevaluateresults
• Lackofoversightandaccountability
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• PotentialtointegrateIHLintotheprofessionallycustomizedservice-deliveryapproach
• PotentialtobuildinoneormoreterminationclausesintheeventofIHLviolationsbythePMSCand/orthesupportedpartytotheconflict
Further reading
Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (ICRC and Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs)
Business and International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business Enterprises under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC)
See also: – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport
25 SeeICRCandSwissFederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,MontreuxDocumentonpertinentinternationallegalobligations andgoodpracticesforStatesrelatedtooperationsofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniesduringarmedconflict, ICRC and SwissFederalDepartmentofForeignAffairs,Geneva,2008:https://shop.icrc.org/the-montreux-document-on- private-military-and-security-companies-pdf-en.
3.3 MILITARY OPERATIONS AND ASSOCIATED ACTIVITIES
Civiliansandothersnotfightingareatriskofharmduringanarmedconflictandinitsaftermath.Thoserisksaregenerateddirectlyandindirectlybytheactivitiesofthepartiestothearmedconflict,includingasaresultofthecumulativeeffectsoftheparties’actions.Forexample,damageordestructiontocriticalcivilianinfrastructureinpopulatedareascanhaveimportantreverberatingeffectsonthecivilianpopulation,suchasillnessanddisplacement.Astheconflictcontinues,multipleattacksand/orotherfactorsdegradeessentialservicesovertime,posingagraverisktopublichealthandpromptingfurtherdisplacement.Moreover,thefailureofactorstoanticipateandmanagetheaftermathofconflictslongafterhostilitieshaveceasedcanalso
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 41
presentimportantriskstocivilians.Forexample,peopledeprivedoftheirlibertyforreasonsrelatedtotheconflictremainentitledtohumanetreatmentaftertheconflicthasendedandwillstillneedtobemanaged.
TherulesofIHLaredesignedtoincreasetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Inadditiontoensuringthattheserulesarerespected,actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldconsiderboththerisksthattheiractivitiesposeforaffectedpeopleandanyopportunitiestheymighthavetoreduceharm.
Belowaresomeconsiderationsspecifictotheactivitiesthatactorsshouldintegrateintotheirdecision-makingthroughoutthepreparation,implementationandtransitionphases.
3.3.1 WEAPONS AND AMMUNITION MANAGEMENTBeforeorduringanarmedconflict,partieswillacquireandstockpilethemeanstoconductmilitaryoper-ations.Theuseofarms,ammunitionandothermeansofwarfarecomeswithariskofharmtociviliansandcivilianobjects,amongothers.Theriskapplieseverytimethemeansareused,andespeciallywhentheyareusedinviolationofIHL.Stepsshouldbetakenateverystagetominimizeoravoidthatharm.
Properweaponsandammunitionmanagement(WAM)isanimportantfactorinpreventingthediversionandillicituseofweapons.Weakammunitionstockpilemanagementincreasestherisksofunauthorizeduse,theft,lossoranaccidentalordeliberatecatastrophicexplosionofthestockpile.Itcanhamperdisarmamenteffortsattheendofanengagement,raisingtheriskthatarmswillcontinuetobeusedinthecommunityorwillbeusedinotherconflictsintheregion.
WhetherornotstrictcontrolismaintainedoverstocksofarmsandammunitionisanimportantindicatoroftheriskthattheseitemswouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateviolationsofIHLorotherwiseinviolationofinternationallaw(seeSection 3.4.2).
Internationalstandardsandguidelines,endorsedthroughtheUnitedNationsandotherinternationalbodies,havebeendevelopedtosupportbestpracticeinthephysicalsecurityandstockpilemanagement(PSSM)ofammunition,explosivesandweaponsinstoragefacilitiesandinthemanagementofarmsandassociatedmaterielwhenbeingshipped,transferredordisposedof.Actorsshouldbeencouragedtoapplythesestandardsandguidelinesinordertoreducethehazardsofmismanagement,whichcanresultinharmtoaffectedpeople.
Anactorthatisconsideringprovidingweaponstoanotheractorshouldconsidertheriskthattheymaybemisusedduetoinadequatestockpilemanagement.Conversely,actorsinasupportrelationshipcanhelptheirpartnerstrengthentheirWAMprocessesthroughthedevelopmentofpoliciesordoctrines(seeSection 6.2.1)andtraining(seeSection 6.2.2).
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Diversionofweaponsorammunitiontounauthorizedendusersandenduses,includingthroughreselling,theftorloss
• Unsafestorage
• Continuedavailabilityofweaponsandammunitionafteraconflict,fuellingarmedviolence andconflictsandunderminingpeaceandsecurityinthelongterm
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Supporttheestablishmentofframeworks,systemsandprocessestostrengthenweapons and ammunition management
• Trainpartnerpersonnel
Key legal rules
Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition (Firearms Protocol), 2001
42 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Further reading
International Ammunition Technical Guidelines (uN)
International Mine Action Standards
Modular Small Arms Control Implementation Compendium (MOSAIC) (uN)
International Small Arms Control Standards (uN)
See also: – Section 3.4.2Armstransfers – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar – Section 6.3.1.CResponsibleresourcedisengagement
3.3.2 THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIESHostilitiesaretheactivitymostreadilyassociatedwitharmedconflict.Whetherornotasupportingactoritselfparticipatesinhostilities(seeSection 1.2),bothactorsinasupportrelationshipshouldprepareforthelikelihoodthathostilitieswilloccurandwillhavehumanitarianconsequences.
Whenpreparing,implementingandtransitioningasupportrelationship,actorsneedtoconsidertheriskthatthesupportprovidedwouldencourage,aidorassistinviolationsofIHLorotherwisecreatehumanitarianconsequencesforthepeopleaffectedbytheconflict.Thisconcernisespeciallypertinentinrelationtotherulesgoverningtheconductofhostilities.Measuresshouldbetakenthroughoutthesupportrelationshiptomitigatetheserisks.
Legal reminder
IHL prohibits attacks against civilians and civilian objects, indiscriminate or disproportionate attacks,
indiscriminate weapons, and the use of civilians as human shields, among other things. It requires
parties to take all feasible precautions to avoid and, in any event, minimize incidental civilian harm.
Itisimperativethatpartnersinasupportrelationshipmakeminimizingcivilianharmastrategicprioritywhenplanningandconductingtheirmilitaryoperations.Thiscanbeachievedthroughanagreementbetweenthepartnersandelaboratedinadoctrineorpolicy(seeSection 6.1.3).
Measuresdesignedtopromoteinstitutionalcapacitybuildingortrainingbetweenpartnerscouldimprovesystemsandprocessestominimizecivilianharm.Theseincludemethodologiesforcollateraldamageestima-tion,targetingproceduresandbattledamageassessmentsthatincludecollateraldamageassessments.ActorscanalsosharegoodpracticesandencouragerespectforapplicableIHLrules(seeSection 6.1.2).
Partnerscouldprovidetechnicalassistancewhileoperationsarebeingplanned,forexamplebysharinginfor-mationaboutthehumanterrain;geographyandstructures;thelocation,interdependencyandfunctioningofcriticalcivilianinfrastructure;andpatternsoflife.Theyshouldstrengthenthecollectionandsharingofdataoncivilianharm,includingthereverberatingeffectsfromthedamageordestructionofcivilianobjects.Byvirtueofthisinformationandtheirexpertise,actorsmayprovideadviceontheselectionoftargetsandonhowtoverifythattheyarenotcivilians,civilianobjectsorsubjecttospecialprotection;theymayalsoprovideinputonmeansormethodsoronprecautionaryandmitigationmeasurestoreduceincidentalcivilianharm.
Stepsshouldbetakentomonitorandevaluatepartnerconduct(aswellasthatoftheactor’sownforces)duringhostilities(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5).Itisalsoimportanttoestablishmechanismstoinvestigateharmtocivilians,ensureaccountabilityanddrawlessonstoinformfutureoperationsorrelationships(seeSection 6.3.2).
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 43
Partnersmayalsobeinapositiontoprovideassistancethatalleviatestheconsequencesofhostilities,forexamplebydedicatingresourcesorexpertisetosupportessentialservicessuchashealth-carefacilities,toevacuatethesickandwoundedortoprovidehumanitarianassistance.
Theroleofsupportingactorsandsupportedparties inensuringrespect for therulesontheconductofhostilitiesisevenmorecriticalwhenarmedconflictiswagedinpopulatedenvironments–wheremilitarytargetsandciviliansandcivilianstructuresarecommingled,placingciviliansatgreatriskofharm.Civilians’inherentvulnerabilityinpopulatedareasmakesitimperativeforStatesandallpartiestoaconflicttoreassessandadapttheirchoiceofweaponsandtacticssoastoreducecivilianharm,includingbyavoidingtheuseofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareainpopulatedareasandtoadequatelyprepare,trainandequiptheirarmedforcesforthispurpose.Statesmustalsoexerciseinfluenceovertheirpartnersandotherpartiestothisend.Allpartiestoarmedconflictsshould,wheneverpossible,employstrategiesandtacticsthattakecombatoutsidepopulatedareasinanefforttoreduceurbanfightingaltogether.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Deathofandinjurytociviliansandothersnotfighting
• Damagetoordestructionofcivilianobjectsandspeciallyprotectedobjects(e.g.culturalproperty andmedicalfacilities)
• Civilianharmresultingfromtheindirect(reverberating)effectsofthedamagetoordestruction ofcivilianobjects
• Displacement
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Makeminimizingcivilianharmastrategicpriorityinalloperationsconductedbyorwithpartners
• Preventorminimizecivilianharmbyimprovingtargetingproceduresthroughinstitutionalcapacitybuildingandtraining
• Improvetheselectionanduseofmeansandmethods,ensuringthroughtrainingthattheyareagoodfitfortheenvironment
• Makeavailabletopartnersequipmentorinformationthatcouldhelpavoidorminimizecivilianharm,e.g.intelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissanceequipment
• Ensureciviliansandexternalobservershaveappropriatechannelstofilecomplaints
• Improvepracticesthroughlearningprocesses
See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 4Theprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting
Key legal rules
Additional Protocol I of 1977
Additional Protocol II of 1977
Customary international humanitarian law
For a full list of relevant treaties, see the ICRC treaty database
44 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Further reading
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2019), pp. 15–25 (ICRC)
International Humanitarian Law: A Comprehensive Introduction, pp. 77–129 (N. Melzer)
Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas (ICRC, forthcoming)
Urban services during protracted armed conflict: A call for a better approach to assisting affected people (ICRC)
Displaced in Cities: Experiencing and Responding to Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps (ICRC)
I saw my city die: Voices from the front lines of urban conflict in Iraq, Syria and Yemen (ICRC)
When War Moves to Cities: Protection of Civilians in Urban Areas (ICRC and InterAction)
3.3.3 CAPTURE, ARREST AND DETENTIONThedeprivationoflibertyisaregularoccurrenceinarmedconflict.Anypartytoanarmedconflict–andactorsthatsupportthem–mustprepareforthiseventuality.Themainprincipleapplicabletothosedeprivedoftheirlibertyishumanetreatment.
Thoseinvolvedinsupportrelationshipsshouldtakemeasurestoensure,totheextentpossible,that any deprivation of liberty is undertaken in conformity with international law andhumanitarian considerations.
Detaineesare inavulnerablesituationbecause theydependcompletelyonthedetainingauthority (seeSection 4.1).Therisksofharmforpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertycanbeexacerbatedinthecontextofanarmedconflict.Therearefourcommonunderlyingproblems:thedetainingauthoritieslackthecapacitytoensuredetaineesaretreatedhumanelyandthatdetentionconditionsarehumane,detaineesareheldintem-poraryormobiledetentionfacilities,detaineesaretransferredtoanotherauthoritythatdoesnotrespectthefundamentalrightsofthedetainees,ordetaineesareheldincommunicado inundisclosedplacesofdetention.
Regardlessofwhethertheyaredirectlyinvolvedindetentionoperations,actorscantakearangeofpracticalmeasurestoensurethatcapture,arrestanddetentionoperationsbyeitherorbothactorsinasupportrela-tionshipareconductedinconformitywithinternationallawandstandardsbothintheshortandlongterm.Thosemeasuresmayincludeagreeingduringthepreparationphaseonresponsibilitiesandstandardsfordetentionoperations(seeSection 6.1.3);engagingwithpartnersonapplicablelawandgoodpractices(seeSection 6.1.2);strengtheningthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions,suchasthroughmechanismstosystem-aticallyregisterpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertyandnotifytheirfamilies,andreviewingthelawfulnessofdetention(seeSection 6.2.1);trainingpartnerpersonnelinthepracticalaspectsandlegalimplicationsofdetention,includinghowtomanagegroupswithspecialneeds(seeSection 6.2.2);andprovidingresourcesorexpertisetoimprovedetaineetreatmentanddetentionconditions,includingaccesstofoodandwater,shelter,medicalcareandfamilycontact(seeSection 6.2.3).
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Extrajudicialkilling
• Enforceddisappearances
• Tortureandotherill-treatment,includingsexualviolence
• Inhumanedetentionconditions(e.g.overcrowding,malnutrition,epidemicsandlackoffamilycontact)
• Detentionwithoutalegalbasisand/orproceduralsafeguards
• Transferofdetaineeswithoutduerespectfortheprincipleofnon-refoulement
• Failuretoensurephysicalandpsychologicalsafetyatthepointofcaptureorarrestandduringtransfers
• Denialoffairtrialrights
• Conditionsnotadaptedtospecialneeds(e.g. children,thementallyillandpeoplewithdisabilities)
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 45
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Engagewithpartnersonapplicablelawandtheimplementationofgoodpractices • Strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions • Trainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrelevantlawandgoodpractices • Providematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(e.g.food,water,shelter,medicalcare,familycontact)
Key legal rules
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
Third Geneva Convention of 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 4–6
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 118–128 and 93
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, 1984
Further reading
The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (uN)
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (uN)
Towards Humane Prisons: A principled and participatory approach to prison planning and design (ICRC)
Water, Sanitation, Hygiene and Habitat in Prisons (ICRC)
“Partnering in detention and detainee transfer operations” (T. Rodenhäuser)
“The protective scope of Common Article 3: More than meets the eye” (J. Pejic)
“Transfers of detainees: legal framework, non-refoulement and contemporary challenges” (C. Droege)
“Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict and other situations of violence” (J. Pejic)
See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport – Section 4.1Personsdeprivedoftheirliberty
3.3.4 LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATIONSLawenforcementoperationscantakeplacebefore,duringandafteranarmedconflict.Incomplexsituations,therecanbeconfusionaboutwhichbodyoflawgovernstheactivitiesofarmedforcesorotherpersonnel,andthisissometimesexacerbatedbyrhetoricthatstigmatizesgroupsorwholecommunities.
Actorsmayencountersuchissuesinrelationtoarrestanddetentionactivities,measuresformanagingdis-placedpeople,theprovisionofhumanitarianassistance,andoperationsdescribedascounter-terrorismorcounterinsurgencyoperations.
Personnelcarryingoutlawenforcementoperationstypicallyrequiredifferenttrainingandequipmentfromthoseprovidedtoarmedforces.Thisisbecausetherulesapplicabletolawenforcementoperationsaregov-ernedbyinternationalhumanrightslawandtheinternationalstandardsderivingfromit,whiletherules
46 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
applicabletotheconductofhostilitiesinarmedconflictaregovernedbyIHL.Bothsupportingactorsandsupportedpartiesshouldbepreparedtomakethisdistinctionintheiroperationsandsupportrelationshipsandadapttheirmindsetaccordingly.Forexample,thearmsprovidedtosupportaparty’sconductofhostil-itiesmaynotbeappropriateorlegaltouseinalawenforcementoperation.Similarly,thetrainingprovidedtoanactoronarrestorcaptureanddetentionactivitiesmayneedtobeadaptedtothesituationathand,i.e.conflictorlawenforcement.
Further reading
Basic Principles on Use of Force and Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (uN)
Military Decision-Making in Security Operations (ICRC)
The use of weapons and equipment in law enforcement (ICRC)
The use of force in law enforcement operations – Factsheet (ICRC)
To Serve and Protect: Human Rights and Humanitarian Law for Police and Security Forces (ICRC)
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2019), pp. 57–63 (ICRC)
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2015), pp. 33–37 (ICRC)
Expert Meeting – The Use of Force in Armed Conflict: Interplay between the Conduct of Hostilities and Law
Enforcement Paradigms (ICRC)
3.4 FORMS OF SUPPORTAsdescribedinSection 1.2,supportrelationshipsinarmedconflictrefertosituationsinwhichoneactorprovidessupporttoanotheractor,enablingthelattertoparticipateinanarmedconflict.Akeyelementofsuchrelationshipsistheformsofsupportthathavesomebearingonthesupportedparty’sabilitytoengageinarmedconflict.
TheICRChasobservednumerousformsofsupport,threeofwhichareespeciallycommon.
SUPPORT
POLITICAL
OTHER
ARMS TRANSFERS
PARTNEREDMILITARY
OPERATIONS
LEGITIMIZATION
STRATEGIC APPROVAL FOROTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT
MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT
FORCE GENERATION
KINETIC SUPPORT
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST,ACCOMPANY (TAAA)
PARTNERED DETENTIONOPERATIONS
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY SUPPORT
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
PMSCs
HOSTING
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 47
Whilethesedifferenttypesofsupportareoftenseenasbeingseparateanddistinctfromoneanother,multi-facetedsupportrelationshipsoftencombinetwoormoreofthem.Eachtypeofsupportisassociatedwithindividualrisks,someofwhicharehighlightedbelow.Decisionmakersareencouragedtoconsiderthecom-binedeffectsofthesupportandhowtherelationshipasawholeismanaged,bearinginmindthatagivenactormayprovidedifferenttypesofsupport.
Decisionmakersshouldconsiderthesupportrelationshipasawhole,notmerelytheconstituentformsofsupportprovided.
Moreover,supportedpartiesmayreceivesupportfrommorethanonesupportingactor,whoseobjectivesmaybeinconsistent(seeSection 2). Inaddition,supportingactorsoftenprovidesupporttoavarietyofparties,someofwhichmaybeoperating inthesameconflictsituation.Asdescribed inSection 1.4, the existenceofmultiplecompetingorintertwiningsupportrelationshipsrisksescalatingandprolongingarmedconflictandthusincreasestherisksposedtoaffectedpeople.
Where possible, decision makers should be mindful of the interaction between, and thecollectiveimpactof,multiplesupportrelationships.
Theseareenvironmentalfactorsthatmaybearupontheformandscaleofsupportprovidedandthedegreeofinfluenceonepartnermayhaveonanother.
Itisrecognizedthatthedecisiontoprovidesupportmaybetakenandthesupportbegunbeforetherecipi-entbecomesapartytoanarmedconflict.Examplesofthisarelong-termsecurityassistanceandsecuritycooperation.Thatdecisionshouldthereforetakeintoaccountthelikelihoodthattherecipientwillengageinarmedconflictintheforeseeablefuture.
Theformsofsupportbeingprovided(oranycombinationthereof)willlikelyaffect–butnotnecessarilydetermine–thepracticalmeasurestobeimplementedwithinthecontextofthesupportrelationship.Hence,actorsshouldconsideralltenareasofpracticalmeasures(seePart C)regardlessoftheformofsupporttobeprovided.
3.4.1 POLITICAL SUPPORT
LEGITIMIZATION
STRATEGIC APPROVAL FOROTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT
MOBILIZATION OF SUPPORT POLITICAL
Theterm“politicalsupport”herereferstopoliticalexpressionsofsupportforapartytoanarmedconflictthataffecttheparty’scapacitywithinthearmedconflict.Suchsupportmaybeexpressedonabilateralormultilaterallevel,publiclyordiscreetly,andformallyorinformally.
48 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Expressionsofsupportforanotheractormaytakethefollowingforms:
• legitimization–providingrecognitionorlegitimacytoanotheractor,forexamplebyfacilitatingaccesstointernationalforumsortonegotiationsoradvocatingforhavingthesupportedpartytakenoffsanctionlists.
• mobilization of political support–mobilizationofsupportforthecausesharedwiththesupportedactor(s)andtheneedtoprovidethethreeothertypesofsupport,whetheratthedomesticlevel(amongstconstituents)ortheinternationallevel(amongstotheractors).Examplesincludemobilizing,joiningorsupportingcoalitionsofStatesforthepurposeofjointmilitaryoperations,organizingspecificroundtablesoreventsofinternationalimportancetoinfluenceornegotiatewithotheractorsforthebenefitofthesupportedparty,andrepresentingtheinterestsofthesupportedpartyininternationalforumsandnegotiationprocesses.
• strategic approval for the other forms of support–decisionstoprovide,modifyorwithholdsupport,whetheratthedomestic,regionalorinternationallevel.Thisisthemostpivotalexpressionofpoliticalsupportanddoesnotexcludeotherformsofsupportinthepoliticalrealm.Itisworthnotingthatdecisionsofpoliticalsupportmadeatthestrategiclevelareakeyleverforotherformsofsupport.Hence,itisthelevelatwhichauthoritiescandecidehowtherelationshipwillinfluencethesupportedactorinordertobringaboutbehaviouralchange.
Akeyconcernwhenitcomestopoliticalsupportisthatastrategicdecisiontoprovidesupportmaynottakedueconsiderationoftherisksthatsupportmaygenerateforciviliansandothersnotfightinginthegivensituation.Inparticular,decisionsbasedonshort-termobjectivestendtounderestimatethelong-termriskstoaffectedpeople.Apreliminarysteptowardsaddressingthisconcernistoensurethatthenecessarylegal,policyandoperationalmechanismsareinplaceforariskassessmenttobeundertakenandforthesupporttobeadaptedsoastomitigateanyidentifiedrisks.Forthosemechanismstobeeffective,however,theassess-mentmustbeintegratedintostrategicdecisions.Inotherwords,themeasuresshouldbeinplacesothatsup-portwillnotbeprovidedunlessoruntilthesupportedpartymitigatesanyincreasedrisktoaffectedpeople.
Anactorthatprovidespoliticalsupportshouldalsoconsiderthepossibilitythattheiractionwillpromptotherstoprovidecountervailingsupporttoanadversary,orthattheinvolvementofexternalinterestswillrenderpeacenegotiationsmoredifficultorimpossible.
Inprovidingpoliticalsupporttopartiestoaconflict,actorsmaycreateopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencethem,notablythroughnormativeengagement(seeSection 6.1.2).Inaddition,decisionmakersatthestrategiclevelhaveanimportantroletoplayinensuringthatpracticalmeasuresareadoptedtoimprovetheprotectionofandreduceharmtoaffectedpeople.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Short-termobjectivesdonotaccountforthelong-termrisksandimpactofdecisions
• Thesupportescalatesthearmedconflict,notablybypromptingotheractorstoprovidecountervailingsupporttotheadversary
• Thesupportrelationshipmakesithardertonegotiatepeace
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Positivelyinfluencepartnersthroughnormativeengagement
• Ensurepracticalmeasuresareimplementedinordertopromotetheprotectionofandreduceharmtoaffectedpeople
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 49
3.4.2 ARMS TRANSFERS
ARMS TRANSFERS
Theprovisionofsupportintheformofarms,ammunitionandothermeansofwarfaregivesrisetoavarietyofdirectriskstocivilians,andinsomecases,combatants,andcanhaveindirectandlonger-termnegativehumanitarianconsequences.Notably,inadequateWAMpractices(seeSection 3.3.1),theinappropriateuseorthemisuseofweaponsintheconductofhostilitiesandinlawenforcementsituations(seeSections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4,respectively),andthepresenceofunexplodedandabandonedexplosiveordnance(seeSection 4.8)poseariskofharm.
Whentransferringarms,stepsshouldbetakentoreducetheserisks.Thiscanbeachievedbypromoting,amongotherthings,safeandsecureWAM(seeSection 3.3.1),strictcontrolsovertheownershipandpos-sessionofarms,theresponsible(i.e.appropriateandlegal)useofweapons(seeSections 3.3.2 and 3.3.4),measurestopreventdiversion,andmeasurestoaddresstherisksposedbyERWandmines(seeSection 4.8).26
Weaponstransfersrequireparticularcautionandduediligencebecauseoftheirreparableharmthatcanbecausedwhenweaponsaremisused.Toreducehumansufferingandcurtailproliferation,certainweaponsareprohibitedfrombeingtransferred.27SupportingStatesthatprovidethemeansbywhichconflictsarefoughthaveaspecialdutytodoeverythingreasonablyintheirpowertoensurethattherecipientsrespectIHL.InkeepingwithitsobligationtoensurerespectforIHL,anarms-transferringStatemustassesswhethertherecipientislikelytousetheweaponstocommitIHLviolations.Ifthereisanexpectationthatthiswillhap-pen,basedonfactsorknowledgeofpastpatterns,theStatemustrefrainfromtransferringtheweapons.28
Athoroughassessmentoftheriskthatthearms,ammunitionormilitaryequipmenttransferredwillbeusedinthecommissionofviolationsofIHLorinternationalhumanrightslawshouldincludeaninquiryintotherecipient’spastandpresentrecordofrespectforIHLandhumanrightslaw,therecipient’sintentionsasexpressedthroughformalcommitments,andtherecipient’scapacitytoensurethatthearmsorequipmenttransferredwillbeusedinamannerconsistentwithIHLandhumanrightslawandwillnotbedivertedortransferredtootherdestinationswheretheymaybeusedtocommitviolationsofthesebodiesoflaw.29
TheArmsTradeTreaty(ATT)andcertainregionalinstrumentsprovidemoredetailedrulesonassessingtherisksassociatedwitharmstransfers.Someoftheseinstrumentsprovideforconsiderationofmeasurestomitigatetheserisks.Anysuchmitigationmeasuresshouldbeassessedcautiously,intermsofwhatis
26 Notethatarmsaresometimestransferredinthecontextofa“train,advise,assist,accompany”mission;seeSection 3.4.3ofthisdocumentforfurtherdiscussion.
27 ForadiscussionofIHLregulatingtheuseandtransferofweapons,seetheICRCwebsite:https://www.icrc.org/en/war-and-law/weapons.
28 See CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.158–163(seenote6above);K.DörmannandJ. Serralvo, “CommonArticle1totheGenevaConventionsandtheobligationtopreventinternationalhumanitarianlawviolations”,InternationalReviewoftheRedCross(IRRC),No.895/896,September2015,pp.707–736:https://international-review.icrc.org/sites/default/files/irrc-895_6-dormann-serralvo.pdf.Treatiesregulatingarmstransfers,includingtheArmsTradeTreaty,imposemoredetailedrequirements.
29 Forfurtherinformationonrelevantindicators,seeICRC,ArmsTransferDecisions:ApplyingInternationalHumanitarianLawandInternationalHumanRightsLawCriteria,ICRC,Geneva,2016:https://shop.icrc.org/arms-transfer-decisions-applying-international-humanitarian-law-and-international-human-rights-law-criteria-a-practical-guide-pdf-en.
50 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
realisticallyachievableunderthecircumstances.Theymustbetimely,robustandreliable,andtheexporterandimportermusthavethecapacitytoimplementthemeffectivelyandingoodfaith.30
Legal reminder
Article 7 of the ATT requires States Parties to deny an arms transfer where there is an “overriding
risk” of serious violations of IHL, serious violations of international human rights law, serious acts
of gender-based violence or serious acts of violence against women and children, also considering
available mitigation measures.31
In the ICRC’s interpretation, the obligation to ensure respect for IHL means all States must deny
arms transfers where there is a substantial or clear risk that the weapons could be used to commit
violations of IHL.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Improperuse,andmisuse,ofweapons,includinginviolationofIHL,leadingtocivilianharm,includingdeath,injuryanddamagetoorthedestructionofcivilianobjects
• Diversionofweaponstounauthorizedendusersandforunauthorizedenduses,includingthroughresale,theftorloss
• Increasedavailabilityofweapons,fuellingarmedviolenceandconflictsandundermininglong-termpeaceandsecurity
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Buildcapacitytoeffectivelyimplementarmstransferriskmitigationmeasures(e.g.tostrengthendiversionpreventionthroughrobustWAM,marking,record-keepingandtracing)
• Strengthencontrolsontheavailabilityofarmsandammunition
• Providetrainingtosupporttheproperandlegaluseofweaponsandsupportmeasurestoeffectivelyprevent,investigateandsuppressIHLviolationsand,whereappropriate,prosecuteseriousviolations ofIHL
• EncourageStatestoformallycommittoandassistinfaithfullyimplementingthehighestinternationalstandardsonresponsiblearmstransfers,safeandsecureWAM,armscontrolanddisarmament
Key legal rules
Article 1 common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949
Arms Trade Treaty, 2013
Further reading
Arms Transfer Decisions: Applying International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law
Criteria (ICRC)
Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty from a Humanitarian Perspective (ICRC)
2013 Arms Trade Treaty – Factsheet (ICRC)
International humanitarian law and gender-based violence in the context of the Arms Trade Treaty (ICRC)
30 See ICRC, UnderstandingtheArmsTradeTreatyfromaHumanitarianPerspective,ICRC,Geneva,2016,pp.38–39.31 UnderstandingtheArmsTradeTreatyfromaHumanitarianPerspective,pp.36-37(seenote30above).
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 51
See also: – Section 3.3.1Weaponsandammunitionmanagement – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar
3.4.3 PARTNERED MILITARY OPERATIONS
PARTNEREDMILITARY
OPERATIONS
FORCE GENERATION
KINETIC SUPPORT
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT
LOGISTICAL SUPPORT
TRAIN, ADVISE, ASSIST,ACCOMPANY (TAAA)
PARTNERED DETENTIONOPERATIONS
For the purposes of this document, the term“partneredmilitary operations” (PMOs) refers to formalarrangementsbetweenpartnerstoachieveaspecificmilitaryaiminaconflict.PMOsareoftenthemostdirectandvisibletypeofsupportprovidedtopartiestoanarmedconflict.AsPMOsmayvarygreatlyintheactivitiesinvolved,theICRChasidentifiedsixcategories,eachofwhichhassubcategories:
• train,advise,assist,accompany(TAAA)
• forcegeneration
• kineticsupport
• partnereddetentionoperations
• intelligencesupport
• logisticalsupport.
Someoftheseactivitiesmayresultinthesupportingactorjoiningitspartnerasapartytoanarmedconflict(seeSection 3.1).Dependingonthecategory,PMOsconsistofavarietyofactivitiesthatgiverisetospecificrisksandopportunities,asdetailedbelow.
Train, advise, assist, accompanyMilitaryarrangementsthataimtobuildthemilitarycapacityofasupportingactorthroughtrainingappeartobethemostprevalentformofPMO-typesupport.Thismaybebecausetheypresentsupportingactorswithatolerablelevelofrisk,allowingthemtoachievestrategicaimsandadegreeofinfluencewithoutmoredirectengagement.
Althoughthissubcategoryplayshosttoawidevarietyofmethodologies,settingsandparameters,mostprogrammescanbegroupedasfollows:
• training –atrainingprogrammeprovidesthepartnerwithspecificskillsorknowledge
• train and equip–atrainingprogrammesetoveraspecificperiodoftimeprovidesthepartnerwithspecificskillsandequipment
• advise and assist (HQ)–personnelareplacedinacommandorheadquarterspositiontoadvisetheirpartnersduringoperations
• accompany (ground) –personnelareassignedtoadvisepartnersduringoperationsdirectlyontheground;theadviseristypicallynotauthorizedtoengageincombatbutmaycallinotherformsofsupportsuchasmedicalevacuation,closeairsupportorlogisticssupport.
ActorsinaTAAAsupportrelationshiparelikelytobeinapositiontoinfluenceeachother.Thedegreeofinfluencemaydependonhowinvolvedtheyare,asdepictedbelow.Whilesupportrelationshipsmaybepursuedasawaytolimitanactor’sdirectinvolvement,increasedinvolvementmaybenecessarytoimproveoutcomes.
52 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Training relationshipspresentauniqueopportunity to conveypositive lessonswithin the scopeof thetrainingrelationship;trainingandadviceonIHLareindeedwaystopromotebetterprotectioninsupportrelationships.
EMBED
ACCOMPANY
ADVISE/ASSIST
TRAIN
Opportunities to positively influence through TAAA missions and embedding personnel
WhileTAAAmissionspresentimportantopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencepartnerbehaviourandout-comes,thereareneverthelessrisksthatshouldbemitigated.Forexample,supportingactorsfaceimportantlimitationsontheextenttowhichtheycanensurethattheforcestheytrain,adviseandassistcomplywithIHLandtakeotherstepstominimizecivilianharm.
ItisimportantthatappropriatesafeguardsbeintegratedintoaTAAAmissiontoensurethatthetrainingisadequateandeffectiveinthecontext.Thiscanbeachieved,forexample,throughcarefulpartnerselec-tion(seeSections 6.1.3 and 6.2.1.C),monitoring,evaluationandoversight(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5)andlearningprocesses(seeSection 6.3.2).Ataminimum,theTAAAprogrammeshouldincorporatetailoredIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2).
AhostofproblemscanresultfromafailuretoproperlymanageTAAAprogrammesthatdrasticallyincreasetheriskstocivilians.Ifthesupportedparty’sintentisnotalignedwiththatofthesupportingactor,orifitshifts,theremaybeariskthatthosetrainedmaychangeallegianceorbecomepredatorytowardsthelocalcommunity,thusincreasingtheriskofharmandprolonginginstability.Withoutimplementingappropriatemeasurestoensurevisibilityandgeneratefeedbackonthebehaviourofthetrainedpersonnel,thereisariskthatthesupportedpartyorindividualswithinitmightusetheirimprovedmilitarycapacityinwaysthatgobeyondorcontradictthesupportagreement.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Increasedcivilianharm
• Efficacyoftrainingnottestedthroughmonitoringandevaluationoftrainedforces
• TrainingdoesnotincorporateandapplyIHLrules
• Trainedforcesoperateoutsideofscopeofsupportagreement
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• SpecificIHLtrainingandinstruction,tailoredtotheexpectedcircumstancesoftheconflict
• Normativeengagementthroughouttheranks
• ImproveIHLcompliance
• Improvecivilianharmmitigation
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 53
Force generation Forcegenerationreferstothepracticewherebyactors,oftenexternalStates,recruit,trainandequiplocalarmedforces.ThekeycharacteristicofthistypeofPMOisthattheeffortsofthesupportingactorarecriticaltothecreationofthesupportedforce;itwouldnototherwiseexist.
Thesupportedpartyisusuallydependentonthesupportingactorfortraining,equipmentandintelligence.Becauseofthischaracteristic,animportantqualityofforcegenerationisthesupportingactor’sinfluenceoverthesupportedforce. Inthisway, forcegenerationmorecloselyresembleswhatotherscouldcallapatron-clientorproxyrelationship.
Becausethesupportedpartyreliesonitssupportingactor,thelatterhasconsiderableinfluence–andanimportantresponsibility–toensurethatthesupportedpartycomplieswithIHL.ThemeasuresthattheactorcantaketopositivelyinfluencethepartyincludearrangingrobustIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2),providingappropriatemission-specificequipment,andsettingupmonitoringandlearningmechanisms(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.3.2).
However,ifthesupportingactordoesnotexercisecontrolandinsteadchoosesahands-offordistantrela-tionshiponcethepartnerbecomesoperational, thesepartnershipscanbeparticularlyriskyforaffectedpeople.Theframeworks,systemsorcultureofnewlyestablishedforcesmaynotbeasrobustasthoseofotherforcesandthereforenotaseffectiveatensuringcompliancewithIHL.Amongotherthings,thenewforceswouldhavelimitedexperienceoperationalizingIHLrulesandlearninglessonstoimprovetheirpractices.
Newandinexperiencedforcesthatlackmonitoringandoversightbythesupportingactormayexperiencevariationsinthekeyfactorsofintentandleadershipowingtoinfluencefromotheractors,changesintheenvironmentorsimplyalackofcommanddiscipline.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Lackofoversightandaccountability
• Nascentinstitutions(frameworks,systemsorculture)notrobust
• InexperiencedinoperationalizingIHL
• Susceptibletovariationsinintentandleadership
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• ImbuecultureofrespectforIHL
• Participateinrecruitingandvettingsupportedforces
• SpecificIHLtrainingandinstruction,tailoredtotheexpectedcircumstancesoftheconflict
• Feedbackloop
Kinetic support KineticsupportreferstoPMOswherethesupportingactorengagesinhostilitiesinsupportofapartytoaconflict.
Thedegreeofkineticsupportmayvary,fromembeddedtrainingpartnershipstofiresupport.Sometypicalexamplesinclude:
• embedded support–embeddingpersonnelwithpartnerarmedforcesbefore,duringandafteroperations,directlyontheground.Embeddedpersonnelareauthorizedtoengageincombattogetherwiththesupportedunitandtofacilitatetheuseofsupportingforcecapabilities–suchasfiresupport orlogisticalsupport–toenhancethecapacityofthesupportedforce.32
• combined, joint and partnered operations–operationsconductedbyamixedforceorteamcomposedofunitsorpersonnelfrombothpartners;theycollectivelyengageincombat.
32 Foradiscussionoflegalissuesrelatingtokineticandothertypesofsupport,see“Fightingtogetherandinternationalhumanitarianlaw”(seenote3above).
54 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
• strikes or raid operations–astrikeoraraidinsupportofaparty.Itcommonlyinvolvesnichecapabilityforcapturinghigh-valuetargets.
• fire support –twotypes: – deliberatetargeting–pre-plannedattacksagainsttargetsthathavebeenanalysed,vettedandprioritizedinadvance
– dynamictargeting–unplannedandunexpectedattacksinwhichthetargetisnotidentifiedinadvance;usuallyinvolvesaircraftorbitingwithinaspecificareaawaitinginstructionsfortargets thatmayormaynotcome(i.e.targetofopportunity,troopsincontactortime-sensitivetargets).
Kineticsupport increasesthemilitarycapacityinfavourofapartytoaconflict. Itthereforenecessarilyinvolvesariskofdirectorindirectcivilianharm.
Just likeinsomeTAAArelationships,poorlyplannedandexecutedkineticsupportcanplaceciviliansatrisk,forexampleowingto inadequatealignmentofoperationalsystemsandprocesses,suchasrulesofengagementandtactics,techniquesandprocedures.Actorsinasupportrelationshipinvolvingkineticsup-portshouldtakestepstoaddresstheadditionalchallengesthatmaycomewithoperatinginpartnership,suchasinteroperability,oversightandaccountability.Indynamicsituations,havingmultipleactorsinvolvedinaspecifickineticoperationalprocess(suchascallingforcloseairsupport)canleadtoadiffusionofresponsi-bility.Practicalmeasuresmayneedtobeputintoplacetomitigatetheincreasedcivilianrisk,suchastailoredtraininginspecificoperationsor“redcardholder”targetingprocedures.
Ontheotherhand,kineticpartnershipscanpromotegoodbehaviourbymakingthepartner’sactivitiesmoretransparent.Theyincreasethepartners’operationalproximity,whichcanleadtoimprovedassessment,normativeengagement,monitoringandevaluation,andoversight.Furthermore,forthepartnerstoworkthroughandresolveinteroperabilitychallenges,kineticsupportisusuallyplannedandpracticedinadvance.Thispreparationprovidesanopportunityforbothsidesoftherelationshiptoaligntheirobjectives,definetheirrespectiverolesandresponsibilities,testtheinteroperabilityoftheircapabilitiesandtakepracticalstepstomitigateanyrisks.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Increasedcapacitycontributestocivilianharm
• SupportingactorbecomesdirectlyinvolvedinaseriousviolationofIHL
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Increasemonitoring,evaluation,oversightandaccountability
• Increasenormativeengagementthroughouttheranks
• Provideassistancetoaddresshumanitarianneeds
Partnered detention operations Partnereddetentionoperationsconsistofactivitiesthatcontributetothecapture-anddetention-relatedactivitiesofapartytoaconflict,includingcapacitybuilding.
Partnereddetentionoperationscantakeanumberofforms,including:
• capture and transfer –groundoperationsleadingtothecaptureandtransferofdetaineestoaplaceofdetention,conductedbyateamcomposedofpersonnelfrombothpartners;logisticalsupportfromonepartnerforadetentionoperationconductedbyanotherpartner;detentionoperationsconductedbyonepartnermakinguseofanotherpartner’sintelligence;orthecaptureofapersonbyonepartnerandthatperson’stransfertotheotherpartner’splaceofdetentionorjudicialsystem
• intelligence collection–interviewing(i.e.tacticalquestioning,interrogatingordebriefing)detaineesandprovidingandreceivingintelligencerelatingtodetainees
• capacity building–providingapartnerwithspecificskills,knowledge,materialassetsortechnologytoconductdetentionoperationsand/ormaintaindetentionfacilities(e.g. buildingdetentionfacilitiesortrainingandequippingdetentionfacilitypersonnel).
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 55
Therisksassociatedwithpartnereddetentionoperationscloselyparalleltherisksattendanttoalldetentionoperations(seeSection 3.3.3).Capture,arrestanddetentionactivitieshavebeenamongthemostcontentiousissuesforactorsinsupportrelationships,bothforlegalandpracticalreasons.Theseactorshavestruggledtoensurecoherenceintheirrespectiveresponsibilities,forexampleinrelationtoinformation-sharingandtransfers.Inpartneredoperations,itisnotalwaysclearwhichpartnerisexercisingcontroloveracapturedperson,whichproceduresgovernthetransferofdetaineesbetweenpartners,andwhichresponsibilitiesthearmedforcesofoneactorhaveregardingthehumanetreatmentofpeoplecapturedbyapartnerforce.Suchpracticalandlegalchallengescanleadtoadiffusionofresponsibilityandresultininhumanetreatmentanddetention conditions.
ActorsshouldtakenecessaryprecautionsintheplanningandexecutionofpartnereddetentionoperationsinordertoanticipateandmitigatetheriskthatIHLandotherinternationalstandardswillbeviolated.Likekineticpartnerships,partnereddetentionoperationstypicallyentailproximitybetweenpartnersthatgivesrisetotworisk-mitigationfactors.First,actorsgainbetterinsightintotheirpartners’decision-makingprocessandactions,andthusarebetterabletoassessanyrisksofharmoropportunitiestoimprovepractices.Second,duringthepreparationstage,partnerscanincorporatemeasurestoreducetheriskofill-treatment,tortureorotherharmoccurringinpartnereddetentionoperations.Preventivemeasurescouldbeimplementedthrough,forexample,legalframeworks,aformaltechnicalagreementorstandardoperatingprocedures.
Amongotherpracticalmeasures,actorsshouldconsiderspecificallytrainingtheirpartners’detentionper-sonnelonapplyingrelevantlawsandstandards,humanelymanagingplacesofdetentionandusingexclu-sivelynon-coerciveinterrogationtechniques(seeSection 6.2.2).Capacitybuildingaimedatstrengtheningthejudicialsystemcouldbettersecuretherightsofdetaineesandensurethattheyarereleasedassoonasthereasonsfortheirdetentionceasetoapply(seeSection 6.2.1).Itmayalsobenecessarytoprovideassistancetoapartytosecurehumaneconditionsforthosedetained(seeSection 6.2.3).
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Extrajudicialkilling
• Tortureorotherformsofill-treatment(includingduringscreening,captureandtransferoperations,andinplacesofdetention)
• Inhumanedetentionconditions(e.g.overcrowding,malnutrition,epidemicsandlackoffamilycontact)
• Detentionwithoutalegalbasisand/orproceduralsafeguards
• Transferofdetaineeswithoutduerespectfortheprincipleofnon-refoulement
• Denialoffairtrialrights
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Engagewithpartnersonapplicablelawandimplementinggoodpractices
• Strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions
• Trainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrelevantlawsandgoodpractices
• Monitorandevaluatepartnerdetentionpractices
• Improvepracticesthroughlearningprocesses
• Providematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(e.g.food,water,shelter,medicalcareandfamilycontact)
See also: – Section 3.3.3Capture,arrestanddetention – Section 4.1Personsdeprivedoftheirliberty
56 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Intelligence supportPartnersinsupportrelationshipscommonlyshareintelligence,i.e.informationofmilitarysignificancetoaconflict.
Intelligencesupportusuallyfallsintooneoftwocategories:
• intelligence sharing –sharinginformationalreadyavailable
• intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) –sharinginformationcollectedspecificallyfortheoperationbeingsupported,typicallythroughtechnicalmeansbutalsothroughothersources.
Informationmaybelessreliablewhenitissharedbetweenactorswithsignificantdifferencesintermsofintent,andthiscanresultinescalatingtheconflictbyinadvertentlyenlargingitsscope.Actorsshouldalsoconsiderhowintelligencewillbeusedbytherecipient,inparticulartheriskthattheinformationsharedwillcontributetoaviolationofIHL,forexampleinrelationtotheconductofhostilities(seeSection 3.3.2)ordetentionactivities(seeaboveandSection 3.3.3).
Falseorinaccurateinformationcontainedinintelligencethatleadstokineticoperationsordetentionoper-ationscanresult inciviliansandthosedeprivedoftheir libertybeingharmed.Whilesafeguardsmaybeinplaceforverifyingtheaccuracyofinformation,suchprocessesmaybelesseffectivewhereintelligenceissharedbetweenadhocpartners(ratherthan longstandingpartners,wheresuchprocesseshavebeenimprovedovertime),orwherethetimeframetoverifyandactonintelligenceisshort.Actorslikelyalsohavegreaterdifficultyverifyinginformationinsituationswithwhichtheyhavelessphysical,culturalandlinguisticproximityandarethereforelessableto“readtheenvironment”.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Falseorfaultyinformationinintelligencepartnershipsleadstoflawedtargetselectionorthedetentionofpeopleonincorrectgrounds
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Intelligencesharing,combinedwithadequatesafeguardsandmonitoring,canhelptominimizecivilianharm
Logistical support Logisticalsupportreferstoarrangementsthatprovideforthemaintenanceandtransportationofmaterial,facilitiesandpersonnel.
Therearefourcommontypesoflogisticalsupport:
• inter-theatre transport –transportofpersonnelorequipmentfromtheirhomelandtoatheatreofoperation,withoutdeploymenttothefrontline(intra-theatre)
• intra-theatre transport–transportofpersonnelorequipmentwithinatheatreofoperation,usuallyduringoperationsinordertoimprovethebeneficiary’srange,mobilityandspeedofdeployment
• air-refuelling–therefuellingofanaircraftinflightbyanotheraircraft
• specialized technical support –mission-criticalspecializedtechnicalsupportormaintenanceforweapons,aircraft,orotherwar-sustainingequipment.
Althoughitmayseemlessinvolvedthanotherformsofsupport,logisticalsupportcanplayanimportantroleinincreasingthemilitarycapacityofapartytoaconflict.Insuchsituations,thesupportingactorhasbothanopportunityandaresponsibilitytopositivelyaffectoutcomes.
Aslogisticalsupportincreasesapartner’scapacitytoengageinconflict,actorsshouldconsidertheconse-quencesoftheoperationstowhichthesupportcontributes.Ataminimum,actorsshouldassesswhetherthereisariskofthesupportedpartyusingtheincreasedcapacityinviolationofIHLandtakestepstomiti-gatethatrisk.Logisticalsupportthatcanbeconsideredasbeingwithinthecausalchainleadingtoriskybehaviour–suchasin-flightrefuellingforpartneraircraftbeforeindiscriminateairstrikes,orspecializedtechnicalassistancewithartilleryequipmentusedinpopulatedareas–shouldcertainlybeconsideredanopportunitytopositivelyinfluenceapartner.
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 57
ActorsthatprovidelogisticalsupportshouldalsoconsiderexercisingtheirinfluencetopromotecompliancewithIHLandprotectionforaffectedpopulations,eveniftheirsupportisnotassociatedwithanyidentifiedrisk.Beyondthepositiveinfluencethatactorscanhavebyvirtueoftheirsupportrelationshipingeneral,actorsshouldconsiderwhetherlogisticalsupportcouldbeonewayofencouragingapartytocomplywithitsIHLobligationsandmanagethehumanitarianimpactofconflictmorebroadly.Forexample,itmayoffertohelptransportessentialgoodstocivilians.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Contributestomilitaryoperationsresultingincivilianharm
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• ProvidelogisticalsupporttofulfilIHLobligationsandotherwiseassistciviliansandothersnotfighting,e.g.bytransportingessentialgoods
3.4.4 OTHER FORMS OF SUPPORT
INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY SUPPORT
FINANCIAL SUPPORT
PMSCs
HOSTING
OTHER
Variousotherformsofsupport,whetherprovidedontheirownorinconjunctionwithothersupport(seeabove),mayhaveaneffectontherecipient’scapacitytoengageinarmedconflict.Asaresult,therisksandopportunitiesthattheyposerelativetotheprotectionofaffectedpeoplemustbeassessed.
Themostpertinentoftheseotherformsofsupportinclude:
• institutionalcapacitysupport
• PMSCs
• financialsupport
• hosting.
Considerationsspecifictoeacharedetailedbelow.
Institutional capacity support Institutionalcapacitysupportreferstoexternalsupportforinstitutionsthatisoftenlongterminnature.Suchprogrammesaretypicallyrelevanttosupportrelationshipswhentheyrelatetomilitaryacademies,detentionandjudicialsectorreform.
Providing institutionalcapacitysupportcan increase therecipient’smilitarycapacity.Therefore,actorsshouldintegrateintotheseprogrammesconcretemeasurestopromotetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting,includingthroughcompliancewithIHL.
Intheabsenceofsuchmeasures,thesupportedpartycouldexpanditsroleinaconflictwithoutfullycon-sideringtheimpactonciviliansandthosenolongerfighting.Asaresult,thenumberofIHLviolationscouldincrease.
Institutionalcapacitysupportcanpresentasignificantopportunity.Well-tailored,meaningfulengage-ment,inwhichactorshelpasupportedpartytointegrateIHLintoitssystems,processesandpersonnel(seeSection 6.2.1),cangreatlyreducethenegativeeffectsofconflictonaffectedpeople.
58 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Furthermore,jointlydesignedeffortstostrengthencivilianjustice,theruleoflaw,detentionauthorities,forensicsauthoritiesandothercivilianauthoritiesshouldhelptoreducesufferingduringandafteraconflictamongthosewhoarenotfighting.Theseinstitutionsmayneedspecifictraining,equipmentoradviceinordertomanagetheiractivitiesinaconflictsituation.Properlymanagedinstitutionsmayalsohelptoattenuatelonger-termgrievances,sentimentsofinjusticeandprotractedconflictandviolence.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Increasesonlyfightingcapacity,withlittleornocontextualizedintegrationofIHLandotherprotectivenorms
• EscalatesconflictandIHLviolations
• Supportforjustice,rule-of-lawandforensicsactorsmayalsosufferfrominadequatecontextualizationandtailoringtoimmediateandupcomingneeds
• Rightsofdetainees,civiliansandthedeadviolatedasaresult
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• ContextualizedintegrationofIHLintothesystems,processesandforcesofapartytotheconflict
• FewerIHLviolationsandbetterprotectionofciviliansduringhostilities
• Improvedcapacityofcivilianauthoritiestoensuretherightsanddignityofcivilians,thedeadanddetainedarerespected
Private military and security companiesInsomesituations,actorssupportapartytoaconflictbycontractingaPMSCtoprovidespecializedservicestothepartythatthesupportingactormightotherwisehaveprovideditself.Examplesincludetrainingaswellasmaintainingandoperatingtechnologicallyadvancedweaponsystems.
AsdescribedinSection 3.2.5,contractingPMSCswithoutappropriatevettingprocedures,robustcontractsandeffectivecontrolandoversightriskscreatingadiffusionofresponsibilitythatcouldresultinIHLviola-tionseitherbythePMSCorbythosewithwhomtheywork.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• DiffusionofresponsibilitybetweenthePMSCandactorsinthesupportrelationship
• Confusionbetweenregulatoryapproaches
• Absenceofrobustvetting
• Rulesofengagementdonotadequatelydelimittheuseofforce
• Inabilitytomonitorconductandevaluateresults
• Lackofoversightandaccountability
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• PotentialtointegrateIHLintoprofessionallycustomizedservice-deliveryapproach
• PotentialtobuildinterminationclausesincaseofIHLviolationsbythePMSCand/orthesupportedparty
Further reading
Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (ICRC and Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs)
Business and International Humanitarian Law: An Introduction to the Rights and Obligations of Business
Enterprises under International Humanitarian Law (ICRC)
See also: – Section 3.2.5Privatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies
3. uNDERSTANDING SuPPORT RELATIONSHIPS 59
Financial supportFinancialsupportreferstodirectorindirectfunding,includingthroughloanagreementsandinvestments,thatsignificantlyenablesthesupportedpartytoengageinarmedconflict.
WhilefinancialsupportisperceivedasbeinglessinvolvedthanPMOs,forexample,supportingactorsarenotwithoutresponsibilityfortheconductofasupportedpartybenefitingfromtheirfunding.
Externalfinancialsupportmayreduceaparty’srelianceonthesupportofthelocalcommunity,thusre-ducingitssenseofobligationandaccountabilitytowardsit.Asaresult,thepartymaybelessconcernedaboutcivilianharmthanitmightotherwisebe.Additionally,thefinancialsupportmightprolongtheconflictifitallowsthesupportedpartytosurvivemuchlongerthanitwouldhaveifitdependedsolelyonlocalsupportandresources.
Financialsupportbringsanopportunitytopositivelyinfluencethesupportedparty.Forexample,thepro-visionoffundingcouldbeconditionaluponcontinuedcompliancewithIHL(seeSection 6.1.3.B).Theagree-mentbetweentheactorscouldalsospecificallyearmarkaportionoffundingtosupportmeasuresthatwouldreducecivilianharm,suchasIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2),providingessentialgoods(seeSection 6.2.3)orclearinglandminesorERW(seeSections 4.8 and 6.2.3).
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Reducedaccountabilitytocivilians
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• FundmeasurestopromoterespectforIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting (e.g.training,providingessentialgoodsandclearinglandminesorERW)
• Providefinancialassistancetoaffectedpeople(e.g. addressingtheneedsofthefamiliesofmissingpersons)
Hosting “Hosting”iswhenanactorplacesitsterritoryorfacilitiesatthedisposalofapartytoaconflict.AcommonformofhostingiswhenaStatepermitsforeignarmedforcesorarmedgroupstomakeuseofitssovereignterritory,e.g.therighttotransitthroughitsairspaceorterritorialwatersortouseitsterritoryformilitarybases.Alternatively,anactormayprovideadministrativeservices(enablingtheparties’leaderstoobtaintransportation,visaandfinancialfacilities,forexample).
ActorshostingapartytoanarmedconflictshouldconsidertheriskofthepartycommittingIHLviolations,notablyfromthehost’sterritory.Itwouldthereforebeimportantfortheactortoassessthesupportedparty’sintent,capacityandleadershipandtoformalizetherelationshipinanagreementthatdefinestheconditionsunderwhichsupportwillbeprovided(seeSection 6.1.3).
Actorsprovidingsupportintheformofhostingmaybeabletopositivelyinfluencethesupportedparty.Forexample,agreementstoprovidehostingfacilitiescouldinvolvespecificlanguagemakingthesupportcontin-gentonIHLcompliance.Thesupportedparty’spresenceonthehost’sterritorymayalsoprovideopportunitiestoimplementmeasuresthatpromotecomplianceandprotection,suchasIHLtraining(seeSection 6.2.2).
SPECIFIC RISkS
• EnablesIHLviolations
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Normativeengagement
• IHLtraining
• MakehostingrightscontingentonIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofcivilians
60 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
PREPARATION
IMPLEM
ENTATIONTRANSITION
Thischapterexploressomekeyareasofconcern,relatingtopeopleandobjectsprotectedbyIHL,thatactorsshouldconsiderwhenmanagingtheirsupportrelationships.Itidentifiessomespecificrisksthatactorsshouldseektomitigate,aswellasopportunitiestopromotetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thisrequiresactorstotakegreateraccountoftheharmthatresults,directlyandindirectly,fromactivitiesrelatedtoarmedconflict(seeSection 3.3).Thesubjectsandconsiderationsdiscussedherearenotintendedtobeexhaustive;actorsshouldundertaketheirowncomprehensiveassessment.
Actorsshouldplacetheprotectionofthosenotfightingatthecentreoftheireffortstomanagetheir support relationships.
IHLprovidesrulestoprotectpeoplewhoarenot,orarenolonger,participatinginhostilities.Generalrulesapplytoprotectciviliansandpersonshorsdecombat,suchasthewoundedandsickandpersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty.IHLalsoidentifiesgroupsrequiringspecificprotection,suchaswomenandchildren,medicalpersonnel,refugees,IDPsandthosewhohavegonemissingasaresultofarmedconflict.Otherbranchesofinternationallawanddomesticlawmayalsoapplytoprotectthesepeople,dependingonthecircumstances.
Thenotionof“civilian”inIHLreferstoallpersonswhoarenotcombatants(inanIAC)orfighters(inaNIAC).“Civilianpopulation”isatermthatreferstogroupingsofcivilians.Thepresenceofcombatantswithinthegeneralcivilianpopulationdoesnotchangethecharacterofthegrouporpopulationasawhole.
Personshorsdecombatarethosewhoareinthepowerofanadverseparty,aredefencelessbecauseofuncon-sciousness,shipwreck,woundsorsickness,orclearlyexpressanintentiontosurrender–providedtheyabstainfromanyhostileactanddonotattempttoescape.
IHLseekstolimittheharmthatpartiestoaconflictmaycausetopeoplebothdirectlyandindirectly.Itpro-videsrulesthatprotecttheaforementionedindividualsduringhostilities,whileinthepowerofapartytoaconflict,andwhenotherwiseaffectedbymilitaryoperations.
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 61
Importantly,abroadrangeofactivitiesbyvariousbodiesofagovernmentorotherauthoritycanaffectcivil-iansandothersnotfighting.Forexample,civiliansloseaccesstohealthcarewhentheirhospitalhasnowaterorelectricitybecausethoseserviceshavebeendamaged;civiliansmustleavetheareabecausetheyfeararrestorattackbyoneoftheparties;ormedicalpersonnelquittheirjobsasaresultofthreatsissuedagainstthem.Actorsinsupportrelationshipsneedtobeawareofthelikelyactivitiesofthepartiestoaconflictandtheirconsequencesforciviliansandothersnotfighting(seeSection 3.3).Itisalsoworthhighlightingthatsexualviolence,althoughfrequentlydismissedasa“by-product”ratherthanapreventablewarcrime,isprohibitedasaseriousviolationofIHLinbothIACsandNIACs.
Inadditiontoobligationsnottocarryoutactionsthatmayharmciviliansandothersnotfighting,partiestoaconflictmayalsohavepositiveobligationstowardsthem,suchastoprovidefood,water,sanitationandmedicalcare.Otheractorsthatarenotpartiestoaconflictmayalsohaveobligationstowardsaffectedpeople,forexamplewithrespecttohumanitarianassistance.
UnderIHL,civilianobjectsareallobjectsthatarenotmilitaryobjectives.Thereisageneralprohibitionagainsttargetingcivilianobjectsduringhostilities,aswellasmorespecificrulesregulatingtheuseofcivilianobjectsbypartiestoaconflict.
WhilecivilianobjectsaregenerallyprotectedunderIHL,someobjectsarespecificallyprotected,suchasmedicalfacilitiesandtransport(seeSection 4.5),objectsindispensabletothesurvivalofthecivilianpopu-lation,andculturalproperty.Attacksagainstornearworksor installationscontainingdangerousforces(e.g.damsornuclearpowerplants)areprohibitediftheywouldresultinseverelossesamongstthecivilianpopulation,asareattacksonessentialcivilianinfrastructureiftheforeseeableeffectswouldbedispropor-tionatetothemilitaryadvantageanticipated.Furthermore,IHLprotectsthenaturalenvironmentandaimstolimitthedamagecausedtoit,notonlybecausetheenvironmentsustainshumanlife,butalsobecauseofitsintrinsicvalue(seeSection 4.7).
Actorsshouldalsoconsiderthecumulativeimpactofthesupportedparties’activities,andthoseoftheirsupporters,onaffectedpopulations.
Further reading
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2019), pp. 37–46
(ICRC)
Engaging with State Armed Forces to Prevent Sexual Violence (ICRC)
Prevention and Criminal Repression of Rape and other Forms of Sexual Violence during Armed Conflicts –
Factsheet (ICRC)
4.1 PERSONS DEPRIVED OF THEIR LIBERTYWhateverthereasonfortheirdetention,peopledeprivedoftheirlibertyare,bydefinition,inavulnerablesituation.Howvulnerabletheirsituationisdependsonanumberoffactors,includingtheirindividualchar-acteristics(sex,age,etc.),thegeneralsituationinwhichtheyaredetained,thereasonfortheirdetention,thestagetheyareatinanyjudicialoradministrativeprocess,andbywhomtheyarebeingheld.
Inaddition,systemicshortcomingsinfacilities,proceduresandprocessesoftenaffectalldetaineestosomedegree,regardlessofotherfactors.Forexample,inthechaosofarmedconflict,detentionsystemsmaybebadlydisruptedormayhavetobeimprovised.Thejudicialanddetentionsystemsareoftenunabletocopewiththenumbers.Thehumanetreatmentofdetaineesismadeevenmorechallenginginfacilitiesthatareneglectedorovercrowded.
62 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
IHLprotectspeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyasaresultofarmedconflict.Theymustbetreatedhumanelyinallcircumstances,andtheyareprotectedinparticularagainstmurder,torture,andcruel,humiliatingordegradingtreatment.Peopledeprivedoftheirlibertymustbeallowedtocorrespondwiththeirfamiliesandbeprovidedwithadequatefood,water,clothing,shelterandmedicalattention.
Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldplaninadvanceforthelikelihoodthatpartiestotheconflictwillarrest,captureanddetainpeople(seeSection 3.3.3).DetentionactivitiesinparticularpresentspecificrisksinPMOs,includingthediffusionofresponsibilityamongpartners(seeSection 3.4.3).Thesechallengescanaffecthowthosedetainedaretreatedandtheirdetentionconditions.PrincipalamongtheICRC’sconcernsaretherisksofextrajudicialkillingsanddisappearances,ill-treatment(particularlyduringinterrogations),inadequatematerialconditionsofdetention,theabsenceofproceduralsafeguardsand/orfairtrialguaran-tees,harshdisciplinarysanctions,specialneedsleftunmet,anddetaineetransfersamongpartnerforceswithoutrespectingtheprincipleofnon-refoulement.
Whetherornotactorsinasupportrelationshiparedirectlyinvolvedindetention-relatedactivities,theyhaveopportunitiestopositivelyinfluencehowtheirpartnerstreatdetainees.Amongothermeasures,theycouldengagewithpartnersonapplicablelaw,internationallyrecognizedstandardsandgoodpractices(seeSection 6.1.2);strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutionsortrainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrele-vantlaw,internationallyrecognizedstandardsandgoodpractices(seeSections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2);andprovidematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(seeSection 6.2.3).
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Extrajudicialkillings
• Enforceddisappearances
• Tortureandotherformsofill-treatment,includingsexualviolence
• Inhumaneconditionsofdetention(e.g.overcrowding,malnutrition,epidemics,lackoffamilycontact)
• Detentionwithoutalegalbasisand/orproceduralguarantees
• Denialoffairtrialrights
• Conditionsnotadaptedtospecialneeds(e.g.children,mentallyill,peoplewithdisabilities)
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Engagewithpartnersonapplicablelawandimplementinggoodpractices
• Strengthenthecapacitiesofpartnerinstitutions
• Trainpartnerpersonneltoimplementrelevantlawandgoodpractices
• Providematerialassetsorhumanresourcestoimprovedetentionconditions(e.g.food,water,shelter,medicalcare,familycontact)
Key legal rules
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
Third Geneva Convention of 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 4–6
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 118–128 and 93
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 63
Further reading
The Copenhagen Process: Principles and Guidelines
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (uN)
Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (uN)
“Partnering in detention and detainee transfer operations” (T. Rodenhäuser)
“The protective scope of Common Article 3: More than meets the eye” (J. Pejic)
“Procedural principles and safeguards for internment/administrative detention in armed conflict
and other situations of violence” (J. Pejic)
“Protecting people deprived of their liberty” (ICRC)
Sexual Violence in Detention (ICRC)
See also: – Section 3.3.3Capture,arrestanddetention – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations
4.2 THE DEADInconflict,thedeadareprotectedunderIHL.Partiestoaconflictareobligatedtotakeallpossiblemeasurestosearchfor,collectandevacuatedeadbodies,andtoensurethattheyarenotdespoiled.Alleffortsshouldbemadetoensurethatthedeadarenotusedtoinstilfearamongopposingforcesorciviliansorasabargainingchipinnegotiationsbetweenpartiestoaconflict.
Foridentificationpurposes,thepartiesmustrecordallavailableinformationpriortothedisposalofdeadbodiesandmarkthelocationofgraves.Furthermore,thepartiesmustensurethedeadareproperlymanaged,whichincludesdisposingoftheminarespectfulmanner.Theymustalsoseetoitthatgravesitesareregis-teredandmaintainedtopreventdeceasedpersonsfromgoingmissingandtopreservenecessaryinformationforthefutureidentificationofunidentifiedhumanremains,inlinewithapplicabledataprotectionstandards(seeSection 4.4).
Actorsinasupportrelationshipmaybeabletohelppartnerstoimprovetheirpracticesinthesearchfor,collection,evacuationandmanagementofthedeadinaccordancewiththeirresponsibilities.Forexample,theycouldshareexpertiseorresourcesinordertoimplementmechanisms,strengthencapacitiestoidentifycombatantsorestablishagravesregistrationservice(seeSection 6.2.1).Theycouldengagewithandtraintheirpartnersonmanagingthedeadinlinewiththeirobligationsandwithbestpracticeintermsofprotec-tionanddignity(seeSection 6.2.2)andconveyinformationonrelevantlaws,customsandotherstandardsonrecoveringandmanagingthedeadinadignifiedmanner,wherevertheyareoperating(seeSection 6.1.2).
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Missingpersons
• Barrierstocollectionowingtohazardsordeliberateaction(e.g.booby-trappedbodiesorgravesites)
• Bodiesbeingdespoiled(e.g.destructionofhumanremainsduringrecoveryoperations,mutilation ofthedead)
• Gravesitesnotmarked
• Culturalandreligiousneedsnotrespected(e.g.burialrites)
• Remainsnotreturned
• Misidentification
• Returnofthewronghumanremainstoafamilymember
• Impedimenttoreconciliation
64 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Assistinproperlymanagingthedead,identifyingremainsandregisteringgravesites
• Trainonrecovery,analysisandidentificationtechniques(e.g.autopsy,forensicarchaeology andforensicgenetics)
Key legal rules
Article 3 common to the Geneva Conventions of 1949
First Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 15–18 and 20
Second Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 16 and 18–21
Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 66, 77 and 120–122
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 16, 113, 129–131 and 138–140
Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 17, 32–34, 61 and 78
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 4 and 8
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 112–116
Further reading
Humanity after Life: Respecting and Protecting the Dead – Factsheet (ICRC)
Guidelines for Investigating Deaths in Custody (ICRC)
Management of the Dead under Islamic Law (ICRC)
“Management of the dead from Islamic law and international humanitarian law perspectives:
Considerations for humanitarian forensics” (A. Al-Dawoody)
Management of Dead Bodies after Disasters: A Field Manual for First Responders (ICRC)
Forensic Identification of Human Remains (ICRC)
Operational Best Practices regarding the Management of Human Remains and Information on the Dead by
Non-Specialists (ICRC)
Guidelines for the Use of Forensic Genetics in Investigations into Human Rights and International Humanitarian
Law Violations (ICRC)
Medicolegal Facilities – Guidelines for Architectural Programming and Construction Assistance (ICRC)
See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 65
4.3 INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS
33 N.Crawfordet al., ProtractedDisplacement:UncertainPathstoSelf-RelianceinExile,HumanitarianPolicyGroup,London,September2015.
TheICRCisseeinggreaternumbersofpeopleatriskofdisplacement.Inrecentyears,thousandsofpeopleincitiesonthefrontlineofarmedconflicthavebeendisplacedwithinjustweeksormonths.Thewide-spreaddestructionofresidentialareasandcriticalcivilianinfrastructurecanrenderhomesuninhabitableand,therefore,causedisplacement.Manyremainwithintheirowncountry,althoughtheymayendupfleeingseveraltimes,andmostdisplacementsituationsbecomeprotracted.33
Those displacedmayfind refuge in camps or,more often, outside camps in rural and especially low-resourcedurbanareas,wheretheirarrivalmayaddtothepressureonalreadyweakand/orstrainedservicesanddeterioratedinfrastructure.Thiscanfurtherworseneveryone’slivingconditionsandbeasourceoftensionbetweendisplacedpeopleandthehostcommunities.
IDPsareparticularlyvulnerabletoriskstotheirhealthandlives,includingongoinghostilities;landminesandERW(seeSection 4.8);sexualviolenceandexploitation;andforcedrecruitment.Theymaylackaccesstoessentialservices,suchashealthcareandeducation,foralongperiodoftime.
IHLprohibitstheforceddisplacementofthecivilianpopulationforreasonsrelatedtothearmedconflictunlessthesecurityoftheciviliansinvolvedorimperativemilitaryreasonssorequire.NumerousotherrulesofIHL,notablythosegoverningtheconductofhostilities(seeSection 3.3.2),arecrucialtoprotectingcivil-ians,andviolationsoftheserulesoftentriggerdisplacement.WhenthepartiestoaconflictcomplywithIHL,displacementisminimized,displacedpeoplearebetterprotectedwhilebeingdisplaced,andtheenvironmentbecomesconducivetosafeanddignifiedvoluntaryreturns.
Legal reminder
Displaced persons have a right to voluntary return in safety to their homes or places of habitual
residence as soon as the reasons for their displacement cease to exist. As part of this, the competent
authorities have a duty to take measures to facilitate these returns and the reintegration of displaced
persons.
Partnersinsupportrelationshipscanhelptopreventdisplacement,protectandassistIDPsandestablishtheconditionsandprovidethemeansforIDPstofindadurablesolutiontotheirsituation.ActorscanworkthroughoutthesupportrelationshiptofosterbetterrespectforIHLandtherebyreducedisplacementandtheriskstothosedisplaced.SupportingactorscanalsohelpsupportedpartiestoremoveimpedimentstosafereturnsbyequitablyrestoringaccesstoessentialservicesandclearinglandminesandERW(seeSections 4.8 and 6.3.1).
Returnsshouldonlyoccurundersafeanddignifiedconditions.Itisthereforeimportantthatthecompetentauthoritiesalsotakenon-discriminatorymeasurestosupportIDPs’effortstonormalizetheirsituationwhilewaitingtoreturnhome,ortofacilitatetheirlocalintegrationasadurablesolution.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Forceddisplacement
• Traumaandotherharm
• Familiesseparated
• Peoplegoingmissing
• Lossoflandandmovableproperty
• Lossofofficialdocumentation,impedingaccesstoessentialservices
66 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
• Attacks against IDP sites
• Abuseandexploitation(includingsexualviolence)
• Restrictionsonthefreedomofmovement
• Limitedornoaccesstoeducation
• Inabilitytoworkandlossofproductivecapacity
• Secondaryandmultipledisplacements
• Forcedorprematurereturn
• Inter-communaltensionorinstability
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Assistpartnersinfacilitatingdurablesolutions
• HelptorestoreaccesstoessentialservicesandclearlandminesandERW,inaninclusivewayandensuringequitableaccess
Key legal rules
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 49 and 147
Additional Protocol I of 1977, Article 85
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Article 17
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 129–133
African union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in Africa
(kampala Convention), 2009
Further reading
Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (uN)
Displacement in times of armed conflict: How international humanitarian law protects in war, and why it
matters (ICRC)
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2019), pp. 38–41 (ICRC)
Addressing internal displacement in times of armed conflict and other violence (ICRC)
Displaced in Cities: Experiencing and Responding to Urban Internal Displacement Outside Camps (ICRC)
Urban services during protracted armed conflict: A call for a better approach to assisting affected people (ICRC)
See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport – Section 6.2.3AssistanceinIHLcompliance – Section 6.3.1Structureddisengagement
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 67
4.4 MISSING PERSONSTheissueofmissingpersonscontinuestobeacommonfeatureofarmedconflicts,bothpastandpresent.Therearelongstandingcasesofmissingpersonsfrompastconflicts,andthenumberofpeoplereportedmissingincurrentconflictsisalarming.
Whenpeoplegomissing,theimpactontheirfamilies,onotherindividualsandonsocietiesisdetrimentalandlong-lasting.Inadditiontonotknowingthefateandwhereaboutsoflovedones,familiesexperiencenumerousotherday-to-dayhardships,includingsocialisolationorstigmatizationandlegal,administrativeandeconomicproblems.Moreover,theanguishanduncertaintymarkfamilyhistoriesovergenerations,jeopardizingtheprospectsforreconstructingthesocialfabricofconflict-affectedcommunitiesandsocieties.
Theissueofmissingpersonscanbeaddressedbothbeforethefact(preventively)andafterthefact(intermsofsolvingcases).Howthisisdone,duringandafterconflict,willdeterminethescaleoftheproblemanditsrepercussionsonthemissingpersonsthemselves,theirfamiliesandthecommunitiesaffected.
Legal reminder
States and parties to armed conflicts have the obligation to prevent people from going missing as a
result of armed conflict. They also have an obligation to clarify the fate and whereabouts of missing
persons, which implies respect for the families’ right to know the whereabouts and fate of their
missing relatives and ensure the dead are treated in a dignified way.
Theseobligationsdonotstartafterhostilitiescometoanend.Thereisaseriesofpracticalpreventiveandearly-actionmeasuresthatpartiestoarmedconflictsshouldtakeduringaconflicttopreventpeoplefromgoingmissing,tosearchandlocatethosereportedmissing,torestorethelinkwiththeirfamiliesand,whererelevant,tobringthembacktogether(whethertheyarefoundaliveordead).
Statesandpartiestoaconflictshouldsupportprofessionalandnon-discriminatoryactioninsupportofmissingpersonsandtheirfamilies.Thisincludesprevention,earlyactionandclarifyingthefateandwhere-aboutsofmissingpersonsoutofrespectforfamilies’righttoknow.
Whiletheissueofmissingpersonsiscomplexandmulti-layered,awealthofinformation,expertiseandknow-howexists.Theseresourcesshouldbesharedbetweenpartnersinsupportrelationships(seeSection 6.2.3).Actorsinsuchrelationshipsmaygettheopportunitytohelppartnersputinplaceframeworks,systemsorprocessesthatcanhelptopreventpeoplefromgoingmissing(seeSection 6.2.1);examplesincluderegisteringpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,notifyingtheirfamiliesoftheirstatus,andidentifyingthewoundedandsickwhenevacuated.Supportingactorsmayalsobeabletoprovidematerialresources,forexampletofacilitatecontactorrestorefamilylinksbetweenmissingand/orseparatedfamilymembers.Incaseswhereactorsaredirectlyinvolvedinthosemechanisms,theyshouldharmonizetheirrespectiveapproaches.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Enforceddisappearances
• Personsgoingmissing,includingasaresultofomissionsorpoorpractices:mismanagedorpoorlymanagedregistries(e.g.inhealthordetentionfacilities),lackofgraveregistries,poorpracticesinmanaging the dead, etc.
• Familiesseparated
• Lossofcontactbetweenfamilymembers
• Traumaoffamilymembersleftwithoutanyinformationonthewhereaboutsandfateofmissingrelatives
• Social,legal,administrativeandeconomicchallenges
• Long-termconsequencesforaffectedsocietiesandpossiblenegativeimpactonreconciliationprocesses
Missing
68 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Supportpartnertopreventpersonsfromgoingmissingortofindthosewhodo
• Assistpartnertofacilitatecontactorrestorefamilylinks
• Institutionalcapacitybuildingtoputinplaceorimproveframeworks,systemsandprocessestopreventpersonsfromgoingmissingandclarifythefateandwhereaboutsofmissingpersons
• Providesupporttounderstandandaddresstheneedsofthefamiliesofthemissing
See also: – Section 3.4.3Partneredmilitaryoperations – Section 3.4.4Otherformsofsupport
Key legal rules
First Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 15–17
Second Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 18–20
Third Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 120–124
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 16, 129–131 and 136–141,
Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 15, 18, 32–34 and 67
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Article 8
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 98, 112, 116–117 and 123
Further reading
The Missing (IRRC)
Missing persons and their families – Factsheet (ICRC)
Guiding Principles/Model Law on the Missing (ICRC)
The missing and their families (ICRC)
4.5 ACCESS TO MEDICAL CARE IN ARMED CONFLICTDisregardfortheprotectionaffordedbyIHLtohealth-careprovidersandtheirbeneficiariesincurrentarmedconflictsmeansthatalargenumberofwoundedandsickcivilians,combatantsandfighterssufferordieunnecessarily.Damagetoorthedestructionofmedicalfacilitiescanhavealong-termimpactonthepublichealthofthecommunityandresultindisplacement.
Militaryoperationscangreatlyunderminebothsafeaccesstoandthedeliveryofhealthcare,especiallywhensuchoperationsrequiresettingupcheckpoints,conductingsearchoperationswithinhealthcentres,orattackingmilitarylocationsnearahealth-carefacility.Supportingactorscancreateopportunitiestoaddresstherisksimplicitinsuchmilitaryoperations,namelybyfacilitatingtheavailabilityofmedicalcare.Themis-useofmedicalfacilitiesormedicaltransportformilitaryoperationsmaycausethemtolosetheirprotectionunderIHLandhenceexposethem,alongwiththewoundedandsickandthemedicalpersonnelinside,totheriskofattack.Workingwithpartnerstoimprovedoctrineandprocessesandprovideadditionaltrainingcanpromotebetterrespectandprotectionformedicalfacilitiesandmedicalpersonnel.
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 69
Accesstohealthcaremayalsobeimpededintheimmediateaftermathofconflictduetoongoingsafetyriskssuchasexplosivedevicesandhazardouswaste.Actorsinasupportrelationshipmaybeabletoassistpartnersbyprovidingthespecialistpersonnelorequipmentneededtoidentifyandremovetheserisks.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Deathandinjuryofprotectedpersons(thewoundedandsick,medicalpersonnelandcivilians)
• Damagetohealth-carefacilities(e.g.ambulancesandhospitals)
• Careforthewoundedandsickimpeded
• Thewoundedandsickpreventedordiscouragedfromseekingcare
• Health-carepersonnelthreatenedorevenprosecutedandnolongerwillingtocontinueworkingintheirareaofresponsibility
• Epidemics
• Displacement
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Encouragepartiestoaconflicttorefrainfromattackingcivilians,medicalpersonnelorcivilianinfrastructure,includinghealth-carefacilitiesandvehicles
• Encouragepartiestoaconflicttoliftmeasurespreventingthedeliveryofnecessarymedicalitems
• Providetrainingonprotectingmedicalpersonnel,facilitiesandtransportandaccesstohealthcare
• Providemedicalsuppliesorpersonnelandassistwithrepairingorbuildingfacilitiesorcivilianinfrastructure
• Assistinclearingrisksthatimpedeaccesstomedicalfacilities
• InvestigateincidentsofviolenceagainsthealthcarebypartnersandensureaccountabilityforattacksthatviolateIHL
Key legal rules
First Geneva Convention of 1949
Second Geneva Convention of 1949
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 20 and 55–56
Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 12, 13, 15 and 21
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 9 and 11
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 25, 28–30 and 35
Further reading
Domestic Normative Frameworks for the Protection of Health Care (ICRC)
Promoting Military Operational Practice That Ensures Safe Access to and Delivery of Health Care (ICRC)
Safeguarding the provision of health care: Operational Practices and Relevant International Humanitarian Law
concerning Armed Groups (ICRC)
The responsibilities of health care personnel working in armed conflicts and other emergencies (ICRC)
Ensuring the Preparedness and Security of Health-Care Facilities in Armed Conflict and Other Emergencies (ICRC)
Ambulance and Pre-Hospital Services in Risk Situations (ICRC)
Protecting Health Care: Guidance for the Armed Forces (ICRC)
70 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
4.6 ESSENTIAL SERVICES
34 TheICRCconsidershealth,water,sanitation,electricity,solidwastemanagementandeducationtobeessentialservices.
Armedconflictsareincreasinglyplayedoutinurbanareas,wheremillionsofpeopleareatriskofharmifessentialcivilianservicesaredegradedoriftheycannotaccesssuchservices.34Severaltrendshavecontrib-utedtoadeclineinthedeliveryofessentialservicesandtoanunprecedentedriseinhumanitarianneedsinurbanareas;theseincludeurbanization,thegrowingprevalenceofparallelarmedconflicts,theprotractednatureofmanyconflictsandthesheerscaleofdestructioninurbanwarfare.Itisincreasinglylikelythatmul-tiplecrises,suchasarmedconflictsandnaturaldisasters,willoccuratthesametime,furthercomplicatingtheresponseandtypicallyoverwhelmingallthoseinvolved.
Residentsofurbanareasoftendependmoreonthecentralizeddeliveryofessentialservices,leavingthemmorevulnerable.Urbanservicesystems(watersupply,wastewaterremovalandelectricitygeneration)arelargescaleandinterconnected,entailcomplexlogisticsfortheiroperationsandmaintenance,andrelyonfragileandmulti-layeredgovernancestructures.
IHLcomplianceinmanyoftoday’sconflictsisinsufficient.Toooften,criticalcivilianwater,sanitationandelectricityinfrastructureisdirectlytargetedorotherwiseaffectedbyextensivedestructioninurbanareas(owingtotheuseofexplosiveweaponswithwideareaeffects,forexample).Thereverberatingeffectsofsuchattackssignificantlyreduceaccesstoessentialservices.
Largeswathsofcommunitieswillremainvulnerabletoalackofaccesstoessentialservicesaslongascivilianobjectsareexposedtodamagefromarmedconflict.Thesameholdstruewhenothercomponentsofaser-viceareaffected,suchaswhenconsumablesaredamagedordestroyed,orwhenthepersonnelnecessarytomaintainaservicearekilled,injuredorpreventedfromcarryingouttheirtasks.Thisisfirstandforemostapublichealthconcern,butitalsothreatenslivelihoodsandcancausedisplacement.Areductioninessentialservicedeliverycanalsoaffectrelatedservices,suchascommunications,foodandagriculture,criticalmanu-facturing,andbankingandfinancialservices.
Inadditiontoimplementingmeasurestomitigatetheaboverisks,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayfindopportunitiestoimproveaccesstoessentialservices.Theycouldhelptorepairor(re)buildcivilianinfra-structureandcouldtakestepstoensuresafeaccessforservice-providerpersonnel(e.g.operatorsandtech-nicians)sotheycanoperateandmaintaintheservicesandconsumables(e.g.chemicalsforwatertreatment)requiredforservicedeliveryinlinewithbasicstandards.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Deathofandinjurytoprotectedpersons(e.g.service-providerpersonnel–operatorsandtechnicians–andothercivilians)
• Damagetoordestructionofessentialserviceinfrastructure
• Damagetoordestructionofotherservice-providerassets(e.g.offices,warehouses,stockyards,vehiclesandmachinery)
• Publichealth(diseaseoutbreaks)
• Displacement
• Economiclosses,lostlivelihoods
• Impairmentofrelatedservices(i.e.criticalcivilianinfrastructuresectors)
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Encouragepartiestorefrainfromattackingcriticalcivilianinfrastructure
• Sharetechnicalexpertiseandgoodpracticesinordertominimizetheimpactofmilitaryoperations onessentialservices
• Assistwithrepairingor(re)buildingcivilianinfrastructure
• Takestepstoensuresafeaccessforservice-providerpersonnel(e.g. operatorsandtechnicians)
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 71
Key legal rules
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 18–19, 53 and 55–56
Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 15, 52 and 54–57
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 9 and 14–15
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 7, 9–10, 14–19, 21, 42, 51 and 53–54
Further reading
Urban services during protracted armed conflict: A call for a better approach to assisting affected people (ICRC)
Bled Dry: How war in the Middle East is bringing the region’s water supplies to breaking point (ICRC)
When War Moves to Cities: Protection of Civilians in Urban Areas (ICRC and InterAction)
I saw my city die: Voices from the front lines of urban conflict in Iraq, Syria and Yemen (ICRC)
Explosive weapons in populated areas: Humanitarian, legal, technical and military aspects (ICRC)
Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas (ICRC, forthcoming)
4.6.1 SCHOOLS AND OTHER EDUCATIONAL FACILITIESEducationalservicesarerapidlyandprofoundlydisruptedduringarmedconflicts.Disruptionoccurswhenstudents,educationalpersonnel,andeducationinfrastructurearedirectlytargetedorincidentallyharmedinattacksandwhenthemilitarymakesuseofeducationalfacilities,impedinglearningandexposingschoolstoattackbyopposingforces.Schoolsarefrequentlyclosedbyauthoritiesowingtonearbyhostilitiesandresourceconstraintsexacerbatedbyconflict;thefearofharmalsokeepsstudentsandstaffaway.Itispar-ticularlychallengingtoprotecteducationalcontinuitywheretheimportanceofeducationasanessentialpublicserviceisundervaluedbybelligerentsorwherethedeliveryofeducationitselfisacontestedissueintheconflict.
Thedisruptionofeducationcanaffectthecommunityimmediately,asschoolsareofteninvolvedinthedeliveryofotherbasicservices.Itseffectscanpersistforgenerations.Forexample,childrenwhoarepre-ventedfromattendingschoolforevenafewmonthsinwartimeoftennevergoback.Thedegradationofbasicservices,includingeducation,hasacumulativeimpactonchildrenandthecommunity,especiallyinsituationsofprotractedconflict.
Inadditiontoimplementingmeasurestomitigatetheaboverisks,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayhaveopportunitiestoeitherpreventeducationaldisruptionorfacilitatetheremovalofconflict-inducedbarrierstoaccess.Dependingonthebarrierstoeducationinagivensituation,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayfindthattheycanraiseawarenessoftheneedtoprotectschoolsascivilianobjectsthroughtrainingprogrammes(seeSection 6.2.2),advocateforareductioninthemilitaryuseofschools(seeSection 6.1.2),helptorepairor(re)buildeducationalfacilities(seeSection 6.3.1.D)andtakestepstoensuresafeaccessforeducationalpersonnelorcoordinationwithhumanitarianorganizations(seeSection 6.2.3).Byincorporatingsuchmeas-uresintotheirsupportrelationships,actorscanplayaroleinchangingthemindsetthataccesstoeducationisa“nicetohave”.
72 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
SPECIFIC RISkS • Deathofandinjurytocivilians(e.g.students,educationalpersonnel) • Closureofeducationalfacilities • Long-termeffectsoncommunityeducationlevels,withadisproportionateimpactongirls • Recruitmentbyarmedgroups • Damagetoordestructionofeducationalfacilitiesandlossofeducationalmaterial,andaconcomitantriseinfuturerebuildingcosts
• Riseinhumanitarianneedsduetothelossofaccesstocriticalservices,informationandsupporttypicallyavailableinschools
• Cumulativeimpactoflong-termdisruptionondevelopmentstandardsandpublichealth
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• Encouragepartiestorefrainfromattackingschoolsandothereducationalfacilitiesaswellasstudentsandeducationalpersonnel
• Advocateforareductioninthemilitaryuseofschools • Providesupportforeducationalpersonneltocontinueactivities,andfacilitaterepairsofeducationalfacilities
• Assisttheauthorities,schoolpersonnelandotherrelevantstakeholdersinassessingandmanagingsecurityrisksaroundschools
• Assistinclearingrisksthatimpedeaccesstoschools(e.g. ERW) • InvestigateincidentsofviolenceagainsteducationcarriedoutbypartnersandensureaccountabilityforattacksthatviolateIHL
Key legal rules
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 24, 50(1) and 94
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Article 4(3)(a)
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 135
Further reading
International Humanitarian Law and the Challenges of Contemporary Armed Conflicts (2019), pp. 44–46 (ICRC)
Guidelines for Protecting Schools and Universities from Military Use During Armed Conflict
4.7 THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENTThenaturalenvironmentisbydefaultcivilianincharacter;allpartsofthenaturalenvironmentarecivilianobjectsunlesstheyhavebecomeamilitaryobjective.Incontemporaryconflicts,thenaturalenvironmentisattimesdirectlyattackedorincidentallydamagedbytheuseofcertainmeansormethodsofwarfare.Itcanalsobeimpactedbydamagecausedtothebuiltenvironment,forexamplewhenwater,sanitationorelec-tricityservicesaredisruptedbyhostilities.Attackscanleadtowater,soilandlandcontamination,renderingdrinkingwaterandagriculturallandscarcerforcivilians;landminesandERWcancontaminatefordecades;andbiodiversitycanbeirreparablydegradedwhenfightingtakesplaceinhotspots.
Theconsequencesofsuchenvironmentaldamageforciviliansaremanifold.Civiliansdependonthenaturalenvironmentforfoodandwater.Farmers,herdersandfishingcommunitiesdependonitfortheirliveli-hoods.Whentheenvironmentisdamagedandfoodandeconomicinsecurityintensifies,thephysicalandmentalhealthofconflict-affectedpeopledeteriorates.Individualsandcommunitiestrytocopebychangingordiversifyingtheirlivelihoods,modifyingtheirwaysoflifeormigratingtonewplaces.Yetthiscapacitytoadaptdecreasesasconflictandenvironmentaldegradationcontinue.
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 73
Whileacertaindegreeofenvironmentaldamageisinherentinconflict,actorsinsupportrelationshipsmayhaveopportunitiestopreventseriousenvironmentaldegradation.Theycould,forexample,disseminateandintegrateIHLrulesprotectingthenaturalenvironmentintotrainingprogrammesandsanctionsystems(seeSections 6.2.1 and 6.2.2);encouragepartiestotheconflicttoadoptandimplementmeasurestoenhancetheirunderstandingofthenaturalenvironmentpriortooronaregularbasisduringmilitaryoperations(seeSection 6.1.2);helppartnerstopreventorminimizeharmtotheenvironment,suchasbyprovidingtechnicalexpertiseorsharingenvironmentalimpactassessmentsandmapsshowingparticularlyimportantorfragileenvironmentalresourcesincombatareas(seeSection 6.2.3);andexchangeexamplesandbestpracticesre- latingtomeasuresthatcanbetakentocomplywiththeirIHLobligationtoprotectthenaturalenvironment.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Waterandsoilcontamination,impactingdrinkingwaterandfoodscarcityandlonger-termfoodandeconomicsecurity
• Long-termbiodiversityloss
• Displacement
• Exacerbationofcivilianharmowingtoclimaterisks
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• DisseminateandintegrateIHLrulesprotectingthenaturalenvironmentintotrainingprogrammesandsanctionsystemsforpartiestoaconflict
• Encouragemeasurestoenhanceunderstandingofthenaturalenvironmentpriortoorregularlyduringmilitaryoperations
• Providetechnicalexpertiseonconductingenvironmentalimpactassessmentsandmappingparticularlyfragileenvironmentalresourcesincombatareas
• Identifyanddesignateareascontainingparticularlyimportantorfragileenvironmentalresourcesandsharethisinformation
• ExchangeexamplesandbestpracticesrelatingtomeasuresthatcanbetakentocomplywiththeIHLobligationtoprotectthenaturalenvironment
Key legal rules
Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949, Articles 53 and 147
Additional Protocol I of 1977, Articles 35(3) and 51–56
Additional Protocol II of 1977, Articles 14–16
ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rules 43–45
For a full list of relevant treaties, see the ICRC treaty database
Further reading
Guidelines on the Protection of the Natural Environment in Situations of Armed Conflict (ICRC)
74 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
4.8 LANDMINES AND EXPLOSIVE REMNANTS OF WAR
Untiltheyaresafelycleared,landminesandERW(i.e.abandonedandunexplodedexplosiveordnance)pres-entacontinuedthreatofharmtocivilians.Inadditiontothedirectriskofdeathandinjury,theycanhinderaccesstoessentialservices,infrastructureandagriculturallands,impedethesafereturnofdisplacedpeople(seeSection 4.3),andhamperreconstructionandrecoveryefforts,withlong-termconsequencesforhumanandsocio-economicdevelopment.
Toreducetheseconsequences,supportingactorsshouldtakeeffectivemeasurestopreventandaddresstheeffectsoflandminesandERW–especiallywheretheactorsthemselvessupplytheexplosiveordnance.SuchmeasuresincludeprovidingsupporttoclearminesandERWassoonaspossibleonceactivehostilitiesend,enactingmeasurestomitigatetheriskstociviliansuntilclearanceiscompletedanddeliveringassistancetovictims,inlinewithinternationalstandards.
Legal reminder
IHL sets out a comprehensive framework for preventing and addressing the problems caused by
landmines and ERW. This includes provisions on clearing mines and ERW, implementing measures
to protect civilians (such as marking and fencing) and providing medical, rehabilitative and socio-
economic assistance for victims. It also includes requirements in terms of destroying stockpiles of
anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions – weapons that have been a particular problem, in
humanitarian terms, in post-conflict situations. The use, production, stockpiling and transfer of
anti-personnel mines and cluster munitions are also banned under specific treaties.
The Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention (1997), the Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War (2003)
(Protocol v to the 1980 CCW Convention) and the Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008) also have
requirements for the States Parties to provide assistance and cooperation to States affected by these
weapons.
SPECIFIC RISkS
• Continuingriskofciviliandeathandinjuryduringandafterconflict
• Preventssafeaccesstobuildings,infrastructureandessentialservices,includingforserviceproviderstooperate,maintain,assessorrepair
• Inabilitytouselandforproductivepurposes(e.g.agriculture)
• Preventsthemovementofpeopleandessentialgoodsandcommercialtrade
• Peopledisplacedandunabletosafelyreturn
SPECIFIC OPPORTuNITIES
• ProvideassistanceandcooperationtoStatesaffectedbylandminesandERW
Key legal rules
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 1997
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, 2003 (Protocol v to the 1980 Convention on Certain
Conventional Weapons (CCW))
The Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the use of Mines, Booby-Traps and Other Devices
as amended on 3 May 1996 (Amended Protocol II to the CCW)
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008
4. THE PROTECTION OF CIvILIANS AND OTHERS NOT FIGHTING 75
Further reading
International Mine Action Standards
Weapon Contamination in Urban Settings: An ICRC Response (ICRC)
Increasing Resilience to Weapon Contamination through Behaviour Change (ICRC)
See also: – Section 3.3.1Weaponsandammunitionmanagement – Section 3.3.2Theconductofhostilities – Section 3.4.2Armstransfers
PART C
FRAMEWORK OF PRACTICAL MEASURES
78 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
5. FRAMEWORK OVERVIEWTherearenumerouspracticalstepsthatactorsinsupportrelationshipscantaketomaximizecompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofthosenotfightingandotherwisereducenegativehumanitarianconsequences.
Fromitspreliminaryanalysis,theICRChasdevelopedaframeworkthatdividesthosepracticalmeasuresintotenfunctionalgroups.Thissectionprovidesanoverviewoftheframeworkandhowitcanbeappliedbydecisionmakersinsupportrelationships.
Bymakingsurethateffectivepracticalstepsaretakenacrossthesetenareaswhereappropriate,decisionmakerscanmitigatetherisksthatthesupportrelationshipposestoaffectedpeople.Itwillbeforindividualdecisionmakerstotailortherangeofstepstheytaketothesupportrelationshipinquestion(seeSections 3 and 4forkeyrisksandopportunities).
Actorsshouldconsidereachareafromalegal,policyandoperationalperspectiveandatalllevelsofdecision-making.Althoughtheyarearrangedintothreestages–preparation,implementationandtransition–themeasuresarenotstrictlysequenced.Manyconcernswillrequirethatstepsbetakenthroughoutthecourseofthesupportrelationship.
5.1 MANAGING SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS
Actors should proactivelymanage their support relationships to promote the protection ofciviliansandothersnotfightingfromharm.
Thisframeworkproposesthatsupportrelationshipsbeconsciouslymanagedtoachievethegoalofmaxi-mizingtheprotectionofthosenotfighting.Actorsshouldinvestinpracticalmeasuresacrossthetenareasthatmakeupthethreestagesofpreparation,implementationandtransition.Decisionmakersshouldidentifywhatpracticalmeasuresareneededtoreducetheriskofharmandpositivelyinfluencetheirpartnerthroughtheirsupportrelationship.Notallmeasures–orareasofmeasures–willberelevanttoeveryrelationshipgiventheincrediblydiverserangeofsupportrelationships.Thereare,however,someareasthatwillberele-vantinmostifnotallsupportrelationships,suchasnormativeengagement,assessmentofandframingtherelationship,andlearning.Decisionmakersshouldconsidereachareatodeterminewhetherornotitisrequiredinthecircumstances.
5. FRAMEWORk OvERvIEW 79
NORMATIVEENGAGEMENT
INTERNALREADINESS
ASSESSMENTAND FRAMING
MONITORINGAND
EVALUATION
ASSISTANCE
IHLTRAINING
INSTITUTIONALCAPACITY
INTERNALOVERSIGHT
STRUCTUREDDISENGAGEMENT
LEARNING
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
PREPARATION
IMPLEM
ENTATIONTRANSITION
Bymakingsurethateffectivepracticalstepsaretakenineachofthesetenareas,decisionmakerswillmiti-gateaconsiderabledegreeofrisktoaffectedpeoplefromthesupportrelationship.Actorswillneedtocon-textualizethesebroadareastodeterminewhatpracticalmeasurestotakeinthesupportrelationshipunderconsideration.
Toassistwithplanning,thesetenareasaregroupedintothreemainphases:1. preparationtoengageinasupportrelationship2. implementationofthesupportrelationship3. transitionawayfromthesupportrelationship.
However,thesemeasuresarenotstrictlysequenced.Alltenareasshouldinformadetailedplanforthesup-portrelationshipattheoutsetandthenbereviewedandadaptedregularlysothattherelationshipremainsfitforpurpose.Manyconcernswillrequirethatstepsbetakenthroughoutthecourseofthesupportrelation-ship.Forexample,learningprocessesandnormativeengagementarerelevantthroughouttherelationship.Andwhileatransitionstrategyisimplementedlaterinarelationship,decisionmakersneedtotakestepstoprepareforastructureddisengagementtoreducetheriskofharm.
Actors should consider and take practical measures throughout the preparation, implementation and transition stages.
ThetenareasofpracticalmeasuresarelistedbelowandthenfurtherdescribedinSection 6.
Protecting civilians and others not fighting Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldconsciouslymanagetheirsupportrela-tionshipsoastoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thisgoalshouldguidedecisionmakerswhenconsideringpracticalmeasuresacrossthetenareasdetailedbelow.
The“protectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting”isusedhereasshorthandfortherangeofmeasuresdesignedtoreducetheharmcaused–directlyandindirectly,intheshortandlongterm–bythepartiestoaconflictandtheactors
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
80 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
thatsupportthem.Includedinthisbroadcategoryaremeasurestoimprovetheprotectionofcivilians,thosehorsdecombatandotherpeopleprotectedbyIHLaswellascivilianandotherspecificallyprotectedobjects.ManymeasuresarerequiredunderorderivefromIHL.
Someoftheparticularhumanitarianconcernsthatshouldbeconsideredaredetailed inSection 4.Theyincludetherisksandopportunitiesspecifictopersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty,thedead,IDPs,missingper-sonsandmedicalpersonnel.Decisionmakersshouldalsoconsiderissuesrelatedtoprotectedobjectssuchascriticalcivilianinfrastructure,medicalfacilitiesandtransport,andthenaturalenvironment,andtherisksposedbylandminesandERW.Therisksandopportunitiesrelatedtopotentialhumanitarianconcernsshouldbeborneinmindwhenmanagingasupportrelationship.
Preparation
NORMATIVEENGAGEMENT
INTERNALREADINESS
ASSESSMENTAND FRAMING
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
PREPARATION
1. Internal readiness to engage–Improvinganactor’sowninternalfunctionsbeforeengagingin asupportrelationship.
• Framework
• Systemsandprocesses
• Personnel
• Cultureandintent
2. Normative engagement–Engagingwithactualorprospectivepartnerstoclarifyandencourage behaviourthatcomplieswitharmed-conflict-relatednorms(legalorotherwise).
• Strategicargumentation
• Contributiontonormdevelopmentandpracticalguidance
• Engagementandinfluencing
• Socialization
• Dissemination
• Mobilization
3. Assessment and framing the relationship –Ensuringthepotentialpartners’intent,capacityand leadershiparealigned.
• Supportassessment
• Agreements
• Specificoperationalreadiness
• Transitionstrategy
5. FRAMEWORk OvERvIEW 81
Implementation
MONITORINGAND
EVALUATION
ASSISTANCE
IHLTRAINING
INSTITUTIONALCAPACITY
INTERNALOVERSIGHT
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
IMPLEM
ENTATION
4. Institutional capacity building–Preparingasupportedparty’sauthoritiestoprotectandassistpeopleduringanarmedconflictandhelpthemtodealwithitsassociatedconsequences.
• Framework
• Systemsandprocesses
• Personnel
• Cultureandintent
5. IHL training–HelpingpartnerforcesunderstandandoperationalizeIHLandotherrelevantrules.
• Training
• Mentoring
• Monitoringandevaluatingtrainingandmentoring
6. Assistance in IHL compliance–HelpingapartnertofulfilitsIHLobligationsorotherwiseimproveitsprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
• Capacitymultiplication
• Resources
• Substitutionoffunctions
7. Monitoring and evaluation –Monitoringapartner’sactionsand,wherenecessary,callingthatpartnertoaccountforanyproblematicconduct.
• Monitoringandevaluation
• Recording
• Investigations
• Oversight
• Accountability
8. Internal oversight –Ensuringthatanactor’sownarmedforcesandothergovernmentalorgansoperatewithinthelawandareaccountabletotheirowngovernmentandconstituents.
• Internaloversight
• Investigations
82 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Transition
STRUCTUREDDISENGAGEMENT
LEARNING
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
TRANSITION
9. Structured disengagement –Properlyplanningtheprocessofendingthesupport,suchasbytaperingit,inordertominimizethedisruptiontotheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
• Systemsustainability
• Ongoingprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting
• Responsibleresourcedisengagement
• Managingtheaftermath
10. Learning –Identifyingandincorporatinglessonslearnedfromthesupportrelationship, i.e.theknowledgeandinsightgainedfromtheexperience.
• Systematiclearningtoensureaffectedpeoplearebetterprotected
• Learningtogether
• Incorporatinglessonsintodoctrineandfuturepractice
5.2 CONTEXTUALIZATIONTheICRCencouragesactorstoassessthemeasuresineachareafromalegal,policyandoperationalper-spectiveandatalllevelsofdecision-making.Incontextualizingtheirapproach,theactorsshouldgenerallyconsiderthetenareas,butalsoinrelationtospecificprotectionconcerns(Section 4)andthetypeofconflict,actors,activitiesandsupportinvolved(Section 3).
PromotingrespectforIHLmeansmorethanjustmitigatingtherisksarisingdirectlyfromthesupportbeingprovided.TheICRCencouragesactorstotakeabroaderviewofthewaysinwhichtheycanpromotepositivebehaviour,includingthroughmeasuresnotdirectlytiedtothesupporttheyprovide.Forexample,theycanengagewithpartnersonrelevantnormsandprovideassistancetomitigatethenegativehumanitariancon-sequencesoftheconflictregardlessofthesupportbeingprovided.
Supportingactorsmayalsoneedtotakepracticalmeasuresbeforeprovidingsupportand/orafterachievingtheirownobjectives.Importantly,eachactor’sobligationsunderinternationalanddomesticlawdonotstartandendwiththesupportrelationship.Forexample,asupportingactor’slegalobligationsmaycontinueafterthesupportrelationshipends,andboththesupportingandsupportedactors’obligationsmayoutlasttheendoftheconflict.Protectingpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertyandclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofthemissingarejusttwoareasinwhichbothtypesofactorsmayhavecontinuingobligationsaftertheendoftherelationshiportheconflict.Theseconsiderationsneedtobefactoredintodecision-makingthroughouttherelationship.
5. FRAMEWORk OvERvIEW 83
Thepointsraisedinthisdocumentaremerelyindicativeofthemanyissuesthatdecisionmakersneedtoconsiderwhilemanagingasupportrelationship.Decisionmakershavearesponsibilitytodeterminewhatpracticalmeasureswillbemosteffectiveinthegivencircumstancesandtocontinuallyadapttheirapproachifthosemeasuresprovelesseffectivethanexpectedorthecircumstanceschange.35 This document is intended asapracticaltoolforuseinawiderangeofcircumstances.Inpractice,eachactormustmakeitsownassess-mentandactincompliancewithitslegalobligations.
Ifproperlyconsidered,thequestionsinthisdocumentshouldleadtoimprovedoutcomes,buttheyshouldnotberegardedasachecklist.Actorshavearesponsibilitytoanalysetherisksthatthesupportrelationshipposestociviliansandothersnotfightingandtheopportunitiestoimprovetheirprotection,andfactorbothintotheirdecision-makingprocess.
35 IHLChallengesReport2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above).
5.3 OVERARCHING QUESTIONSInordertomanagesupportrelationshipstowardsachievingcoherentresponsibility,decisionmakersshouldbeguidedbyfiveoverarchingquestions:
1) Whattypeofconflict,actors,activitiesandsupportareinvolvedinthesupportrelationship?
2) Whatgapsexistbetweenthepartners’respectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity?3) Whataretheimplicationsoftheanswerstotheabovequestionsforciviliansandothersnotfighting?
4) Whatstepsfromanyofthetenareasofpracticalmeasuresdiscussedabovecould youandyourpotentialpartner(s)taketogethertoimprovethelevelofprotectionandreduceharmtociviliansandothersnotfighting?
5) Ifthegapsidentifiedinquestion2aboveremainsignificant,shouldyoureconsider the support relationship?
Theseoverarchingquestionsaresupplementedbyaseriesofkeyquestionsabouteachofthetenareasofpracticalmeasures(seeSection 6)andmoredetailedquestionsmeanttoorientdecisionmakersatalllevels(seeSection 7).
84 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAKERS
FollowingtheoverviewinSection 5,thissectionlooksindetailateachofthetenareasofpracticalmeasuresformanagingsupportrelationships.Foreacharea,keyquestionsareposedfordecisionmakersatthestra-tegiclevel.Thissectionalsoidentifiesanumberofmorespecificconcernsaswellasexamplesofpracticalmeasurestoconsiderineacharea.ThesegeneralconsiderationsarefurtherdevelopedinSection 7throughdetailedquestionsfordecisionmakersatalllevels.
6.1 PREPARATION
NORMATIVEENGAGEMENT
INTERNALREADINESS
ASSESSMENTAND FRAMING
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
PREPARATION
6.1.1 INTERNAL READINESS TO ENGAGEInternalreadinessreferstothemeasuresthatactorscantaketopreparetheir internalfunctionsbeforeengaginginasupportrelationship.
Introduction Actorsshouldtakestockoftheirowninternalreadinesstomanageasupportrelationshipbeforeagreeingtodoso.Internalpreparednessisimportantbecause,whiledecisionmakersmaybepressedtoagreetothesupportrelationshipquickly,thechangesrequiredtooperateinasupportrelationshipmaybesignificantandtaketimetoimplement.
Internalreadinessconsistsoffourkeyelements,including:
• Framework–thelawsandpolicies,bothinternationalanddomestic,thatestablishtherulesandboundariesforhowasupportrelationshipwilloperate
• Systems and processes–theprocedures,boundbytheframework,usedtoestablish,maintain,overseeandendasupportrelationship
• Personnel–determiningthestaffpositionsthatwillbeinvolvedinsupportrelationships,andselectingandtrainingtheindividualsforthesepositions
• Culture and intent–theinfluences,bothinternal(suchasleadership,institutionalcultureandpeerpressure)andexternal(suchaspublicopinion,media,societalcultureandreligion),thatshapehowsupportrelationshipsareconducted.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 85
Giventhevarietyofactorsandtypesofsupportthatmaybeinvolved(seeSection 3),preparationsmayneedtobemadewithinandacrossseveralagencies,departmentsorfunctions.Despiteoperatingunderacommonframework,eachoftheseentitieswillhavetheirownsystems,processes,personnelandculture.Forexample,armsexportcontrolagencieshavewell-definedlicencingprocedures,andmilitarybrancheshavedoctrineandrulesofengagement.
Thekeypointistoconsideranactor’soverallreadinesstoengageinasupportrelationshipandthecoherenceofitsapproach.Internalreadinessshouldentailarealisticassessmentofthespectrumofsupportrelation-shipsthegivenactormightengagein.Themeasurestakentoprepareinternallyshouldputtheactorinapositiontomanagefuturesupportrelationshipsinawaythatincreasestheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
Key questions • Whatconditionsandcriterianeedtobemetinasupportrelationship?Aretheseconditionsandcriteriaconsistentacrossallyoursupportrelationships?
• Doresourcesneedtobeallocateddifferently,doprocessesrequire“partner-proofing”anddopersonnelneedspecifictraining?
• Aretheinternalentitiesinvolvedinasupportrelationshipalignedintheirvision,andaretheysetuptomanagethetypeofsupportrelationshipenvisaged?Howdoyouensurecoordinationbetweentheseentities?
• Doyouhavesystemsinplacetoassessyourpartner’sintent,capacityandleadershipwithregardtoprotectingciviliansandothersnotfighting?
• Doyouhaveestablishedsystemsandproceduresaswellasthecapabilitytomonitoryourpartner’sactions?
Inindividualdecision-makingprocesses,theseconsiderationscanberevisited(seeSection 6.1.3).Aftertakingthenecessarypreparatorysteps,actorsshouldbeabletoadaptmorequicklytoanyspecificsupportrelation-shipthattheyenterinto.
A. FrameworkMostStateactorsthatprovidesupportalreadyhaveasetofdomesticlawsandpoliciesthatcanbeusedasaninitialframeworkformanagingsupportrelationshipsincompliancewithIHL.However,IHLobli-gationsapplytoallthoseengagedinarmedconflict–includingStatesthatreceivesupportandNSAGsthatarelesslikelytohavesimilarnormsandpolicies.
Anoverarchingandcoherentframeworkoflawsandpoliciesisneededtoensureconsistencybetweendepartments,agenciesandfunctionsinvolvedinsupportrelationships.Certainpartsofthatframeworkcanbepreparedinadvance,suchasrelevantmilitarypoliciesanddoctrine,whichshouldbeIHLcompli-antanddesignedtoprotectcivilians.Anotherexampleisthecomprehensivelegalandregulatoryframe-workneededtoeffectivelyimplementandenforcearmsexportandimportcontrols.
PMOswillbereaching–andimplementing–agreementonresponsibilityfortheuseofmilitaryforceatalllevelsandtheuse,locationandcommandandcontrollinesofadvisersandmentorsatheadquartersorinthefield.Draftstatusofforceagreementsordraftsofotheragreementsbetweenactorsthatplaceemphasisonprotectingthosenotfightingcanformpartofthatframeworkandbepreparedinadvanceaspartofinternalreadiness.Forexample,partnerscanagreeonresponsibilitiesandstandardstobefollowedduringpartnereddetentionoperations,withtheaimofmitigatingtheriskofIHLviolationsandavoidingadiffusionofresponsibility(seeSection 3.4.3).Theseagreementscanalsoanticipatethestatusofforcesaccusedofcommittingviolationsaswellasprocessesforclarifyingprimaryandsecondaryjurisdictioninordertoadjudicateanyallegations.
Whenconsidering framework lawsorpolicies, it is also important foractors to establishminimumstandardsandthresholdsthatshouldbemetwhenenteringintoanypartnership.Thesestandardscanbe appliedbothbetween supporting actors, regarding anypotential supportedparty, andby actors
86 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
consideringacceptingsupportfromapartner.Thestandardscouldbelinkedtointernalassessmentsand/orexternalbenchmarksusingcriteriasuchashumanrightsrecords,corruption,militarycompetencyandarmsavailability.
Forsupportrelationshipstobetterprotectciviliansandothersnotfighting,theactorsinvolvedmusttakestepstointegratetheseframeworksintothesubordinatesystemsandprocesses.
B. Systems and processesFordecisionmakers,assessinginternalreadinessforsupportrelationshipswillentailreviewingawiderangeofsystemsandprocesses.Itisimportantthatallrelevantsystemsandprocessesintegratemeas-uresdesignedtomoderatebehaviourinconflict.
Wherethesystemsorprocessesofdifferentministries,departmentsoragenciesareinterlinked,aholisticperspectiveofthosesystemsandprocessesisneededtoreduceinternalgaps.Thiscanimproveinternalreadiness,especiallyinviewofthecomplexityofgovernmentadministrationsandsupportrelationships.Thisperspectiveshouldencompassalldepartments,agenciesandfunctionsofagivenadministrationaswellasotheractors(includingactorsinasupportrelationshipsuchasStates,non-Stateactorsandmultilateralorganizations).
Thedevelopmentandimplementationofapolicyontheprotectionofcivilianshelptoraisetheprofileofciviliansandofcivilianharmmitigationmeasuresinreadinessactivities.Suchpoliciesprovideover-archingguidancetobothcivilianandmilitaryentitiesandensurethatthedutytoprotectciviliansisinte-gratedintosystemsandprocessesinacoordinatedway.Internaloversightandaccountabilityprocesseshelptoensuretheeffectivenessofsuchpoliciesinactualpractice(seeSection 6.2.5).
Oneoftheproblemsthatmaychallengeanactor’sabilitytooperateincompliancewithIHL–andrequirespecificsafeguards–isadisparitybetweenitscapabilitiesandthoseofitspartner.Forexample,whereasupportingactorisprovidingcloseairsupport,acapabilitythatishighlydesiredbysupportedparties,caremustbetakentopreventitsmisuse.Thismayrequiremorestepsorverificationsthantheprocessemployedwhenthistypeofsupportisdeliveredtoone’sownforces.
Beforecommittingorreceivingresourcesandfinalizingtheplanningofasupportrelationship,actorsshouldfullyconsiderlessonsidentified,lessonslearnedandbestpractices.Thatwillallowthemtounder-standwhathasworkedpreviously,whathasfailed,andwhatchallengesandrisksarelikelytoarise(seeSection 6.3.2).Theselessonsmaycomefromotheractors,ministries,departmentsandagenciesthathaveprovidedorreceivedsupport,suchasotherdevelopmentactivitiesundertakenwiththesameactor.Thiswillhelptoprovidearealisticcheckofpotentialsupport,themethodologyneededtomanagethesupportandthecommitmentsafuturepartnermayneedtotake.
Actorsthatcommonlyworkwithinacoalitionshouldconsidergeneralstepstheycantakeinordertofacilitatecoordinationwitheachother.Theymightalsoensurethatrolesandresponsibilitiesforalljointorcombinedprocessesareclearlydefined,evenbeforetheserolesandresponsibilitiesareconsideredforaspecificoperationalsituation.
Systems and processes of governments and authoritiesGovernmentsandauthorities,includingtheseniorleadershipinmanycases,arenotalwaysinagreementregardingthesystemsandprocessesrelevanttosupportrelationshipsacrosstheirministries,depart-ments,agenciesandfunctions.Thislackofagreement,whichcanaffecttheirunderstandingofthesup-portrelationshipandintra-agencyexpectations,willbeexacerbatedbytheextralevelofcomplexitythatsupportrelationshipsbring.InthecaseofasupportingState,acomprehensiveapproachisneededatbothcapitallevelandwithinthehostState,wherelocalsupportismanagedbetweendepartmentsandagenciespresentontheground.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 87
Iftheyfailtotakeaccountofthewiderimplicationsthatasupportrelationshiphasoninternalstructuresandresources,actorscouldultimatelyexacerbate–ratherthanmitigate–thehumanitarianrisksasso-ciatedwitharmedconflicts.Thisisespeciallytrueifthatsupportisdeliveredtothepartner’ssecuritysectoralone.Forexample,externalsupportfordefencemayresultinanincreaseindetaineesthatthejusticesectorisunabletoadequatelycopewith.Systemsandprocessesshouldbecoordinatedacrossallgovernmentdepartmentsoragenciesinvolvedtopreparefor,mitigate,monitorandremedysuchgapsasearlyaspossible.
Supportedactorsshouldbecognizantoftheeffectssupportrelationshipscanhaveacrosstheirministries,departmentsandagencies,andtheyshouldapproachsupportrelationshipsinacoherentandconsistentfashionthatpreventsgapsoccurring.
Therefore,whereseveraldepartmentsandagencieswithinoneauthorityareinvolvedinprovidingorreceivingsupport,thesystemsandprocessesshouldbeoverseenbyaleaddepartmentoragencyandincludesufficientcoordinationandinformation-sharingmechanisms.Theauthoritiesinchargeofman-agingrelationshipswiththepartnershouldalsobeclearlydelineated.Bothsupportingandsupportedactorscaninsistuponthesemeasuresfromtheotherpartyintherelationship.
ThisapproachcanhelptoensurethatsupportisdeliveredandreceivedinacoordinatedandconsistentfashionandpreventthelossofvaluableinformationaboutrisksorallegationsofmisconductorIHLvio-lations,asthatwouldreducethelikelihoodofaccountability.
See also: – Section 6.2.5Internaloversight
C. PersonnelDedicatingresourcestodevelopexpertiseinsupportrelationshipscanimproveanactor’scollaborationwithpartners.WhileparticularlyapparentforthoseengaginginPMOs,thisisalsoapplicabletothoseworkingwithpartnersusingothertypesofsupport,e.g.diplomatsandstafffromministriesordepart-mentsofforeignaffairs,intelligenceservices,developmentagenciesandtreasuryofficials.
Overtime,individuals,unitsandagenciesthatspecializeinworkingwithpartnerforcescandevelopahighlevelofprofessionalizationandstandards,includingintermsofIHLdisseminationandpromotingvaluesandpracticesthatprotectciviliansandothersnotfighting.Thismayincludeexperts innon-militaryroles–whomaynotnormallybeperceivedaspartofthedeployableforce–tosupportinstitu-tionalcapacitybuilding.
Trainingandexercisesforfuturesupportingtroops,staffanddiplomatsshouldaddresshowtoworktogetherandencourageapartnertocomplywithIHLandbetterprotectciviliansandothersnotfighting.Militaryexercisesoftenfocusonanactor’sowntroops,whentherealityofsupportrelationshipsisthatthecommandlevelwillbeheavilyinvolvedinrelationship-buildingwithpartnersandapplyingsupport,influenceandoversight.
Smallstepscangoalongwaytowardsachievingbetterreadinessforasupportrelationship.Examplesinclude training in thepotentialpartners’ languageandstaffexchangesbetweenactors,ministries,departmentsandagencies.
D. Culture and intentEachentityinasupportrelationship,includingthosewithinoneactor,mayhaveitsownapproachtosupportrelationshipsthatisdrivenbytheorganizationalcultureandtheorganization’smission.Forexample,diplomats,developmentstaffandtroopsarelikelytoapproachandmanagesupportrelation-shipsinslightlydifferentways.Thisrequiresrobustandongoingcoordinationamongthemtoensureconsistency,lestthesedifferencescreategapsinoperationalizingIHLandprotectingcivilians.
88 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Theseniorcivilianandmilitaryleadership,especiallyindividualswholeadorcoordinateinter-agencyorinter-departmentalactivitiesinvolvedinsupportrelationships,canplayanimportantroleinpriori-tizingIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansasactorspreparetoengageinasupportrelationship.ThiscanbeachievedbyincorporatingIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansintoreadinessactivitiessuchaspolicy-making,byensuringthesetopicsareemphasizedwhenselectingandtrainingstaff,andthroughsystemandprocessdesign.
6.1.2 NORMATIVE ENGAGEMENT Normativeengagementreferstotherangeofmeasurestakentoclarifyandencourageadherencetoconduct-relatednormsinrelationtoarmedconflict.Therelevantnormsmaybefoundininternationallaw(bothtreatyandcustomary),domesticlaw,“soft”laworotherguidanceorbederivedfrompractice.
IntroductionNormativeengagementshouldbetailoredwhenpreparingandimplementingaspecificsupportrelationship.
Tomaximizeengagement,partnersshouldhaveagoodunderstandingofthemajorpolitical,socialandeco-nomicfactorsdrivingtheirpartner’sdecisions.ThesemyriadfactorswillhaveabearingonthevaluepartiesplaceonIHLandtheextenttowhichtheycomply,suchashowtheyconducthostilitiesandtreatciviliansandothersnotfighting.
Awiderangeofgovernmentalandnon-governmentalstakeholderscaninfluenceanactor’sagreementwithandadherencetobehaviouralnormsinanarmedconflict.ThiscanincludesuchdisparateactorsasheadsofStateorgovernment,ministries,ambassadors,operationalcommanders,media,andreligiousandcommu-nityleaders.
ThereisariskthatpartnersdonotsharethesameunderstandingofIHLordonotimplementtheirobli-gations.Whenenteringasupportrelationship,actorsshouldthereforetakestepstoidentifywherethesediscrepanciesmightlieandtoensurethatanyconductwithinthecontextofthesupportrelationshipwillbeundertakenaccordingtothemoreprotectiveofthepartners’standards.
Muchcanbedone,evenbeforeconsideringspecificsituationsandactors,topromoteunderstandingandgoodpracticeswithregardtoIHL.PromotingcompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingwithinthebroaderinternationalcommunitywillhelpfuturepartnersprepareforthesupportrela-tionship(seeSection 6.1.1).Morespecificmeasurescanbetakenonceaspecificrelationshiporengagementcomesintoconsideration.
Anactor’sintentisacriticalfactorinIHLimplementationandcompliance(seeSection 6.1.3).Totheextentpossible,supportingactorsshouldseektoassessthestrengthofapotentialpartner’sintenttocomplywithIHLinagivensituationandtotakemeasurestoinfluencethatintentifneeded.Forexample,actorscanmaketheirsupportcontingentuponIHLcompliance.Moreover,actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldengagewiththeirpartnerstoaddresspotentialhumanitarianconcernsandconsidermoregeneralpreventivemeasures.
Key questions • Initsinternationalrelationsandininternationalforums,hasyourleadershipcommittedtobroad,multilateralpositionssupportingIHLcompliance?
• Doesyourleadershipencourageotheractorstoaccedetointernationallegalinstrumentsandotherstandardsintendedtoreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofarmedconflict?
• DoyouhaveprogrammesthatpromoterespectforIHLandtheprotectionofcivilians,anddoyoumaketheseprogrammesavailabletopartnersorpotentialpartners?
• Doyouhavebilateralandmultilateralmechanismsdesignedtoinfluencepotentialpartners’viewsandperspectivesoncompliancewithIHL?
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 89
A. Strategic communicationStatementsmadebyactorsininternationalforumscanservetoreinforcestandardsorexpresstheircom-mitmenttobehaveinacertainway.Theycanalsousepublicstatementstocondemnordiscouragepoorbehaviour.Suchstatementssignaltopartnersthestandardsofconductexpectedwhentheyteamupwithsuchactors.Theclosertherelationshipbetweentwoactors,themoreinfluenceoneactor’sstatementislikelytohaveonthepartner.
Forexample,actorscouldmakeknown(publicly,inrelevantforums,orbilaterallytotheirprospectivepartners)howtheirarmedforcesimplementIHLrulesapplicabletotheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas–inparticulartheprohibitiononindiscriminateanddisproportionateattacksandtheobligationtotakeallfeasibleprecautionsinattack.Theycouldleadbyexamplebymakingpubliccom-mitmentsthatgobeyondtheirlegalobligations.ExamplesincludeboththeSafeSchoolsDeclarationandtheDeedofCommitmentforAdherencetoaTotalBanonAnti-PersonnelMinesandforCooperationinMine Action.36
B. Contributing to the development of norms and practical guidanceBycontributingtotheworkofinternationalormultilateralbodies,actorscanhelptoclarifyinternationallawanddevelopguidanceforoperationalizingit.Relevantbodiesandprocessesmayalreadyexist,suchasconferencesofStatespartytoweaponstreatiesortheMontreuxDocumentForum.37Actorscouldalsoseektoestablishagrouporbodyforaspecificpurpose,suchasaworkinggrouporacentreofexcellence.
Tociteanexample, the ICRCrecommends thatactors sharegoodpractices, experienceand lessonslearnedintheprotectionofciviliansintheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas,includingwithregardtothechoiceanduseofmeansandmethodsofwarfare(seeSections 3.3.2 and 4.6).
C. Engaging and influencingActorsinsupportrelationshipsarewell-placedtoencourageandinfluencetheirpartnerstocomplywithIHL.Amongstotherthings,supportingactorsshouldconsiderremindingallpartiestotheconflictoftheneedtorespectIHLrulesinallcircumstances. Tobeeffective,anyinfluencewillhavetobetailoredtotheparty’scharacteristicsandthenatureoftheconflict.Thus,whereverpossible,argumentsshouldbebasedonasoundunderstandingofthemotivationsandinterestsofthepartytotheconflictandbackedbygoodcontactsandatrackrecordofengagementwiththeparty.
Someofthefollowinginterestsmayhelpstructurethedialogueandengagementwithpartiestoarmedconflicts:1. corevalues2. militaryefficacyanddiscipline3. reciprocalrespectandmutualinterest4. reputation5. criminalprosecution6. economyandinfrastructure.
36 SeeICRC,“TheSafeSchoolsDeclarationandtheGuidelinesforProtectingSchoolsandUniversitiesfromMilitaryUseduringArmedConflict”,ICRC,Geneva,2018:https://www.icrc.org/en/document/safe-schools-declaration-and-guidelines-protecting-schools-and-universities-military-use.FormoreonGenevaCallDeedsofCommitment,seewww.genevacall.org.
37 TheMontreuxDocumentForumisaforumforparticipantsoftheMontreuxDocumentonpertinentinternationallegalobligationsandgoodpracticesforstatesrelatedtooperationsofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniesduringarmedconflict.Formoredetails,seewww.mdforum.ch.
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D. Socialization Socialization is the process by which people adopt the norms and rules of a given community.38 Individuals can be socialized into committing violence or, conversely, showing restraint (taking deliberate action to limit the use of violence).
At a minimum, formal socialization mechanisms in armed forces and armed groups inculcate the rules of IHL in all group members, incorporate these rules into practical training, and include the threat of punishment for non-compliance. However, informal norms can be as strong as formal norms. Partners can cooperate creatively with integrated State armed forces and with NSAGs to socialize their fighters of all ranks to act with restraint (see also Section 6.2.1).
Further reading
The Roots of Restraint in War (ICRC)
E. DisseminationArms bearers with little or no IHL training can significantly impede efforts to increase the protection of civilians and others not fighting and to regulate the behaviour of parties to conflicts. There is little likeli-hood that a body of law will be observed unless those whose duty it is to respect and apply it are instructed in it and trained to comply with its obligations.
Parties to armed conflicts have a duty to integrate IHL into their doctrine, training and rules of engage-ment.39 This duty stems from the obligation of all parties to respect and ensure respect for IHL. In cus-tomary law, the duty to train members in IHL is considered binding on both States and armed groups.40
Both supporting and supported actors may be able to assist with IHL dissemination and training aimed at those whose actions and behaviour can affect victims of armed conflicts. They include armed forces, police forces, security forces and others bearing arms, as well as decision makers and members of key departments and agencies, not to mention opinion leaders at both the local and international levels.
See also: – Section 6.2.2 IHL training
F. Mobilization Actors engaged in support relationships should consider engaging and mobilizing other actors, including States, armed groups and international organizations, to encourage the parties to improve their com-pliance with IHL. This would be especially relevant in military coalitions, where multiple actors act in concert to address concerns about the conduct of one partner.
Further reading
Increasing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts (M. Mack)
38 See J. Checkel, “Socialization and violence: Introduction and framework”, Journal of Peace Research, Vol. 54, No. 5, September 2017, pp. 592–605.
39 In treaty law, the duty of States to provide IHL instruction to their armed forces is found in Articles 47, 48, 127 and 144 in the First, Second, Third and Fourth Geneva Conventions, respectively, and in Article 83 of Additional Protocol I. This treaty obligation is applicable both in peacetime and in times of IAC. In a specific reference to NIACs, Additional Protocol II requires, in Article 19, that the Protocol “shall be disseminated as widely as possible”.
40 ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 142 and explanation (see note 7 above).
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 91
6.1.3 ASSESSMENT AND FRAMING OF THE RELATIONSHIPIntheICRC’sview,assessingandframingasupportrelationshipreferstotheprocessofcarefullyanalysingpotentialpartnersandplanningsupportinamannerthatmorecloselyalignsthepartnersinordertoreducetheriskofharmtoaffectedpeople.
Introduction Assessingandframingarecriticaltomanagingacoherentsupportrelationship.Conductingathoroughsup-portassessmentallowsactorstoidentifyrisksandopportunitiesinrelationtocompliancewithIHLandotherstandardsandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Anysignificantconcernscanbeidentifiedandaddressed–andtherelationshipitselfcanbereconsidered–beforeimplementation.Basedonthatassessment,theactorscanagreeontheparametersofthesupportrelationship,incorporatinganymeasurestoaddresstherisksandopportunitiesidentifiedintheassessment.Finally,creatingadetailedplanforstruc-tureddisengagementclarifiestheintendedoutcomesoftherelationshipandthemeasuresthatwillbetakentominimizeharmduringthetransitionandbeyond.
Inordertoassesstherisksandopportunitiesthatmayariseintermsofprotectingaffectedpeople,thefol-lowingthreefactorsofeachpartnershouldfirstbeanalysed:1. intent 2. leadership3. capacity.
Ofcourse,thesefactorsshouldbeassessedpriortoenteringintoorimplementingthesupportrelationship.41 Theyshouldalsoberoutinelyreassessedinthelightofsubsequentbehaviourandevolvinginternalandexternalcircumstances.
Bringingthesefactorsintoalignmentiscentraltoensuringthatasupportrelationshipservestoenhance,notundermine,IHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofthoseaffectedbyconflict.
IntentIntentreferstotheprospectivepartner’sobjectivesorgoals,notablyitsintentionorwillingnesstocomplywithIHLandpromotetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.IntentionwithrespecttoIHLandprotectioncanbeassessedusingarangeofsources,includingformalcommitmentsandadherencetoIHLandotherrelevantinternationallegalandotherframeworks,therecipient’spastandpresentrecordofrespectforIHLandhumanrightslaw,publicdiscourseandbilateralassurances.42
Alackofintentcanbereflectedinpoliticaldeclarations,priorbehaviourorobjectivesthatareinconsistentwiththeprinciples,rulesandspiritofIHL.Supportrelationshipsinwhichthisintentislackingconstituteaconsiderableriskfortheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting,andsocarefulconsiderationmustbegivenbeforeenteringintosuchapartnership.
LeadershipLeadershipreferstoapartner’sorganizationalstructureanditsabilitytoensurethattheleaders’intent,goals,directions(instructionsorguidance)andvalues–whetherrelatedtoIHLornot–areunderstood,respectedandfaithfullyexecutedthroughouttheorganization’shierarchy.Forexample,thismaybearupontheweightgiventodiplomaticassurances.
41 StatespartytotheArmsTradeTreatyhaveanobligationtoassessthepotentialthatconventionalarmsoritemscouldbeusedtocommitorfacilitateaseriousviolationofIHLorinternationalhumanrightslaw,amongotherfactors,priortoauthorizinganexport.Theyarealsoencouragedtoreassesstheirauthorizationiftheybecomeawareofnewinformation. SeeArmsTradeTreaty,Arts7.1and7.7.
42 See,forexample,ArmsTransferDecisions,p.21(seenote29above),andtheMontreuxDocument(seenote25above).
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Althoughtheleadershipaspectisnotalwayseasytoassess,anefforttodososhouldbemadeduringthereadinessstagepriortotakingadecisiontoengage.Assessingthepartner’sstrengthofleadershiprequiresanunderstandingofitsorganizationalstructure,includingthechainofcommandinitsarmedforces,andhoweffectivelytheirdecisionsareimplemented.Understandinganactor’sorganizationalstructurealsohelpstoidentifykeydecisionmakerswithinagroupandprimarycontactsforaddressingoperationalandhumani-tarianconcerns.43ThisexercisemaybemorechallengingincasesofdecentralizedNSAGsorcommunity-embeddedNSAGs,44orwherethelinesofauthorityareotherwiseopaquetotheexternalactor.
Thisassessmentcanalsoindicatetheleversofinfluencethatleadershaveattheirdisposal.Forexample,centralizedarmedgroupsrelyonclearlyestablishedrulesandvalues,whicharelikelytobeimpartedtotherankandfilethroughindoctrinationandtraining.Decentralizedandcommunity-embeddedarmedgroupsdonotalwayshavewrittencodesofconduct,drawinginsteadonsharedvaluesandtraditions.45
CapacityCapacityreferstothematerialassets,humanresourcesandskillsthatenableanactortoachieveitsgoals.
Whenassessingcapacity,onecriticalaspecttoconsideristhedegreetowhichthepartnerisinteroper-ablewithothers.Evenifbothintentandleadershiparestrongandwellalignedbetweenactorsinasupportrelationship,thatrelationshipmaybeweakenedifthepartners’resourcesarenotappropriatelyalignedandinteroperable.
Apartnermayhavestrongleadershipbutlacktheresourcestoachieveitsobjectives.Theactorswillneedtoagreeonrolesandresponsibilitiesinviewoftheirmutuallyassessedcapacities.
Ifthesupportedactoridentifiesanygapsinitscapacitytoeffectivelyreceivesupport,itshouldmaketheprospectivesupportingactorawareofthem.Thegapscanthereforeberectifiedassoonaspracticabletoprotectboththepartnersandcivilians.
Visualizing Intent-Leadership-CapacityActorsconsideringenteringintoasupportrelationshipinarmedconflictshouldcarefullyassesstheirpoten-tialpartner’sintent,leadershipandcapacity.Theiraimshouldbetoidentifystrengths,weaknessesandmajoralignmentgapsduringthepreparationphase.Theobservedgapscouldleadtothediffusionofresponsibility.
Beforeenteringasupportrelationship,eachpartnershouldassessitselfandthenitspotentialpartner,basedonthethreefactorsdescribedabove.
Havingundertakenthosetwoassessments,eachpartnershouldthenconductagapanalysistodeterminewhetherthepartnersarecompatible.
Inallcases,analignmentgapshouldtriggerconsiderationofhowtomitigatetheresultingriskstotheaffectedcommunity.Inconductingthegapanalysis,itisimportanttoconsiderthefollowingpoints:
• Iseachpartnerstrongenoughoneachcriteriontooperatewellinasupportrelationship?
• Workingtogether,wouldthepartnersbecapableofmakingupforanyweaknessesinoneortheother?
• Whatpracticalmeasurescouldbetakentocloseanyidentifiedgaps?
• Howdoyouassesstheeffectivenessofmeasuresaimedatclosingthegaps?
• Whataretheimplicationsofanyremaininggapsforaffectedpeople?
43 RootsofRestraint,p.23(seenote20above).44 RootsofRestraint,pp.23and55(seenote20above).45 RootsofRestraint,p.23(seenote20above).
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 93
INTENT
PARTNER A PARTNER B
CAPACITY
INTENT
CAPACITY
LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP
RISK
Ideally,partnersshouldeachbestrongacrossallthreefactors.
INTENT
PARTNER A PARTNER B
ALIGNMENT
CAPACITY
INTENT
CAPACITY
LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP
Alternatively,onepartner’sstrengthsmaycompensatefortheotherpartner’sweaknesses.
Wheretherearegapsbetweenthepartners,practicalmeasuresshouldbeidentifiedtoclosethem.
RISK
PRACTICAL MEASURES
INTENT
PARTNER A PARTNER B
CAPACITY
INTENT
CAPACITY
LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP
However,thereisalimittohowmuchapartnercanreasonablyexpecttobeabletocompensateforanotheractoroverwhichitdoesnothavecontrol.Partneringwithanactorthatdoesnothaveatleastaminimumlevelofintent,leadershipandcapacityshouldbeavoided,assuchasupportrelationshipcouldposeahighandunmitigablerisktociviliansandothersnotfighting.
94 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
INTENT
PARTNER A PARTNER B
CAPACITY
INTENT
CAPACITY
LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP
HIGH-RISK PARTNER
Similarly,wherethegapsaresignificant,theactorsmayneedtoreconsidertherelationshipaltogether.
INTENT
PARTNER A PARTNER B
CAPACITY
INTENT
CAPACITY
LEADERSHIP LEADERSHIP
HIGH-RISKPARTNERSHIP
Key questions • Haveyouaccuratelyassessedyourandyourpartner’srespectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity?
• Areanygapsinintent,leadershipandcapacityabletobeaddressedthroughtheplannedsupport?
• Whataretheconditionsthatdefineasuccessfulsupportrelationship?
• Howwillyoutransitionoutofthesupportrelationshipwhen:(a)yourobjectivesaremetor(b)yourobjectivesarenotmet?
A. Support assessmentsAsanextensionofthegapanalysis,itisimportanttoconduct,totheextentfeasible,anaccurateassess-mentoftheneedsandcapacitiesoftheproposedpartner.Suchassessmentsprovidethestartingpointforacomprehensiveplanthatshouldcoverthedurationofthesupportrelationship.Formalsupportassessmentsshouldbereviewedregularlyinthelightofoperationalrealitiesandevolvingcircumstances.
Processes should be established for conducting rigorous assessments and framing the relationshipaccordingly.Carryingoutaneffectivesupportassessmentattheoutset,evenwhereitdoesnotresultintheidentificationofsignificantrisks,willhelpactorstodefineareasonableendstatefortherelation-ship,tailorthesupportaccordinglyandidentifyappropriatemeasurestofosterrespectforIHLandtheprotectionofaffectedpeople.Anassessmentisalsoneededtoidentifyanyriskstobemitigated.Wherethereareidentifiablerisks,theassessmentframeworkprovidesamechanismforfactoringthemintothedecision-makingprocessandidentifyingpossiblemitigatingmeasures.Supportingactorscanconductsupportassessmentsofthesupportedparty,whilesupportedpartiescanassesstherisksassociatedwithacceptingsupport.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 95
Themostobviousriskisthatasupportingactorcouldprovideorenhancethecapacitybywhichviolationsoccur.IfthesupportrelationshipisknowinglythedeterminativefactorleadingtoanIHLviolation,thenthesupportingactorcanrightlybeseenasresponsiblefortheviolation.Wherethereisanexpectation,basedonfactsorknowledgeofpastpatterns,thatthesupporttobeprovidedwouldbeusedtocommitaviolationofIHL,thatsupportmustnotbegiven.46Morebroadly,theprovisionofsupportthatdoesnotproperlymatchthepartner’scapacityandcircumstancesisapttoresultinharmtopersonsprotectedunderIHL.
Assessing risks and defining mitigating measures Inordertoidentifyanyrisksspecifictothepartner,theassessmentshouldincludethepartner’spoliticalandlegalpositions,language,culture,educationalsystemandlevels,economicand/orfinancialcapacity,andmilitaryandtechnicalcapacity.Thepartner’spastbehaviourwillbeanimportantindicatoroftheriskoffutureviolations.However,especiallyfornewlyestablishedforcesorunits,theabsenceofconfirmedviolationsisnoguaranteeoffutureIHLcompliance.Rather,eachactorshouldseektopositivelysatisfyitself,totheextentfeasible,thattheotherpartywillrespectIHLandotherrelevantlegalstandardsthatapplytoit.Totheextentthatpatternsofbehaviourareevident,theactorshouldseektounderstandwhatdrivestheotheractor.Abetterunderstandingofthedriversofbehaviourwillinformthesubsequentconsiderationofpossiblemitigatingmeasuresandtheirexpectedeffectiveness.
Stepsshouldalsobetakentoassessotherrisks,suchasunintendedconsequencesoftherelationshipitself.Theagreementbetweenthepartnersshouldaddressthoserisks,suchasbyclearlydefiningeachpartner’srolesandresponsibilitiesandtheendstateoftherelationship,whichmayincludethesupportedparty’spost-conflictfuturesuchasDDRoptions.
Anactorundertakingasupportassessmentmayultimatelyreachtheconclusionthattherisksassociatedwiththesupportrelationshipcannotbeadequatelymitigated.Insuchcases,thesupportrelationshipshouldnotbeestablishedunlessspecificadditionalconditionsthatdirectlyaddressthesourceoftheriskaremet.
Assessing respective frameworksItislikelythattwoactors’legalframeworks,amongotherthings,willdiffer.Actorsshouldthereforeidentifythecriticalissuesforwhichtheywillneedtounderstandhowtheirpartnerinterpretsandappliesitslegalobligations.CriticalissuesarethosethataffecthowpeopleprotectedunderIHLaretreated,withregardtoissuessuchasdetention;detaineetransfers;thedeathpenalty;thechoiceofmeansandmethodsofwarfare;thedefinitionofcivilians,combatantsandprisonersofwar;andsanctionsforIHLviolations.Differencesregardingtheseissueswillhavesignificantpracticalandlegalimplicationsforbothparties.
Theaboveissuesareamongthosethatwillbeaffectedbythepartner’slegalobligations,whichmaydifferfromthoseoftheotherpartner.Inparticular,onepartnermaybepartytodifferentlegalinstruments,suchastheProtocolsAdditionaltotheGenevaConventionsortheConventiononClusterMunitions.Non-Stateactorsmayalsobeboundbyinternationaltreatiesapplicableintheterritoryinwhichtheyoperateandmay,inaddition,havecommittedtoabidebyinternationalstandards.47Inviewofapotentialsupportrelationship,oneactormayencourageanothertoaccedetorelevanttreatiesorcommitments(seeSection 6.1.2).Indeed,StatespartytotheConventiononClusterMunitionsarerequiredtobothencouragetheircounterpartstojointheConventionandtomaketheirbesteffortstodiscouragesuchnon-partyStatesfromusingclustermunitions.48
46 CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.158–163(seenote6above).47 SeeGenevaCallDeedsofCommitment(seenote36above).48 SeeConventiononClusterMunitions,Art.21.AlthoughtheConventionallowsStatesPartiestocontinuetocooperateandengageinmilitaryoperationswithStatesnotpartyevenifthelattermaycontinuetouse,stockpileandtransferclustermunitions,suchcooperationcannotamounttoassistingin,encouragingorinducingprohibitedactivitieswithinthemeaningofArticle1oftheConvention.
96 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Adecisionmakermayalsoneedtounderstandhowtheirpartner’slegalobligationsareinterpretedandappliedwithinitsdomesticorinternalsystem.Forexample,linguisticdifferencesmayleadpartnerstohavedifferentinterpretationsofthemeaningofkeyterms,suchas“civilian”.Suchdifferencescanhaveimportantimplicationsinpractice,especiallyduringPMOs.
Legal reminder
under IHL, States must:
• comply with IHL
• refrain from providing any support that would encourage or assist in IHL violations
• do everything reasonably in their power to prevent IHL violations by the parties to an armed
conflict and bring such violations to an end.49
Legal reminder
In keeping with States’ obligations under the Arms Trade Treaty (2013), where applicable, States that
support parties to an armed conflict must assess the intended recipients’ likely level of compliance
with IHL and refrain from authorizing weapons transfers if there is a clear or substantial risk that
the arms could be used to commit or facilitate serious violations of this law.
Further reading
Understanding the Arms Trade Treaty from a Humanitarian Perspective (ICRC)
Arms Transfer Decisions: Applying International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law
Criteria (ICRC)
B. AgreementsAgreementsaboutsupportrelationshipsservetosetexpectationsandcancontributetoensuringrespectfor IHLandotherrelevantstandards.Theyprovidepartnerswiththeopportunity toreachasharedunderstandingaboutthescopeandobjectivesofthesupportrelationshipandanyconditionsattachedtothearrangement.Suchdetailsmaybecontainedin,forexample,statusofforcesagreements,memo-randaofunderstandingandtechnicalagreements.Whatevertheirform,theseagreementsshouldclearlydelineateandallocaterespectiverolesandresponsibilitiesandaddressissuesassociatedwiththeprotec-tionofciviliansandIHLprinciples.Theinternaldivisionofresponsibilitiesamonganactor’ssubsidiaryinstitutionsshouldbecleartoitselfandtoitspartner(seeSection 6.1.1).
Anyambiguitiesaboutwhateachpartnerwilldo,andthelimitsoftheirresponsibilityandauthority,increasetheriskofconfusionandreducetheactors’combinedcapacitytoensurerespectforIHLandotherrelevantstandards.Confusionastowhoisresponsibleforwhatcanhaveimportantconsequencesinaconflictsetting.Forexample,incertainPMOsofakineticnature,coordinationandexpectationsshouldbeairtight.Similarly,ininformation-sharingpartnerships,acommonunderstandingoftheuseoftheinformationandofanypotentialdoubtoruncertaintyastotheaccuracyorvalidityoftheinformationiscritical.Insomecases,ambiguitiesmaycauseactorsorpersonneltomisunderstandtheirresponsi-bilityforanoperationorforitsconsequences,potentiallyunderminingnormsofrestraint.Moreover,poorlydefinedrelationshipscanresultinthelossofvaluableinformationaboutallegedmisconductor
49 Article1commontothefourGenevaConventions;AdditionalProtocolI,Art.1;ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rules139 and144(seenote7above);CommentaryontheFirstGenevaConvention, paras.164–173(seenote6above);IHLChallengesReport 2019,pp.75–76(seenote1above).
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 97
IHLviolationsandcanlimittheactors’capacitytoaddresssuchconcerns.Consequently,clearlinesofauthorityforreportingandinvestigatingallegationsandassigningaccountabilityareparticularlyimport-ant,asaredelineatedrolesandresponsibilitiesforsharedprocessesthatcanhaveadirectimpactuponcompliancewithIHL.
Wherethepartnersdonotsharethesamelegalobligations,itwillbeevenmoreimportantthattheyseektoreachagreementoveranylegalandnon-legalstandardsofbehaviour.Theactorsmayneedtoconsiderhowtheirrespectivecapacitywillenableor,conversely,limittheirabilitytofulfilthosestandardsinagivensituation.Theywillthenhavetotakemeasurestoadapttheircapacityorrolesandresponsibilitiesaccordingly.
Atechnicalagreementorunderstandingcoulddefinethescopeandmeansofthesupportrelationshipandestablishproceduresthatformalizetherelevantlinesofauthorityandreportingresponsibilities.ClearproceduresshouldbeestablishedforallmattersrelatedtoIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofciviliansinarmedconflict.Theseinclude,forexample,civilianharmtrackingmechanisms,markingandclearingERWanddeadbodymanagement.
Togiveeffecttotheagreement,itisalsoimportanttoestablishclearcommunicationchannelssothatallrelevantproceduresareknown,understoodandfollowedbyallofthepartners’representatives.ThepartnersshouldmaintainaregulardialogueonallmattersofhumanitarianconcernandonthemeasuresundertakentoensurerespectforIHLinpractice.
Whiletheaboveconsiderationsapplytobilateralsupportrelationships,theyarealsorelevanttocoalitionpartnershipsorarrangementswhereanactorreceivessupportfrommultiplepartners(seeSection 2.2.3).Inparticularlycomplexsituations,thereshouldbealignmentbetweenafew“lead-role”functionsthatmightincludetheterritorialState,aleadStateofamultinationalcoalition(orequivalentinanallianceofNSAGs)and/ortheUnitedNations.
MakingsupportconditionaluponcompliancewithIHLorfurthermeasurestostrengthentheprotec-tionofcivilians,togetherwithtargetedmitigationmeasures,givessupportingactorstheopportunitytoimproveotherpartners’conductandalleviatesufferingwhilestillmaintainingthesupportrelationship.Forexample,theICRCrecommendsmakingthetransferofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactareaconditionaluponrecipientsputting inplace limitsontheuseofsuchweapons inaccordancewithanumberofgoodpracticesaimedatavoidingtheiruseinpopulatedareas.Likewise,supportfordetentionoperationscouldbemadeconditionalupontherecipientallowingthesupportingactoraccesstoplacesofdetentionanddetainees.SuchconditionsmaybenecessaryforthesupportingactortobesatisfiedthatthesupportitprovidesisbeingusedasintendedandincompliancewithIHL.
Minimizing harm to civilians and others not fighting should be agreed as a primaryconditionofthesupportrelationship.
C. Specific operational readinessActorswillreviewthemeasurestakentoprepareinternallyandadaptthemtotheidentifiedpartnerandsituation.
Oncethespecificareaofdeploymentisknown,pre-deploymenttrainingincludingculturalawarenessandlanguagetrainingshouldbeconducted.Elementsthatsupportnormativeengagement,suchasthelocalcultureandinfluencesinfavourofIHLcompliance,canbetailoredforthespecificcircumstances.Trainingmaterialsintheappropriatelanguagecanbeprepared,andstaffmemberswithexperienceinthatarea–includingfromotherministries,agenciesanddepartments–canbeapproachedtoenhancespecificreadiness.
98 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
D. Transition strategy Theendstateofthesupportrelationshipshouldbeclearlydefined,togetherwithanyconditionsforterminatingorrestructuringthesupport.Duringthepreparationphase,bothactorsshoulddevelopatransitionplanforastructureddisengagement.Thisplanshouldlisttheconditionsforthedisengagementtobeconsideredcompleteandthestepsneededtoendthesupportrelationshipinanorderlyandsafefashion.Theplanshouldanticipatetwoscenarios:oneinwhichtheactors’objectiveshavebeenreached,andtheotherwheretheyhavenotbeenreachedandthesupportiswithdrawnormodified.
Alltoooften,politicalormilitaryconsiderationspromptasupportingactortosuddenlywithdrawitssup-port.Withoutproperplanning,suchanabruptchangecanleaveciviliansandothersnotfightingexposedtonewviolationsofIHLandhumanrights.Itmayalsohindertheiraccesstoremediesforpastviolations.Asuddenwithdrawalmayalsohaveasignificantimpactonthesupportedparty’sbehaviour,andthisimpactmayneedtobeweighedinadvanceagainstthereasonsforthewithdrawal(seeSection 2.3.1).Thetransitionstrategyshouldtakeintoaccount,amongotherthings,theriskstociviliansandothersnotfighting,thevestedinterestsoflocalactors,andquestionsofDDR(seeSection 6.3.1).
See also: – Section 6.3.1Structureddisengagement
6.2 IMPLEMENTATION
MONITORINGAND
EVALUATION
ASSISTANCE
IHLTRAINING
INSTITUTIONALCAPACITY
INTERNALOVERSIGHT
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
IMPLEM
ENTATION
6.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDINGInstitutional capacity building refers to the group ofmeasures taken to prepare the institutions that constituteasupportedpartytoundertakeactivitiesassociatedwiththeconductandconsequencesofanarmedconflict.
Fourcomponentsofinstitutionalcapacitybuildingarediscussedhere:A. frameworkB. systemsandprocessesC. personnelD. cultureandintent.
Suchmeasuresareespeciallypertinentwhensupportisprovidedintheformofarmstransfers(Section 3.4.2)andPMOs(seeSection 3.4.3).
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 99
IntroductionAkeyconcerninsupportrelationshipsisthesupportedparty’sinstitutionalcapacitytomanageandutilizethesupportitreceivesinamannerconducivetotheprotectionandassistanceofpeopleduringarmedconflictandinitsaftermath.
Actorsenteringasupportrelationshipshouldconsiderwhethertheinstitutionscomprisingthesupportedpartyaresuitablypreparedtoreceivetheproposedsupport(seeSection 6.1.3).Theinstitutionsinquestionarefirstandforemostthoseassociatedwiththearmedforcesandothersecurityforces.However,therangeofinstitutionspotentiallyaffectedbyarmedconflictiswideandincludesthoseinvolvedindetention,policing,criminaljustice,healthcare,education,socialwelfareandcivilregistration.
Takingstepstostrengthenthoseinstitutionscouldhelptomaximizethepositiveimpactofthesupportandminimizetheriskofthesupportbeingmisapplied,inparticulartocommitorfacilitateviolationsofIHL.
Some institutional capacity-buildingprogrammesbetweensupportingandsupportedactorsare imple-mentedinpeacetimeinthenormalcourseofinternationalrelations,suchassecurityanddefencesectorreformprogrammes.Itmaybethecasethatthelong-termnatureoftheseprogrammesandtheirprescribedobjectivesmakethemresistanttoshorter-termadjustments.Ifpartnersengageinconflict,andthiswasunforeseenattheoutsetofthecapacity-buildingrelationship,decisionmakersshouldbeflexibleandpre-paredtoadaptthoseprogrammes.
Key questions • Dothepartner’sinstitutionsapplyaframeworkandusesystemsandprocessesthatsupportandensuretheproposedconflict-relatedsupportactivitiesareincompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlegalstandards?
• Arepartnerarmedforcesselectedandvettedeffectively?
• Doesthepartnerhavethecapacitytomanagetheaftermathofhostilities?
• Whentheproposedsupportdrawstoaclose,willthepartner’sinstitutionshavethecapacitytocontinueIHL-compliantoperationsontheirown?
A. FrameworkTheframeworkofpoliciesandlawssettingouthowanactorshouldoperate,aswellasthesysteminplacetoenforcethatframework,willinfluenceitsbehaviour.Thebettertheactor’smandateandauthorityaredefined,thegreaterthelikelihoodthattheywillcomplywithIHL.
Asastartingpoint,thepoliciesandrulespromotedbyanactormustbeconsistentwithitsobligationsunderIHL.Amongotherthings,aparty’srulesofengagementandrulesonhumanetreatmentduringcaptureanddetention,andtheprocessbywhichmembersofthepartywillbeheldaccountableincaseofmisconductoraviolationofthelaw,mustallbeclearlyarticulated.Theframeworkmustbeaccompaniedbyaneffectiveorganizationalstructuretoensureadherencetothepoliciesandlaws.
Actorsmayhaveopportunitiestoenhancetheframeworkregulatingtheirpartner’sbehaviourincom-pliancewithIHL,particularlywithrespecttotheirengagementwithcivilians,rulesofengagementandarrestanddetentionoperations.ThisisparticularlyrelevantwhenasupportingactorisoperatingontheterritoryofahostState.
Furthermore,actorsthatsupportpartiestoarmedconflictsshouldconsiderensuring,tothegreatestextentpossible,thatthesupportedpartyhasastrong,effectivechainofcommandandcontrolthatallowscommanderstoenforcecompliancewithIHL.Theyshouldalsoconsiderbringing,whererelevantandappropriate,asupportedarmedgroupintotheestablishedframeworksgoverningtheterritorialState’sarmedandsecurityforcesandstrengtheningthatState’scapacitytointegrate,controlandoverseethegroup.
100 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
B. Systems and processesThesystemsandprocessesofallofthearmedforcesorgroups,ministries,departmentsandagenciesthatmakeupthesupportedpartyshouldbealigned,withthegoalofachievinggreaterrespectforIHLandenhancingtheprotectionofcivilians.Civilianentities,evenifnotconsideredpartofthesupportrelation-shiporengagedinthearmedconflict,canplayanimportantroleinpromotingandensuringadherencetoIHL.Effectivesystemsandprocessescanbeimplementedcoherentlyacrossentitiesthroughrelevantlawsandpolicies,suchasprotection-of-civilianspolicies,deedsofcommitmentanddeclarations.Asupportingactorcansupportthedevelopmentofsuchframeworks,systemsandprocesseswheretheydonotalreadyexist.
Armedforcesandarmedgroupsshouldprovidestafftraining,clearstandardsofconductandeffectivesanctionsintheeventofmisconduct.Thearmedactor’sbasicstructuremustallowforclearcommandandcontrol,theabilitytoplanandconductoperations,oversightandclarityonresponsibilityforcon-duct,andasanctionsregime.Theneedsgobeyondoperations,however,andtheynormallyincludeahuman-resourcepolicyandstructure, logistics, trainingandcommunications.Armedgroupsmirrorthesefunctions,albeitthroughavarietyofgroupstructures(centralized,decentralized,orcommunity-embeddedarmedgroups).Clearly,fromintegratedStatearmedforcestothevariousstructuresofarmedgroups,thereneedstobeamechanisminplaceforreportingandinvestigatingpotentialIHLviolations(seeSection 6.2.5).
Actorsshouldtakeallnecessarymeasurestoensurethattheapplicablerulesandsanctionsareintegratedintotheirsystemofreferenceandthattheyareknownandproperlyapplied.Amongothermeasures,effortsshouldbemadetoensurethatnationaljudgesorcompetentjudicialauthoritiesaretrainedinIHL.Thoughbeyondtheremitofthisdocument,thereshouldalsobealignmentbetweenStatesintheguaranteesandproceduresusedbythenationalcourtsresponsiblefordealingwithviolationsofIHL.
Thisconsiderationisparticularlyrelevantforneworburgeoningforces,wheretherecruitmentprocessmayoutpacethedevelopmentofsupportingstructuresandanorganizationalculture.Theabsenceofbothclearguidelinesontheorganizationandmanagementoflocalpartnerforcesandtheleadershipneededtoensuresuchguidelinesareappliedmayexacerbateotheridentifiedrisks.
Further reading
The Roots of Restraint in War (ICRC)
Elements to Render Sanctions More Effective – Factsheet (ICRC)
See also: – Section 6.2.2IHLtraining
C. PersonnelEachactorhasprimaryresponsibilityforselectingandvettingitsownpersonnel,includingitsweaponsbearers.Wheretheseprocessesdonotalreadyexist,supportingactorsmaybeabletoassistwithestab-lishingandsystematicallyimplementingrobust,standardizedprocessesforselectingandvettingthemembersofthearmedforcesofthepartytheysupport.
Onepriorityforsuchprocessesshouldbetoensurethatallrecruitsare18yearsofageorolder.50 The processesshouldalsoexcludepersonsconvictedofIHLviolationsorseriouscriminalbehaviour;thosesuspectedoraccusedofpastIHLviolationsorseriouscriminalbehaviourshouldonlybepermittedto
50 ForanoverviewofStateobligationsregardingtheageofrecruitment,seethelegalreminderinthissection.Incaseofdoubtastoanindividual’sage,theICRCconsidersthatthepersonshouldalwaysbetreatedasachild(presumptionofminority)andthatageassessmenttechniquesshouldbeusedasameasureoflastresort.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 101
enlistifanappropriateinvestigationhasbeenundertaken.Partneringwitharmedforceswhosemembersarethesubjectofcredibleallegationsofseriouscriminalconduct(domesticorinternational)increasestheriskthatthesupportprovidedwillcontributetoviolationsofIHL,includinginrelationshipswithotheractors.
CarefullyselectingandvettingrecruitsforthearmedforcesofapartytoaconflictisessentialtoensurecompliancewithIHL.Thesamelogicappliestoapartner’sarmedforcesandPMSCs.ParticularlyinPMOs,theprocessbywhichpartnersrecruitfortheirarmedforcesaffectstheircapacitytoensurecompliancewithIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandcanhaveabearingonthesecurityoftheactor’sownperson-nel.Anactormaybeconsideredlegally,ethicallyormorallyresponsibleforthelaterconductoftheotheractor’sforces,evenifthesupportrelationshiphasceasedtoexistanddespitechallengestoobtainingthenecessaryinformationduringthevettingphase.
Inordertoproperlyassesstheabovefactors,thevettingprocessshouldfocusonindividuals,notgroups.Vettingmayalsoextendtoexistingmembersofaforce,especiallythosewithcommandappointmentswhoseauthorityandinfluencemayhaveagreaterimpactontheapplicationofIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
Thequestionofidentityanditsimpactonbehaviourinconflictshouldbegivenspecialattentionduringrecruitmentandvetting.Unitsorgroupsformedonthebasisoftribal,religiousorpoliticalaffiliationstendtoretainthatunderlyingidentityorunifyingtrait;thismaybeinconsistentwiththeirofficialroleandnegativelyaffecthowtheyconductmilitaryoperations.Conversely,unitswithinarmedforcesthatrepresentabroadercrosssectionofsocietymaypromoteabetterunderstandingofculturalnormsacrossthecountryandpotentiallyimproveacceptanceofthoseunitscountrywide.
Asmuchaspossible,recruitmentshouldbevoluntaryandfreefromanycoercivepressure.
Legal reminder
Most States are party to the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (2002) (OPAC). These States must ensure that people
under the age of 18 are not compulsorily recruited into their armed forces (Article 2) and take all
feasible measures to ensure that members of their armed forces who have not attained the age of
18 years do not take a direct part in hostilities (Article 1).
under the OPAC, armed groups distinct from the armed forces should not, under any circumstances,
recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 (Article 4).
For States not party to the OPAC, Additional Protocols I (Article 77) and II (Article 4) put the
minimum age for the recruitment of children and their participation in hostilities at 15 years, as
does the Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) (Article 38).51 Additional Protocol I and the
Convention on the Rights of the Child also encourage parties, in recruiting among those aged from
15 to 18, to give priority to the oldest.
For States party to the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (1990), any recruitment
(compulsory or voluntary) of children under 18 is prohibited (Article 22).
under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (1998), conscripting or enlisting children
under the age of 15 into the armed forces or armed groups or using them to participate actively in hostilities
is a war crime both in international (Article 8 (2)(b)(xxvi)) and non-international (Article 8 (2)(e)(vii))
armed conflicts.
51 AlistofStatespartytothesetreatiesisavailableat:https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/ihl.
102 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Further reading
The vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and use of Child
Soldiers
The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups
The Paris Commitments to protect children from unlawful recruitment or use by armed forces or
armed groups
Children associated with armed forces or armed groups (ICRC)
Guiding principles for the domestic implementation of a comprehensive system of protection for children
associated with armed forces or armed groups, pp. 395–396 (ICRC)
Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflict – Factsheet (ICRC)
See also: – Section 6.3.1Structureddisengagement
D. Culture and intentTheinstitutionalcultureofeitheractorinasupportrelationshipcanbepositivelyshapedtoreinforcethenormativeframeworkadoptedandthesystemsandprocessesemployed.Themeasurestakenforthispurposemayneedtobeimplementedconsistentlyoveralongperiodfortheireffectstobeseen.
Instructureswherethereiscivilianauthorityorinfluenceoverthearmedforces,thecivilianleadershipwillalsoshapeandreinforcetheinstitutionalculture.Measurestoshapeinstitutionalculturecanbepositiveornegative.Forexample,leadersmayimplicitlyencouragebehaviourcontrarytoIHLorotherbranchesoflawbystigmatizingadversariesorsettingsalestargetsforarmstransfers.
Militarycommandersareresponsible for theconductof thearmedforcesunder theircommand.Anappropriatecombinationofguidance,leadershipanddirectionfromthecommanderwillsetthetoneforallactivities.Itisimportantthatacommander’sguidancebecomeroutineandbegiveneffect.Thecommander’sguidanceanddirectionshouldaddressnotonlywhatshouldhappen,butcriticallywhatshould nothappen.Forexample,aclearstatementontheprotectionofcivilianshasbeenseentodirectlyinfluencetheactionsofcombattroops.
Actorsinasupportrelationshipmayworktogethertodevelopmilitaryacademiesorstaffcollegeswithrobustprotection-of-civiliancurricula.Theymayalsomakeiteasyforoneactor’sarmedforcestoattendanother’sprofessionalmilitaryeducationalinstitutions.Long-termexposuretopositiveexamplesoforganizationalcultureandethicswhereIHLisappliedandnon-combatantsareprotectedcanhaveapositiveeffectonsubsequentbehaviour.Itcanalsoformthebasisforlong-terminterpersonalconnec-tionsthatstrengthentheoverallrelationship.
6.2.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TRAINING IHLtrainingreferstotrainingactivitiesspecificallydesignedtoensurerespectforIHLandreduceharmtocivilians,othersnotfightingandbothcivilianandspecificallyprotectedobjects.
IHLtrainingasapracticalmeasuretoimproveprotectionshouldbedistinguishedfromTAAAPMOsasatypeofsupportprovidedtoapartytoaconflict(seeSection 3.4.3).TrainingandinstructiononIHLwouldnotnecessarilyqualifyasasupportrelationshipinandofitself.Conversely,trainingandinstructiononIHLorotherprotectionissuescanbe,andoftenare,incorporatedintobroaderTAAAprogrammes.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 103
Broadlyspeaking,threerelatedtypesofmeasurescouldbeimplemented:A. trainingB. mentoringC. monitoringandevaluatingbothtrainingandmentoring.
IntroductionPropertrainingandinstructionarecentraltoensuringrespectforIHLandtheprotectionofvictimsofarmedconflictmorebroadly.52Theyensurethattheapplicablerulesaresystematicallyknown,internalizedandputtowork.Justastheydedicateresourcestotrainingtheirownpersonnel,actorsthatsupportpartiestoanarmedconflictshould–regardlessoftheformoftheirsupport–considersupportingorprovidingthemwithtrainingandinstructionontherulesandprinciplesofIHLandotherrelevantlawsandstandards.
Legal reminder
Parties to armed conflicts have a duty to integrate IHL into their doctrine, training and rules of
engagement.53 This duty stems from the obligation of all parties to respect and ensure respect for
IHL. under customary law, the duty to train members in IHL is recognized as binding upon both
States and armed groups that are party to non-international armed conflicts.54
Despiteitsimportance,IHLtrainingonitsownmaynotbesufficienttomitigatetherisksidentifiedinthesupportrelationship(seeSection 6.1.3).Moreover,theeffectivenessoftrainingdependsonanumberoffac-tors,asdetailedbelow.Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldcarefullyconsideranytrainingandmentoringprogrammesandbepreparedtoadapttheminlinewithsubsequentmonitoringandevaluation.
Key questions • DoyouincorporatetrainingonIHLandotherrelevantlawsintoyoursupportrelationship?
• Doyourpersonnelhavetheappropriateskills,includinganunderstandingofthetrainees’languageandculture,toprovidetraining?
• Isyourtrainingprogrammeadaptedtothepartnerintermsofcontent,methodsandmaterials,timingandfrequency,andaudience?
• HowdoyouevaluatetheeffectivenessofyourIHLtrainingandincorporatethatassessmentintosubsequenttrainingcycles?
• IsIHLtrainingintegratedacrossyourbroadertrainingprogramme,suchasincombinedexercises?
• Willyousupplementtrainingorinstructionwithmentoring?
A. International humanitarian law training programmeThechoiceofcontent,format,audienceandtrainersiscentraltoensuringthatatrainingprogrammeiseffective.Ideally,trainingprogrammesaretailoredtotherecipientpartner’sneeds,asdetermineddur-ingthesupportassessment(seeSection 6.1.3).Similarly,trainingprogrammesshouldbereviewedandadaptedovertimeinresponsetooperationalobservations,whethertheyconcerntheperformanceofpasttrainees(seeSection 6.2.2),specificissuesofhumanitarianconcernorotherchangesintheoperationalenvironment.
TheplacegiventoIHLtrainingandeducationwithinabroadertrainingprogrammeshouldservetounderscoreitsimportance.IHLandotherlegalprinciplesapplicabletosituationsofarmedconflictandothersituationsofviolenceshouldnotonlybe taughtasstand-alonemodulesorcourses.Allother
52 RootsofRestraint,pp.28–29 (seenote20above),includingreferencesfoundtherein.53 Intreatylaw,thedutyofStatestoprovideIHLinstructiontotheirarmedforcesisfoundinArticles47,48,127 and144intheFirst,Second,ThirdandFourthGenevaConventionsrespectively,andinArticle83ofAdditionalProtocolI.ThistreatyobligationisapplicablebothinpeacetimeandintimesofIAC.InaspecificreferencetoNIACs,AdditionalProtocolIIrequires,inArticle19,thattheProtocol“shallbedisseminatedaswidelyaspossible”.
54 ICRCCustomaryIHLStudy,Rule142(seenote7above).
104 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
militarytrainingmustbeconsistentwiththerequirementsofIHL.Indeed,othertrainingprogrammesorexercisesoftenprovideopportunitiestoreinforceorclarifyIHLrules.
WeaponstrainingwhichappliesIHLprinciplestotheuseofcertainweaponsisevenmoreimportantinthecontextofarmstransfersorPMOs.Asanexample,theICRCrecommendsthat,whenprovidingsup-portintheformofexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea,supportingactorsalsocarryouttrainingtoensurethatthesupportedparties’armedforcesknowandunderstandtheeffectsofsuchweaponsinpopulatedareasandimplementgoodpracticestoavoidtheiruseinsuchsituations.
Content Inthecaseofarmedconflict,IHListhebaselineofsuchtraining.ComprehensiveIHLtrainingshouldbeprovidedontherulesgoverningspecificactivities,asneeded,suchasthehumaneanddignifiedtreat-mentofpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,ortheprinciplesofprecautions,distinctionandproportionalityinattack.Normsandprinciplespertainingtotherespectfulengagementwithciviliansandparticularlyvulnerablegroupscanfurthermitigatehumanitarianconsequences.ProvidingtrainingandadviceonsuchnormsandprinciplesmayfurthercontributetoIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyarmedconflict.
Otherlegalframeworkssuchasinternationalhumanrightslaw,internationalrefugeelawandinter-nationalcriminallawmayberelevantinthecircumstancesandmaythereforeneedtobeincludedinthetraining.Asmilitaryandsecurityforcesmayhavetoengageinsituationsbelowthethresholdofarmedconflict,propertrainingshouldbeprovidedonthedifferentlegalandnormativeframeworksgoverningtheuseofforce(armedconflictandlawenforcementparadigms).Theneedforsuchtrainingwilldependonthefunctionsoftheforcesbeingtrainedandmaychangeovertime.
Actorsshouldconsiderincorporatingagenderperspectiveintoallaspectsoftheirtraining.“Gender-blind”trainingcanhaveanegativeimpactonboththemilitarymissionandtheabilitytoprotectaffectedpeople.Conversely,incorporatingagenderperspectiveintothetrainingcanincreasesituationalaware-nessandresultinbetterprotectionforthoseaffected.Includingagenderperspectivealsofacilitatesidentifyingandaddressingtheparticularvulnerabilitiesofmen,women,boysandgirlsinsituationsofarmedconflictandviolence.
Actorsshouldconsultwithlocalpartnerswhenpreparingatrainingprogrammesothatitisinkeepingwithrelevantandsituation-specificchallengesandrealities.
Incertainsituations,theICRCmaybeinapositiontoofferitsservicesindevelopinganIHLcurriculumortocontributetothetrainingitself.
Methods and materials Makinglegalconceptsmorepracticalandgroundingtheminoperationalrealityallowsforbetteras- similationthaniftheyremainpurelyacademicandtheoretical.MixedtrainingmethodsthatcombineIHLbriefings,classroomdiscussions,case-studyreviewsandpracticalfieldexerciseshavebeenshowntobethemosteffectiveininculcatingnormsofrestraintincombatants.55Deliveringpracticaltrainingthatincludesintense,realisticandfast-pacedexercisesbasedontheapplicablerulesofengagementallowstraineestooperationalizeIHLtraining,linkingittoon-the-groundrealitiesandchallenges.
Thepartnerforces’organizationalstructure,levelofintegrationandtypeofcommandmaycallfordiffer-entformsoftraining.Tobeeffective,trainingprogrammesshouldbetailoredtothetargetaudienceintermsofthelanguagespokenandtheireducationallevelandothercharacteristics.Inadditiontoaddress-ingtraineesinalanguagetheyspeakcomfortably,trainersshouldgeartheleveloflanguagetotheaudi-ence,forexamplebyfavouringlesstechnicallanguage,usingimagesandactingoutpracticalscenarios.
55 BasedonempiricalresearchundertakenwiththeAustralianandPhilippinearmiesbyAndrewBell.Forfurtherdetailssee RootsofRestraint(seenote20above).
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 105
Understandingpartners’varyingincentivestocomplywithIHLnormsmayinformandshapethetrainingandadviceprovided.Howthelegalnormsareframedcanbeanimportantfactorcontributingto–orundermining–compliancewiththosenorms.Themosteffectivetrainingcombineslegalnormsandprincipleswiththevaluesunderpinningthem.Whilethelawshouldalwaysbepresentedaccurately,andnocompromisesshouldbemadeonlegalprinciplesandnorms,tailoringtheinformationtothespecificcultural,religiousandsocialcontextandoperationalrealitieswillmakethetrainingmoreeffectiveandpersuasive.AndbecauseIHLandotherlegalprinciplesareoftenmirroredincultural,religious,orsocialnormsandtraditions–intermsofcivilianprotectionandprohibitingtheuseofcertainmeansandmethodsofwarfare,forexample–trainersshouldseektoemphasizethiscorrelation.56Incorporatingcomparablehistoricalorcontemporaryexamplesofcompliancecanalsoaddcredibilityandrelevancetothetraining.57Appealingtothetrainees’identityandethoscanhelptoinstilhumanitarianprinciplesandrespectforthelaw.
Timing and frequencyTrainingandinstructionshouldberepeatedatregularintervals,giventheturnoveramongpersonnelandwithinunitsandtheneedtorefreshtheknowledgeofthosealreadytrained.Repeatingtrainingsessionsatregularintervalsservestoanchorrespectforhumanitarianprinciplesasareflexreaction.Thefrequencyoftrainingwillneedtobedeterminedinviewofthetrainees’operationalrequirements,although,asageneralrule,personnelshouldreceivetrainingatleastonceperyear,eveninoperationalsettings.ResearchonintegratedStatearmedforcessuggeststhatmilitaryunitscommandedbyleaderswithmoreintensivetraininginnormsofrestraintengagedinlessviolenceagainstcivilians.58Unitlead-ersareuniquelyplacedtoemphasizenormsofrestraintinkeymoments,forexampleinthewakeofanincidentinwhichaunitmemberhasbeeninjuredorkilled.59
AudienceAnyonewhoplaysakeyroleintheapplicationofIHLshouldbetaughtitsrulesandthesanctionsap- plicabletoviolations.Thatincludesallarmedforces,aswellaslegalofficersandadvisers,regardlessofthegrouptowhichtheybelong,andthoseactingundertheauspicesoftheUnitedNationsoracompetentregionalorganization.Itmayalsoincludecivilianpersonnelwhoperformrelevantfunctions,suchasdiplomaticstaff,armsexportcontrolofficialsandmedicalpersonnel.Thetrainingshouldenableindi-vidualstoclearlyidentifywhatispermissibleandwhatisnot.
Reinforcingnormsofrestraintshouldtakeplacenotonlyatthestrategiclevelofgovernmentorthearmedforces,butatthetacticallevelaswell.Whilethiscanbechallenging,itisanimportantelementinpreventingviolationsofIHL.LeadershipcanbeanimportantfactorininstillinganorganizationalcultureofIHLcomplianceandcivilianprotection(seealsoSections 6.1.2 and 6.2.1).Forexample,juniornon-commissionedofficersarecentraltoeffortstopromotenormsofrestraintamongjuniorsoldierswithinsmalloperationalunits.Whiletrainingseniorcommanders,ambassadorsandotherleadersisworthwhileinitself,theiractiveparticipationintrainingsessionsalsoservestoreinforcethevalueofthetrainingintheeyesofothertrainees.Thismessagingcanbereinforcedbytheleadershipofbothactorsinthesupportrelationship.
TrainersThechoiceoftrainercanmakeadifferenceintheextenttowhichnormsaresocialized.Toidentifythemosteffectivetrainingprovidersforagivenaudience, itwillbenecessarytounderstandtheorgan-izationalandculturalcontext.Insomecases,aneffectiveinstructorinIHLmayrequirecredibilityderivedfromoperationalexperience;thatwillallowthemtodrawondilemmastheyhavefacedandexplainthechoicestheymade.Otheraudiencesmaygivegreatercredencetotrainerswithnocombatexperiencebut
56 RootsofRestraint,p.34(seenote20above).57 RootsofRestraint,p.65(seenote20above).58 AndrewBell,“Measuringtheeffectofnormsocializationonthetreatmentofcivilians:AnanalysisofU.S.armyconductinIraqandAfghanistan”,paperpresentedattheannualmeetingoftheAmericanPoliticalScienceAssociation,SanFrancisco,31August–3September2017.SeealsoRootsofRestraint,p.28–29(seenote20above).
59 RootsofRestraint,p.29(seenote20above),citinginterviewwithDavidKilcullen,Geneva,29November2017.
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recognizedIHLexpertise,suchascivilianlawyersfromtheICRC.Consideringtheimportanceofleader-shipandasenseofrapport,atrainingprogrammemaybemosteffectivewhenthetrainerisinadirect,closehierarchicalrelationshipwiththetraineesand/orisclearlyseentosupporttheprinciplesandideasofIHLbeingconveyedandpracticed.
Someactorsmayhirecontractorstodeliverspecializedtraining.However,thismaycomeatthecostofoperationalexperienceandthefeedbackloopthatwouldbeavailableifthetrainercamefromwithintheactor’sownranks.Additionalframeworksandsafeguardsmayberequiredwhenhiringexternalcontrac-tors,suchasvettingthetrainersbasedontheirpastconductandtraining(seeSection 3.2.5).
Trainingmayalsobemoreeffectivewhendevelopedordeliveredinconjunctionwithlocalauthoritiesandcivilsociety(suchasRedCrossandRedCrescentSocieties,legalprofessionalsand/ornon-governmentalorganizations).Suchpartnersmaybebestpositionedtoappealtolocalvalues,usefamiliarpedagogicalapproachesandexplainconceptsmoreeffectively.Furthermore,suchcollaborationscanhaveapositiveeffectoncivil-militaryrelationsanddeveloptrust,thuscreatingaconduciveenvironmentforcontinuedengagement.
Further reading
The Roots of Restraint in War (ICRC)
Montreux Document on pertinent international legal obligations and good practices for States related to
operations of private military and security companies during armed conflict (ICRC and Swiss Federal
Department of Foreign Affairs)
Islamic Law and International Humanitarian Law – Factsheet (ICRC)
Explosive Weapons with Wide Area Effects: A Deadly Choice in Populated Areas (ICRC, forthcoming)
B. Mentoring Partnerforcesorcivilianpersonnelwhoreceivetrainingcanalsobementoredinoperationalsituationsoutsideofformaltrainingprogrammesorinstitutions.Thepresenceofmentorsprovidesanopportun-itytoprovidetechnicalguidanceorcoachingthatistailoredtothepartner’sday-to-dayoperationalactivities.Itmayalsoallowcounterpartstodeveloparapportthroughwhichofficialgroupnormsaresupportedorenforcedatthepeerlevel,thusincreasingthelikelihoodthattheywillbeinternalized.60
Thecommonfeatureofmentoringprogrammesisthatthementorisusuallyoutsideofthesupportedactor’shierarchy.Thisfostersaclimateofopendialogue.Justaswithtrainersandadvisers,mentorsshouldbequalifiedandexperiencedintherelevantareaofoperation.
Mentorswhoworkcloselywiththepartner’spersonnelwillbeinabetterpositiontoassesstheefficacyofthetrainingandthepartner’sfurtherneeds,includingchangesthatshouldbemadetotheexistingtrainingregime.Theycouldalsocollectlessonslearnedthatcouldbeusedtoimprovetherelationshipandthepre-deploymenttrainingofincomingpersonnelfromtheirownorganizationorotherpartners(seeSection 6.3.2).
Throughmentors,normsofrestraintcanbecontinuallyreinforcedduringtrainingprogrammes,pre-deploymentpreparationsandspecificmissionsandoperations.Tobeeffective,mentoringshouldbeundertakeninconjunctionwithothermeasures.Italsorequirescontinuityofpersonneloverasustainedperiod,andthepersonnelshouldbeabletoimpartapositiveinfluenceinregardtotheprotectionofcivilians.
60 RootsofRestraint,p.25(seenote20above).
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 107
C. Monitoring and evaluationPracticalmeasurestoprovidetrainingormentoringtopartnersshouldbesupplementedbymeasurestoevaluatetheireffectiveness.Anyobservationsshouldfeedbackintothedesignandimplementationoffurthertrainingormentoring–asisthecasewithmonitoring,evaluationandlearningmechanismsingeneral(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.3.2).
Evaluationmethodscouldincludetestingthetraineesunderduress,aswellaspeer-judgedandcollec-tivelydebriefedexercises.Anotherapproachwouldbetomonitortrainedtroopsonthegroundforaperiodof timefollowingthe trainingtoobserveandassess theoutcome.Extensivedebriefingswithpartnerforcesandotherpartnersengagedwiththetrainedforcescanalsohelpintheevaluationprocess.
6.2.3 ASSISTANCE IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW COMPLIANCEThissectionaddressesmeasuresthatcanhelpanactortocomplywith itsIHLobligationsorotherwiseimproveitsprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
Thisisdistinctfromthetypeofassistancethatenablespartiestoengageinarmedconflict(seeSection 3.4.3)andismoreoperationallytargetedthaninstitutionalcapacitybuilding(see Section 6.2.1).
TheICRChasidentifiedthreemaintypesofassistance:A. capacitymultiplicationB. resourcesC. substitutingfunctions.
Thesemeasuresprovideactorsinasupportrelationshipwitheffectivewaystoreducethenegativehumani-tarianconsequencesofanarmedconflictwithoutnecessarilybecomingapartytotheconflict.Thesemeasuresareespeciallyrelevantwhereapartnerintendstobephysicallypresentintheconflictsituation–althoughsomeactorsmayconsiderallocatingspecificpersonnelforthepurposeofimplementingthesemeasures.ThesemeasuresrelatetoensuringadherencetoIHLduringtheconductofoperationsandmaytakeplacealongside,andreinforce,similareffortsduringtrainingortobuildinstitutionalcapacity.
Introduction Assessmentsorongoingmonitoringmayrevealgapsinaparty’scapacitiestofulfilitsobligationsunderIHLandotherwiseimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting(seeSections 6.1.3 and 6.2.4). The existenceofasupportrelationshipcanprovideanavenueforapartytoaconflicttoreceiveassistancetofulfiltheseobligations.Throughthesupportrelationship,itcanreceivehelpinenhancingitscapacity,itcanobtainadditionalresources,oritcanbesubstitutedincertainfunctions.Ifthesupportingactorprovidessupportasacapacitymultiplier,itshouldensurethatsuchcapacityisdirectedtowardsimprovingcompliancewithIHLandinamannerthatprotectscivilians,whichmayentailadditionalcontrolmeasuresortraining.
Actorsshouldconsiderwhatspecificortechnicalassistancetheymaybeabletoprovideorneedtorequest,forexampleincaringforthewoundedandsick,preparingforandmanagingdetainees,managingthedead,preventingpeoplefromgoingmissingorclarifyingtheirfateandwhereabouts,andmarkingandclearingERW.Assistancemayserveasameanstomitigateanidentifiedrisk(seeSection 6.1.3),orsimplytocontributetowardsimprovingconditionsforthoseaffectedbytheconflict.
Supportingactorsareencouragedtoplanaheadwhenprovidingthistypeofspecializedassistanceinordertomitigatethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesoftheconflicttowhichtheyhavecontributed,evenaftertheyhaveachievedtheirownstrategicobjectives.Intheeventthatasupportingactorwithdrawscompletelyorreducesitsengagementinagivensituation,itshouldconsidertheongoingimpactonciviliansandothersnotfighting.Wherepossible,arrangementsshouldbemadetoensurethatthesupportedpartyisabletocon-tinuetofulfilitsobligationsandachieveitsprotectionoutcomeswithoutthesupportingactor’sassistance.Itmayrequirethattheassistancebeslowlyrampeddownwhilethosetransitionalarrangementsareestablishedandimplemented.Formoreonthequestionofdisengagement,seeSection 6.3.1.
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Key questions • Doesyourpartnerhavegapsintheircapacity,functionsorresourcesthatimpedeitsabilitytofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?
• Canyouhelpyourpartnertoincorporatecivilianprotectionintoitsmilitaryplanningandcommitresourcesthataddressthesegaps?
• WhatcontingenciesdoyouhaveinplaceifthesupportedpartyprovesunabletofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?
A. Capacity multiplicationBycommittingitselftoasupportrelationship,asupportingactorcanputitselfinapositiontoactivelyassistitspartnerinfulfillingIHLobligationsduringoperations.Naturally,thegreaterthepresenceofthesupportingactorintheoperationalcontext,thegreaterthedegreeofassistancetheycanprovide.
Asupportingactormayrenderassistancebylendingspecificexpertisetothesupportedparty;itmayprovidestafftoundertakespecificfunctionsortoadvisethesupportedpartypersonnelinthosefunctions.Apartnercouldmakeitspersonnelavailabletoprovideadditionalcapacityforagivenperiod,oritcouldofferadviceorrespondtorequestsforadviceonspecificissues.Theadvicecouldbeprovidedatastra-tegic,operationalortacticallevelandpertaintoahostofissues.Itisusuallyconnectedwithaparticulartechnicalcapacityoraspecificissuethatrequiresinputorintervention.
Supportedpartiesmaybeabletoenhancethesupportingactor’scapacitytoabidebyIHLbyprovidinginformationandintelligencethatimprovesthesupportingforce’sunderstandingofcivilianconsider-ations(suchasculturalnormsandpatternsoflife)andhelpsittoidentifytargetsinordertoproperlyapplytheprinciplesofdistinction,proportionalityandprecautions.
Muchasasupportingactormayprovideadvicetoitspartneronmilitaryoperations,itmayalsoenhanceitspartner’scapacitytointegratehumanitarianprinciplesintoitsoperations.Theadviceitprovidesmaybeframedwithinabroadertrainingrelationship.
Whenitcomestoimprovingdetentionconditions,forexample,thesupportingactorcouldprovidethesupportedpartywithaliaisonofficertohelpittoplandetentionoperationsandmanageplacesofdeten-tion.Andwithregardtominimizingcivilianharm,asupportingactormaybeinapositiontoworkwithitspartnertoestablishasystemfortrackingcivilianharm,whichwouldhelpthemidentifypatternsandimprovetheirtargetingprocedures.
Technicalpersonnelassignedtoadviseasupportedpartyshouldbequalifiedandexperiencedinthefieldinwhichtheyprovideadvice.TheyshouldbetrainedinIHL-complianttechniquesthatreducecivilianharmandabletoidentifyandmitigaterisksofIHLviolationsorcivilianharm.Furthermore,advisersshouldbefamiliarwithboththepartnerandthesituation(s)inwhichitoperatesinordertoprovidecontextuallyappropriateadvice.
Thisadvisorymeasureneednotbelimitedtomilitarypersonnel;insomecasestherequiredspecialistsupportcouldbeprovidedbycivilians.Forexample,acivilianharmtrackingsystemcanbenefitfromtheinputofcivilsociety,community-basedorganizations,non-governmentalorganizationsandthemedia.
B. ResourcesAsupportingactormaybewell-placedtocontributeresourcestohelpitspartnertofulfilitsobligations.Examplesincludetransferringessentialgoodsforaffectedpeople,transferringequipmentthatwillhelpthepartyperformitsfunctionsmoreeffectively,orbuildingorrenovatinginfrastructurethatservesahumanitarianpurpose.
Forexample,thesupportingactorcouldassistbyprovidingfood,hygieneservicesormedicalcarefordistributiontopeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,thewoundedandsick,orcivilians.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 109
Infrastructuresupportcouldconcernthesupplyofessentialservicestothecivilianpopulation,orensur-ingadequatestandardsaremetforthoseundertheauthorityofapartytoaconflict,inparticularthosedeprivedoftheirliberty.Thesupportingactorcouldprovidefinancialassistance,physicalresourcessuchasbuildingmaterialsandITsystems,orpersonnel.
C. Substituting functionsWherethesupportedpartyisunabletoperformitsfunctions,thesupportingactorshouldconsidersub-stitutingforthepartyinthosefunctions.Thismaybethecasewhen,forexample,thesupportedpartyisunabletoclearareascontaminatedbyERWorprovidehealthcaretociviliansandothersnotfighting.Thosefunctionscanthenbeprovidedbythesupportingpartyuntilasupportedactorcanfulfilthosefunctionstotherequiredlevel.
6.2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION Arangeofmeasurescanbetakenbyanactortoensurevisibilityoveritspartner’sactionsand,whereneces-sary,tocallthatpartnertoaccountforanyproblematicconductortotakecorrectivemeasuresaimedatimprovingconduct.Ordinarily,thesemeasureswillbuildonthemechanismseachactorhasdevelopedtoconductinternaloversightduringasupportrelationship(seeSection 6.2.5).
Decisionmakersshouldconsiderandaddresssixinterrelatedelements:A. monitoringandevaluationB. recordingC. oversightD. reportingproceduresE. investigationsF. accountability.
IntroductionAllactorsshouldregularlyassesstheconductoftheirpartnersinasupportrelationshipandtakemeasurestoreducetheriskstowhichciviliansandothersnotfightingmaybeexposed.
Anactorthatprovidessupporttoapartytoanarmedconflicthasalegal,moralorethicalresponsibilitytoconsiderhowthatsupportisusedandtodevelopmechanismstoholditspartnertoaccountforanyprob-lematicbehaviour.Thesupportingactorshouldalsotakethesupportedparty’sbehaviourintoaccountasitassessestheriskofcontinuingtosupportthatparty,anditshouldseektoidentifyanynecessarycorrectivemeasures.TopreventviolationsofIHLorothernormsfromrecurring,thesupportedpartymustbeheldaccountableforitsactionsandsanctionedappropriately.
Aresponsiblesupportrelationshipthereforerequireseffectivemechanismsthatensurethatthesupportingandsupportedactorseachhaveknowledgeofhowtheotherbehaveswithintheframeworkoftherelationshipandhowthesupportgivenorreceivedisbeingused.Attheoutset,aclearlydefinedagreementthatplacesapriorityonhowadherencetoIHLandtheprotectionofcivilianswillbemonitoredcansignaltheimportanceplacedonthisissueandhaveadeterrenteffect(seeSection 6.1.3).
Where thepartnerseachhaveeffective internalmechanisms, the focuswill beonachievingalignmentbetweentheirrespectivemeasures.Ifanyexistingmechanismsarenotexpectedtobeeffectiveinagivensituation,theactorcanhelpitspartnertostrengthenthem.
Themonitoringandevaluationmechanismsshouldalsobeintegratedintolearningprocesses.Thismeansincorporatinganyissuesidentifiedthroughthosemechanismsintoanalysesand,whereappropriate,makingsystemicadjustmentstopreventthoseissuesfromrecurring(seeSection 6.3.2).
110 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Key questions • Doyouhavevisibilityonyourpartner’soperations?
• Howdoyouevaluatethehumanitarianimpactofyourpartner’soperations?
• HowdoyoudeterminewhetherthesupportyouprovideisusedincompliancewithIHL?
• Whatmetricsdoyouusetoreviewandmodifythesupportrelationshipovertime?
• Whatsystemdoyouusetoaddresspotentialmisconductbythepartner,orotherproblemsin therelationship?
• IfIHLviolationsmayhaveoccurred,howwilltheybeeffectivelyinvestigated?
A. Monitoring and evaluationThecapacitytomonitortheconductofpartnersinasupportrelationshipisabaselinerequirement.Asinallprocessesandrelationshipsinvolvingdifferentactors,timelyandaccurateinformationcanhelptotrackwhetherasupportrelationshipisworkingefficientlyandcorrectlyandtoidentifyanyspecificrisks.MonitoringisparticularlyimportanttoascertainwhethersupportisbeingusedinaccordancewithIHLandotherrelevantinternationallawsandstandards.Itthereforefeedsintotheexerciseofoversight(ifany)andaccountabilitybetweenpartners.Itisalsocloselylinkedwiththerecordingofinformation,reportingproceduresandinvestigations,whererelevant.
One-off assessments are not enough to ensure a responsible support relationship. Ascircumstanceschangeovertime,itisimportanttomonitorthepartner’sconductinordertoidentifylinksbetweenthesupportprovidedandthatpartner’sbehaviour.
Effectivemonitoringdependsonavarietyoffactorsoutsideoftheactor’scontrol.Yetthatactor’sdeci-sionsalsohaveimplicationsforitscapacitytomonitor.Thisisespeciallytruewherethesupportingactor,optingforalight-footprintstrategy,hasdecidedtolimitthenumberofitspersonnelontheground,orduringarmstransferswheretheremaybenopersonnelfromthesupportingactorontheground.
However,theonusremainsoneachactortoensureithassufficient,reliableinformationuponwhichtobaseitsdecisionswithrespecttothesupportrelationship.Theurgencyofsecurityconcernsshouldnotbeseenasoverridingtheneedtoensureadequatemonitoring.
Toconducteffectivemonitoring,theactormustrelyondifferentsourcesofinformation.Triangulatedreportinghelpstoensurethatinformationisreliable.Monitoringprocessesshouldseektogatherinfor-mationprovidedbythewidestpossiblerangeofexternalmonitoringbodies,particularlythosethatareindependentand impartial.Communitiesaffectedbyanarmedconflict shouldbeprovidedwith themeansandmechanismstosafelyreportandshareallegationsthatcouldbearuponsuchevaluations(seeSection 6.2.4.D).Evenwhereanactordoesnothaveaphysicalpresence,therearedifferentwaystoensuresomelevelofmonitoringisavailable.
Potentialsourcesofinformationinclude:
• internalreportsfromcombined,jointandpartneredoperations(seeSection 6.2.4.B)
• reportsfrompersonnelembeddedwithpartnerarmedforces
• specialized,trainedmonitoringpositions
• aperiodicreportingmechanismbythepartneritself
• otheractorsthatarepresent,likeotherarmedforces
• otherministries,departmentsoragenciesofeitherthesupportedorsupportingactor
• independentorganizations
• civilsociety
• externaldata,suchassatelliteimagery,socialmediainformationorpublicreporting.
Insomecases,aphysicalpresencemaybetheonlywayforthesupportingactortobesatisfiedthatthesupportitprovidesisbeingusedincompliancewithIHL.Inothersituations,regularreportsmaysuffice.Thelevelofmonitoringwillofcoursedependonthetypeofsupportprovidedandtheassessmentofthe
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 111
riskassociatedwiththissupport.Inanycase,theabsenceofinformationshouldnotberegardedascon-firmingthatthesupportedparty’sbehaviourcomplieswithinternationallaw.
Wherefeasible,anactorcanimproveitsreactivitytoincidentsandfinditeasiertoidentifysystemicissuesifithasdedicatedmonitoringpersonnel.Forexample,inaPMO,thecapacitytorespondquicklytoincidentsofcivilianharmmayhelptoreducethenegativehumanitarianconsequences,respondtotheconcernsofthepartnerand/oraffectedcommunityand,whererelevant,takecorrectivemeasures.
Monitoringandevaluationneednotrequireasubstantialinvestmentoronerousreportingprocedures.61 Indeed,someactorsmayalreadyhaveamonitoringandevaluationframeworkinplaceforkeepingtrackofitsownactivities.Suchframeworksshouldbeadaptedtoensurethattheyincludepartnersandthatthescopeofinformationbeingcollectedincludesissuesrelatedtopossiblemisconductandviolationsofthelaw.Theinformationcollectedthroughmonitoringshouldbeevaluatedtodeterminewhetherthesupportrelationshipisworkingasenvisagedandwhatfactorsaffectitseffectiveness,andtoidentifyanyspecificrisksthathaveormayarise.
B. RecordingCollecting,documentingandretaininginformationrelatingtomilitaryoperationsservemultiplepur-poses:theyenablethepartnerstolearnthroughouttherelationship(seeSection 6.3.2);theinformationcanbeusefulforimprovingoperationaleffectiveness,tailoringtrainingprogrammes(seeSection 6.2.2)andreviewingriskassessments(seeSection 6.1.3);andtheinformationisessentialforanycriminaloradministrativeinvestigationsthatmightbelaunched(seeSection 6.2.4).
Examplesofmattersthatshouldberecordedincludecivilianharm(lossofcivilianlife,injurytociviliansand/ordamagetocivilianobjects)resultingfromoperations;munitionsthathavebeenused, lostorabandoned;andinformationonpeoplewhoarecapturedordetained.Theinformationmayberecordedinoneofseveralformats, includingpost-missiondebriefs,contactreportsandafter-actionreviews.Theinformationrecordedinacivilianharmtrackingmechanism,forexample,canfacilitateiterativeimprovementsinpractice,revealpotentialsystemicissues,supportcontextuallyrelevanttrainingandflagpossibleviolationsthatmayrequireinvestigation.
InPMOs,aprocedure forsharing informationrelated topossible incidentsshouldbeestablished inadvance–yetwithreasonableexpectations,giventhechallengeofverifyingthematerialsharedandclassifyingtheinformationrecorded.62Moregenerally,anactormaytakestepstorecordinformationrelating to itspartner’smilitaryoperationsaspartof itsmonitoringandevaluationprocedure (seeSection 6.2.4.A).
Alearningprocessshouldbeimplementedthroughouttherelationshiptoreviewperformanceandiden-tifylessonsthatcanbeappliedwithintherelationshipgoingforward.Dependingontheissuesraised,thefeedbackloopmaybemoreorlessimmediate.ContinuallearningisespeciallyimportantininstanceswherethereisariskthatviolationsofIHLorotherstandardsmayoccur(orcontinue).Thelearningprocesscanservetoensurethatcorrectivemeasuresaretakentopreventorputanendtotheviolations.Adynamic,on-the-flymethodto identify,captureandapplythoselessonswhiletherelationshipisongoingwillallowforanyimprovementstobeincorporatedintotherelationshipandforanyproblemstobeaddressedassoonaspossible.
61 UNHumanRightsDueDiligencePolicyGuidance(seenote16above).62 N.Lubell,J.PejicandC.Simmons,GuidelinesoninvestigatingviolationsofIHL:Law,policyandgoodpractice, ICRC and the GenevaAcademyofInternationalHumanitarianLawandHumanRights,Geneva,2019,p.15:https://www.icrc.org/en/document/guidelines-investigating-violations-ihl-law-policy-and-good-practice.
112 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Further reading
Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL: Law, policy and good practice, pp. 14–15 (N. Lubell, J. Pejic,
and C. Simmons)
See also: – Section 6.2.2IHLtraining – Section 6.3.2Learning
C. OversightEffectiveoversightisfundamentaltoensuringrespectforIHLandreducingtheriskofharm.Oversight,inthesenseofhavingthepowertoreviewandact,istypicallyamatterforanactortoimplementinternally(seeSection 6.2.5).Itisintheactor’sinteresttoensurethatitspartnerhasadequateinternaloversightand,ifnot,tohelpthemdevelopthenecessarymechanisms(seeSection 6.2.1).
Actorsinasupportrelationshipshouldhaveacertaindegreeofhigh-levelvisibilityintotheirpartner’sbehaviourinthecontextoftherelationshipandhaveatleastsomepowertointervene.Thisisnottosug-gestanysituationofhierarchyorcontrolbetweenactors.Itissimplyaquestionofexercisingoversightbymonitoringtheirpartner’sbehaviourandexercisingtheirpowertopositivelyinfluencethatbehaviourbyreviewing,suspendingordecreasingtheirsupportifnecessary.
Theissueofoversightatanoperationallevelbecomesrelevantinsupportrelationshipswhereoneoftheactorsdoesnothavetheframework,systemsorprocessestoconductitsowninternaloversight.ThisisparticularlyrelevantinPMOs,forexamplewhenitcomestonewlyestablishedforces.Bydefinition,theseforcesarelesswell-establishedthanexistingsecurityforces.Dependingonhowtheseforcesaregener-ated,newrecruitsmaybefreshlytrainedandseniorstaffmaylackcommandexperience.Leadershipandaccountabilitymechanismsmaynotyetberootedintheorganizationalculture.Thesefactorssuggestthesupportingactoritselfshouldexerciseoversight,atthesametimethatitbuildstheforce’scapacitytoaddresspressingsecurityconcerns.Inareaswherelong-termoversightcannotreasonablybeexpectedtobeexercisedbythesupportingactororanotheractor,suchforcesshouldnotbeestablishedorsupported.Suchoversightshouldcontinueuntiltheforcesaredemobilized,integratedintonationalsecurityforces,orotherwisemaderesponsivetothepoliticalandjudicialaccountabilitymechanismsestablishedbytherelevantauthorities(seeSection 6.3.1).
D. Reporting proceduresReportingproceduresprovidethelinkbetweenmonitoringandtheinvestigationofpossibleviolationsofIHL.
Firstly,actorsshouldconsiderwhethertheirpartnershaveanexistingprocedureforreportingpossibleviolationsofIHL.AnyonewithareportingobligationshouldbecapableofrecognizingbreachesofIHL(andofotherrelevant laws).Tothatend,personnel insupervisoryorcommandpositionsshouldbetrainedtorecognizebreachesofthesebodiesoflawandunderstandtheirresponsibilitytoreportsuchbreachestotherelevantauthorities.Itisalsocrucialthatthesepersonnelbeauthorizedtoactonthebasisofoutsideallegations.
Secondly,whenenteringasupportrelationship,actorsshouldseektoimplementuniformreportingpro-ceduresthatareagreedandunderstoodbyallpartiesconcernedandcommunicatedtoallrelevantper-sonnel.Theestablishmentofadatabaseforthispurposewouldhelptrackallegationsandensurethatrelevantinformationispreservedtoassistpotentialinvestigations(seenextsection).Itmaybeappro-priatetoimplementadualreportingsystem,wherebypossibleviolationsarereportedwithinthechainofcommandofeachactorintherelationship.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 113
Thirdly,actorsshouldcreateaccessibleandeffectiveprocessesforreceivingoutsideallegationsofanincidentthatmayrequireinvestigation.63Allegationscouldbemadebyindividualsdirectlyorindirectlyaffectedbymilitaryoperationsorotherpeopleorbodieswithaninterestinthematter.Proceduresandchannelsofcommunicationshouldbeestablishedtoensurecomplainants’safety,securityandprivacy.Actorsmayneedtoaddresschallengessuchaslinguistic,socialandculturalfactorsthatmighthinderindividualsfrommakinganallegation.Sharinggoodpracticeswouldbevaluableinthisregard.
E. InvestigationsThissectionaddressesinvestigationsbyanactorintoapartner’sconduct,andmechanismsforjointinvestigations.Theselectionofappropriatemeasureswillbeinformedbythestrengthofthepartner’sinternalinvestigationprocesses(seeSection 6.2.5.B).
Investigationrefers toactivitiesaimedatestablishing the facts surroundingan incident inorder toallowforasubsequentdeterminationofresponsibility forapossibleviolationof IHLorother law.64 Investigationsmaybeofacriminaloradministrativenature,dependingonthepossibleviolationsinquestion.Forexample,regularmonitoringmaydetectpotentialsystemicissueswhich,throughadmin-istrativeinvestigation,canbecorrectedtopreventpossibleIHLviolationsortheirrecurrence.
Decisionmakerswillneedtoconsiderwhethertheirpartner’sinvestigationprocessislikelytobeeffectiveinthecontextofabilateralormultilateralsupportrelationship.Forexample,asupportingactormayhavedifficultysecuringthecooperationofotheractorsorobtainingrelevantinformationfromthesupportedparty.Stepsmayneedtobetakentoremedypotentialweaknesses,suchasbycollectinginformationtotransmittopartnerauthorities,bytrainingpartnerforcesintheinvestigativeprocessandprovidingcapacity-buildingassistancetothisend,orbyestablishingasystemforjointinvestigations.Jointinves-tigationsmayalsobeappropriatewheretheyarerelatedtocombined,jointandpartneredoperations.Ineithercase,cooperationmaystrengthentheinvestigationandsupportthepartner’sabilitytoregulatetheforcesunderitscommand.
Othermeasuresfailing,anactorshouldbepreparedtoconductitsowninvestigationintopossibleviola-tionsofIHLorofotherrelevantlawscommittedbyitspartner’spersonnelandreferthemtotheauthor-itiesconcernedand/ortriggertheappropriateaccountabilitymechanisms.
Further reading
Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL: Law, policy and good practice (N. Lubell, J. Pejic, and C. Simmons)
F. AccountabilityEffectiveaccountabilityprocessesareessentialtoensuringcompliancewithIHLandotherinternationalstandards.Inasupportrelationship,accountabilityhastwofacets:accountabilitybetweenactorsintherelationshipasafeatureofcoherentresponsibility(discussedbelow),andeachactor’sinternalaccount-ability(seeSection 6.2.5).
Accountabilityprocessescanbemilitaryorcivilian,administrativeorcriminal.Thenotionofaccount-abilityusedhereisnotnecessarilylimitedtolegalprocesses;someissuesinthesupportrelationshipcanbeaddressedinformallyorthroughdiplomaticchannels.Forexample,therapportbetweencommandersoftwoforcesmayallowthemtoshareconcernsabouttheother’spersonnel.Inmoreseriousorsystemiccases,suspendingorterminatingsupportmaybeawayforasupportingactortomakethesupportedpartyaccountableforitspastuseofthatsupport.Eachactorshouldhaveaclearunderstandingoftheappropriateavenuesforaccountabilitydependingontheissueatstake,includingwhereformalaccount-abilitymechanismsarerequiredbyinternationalordomesticlaw.
63 See GuidelinesoninvestigatingviolationsofIHL,p.20(seenote62above).64 Foramorecompleteunderstanding,seeGuidelinesoninvestigatingviolationsofIHL(seenote62above).
114 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Thecentralquestioniswhetherapartnerhasinplaceeffectivemechanismstoensureaccountabilityforitsownactionsandthosetakenonitsbehalf.65Wherethiscannotbeaffirmed,theotheractor(s)inthesupportrelationshipshouldtakestepstoimprovethosemechanismsand,inthemeantime,takeotherpracticalmeasurestofilltheaccountabilitygap.
Allsupportrelationshipsshouldalsohavewell-developedandunderstoodproceduresforeitherpartnertobeinformedof,raiseand,ultimately,resolveanyproblemsrelatingtoeitherpartner.Partnersinasupportrelationshipmayalsoneedasystemforreconcilingtheirrespectivemechanismssothatanygapsarefilledwhileduplicationisavoided.
Inasupportrelationship,theactorsshouldindividuallyorcollectivelyensurethatanaccountabilitymechanismisinplace.Accountabilityprocessesshouldbecapableofdeterminingtheresponsibilityofbothallegedperpetratorsandcommanders;theyshouldalsoleadtoallegationsbeingreported,effect-ivelyinvestigatedandaddressed.
Measurestoensuretheirpartners’accountabilityaremostcrucialwhenactorsareengagedinPMOs.Yettheissueisnolessrelevantwhensupportingactorsarenotpresentonthegroundalongsidethepartner.Insituationswhereacoalitionofactorsprovidessupport,theactorsshouldcoordinatewitheachothertobuildappropriatemechanismsandprocessesthatcanaddressindividualandcollectivebehaviour.
Accountabilitymechanismsshouldbefactoredintotherelationshipfromtheoutsetbybothsupportingandsupportedactors,regardlessofthetypeofsupportprovided.
Accountabilityissuchakeyelementinresponsiblesupportrelationshipsthatthenecessaryprocessesandmechanismsshouldbeincorporatedintothemduringthepreparationphasewhereverpossible(seeSection 6.1).Standingalliancesandcoalitionscandevelopsuchcomplementaryprocessesinpeacetimeasamatterofpreparedness.
6.2.5 INTERNAL OVERSIGHTInternaloversightreferstothegroupofmeasuresestablishedtoensurethatanactor’sownarmedforcesandothergovernmentalbodiesoperatewithinthe lawandareaccountabletotheirowngovernmentorconstituents.
Twoelementsaredescribedbelowforconsideration:A. internaloversightB. investigations.
Introduction Actorsthatengageinarmedconflictoftenhavesystemsinplacetoensurethatdecisionstogotowarandtheconductoftheirforcesinwarhaveasoundlegalbasis.Tothisend,mechanismsareestablishedsothatarmedforcesandothergovernmentalbodiesoperatewithintheirlegalpowers,thattheconductofindivid-ualpersonnelcanbereviewedand,wherenecessary,thatsanctionsareimposedforviolationsofapplicabledomesticandinternationallaw.
Alltoofrequently,however,actorsstructurallyorpoliticallydistancethemselvesfromtheconflictsituationinwhichtheyprovidesupport.Forexample,someprogrammesoractivitiesmaybeexcludedfromstandardoversightframeworksbecausetheyrelatetonationalsecurity.Furthermore,dependingonthetypeofsup-portprovided,supportingactorsmaynotapplydomesticframeworkstocertainprogrammesoractivitieswiththesamedegreeofscrutinyastheywouldiftheseactorswerethemselvespartytothearmedconflict.Evenwhilesupportrelationshipsmayberegardedasameansofminimizinganactor’scostsortheriskoftakingdirectaction,theycouldbeusedtooperatewithimpunityifappropriatemeasuresarenottaken.
65 TheinternalaccountabilityofanactortowardsitsowngovernmentandconstituentsisaddressedinSection 6.2.5 of this document.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 115
Inviewofthepotentialhumanitarianconsequencesofprovidingsupporttopartiestoarmedconflict,itisimportantforsupportingactorstoestablishsystemsofoversightandaccountabilitythatallowthemtoreviewand,wherenecessary,correctthesupporttheyprovide.
Wherethescopeofthesupportprovidediswideorvariesovertime,thereisariskthatnosingleagencyorbodyhasgeneraloversightofthesupportrelationship.Thishamperseffectivecoordination,createstensionbetweendifferentbodiesandcontributestotheinternallackofaccountabilityandthediffusionofrespon-sibility(seeSection 2.2).
Incoalitions,alackofoversightoraccountabilitycanoccurwhereverrolesandresponsibilitiesareunclear.Thisisparticularlyprevalentwhereactorspoolresourcesinlooseallianceswithnoformalcoordinationandaccountabilitymechanisms.
Key questions • DoyouhaveaprocedureforeffectivelyinvestigatingallpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourarmedforcesorpersonnel,includinginthecontextofasupportrelationship?
• Whatisyourprocessforreviewingyourowndecisionstoprovideorreceivesupport?
• Dootherpartsofthegovernmenthavethepowertocheckthatthesupportrelationshipisplannedandimplementedinaccordancewithinternationalanddomesticlaw?
A. Internal oversight Variousmechanismscanbeusedtoreviewanactor’sdecisionsandconductinasupportrelationship.Dependingontheactor’sgovernancestructure,governmentofficials,electedrepresentativesandcon-stituenciesmaybeabletoscrutinizethegovernment’sorauthority’sdecisions.
Oversightmechanismsmaycoverthedecisiontoprovideorreceivesupport,theselectionofthetypeofsupportprovidedandtheconductofpersonnelwhileprovidingsupport.Inadditiontoensuringthatsup-portisprovidedinaccordancewithrelevantlawsandpolicies,suchmechanismsprovideanopportunitytolearnfromthosesupportrelationshipsandbuildonanyidentifiedweaknessesorstrengths.
Havinganeffective internalreviewmechanismisparticularly importantwhen itcomestoactorsoroperationsthatareintentionallyexcludedfromnormalreportingproceduresforsecurityreasons,suchasmissionsconductedbyspecialforcesorintelligenceservices.Whateverthereasonsfornotdisclosingthesetypesofoperations,exemptingthemfromnormaloversightmechanismsrisksdiminishingtheaccountabilityoftheirpersonnel.Reviewmechanismscanbeputinplacethatprotectthosesecurityimperativeswhilestillensuringaccountability.
Parliament Insofarastheyareinvolvedincreatingoramendinglaws,parliamentariansplayanimportantroleingrantingandcontrollingtheauthorityoftheexecutive.Dependingontheparliamentarysystem,parlia-mentscantakeorshapedecisionstoprovideorreceivesupportandmanagetheapplicationofnationalresourcestothisend.Underdomesticlaworcustoms,parliamentariansmaybeabletoaskthegovern-mentquestionsrelatingtotheexerciseofitspowers,ortoestablishcommissionsofinquiryintoagivenmatter.Inexercisingtheirfunctions,parliamentarianscanhaveaccesstoinformationprovidedbythegovernmentorexternalsources,suchasreportsbyindependentobservers.
Parliamentariansrequiretransparencyfromthegovernmentinordertoobtainthenecessaryinformationwithwhichtotakeorshapedecisionsaffectingthesupportrelationship,includingtoamendtherela-tionshipwherenecessary.Wherethetopicsbeingdiscussedareregardedassensitivefornationalsecurityreasons,specialmeasurescouldbeadoptedtoensurethattheinformationissharedonlywiththosewhorequireittoexercisetheirfunctions.
116 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Judicial authorities Amongsttheentitiesabletoprovideoversightaredomestic judicialauthorities.Theymayprovideaforumforchallengingthedecisionsorconductoftheotherbranchesofgovernment.StatescantakestepstoensurethatthenationalcourtshavejurisdictionoverquestionsofcompliancewithIHLandotherinternationallaws.Forexample,domesticlawmaygivecourtstheauthoritytoreviewthelegalityofarmstransferdecisions.Judicialauthoritiesarealsoanimportantmeansofensuringaccountabilityforanycrimes.Thisincludesthetaskofprosecutingwarcrimesallegedlycommittedbytheirnationalforcesorontheirterritory.
Further reading
International Humanitarian Law: Handbook for Parliamentarians (ICRC and Inter-Parliamentary union)
B. Investigations AllsupportingandsupportedactorsshouldhavesystemsinplacetoensurethateffectiveinvestigationsareconductedintopossibleviolationsofIHLundertheirjurisdiction.Investigationsmayberequiredunderinternationalordomesticlaw,suchasincasesofallegedwarcrimes.Theymayalsoserveotherpurposes,suchastoidentifygoodpracticesandlessons,improveoperationaleffectiveness,maintaindiscipline,demonstrateaccountabilitytoaffectedcommunitiesandfacilitateatransitiontopeace.
ManyStateshavenationallegalframeworksandprocessestoinvestigatepossibleviolationsofIHLbypeopleundertheirjurisdiction,includingtheirownarmedforces.However,investigativepracticesvarywidely.
Decisionmakerswillneedtoconsiderwhethertheirinvestigativeprocessesarelikelytobeeffectiveinthecontextofabilateralormultilateralsupportrelationship.Foraninvestigationtobeeffective,itshouldbecapable ofenablingadeterminationofwhethertherewasaviolationofIHL,identifytheindividualandsystemicfactorsthatcausedorcontributedtoanincident,andlaythegroundforanyremedialactionthatmayberequired.Actorsmaysetupadhocframeworks,systemsandprocessesforthesupportrela-tionship,forexampleinmultinationalcoalitionsorpeaceforces.Inaddition,thesupportagreementmayrequirethepartnersandthehostStatetoshareinformationandcooperatewitheachother.
Further reading
Guidelines on investigating violations of IHL: Law, policy and good practice (N. Lubell, J. Pejic, and
C. Simmons)
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 117
6.3 TRANSITION
STRUCTUREDDISENGAGEMENT
LEARNING
PROTECTIONOF CIVILIANSAND OTHERSNOT FIGHTING
TRANSITION
6.3.1 STRUCTURED DISENGAGEMENTStructureddisengagementreferstomeasurestoensurethattheactorsproperlyplantheendorthereductionofsupportinordertominimizethedisruptiontotheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.
IntroductionItistobeexpectedthatasupportrelationshipwillevolveovertime.Thescaleornatureofsupportmayvaryinresponsetotherecipient’sinvolvementinanarmedconflict,therecipient’sbehaviour,shiftsineitherpartner’sobjectives,orotherenvironmentalfactors.Whateverthereason,itisinevitablethatatransitionwilloccuratsomepoint,whethertherelationshipcomestoanend(withdrawalorhandover)orthesupportbeingprovidedissignificantlyreduced.
Itisimportanttohaveacomprehensiveexitortransitionstrategyinplaceasearlyaspossible,oncethemainparametersofthesupportrelationshiphavebeendefinedandbeforethesupporthasbeenimplemented.Forexample,aprovisionalstrategyshouldbeestablishedbeforePMOsbegin.Becausesomemeasureswillneedtobetakeninadvanceofthedisengagement,waitinguntilshortlybeforedisengagementtocomeupwithaplanincreasestherisksforthelocalcommunity.IntheICRC’sview,actorsshouldplantheirstructureddisengagementfromtherelationship,takingintoaccountscenariosinwhichtheirstrategicobjectiveshavebeenmetorhavenotbeenmet.Actorsshouldalsobeawarethatdisengagementmaynottakeplaceuntilanarmedconflictends.Insomecases,thetransitionstrategywillbepartofalargerintegratedrecoverystrategyencompassing,forexample,economicdevelopment,securitysectorreform,thereturnofrefugeesandIDPs,andjusticeandreconciliation.Thedisengagementstrategywillneedtobereviewedastherelationshipandthenatureandextentofsupportevolve.Thiswillminimizethenumberofchangesrequiredintherun-upto disengagement.
Inadditiontoaddressingtheneedsofthepeopleaffectedbyconflict,thestrategyshouldreflectanassess-mentoftherisksofharmstemmingfromthetransitionitself.Forexample,actorsshouldconsiderhowtheywillmanageanyhandoverandtheimpactofthefutureabsenceofsupport.Thestrategyshouldanticipatethevestedinterestsoflocalactors,anditmayneedtoaddresstheDDRofthesupportedparty’spersonnelaswellasthatparty’scapacityinthePSSMoftransferredweaponsandrelatedammunition.
Theplanshouldalsotakeintoaccountthebroaderhumanitarianconsequencesofthearmedconflictandthesituationasitstandsatthetimeofdisengagement.Theseconsequenceswillbefeltforyearsifnotdecadesaftertheconflicthasended.Thedisengagementstrategyshouldthereforeidentifywaysofminimizingthelong-termimpactoftheactors’activitiesonaffectedpeople.Manyofthesemeasuresmaythemselvesneedtobeimplementedoverthemediumtolongterm.Failingtoproperlymanagetheseconsequencesmayresultincontinuedinstabilityandviolenceoreventherecurrenceofarmedconflict.
118 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Practicalmeasuresmaybetakeninthefollowingareas:A. systemsustainabilityB. ongoingprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingC. responsibleresourcedisengagementD. managingtheaftermath.
Key questions • DoesthesupportedpartydependonthesupporttocomplywithIHL,andwhatcanyoudotoensureitremainscompliantonceyoursupportends?
• Whatotherfunctionsthatthesupportingactorfulfilstopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflictwillneedtobeassumedbythesupportedpartyoranotheractorwhenthesupportends?
• Howwillthesupportedparty’sintentiontocomplywithIHLandotherrelevantstandardsbeaffectedifthesupportrelationshipchangesorends?
• Haveyouagreedonresponsibleresourcedisengagementmeasures(suchasDDRprogrammesorarmsmanagementprogrammes)toputintoplace?
• Howwillyouassessandmitigatetheriskofharmtomembersofyourpartner’sarmedforcesandtheirfamiliesorcommunitiesoncethesupportorconflictends?
A. System sustainability Acomprehensiveexitstrategyshouldincludemeasurestoensurethesupportedparty’sinstitutionsandoperationsaremaintained,transferredorendedfollowingdisengagement.Functionsofparticularcon-cernarethoseaffectingpeoplenotornolongerparticipatinginhostilities.Theyincludeessentialser-vicessuchashealthcare,detentionandjusticesystems,processestofindmissingpersonsandfacilitatedurablesolutionsforIDPs,weaponsandammunitionmanagementandmarkingandclearingERW,andproceduresaimedatmitigatingcivilianharm(seeSections 3 and 4).
Wherefunctionsaretransferredfromthesupportedpartytoanotheractor,thesupportingactorshouldensurethatmeasuressetuptoprotectciviliansandothersnotfightingremaininplace.Ifthesupportedpartyintendstocontinueitsoperations,thefocusshouldbeonensuringthattheycanbemaintainedinfullrespectofIHLandapplicablehumanrightsstandards.Thismayrequiretailoredmeasuressothatthepartycantakeoveranyfunctionsbeingprovidedbythesupportingactor.Thesupportingactor’sfunc-tionsshouldbegraduallytaperedasthesupportedpartytakesthemover.
Supportingactorspreparingtodisengageinanticipationoftheendofaconflictshouldconsidershiftingtheirtrainingobjectives.Inparticular,thesupportedparty’sweaponsbearersmayrequireincreasedtraininginrulesandbestpracticesapplicableinpeacetime,includinginrelationtouse-of-forceproced-uresandweaponsmanagement.Ifarmedforcesarecalledupontoengageinlawenforcementoperations,specializedtrainingandequipmentisneeded.
Incaseswhereasupportingactorintendstoceaseitsfunctionsortransferthemtoanauthorityotherthanthesupportedparty,suchaspursuanttoapeaceprocess,itsexitstrategyshouldincluderesponsibleresourcedisengagementfromthesupportedparty(seeSection 6.3.1.C).
Ifthesupportedpartyprevailsinaconflict,thesupportitreceiveswillalmostcertainlyneedtobeshiftedawayfromthesecuritysectorandfocusedonbroaderstabilizationneeds,includingdevelopment.Suchatransitionbeforethispoint,orintheabsenceofstrategicsuccess,maybemorechallenging;insuchcasesitmaymakesensetotransitionthesupporttoanotherresponsibleactor.Itisbeyondthescopeofthisdocumenttofullyexplorethequestionoftransition,thepracticalimplicationsofwhichwillneverthelessaffectallgovernmentdepartmentsandagencies.Awhole-of-governmentapproachwillbeessentialtominimizedisruptionandthreatstociviliansandothers.
See also: – Section 3.3.4Lawenforcementoperations
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 119
Train the trainersItmayberelevanttodevelopthecapacityofpartnerforcestoconducttheirownIHLtrainingtoensuresustainabilitybeyondtheendoftherelationship.Whiletrain-the-trainerprogrammesareoftenlong-terminitiativesexecutedthroughoutthesupportrelationship,theyareespeciallyrelevantaspartofacomprehensiveexitstrategy.Insuchcases,theymusttakeaccountofthepartnerforces’currentandfuturefunctions,whileatthesametimedistinguishingbetweenlegalparadigmsapplicableduringtimesofconflictandtimesofpeace.
B. Ongoing protection of civilians and others not fighting Actorsinasupportrelationshipmustnotoverlooktheimpactthatatransitionwillhaveonciviliansandothersnotfighting.Evenifthetransitionoccursattheendofaconflict,bothsupportedpartiesandsupportingactorsmayhavecontinuinglegalobligationsorotherresponsibilitiestowards,forexample,personsdeprivedoftheirliberty,thedeadandthemissing.
See also: – Section 4Theprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting
Continued protection of detaineesSpecialconsiderationshouldbegiventotheobligationsthatpartiestoanarmedconflict,andsometimessupportingactors,havetowardspeopledeprivedoftheirliberty.
Ifittransfersdetaineestothesupportedparty,thesupportingactorhasacontinuingresponsibilitytoensurethosedetainees’well-being.Thisdutymaybeimplementedthroughpost-transfermonitoring,forexample(seeSection 6.2.4).
Wherethesupportingactorwithdrawsfinancialandmaterialassistancethatthesupportedpartyrequirestoprovidedignifiedconditionsofdetention,mitigatingmeasuresmustbeimplementedtoensurethatpersonsdeprivedoftheirlibertycontinuetobeprotected.
Actorsshouldalsoconsiderthecapacityofthelocaljusticesector.Ifasupportingactorintendstotrans-fercustodyofalargenumberofdetaineestothesupportedparty,itmustconsiderwhetherthatpartyhastheresourcesandproceduresinplacetodetain,investigateand,whereappropriate,prosecutethosepeopleinaccordingwithinternationalstandards.Supportingactorsmayalsoplayaroleinimplementingconflict-relatedamnesties.
Further reading
Amnesties and International Humanitarian Law: Purpose and Scope – Factsheet (ICRC)
See also: – Section 6.3.1.DManagingtheaftermath
Mechanisms to clarify the fate and whereabouts of missing personsWithoutinfringingupontherightsofthepeopleconcerned,actorscouldshareinformationwiththeirpartnersthatwillhelptopreventpeoplefromgoingmissingandclarifythefateandwhereaboutsofthosealreadymissing,insupportofthefamilies’righttoknow.Thisprocessmayincludeestablishingmech-anismstocentralizeinformationonpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,hospitalized,deceasedorreportedmissing.Suchmechanismsshouldensurethatfamiliescanreportandreceiveinformationonthefateandwhereaboutsoftheirlovedonesinasafeandnon-discriminatorymanner.
Anytransitionaljusticeprocessesshouldincorporatemechanismstoclarifythefateandwhereaboutsofmissingpersons,althoughtheyarealsorelevantintheabsenceofsuchaprocess.
120 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
See also: – Section 4.4Missingpersons
C. Responsible resource disengagement Animportantfactorfordecisionmakerstoconsideristheneedtoensurethatmaterialassetsandperson-nelthatithasinjectedintoasupportrelationshiparemanagedresponsibly.Aspartofthetransition,itmaybenecessarytoputinplacemeasurestoensuretheseresourcesarealsodisengaged,forexamplethroughtheremovalofarmsstockpilesortheestablishmentofaDDRprogramme.
Disarmament, demobilization and reintegration DDRprogrammesareanimportantpartofmanagingthetransitionfromarmedconflicttopeace.Doneproperly–incompliancewithapplicableIHLandhumanrightsstandards–DDRprogrammescanhelppreventfurthersocialupheaval.DDRisespeciallyimportantafterNIACs,whereformerlyopposingforcesfindthemselveslivingalongsideoneanotherinsocietyaftertheconflicthasended.
ThepartnersshouldconsideroutliningplansfortheeventualDDRofmembersofthearmedforcestheysupport(seeSection 6.1.3).Therelevanceofsuchmeasuresmaydependonthenatureofthesupportedparty(seeSection 3.2)andtheoutcomeoftheconflict.
DetailedplansforDDRshouldbedrawnupandthecorrespondingfundsallocatedasearlyaspossible.Itisimportanttoensurethatspecialattentionisgiveninatimelymannertoidentifyingandhandlingchildren–bothgirlsandboys–whoareassociatedwitharmedforcesorNSAGs,throughappropriateprocesses.66However,theICRCcannotrecommendoneparticularDDRstrategytominimizethelong-termimpactontheaffectedpeople.
WheretheterritorialStatewillberesponsibleforDDR,supportingactorsshoulddetermineassoonaspossiblewhichbodieswillimplementitandallocateresourcestothosebodiessothattheycanbuildandsustaintheircapacitytofulfilthisrole.WheresupportisprovidedtoanNSAG,theneedsofthesupportedgroupmaybedifficulttopredictanddependontheoutcomeoftheconflictortherelationship.
Legal reminder
States party to the Optional Protocol on Children in Armed Conflict (the majority of States) must
take all feasible measures to demobilize or otherwise release from service persons under 18. When
necessary, they must also accord all appropriate assistance for their physical and psychological
recovery and their social reintegration.67 States Parties must cooperate in the implementation of
this protection for children, including in the prevention of any activity contrary thereto and in
the rehabilitation and social reintegration of persons who are victims of acts contrary thereto,
including through technical cooperation and financial assistance (Article 7). The release of all
children unlawfully recruited or used by armed forces or groups must be sought unconditionally
at all times, including during armed conflict. Actions to secure disarmament, demobilization and
reintegration of children should not be dependent on a cease-fire or peace agreement or on any
release or demobilization process for adults. Coordination with local actors as well as international
humanitarian actors such as uNICEF should be facilitated to implement DDR.
All children (meaning persons under the age of 18) who have been associated with armed forces or
armed groups are entitled to care and special protection (ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 135).
66 Achildisdefinedasanyonebelow18yearsold;seeConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Art.1.67 OptionalProtocoltotheConventionontheRightsoftheChild,Art.6(3).
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 121
Further reading
The vancouver Principles on Peacekeeping and the Prevention of the Recruitment and use of Child
Soldiers
The Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups
Implementation Guidance for the vancouver Principles
Children associated with armed forces or armed groups (ICRC)
Guiding principles for the domestic implementation of a comprehensive system of protection for children
associated with armed forces or armed groups, pp. 395-396 (ICRC)
Legal Protection of Children in Armed Conflict – Factsheet (ICRC)
uN Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Resource Centre (uN)
See also: – Section 6.2.1.CPersonnel
Weapons and ammunition management Supportingforceswilloftendeploywithandaccumulatestockpilesofammunitions,weaponsandotherlethalequipmentoverthecourseoftheirsupportrelationship.Transitioningoutofasupportrelation-ship,howeverhastily,doesnotnegateasupportingforce’sresponsibilityforweaponsandammunitionthat,ifnotsafelyandsecurelystored,mayjeopardizecivilianprotection.Topreventweaponsandammu-nitionfrombeingdivertedormisused,andtoavoidaccidentalexplosions,supportingforcescandestroyorpermanentlydisabletheseitems,takethemoutofthecountryorterritorywhentheywithdraw,ortransfercustodyofthemtoaresponsiblepartner.
See also: – Section 3.3.1Weaponsandammunitionmanagement – Section 3.4.2Armstransfers – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar
D. Managing the aftermathActorsinsupportrelationshipsshouldconsidermeasurestoaddresstheimpactofmilitaryoperationsandassociatedactivitiesonaffectedpeople(seeSection 4).Partiestoconflictsandotheractorsmayhavelegalobligationstotakestepssuchascollectingandcaringforthewoundedandsick.Othermeasuresmaybeimplementedasamatterofpolicy.
Takingstepsintheimmediateaftermathofoperations,totheextentfeasible,canhelptolimittheirlong-termandcumulativeimpact.Therefore,measurestomanagetheaftermathofaconflictshouldbeconsideredwhileplanningandimplementingtherelationshipratherthanwaitingforthetransitionortheendoftheconflict.Ofcourse,certainmeasuresmayonlybepossibleoncetheconflicthasendedormayneedtobeimplementedoveralongerperiod.Theyremainrelevantregardlessofwhethertheactorshaveachievedtheirobjectivesinthesupportrelationship.
Reconstruction efforts Totheextentpossible,actorsshouldconsidercontributingtoorotherwisefacilitatingthereconstructionofanycriticalcivilianinfrastructurethatmayhavebeendamagedasaresultofthearmedconflictandre-establishinganyessentialservices.
Measuresmayincluderebuildingorrenovatingdamagedfacilitiesorrenewingthesupplyofgoodssuchasmedicalequipment,withdueconsiderationforcivil-militarycoordinationprinciplesandgoodprac-tice.Reconstructionandrepairsshouldtakeplaceassoonaspossibleinordertomitigatethecumulative
122 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
impactonessentialserviceinfrastructureandreducetheriskofalong-termorirreversibledeclineinservice.68Thisisimportantnotonlyforhumanitarianreasons,butalsotopreventmajordevelopmentreversalsandtoreducethelikelihoodofprotracteddisplacement.Careshouldbetakentoensurethatanysuchmeasuresareimplementedequitably,toavoidinflaminganyongoingsocialdivides.
Intheirefforttoincludewomeninpost-conflictreconstructionefforts,Statesmayalsoconsulttheguid-anceandstandardssetoutintheUNSecurityCouncil’shostofWomen,PeaceandSecurityresolutionsandrelatedframeworks.
See also: – Section 4.6Essentialservices
Durable solutions for internally displaced personsThelackofaccesstoessentialservices,especiallyinurbanenvironments,isakeyfactordrivingdis-placementandcanalsoaffectthesearchfordurablesolutionstothisproblem.ReconstructioneffortsmaymakeiteasierforIDPstoreturn,iftheysowish,andhelptoreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofprotracteddisplacement.Itisimportanttorecognizethatnoteveryonedisplacedbyhostilitieswillwantorbeabletogoback.Insuchcases,actorsshouldconsiderhelpingtheirpartnerstofacilitateotherdurablesolutions,namelylocalintegrationandresettlementinotherpartsofthecountry,whileensuringthattheIDPs’optionsarevoluntary,safe,anddignified.
See also: – Section 4.3Internallydisplacedpersons
Clearance of mines and explosive remnants of warAnotherimportantfacetofhelpingpeopletoreturntoordinarylifeistheremovalofERW.Contaminationbyunexplodedordnance,laidmines,abandonedammunition,improvisedexplosivedevicesandweaponscanallposedirectandindirectriskstociviliansandhamperreconstructionandrecovery,withlong-termconsequencesfordevelopment.
Eachactorshouldmarkand,iftheyhavethecapacity,disposeofanyERWdiscovered.Amechanismtocoordinatecontaminationsurveysandhumanitarianclearanceeffortsshouldbeestablishedassoonaspossibleonceactivehostilitiesend.OthermeasurestosupporttheclearanceofminesandERW,mitigatetheriskstociviliansandprovideassistancetoaffectedStatesmayberequiredasamatteroflaworpolicy.
See also: – Section 4.8Landminesandexplosiveremnantsofwar
Key legal rules
Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, 1997
Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War, 2003 (Protocol v to the 1980 CCW Convention)
Convention on Cluster Munitions, 2008
68 See ICRC, UrbanServicesduringProtractedArmedConflict:ACallforaBetterApproachAssistingAffectedPeople, ICRC, Geneva,2015:https://shop.icrc.org/urban-services-during-protracted-armed-conflict-pdf-en.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 123
6.3.2 LEARNINGA lesson learnedisknowledgeorunderstandinggainedbyexperienceandobservation.Theexperiencemaybepositive,asinasuccessfultestormission,ornegative,asinamishaporfailure.
A“lessonsidentifiedandlearned”(learning)processisonethatcrossesfunctionalboundariesandallowsorganizationstolearnfromboththeirmistakesandsuccesses.Theprocessshouldpreventtheactorsfromrepeatingmistakesandencouragethemtobuildonsuccesses.
Alessonmustbe: • significant,inthatithasarealorassumedimpactonoperations • valid,inthatitisfactuallyandtechnicallycorrect • applicable,inthatitidentifiesaspecificdesign,processordecisionthatreducesoreliminatesthepotentialforfailuresandmishaps,oritreinforcesapositiveresult.
IntroductionLearningprocessesshouldspecificallyaddresstheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting,asthiswillbeakeymeasurementofmissionsuccess.
Iftheydonot learnlessonsfrompastexperience,allactorsare liabletorepeatthesamemistakes.TheobjectiveoflearningprocessesistoimprovecompliancewithIHLandtobetterprotectciviliansbystoppingsomething,doingsomethingdifferentlyordoingsomethingnew.Inthatsense,thelessonisnotlearneduntilithasbeenidentifiedandincorporatedintosubsequentpractices.
Learningisanongoingandcyclicalprocessthattakesplaceateverystageofthesupportrelationship: • atthepreparationstage,whenpastlessonslearnedareincorporatedintotheframework,systemsandprocesses
• duringtherelationship,whenasystemforrecordingissuesthatgowrongisimplemented • aftertheconflictorrelationshipends,whenlessonsareidentified,incorporatedintofuturepracticeandsharedwithothers.
Monitoringandevaluationmechanismsshouldalsobeintegratedintolearningprocesses.Asaresult,prob-lemsidentifiedthroughthosemechanismscanbeincorporatedintolessons-learnedanalysesand,whereappropriate,preventedfromrecurringthroughsystemicadjustments.
SUPPORTACTIVITY
ANALYSELESSONS
IDENTIFIED
IDENTIFYLESSONS THROUGH
A SYSTEMATICPROCESS
UPDATE ANDADJUST PROCEDURES,OTHER INSTITUTIONAL
MEMORY, AND EDUCATION AND
TRAINING
VALIDATELESSONS THROUGH
JOINT EFFORTBY PARTNERS
QUICKREACTIONIF NEEDED
MONITORACTIVITIES AND
IDENTIFY MISTAKES AND SUCCESSES
TRANSFORM LESSONS
IDENTIFIEDINTO LESSONS
LEARNED CHANGE BEHAVIOUR
124 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Key questions • Doyouhaveaprocessforcapturingandmanagingobservationsandlessonslearnedthroughoutthesupportrelationship?
• DoesthelearningprocessallowyoutoidentifyissuesrelatingtoIHLandtheprotectionofthosenotfighting?
• Doyouhaveaprocessforfindingrootcausesanddevelopingremedialactions?
• Howdoyoumakesurethelessonsidentifiedorlearnedarecorrectlyimplemented?
• Doesyourlearningprocessallowyoutoidentify,captureandincorporatelessonsinordertoimprove anongoingsupportrelationship?
• Howwillyouincorporateyourpartner’sfeedbackinthelearningprocess?
• Doyoushareyourlessonswithotherpartnersorallies,orotherparties,inordertoimprove support-relationshippractices?
A. Systematic learning to enhance the protection of affected peopleActorsinsupportrelationshipsshouldestablishanongoingorperiodicreportingsystemthatallowsthemtocontinuallyidentifypotentialissues.Thesystemwillrevealpatternsofissuesthathavenotbeendealtwithonamoreimmediatebasis,andthesepatternswillformthebasisofalessons-learnedprocess.Thesystemwilltypicallycaptureissuesonmultiplelevels.
Culturaldifferencesbetweenthesupportingandsupportedactorsmayalsogeneratecontext-specificlessons(forexamplewithrespecttoculture),andrevealmoregenericnon-contextualpractices.
Adistinctionshouldbemadebetweenrecordinginformationforlearning-relatedpurposesandforinves-tigatingpossibleviolations.Alearning-orientedsystemcanrecordissuesonatechnicallevelwithoutidentifyinglegalliability.IssuesrelatingtopossibleviolationsofIHLorotherlawsshouldalsotriggeraninvestigativeprocessand,whereappropriate,disciplinaryorpenalsanctions(seeSections 6.2.4 and 6.2.5).However,theinvestigationofpossibleviolationsmayalsoproducelessonslearnedthatcanpre-ventfutureviolations.
Reviewprocessesoftenconsideroutputs,ratherthangeneraloutcomes,andignoretheimpactofsupportrelationshipsonthevictimsofarmedconflict.Learningshouldfocusonvictimsofarmedconflictandconsidercivilianprotectionasayardstickforevaluatingthesuccessofamissionanddrawinglessons.
B. Learning together Alltoooften, lessons-learnedexercisesareconductedindependently,usuallywithoneactormakingassumptionsabouttheotheractor’sperspectiveorneeds.Wherepossible,thelessons-learnedprocessshouldinvolvethesupportedandsupportingactorscombiningtheirexperiencesandprovidingjointlessons,inpursuitofafullerunderstandingoftheissue.Theprocessmayneedtobetailoredtotherelationshiptoaccommodateeachpartner’scultureandlearningtradition.Anygoodpracticesidentifiedshouldbesharedwithalliesandpartners.
Tobetter incorporate lessonsrelatedto thehumanitarianconsequencesof thesupportrelationship,learningprocessesshouldbeopentociviliansandcommunitieswheneverpossible.Seekingdirectfeed-backonhowinstitutionalcapacitysupportoraTAAAmissionaffectslocalcommunitiesisacrucialcom-ponentofresponsiblesupportrelationshipsandthelong-termsuccessoftheseprogrammes.
Supportrelationships,evenifpurelymilitary,willhaveimplicationsacrosstheentiregovernment.Theirinfluencewillthereforebemuchbroaderthan“just”military.Thelearningprocessshouldbeopentoinputfromnon-militaryactorsatallstagesbefore,duringandaftertherelationship.
C. Incorporating lessons into doctrine and future practice Whenasupportrelationshipends,acomprehensivelessons-learnedexerciseshouldbeconductedontheentirerelationshipandthoselessonsincorporatedintofuturesupportrelationships.Thoselessonsshouldalsobecarefullyreviewedbeforeembarkingonanewsupportrelationshipwiththesameactor.
6. CONSIDERATIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 125
Insomecases,itmaybeappropriatetosharelessonslearnedmorebroadly.TheICRCencouragesallactorstopublish,orshareinrelevantforums,theirexperienceandlessonslearnedinrelationtothepro-tectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting.Areasofinterestwouldinclude,forexample,thechoiceanduseofmeansandmethodsofwarfareinpopulatedareas.
Previouslessonsshouldbestudiedinthepreparationphase,whilerecognizingthatsupportcanbecultur-allyspecific.Theycanprovideextremelyusefulinsightintochallengesthatarelikelytoariseinfuturesupportrelationships,andtheyshouldbeusedfortrainingandexerciseeventsbeforecommittingtoanynewsupportactivity.Supportingactorsneedtoknowwhatdoesanddoesnotworkinordertoapplyinfluenceeffectivelyandlaythefoundationsforasuccessfulsupportrelationship.
Thesupportedpartnermayhavelearneditsownlessonsfrompreviousexperience,eitherformallyorinformally.Partnersandotherministriesoragenciesshouldconferatthepreparationstageandheedlessonslearnedonallsidesastheyimplementtherelationship.
126 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
7. QUESTIONS FOR DECISION MAKERS
ThissectionsupplementsSection 6byprovidingspecificquestionstohelpdecisionmakersconsiderwhatmeasuresmayberelevanttotheircircumstances.Foreachoftheten areasofpracticalmeasures,questionsareaimedeitheratsupportingactorsorsupportedparties,orboth.
Additionally, some considerations relevant to specific humanitarian concerns are posed, for exampledetention-relatedrisks.SeeSection 4forfurtherinformationonissuesrelatingtotheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfightingaswellasthesafeguardingofcivilianandotherspecificallyprotectedobjects.
Somequestionsmayalsoaddressspecificfactorsinthesupportrelationship,asdescribedinSection 3, and somaynotberelevanttoallsupportrelationships.Inthewebversionofthisdocument,decisionmakerscanfilterthequestionsbydifferentvariablesinordertonarrowthelistofquestionstothosemostrelevanttotherelationshiptheyareconsidering.
Thedetailedquestionsinthissectionaresecondarytotheoverarchingstrategicquestionsapplicabletoallsupportrelationships(seealsoSection 5):1. Whattypeofconflict,actors,activitiesandsupportareinvolvedinthesupportrelationship?2. Whatgapsexistbetweenthepartners’intent,leadershipandcapacity?3. Whataretheimplicationsoftheanswerstotheabovequestionsforciviliansandothersnotfighting?4. Whatstepsfromanyofthetenareasofpracticalmeasuresdiscussedabovecouldyouand yourpotentialpartner(s)taketogethertoimprovethelevelofprotectionandreduceharmto civiliansandothersnotfighting?
5. Ifthegapsidentifiedinquestion2aboveremainsignificant,shouldyoureconsiderthesupportrelationship?
Furtheroperationalquestionsareposedbelowforeachofthetenareasofpracticalmeasures.Keyquestionsatthetopofeachsectionhighlighttheprimaryconsiderationsthatshouldguidedecisionsinmanagingthesupportrelationship(seealsoSection 6).Theyarefollowedbymoredetailedguidingquestionsthatmayberelevant,dependingonthecircumstances.
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 127
7.1 PREPARATION7.1.1 INTERNAL READINESS TO ENGAGE • Whatconditionsandcriterianeedtobemetinasupportrelationship?Aretheseconditionsandcriteriaconsistentacrossallyoursupportrelationships?
• Doresourcesneedtobeallocateddifferently,doprocessesrequire“partner-proofing”anddopersonnelneedspecifictraining?
• Aretheinternalentitiesinvolvedinasupportrelationshipalignedintheirvision,andaretheysetuptomanagethetypeofsupportrelationshipenvisaged?Howdoyouensurecoordinationbetweentheseentities?
• Doyouhavesystemsinplacetoassessyourpartner’sintent,capacityandleadershipwithregardtoprotectingciviliansandothersnotfighting?
• Doyouhaveestablishedsystemsandprocedures,aswellasthecapability,tomonitoryourpartner’sactions?
General questions
General
• Arelegaladvisersavailabletoyourarmedforces?
• Willlegaladvisersprovideguidancetopersonnelondistinctissuesrelatedtosupportrelationshipspriortodeployment?
• HaveyouincorporatedtheGenevaConventionsintonationallaw?
• HaveyouadoptedcriminallegislationtopunishthoseguiltyofseriousviolationsofIHL?
• Doyournationalcourtshaveuniversaljurisdictionoverwarcrimescommittedbyoragainstnationalsofyourcountryoronyourterritory?
• DothelawsofyourStateallowforcorporatecriminalresponsibility?
• Whatmechanism(s)existtodiscussamongtherelevantentitiesmattersrelevanttothesupportrelationship(e.g.aninterministerialcommittee,areviewboardoraworkinggroup)?
• Howaretherolesandresponsibilitiesinasupportrelationshipcommunicatedtotherelevantagenciesanddepartmentsinvolvedinprovidingorreceivingsupport?
• Whatistheprocessforconsidering,acrossgovernmentagenciesanddepartments,mattersofhumanitarianconcernandmeasurestoensurerespectforIHLinpractice?
• Howistheprotectionofciviliansintegratedintomilitarypolicyanddoctrine?
• DoyourmilitarypolicyanddoctrineaddressthemeasurestobetakentoreducecivilianharminPMOs?
• Doyouhaveapolicyontheprotectionofcivilians?
• Doyouhaveacivilianharmtrackingmechanism?
• Doyouhaveasystemtomanageyourhumanresourcesinasupportrelationship?
• Howwillyouharmonizeyouroperationaldirectivesorpolicieswithrespecttothemeansandmethodsofwarfare?
• Areyourcommandandcontrolsystemssufficientlyrobusttoworkinapartneredenvironment?
• Howwillyouensurecommunicationwithfieldcommanders?
• Haveyourcommandandcontrolsystemsbeenadaptedtooperatewithpartnerforces?
Detention
• Doesyourpre-transferriskassessmentallowdetaineestovoicefearsrelatingtotheirtransfer,andifso,howdoyouaddresssuchfears?
Missing persons
• Doyouhaveasystemforsharinginformationcollectedbyyournationalinformationbureau(orequivalent)andothersourceswithyourpartner?
• Doyouhaveprotocolsinplacetocollectandsafeguardallrelevantdataonthewoundedandsickyouevacuate(i.e.personaldataandtheplace,dateandtime,andbywhom,thepersonwasevacuated)?
• Doyouhaveamechanismtonotifythefamilieswhenyouevacuatethewoundedorsick?
• Doyouhaveamechanismtoensurethatpeopleadmittedtomedicalfacilitiesunderyourresponsibilitycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?
General questions
Missing
128 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• IsthereanationalmineactionauthorityinyourState?
• WhataretheroleandresponsibilitiesofthenationalmineactionauthorityinyourState?
• Havenationalmineactionstandardsandstandardoperatingproceduresbeenwrittenanddisseminated?
• Whatinternationalstandardsandguidelinesareapplicable(e.g.IMAS,IATGandMOSAIC)?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Haveyourlegaladvisersconsideredthespecificissuesthatsupportrelationshipsmayraise?
• Doyouhaveanarmsexportcontrolregime?
• WhichlawsarerelevanttocontractingPMSCs?
• HowdoyouensuretransparencyandaccountabilityintheprocessofcontractingPMSCs?
• Doyouhaveasystemtoensurealignmentacrossgovernmentagenciesinrespectofasupportrelationship?
• Howdoyouensurethatresourcesareappropriatelyallocatedtosupportthepartner?
• Isyourhumanresourcesmanagementsystemadaptedtotherolesyouwishtoassignyourpersonnel?
• AretheunitsassignedtoPMOsspeciallytrainedtoundertakesuchmissions?
• Doyouhaveaunitorgroupinyourarmedforcesthatisspecializedindeliveringtrainingandassistancetopartnerforces?
• Willyourarmedforceshaveaccesstolegaladviserspriortoandduringtheirdeployment?
• Areyourarmedforcestrainedtoaddresstheprotectionofcivilianswithpartnerforces?
• AreyourarmedforcestrainedtoidentifyandaddressviolationsofIHLbypartnerforces?
• Howdoyoupreserveyourinstitutionalmemoryofsupportrelationships?
• Howdoyouensurethatlessonsarecarriedforwardsothattheycanbeappliedinsubsequentsupportrelationshipswiththesameoradifferentpartner?
• Whichministriesneedtobeinvolvedinvetting,selectingandcontractingPMSCs?
• WhatcriteriadoyouapplywhenevaluatingwhethertoemploytheservicesofaPMSC?
• Doyouhaveaprocessinplacetoensurethatlessonsfromsupportrelationshipsareidentifiedandtakenintoaccount?
• Howwillyouestablishclearlinesofresponsibilityintherelationship?
• Dosomeofyourpersonnelhaveexperienceinpartneredoperations?
• Doestheirpre-deploymenttrainingaddressculturalandlinguisticdividesbetweenthemandpartner forces?
• AretheyabletoincorporateIHLtrainingandeducationintotheirtrainingprogramme?
• DotrainingandinstructiononIHLandotherrelevantlegalframeworksaddressissuesrelatedtoworkingwithpartners?
• Doyouhaveareportingmechanismthatincludespartners?
• DoyouhavealogisticschainfitforthepurposeofPMOs?
The dead
• Doyouhavesuitablyqualifiedpeopletocarryoutgravesiteexcavations?
• Howwillyoucontributetotheprocessofrecoveringthedeadwithoutfurthercomplicatingidentificationeffortsandwithoutdesecratingtheremains?
• Howwillyouaddresstheriskstothosewhorecoverthedead?
Missing persons
• Haveyouestablishedasystemforfamiliestoreportmissingpersonsandreceiveinformationontheirfateandwhereabouts?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Doyouhaveaplaninplaceandthecapacitytoimplementcorrectivemeasuresinyourpartner’shumanitarianmineactionprocess,explosiveordnancedisposalprocessandPSSM?
General questions
Missing
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 129
Questions for supported parties
General
• Whataretheimplicationsofhavingadifferentlegalframeworkfromthatofyourprospectivepartner?
• Whatconditionswillyouplaceonagreeingtoenterthesupportrelationship?
• Canyouworkacrossdepartmentsoragenciestofullyunderstandandputintoplacemeasuressothatexternalsupportdoesnotimpedeawhole-of-governmentapproach?
Missing persons
• Doyouhaveamechanismtonotifyfamilieswhenyoudetainpeopleandwhenyousubsequentlytransferthem?
• Doyouhaveamechanismtoensurethatdetaineescanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?
Missing persons and the dead
• Doyouhaveasystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,sick,missinganddeadpeopleandtotransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiesduringtheconflict?
General questions
Missing
Missing
130 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
7.1.2 NORMATIVE ENGAGEMENT • Initsinternationalrelationsandininternationalforums,hasyourleadershipcommittedtobroad,multilateralpositionssupportingIHLcompliance?
• Doesyourleadershipencourageotherpartiestoaccedetointernationallegalinstrumentsandotherstandardsintendedtoreducethehumanitarianconsequencesofarmedconflict?
• DoyouhaveprogrammesthatpromoteIHLcomplianceandtheprotectionofcivilians,anddoyoumaketheseprogrammesavailabletopartnersorpotentialpartners?
• Doyouhavebilateralandmultilateralmechanismsdesignedtoinfluencepotentialpartners’viewsandperspectivesoncompliancewithIHL?
General questions
General
• HowdoyoupromoteIHLinpublicstatements?
• Towhatextentdoyouemploystrategicargumentationtoexplainwhyitisinyourpartner’sinteresttocomplywithIHL?
• WhenencouragingyourpartnertocomplywithIHL,doyouhighlighthowcompliancewillserveyourpartner’smotivationsandinterests?
• IfyoubecomeawareofpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourpartner,doyouaskotheractorstoencourageyourpartnertoimproveitsIHLcompliance?
• DoesyourpartnershareyourinterpretationofIHL,andhaveyouidentifiedanydiscrepanciesthatshouldbeaddressed?
• IfyouandyourpartnerhavedifferentinterpretationsofanIHLrule,whichinterpretationprovidesgreaterprotectionforciviliansorothersnotfighting?
• Foryouandyourpartner,isminimizingcivilianharminplanningandconductingmilitaryoperationsconsideredastrategicpriority?
• Doestheagreementwithyourpartnerincludetheobjectiveofminimizingcivilianharm,andwasthisobjectiveenshrinedindoctrineandpolicy?
• Canyouencouragethesupportedpartytoengageinaconstructive,confidential,bilateraldialoguewiththeICRCtoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting?
• Haveyoumadecleartoyourpartneryourexpectationsregardingthemeansandmethodstheyuse?
• Doyouencourageyourpartnertograntaccessandprotectiontoneutral,impartialandindependenthumanitarianactors?
• Doesyourpartnerunderstand,acceptandreadilyapplyinternationalstandardsandguidelinesonweaponsmanagement(e.g.IMAS,IATGandMOSAIC)?
• Howdoyoupromotecommonstandards,includingrestrictionsandlimitations,ontheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareasinlinewithIHL?
• DuringPMOs,howdoyourpersonnelestablishrapportwiththeircounterparts?
Detention
• Canyouencouragethepartnertoengageinaconstructive,confidentialandbilateraldialoguewiththeICRCtoensuredetaineetreatmentanddetentionconditionscomplywithinternationallawandstandards?
The dead
• Doyouengagewithyourpartnerontheneedtoensurethedignifiedmanagementofthedead,includingthoseofenemyforces?
• Haveyouengagedwithyourpartnerontheinternationallawsandcustomsapplicabletomanagingthe dead?
• Haveyouandyourpartnerconsideredtheimportanceofestablishingadedicatedunitforrecoveringandtransferringthedeadwithdignity?
• Doyouencourageyourpartnertoagreeonthetransferofremainstoopposingforces?
• Doyouencouragethepartiestotheconflicttodocumentandrecordwherecivilians,combatantsandfightershavedied?
• Doyouemphasizeforyourpartnertheneedforgravesitesresultingfromarmedconflictto be protected?
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 131
Health care
• Canyouencourageyourpartnertoavoidconductingmilitaryoperationsinvolvingmedicalfacilitiesormedicaltransports,asthatcouldcausethemtolosetheirprotectedstatusunderIHL?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Doyourpartner’spoliciesormilitarydoctrineaddressdetecting,markingandremovingminesandERWinaccordancewithhumanitarianstandards?
• Haveyouengagedwithyourpartneronaccedingtoandimplementinginternationalinstrumentsprohibitingtheuseofcertainweaponsaboutwhichthereislongstandingconcerninhumanitarianterms(e.g.theConventiononConventionalWeapons,theAnti-PersonnelMineBanConventionortheClusterMunitionsConvention)?
• Isyourleadershipinapositiontourgeyourpartnernottouseanti-personnelminesorclustermunitionsunderanycircumstances?
• Canyourleadershiphelppartnerstodeveloptoolsforcollectingandmanagingdatainsupportofhumanitarianmineaction?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Isthesupportyouprovideaccompaniedbyaparalleldiplomaticefforttoencouragesupportedpartiestoratifyregionalandinternationallegalframeworksandobligations?
• DoyouencourageandhelpyourpartnerNSAGtodevelopitsowncodesofconduct?
• Doyouidentifyandsharegoodpracticesformitigatingtheriskofcivilianharminurbanarmedconflict,includingrestrictionsandlimitationsontheuseofheavyexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas?
• Doestherapportbetweenyourarmedforcesandyourpartner’sforcesenableyourarmedforcestoengagewithyourpartner’sforcesonIHLissues?
The dead
• Areyourpersonnel,includingcombatantsorfighters,awareofthelaws,customsandotherstandardsonrecoveringandmanagingthedeadwithdignity?
• Inyourcombined,jointandpartneredoperationswiththesupportedparty,doyouemphasizetheneedtoensureremainsarecollected,disposedofandtransferredwithdignity?
Health care
• Doyouremindthesupportedpartythat,underIHL,medicalcaremustbeprovidedtowoundedenemieswithoutanyadversedistinction?
• Doyouremindthesupportedpartythat,underIHL,thetasksofcollectingandcaringforwoundedenemiesareneverconsideredmilitaryfunctions?
Questions for supported parties
General
• Areyourpersonnel,includingcombatantsandfighters,awareofIHLrulesprotectingciviliansandothersnotfighting,andoftheconsequencesresultingfromnon-compliance?
The dead
• Haveyouinformedyourpartneroflocallawsandcustomsgoverninghowthedeadaretobemanaged?
General questions
General questions
132 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
7.1.3 ASSESSMENT AND FRAMING OF THE RELATIONSHIP • Haveyouaccuratelyassessedyourandyourpartner’srespectiveintent,leadershipandcapacity?
• Areanygapsinintent,leadershipandcapacityabletobeaddressedthroughtheplannedsupport?
• Whataretheconditionsthatdefineasuccessfulsupportrelationship?
• Howwillyoutransitionoutofthesupportrelationshipwhen:(a)yourobjectivesaremetor(b) your objectivesarenotmet?
General questions
General
• Whatcriteriadoyouapplytovetandselectpossiblepartners?
• HasyourpartnerintegratedIHLintoitstraining,doctrineandrulesofengagement?
• Isthereanobviousleadershipthatissuesorders?
• Dotheleadership’sordersappeartobefollowed?
• Aretherevisiblesignsofhierarchyanddiscipline,suchasuniforms,saluting,andtheconsistentuseofranksthroughoutthegroup?
• Howdoesyourpartnerrelatetothelocalcommunity?
• Doesyourpartnerreceivepolitical,socialoreconomicsupportfromthelocalcommunity?
• Whoorwhatarethesourcesofpolitical,social,economic,spiritualorothertypesinfluenceoveryour partner?
• Howdoesyourpartnerexertitsauthority?
• Doyourpartner’sactionsreflectitsideology?
• Howarethegroup’srulessocializedandreinforcedwithinthegroup(e.g.throughtraining,rituals,speechesbyinfluentialfigures,orviolentpractices)?
• Doanyunitswithinalargepartnerforceengageinritualsorpracticesthatareatoddswiththegroup’sdoctrineandstatedpurpose?
• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsanalysisofyourpartnertoevaluateitslevelofmilitarycompetency(e.g. intheuseofindirectweaponsystems)?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveacivilianharmtrackingmechanism,andwhatdoesitentail?
• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoconductanassessmentoftheeffectofattacksandtoidentifywhetheranattackmaycauseincidentalcivilianharm?
• Howisthelocalcommunityinformedofthedivisionofrolesandresponsibilitiesbetweenactors?
• Arethereeffectivelegalandadministrativemeasuresinplacetopreventandcombatcorruption?
• DoesthePMSChaveallrequisitelicenses/authorizations?
• IstherequirementtocomplywithapplicablelegalframeworksincludedinthecontractwiththePMSC?
• DoesthecontractwiththePMSCprovideforthePMSCtobefinedorthecontractcancelledifthePMSCviolatestheapplicablelegalframework?
• Underyournationallegalframework,canPMSCsandtheirpersonnelbeheldaccountableforviolationscommittedextraterritorially?
Detention
• Doesthepartnerapplyadequateproceduralsafeguardsforpersonsdeprivedoftheirliberty?
• Whatareyourlegalresponsibilitieswithregardtodetaineescapturedorarrestedbyyourpartnerinapartneredoperation?
• Doesyourpartnerhavetheintentandcapacitytohandlethosearrestedand/ordetainedinrelationtotheconflict?
• Dopartnerforceshavethenecessaryfacilities,personnelandexpertisetotakeandholddetainees?
The dead
• Whichlawsandcustomsapplytothecollectionanddisposalortransferofthosekilled,regardlessoftheirstatus,inthearmedconflictintheareawhereyouandyourpartnerareoperating?
• Arelegalframeworksthatapplytotheprotectionofthedeadintegratedintoyoursupportagreement?
• Underwhatcircumstanceswillyou,oralternativelyyourpartner,beresponsibleforcollectingandmanagingthedead?
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 133
Missing persons
• Doesthesupportagreementsetoutobligationsonpreventingpeoplefromgoingmissing?
• Arelegalframeworksthatapplytotheobligationtoaccountformissingpersonsintegratedintoyoursupportagreement?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveprotocolsinplacetocollectandsafeguardallrelevantdataonthewoundedandsicktheyevacuate(i.e.personaldataandtheplace,dateandtime,andbywhom,thepersonwasevacuated)?
Health care
• Arelegalframeworksthatapplytotheprotectionofthemedicalmissionintegratedintoyoursupportagreement?
• Whichactorisresponsibleforensuringthesupplyandqualityofmedicalgoods?
• Howaremedicalsupplylinesmaintained,andaremechanismsputinplacetoverifythequalityofmedicalsupplies(facilities,equipmentandmedications)andsafeguardinventories?
• Whattypesofhealth-caredeliveryareexpectedtobeprovided,andtowhom?
• Howareciviliansinformedofhowhealth-careservicesarerun?
• Howwillyouandyourpartnerpreventthelocalhealth-caresystemfrombeingdisrupted?
• Whatistheimpactofmilitarymedicalclinicsinanarea,andhowcanyouensurethattheywillcomplement–andperhapsenhance–existingmedicalfacilities?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Isthereanationalmineactionauthorityinyourpartner’sState?
• Whataretheroleandresponsibilitiesofthenationalmineactionauthorityinyourpartner’sState?
• Haveyouassessedyourpartner’scapacitytoengageinhumanitarianmineaction,explosiveordnancedisposalandPSSMmeasures?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Whatlawspermitorlimitthedecisiontosupportapartyandthetypeofsupportthatcanbeprovided?
• Doyouregularlyassessyourpartner’sconductthroughtheprismofIHLbefore,duringandafterthesupportrelationship?
• Howisapartner’sconductinarmedconflictandIHLcompliancefactoredintodecisionstoprovideandcontinuesupport?
• HasthepartnerStateratifiedanyIHLinstruments(i.e.thefourGenevaConventionsof1949andtheirAdditionalProtocolsof1977,treatiesthatexpresslyprohibitorlimittransfersofspecificweapons,orotherkeyIHLtreaties),andhasitaccededtointernationalorregionalhumanrightsinstruments?
• DoesthepartnerStatehavenationallegislationthatprohibitsandpunishesgravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHLandhumanrightslaw?
• HasthepartnerStatejoinedtheArmsTradeTreatyoranyregionalarmstransferinstruments?
• HasthesupportedpartyimplementedthemeasuresrequiredbytheIHLandhumanrightslawinstrumentstowhichitisparty,includingtheadoptionofinternaldoctrineandnationallegislationandregulations?
• Doyourpartner’sarmedforceshaveaneffectiveandtransparentmilitarydisciplinarysystem?
• Haveyouagreedwithyourpartneronthedefinitionofcivilians,civilianobjects,andmilitary objectives?
• Haveyouagreedwithyourpartneronthedefinitionofdirectparticipationinhostilities?
• IsthepartnerapartytoCCWProtocolV?
• DoesthepartnercomplywithitsreportingobligationunderCCWProtocolV?
• DoestherecipienteducateandtrainitsmilitarypersonnelatalllevelsinapplyingIHL(e.g.duringmilitaryexercises)?
• Doestherecipienteducateandtrainitsmilitarypersonnelatalllevelsinapplyingtherulesofhumanrightslaw(e.g.duringlawenforcementoperations)?
• Doestherecipienttrainpoliceandlawenforcementofficialsinapplyingtherulesofhumanrightslaw?
Missing
General questions
134 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
• HasIHLbeenincorporatedintomilitarydoctrineandmilitarymanuals,rulesofengagement,instructionsandorders?
• HaveIHLconsiderationsbeenintegratedintotheprocessesoftargetselectionandtargetverification?
• DoesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoensurethatweaponswillbeusedinaccordancewithIHL?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhavethecapacitytouseweaponssystemscorrectly(andthusaccurately)?
• DoesthesupportedpartyhaveadequatesystemsinplaceforWAMandPSSMinthetheatreofoperations?
• Haverelevanthumanrightsrulesandstandardsbeenincorporatedintothemanualsandinstructionsusedbypoliceandotherlawenforcementofficials?
• HaverelevantIHLandhumanrightsrulesandstandardsbeenincorporatedintothemanualsandinstructionsusedbyweaponsbearers(e.g.armedforces,policeandotherlawenforcementofficials, andPMSCs)?
• ArelegaladviserstrainedinIHLavailabletoadvisethearmedforces?
• Whatisthegeneraldegreeofconcernandrespectshownforthesituationofcivilians?
• HavegravebreachesorotherseriousviolationsofIHLbeencommittedinthepartnercountry?
• Haveviolationsbeencommittedbyactorsforwhichthepartnerisresponsible?
• AretherepoliciesorpracticesbywhichseriousviolationsofIHLandofhumanrightslawaretreatedwithimpunityortolerated?
• Haveseriousactsofgender-basedviolenceagainstwomen,men,boysorgirls,includingseriousactsofviolencetargetingwomenandchildreninthecontextofanarmedconflict,beencommittedintherecipientcountry?
• IfviolationsofIHLareknowntohaveoccurred,hasthepartnertakenmeasurestopreventandsuppresssuchviolationsbyitsnationals,bypeopleunderitscommandoronitsterritory?
• HasthepartnerStatefailedtoinvestigategravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHLallegedlycommittedbyitsnationalsoronitsterritory?
• HasthepartnerStatefailedtosearchforandprosecute(orextradite)itsnationalsorthoseonitsterritoryresponsibleforgravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHL,orhasitfailedtocooperatewithotherStatesorinternationalcourtsinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsrelatingtogravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHL?
• IsthepartneropentodialogueonIHLconcerns?
• Hasthepartneragreedtoexternalorotherformsofindependentmonitoringand/orinvestigationsofallegedIHLviolations?
• Hasthepartnercommittedseriousviolationsofhumanrightslaw?
• Whatisthenatureoftheviolationsortheharmsuffered(includingacrossdiversegroupsofwomen,men,girlsandboys)?Whatisthescaleoftheviolations?Arecertaingroupsaffecteddisproportionately?
• Haveseriousactsofgender-basedviolenceagainstwomen,men,boysorgirls,includingseriousactsofviolencetargetingwomenandchildren,beencommittedinthepartnerStatebythatStateoritsagents?
• HasthepartnerStatetakenappropriatemeasurestoendhumanrightsviolationsandpreventthemfromrecurring?
• IsthepartnerStateopentodialogueonhumanrightsconcerns?
• HasthepartnerStateagreedtoexternalorotherformsofindependentmonitoringand/orinvestigationsofallegedhumanrightsviolations?
• TowhatdegreedoesthepartnerStatecooperatewithinternationalandregionalhumanrightsmechanisms?
• AremilitarycommandersrequiredtopreventandreportgravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHLandtotakeactionagainstthoseundertheircontrolwhohavecommittedsuchviolations?
• HasthepartnerStateputinplacemechanisms,includingdisciplinaryandpenalsanctions,toensurearmedforcesandotherweaponbearersareheldaccountableforanyviolationsofIHL?
• Aretheresimilarmechanismstoensurethepoliceandotherlawenforcementofficials,aswellasotherStateagents,areheldaccountableforviolationsofhumanrightslaw?
• DoesthepartnerState’snationallegislationallowtheStatetocooperatewithinternationaltribunals?
• DoesthesupportedStatecooperatewithotherStates,adhoctribunalsortheInternationalCriminalCourtinconnectionwithcriminalproceedingsrelatingtogravebreachesandotherseriousviolationsofIHL,genocideandcrimesagainsthumanity,andseriousviolationsofhumanrights?
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 135
• IfthesupportedpartyisaNSAG,hasitcommittedtocomplywithIHLandinternationalhumanrightsstandards,forexamplethroughaunilateraldeclarationoranagreement?
• Whatframeworks,systemsorprocessesdoesthesupportedNSAGhaveinplacetoensureitspersonnelrespectIHL?
• Isthepartnerknowntohaverecruitedchildrenortohaveusedthemtoparticipateinhostilities?
• HasthepartnerStateratifiedlegalinstrumentsestablishingaminimumagefortherecruitmentofchildrenandtheirparticipationinhostilities(AdditionalProtocolsIandII,andtheConventionontheRightsoftheChildanditsOptionalProtocolontheInvolvementofChildreninArmedConflict)?
• Isthereanestablishedminimumagefortherecruitment(compulsoryandvoluntary)ofpeopleintothearmedforces(orthearmedgrouporPMSC)?
• Isthereanindependentandfunctioningjudicialsysteminthesupportedparty’sterritory,capableinparticularofprosecutingortakingdisciplinaryaction(asappropriate)inresponsetoviolationsofIHLorhumanrightslaw?
• DoestherecipientStatehaveaneffectivenationalarmscontrolsystemandproceduresinplace(forimport,export,transitandtrans-shipment)thatconformtointernationalnorms,includingthearmstransferinstrumentstowhichitisparty?Doesthesystemincludedecision-makingcriteriabasedonIHLandhumanrightslaw?
• DoestheenduserhavetheknowledgeandcapacitytousethearmsorrelateditemsinaccordancewithIHLandhumanrightslaw?
• Doestheenduserhavethecapacitytomaintainanddeploythearmsorrelateditems?
• Arethetype,qualityandquantityofarmsorrelateditemsinkeepingwiththestatedenduser’smilitaryrequirements(e.g.itsexistinginventoryandforcestructure)?
• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsassessmentofyourpartner’scapacitywithregardtoPSSM?
• Doesthearmstransferrecipienthaveinplaceanationalsystemforlicencingandcontrollinginternationaltransfersofconventionalarms,ammunitionandmilitaryequipment?
• Doesthearmstransferrecipienthavelegislative,regulatoryorothermeasurestogovernbrokeringwithinitsjurisdiction,anddoesitapplythesemeasures?
• Whatmeasureshasthearmstransferrecipienttakentopreventorcombattheillicittradeinconventionalarmsandtopreventtheirdiversion?
• Doesthearmstransferrecipienthavethecapacitytoensurethattheweaponswillnotbedivertedtotheillicitmarket,tounauthorizedendusersortoasituationinwhichseriousviolationsofIHLorofhumanrightslawcouldoccur?
• Doestherecipienthaveahistoryofdiversionofarms?
• Areprevioustransfersofarms,ammunitionormilitaryequipmenttotherecipientknownorsuspectedtohavebeenretransferredordivertedtoathirdpartywhentherewasaclearorsubstantialriskthattheywouldbeusedtoviolateIHLorhumanrightslaw?
• Doestherecipientcountryhaveagoodrecordofprovidingauthenticandreliableend-usedocumentation?
• Doesthestatedenduserhaveadequatestockpilemanagementandsecurityproceduresinplace,includingforsurplusarmsandammunition?
• AretheftandleakagesfromstockpilesorcorruptionknowntobeaproblemintherecipientState?
• IstheillicittraffickingofweaponsaproblemintherecipientState?
• DogroupsinvolvedinillegalarmstraffickingoperateintherecipientState?
• ArethereadequatebordercontrolsintherecipientState,orarethebordersknowntobeporous?
• Istherecipienttheactualenduserofthearms,ammunitionormilitaryequipment?Haveguaranteesbeengiveninthisregard(e.g.commitmenttoend-userorend-usecertificationthatconfirmsthattransferreditemswillnotbere-exportedwithouttheagreementoftheexportingStateorusedinamannerotherthanthatdescribedinthecertificate)?
• Doestherecipientagreetothisbeingverifiedandtonottransferthearms,ammunitionormilitaryequipmenttothirdpartieswithouttheauthorizationofthetransferringState?
• WhatlimitationsexistunderapplicablenationalandinternationallawonthetypeofserviceyouwishtocontractaPMSCfor?
• Whatareyourcriteriaforendingeachtypeofsupportprovidedtoyourpartner?
136 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
• Whenyoursupportisdrawingtoaclose,willtheforcesyousupportneedtobeintegratedintootherarmedforcesordisarmed,demobilizedandreintegrated?
• Whenarmsareprovidedtorecipients,otherthanStateentities,thatoperateinsituationsofarmedconflict(e.g.armedgroupsorPMSCs),havetheytakenmeasurestoensurethatthearmswillbeusedinaccordancewithIHL(e.g.byadoptinganddistributingIHL-compliantcodesofconduct,standardoperatingproceduresandrulesofengagement;byprovidingtraininginIHL;andbyestablishinginternaldisciplinaryprocedures)?
• Isthereariskofasuddenorunexpectedchangeofgovernmentorauthoritystructures(e.g.overthrowofthegovernmentordisintegrationofStatestructures)thatcouldunderminethesupportedparty’swillingnessorabilitytorespectIHLandhumanrightslaw?
• Doyouhaveaplantomanagethewithdrawalofsupportwhentheend-statecriteriaaremet?
• WhatsafeguardswillbeinplacetoensurecompliancewithIHLincasethesupportissuddenlyhaltedorwithdrawn?
• Ifconcernshavebeenraisedaboutanexistingrelationship,haveeffectiveremedialmeasuresbeentakentoaddresstheseconcerns?
• Hasconsiderationbeengiventothesupportedparty’sexitstrategywhentheyceaseoperations?
• DoesthePMSCyouwishtohirehavesufficientfinancialmeanstopayfinesandcompensationifnecessary?
• Doyouhaveaprocessornecessarypreconditionsforyourpartner’srequestsforfiresupport?
• Doyouverifytargetsindependentlywhenprovidingfiresupport?
• Doestheenduser(e.g.armedforcesorarmedgroup,policeorotherlawenforcementofficials,orPMSC)operateunderclearandaccountablelinesofcommandandcontrol?
Detention
• AretheresimilarmechanismstoensureaccountabilityforviolationsofhumanrightslawbyotherStateagentsorprivateactorstaskedtoperformsecurity-relatedfunctions?
• Doesthesupportagreementincludeaspecificguaranteebythesupportedpartythatitwilltreatalldetaineesinaccordancewithitsinternationallegalobligations?
• Doesthesupportagreementspecifywhichstepsthetransferringpartymaytakeiftransferredpersonsarenottreatedinaccordancewithinternationallaw?
• Doyouhaveclearproceduresonthelawfultransferofdetaineesinaccordancewiththeprincipleofnon-refoulementunderinternationallaw?
• Doesyourpartnerapplyfairtrialguaranteesforpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty?
• Dopartnerforceshaveajudicialoradministrativeframeworktodetainpeopleandholdthemlawfully?
• DoesthesupportedpartytrainweaponsbearersinapplyingtherulesofIHL(whereapplicable)andhumanrightslaw?
• HavethesamemeasuresbeentakentoensureIHLcompliancebyotherweaponsbearers(e.g.thepolice)whomayoperateinsituationscoveredbyIHL?
• HasthesupportedpartyagreedtoallowtheICRCtovisitpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty?
The dead
• Hasyourpartnerdesignatedparticulardepartmentsorpersonneltoorganizethecollectionandmanagementofthedead?
• Doyourdirectivesonthecollection,disposalandtransferofthedeadconformwithlocallawsand customs?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveasystemformanagingthedeadinanarmedconflict?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhavethecapacity,eitherwithinoroutsideitsarmedforces,toproperlymanagethedead?
Missing persons
• Doesthesupportedpartyissueidentitytagstoitscombatantsorfighters?
• DoesthesupportedpartytakeDNAsamplesofitscombatantsorfighters?Missing
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 137
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtonotifythefamilieswhentheyevacuatethewoundedorsick?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtoensurethatpeopleadmittedtomedicalfacilitiesundertheirresponsibilitycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsassessmentofthesupportedparty’scapacitywithregardtohumanitarianmineaction?
• Haveyouconductedatechnicalneedsassessmentofthesupportedparty’scapacitywithregardtoexplosiveordnancedisposal?
• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacity,eitherwithinoroutsideitsarmedforces,toproperlysurveyand,wherenecessary,clearERWorotherweapon-relatedhazardsthatcanhindertheabilitytorecoverandmanagethedead?
Questions for supported parties
General
• HaveyouagreedwithyourpartneronaprotocoltoinvestigateallegationsofIHL-relatedmisconductorviolations?
• Whatlawspermitorlimityourabilitytoreceivesupport?
• Howdoyoufactoryourpartner’sconductinarmedconflictandIHLcomplianceintoyourdecisiontoacceptandcontinueacceptingsupport?
• Havelegalorothermeasuresbeenadoptedprohibitingandpunishingtherecruitmentoruseinhostilitiesofchildren?
• Doesthesupportingactorhaveapost-conflicttransitionplan?
Missing persons
• Haveobligationstoaccountformissingpersonsbeenintegratedintothesupportagreement?
• Haveyousharedwithyourpartnerthepracticaltechniquesyouusetoidentifytheremainsofmembersofyourarmedforces?
• Hasyourpartnerestablishedasystemforfamiliestoreportmissingpersonsandreceiveinformationontheirfateandwhereabouts?
The dead
• Haveyousharedwithyourpartneryoursystemforcollectingandtransferringordisposingofremainswithdignity?
• Aretheregapsinyourcapacitytocollect,record,disposeofortransfertheremainsofpeoplekilledinarmedconflict?
General questions
Missing
138 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
7.2 IMPLEMENTATION7.2.1 INSTITUTIONAL CAPACITY BUILDING • Dothepartner’sinstitutionsapplyaframeworkandusesystemsandprocessesthatsupportandensuretheproposedconflict-relatedsupportactivitiesareincompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlegalstandards?
• Arepartnerarmedforcesselectedandvettedeffectively?
• Doesthepartnerhavethecapacitytomanagetheaftermathofhostilities?
• Whentheproposedsupportdrawstoaclose,willthepartner’sinstitutionshavethecapacitytocontinueIHL-compliantoperationsontheirown?
General questions
General
• Doyourpartner’sinstitutionshavetheorganizationalcapacity,rulesandprocedurestofacilitatetheproposedmilitaryoperationsandassociatedactivitiesincompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlegal standards?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveasystemforidentifyinglessonsandincorporatingthemintosubsequentoperations?
• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytocarryoutpattern-of-lifeassessments?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveaneffectivesystemforcommunicatinginformationtocivilians(e.g.evacuationordersandadvancewarningsofattack)?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveasystemforreceivingallegationsofmisconductfromthepublicandfromyou,andforaddressingthosecomplaints?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveamechanismforapersondeprivedoftheirlibertytoseekreviewofthelawfulnessoftheirdetention?
Health care
• Isconsiderationgiventofollowinguponthedeliveryofhealthcare,eitherbythemilitarymedicalpartnerorcivilianmedicalproviders,followingtheinitialprovisionofcare?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacity,rules,policiesandproceduresneededtoundertakenon-technicalandtechnicalsurveysandreportinginrelationtominesandERW,markingandfencing,accidentreporting,minefieldrescue,risk-awarenessandsafe-behaviourprogramming,traumamanagementinemergencymedicalcaresystems,andexplosiveincidentinvestigations(e.g.post-blastandpost-strike)?
• Whatin-theatre“licencing”proceduresdoyouhaveinplaceforexplosiveordnancedisposaloperators,ammunitionstockpileareasandammunitionmanagers?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Whatlegalframeworksregulatetheconductofyourpartner’sarmedforces?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveasystemforinvestigatingand,whereappropriate,prosecutingallegedseriousviolationsofIHLbyitsarmedforces?
• Doyoueffectivelyvetthesupportedparty’sarmedforces,thearmedgrouporthepersonnelofthePMSC?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhavetheknow-howandresourcestomanagetheaftermathofhostilities?
• Doesthesupportedparty’sgovernmentcoordinatetherelevantbodiesinprovidingtheagreedsupport?
• Doyoucontributetobroadercapacity-buildingactivitiesinthemilitaryorsecuritysectorinthenormalcourseofyourrelationship?
• Whatrulesandproceduresregulatetheconductofthesupportedparty’sarmedforces?
• Arethemeasuresyoutaketostrengthenthesupportedparty’sinstitutionalcapacityenoughtomitigatetheriskofIHLviolationsorothercivilianharminanongoingorpotentialarmedconflict?
General questions
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 139
• Doesthesupportedpartyhavealearningsysteminplacethatisdistinctfromtheprocessesitusestoinvestigateandprosecutecriminalconductandfromitsdisciplinarymeasures?
• Whatisthescopeofthesupportedparty’slearningsystem?
• Doestheintendedenduserhaveappropriatestockpilemanagementprocesses?
• Whatarethesupportedparty’srulesofengagement?
• Doyourpartner’srulesofengagementdifferentiatebetweenconductingcombatandsecuritytasks?
• Whatmechanismsdoesthesupportedpartyhaveinplacetoimplementinternationalstandardsandguidelinesonweaponsmanagement(e.g.IMAS,IATGandMOSAIC)?
• Whatproceduresdoesthesupportedpartyhaveinplacetovetitscombatantsorfighters?
Detention
• Inrelationtopossibledetaineetransfers,doesthesupportagreementprovideforthetransferringpartytovisittransferredindividualsinordertomonitortheirtreatmentandthedetentionconditions?
• Willthesupportedparty’sjudicialsystembeabletocopewiththenumberandtypeofcasesitislikelytoreceive?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveclearproceduresforallmattersrelatedtotheprotectionofpeopledeprivedoftheirliberty,includingasregardslawfultransfersinaccordancewiththeprincipleofnon-refoulement underinternationallaw?
• Doyoutrainandhelpthesupportedpartytoestablishapropersystemforregisteringdetaineesandnotifyingfamiliesoftheirarrest,detentionandtransfer?
• Doyoutrainandhelpthesupportedpartytosetupawayfordetaineesandtheirfamiliestocommunicate,allowingforaregularexchangeoffamilynews?
The dead
• Hasthesupportedpartyconsideredtheimpactthatanurbanconflicthasonrecoveringthedeadandtheaddedcomplicationsthisentails?
• Howwillthesupportedpartyaddresstheriskstothosewhorecoverthedead?
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupagraveregistrationservice?
• Howwillyourpersonnelsupplementthesupportedparty’ssystemandtechniquesinrecoveringandmanagingthedead?
Missing persons
• Howcanyouhelpthesupportedpartytoestablishanationalbureauofinformation(oranequivalentsystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandtransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiestotheconflict)beforeorattheoutsetoftheconflict?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveanationalinformationbureau(orequivalentsystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandtransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiestotheconflict)?
• Whatsystemdoesthesupportedpartyhaveinplacetohelppreventcombatantsorfightersbecomingunaccountedforasaresultoftheconflict?
• Beforedeployingthem,doesthesupportedpartyprovideitscombatantsorfighterswithidentitycardsordiscs?
• Beforedeployingthem,doesthesupportedpartyrecorditscombatants’orfighters’medicalidentifiers(e.g.fingerprints,DNAordentalrecords)toidentifythemiftheydie?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtosystematicallyregisterpeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyintheircustodyandrecordtheirtransfer?
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetuponeormoremechanismstosystematicallyregisterpeopletheytakeintocustodyandrecordtheirsubsequenttransfer?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanismtonotifyfamilieswhenitdetainspeopleandsubsequentlytransfersthem?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveamechanisminplacetoensurethatdetaineescanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?
Missing
140 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupamechanismtoensurethatpeopleintheircustodycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?
• Howcanyouhelpthepartiestoanarmedconflicttogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationonpossiblelocationsofgravesitesandtosharethisinformationwithotherpartiestotheconflict?
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupprotocolstocollectandsafeguardallrelevantdataonthewoundedandsicktheyevacuate(i.e.personaldataandtheplace,dateandtime,andbywhom,thepersonwasevacuated)?
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupamechanismtonotifythefamilieswhentheyevacuatethewoundedorsick?
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytosetupamechanismtoensurethatpeopleadmittedtomedicalfacilitiesundertheirresponsibilitycanrestoreand/ormaintaincontactwiththeirfamilymembers?
• Howcanyouhelpthesupportedpartytoestablishasystemforfamiliestoreportmissingpersonsandreceiveinformationontheirfateandwhereabouts?
Health care
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytodevelopandimplementproceduresandrulestogovernbehaviourduringsearchoperations,prioritizethewoundedandsickatcheckpointsandlimittoexceptionalcircumstancesthedenialofmedicalevacuations,searchesofhealth-carefacilitiesortheremovalofpatientsfromthem?
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytodevelopandimplementtargetingrulesandproceduresaimedatprotectingmedicalpersonnel,facilitiesandtransport?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Canyouhelpthesupportedpartytodevelopanationalmineactionauthority?
Questions for supported parties
General
• Doyouhaveanarmsimportcontrolregime?
• Doyouhaveasysteminplacetomonitortheimpactofyourmilitaryoperationsonciviliansandtosystematicallycollectdataonanyresultingcivilianharm,includingthereverberatingeffectsofdamagingordestroyingcivilianobjects?
• CanyouprovideintelligenceandinformationtoyourpartnertoimproveitsunderstandingofcivilianconsiderationsrelevanttoIHL,e.g.culturalnorms,patternsoflife,andpositivelyidentifyingtargets?
The dead
• Foreachmilitaryoperation,doyouhavededicatedpersonnelforrecoveringandmanagingthedead,includingthoseofenemyforces?
• Howcanthesupportingactorsupplementyoursystemforrecoveringandmanagingremains?
Missing persons
• Doyouhaveanationalinformationbureau(orequivalentsystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandtransmitthatinformationtotheotherpartiestotheconflict)?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Canyourpartnerhelpyoutodevelopanationalmineactionauthority?
General questions
Missing
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 141
7.2.2 INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW TRAINING • DoyouincorporatetrainingonIHLandotherrelevantlawsintoyoursupportrelationship?
• Doyourpersonnelhavetheappropriateskills,includinganunderstandingofthetrainees’languageandculture,toprovidetraining?
• Isyourtrainingprogrammeadaptedtothepartnerintermsofcontent,methodsandmaterials,timingandfrequency,andaudience?
• HowdoyouevaluatetheeffectivenessofyourIHLtrainingandincorporatethatassessmentintosubsequenttrainingcycles?
• IsIHLtrainingintegratedacrossyourbroadertrainingprogramme,suchasincombinedexercises?
• Willyousupplementtrainingorinstructionwithmentoring?
General questions
General
• Doyousharebestpracticesincivilianharmmitigationtechniqueswithyourpartner?
• Doyouprovideadvicetoyourpartnerondevelopingandimplementingano-strikelistinordertoensurethatcivilians,civilianobjectsandotherspeciallyprotectedobjectsareprotectedfromattack?
Detention
• WhenconductingPMOs,whattrainingdoyouprovidetopartnerforcesintermsofprotectingpeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyandadministeringplacesofdetention?
The dead
• Canyouprovideyourpartnerwithadviceonaddressinggapsinitssystemforrecoveringandmanagingthedeadwithdignity?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• DoyouincorporatetrainingonIHLandotherrelevantlawsintoyoursupportrelationship?
• Whensupportingapartytoaconflict,doyoualsoprovideIHLtraining?
• Whataretheminimumtrainingrequirementsthatotherarmedforcesmustfulfilforyoutoprovidesupporttothem?
• HowdoyoufactorthespecificcircumstancesoftheplannedoperationalcontextintotheIHLcomponentofyourtrainingpackage?
• Doyouadapttrainingprogrammestothespecifictaskspartnerswillperform?
• Whenprovidingmilitaryequipmenttopartnerforces,doyousystematicallytrainthoseforcesintheIHL-compliantuseofthatequipment?
• Howdoyouinstruct,prepareand/ortrainyoursupportedpartnerontakingfeasibleprecautionswhenconductinghostilities?
• Doyourpersonnelhavetheappropriateskills,includinganunderstandingofthetrainees’languageandculture,toprovidetrainingandadvice?
• Whatevents,legends,personalitiesandvaluesarepartofthetrainees’identityandcanshapeformalandinformalsocialization?
• Doanyoverlappingidentities(e.g.religiousorethnic)amongthetraineescreateentrypointsformessagesonrestraint?
• Howmuchinfluencedojuniorandnon-commissionedofficershaveonunitmembers’behaviourandviewpoints?
• Whattrainerprofilewouldbemostcrediblewithparticulartrainingaudiences?
• Willyousupplementtrainingorinstructionwithmentoring?
• Isthereaprocessfordevelopingatrainingprogrammeforpartnerforcesthatistailoredtotheirspecificcapacityandneeds?
• Howarethecurriculumandmaterialstranslatedsothatlanguageandculturaldifferencesarewell-integratedintothetraining?
• Doyouhaveaprogrammetorepeatpartnertrainingatregularintervals?
General questions
General questions
142 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
• HowdoyouincorporatecivilianprotectionandIHLcomplianceintoyourtrainingforthesupported party?
• DoyouincorporateIHLintoyourpracticaltrainingexerciseswithpartners?
• DoyoutrainpartnerarmedforcesonIHLasitrelatestoprecautions,distinctionandproportionality?
• Haveyouincludedatrainingpackageontheappropriateandresponsibleuseoftheweaponsandothermilitaryresourcesthatyouprovidetoyourpartner?
• Isthesupportedpartytrainedinusingmeansandmethodsofwarfareinsuchawayastoavoidorminimizecivilianharm(e.g.trainedtounderstandandanticipatetheeffectsofweaponsandtobeasaccurateaspossiblewhenusingindirectfire)?
• DoyoutrainpartnersonselectingtargetsinaccordancewithIHLandonverifyingtheyarenotcivilians,civilianobjects,orspeciallyprotectedobjects?
• DoyoutrainpartnersonapplyingIHLrulesinurbanwarfare?
• Doyoutrainpartnersonapplyinghumanrightslawinlawenforcementoperations?
• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartyincollateraldamageestimationmethodologies?
• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartytoconductbattledamageassessments?
• Ifyouprovidethesupportedpartywithexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea,doyoualsotrainittoensurethatitsarmedforcesknowandunderstandthedirectandindirecteffectsofsuchweaponsinpopulatedareas?
• Ifyouprovidethesupportedpartywithexplosiveweaponswithawideimpactarea,doyoualsotrainittoensurethatitsarmedforcesimplementgoodpracticestomitigatetheriskofcivilianharm,includingrestrictionsandlimitationsontheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas,asrecommendedby theICRC?
• Doyoushare,withpartnerforcesand/orsupportedparties,goodpracticesandlessonslearnedinrelationtotheuseofexplosiveweaponsinpopulatedareas?
• Doyoutrainpartnersonthesafestorageof,andaccountabilityfor,weaponsandothermilitaryresources?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhavetheresourcesnecessarytousethetrainingmaterialsyouprovide?
• Whoisresponsibleforsettingupaninvestigativeorauditbodytoreviewhowthetrainingwas provided?
• Doesyourtrainingprogrammesuitthesupportedpartyintermsofthecurriculum,methodsandmaterials,choiceoftrainersandchoiceoftrainees?
• Doesthetrainingyouprovidetopartnerforcesincludepracticalexercises?
• Arethematerialsyouusefortrainingpartnerforcestranslatedintotheirlanguageandotherwiseadaptedtotheirneeds?
• Howdoyoumonitortheperformanceofunitstrainedbyyourpersonneland/orcontractorsduringtheiractualmilitaryoperations?
• Howdoyouevaluatetheeffectivenessofyourtrainingandincorporatetheresultsintosubsequenttrainingcycles?
• Howareyourtrainingprogrammesadaptedduringanoperationtotakeintoaccountthetrainedunits’observedperformanceandotherfeedback?
• Canthesupportedparty’sbehaviourleadtoachangeintheIHLtrainingyouprovide?
• WhenhiringaPMSCtoprovidesecurity-relatedservices,whichlegalstandardsdoyoutrainthemon?
• WhenhiringaPMSCtomaintainandassistinoperatingweaponsystems,includingthoseofapartner,doyoutrainthemontheirlegalresponsibilities?
• HowdoyouensurethatthepersonnelofaPMSCyouhireknowwhentheirconductmightaidorabetawarcrime?
• IfyouhireaPMSCtotrainyourpartner’sforces,howdoyouensurethatthetrainingitdeliversmeetsyourarmedforcestrainingstandards?
• IfyouhireaPMSCtotrainyourpartner’sforces,howdoyouensurethetrainingfocusessufficientlyonrelevantlegalobligations?
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 143
Detention
• Doyoutrainyourpartner’sarmedforcesonthehumaneanddignifiedtreatmentofthosetheycaptureordetain?
• Woulditbepertinenttomentororadvisepartnerforcesthatmanageplacesofdetentiontoensuretheyestablishandcomplywithappropriaterulesandprocedures?
• Doyouprovidethesupportedpartywithsupportandtrainingonnon-coerciveinterrogationtechniques?
Missing persons
• DoesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeasectionontheICRCandtheroleofitsCentralTracingAgency?
• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeasectiononmaintainingfamilylinks?
• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeasectiononthenationalinformationbureauorsimilarstructures(i.e.asystemtogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeopleandsharethatinformationwiththeotherpartiestotheconflict)?
• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludeprocessestoensurethatdetaineescanmaintain and/orrestorefamilycontact?
• Doesyourtrainingforthesupportedpartyincludemeasuresthatcanbetakentopreventpeoplefromgoingmissingduringmedicalevacuations?
The dead
• Canyouprovidespecializedtrainingintherecoveryandmanagementofthedeadinordertoensurethedeadaretreatedwithdignity,topreventdeadbodiesgoingmissingandtopreserveinformationthatmaybeneededtoidentifyhumanremainsinthefuture,inlinewithapplicabledataprotectionstandards?
• Howisyourtrainingonrecoveringthedeadadaptedtothesupportedparty’slawsandcustoms?
• Howisyourtrainingonrecoveringthedeadadaptedtothesupportedparty’sexistingpractices?
Health care
• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartyonhowtoavoidorminimizeharmtocriticalcivilianinfrastructuresuchasmedicalfacilities?
• Doesyourtrainingforpartnersaddressprotectingthemedicalmission?
• Doyoutrainandadvisepartnersecurityforcesonmanagingcheckpointsinawaythatminimizesthedelaytothemedicaltreatmentofpatients?
• Doyoutrainandadvisepartnersecurityforcesonconductingsearchoperationsinmedicalfacilitiesinawaythatensuresrespectforandtheprotectionofthewoundedandsickandminimizesthedisruptiontotheworkofmedicalpersonnel?
• Doyoutrainthesupportedpartyontheimpartialityofmedicalcareandtheevacuationprocess,notablyduringpre-deploymenttrainingprogrammesorbriefings?
• Doyoutrainoradvisethesupportedpartyinupdatingitsmapsoflocalhealthstructuresandotherprotectedsites?
• Doesyourtrainingontargetingclarifytherespectandprotectionduetomedicalpersonnelandfacilities,includingthelimitedcircumstancesinwhichprotectionmightbelost?
• Doesyourtrainingonsearchoperationsclarifytherulesgoverningbehaviourduringsearchoperations,prioritizethewoundedandsickatcheckpointsandlimittoexceptionalcircumstancesthedenialofmedicalevacuations,searchesofhealth-carefacilitiesortheremovalofpatientsfromthem?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Canyourpersonnelprovidespecializedtraining,inaccordancewithinternationalhumanitarianstandards,indetecting,markingandclearinglandminesandERW?
• Doyouplantoembedatechnicaltrainingteamwithyourpartnertoassessitsneedsandprovidepre-deploymenttraining(insuchareasasIMASExplosiveOrdnanceDisposal,ExplosiveLimitLicencesandammunitionstorageandmanagementinconflictareas)?
Missing
144 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Questions for supported parties
General
• WhatIHLtrainingarethearmedforceslegallyrequiredtoundergo?
• DoesthesupportingactorrequiretrainingonIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansinpopulatedareas?
• DoyourarmedforcesreceiveregularIHLtraining?
• WoulditbehelpfultoreceiveIHLtraining,orhelpindeliveringIHLtraining,fromthesupporting actor?
• WhatdoesyourleadershipdotoreinforcetheimportanceofIHLtrainingthroughoutyourorganization?
• HowareIHLprinciplesincorporatedintoyourmilitaryeducation?
• HowdoesthetrainingyourforcesreceivereinforcetheimportanceofIHLcompliance?
• DoyourforcesreceivespecifictrainingonrulesandstandardsoncivilianprotectionandIHLcomplianceduringhostilities?
• Doyourarmedforcesreceivetrainingonissuesrelatingtotheprotectionofcivilians?
• HowdoestheirtrainingprepareyourforcestocomplywithIHLduringdynamictargetingdecisions?
• DotraineeshaveaccesstorelevantmaterialsintheirIHLtraining,includingacopyoftherelevantrules?
• Arelegalprinciplesincorporatedintotheoperationaltrainingdeliveredtoyourarmedforces?
• Doesyourpartnerrequirespecifictraininginthelawsandgoodpracticesrelatingtotheconductofhostilitiesinpopulatedareas?
• Whenyoureceiveoffensivemilitaryequipmentfromasupportingpartner,doyouaskthemtoprovidetrainingorinstructionsonhowtousetheequipmentinlinewithIHLrules?
• DoestheIHLtrainingprovidedtoyourarmedforcesincludepracticalexercisesonputtingtherules intoaction?
• Doyouhaveasystemforkeepingtrackofthetrainingcompletedbyeachunitorgroup?
• WhendevelopinganIHLtrainingcoursewithapartnerforce,doyouallowthecoursetobeadapted inresponsetoissuesarisinginoperations?
• HowdoyouprovideinputontheIHLtrainingdeliveredbyyourpartner(e.g.curriculum,methods andmaterials)?
• WhenagreeingtohaveapartnerdeliverIHLtrainingtoyourarmedforces,doyouensurethat thetrainingisadaptedtoyourtrainees’languageorculture?
• Aftercompletingatrainingpartnership,doyoumonitortrainees’subsequentperformanceandIHLcompliance?
• Afteratrainingpartnershiphasended,doyousharetheresultsofpost-trainingperformanceand IHL-complianceassessmentswithpartnerforces?
• Doyouhaveaprocessinplacetoreceivefeedbackontrainingprogrammesandtoensurethatitisusedtoimprovetheeffectivenessoffuturetrainingprogrammes?
• Isthereaninvestigativeorauditbodyinchargeofreviewinghowthetrainingwasprovided?Ifso,whosetsupitupandwhorunsit?
• Ifyoubecomeawareofreportsofproblematicbehaviourbypersonneltrainedbyapartner,doyouhaveasystemforraisingtheseissueswiththepartner?
Detention
• Doyourforcesreceivespecifictrainingonrulesandstandardsregardingtheprotectionofpeopledeprivedoftheirlibertyandtheadministrationofplacesofdetention?
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 145
7.2.3 ASSISTANCE IN COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW • Doesyourpartnerhavegapsintheircapacity,functionsorresourcesthatimpedeitsabilitytofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?
• Canyouhelpyourpartnertoincorporatecivilianprotectionintoitsmilitaryplanningandcommitresourcesthataddressthesegaps?
• WhatcontingenciesdoyouhaveinplaceifthesupportedpartyprovesunabletofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?
General questions
General
• Areyouabletocommitresourcestohelptominimizethenegativehumanitarianconsequencesofthearmedconflict?
Detention
• Doyouhavetheresourcesorknow-howrequiredtoimproveyourpartner’sdetentionfacilitiessothattheyoperateinaccordancewithinternationallawandstandards?
The dead
• Doyourarmedforceshaveinstructionsoncollecting,identifyingandmanagingthedeadfollowingyouroryourpartner’smilitaryoperations?
Health care
• Whatlevelofcareareyouhelpingtoprovidetocivilians(e.g.firstaidandemergencycare,evacuations,routineandfollow-uptreatmentsorpublichealthprogramming)?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Doyousharewithyourpartnerthelocationsorcoordinatesofexplosivemunitionsyoulaunchoremplace,tofacilitatethetaskofdetecting,markingandclearinganyexplosiveremnants?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Couldyourpersonnelhelpthesupportedpartytoincreasetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflict?
• WillyouassignpersonneltoadviseyourpartnerinmattersrelatingtoIHLcomplianceandcivilianprotection?
• WhatcontingenciesdoyouhaveinplaceifthesupportedpartyisunabletofulfilitsobligationstowardspeopleprotectedbyIHL?
• Areyouabletoprovideyourpartnerwithintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissanceequipmenttoimproveitscapacitytodistinguishbetweenciviliansorcivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectives?
• Canyoudevelopano-strikelisttosharewithyourpartner?
• Couldyourpersonnelassistbybeingpresentduringthesupportedparty’stargetselectionprocess?
• Canyouhelpyourpartnertosetuporimproveacivilianharmtrackingmechanism?
• Canyouhelpyourpartnertosetupmechanismstoinvestigateharmcausedtociviliansandensureaccountability?
• Howcanyouhelpyourpartnerintegratecivilianprotectionintoitsmilitaryplanning?
• Canyoudeployintelligence,surveillanceandreconnaissance(ISR)supportinordertosupplementyourpartner’starget-verificationprocessandcollateraldamageestimates?
• Canyouhelpyourpartnertoorganizeitscheckpointssoastoimproveitscapacitytodistinguishbetweencombatantsandcivilians?
The dead
• Canyouhelpyourpartnertorecoverandtransferthedeadwithdignity?
General questions
General questions
146 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Missing persons
• Canyouhelpthepartiestoanarmedconflicttogather,centralizeandsafeguardinformationoncaptured,wounded,deadandmissingpeople,includingthepossiblelocationofgravesites,andtopotentiallysharethatinformationwiththeotherpartiestotheconflict?
• Couldyouprovidethesupportedpartywiththeresourcesneededtocreateidentitycardsordiscs and/ortotakeDNAreferencesamples?
• Canyouhelpyourpartnertodocumentandrecordthelocationofallfallencivilians,combatantsand fighters?
• Canyouprovidetheresourcesorknow-howyourpartnerneedstodevelopasystemthathelpstopreventcombatantsorfightersbecomingunaccountedforasaresultofaconflict?
Health care
• Doyouhavetheresourcesorknow-howrequiredtoimproveyourpartner’sabilitytocareforthewoundedandsick?
• Couldyouassistbycarryingoutmedicalevacuationsofwoundedandsickciviliansandcombatantsorfightersfromthefrontlines?
• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytocarryoutmedicalevacuationsofwoundedandsickciviliansandcombatantsorfightersfromthefrontlines?
• Canyouprovidedirectsupporttolocalmedicalfacilitiesinareaswhereyourpartneroperatesandwheremedicalfacilitiesareimpairedbythemilitaryoperations?
• Howdoyouhelptoprepareyourpartnertocollectandcareforthewoundedandsick,includingwoundedadversaries?
• Isthehealth-careassistanceyouprovidedesignedtoincludecivilians?
• Couldyouhelpinupdatingthemappingoflocalhealthstructuresandestimatingthehumanitarianconsequencesofmilitaryoperationsinvolvingvitalmedicalinfrastructure?
• Couldyouworkwithhealth-careprofessionalsandtheauthoritiestoensurethatmedicalfacilitiesandpersonnelarerespectedandprotected?
• Canyouhelptosetupamedicalsupplyline?
• Doyouhavethecapacitytohelpyourpartnertosearchfor,collectandcareforthewoundedandsick,includingwoundedandsickadversaries?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Canyouprovidesupportfordetecting,markingandclearinglandminesandERW?
• Canyouprovidesupporttorisk-educationprogrammesinordertoreducecivilianexposuretothedangersposedbylandminesandERW?
• CanyouprovidesupportfortheassistanceandrehabilitationofvictimsoflandminesandERW?
Questions for supported parties
General
• Haveyoudiscussedwithyourpartnerwhattype(s)ofspecializedassistanceyouneedinordertoimprovetheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting?
• Doyourequireassistancetoimproveyourtarget-selectionprocess,suchastoincreaseyourcapacitytodistinguishbetweenciviliansorcivilianobjectsandmilitaryobjectives?
• Canyousharewithyourpartnerinformationthatcaninformtargetingdecisions,suchasthehumanterrain,geography,criticalcivilianinfrastructureandpatternsoflife?
• WillyoubeabletocontinuecomplyingwithIHLifyourpartnerreducesorendsitsassistance?
The dead
• Doyourequireassistanceinrecovering,identifying,disposingofortransferringremainswithdignity?
Missing
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 147
7.2.4 MONITORING AND EVALUATION OF THE PARTNER • Doyouhavevisibilityonyourpartner’soperations?
• Howdoyouevaluatethehumanitarianimpactofyourpartner’soperations?
• HowdoyoudeterminewhetherthesupportyouprovideisusedincompliancewithIHL?
• Whatmetricsdoyouusetoreviewandmodifythesupportrelationshipovertime?
• Whatsystemdoyouusetoaddresspotentialmisconductbythepartner,orotherproblemsinthe relationship?
• IfIHLviolationsmayhaveoccurred,howwilltheybeeffectivelyinvestigated?
General questions
General
• Doyourequestaclearlistoffocalpointsfromthepartnerinordertoexchangeinformationandaddresspotentialproblems?
• Arethereclearcommunicationchannelsandproceduresforengagingwithyourpartner’sofficials?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveamechanismfortrackingcivilianharmresultingfromitsoperations?
• Whatinformation-sharingandcoordinationprocessesdotheactorsinthesupportrelationshipusetosupportinvestigations?
• Doyouhaveaprocessforconductingjointinvestigationswithyourpartner?
• Whichmeasuresmustbetakenduringoperationstoallowforpotentialinvestigationsandprosecutions?
• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoconductbattledamageassessments?
• Doesyourpartnerhavethecapacitytoinvestigateexplosiveincidents(e.g.post-blast,post-strike)?
• WhatprocessdoyourpersonnelfollowtoreportpossibleIHLviolationsbypartnerforces?
• Doyouhaveaneffectiveprocessfordiscussingcredibleallegationsofmisconductbyyourpartnerwithitshierarchy?
• Howdoesyourpartnerhandlecredibleallegationsofmisconductbyitspersonnel?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveeffectivemechanismstoensureaccountabilityforactionstakenbythemorontheirbehalf?
• Whatsystemdoyouhaveforaddressingpotentialmisconductbyyourpartnerorotherproblemsinthe relationship?
• DothelawsofyourStateallowyoutoprosecuteandholdpartnerforcesaccountableiftheycommitinternationalcrimes?
• Doyourmonitoringmechanismsensuresufficientevidencecanbecollectedforpossiblelegal investigations?
• Towhichactor(s)isthePMSCaccountable?
• WhatsystemisinplacetoholdthePMSCaccountableforviolationsofapplicablelaw?
• Isthereanindependentmechanismtoreceivecomplaintsfromindividualsorcivilsocietyorganizationsconcerningtheactivitiesofeitherthesupportingactororthesupportedparty?
• Istheindependentmechanismtoreceivecomplaintseasilyaccessibleandsafeforindividualstouseinviewoftheirpossiblevulnerabilities?
• Howdoesyourpartnerhandleinformationonpotentialviolationsfromindividualsorcivil-societyorganizations?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveaprocessforremedyingharmcausedbyitsmilitaryoperations?
• Doesthepartner’ssystemincludethepossibilityofcompensatingvictimsandtheirfamilies?
• Howistheinformationyourecordintegratedintolearning,trainingand,whereappropriate,investigations?
Detention
• Doyouhavemechanismstoassesstheriskoftransferringdetaineestoyourpartners?
• Whatmeasuresaretheretopreventtheuseoftortureandill-treatmentbyyourpartner?
• Doyouhaveprocessestoassesshowdetaineesaretreatedoncetheyaretransferredtothesupportedpartyandthentochannelanycredibleallegationsofmisconduct?
General questions
148 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
• Whatmeasuresdoyoutakeifyoureceivecredibleallegationsofill-treatmentbyyourpartnerofpersonswhomyoutransferred?
• Doyouconductpost-transfermonitoringvisits?
• Doyouensurethatindependentmonitoringbodies,inparticulartheICRC,haveunimpededaccesstoallplacesofdetentionthatholddetaineesyoutransferred?
Health care
• Howisthequalityofcareprovidedbymilitarymedicalcounterpartsmonitored?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Doyouhavevisibilityonyourpartner’soperations?
• HowdoyoudeterminewhetherthesupportyouprovideisusedincompliancewithIHL?
• Whatcriteriadoyouuseovertimetoreview,modifyorterminateasupportrelationship?
• HowwillyoumonitorandreviewthemeasuresputinplacebyyouandthepartnertoimproverespectforIHL?
• Beforetransferringarms,doyourequireyourpartnertoagreetopost-shipmentverifications?
• Haveyoudeployedsufficientresourcestomonitorandevaluatewhatishappeningintheconflict,includingyourpartner’sconduct?
• Haveyouinstructedyourarmedforcestomonitorandevaluatetheconductofpartnerforcesduring hostilities?
• Dotheunitsassignedtotraining,advisoryorassistancemissionshavethecapacitytomonitorandevaluatepartnerforces?
• Aretheunitsassignedtotraining,advisoryorassistancemissionsinstructedandtrainedtoproactivelyidentify,collectandreportallegationsofIHLviolationsbytheirpartnerforces?
• Aretheresourcesthatyouhavedeployedqualifiedtomonitorandevaluateyourandyourpartner’sconduct?
• Aretheresourcesthatyouhavedeployedqualifiedtoinvestigateanyallegedmisconductbyyourpartner?
• HowwillpossibleIHLviolationsbeinvestigatedeffectively?
• Whatsafeguardshaveyouputinplacetoprotectindividualsorgroupsthatmakeallegationsagainstthesupportedparty?
• Willyoubepresentwhenthesupportedpartyplansandconductsmilitaryoperations?
• Haveyouputinplacejointafter-actionreviewprocesseswiththeauthoritytoevaluateallpositiveandnegativeaspectsofoperationsandtakeconcretemeasurestoadoptremedialmeasures?
• Willyouengage,whereappropriate,directlywithcivilians,peopledeprivedoftheirlibertyandothersaffectedbythearmedconflictinordertounderstandandassessthesupportedparty’sconduct?
• Doyoumaintainsomeoversightoverthemeasurestakenbyyourpartnertoaddresscivilianharm?
• Doyourequireend-usercertificatesasaconditionforyourarmstransfers?
• Doyouhaveasystemtomonitoryourpartner’suseorreporteduseofarmsyoutransfertoit?
• Doyouhaveasystemtomonitoryourpartner’suseorreporteduseofthecategoryofarmsyouintendtotransfertoit?
• Doyouhaveasystemtoensurethatpastconductisfactoredintoriskassessments?
• Doesyourrisk-assessmentprocesstakeintoaccountpastconductthatcouldpotentiallyamounttoaviolationofIHL?
• Whentransferringarms,doyourpersonnelhavethecapacitytoundertakepost-shipmentverificationsintherecipientState?
• WhatmeasureshaveyouincludedinthecontractwiththePMSCtoensureaccountability?
• IsthePMSCyouhiredcoveredbyanyrelevantorapplicablestatusofforcesagreements?
• DoyouhaveeffectivemeasuresformonitoringtheconductofPMSCsyouhire?
• Doesyouroversightovercivilianharmmitigationmeasuresmakegooduseofyourpartner’slocal knowledge?
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 149
• Doyoudeploypersonneltomentorpartnerpersonnelinidentifyingandcorrectingproblematicpractices?
• Doyouhaveaqualitymanagementsystemtoassessyourpartner’sPSSM?
• Doyouhaveasystemofongoingperiodicqualityassuranceandqualitycontroltoassessyourpartner’sPSSM?
Detention
• Howistheprincipleofnon-refoulement–includingpre-andpost-transferresponsibilities–integratedintoyoursupportagreements?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Doyouhaveaqualitymanagementsystemtoassessthesupportedparty’sactivityinhumanitarianmineaction?
• Whenengagingathirdpartytoprovideservices(e.g.contaminationsurveys,theclearanceofERW,risk-awarenessandsafe-behaviourtraininginaffectedcommunities,orstockpiledestruction),howdoesthecontractofengagementprovideforpartneredpersonneltoreceive mentoring?
• Doyouhaveaqualitymanagementsystemtoassessyourpartner’sactionsintheareaofexplosiveordnancedisposal?
• Doyouhaveanongoingperiodicquality-assuranceandquality-controlsystemtoassessyourpartner’shumanitarianmineaction?
• Doyouhaveasystemofongoingperiodicqualityassuranceandqualitycontroltoassessyourpartner’sactionsintheareaofexplosiveordnancedisposal?
Questions for supported parties
General
• Doesthesupportingactorhaveeffectiveoversightandaccountabilitymechanisms?
• Doyoukeepcompleterecordsofallarmsandequipmentreceivedfrompartners?
• Howdoyouensurethatarmsandothermilitaryequipmentprovidedtoyourforcesarenotlostor resold?
• Willyousetupaseparateprogrammeforcompensationforcivilianharmofyourmilitaryoperations,orwillyouintegrateitintoanexistingsystem?
• Hasyourpartnertakenmeasurestoremedyanyharmitcauseswhilesupportingyourarmedforces?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• HaveyoutakenparticularmeasurestoreducetheimpactoflandminesandexplosiveERWoneffortstorecoverandidentifythedeadormissing,providemedicalcareandrepairandmaintainessentialinfrastructure?
• Howdoyoumanagereportingproceduresinaccordancewiththird-partycontracts?
General questions
150 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
7.2.5 INTERNAL OVERSIGHT • DoyouhaveaprocedureforeffectivelyinvestigatingallpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourarmedforcesorpersonnel,includinginthecontextofasupportrelationship?
• Whatisyourprocessforreviewingyourowndecisionstoprovideorreceivesupport?
• Dootherpartsofthegovernmenthavethepowertocheckthatthesupportrelationshipisplannedandimplementedinaccordancewithinternationalanddomesticlaw?
General questions
General
• WhatmechanismsdoyouhavetoidentifypotentialsystemicissuesrelatingtoIHLandtheprotectionofciviliansandothersnotfighting?
• Doyouhavethenecessarylawsandregulations,aswellasthecapacity,toconducteffectiveinvestigationsintopossibleIHLviolationsandotherviolationscommittedinanarmedconflict?
• Doyouhaveaccesstothereportsgeneratedbyyourpartner’scivilianharmtrackingmechanism?
• Howarethereportsgeneratedbythecivilianharmtrackingmechanismusedinadministrativeandcriminalinvestigations?
• DoyourreportingproceduresallowforyourpersonneltoreportpossibleIHLviolationswhileoperatinginasupportrelationship?
• WhatistheprocessforyourpartnertoreportpossibleIHLviolationsbyyourpersonnel?
• Doyouhavethecapacitytoinvestigateexplosiveincidentsinvolvingyourpersonnel(e.g.post-blast,post-strike)?
• DoyousharewithyourpartnerthefindingsofanyreportsorinvestigationsintopossibleIHLviolations?
• WhatmechanismsensurethatPMSCsareselectedandhiredwithproperoversightandtransparency?
• Doesyourgovernancestructure(parliamentaryorother)haveadequateknowledgeoftheoperationsbeingconductedandtheauthoritytorequestandreceiveinformationsothatitcanshapeandframethewayinwhichsupportisprovided?
• DoesyourjudicialsystemhavethecapacityandauthoritytoconsiderquestionsofcompliancewithIHLandotherrelevantlawsandtoprosecuteseriousviolationsofIHLcommittedbyyournationalsoronyourterritory?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Doyouhaveanationalmineactionauthority?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Whatreviewproceduresdoyouapplytotheconductofspecialforcesoverseas?
• Canelectedrepresentativesaskquestionsaboutthegovernment’sdecisiontoprovidesupport?
• Whatmechanismsdoyouhavetoreviewdecisionsandconductrelatingtotheprovisionofsupportanditsimpactonciviliansandothersnotfighting?
• Doyouhavemechanismsforyourgovernancestructure(parliamentaryorother)tooverseethebehaviourofallforcesprovidingsupport?
• Doesthisoversightalsocoverspecial,paramilitaryandintelligenceforces?
Questions for supported parties
General
• WhatcapacitydoyouhavetoinvestigatepossibleIHLviolationscommittedduringjointoperationswiththesupportingactor?
• Woulditbefeasibletoestablishajointinvestigativeandaccountabilitymechanism?
• Whatmechanismsdoyouhavetoreviewdecisionsandconductrelatingtothereceiptofsupportanditsimpactonciviliansandthosenolongerfighting?
• Dothesereviewmechanismsapplytoallagenciesreceivingsupport?
General questions
General questions
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 151
• Doesyourarmedforces’leadershiphaveawaytoreviewtheirmembers’conductduringsupportoperations?
• Doyouhavemechanismsforyourgovernancestructure(parliamentaryorother)tooverseethebehaviourofallforcesbeingsupported?
• Doesthisoversightalsocoverspecial,paramilitaryandintelligenceforces?
• Doesitapplytoallexistingforcesandthosenewlygeneratedbysupportingactors?
• Doesyourjudicialsystemhavethecapacityandauthoritytoreviewtheconductofthemilitaryandallotherrelevantagenciesandhowthatconductisshapedbysupportingactors?
152 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
7.3 TRANSITION7.3.1 STRUCTURED DISENGAGEMENT • DoesthesupportedpartydependonthesupporttocomplywithIHL,andwhatcanyoudotoensureitremainscompliantonceyoursupportends?
• Whatotherfunctionsthatthesupportingactorfulfilstopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflictwillneedtobeassumedbythesupportedpartyoranotheractorwhenthesupportends?
• Howwillthesupportedparty’sintentiontocomplywithIHLandotherrelevantstandardsbeaffectedifthesupportrelationshipchangesorends?
• Haveyouagreedonresponsibleresourcedisengagementmeasures(suchasDDRprogrammesorarmsmanagementprogrammes)toputintoplace?
• Howwillyouassessandmitigatetheriskofharmtomembersofyourpartner’sarmedforcesandtheirfamiliesorcommunitiesoncethesupportorconflictends?
General questions
General
• Whatinternalcoordinationisneededwithotherrelevantcivilianservicesandinstitutionstoensurethatpeopleaffectedbythearmedconflictcontinuetobeprotectedbothduringandafterthetransition?
• HasaDDRprogrammebeenestablishedbylaw?
• IstheDDRprogrammepartofaregionalpeaceprocessthatisinclusiveofallparties?
Missing persons
• Willyourpartner’snationalbureauofinformation(orequivalent)continuetooperateafter theconflict?
Essential services
• Isthereaplaninplacetorestorecriticalcivilianinfrastructurethatwasdamagedasaresultoftheconflict?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• Hasastockpiledestructionphasebeenincludedinathird-partycontractoroperationsorder?
• Doyouhavealogisticsplanforthestockpiledestructionphase,includinganappropriatedisposalplanforWAM?
• Isthereacrediblehumanitarianmineactionprogrammeinplace?
• Whatinternalorexternalagencieswillcompletethesurveyandclearanceplan?
• Whatistheprojectedscopeofworkforthesurveyandclearanceactivities(e.g.expectedlevelofweaponscontamination)?
• Whatareyourpartner’sammunitiondisposalcapabilities?
• Whatproceduresdoyouhavetomanageammunitioninventories,thedestructionofstockpilesofopenedandunusedammunitionandthesafetransportandmovementofanyremainingammunitionstockpiles?
• Doesyourpartnerhaveadata-managementsystemtorecord,forexample,clearancerates (timetoclearandterritorycleared),numbersandtypesofweaponscleared,risk-awarenessandsafe-behaviourprogrammesandminevictimdata?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Arethereparametersinplacethatwillhelptodeterminewhenthesupportrelationshipwillend,orhasanenddatebeenset?
• Willthesupportedparty’sinstitutionshavethecapacitytocontinueoperatingonitsownwithoutyoursupport?
• Haveyouconsideredhowendingyoursupportwillaffectthesupportedparty’scapacityandwillingnesstocomplywithIHLandotherrelevantstandards?
General questions
Missing
General questions
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 153
• Canyoumitigatetransition-relatedrisksthroughotherformsofengagement(e.g.diplomaticeffortsordevelopmentaid)?
• Whatotherfunctionsdoyoufulfiltopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflict?Howwillyouensurethatthesefunctionsareassumedbythesupportedpartyoranotheractorwhenyoursupportends?
• Isthereariskthatfamiliesorcommunitiesperceivedtobealignedwithyourforcesorthesupportedpartywillfaceharmfromotherswhenyouwithdrawyoursupportorpresence?Howwillyoumitigatethisrisk?
• Howwillyouassessandmitigatetherisksfacedbymembersofyourpartner’sforcesandtheirfamiliesorcommunitiesoncethesupportorconflictends?
• Whereapplicable,haveyouagreedwiththesupportedpartyontheirinclusioninaDDRprogramme?
• DoestheDDRprocesstakeintoaccountthespecificneedsandrisksofthemostvulnerablegroups,suchaschildrenassociatedwitharmedgroups,foreignersandfemalecombatantsorfighters?
• DoestheDDRprocesstakeintoaccountthespecificneedsandrisksarisingfromthedetentionofvulnerablegroupssuchaschildrenassociatedwitharmedgroupsandforeigners?
• IstheDDRprogrammesufficientlyfundedandresourced?Isthereonebodyinchargeofit?
• Howwillyoumonitortheeffectivenessofthedisarmament,demobilizationandreintegration(DDR)programme?
• Areallweaponsandothermilitaryequipmentfullyaccountedfor,asrequiredbytheDDRprogramme?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhaveadequatestockpilemanagementprocessestopreventitsarmsstockpilesbeinglostordiverted?
Detention
• Whatmeasureswillyouputinplacetoensurethatprotectivestandardsgoverningdetaineetreatmentanddetentionconditions,especiallyforvulnerablegroups,willbemaintainedafteryoursupportends?
• Doesthesupportedpartyhavetheinfrastructure,resources,proceduresandtrainingneededtoensurehumanetreatmentandconditionsinplaceswherepeoplemaybeheld,includingplacesofdetention?
• Willyourdepartureharmtheabilityofimpartialhumanitarianorganizationstoaccessdetaineesandplacesofdetention?
Missing persons
• Hasyourpartnerestablishedadedicatedmechanismforclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofpeoplewhowentmissingduringorasaresultoftheconflictandforattendingtotheirfamilies’needs?
• Doesthismechanismincludeproceduresforfamiliestoreportmissingrelativesandreceiveinformationonthefateandwhereaboutsoftheirmissinglovedonesaftertheconflict?
Health care
• Howwillyourdepartureaffecttheabilityofsupportedpartiestocollectandcareforthewounded andsick?
• Howwillyourdepartureaffectthecapacityoflocalfacilitiestoprovidemedicaltreatmenttopeoplein need?
• Whatisyourexitstrategywhenyoudecidetoendassistancetoamilitarymedicalpartner?
Essential services
• Doesthesupportedpartydependonyoursupporttoprovideanyessentialservices?Howwillyouensurethattheseservicesaremaintainedonceyoursupportends?
Landmines and explosive remnants of war
• WhatWAMmechanismsdoyouhavewithrespecttoanyarmstobesoldorgiftedtoyourpartner?
• Canyouprovideassistancewiththedetection,markingandremovalofminesandERWinaccordancewithhumanitarianstandards?
Missing
154 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Questions for supported parties
General
• Canyourpartner’ssupportberedirectedfromthesecuritysectortoothergovernmentdepartmentsoragenciesinordertoassistwiththeaftermathoftheconflict?
• Whatfunctionsdoesthesupportingactorfulfiltopromotetheprotectionofpeopleaffectedbyconflictthatyouwillneedtoassumewhenitssupportends?
Missing persons
• Haveyouestablishedadedicatednationalmechanismforclarifyingthefateandwhereaboutsofpeoplewhowentmissingduringorasaresultoftheconflictandforattendingtotheirfamilies’needs?
• Doesthisnationalmechanismincludeproceduresforfamiliestoreportmissingrelativesandreceiveinformationonthefateandwhereaboutsoftheirmissinglovedonesaftertheconflict?
General questions
Missing
7. QuESTIONS FOR DECISION MAkERS 155
7.3.2 LEARNING • Doyouhaveaprocessforcapturingandmanagingobservationsandlessonslearnedthroughoutthesupportrelationship?
• DoesthelearningprocessallowyoutoidentifyissuesrelatingtoIHLandtheprotectionofthosenotfighting?
• Doyouhaveaprocessforfindingrootcausesanddevelopingremedialactions?
• Howdoyoumakesurethelessonsidentifiedorlearnedarecorrectlyimplemented?
• Doesyourlearningprocessallowyoutoidentify,captureandincorporatelessonsinordertoimproveanongoingsupportrelationship?
• Howwillyouincorporateyourpartner’sfeedbackinthelearningprocess?
• Doyoushareyourlessonswithotherpartnersorallies,orotherparties,inordertoimprovesupport-relationshippractices?
General questions
General
• Whatlessonshaveyouincorporatedintothisrelationshipfrompreviousexperience?
• Howdoyoumakesurethelessonsidentifiedorlearnedarecorrectlyimplemented?
• Doyouhaveaprocessforcapturingandmanagingobservationsthroughoutthesupportrelationship?
• Doyouperformafter-actionreviews?
• Whatarepossibleareasforremedialactions?
• Doyoushareyourlessonswithotherpartnersorallies,ormorewidely,inordertocontributetobestpractices?
• CanyoualsosharelessonslearnedfromPMSCswithpartners?
• Doyouhaveaprocessforfindingrootcausesanddevelopingremedialactions?
• Doesyourlearningprocessallowyoutoidentify,captureandincorporatelessonsinordertoimproveanongoingsupportrelationship?
• Howdoyoucaptureyourpartner’sinputonyourlearningprocess?
• Howdoyouincorporateyourpartner’sfeedbackinthelearningprocess?
• Howdoyoukeeprecordsoflessonslearned?
• Doyouhaveaprocessforreviewinganylessonslearnedwithyourpartner?
• Howwilllessonslearnedfromasupportrelationshipfeedintofuturepartneringdecisions?
Questions for supporting actors
General
• Doyouhavealearningprocessthatrequiresyoutoreviewyoursupportrelationships?
• Arelessonslearnedsharedamongcoalitionmembers?
• Doyoumaintainarepositoryoflessonslearnedthatgobeyondaspecificconflictsituation?
• Isacentralunitinchargeofidentifyinglessonslearnedattheendofaconflictorofasupportrelationshipinformedofmisstepsbythesupportedparty(misconduct,improperuseofsupport,etc.)?
• HowdoyousharelessonslearnedfromtheperformanceofaPMSCwithothergovernmentagenciesthatmayhiresuchcompanies?
Questions for supported parties
General
• Isalessons-learnedprocessrequiredunderthesupportagreement?
• Doyouhaveasystemforidentifyingproblemsthatariseduringorasaresultofyouroperations?
General questions
General questions
General questions
156 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
GLOSSARYThefollowingtermsaredefinedforthepurposesofthisdocument.Althoughsomeofthetermsusedhaveabasisinlaw,nothinginthisglossaryisintendedtoconferlegalmeaningtotheseterms.
AccountabilityThistermisusedinthecontextofpracticalmeasurestodescribeoneoftwothings:measuresbywhichoneactorinasupportrelationshipisheldaccountablebytheother,ormeasuresbywhichasupportingactorisheldaccountablebyitsownstakeholders(e.g.parliamentorconstituents).
Armed groupAnoperationaltermthat,fortheICRC,includesabroadrangeofgroupswithvaryinggoals,structures,doctrines,fundingsources,militarycapacityanddegreeofterritorialcontrol.ItdenotesagroupthatisnotrecognizedasaStatebutthathasthecapacitytocauseviolenceofhumanitarianconcern.
Includedinthisbroadoperationalcategoryarenon-Statearmedgroups(NSAGs)thatqualifyaspartiestoanon-internationalarmedconflict(NIAC)andarethereforeboundbyinternationalhumanitarianlaw(IHL).Othergroupsinthiscategoryincludepro-governmentparamilitaries(bothlocalandnational),andlocalgroups(tribalorcommunity)thatserveassecurityforcesinalocalarea.
Arms transferAcatch-alltermforthetransfer(includingexport,import,transit,trans-shipmentandbrokering)ofarms,ammunition,andpartsandcomponentsofarmsandammunition.Armstransfersincludecommercialsales,militaryaidorgifts,loansandleases.
Central Tracing AgencyAnorganizationsetupbytheICRCtocollectalltheinformationitcan,throughofficialorprivatechannels,aboutprisonersofwarandprotectedpersons,particularlythosesubjecttointernment,andtotransmitthatinformationtotheircountryoforiginorofresidenceortothePoweronwhichtheydependunlesstransmit-tingthatinformationmightbedetrimentaltothepersonswhomtheinformationconcernsortheirrelatives.
Contracting StateAStatethatdirectlyentersintocontractsfortheservicesofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompanies(PMSCs),includingwherethePMSCsubcontractsanotherPMSC.
Explosive weapons in populated areasExplosiveweaponsthat,becauseofthelargedestructiveradiusoftheindividualmunitionused,theinaccur-acyofthedeliverysystem,and/orthedeliveryofmultiplemunitionsoverawidearea,haveawideimpactareaorwideareaeffectsandarethusverylikelytohaveindiscriminateeffectswhenusedinpopulatedareas.Thesecategoriesofexplosiveweaponsincludelargebombsandmissiles,indirectfireweaponsystemssuchasmortars,rocketsandartillery,multi-barrelrocketlaunchersandcertaintypesofimprovisedexplosivedevices.
Financial supportAformofsupportrelationshipinwhichanactorprovidesdirectorindirectfunding,includingthroughloanagreementsandinvestments,thatsignificantlyenablesthesupportedpartytoengageinarmedconflict.
Force generationAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)inwhichanactor,oftenanexternalState,recruits,trainsandequipslocalarmedforces.
GLOSSARy 157
Home StateTheStateofnationalityofaprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompany(PMSC),i.e.wherethePMSCisregisteredorincorporated.IftheStatewherethePMSCisincorporatedisnottheoneinwhichithasitsprincipalplaceofmanagement,thentheStatewherethePMSChasitsprincipalplaceofmanagement.
HostingAsituationinwhichanactorplacesitsterritoryorfacilitiesatthedisposalofapartytoaconflict.
Institutional capacity supportExternalsupportforinstitutionsthatisoftenlongterminnature.Suchprogrammesaretypicallyrelevanttosupportrelationshipswhentheyrelatetomilitaryacademies,detentionandjudicialsectorreform.
Intelligence supportAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)inwhichpartnersshareintelligence,i.e.informationofmilitarysignificancetoaconflict.
Internally displaced persons (IDPs)Peoplewhohavebeenforcedorobligedtoleavetheirhomesbehind,notablyforreasonsrelatedtoarmedconflictorotherviolence,andwhoremainwithinthebordersoftheircountry.
Kinetic supportAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)wherethesupportingactorengagesinhostilitiesinsupportofapartytoaconflict.
Logistical supportAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)involvingthemaintenanceandtransportationofmaterial,facilitiesandpersonnel.
National information bureauAninstitutionoperatingonthenationalleveltocollectinformationregardingthefateofprotectedpersons.Itregistersthisinformation,conductssearchesandtransmitstheinformationthroughtheprotectingpower,theICRCortheNationalRedCrossorRedCrescentSocietiesoftheStateconcerned.
Partnered detention operationsAformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)thatconsistsofactivitiesthatcontributetothecapture-anddetention-relatedactivitiesofapartytoaconflict,includingcapacitybuilding.
Peace forcesMilitaryandcivilianpersonneldeployedonmultilateraloperationsconductedbytheUnitedNationsorother-wiseauthorizedbytheUnitedNationsSecurityCouncilforpeace-enforcementorpeacekeepingpurposes.
Partnered military operation (PMO)Aformalarrangementbetweenpartnerstoachieveaspecificmilitaryaiminconflict.
Private military and security company (PMSC)Aprivatebusinessentitythatprovidesmilitaryand/orsecurityservices,irrespectiveofhowtheydescribethemselves.Militaryandsecurityservicesinclude,inparticular,armedguardingandprotectionofpersonsandobjects,suchasconvoys,buildingsandotherplaces;maintenanceandoperationofweaponssystems;prisonerdetention;andadvicetoortrainingoflocalforcesandsecuritypersonnel.69
69 TheMontreuxDocumentonpertinentinternationallegalobligationsandgoodpracticesforStatesrelatedtooperationsofprivatemilitaryandsecuritycompaniesduringarmedconflict,17September2008,https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/en/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20192511-montreux-document_EN.pdf.
158 ALLIES, PARTNERS AND PROXIES
Political supportPoliticalexpressionsofsupportforapartytoanarmedconflictthataffecttheparty’scapacitywithinthearmedconflict.
Populated areaAnyconcentrationofciviliansorofciviliansandcivilianobjects,inacity,town,villageornon-built-uparea,whetherpermanentortemporary.
Support relationship (in armed conflict)Arelationshipinwhichanactorprovidessupporttoapartytoanarmedconflictthatincreasestheparty’scapacitytoconductarmedconflict.
Supported partyApartytoanarmedconflictthatreceivessupportfromanotheractorthatincreasesitscapacitytoconductarmedconflict.ThesupportedpartymaybeaState(includingwithinacoalition),internationalorganizationornon-Statearmedgroup(NSAG).
Supporting actorAState,internationalorganizationornon-Stateactorthatprovidessupporttoapartytoanarmedconflictthatincreasestheparty’scapacitytoconductarmedconflict.Thesupportingactormayalsobeapartytothearmedconflict,althoughthisisnotadefiningfeature.
Train, advise, assist, accompany (TAAA)Aformofpartneredmilitaryoperation(PMO)inwhichanactortrains,trainsandequips,advisesandassists,oraccompaniespartnerforces.
Territorial StateTheStateonwhoseterritoryoperationsoccur.KnowninsomecasesasthehostState.
BIBLIOGRAPHy 159
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