****ALLIES DA: Japan—Usable for Kentucky****

Neg

1NCThe plan is a space shock that crushes US/Japan relations and causes Asian arms racesDean Cheng 9, Senior Research Fellow in the Asia Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, Former Senior Analyst at the China Studies Division of the Center for Naval Analyses, Former Senior Analyst with Science Applications International Corporation, “Reflections On Sino-US Space Cooperation”, Space and Defense, Volume 2, Number 3, Winter 2009, https://www.usafa.edu/app/uploads/Space_and_Defense_2_3.pdfBroader International ImplicationsBeyond the bilateral difficulties of cooperating with the PRC, it is also important to consider potential ramifications of Sino-US cooperation in space on the Asian political landscape. In particular, coop eration between Washington and Beijing on space issues may well arouse concerns in Tokyo and Delhi. Both of these nations have their own space programs, and while they are arguably not engaged in a “space race” with China (or each other), they are certainly keeping a close eye on developments regarding China .Of particular importance is Japan. The U nited S tates relationship with Japan is arguably its most important in East Asia.

US interest in Japan should be self evident. Japan hosts 47,000 US troops and is the linchpin for forward US presence in that hemisphere. Japan is the second largest contributor to all major international organizations that buttress US foreign policy …. Japan is the bulwark for US deterrence and engagement of China and North Korea —the reason why those countries cannot assume that the United States will eventually withdraw from the region.35

For Japan, whose “peace constitution” forbids it from using war as an instrument of state policy, the U nited S tates is an essential guarantor of its security. Any move by the US that might undermine this view raises not only the prospect of weaken ing US-Japanese ties , but also potentially affecting Japan’s security policies . In this regard, then, it is essential not to engage in activities that would undercut perceptions of American reliability . Such moves , it should be noted, are not limited to those in the security realm. For example , the Nixon administration undertook several initiatives in the

late 1960s and early 1970s that rocked Tokyo-Washington relations , and are still remembered as the “Nixon shocks.” While some of these were in the realm of security (including Nixon’s opening to China and the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine), the others were in the trade area. These included a ten percent surcharge on all imports entering the US and suspended the convertibility of the dollar (i.e., removed the US from the gold standard).36

Part of the “shock” was the fundamental nature of these shifts. Even more damaging , however, was the failure of the Nixon Administration to consult their Japan ese counterparts, catching them wholly off-guard . It took several years for the effects of these shocks to wear off. If the U nited

S tates is intent upon expand ing space relations with the PRC , then it would behoove it to consult Japan , in order to minimize the prospect of a “space shock.” Failing to do so may well incur a Japanese reaction . The decision on the part of Japan to build an explicitly intelligence-focused satellite was in response to the North Korean missile test of 1999, suggesting that Tokyo is fully capable of undertaking space-oriented responses when it is concerned.37 That , in turn, would potentially arouse the ire of China . The tragic history of Sino-Japanese relations continues to cast a baleful influence upon current interactions between the two states. If there is no t a “space race” currently underway between Beijing and Tokyo, it would be most unfortunate if American actions were to precipitate one .

Japan will develop offensive strike in response---nuclear warKelly C. Wadsworth 19, Non-Resident Kelly Fellow at Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic & International Studies, PhD Student in International Security Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, MBA and MA in International Studies (Korea Studies) at the University of Washington, Former Visiting Fellow at the Japan Institute of International Affairs, BA in International Relations and East Asia from the University of California, Davis, “Should Japan Adopt Conventional Missile Strike Capabilities?”, Asia Policy, Volume 14, Number 2, April 2019, p. 83-87American proponents of Japan obtaining a conventional missile strike capability interviewed for this research argued that the United States could use a more capable ally in the region to address the threat posed by heightened Chinese naval activity. While that prospect might be a tempting short-term fix to offset the U.S. Department of Defense budget cuts over the last decade, the long-term interests of the United States in maintaining regional stability should also be considered. In addition to the negative reactions of Beijing and Seoul, a Japanese offensive strike capability could decrease regional confidence in the credibility of U.S. power in Asia . As

noted above, some experts argue that if Japan strengthens its offensive capability, such a move might be interpreted by neighbors reliant on the U.S. nuclear umbrella as a sign that Tokyo is losing confidence in the U nited S tates’ credibility.71 This could start a chain reaction that causes more U.S. allies to hedge with China or to develop their own strike capabilities , further increasing instability in Asia .China. China would likely be the most vocal in its disapproval of a Japanese conventional missile strike capability, potentially

offering not just harsh words but also harsh actions that could further decrease regional stability in an already tense security environment . China expressed dissent when Japan considered a preemptive strike option against the North Korean threat in 2006, arguing that the move was “extremely irresponsible” and would severely interfere with international diplomatic efforts, aggravating tensions in Northeast Asia.72 Over ten years later, the regional environment is even more tense as a result of North Korea’s acquisition of nuclear weapons and China’s island reclamation efforts in the E ast and S outh C hina S eas. Support from

Washington for Tokyo’s armament would likely fuel Beijing’s narrative that an aggressive and hegemonic United States is fixated on containing China and would be used to justify China’s own increased militarization. It would likely also end any chance of dialogue between Washington and Beijing on facilitating peaceful resolutions to regional territorial disputes .Brad Roberts points out that adopting strike capability would assist Japan in cases where its interests do not align with those of the United States, as in potential gray-zone conflicts. 73 However, the ensuing heightened mistrust between the alliance partners and China may work to increase the likelihood of a gray-zone conflict —such

as the 2010 collision of Japanese and Chinese boats in disputed territory—possibly escalating into war . In addition, if Japan had a conventional missile strike capability that could be used to “preempt” a perceived imminent attack from China, Beijing would in turn be more likely to consider preempt ion of Japanese strike abilities, causing a premature escalation of the crisis that would undoubtedly draw in the U nited S tates .

South Korea. Despite significant progress on U.S.-ROK-Japan trilateral security cooperation in recent years, Japan-ROK military relations remain increasingly tense, a situation that could easily spiral out of control if Japan adopted an offensive capability .74 When Japan, sparked by North Korea’s provocations in 2006, publicly debated the legality of a “preemptive strike” option, South Korean officials bluntly expressed their negative opinion of Japan’s intentions. A spokesperson for the Blue House secretariat, for example, remarked, “We have been alerted by this display of Japan’s inclination to aggression,” and that Japan was using the crisis “as an excuse to beef up their military.”75 South Koreans demonstrated a similar sentiment after Tokyo’s 2014 CSD proposal, with a 2015 poll showing that the majority of the public (56.9%) perceived Japan as “militaristic,” up 3.8 percentage points from the previous year.76 If Tokyo were to push forward with the discussion of adopting a conventional missile strike capability, South Korean public opinion would likely become even more unfavorable toward Japan.

At a time when enhanced trilateral coop eration is important to deter the evolving threats in the region, Japan advancing legislation to allow for conventional missile strike

capabilities would likely derail those efforts , especially if labeled “preemptive.” Such a move could even push Seoul to hedge with Beijing , as the ROK is increasingly reluctant to join any initiative perceived to be aimed at containing China.77 With China as South Korea’s largest trading partner and the United States as its greatest security ally, the ROK is not eager to choose between the two sides.Southeast Asia. Countries in Southeast Asia are watching the Trump administration closely to see where Washington will draw the line on China’s military rise and growing regional assertiveness, and many are already hedging accordingly. For example, countries such as Vietnam and the Philippines are increasing their own conventional arsenal and naval capabilities as a result of Washington’s “slow erosion of credibility” in the region during the Obama administration.78 Defense of Japan 2018 seems to have confidence in the Trump administration’s commitment to maintaining a powerful presence in Asia.79 However, as discussed earlier, if Japan were to pursue an offensive defense strategy, the Southeast Asian countries could see this as a sign of Tokyo’s loss of faith in the U nited S tates’ willingness to uphold its defense commitments. China’s seizure of the Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines in 2012 has already eroded these countries’ confidence in the U.S. security guarantee to some extent.80 Declining cred ibility and corresponding hedging—through either growing armament or alignment with China—could not only further increase tensions and heighten the risk of a gray-zone escalation but also lead to greater Chinese military assertiveness and dominance in the region .SummaryDespite the seemingly unbalanced nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance, the argument for “balancing” the alliance with Japan’s development of an independent conventional missile strike capability does not take into account

important repercussions that could undermine both regional stability and U.S. credibility . In addition, updated Japanese defense guidelines, such as CSD, already give Japan a “greater role” in global security. Unless future U.S. administrations drastically reduce the U.S. military presence in Asia, the benefit of a more equal alliance would not outweigh the potential costs of Japan’s adoption of a conventional missile strike capability.CONCLUSIONThe arguments supporting Japan’s acquisition of a conventional missile strike capability do not hold weight in the current regional, economic, and alliance environments. The development of such a capability is not a practical solution for Japan to abate the threat from the DPRK, and the move could be perceived by China and South Korea as facilitating a U.S. strategy of containment. Traditional restrictions on the Japanese defense budget would not practically allow the buildup of the military capabilities required for a conventional missile strike force, a restriction that cannot be changed without support from a military-wary public. At first glance, a “normal” Japan that is capable of contributing to U.S. deterrence efforts might seem appealing from an alliance perspective, especially after the 2010 U.S. defense budget cuts, and an increasingly threatening regional security environment. Yet, though the U.S.-Japan alliance may be unbalanced in terms of capabilities, the United States has broader interests in regional stability that will be better promoted if Japan maintains a purely defensive force. A strike-capable Japan might not only escalate an already tense regional standoff with China but also elicit a harsh response from other countries against Tokyo and Washington. It could also erode the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella, potentially leading to increased militarization throughout Asia .

If the environment surrounding any of these three arguments changes —for example, if the U nited S tates’ actions discredit its reliability to protect Japan under the alliance , if Japanese public support allows an increase in the JSDF’s budget, or if the United States can no longer maintain a credible military

deterrence in Asia— Japan would have a strong argument to move forward with conventional missile strike capabilities . In that case, both parties should exercise prudence in their public communications of planned alliance cooperation on the matter and about how or why the alliance would choose to employ such abilities. Hawkish suggestions of the potential to increase U.S. dominance in the region should be avoided.81 China is rightfully wary of any reference to conventional prompt global strike. Such rhetoric coming from Japan or the United States combined with the decision to move forward on conventional missile strike capabilities could be considered a threatening signal by Beijing.82 Without calculated

prudence in regional dialogues, even the discussion of Tokyo acquiring conventional missile strike capabilities could ultimately worsen the regional security environment rather than improve it.

U---Top Level---Yes Assurance---2NCThe alliance is strong, but there’s latent fear of U.S. disengagement---a new China deal triggers a crisisDr. Matteo Dian 19, Professor in the Department of Political and Social Sciences of the University of Bologna, Ph.D. (cum laude) in Political Science from the Scuola Normale Superiore--Italian Institute of Human and Social Sciences, “Tokyo's Strategy, Between China and the U.S.”, About Energy, 7/10/2019, https://www.aboutenergy.com/en_IT/topics/tokyo-strategy.shtml#Abe, Trump and the U.S.-Japan allianceDuring the last decade, and particularly since Shinzo Abe ’s second term as prime minister, Japan has pursued different strategies to respond to China’s ascent. These strategies have focused on efforts at bolstering its alliance with the U nited S tates, which culminated in the approval of new guidelines for defense coop eration between the two countries in 2015, the building of bilateral and multilateral relations with other Asian partners such as through the “Quad” with Australia and India and the development of trans-Pacific forms of economic governance such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP).Donald Trump ’s election as president of the United States has put this multidimensional strategy under serious strain. Both as a presidential candidate and as U.S. president, Trump has repeatedly expressed his skepticism about alliances and has openly accused America’s leading European and Asian partners of exploiting alliances to avoid “paying the bill” in terms of military expenditure. Trump has also voiced his opposition to renewing America’s unconditional commitment to defending its allies, arguing that alliances should be made conditional on possible economic and trade concessions.On the economic front, Trump immediately announced that the U.S. would withdraw from the TPP, a move widely interpreted in the region as benefiting Chinese state capitalism insofar as it brought to an end the attempt to shape the rules of regional economic integration in a way that would foster a form of free market capitalism. The Trump administration, moreover, has imposed tariffs against its allies, including Japan, hitting sectors like steel and aluminum.

Abe’s response has been very clear , with security as his top priority along with the preservation of Japan’s alliance with Washington. Following the November 2016 elections Abe immediately set about establishing a privileged personal relationship with Trump and separating the management of the alliance from the various political and economic problems created by the new American administration .For the time being , Abe ’s strategy has been successful in avoiding a deeper crisis in bilateral relations and has allayed Japanese fears of American disengagement . Also, developments that would be detrimental to Japan , such as a bilateral agreement between the U nited S tates and North Korea in the absence of denuclearization, seem less likely today than in the recent past .This , however, has not completely dissipated the climate of uncertainty characterizing the alliance under President Trump’s Administration. On the one hand, Tokyo fears the danger of “entanglement” if the trade war with China were to lead to increased tension between the two global powers, including in the military sphere, on the other

hand, Japan is concerned about the possibility of being “abandoned” if Trump were prepared to enter into agreements with Beijing that have the potential to damage Japanese interests and security .

U---Yes US/Japan Space CooperationJapan’s actively cooperating with the U.S. on space issues because they see it as so central to the allianceDr. Paul Kallender 19, PhD, Senior Researcher at Keio Research Institute at SFC, and Dr. Christopher W. Hughes, Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies and Pro-Vice-Chancellor, University of Warwick, “Hiding in Plain Sight? Japan’s Militarization of Space and Challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine”, Asian Security, Volume 15, Issue 2, p. 17This article’s analysis has demonstrated systematic and deep challenges to the Yoshida Doctrine’s central tenets in four ways, as summarized again in Table 1. First, it has shown that Japan’s former strategic calculus over security policy is fundamentally shifting, becoming increasingly dominated by international systemic pressures, concerns over abandonment rather than entrapment , the need to more actively maintain alliance ties , and to a build-up of capabilities for internal and external balancing – all indicating a shift to a more proactive military stance.

Second, Japan has embedded space at the forefront of national and US–Japan alliance security strategy and deploys a triad of national space capabilities in launch vehicles, satellites, and counterspace that competes with, or even gains superiority over , if seen in the context of ever-closer interoperability with US space resources, those of its main security adversary China . Japan’s space technologies even now hint at offensive power projection and augmenting a

recessed nuclear option for deterrence by punishment. Thus, Japan is becoming a far more capable and complete military actor overall , especially when combined with the build-up of network-centric-type technologies yielding significant leveraging of JSDF military capabilities to participate in full-spectrum dominance in a range of contingencies, even if the quantitative resource base has not greatly increased.88 These capabilities mark a step change beyond the constrained stance of the Yoshida Doctrine.

Space is currently a united and seamless frontDr. Saadia M. Pekkanen 18, Job and Gertrud Tamaki Professor at the Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies and Adjunct Professor at the School of Law, University of Washington, “The US-Japan Space Alliance — the Most Critical Bilateral Relationship for Peace & Prosperity”, Japan Spotlight, July / August 2018, https://www.jef.or.jp/journal/pdf/220th_Cover_Story_01.pdfPekkanen: I mentioned the US-Japan Space Forum earlier, and how it has had a huge impact on opening my mind to many possible paths forward for the US and Japan as allies in space. If I could bring in the famous saying by Ambassador Mansfield in which he emphasized the importance also of economic and security linkages, I would say that today the US-Japan space alliance is the most important bilateral relationship out there, bar none. There have been a number of steady moves on the part of both countries to deepen their coop eration , especially if you think about the fact that space assets from the ground to the various orbits represent the critical infrastructure for war strategists and fighters back on Earth. Needless to say, the future of the space economy depends on this reality as well. In 2011, the US and Japan issued a joint statement, stating their interest in the protection of and access to space. So

both sides need to devote resources to and work on solidifying a united and seamless front . Ensuring space security means preparing for peace.

U---Yes US/Japan RelationsThe alliance is strongMainichi 9-12 Japan (Japanese Newspaper), “US Eyes Deeper Cooperation With Japan After Cabinet Reshuffle”, 9/12/2019, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190912/p2g/00m/0na/010000cThe U nited S tates expects to "sustain and deepen " its close ties with Japan over regional and global issues, a State Department spokesperson said Wednesday after Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe revamped his Cabinet."U.S.-Japan relations and our alliance are stronger than ever , and we look forward to strengthening our cooperative efforts to ensure peace and prosperity in Asia and around the world," the official said.Abe reshuffled his Cabinet on Wednesday in the latest effort to give a fresh image to his nearly seven-year-old government, while seeking to ensure stability by retaining his key allies.The U.S. administration will likely feel " very comfortable with this lineup," said James Schoff, an expert on Japan-U.S. relations at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Schoff noted that Abe kept the core members of his team , such as Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshihide Suga and Deputy Prime Minister Taro Aso.The senior fellow at the Washington-based think tank also said the "continuity" of the bilateral trade negotiations seems to have been ensured as Toshimitsu Motegi, previously the economic revitalization minister and Japan's top negotiator in the talks, has assumed the post of foreign minister.

Overall ties are strong---there’s alignment on security policyEmma Chanlett-Avery 19, Master’s in International Security Policy from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, Specialist in Asia Policy at the Congressional Research Service, Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs at CRS, and Joshua A. Williams, Research Associate at CRS, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance”, Congressional Research Service Report, 6/13/2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdfA series of provocations by North Korea and increasingly assertive (and at times aggressive) maritime operations by China starting in 2010 highlighted shared concerns about the region and appeared to set the relations hip back on course . These concerns contributed to the return of bipartisan Japanese consensus in support for the alliance by the time the LDP unseated the DPJ as Japan’s party in power in 2012. Meanwhile, the LDP had coalesced around leaders, including Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who supported a more vigorous alliance and accelerating the expansion of Japanese military doctrine and capabilities. In 2015, the U nited S tates and Japan revised their bilateral defense guidelines , which provide a framework for defense cooperation, a demonstration of the enduring strength of the alliance, and a vision for enhanced cooperation in the future. Overall , this trend toward deeper security policy alignment and more integrated military operations has continued into the Administrations of U.S. President Donald J. Trump and Prime Minister Abe. Questions linger, however, about the Japanese public’s appetite for further alliance expansion, as well as if future leaders will embrace the more forward-leaning security posture that Abe has promoted.

Our impact is about strategic cooperation, not just everyday political disputes---that’s strong because China’s the key focus and the U.S. and Japan are lockstep in maintaining a hard lineEmma Chanlett-Avery 19, Master’s in International Security Policy from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, Specialist in Asia Policy at the Congressional Research Service, Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs at CRS, and Joshua A. Williams, Research Associate at CRS, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance”, Congressional Research Service Report, 6/13/2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdfChina Emerges as Central Focus of Alliance

Strategic cooperation between the U nited S tates and Japan has increasingly focused on China as it has emerged as a major regional military power after decades of armed forces modernization fueled by a booming economy and fast-expanding defense budget. Emboldened by its own economic growth and a perception of U.S. decline, Beijing has asserted itself more forcefully in diplomatic and military arenas. This has included direct challenges to Japan ’s territorial claims to and administration of the Senkaku Islands, a set of five islets in the East China Sea contested between Japan, China (which calls them the Diaoyu), and Taiwan (which calls them the Diaoyutai), and Beijing’s ambitious multicontinent infrastructure programs that stretch across Asia and into Africa and seek to tie those regions more firmly to China politically and economically.

In successive Administrations , the U nited S tates has appeared to put more emphasis on its Asia -Pacific strategy as China expands its power and influence . In the early 2010s, as U.S. forces started extracting from wars in the Middle East in 2011, Washington’s attention turned more toward the Asia-Pacific region. The Obama Administration aimed to build trade and strategic connections to the Asia-Pacific through expanded diplomatic, security, and economic engagement with the region. Its “rebalance” policy included, among other initiatives, the proposed 12-country Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) free trade agreement. The Trump Administration withdrew from the TPP, but introduced its own approach to the region, branding it the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The “free and open Indo-Pacific” expanded the geographic boundaries of the region with overtures to India to engage to its east. Embracing this Indo-Pacific construct was seen as affirmation of a vision that Abe had promoted for years, and helped fuel the sense of strategic alignment in the early days of the Trump Administration.15 Both the “rebalance” and the “free and open Indo-Pacific” were broadly understood as a reaction to China’s rise.16 DOD’s Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, issued in June 2019, states that the “primary concern for U.S. security” is “inter-state strategic competition,” particularly from China.17 Confronting the implications of this rise appeared to emerge as the major strategic anchor to the U.S.-Japan alliance.

U.S. and Japanese security strategy and policy documents are closely aligned regarding the perceived challenge posed by China .18 The Trump Administration frames its strategy toward China in terms of “great power competition ,” with the 2017 U.S. N ational

S ecurity S trategy describing China (and Russia) as seeking to “change the international order in their favor” and “challenge American power, influence, and interests, attempting to erode American security and prosperity.”19 A summary of the 2018 U.S. National Defense Strategy asserts that China “seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the near-term and displacement of the United States to achieve global preeminence in the future.”20 Japan’s December 2018 National Defense Program Guidelines acknowledges the United States’ “strategic competition” framework, and asserts “China engages in unilateral, coercive attempts to alter the status quo based on its own assertions that are incompatible with the existing international order.”21

In a clear reference to China, an April 2019 joint statement by the U.S. and Japanese defense

and foreign policy ministers “acknowledged their shared concern that geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”22

Japan’s still strongly committed to the alliance---strategic cooperation is deepeningDr. Adam Liff 19, Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations at the Hamilton Lugar School of Global and International Studies at Indiana University, Ph.D. and M.A. in Politics from Princeton University, and B.A. from Stanford University, “Unambivalent Alignment: Japan’s China Strategy, The US Alliance, and the ‘Hedging’ Fallacy”, International Relations of the Asia-Pacific, July 2019, p. 15-165.4 Strengthening US-Japan security cooperationIn policy terms, far from manifesting increased ambivalence toward Washington, much less a strategic reorientation toward China, since 2010 US-Japan alliance ties and commitments to each other have deepened significantly . Particularly salient developments include institutional reforms to bolster bilateral strategic planning , decision-making, intelligence sharing, and flexible crisis response across a range of scenarios in peacetime, a gray-zone contingency, and actual armed attack. Examples can be found in the 2015 Guidelines for Defense Cooperation, such as its establishment of an Alliance Coordination Mechanism, and calls for expanded cooperation in the cyber and space domains (JMOD, 2017).

Also significant are high-level political commitments to provide mutual support in certain scenarios. In April 2014, President Barack Obama declared that the US-Japan security treaty applies to a contingency between Japan and China over the Senkakus. Another example is the Abe administration’s historic ‘reinterpretation’ of the Article 9 ‘peace clause’ of Japan’s constitution and the Diet’s passage of landmark legislation enabling JSDF to , conditionally, use kinetic force to defend

US forces outside a strict ‘defense of Japan’ scenario. Abe highlighted his take on the significance of this major policy shift for a ‘much stronger’ US-Japan alliance, stating boldly: ‘we can defend each other from now on’ (Japan Times, 2016). Inter alia, the new legislation allows JSDF to use weapons to shoot down a ballistic missile threatening the United States and to aid US military forces defending Japan in peacetime (‘asset protection’ missions) or in the event of armed attack under certain conditions (so-called

‘limited’ collective self-defense). Such legal and policy changes have facilitated a significant expansion of bilateral training and exercises - independent of and together with additional US allies and partners. For example, in 2017 Japan carried out its first-ever maritime and aerial escorts of

US forces, and bilateral exercises tripled relative to 2015 (from 19 to 62). Further indicative of deepening security coop eration have been additional reforms to allied force structure and posture, including US deployments of its most capable assets to Japan (e.g., the first overseas de- ployment of

F-35s in 2017); greater interoperability ; and Japanese commitments to big-ticket purchases of US military equipment (e.g., Aegis Ashore ballistic missile defense) (Liff, 2018, 13-17). The aforementioned 2018 decision to strengthen DDH decks also has alliance implications: it will enable US F-35s to land on, and possibly operate off of, Japanese ships (JMOD, 2018).

Thus, far from reducing or weakening security coop eration with Washington, Japan has actively pursued significantly deeper ties and even rendered possible, and made an implicit political commitment to take on, far greater security risk vis-a-vis its ally than ever before - even beyond a strict ‘defense of Japan' scenario.

Since 2017 , joint statements have reaffirmed key commitments made during the Obama era, including implementation of the 2015 guidelines (MOFA, 2017). Japan’s latest defense plan makes the trend abundantly clear when it asserts that ‘ strengthening Japan’s

relationship with the U nited S tates, which shares universal values and strategic interests, has become more important than ever for Japan’s security’ [emphasis added]. (JMOD, 2018, 12)

U---Yes Assurance---A2: Trump---2NCThis is just talk and campaign rhetoric---actual Trump policy has been solidly behind the allianceEmma Chanlett-Avery 19, Master’s in International Security Policy from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, Specialist in Asia Policy at the Congressional Research Service, Caitlin Campbell, Analyst in Asian Affairs at CRS, and Joshua A. Williams, Research Associate at CRS, “The U.S.-Japan Alliance”, Congressional Research Service Report, 6/13/2019, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33740.pdfThe election of Donald Trump in 2016 stoked fears that the expansion of the alliance could slow. As a candidate , Trump sharply questioned the value of U.S. alliances and criticized Japan specifically , saying it failed to compensate the United States for protection. In 2017 , these fears were somewhat allayed when Abe and Trump appeared to develop close personal rapport and coordinated on responses to North Korean nuclear and missile tests, which proliferated throughout the year. In addition, Trump reaffirmed the alliance’s central aspects early in his Administration, including asserting that Article 5 of the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security covered the Senkaku Islands , which are administered by Japan but also claimed by China and Taiwan.8 (Article 5 states that the allies “would act to meet the common danger” of an “armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan.”9) During his first visit to Japan in November 2017, Trump articulated a U.S. “vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” which echoed Abe’s own concept of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”10 For several months, Abe was presented (and presented himself) as one of Trump’s closest friends among international leaders.11

AT: Cooperation NowThe U.S. is avoiding significant deals with China, especially on security issues---the overall trajectory is toward competition, not co-opDr. Giulio Pugliese 19, Lecturer in War Studies at King's College in London, PhD from the University of Cambridge, M.A. in International Economics and International Relations (Concentrating on East Asian Studies) at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University, “Four Scenarios for U.S.-China Relations and What They Mean for Japan”, Tokyo Review, 5/29/2019, https://www.tokyoreview.net/2019/05/four-scenarios-us-china-relations/Dismay at China’s assertiveness, authoritarian regression, and at its relatively closed economic system has fed into a major U.S. rethink of its China policy. By early 2018 , the U.S. government had unveiled a new set of international and domestic initiatives that underscored U.S.-China strategic competition . The pendulum has rapidly shifted away from a strategy of restraint to one of exaggerated pressure . In fact, while a shift in gears was already in the making thanks to a degree of bipartisan consensus , the Executive Branch- led pushback has been a maximalist one . Many voices even go as far as calling U.S.-China interaction a new kind of Cold War .

In such a Cold War 2.0 scenario, Washington would have very little tolerance for China-related risks, filtering all China -related matters through thick national security lenses . In fact, U.S. policymakers wouldn’t merely pressure Beijing to rectify the trade deficit , abandon large chunks of its state-controlled economic policies , level the playing field and put a halt to direct and indirect i ntellectual p roperty r ights infringement. More ambitiously, Washington would also want to slow down China’s transformation into a leading economy able to compete with the U nited S tates. After all, 120 companies out of the list of Fortune 500 global powerhouses are Chinese (while 126 companies hail from the United States and 52 from Japan) . This scenario – currently in the making through import tariffs, blanket bans against the rollout of Chinese 5G networks, export controls in emerging and foundational technologies and against Huawei itself – would lead to a technological and economic decoupling between the two powers, with major ruptures to global supply chains.Japan would have to navigate between two deeply unpalatable options in such a scenario. Japanese multinationals and small & medium enterprises rely heavily on Chinese demand and regional supply chains. Policymakers in Tokyo would thus need to square the circle between a strong U.S.-Japan alliance and the preservation of deep economic ties with its wealthy neighbor. China’s rise presents opportunities and risks that need to be managed, in some cases with the help of the United States – but Japan will hopefully not get dragged into needless confrontations that entail economic pain and self-fulfilling prophecies that turn China into an enemy. Tokyo must resist a U.S.-China decoupling and brave the stormy Trump seas while teaming up with like-minded European partners to preserve the open global economy in the face of “might makes right” approaches from both sides of the Pacific Ocean. The expected unwillingness of U.S. allies, possibly including Japan, to pick sides in this hypothetical Cold War 2.0 makes this scenario unlikely.Indeed, the above is but the first of four likely scenarios for U.S.-China relations in the medium run. Each of them carries a set of policy implications for Japan and other U.S. allies. Naturally these scenarios are reductionist since appropriately working out the different permutations and possible futures is too complex for the purposes of this article, but these four scenarios can help frame the costs and decisions that Japan may face going forward.The second scenario, and the optimum scenario for Japan, would be sustained U.S. regional engagement, with renewed American commitments to the global commons, including preservation of the multilateral free trade system. In this scenario, the United States would maintain its forward military presence and deter a more assertive China with the help of its allies. In addition, the United States would join the revived Trans-Pacific Partnership and coordinate with Japan, the European Union, and like-minded parties to shape the rules of twenty-first century economic practice, and work together towards the realization of connectivity projects through government financing (rather than rhetoric and MoUs). The aim would not be a zero-sum containment of China, but rather the preservation of a favorable regional balance coupled by joint efforts towards shaping Chinese political and economic behavior in a constructive direction through sticks, carrots, and international norms. One concrete example of such an attitude is Japan’s constructive ambivalence towards the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as Tokyo aims at shaping Chinese government financing towards international standards gearing up to the G-20 Summit.Yet, Japan may want to keep its options open in the face of China’s rise and the relative decline of the United States. In the third scenario, cost-cutting offshore balancing, the United States would shun liberal hegemony in favor of a strategy that plays defense rather than offense, while still aiming to preserve a balance vis-à-vis China. It would do this by retrenching U.S. forward deployment to its islands and protectorates such as Hawaii and Guam and, more cynically, would rely on sympathetic regional powers – such as India and Japan – to preserve the balance. The problem with this strategy is that the Asia-Pacific regional system is effectively unbalanced, as China’s material capabilities outmatch that of all its neighbors.In this scenario, Japan may still rely on U.S. extended deterrence (through the nuclear umbrella) to shore up Japan’s defences, perhaps by further increasing its asymmetric capabilities and making a Chinese invasion of Japanese islands costly, while considerably deepening Japan’s strategic relationships in the Indo-Pacific. To keep its options open, Japan would more proactively push for a dual-hedge between the United States and China. Rather than focus on deterring and confronting China’s influence, Abe’s successors will pursue meaningful engagement of Beijing by conceding to membership of China’s Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank and by openly supporting Xi’s BRI.In the final scenario, a new breed of U.S. policymakers would reason that a U.S.-China confrontation is not worth the massive costs and would therefore pull back U.S. commitments in the region. In this scenario, the United States would retreat to its earlier isolationism while recognizing a Chinese sphere of interest in the Western Pacific. For its part, an aging and depopulated Japan may retrench to its own form of splendid isolationism akin to most of its pre-Meiji history, or bandwagon with a Sino-centric order, not unlike the brief parenthesis during the Ashikaga shogunate (1401-1551). In this scenario, Japan’s role would more closely resemble that of a much more affluent and influential Switzerland that stands aloof from a China-centric regional order through its financial and economic prowess. In the face of persistent antimilitarism and a diffuse nuclear allergy, Japan may be unable to effectively confront Chinese coercive diplomacy. Tokyo would need to make political concessions, such as, at the very least, a public recognition of the existence of a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and a tacit acknowledgement of China’s routine deployments of its forces there.

With the caveat that the above exercise has taken China’s rise and U.S. relative decline as a given, Japan confronts four likely future scenarios: a “G-2” order with China and the U nited S tates acting jointly as the world’s great powers, U.S. offshore balancing, U.S. balancing-plus-engagement, and a

Cold War 2.0 . The final scenario is the most likely as of now, but the indisposition of European allies to lean on the U.S. side is coupled with tepid U.S. public opinion that does not (yet) prioritize a costly containment strategy. The truth is probably in the middle and , following Trump, the U nited S tates will return to a more reasonable ( if still stern er ) China policy to accommodate those concerns – if not by choice, by necessity .

The trend has flipped toward competition, assuring JapanGlen S. Fukushima 19, Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress, Former President of the American Chamber of Commerce in Japan and Deputy Assistant United States Trade Representative for Japan and China, “The U.S.-China Rivalry and Japan”, Japan Times, 1/20/2019, https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/01/20/commentary/world-commentary/u-s-china-rivalry-japan/#.XTorG-hJHbEIn stark contrast to his cordial relationship with Russia, Trump has evinced a hostility toward China as shown by his slapping hundreds of billions of dollars of tariffs on Chinese products exported to the United States. Although the “trade war” between the two countries playing out through the mutual imposition of tariffs has gained the world’s attention, it’s only the tip of the iceberg of the intensifying rivalry between America and China .Changing American viewsOn Oct. 4, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence gave a speech at the Hudson Institute that many have labeled the “Chinese Iron Curtain Speech,” alluding to Winston Churchill’s historic 1946 speech predicting the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. According to Pence, “Beijing is employing a whole-of-government approach to advance its influence and benefit its interests. It’s employing this power in more proactive and coercive ways to interfere in the domestic policies of this country and to interfere in the politics of the United States.”

On Oct. 10, the U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China, a bipartisan commission established in 2000, issued its annual report, finding that “we see an ascendant and increasingly aggressive China, seeking to take center stage in the world, and in so doing, determined to shape new global norms on development, trade, the internet, and even human rights. … China’s authoritarianism at home directly threatens our freedoms as well as our most deeply held values and national interests.”On Nov. 29, the Hoover Institution issued a report titled “Chinese Influence and American Interests: Promoting Constructive Vigilance.” The extensively documented 191-page study was prepared by more than 30 scholars over a 1 1/2 year period. Among the report’s findings is that “China is exploiting America’s openness in order to advance its aims on a competitive playing field that is hardly level. For at the same time that China’s authoritarian system takes advantage of the openness of American society to seek influence, it impedes legitimate efforts by American counterpart institutions to engage Chinese society on a reciprocal basis.”On Dec. 13, U.S. National Security Adviser John Bolton spoke at the Heritage Foundation to explain the administration’s new Africa policy. He stated: “China uses bribes, opaque agreements, and the strategic use of debt to hold states in Africa captive to Beijing’s wishes and demands. Its investment ventures are riddled with corruption, and do not meet the same environmental or ethical standards as U.S. developmental programs. Such predatory actions are sub-components of broader Chinese strategic initiatives … with the ultimate goal of advancing Chinese global dominance.”Implications

What these speeches and reports reflect is a fundamental shift in American perceptions of China over the past 10 years. As recently as 2009 , at the beginning of the Obama administration, the prevailing view in the U.S. was that increased trade and economic ties, as well as diplomacy and active cultural exchange, would lead to greater openness and political liberalization in China. However , these hopes have been betrayed , and the Chinese Communist Party under President Xi Jinping is, according to the congressional study cited above, “deeply committed to preserving its monopoly on power through state-sponsored repression, surveillance and indoctrination.”

Three aspects of this change of perception are noteworthy. First, it is bipartisan , with Democrats as well as Republican political leaders sharing the view that China poses a serious challenge to American leadership in the world. Some Democrats in the past had taken a more benign and idealistic view of China’s potential to democratize, but President Barack Obama himself is an example of a Democrat who learned through experience that China has its own authoritarian model of society, politics and development that it is aggressively imposing on others.

Second, the change of perception is not confined to policymakers in Washington. The

American business community, which has been eager to sell products and services to China, as well as to manufacture there, has until recently been a moderating influence on U.S. policymakers who wanted to take harsh measures toward China. However, problems including barriers to market access, theft of technology and intellectual property, arbitrary changes of laws and

regulations detrimental to foreign companies, etc., have led many U.S. business leaders to openly support the U.S. government’s tougher line toward China. And the U.S. intellectual community, including scholars,

have been alarmed by Beijing’s efforts to suppress free speech, academic freedom and civil society — even outside of China.

Finally, the change of perception is consistent with a global trend that is emerging in response to Chinese attempts to expand its influence around the world. That the issue is not confined to the U.S. can be gleaned from the Hoover Institution report referenced above, in which 10 “International Associates” from abroad participated, and which includes an appendix examining Chinese attempts to influence the domestic politics of Australia, Britain, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and Singapore and ASEAN.Prospects

What this trend means is that the current tensions and rivalry between the U.S. and China will continue for the foreseeable future on three levels. The first is that of trade. This is the easiest issue to address because progress can be shown by China buying more from the U.S. This can be achieved by reducing tariffs, eliminating import quotas, or outright purchases of American products and services — easier for China to do than for most other countries given the central role the government plays in the economy. These purchases will also have the effect of reducing pressure against Beijing from the U.S. producers and their elected political representatives who will benefit from increased sales to China.There will be an incentive for the U.S. to lift tariffs on Chinese products in response to these purchases by China, since over time the negative effects on U.S. producers and consumers from such tariffs will grow. And a continuing tariff war will have a negative impact on the U.S. stock market, which is already showing signs of a major correction and perhaps a significant tumble as signs of a potential recession loom for 2019 or 2020.In addition, the transactional nature of trade and trade agreements are short-term and easier for Trump to understand, manipulate, and use to his advantage in his attempt to gain support from his domestic constituents. Witness the gap between the rhetoric of “success” and the very limited substance of what was actually achieved in renegotiating the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement and the North American Free Trade Agreement.Second, compared to trade, structural issues are more difficult to resolve precisely because they are structural — i.e., embedded in the Chinese social and economic system. Trade is quantifiable — e.g., how much tariff levels are reduced, how many cars are sold, how much the trade imbalance has been reduced. Structural issues are more difficult to identify, quantify, and remedy, especially since many of them are not fully under the control of the central government. In addition, policies such as “Made in China 2025” — the latest drive to modernize the economy — are considered essential to the nation’s economy, technology, and global competitiveness. Expecting Chinese leaders to abandon it would be nothing short of naive.Therefore, the likelihood of fully resolving these issues in the 90-day period set for the bilateral negotiations is low. However, with the pressure of the midterm elections behind him and with a Democratic majority in the House of Representatives that will keep him on the defensive with subpoenas, hearings and investigations, Trump is unlikely to put structural economic issues with China as a top priority on which to continue a trade war. Instead, U.S. Trade Representative Robert Lighthizer will likely be tasked with continuing negotiations beyond the 90-day period to achieve a semblance of progress.

Third, a partial resolution of the trade issues and ongoing negotiations on the structural issues will do little to avert the tensions that are certain to continue as China challenges the U.S. economically, politically and militarily. The only question is whether a future U.S. administration will choose to pursue a more strategic , nuanced, and long-term policy toward China that will effectively engage America’s

allies and partners, rather than the “America First,” tariff-centered, transactional approach being pursued by the Trump administration.

How will Japan respond to this intensifying Sino-American rivalry? Japan has traditionally feared the U.S. and China getting too friendly with each other, since this might result in a “G2” world that could marginalize Japan . On the other hand, tensions between the U.S. and China could have negative repercussions for Japan, and could lead to Japan needing to balance with considerable sensitivity its postwar political and security alliance with the U.S. with its increasingly dependent economic ties — trade, investment, finance, tourism, etc. — with China.

Link---2NCThe plan crushes assurance and causes Japanese arms racing---co-op with China is a policy 180 on a key security issue without consultation and causes Japan to think the U.S. is prioritizing Beijing over the alliance---that undercuts perceptions of reliability and causes hedging through weapons acquisition---that’s Cheng

Our evidence says it’s a space shock analogous to the Nixon Shocks of the 70s---that’s the nuke war of assurance links and the current environment is primed for a repeatElliot Waldman 18, Associate Editor of World Politics Review, Master’s Degree in International Relations and International Economics from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Former News Producer at the Washington, DC Bureau of Tokyo Broadcasting System, “Abe’s Rare China Visit and Japan’s Bifurcated Foreign Policy in the Trump Era”, World Politics Review, 10/31/2018, https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/trend-lines/26647/abe-s-rare-china-visit-and-japan-s-bifurcated-foreign-policy-in-the-trump-eraAs Japan rebuilt its industrial and manufacturing base following the destruction of World War II, it needed overseas markets for its exports, and mainland China provided a prime opportunity. But Japan was restrained from engaging economically with China by its ally, the U nited S tates, which was laser-focused on containing communism. It was none other than Abe’s maternal grandfather, then-Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, who visited the White House in 1957 and told President Dwight Eisenhower that Japan’s limited size and large population meant it “must depend on foreign trade” for economic growth, and that it already had “geographical and historical relationships with China,” according to a U.S. government memorandum at the time. But Eisenhower discouraged Kishi from expanding trade with China, as did successive American administrations.

It is easy to imagine, then , the surprise and betrayal felt by senior officials in Tokyo when President Richard Nixon announced in July 1971, in a nationally televised speech, that he had accepted an invitation from Premier Zhou Enlai to visit China. Japan had received no advance warning of this momentous shift in American foreign policy, and the event came to be known in Japan as one of two “Nixon shocks,” the other being the decision to abandon the gold standard and end the Bretton Woods system.

“The Japanese have that permanently fixed in their brain,” says Daniel Sneider, a lecturer

in international policy at Stanford University. “I don’t think you can join the Foreign Ministry unless you learn what the Nixon shocks were.” The political ramifications of Nixon’s decision for Japan are difficult to overstate . In a power struggle within Japan’s ruling party the following year, the charismatic Kakuei Tanaka won out with a policy platform of peaceful engagement with Japan’s neighbors. Just 84 days after taking office as prime minister, he engineered his own visit to China, during which he signed a joint statement normalizing bilateral relations.

That history looms large over the current era , as Tokyo strives to conduct its economic diplomacy with Beijing independent of an administration in Washington that has taken a hard line against China and launched a damaging trade war . The result, Sneider argues, is a “bifurcation” of Japan’s security policy and economic policy. “On the security policy side, they’re totally locked in to the alliance with the U.S., and there is no security alternative for Japan.” He notes that Vice President Mike Pence’s hawkish speech on China policy earlier this month—seen by many as a declaration of a new cold war—was well-received in Tokyo. But at the same time, the Japanese remain keenly interested in doing business with China.

Link---Space CooperationThe plan sends a signal of a huge political shift by compromising in a strategically central areaEric R. Sterner 9, Fellow at the George C. Marshall Institute, Formerly Held Senior Staff Positions with the House Armed Services and Science Committees, and Served in the Department of Defense and NASA, “U.S.-China Space Relations: Maintaining an Arm’s Length”, SpaceNews, 3/6/2009, https://spacenews.com/oped-us-china-space-relations-maintaining-arms-length/

Finally, consider the symbolism of a partnership with China in space . Since its inception, the civil space program has served as a geopolitical metaphor . Presidents Dwight

Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy intended to send geopolitical messages in creating NASA and launching us to the Moon . Similarly, President Ronald Reagan’s administration conceived of the i nternational s pace s tation as a demonstration of the unity and technical prowess of the western democracies in contrast to Soviet authoritarianism. When Russians overthrew communism and joined the family of democratic nations, they were welcomed into the program, further symbolizing their changed status. Partnership with China would send the signal that values held by the West , such as representative government, individual liberty, the rule of law and respect for human rights – which the leaders of the People’s Republic of do not share – are no longer as important to the relationship .Others will be tempted to promote a partnership in the vain hope of influencing the direction of ‘s space program. The simple truth is that China’s space program exists to serve the interests – both domestic and foreign – of the ruling party in China. It is not merely an appendage of the U.S.-PRC relationship to be directed by western carrots and sticks. The Chinese people are immensely proud of their accomplishments in orbit, as well they should be. They represent technical prowess that once belonged solely to the superpowers and appear to resonate emotionally with the Chinese people in much the same way that Apollo once did with Americans. Space programs represent progress and the promise of a brighter future.More specifically, and of greater concern to the United States, China’s space program is an adjunct of its growing military power , built to affect the relative balance of power in Asia in ways unfavorable to the United States and its allies . Given conflicting interests, Americans will not be able to “steer” China’s space behavior through the promise of a close partnership any more than King Canute could order the tides to stop . Indeed, a true partnership may exacerbate the conflict of interests by strengthening China’s technical capabilities and political weight in space matters . Instead of seeing new potential partners in China, space policymakers must watch the full range of developments in closely with an eye toward improving our understanding of ‘s capabilities and intentions.

Link---China EngagementStrategic co-op with China triggers Japanese fears of U.S. disengagement and spurs rearm that destabilizes AsiaEmma Chanlett-Avery 10, Master’s in International Security Policy from the Columbia University School of International and Public Affairs, Specialist in Asia Policy at the Congressional Research Service, Japan's Nuclear Future: Policy Debate, Prospects, and U. S. Interests, p. Google Books****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Issues for U.S. PolicyU.S. Security Commitment

Perhaps the single most important factor to date in dissuading Tokyo from developing a nuclear arsenal is the U.S. guarantee to protect Japan's security . Since the threat of nuclear attack developed during the Cold War, Japan has been included under the U.S. "nuclear umbrella," although some ambiguity exists about whether the United States is committed to respond with nuclear weapons in the event of a nuclear attack on Japan.25 U.S. officials have hinted that it would: following North Korea's 2006 nuclear test, former Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, in Tokyo, said, " ... the United States has the will and the capability to meet the full range, and I underscore full range, of its deterrent and security commitments to Japan."26 Most policymakers in Japan continue to emphasize that strengthening the alliance as well as shared conventional capabilities is more sound strategy than pursuing an independent nuclear capability.27During the Cold War, the threat of mutually assured destruction to the United States and the Soviet Union created a sort of perverse

stability in international politics; Japan, as the major Pacific front of the U.S. containment strategy, felt confident in U.S. extended deterrence. Although the U nited S tates has reiterated its commitment to defend Japan, the strategic stakes have changed, leading some in Japan to question the American pledge. Some in Japan are nervous that if the U nited S tates develops a closer relations hip with China , the gap between Tokyo's and Washington's security perspectives will grow and further weaken the U.S. commitment .28 These critics also point to what they perceive as the soft negotiating position on North Korea's denuclearization in the Six-Party Talks as further evidence that the

United States does not share Japan's strategic perspective.29 A weakening of the bilateral alliance may strengthen the hand of those that want to explore the possibility of Japan developing its own deterrence .

Despite these concerns, many long-time observers assert that the alliance is fundamentally sound from years of cooperation and strong defense ties throughout even the rocky trade wars of the 1980s. Perhaps more importantly, China's rising stature likely means that the United States will want to keep its military presence in the region in place, and Japan is the major readiness platform for the U.S. military in East Asia. If the United States continues to see the alliance with Japan as a fundamental component of its presence in the Pacific, U.S. leaders may need to continue to not only restate the U.S. commitment to defend Japan, but to engage in high-level consultation with Japanese leaders in order to allay concerns of alliance drift . Disagreement exists over the value of engaging in a joint dialogue on nuclear scenarios given the sensitivity of the issue to the public and the region, with some advocating the need for such formalized discussion and others insisting on the virtue on strategic ambiguity.30

U.S. behavior plays an outsized role in determining Japan's strategic calculations , particularly in any debate on developing nuclear weapons . Security experts concerned about Japan's nuclear option have stressed that U.S. officials or influential commentators should not signal to the Japanese any tacit approval of nuclearization.31 Threatening other countries with the possibility of Japan going nuclear, for example, could be construed as approval by some quarters in Tokyo.U.S.-Japanese joint development of a theater missile defense system reinforces the U.S. security commitment to Japan, both psychologically and practically. The test-launch of several missiles by North Korea in July 2006 accelerated existing plans to jointly deploy Patriot Advanced Capability 3 (PAC-3) surface-to-air interceptors as well as a sea-based system on Aegis destroyers. If successfully operationalized, confidence in the ability to intercept incoming missiles may help assuage Japan's fear of foreign attacks. This reassurance may discourage any potential consideration of developing a deterrent nuclear force. In addition, the joint effort would more closely intertwine U.S. and Japan security, although obstacles still remain for a seamless integration.32Potential for Asian Arms RaceTo many security experts, the most alarming possible consequence of a Japanese decision to develop nuclear weapons would be the development of a regional arms race.33 The fear is based on the belief that a nuclear-armed Japan could compel South Korea to develop its own program; encourage China to increase and/or improve its relatively small arsenal; and possibly inspire Taiwan to pursue nuclear weapons. This in turn might have spill-over effects on the already

nuclear-armed India and Pakistan. The prospect —or even reality—of several nuclear states rising in a region that is already rife with historical grievances and contemporary tension could be deeply destabilizing . The counter-argument, made by some security experts, is that nuclear deterrence was stabilizing during the Cold War, and a similar nuclear balance could be achieved in Asia. However, most observers maintain that the risks outweigh potential stabilizing factors.U.S.-China Relations

The course of the relations hip between Beijing and Washington over the next several years is likely to have a significant impact on the nuclearization debate in Japan. If the relations hip chill s substantially and a Cold War-type standoff develops, there may be calls from some in the U nited S tates to reinforce the U.S. deterrent forces . Some hawkish U.S. commentators have called for Japan to be "unleashed" in order to counter China's strength.34 Depending on the severity of the perceived threat from China, Japanese and U.S. officials could reconsider their views on Japan's non-nuclear status. Geopolitical calculations likely would have

to shift considerably for this scenario to gain currency. On the other hand, if U.S.-Sino relations become much closer , Japan may feel that it needs to develop a more independent defense posture . This is particularly true if the U nited S tates and China engaged in any bilateral strategic or nuclear consultations .35 Despite improved relations today, distrust between Beijing and Tokyo remains strong , and many in Japan's defense community view China 's rapidly modernizing military as their primary threat .

Closer US/China ties weaken the alliance and push Japan toward offensive strikeKaya Forest 16, PhD in Chemistry, Writer Regularly on Environmental and Security Issues, and Sierra Rayne, Ph.D. in Chemistry at the University of Victoria, “Japan's Security Concerns and The Need for a Revitalized U.S. Nuclear Deterrent”, American Thinker, 3/20/2016, https://tinyurl.com/y3hbfsfw****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Exchanging basing rights for security and protection under the U.S. deterrence umbrella after WWII, any significant change in the United States' commitment to maintaining its nuclear deterrence structure would have profound

implications for Japan's defense policy. A strengthened U.S.-China relations hip and the ongoing buildup of nuclear weapons capacity by North Korea may call into question whether the U.S. will continue to exert dominance in East Asia to the extent needed to adequately defend Japan ese interests .Japan began researching nuclear weapons development during WWII. Today, with one of the world's most advanced civilian nuclear power programs and a highly technologically sophisticated society, many believe that Japan could develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months should it choose to do so.Despite being a non-nuclear state, Japan has long been committed to developing and maintaining a full-spectrum fuel cycle capability. The Rokkasho reprocessing facility is due to come online in 2016 and will be capable of producing eight tons of weapons-grade plutonium annually. Japan already has 48 tons of plutonium stockpiled and a defense and space industry capable of producing advanced delivery systems.As China gets ever more expansive in its territorial ambitions, and North Korea continues to flex its military muscle, other Asian countries are put on the defensive over issues that may be unlikely to trigger the extended deterrence promised by the U.S. If the U.S.- Japan alliance weakens , for example as a result of closer U.S.-China ties or a softening of the negotiating position on North Korea's denuclearization, it may strengthen the argument of advocates pushing for Japan to develop its own independent deterrence .

Engaging China triggers Japanese fears of disengagement---they’ll read into the plan as a sign of a shift to co-management of Asia, greenlighting Chinese expansionismElena Atanassova-Cornelis 16, Visiting Lecturer at the Brussels School of International Studies University of Kent, University of Antwerp & Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium, “Strategic Uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific: Drivers, Responses and the Evolving Security Order”, PSA Annual Conference – “Politics and the Good Life”,

3/23/2016, https://www.psa.ac.uk/sites/default/files/conference/papers/2016/Paper%20Elena%20Atanassova-Cornelis%2C%20PSA%202016.pdf****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Japan , due to its position as the more dependent partner in the bilateral alliance, has had long-standing anxieties about ‘abandonment’ amid possible US disengagement from Asia (Ashizawa 2014). Since the 2008 financial crisis, in particular, Japan has worried about the sustainability of the US military commitments due to the growing fiscal and economic constraints, especially cuts in America’s defence spending. Now, four years since the announcement of the rebalance, Tokyo’s concerns about Washington’s ability to fund the rebalance remain.4 The rise of Chinese power , and the implications this has for the US security commitments to Japan and, more broadly, to the Asia-Pacific have become a n additional source of Tokyo’s anxieties .As a grouping of small and middle powers, ASEAN’s strategic uncertainties are driven by the shifting balance of power in the Asia-Pacific, more specifically, by fears of America’s relative decline, and the implications this has for the organisation’s interests and position in the evolving regional order (Thayer 2014; He 2015b). As in Japan, many strategists in Southeast Asia remain unconvinced about Washington’s ability to sustain its mid- to long-term security commitments to the region. Anxieties about the (staying) economic and military power of the US remain, and the rebalance does not seem to have achieved the desired reassurance and trust across Southeast Asia.5 Instead, the rebalance appears to have generated diverging concerns.6 On the one hand, there are worries about a more pronounced US-China power struggle and its outcome. Indeed, many Asian states are economically dependent on the PRC, but rely on the US for security protection against the prospect of a more hostile China. For ASEAN, this raises, what He (2015b) calls, the dilemma of ‘taking sides’ and is a long-standing concern. On the other hand, similarly to Tokyo, there are fears of a reduction of US presence in the region , possibly as a result of Washington’s inability

to fund the rebalance (and/or changes from 2017 on in US Asia policies under the new administration), or of its decision to accommodate Beijing . The latter aspect is a relatively recent concern directly related to regional perceptions of American decline in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis and of the concomitant uncertainties associated with the transition towards a post-US regional security order (that may or may not be dominated by China).

Given Japan’s security over-reliance on America, Japan ese strategists are particularly concerned about a possible ‘US-China co-management of Asia’ amid Washington’s future accommodation of Beijing, which may mean a certain degree of Sino- US strategic understanding at the expense of Tokyo .7 A source of these anxieties was the Obama administration’s emphasis on engagement of the PRC , especially in 2009-2010, and Obama’s positive

response to the ‘new model of great power relations’ discourse of the Xi government. Japan’s ‘fear of abandonment’ thus acquired a somewhat different dimension: a reduction of US commitment to Japan not due to American withdrawal from Asia per se , but due to a shift in Washington’s China policy .At the same time, Japanese strategists have recognised that the alliance with Japan has remained a main pillar of America’s continuing regional involvement under the rebalance. The Obama administration’s reaffirmation, on numerous occasions, that ‘our [US] treaty commitment to Japan’s security is absolute, and Article 5 covers all territories under Japan’s administration, including the Senkaku islands’ (Asahi Shimbun, 2014) has been a manifestation of the continuing value the US attaches to its alliance with Japan. Washington has also strongly supported Tokyo’s security initiatives under Abe, discussed below. Observers (e.g., Green and Cooper 2014) point out that Abe’s policies have reinforced the US-Japan alliance and have furthered the implementation of the rebalance. While Tokyo’s abandonment concerns may have subsided, they have remained latent. A US-China accommodation, however remote it may seem at the time of this writing (spring 2016), remains a distinct possibility .

Japan closely watches US policy toward China and reads into even minor policy for signs of alliance reliability---the plan has a powerful audience effectIain Henry 14, PhD Candidate at the Australian National University's Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, MA in Strategic Studies from Australian National University, Fulbright Scholar, “The Alliance Audience Effect in America’s Asian Alliances”, 11-16, p. 27-28****NCC’19 Novice Packet****ConclusionThese findings suggest that interactions within one relationship , if they are observable, occur in front of an "alliance audience" . The fact that these allies then adopted specific forms of

balancing behaviour suggests mat the "alliance audience effect" exists and can be quite influential .

Perhaps the best example is that Japan's decision-making —both in offering bases to US forces, and

then to refusing to create a large defense force—was significantly influenced by Tokyo's observations of American behaviour within the US-Korea and US-China relations hips .What are the implications for Asia today? The first is that just like it did in the Cold War, the US will have to manage each alliance with an awareness of interdependencies within Asia. Minor examples of this interdependence have already come to light : when the US affirmed that the disputed territory of the Senkaku Islands fell under the US-Japan Mutual Defense Treaty, the President of the Philippines issued a statement which hinted that the Philippines 'expects to get the same assurance that the US had given Japan when faced with a similar conflict with China'." Just like they did in the 1949-1951 period, US allies will observe how America treats its other allies and be concerned that inconsistent behaviour across different alliance commitments suggests divergent strategic interests .Likewise, inaction could have regional effects . In 2012, when China and the Philippines clashed over ownership of the Scarborough Shoal, America's response was muted. The Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, simply noted that *We are opposed to the threat or use of force by any party to advance its claim' and pledged to 'remain in close contact with our ally, the Philippines'.*"1 This tepid response probably did not go unnoticed by Japan, which is currently concerned about America's willingness to defend against a Chinese effort to seize the Senkaku Islands.More recently, in April 2014, mere were unconfirmed reports that United States military assets had assisted in efforts to resupply the Sierra Madre, a Filipino vessel that was deliberately wrecked onto the Second Thomas Shoal, despite attempts by the People's Republic of China to prevent the resupply."' Such efforts, if true, could be very reassuring to Japan. They might demonstrate the strength of common interests, whereas words—even when they come from senior decision-makers or Presidents—are cheap by comparison. In simple terms, actions such as these would demonstrate that the interests which underpinned an alliance signed decades ago are still convergent. By contrast mere words could be concealing the decomposing corpse of an alliance.The evidence presented in this article suggests that a state's behaviour within one alliance can influence the reliability perceptions of other allies , and that these allies will act to mitigate the risk posed by their unreliable ally . My hypotheses require further testing across a range of scenarios, alliances and time periods, but this initial examination suggests that a state's behaviour can have an alliance audience effect . In the Cold War examples assessed above, US policymakers instinctively understood this interdependence and tried to ensure their actions in one alliance would not negatively affect other alliances. This dynamic will almost certainly be of immense policy relevance over the next few decades.Other factors also warrant further study. Do these hypotheses hold true when two allied states share different adversaries? How are these dynamics affected by geography - was Australia, located far from Korea, less concerned than Japan because of this physical distance? Does the nature of a security commitment matter: are these dynamics stronger within formal military alliances than more informal security partnerships or alignments? Can a state deliberately create the impression of unreliability in order to prompt one of its allies to adopt a particular form of balancing behaviour? How do states avoid the danger that an ally may deliberate attempt to manipulate its reliability image? Finally, although in these case studies Korea and Japan balanced with the US against the threat of Communism, this outcome was not guaranteed. The nexus between the balancing and bandwagoning debate, and the issue of alliance audience effects, is a promising area of policy-relevant research.With several regions of the world currently clamouring for US leadership, it might be convenient to dismiss concerns about America's reliability as the efforts of deceitful allies seeking to free ride on American military power. This article does not argue that the US should remain captive to the concerns of its allies - in some cases, the second-order effects of this alliance interdependence may be negligible, or perhaps even advantageous for the United States. However, this article does show that America's actions in Asia matter: they affect the beliefs and behaviour of allies, influencing them toward particular defense and diplomatic policies . US policymakers should not discount allied perspectives on American reliability, but rather carefully consider the importance of interdependence between these alliances.

Link---Arms ControlUS/China arms control crushes assuranceDr. Caitlin Talmadge 15, Associate Professor in the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Nonresident Senior Fellow in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution, PhD from MIT, “Preventing Nuclear Escalation in Conventional Conflict: The Case of the United States and China”, May 2015, https://nuclearconference2015.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/talmadge-nsri-draft.pdf****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Alliance Politics: Alliance politics on the U.S. side likely would further exacerbate this problem. The Pacific Ocean may insulate the United States from much of China’s striking power, but U.S. allies, particularly Japan and Taiwan, would be much more exposed militarily (and economically) in the event of a U.S.- ‐China war. Even if the U nited S tates believes it could achieve security through more defensive military approaches , U.S. allies do not appear to share this conviction .76 Already in peacetime, U.S. relationships with its Asian allies involve a constant process of reassurance , with the U nited S tates engaging in extensive dialogues and consultations to convince allies of the strength of U.S. commitments .77 These allies —and their supporters in the United States—attach tremendous symbolic importance to U.S. decisions about basing, arms sales, and forward deployment, even in cases where these choices likely would have little real military impact on U.S. or allied abilities to prevail in a conflict versus China.78 In the event of conflict with China, these same U.S. allies likely would prefer that the United States pursue robust, offensive operations . Indeed, allied officials embraced the promulgation of A ir- S ea B attle precisely because it seemed to indicate U.S. willingness to fight a war with China and to fight it aggressively . Interviews with allied diplomats and military officers suggest little recognition of the prospect that this sort of conventional military approach might create inadvertent nuclear pressures on China . In their view, war will have broken out because of Chinese aggression, so further efforts at intra-‐war deterrence are moot. Perhaps because these allies have been discouraged from seeking their own nuclear weapons, the security elite tend to be less sensitized to the potential connections between conventional and nuclear uses of force. Most see the full application of U.S. conventional military power as an unalloyed good and profess little interest in calibrating the use of that power to decrease the chances of nuclear use by China.79

Link---SSAJapanese elites view SSA as a key aspect of overall security policyDr. Jana Robinson 15, Space Security Program Director at the Prague Security Studies Institute, Former Space Policy Officer at the European External Action Service, PhD from the Institute of Political Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Prague, Two Master’s Degrees, from George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs and Palacky University in Olomouc, “U.S. Space Security and Allied Outreach”, in Handbook of Space Security, Ed. Schrogl et al., p. 333-334****NCC’19 Novice Packet****18.5 U.S. Space Security Collaboration with Japan

A special security relationship has long existed between the U.S. and Japan, including the preexisting framework it provides for security-related conversations. Space policy has been influenced significantly by the nation’s overall foreign and security policy . Since the beginning of its space activities, Japan has been reluctant to engage in security-related uses of space, largely due to its constitution. This has been evolving over the past few years. The country passed the New Basic Space Law in 2008 and developed a National Space Plan in 2009, which has created new opportunities for the involvement of Japan in international efforts to address the most pressing space security-related challenges of the twenty-first century. The Strategic Headquarters for Space Policy was established in the Cabinet in August 2008 in order to reorganize Japan’s space management structure and coordinate space-related activities with other ministries (e.g., MEXT, METI, MOFA, JMOD). The year 2012 has seen a number of important organizational changes in Japan’s space policy-making processes and management of space activities. In late June 2012, the Upper House of the Japanese Diet passed legislation that created a Office of National Space Policy within the Cabinet Office that works toward centralizing control of the planning and budgeting of the country’s space program.Although in the U.S. it is the Air Force that has preeminence over the space domain, in Japan, the Maritime Self-Defense Force (MSDF) is probably best equipped to serve this function. Reasons include their resource base, expertise and field experience leveraging space-related assets for sea-lane protection, and the administering of missile defense cooperation with the U.S. via their AEGIS-equipped destroyers and joint SM-3 missile program. Moreover, the MSDF tends to have primacy in theaters from which the most likely threats – including to space-related assets – are likely to emerge, such as the East China Sea.Since 2005, the main institutional framework for the U.S.-Japan interaction on bilateral security issues has been the Security Consultative Committee (SCC), informally known as the “2 + 2 Ministerial” involving the U.S. Secretaries of Defense and State and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense from Japan. Within the “2 + 2 Ministerial” structure, government officials have been generally encouraged of late by the progress made over the relatively short period of time that space has been included as a serious topic of discussion. The Japan-U.S. Joint Statement made during former Japan’s Prime Minister Yoshihiko

Noda’s trip to the White House in April 2012 called for bilateral measure to “ deepen cooperation regarding. . .space and cyber space security,” among other items (Weitz 2012). Specific joint projects are now being discussed, including in the area of SSA.

Engagement on SSA is viewed by Japanese policy-makers as an important aspect of space security, as well as broader security-related cooperation . Accordingly, Japan seeks to expand gradually its involvement in international SSA-related discussions and cooperation (especially with the U.S. ), as well as to develop a framework for strengthening its own SSA capabilities . For this purpose, the Japan Space Forum (JSF) organized, with the support of the Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology (MEXT), an International Symposium on Sustainable Space Development and Utilization for Humankind. The JSF convened a second SSA Symposium in spring 2013.

Japan’s currently the partner of preference for the U.S. on SSAThe Mainichi (Japanese Newspaper), Mainchini 19, “Japan, US To Collaborate On Space Surveillance”, 3/30/2019, https://mainichi.jp/english/articles/20190330/p2a/00m/0na/002000c****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The governments of Japan and the U nited S tates are planning to link up the Space Situational Awareness

(SSA) systems of Japan's Self-Defense Forces (SDF) and the U.S. military from fiscal 2023 to share real-time information on such things as third-country satellites and space debris, it has been learned.

In the future, the two countries hope to build a collaborative arrangement of mutual protection from potential attacks by other countries' satellites .

Beefing up bilateral coop eration in space is up for discussion and confirmation at the two-plus-two talks between the diplomatic and defense officials of Japan and the U.S. that are to be held in Washington in April.Japan's space surveillance, which entails monitoring debris and suspicious satellites, is conducted by the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA) using satellites orbiting 200 to 1,000 kilometers above Earth. Because the SDF currently does not have its own SSA system, it is in the process of setting one up that monitors a stationary orbit about 36,000 kilometers from Earth. Since fiscal 2018, the SDF has received technical assistance from the U.S. through the American foreign military sales (FMS) program, and plans to complete the system in fiscal 2022.JAXA, furthermore, is set to install new radar by fiscal 2023, which will boost its ability to observe objects 650 kilometers from Earth from the current 1.6 meters in size to 10 centimeters.The SDF's new SSA system will be linked up with that of the U.S. military when the former begins operations in fiscal 2023, and efforts will be made to tie both up with JAXA's system. JAXA has already begun to share information with the U.S. military, and the upcoming developments are expected to accelerate the exchange of information among the three parties. Because the U.S. military's outposts in Asia are limited, its aerial reconnaissance in the region is said to be scarce. Therefore, a Japanese Defense Ministry official explained, "Japan's contribution is being sought (in this arrangement). It will be a plus for the U.S. military."To improve the precision of Japan's SSA system, the Defense Ministry included funding for research into SSA satellites equipped with optical telescopes that would be used for orbital surveillance in the fiscal 2019 budget. The aim is to construct an integrated surveillance system based both on the ground and in space.Still, some in the Defense Ministry have voiced concerns that merely building an SSA system is not sufficient to protect satellites in the future. The ministry's Annual White Paper from 2018 pointed out that China and Russia were in the process of developing the technology necessary for anti-satellite weapons and communications-jamming electromagnetic waves.

For the time being, the ministry will seek the coop eration of the U.S. in protecting Japan's satellites , while aiming to develop independent technology to remove space debris and evade satellite attacks in the future.

Space KeySpace is a vital issue for Japan---they view U.S. dependence on their capabilities as a key means of preventing abandonment and ensuring interoperability and its dual-use nature is strategically crucial for defenseDr. Chris Hughes 19, Professor of International Politics and Japanese Studies in the Department of Politics and International Studies the University of Warwick, PhD from the University of Sheffield, “Japanese Security Turns To The Stars”, East Asia Forum, 5/7/2019, https://www.eastasiaforum.org/2019/05/07/japanese-security-turns-to-the-stars/****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Japan’s space program generally attracts attention for its civilian applications, such as in February 2019 when JAXA, the Japanese space agency, landed the Hayabusa-2 probe on an asteroid 300 million kilometres from earth. But Japan’s ‘civilian outlook’ in space disguises the fact that many of its burgeoning space programs also serve techno-nationalist purposes for national security. Most space technologies are inherently dual-use, and over the last two decades Japan has consistently invested in an impressive national space security architecture .The increasingly important position of space in Japan’s military planning is evident in a number of policy measures . In 2008, the National Diet passed a Basic Space Law that enabled the use of outer space for defensive military purposes. The new law overturned the 1969 Peaceful Purposes Resolution that limited Japan’s space activities to non-military uses. Since 2009, successive versions of the Japanese government’s Basic Space Plan have openly accepted the need to use space for security. Japan’s National Security Strategy now notes the connection between space and national security.The 2019 National Defense Program Guidelines went further and positioned space as a key strategic military domain . The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are now to engage in ‘cross domain operations’ that enable all three services to move beyond the confines of land, sea and air operations and work together to counter threats in outer space, cyberspace and electronic warfare.Japan has also built an impressive array of dual-use space systems that support military functions. Starting in the mid-19 80s , Japan began developing a civilian space launch capability with the H-II liquid-fuelled rocket series. From the 1990s, these efforts extended to the M-series and Epsilon solid-fuelled rockets for ‘scientific’ launches. Solid-fuelled rockets are rarely developed solely for civilian purposes. The Epsilon in particular is considered to be a mobile, launch-on-demand rocket for military payloads such as tactical satellites.In the late 1980s, Japan initiated a program to build and launch a domestic-built information-gathering satellite (IGS) constellation using optical and radar technologies. The government termed the IGS ‘multipurpose’ to justify its introduction, but they are in effect spy satellites.The principal reason for Japan’s development of techno-nationalist capabilities is to use it as leverage in the US–Japan alliance . Space capabilities add a means for Japan to hedge within the alliance against abandonment , while offering their integration with US systems as a way to cement bilateral cooperation . Ballistic-missile defence has long been the centrepiece of this approach but under the Abe administration this effort has been stepped up.

Space is critical for US/Japan relations and decisions about international cooperation intersect with every other major policy areaDr. Kurt Campbell 3, Kissinger Chair in National Security Policy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, PhD in International Relations from Oxford University, Deputy Director of the Aspen Strategy Group, “U.S.-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation”, CSIS Report, July 2003, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/taskforcereport.pdf****NCC’19 Novice Packet****This project on the prospects and consequences for enhanced U.S.–Japan Strategic Cooperation in Space is the product of a rich, interdisciplinary research agenda undertaken by the International Security Program of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. over the last twelve months. While various aspects of enhanced cooperation between the U nited S tates and Japan have received considerable attention in recent years, there has been a conspicuous absence of analysis and

commentary concerning the legacy of and possibilities for American and Japanese bilateral cooperation in space . At the onset of a new strategic era marked by profound international uncertainty, the U nited S tates and Japan now stand at a critical juncture in their bilateral relationship. While economic tensions and contrasting political agendas have marked much of the history of U.S.–Japan relations, the relations hip has matured in recent years into a deep partnership that encompasses a wide range of global and regional issues . The trade frictions that poisoned the relationship in the 1980s and early 1990s have receded somewhat, and there is currently a more powerful sense of commitment in both capitals to help maintain a strong security alliance in an unexpectedly dangerous post-Cold War environment.The way the U nited S tates and Japan interact in space is likely to be one of the more important , and indeed interesting, arenas for potential cooperation in the future. Space policy is truly multi-dimensional , and decisions regarding the allocation of resources, structure international cooperation agreements , and establishment of industry-wide standards touch on a number of crucial policy areas . Virtually every major step in space invariably affects the security , commerce , trade , science and info rmation tech nology agendas of each nation .

Cooperation in other areas will inevitably decline but strong alignment on space can be a pillar that keeps the alliance afloatChristian Beckner 3, Senior Associate at The O'Gara Company, Master of Business Administration and Master of Science in Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Bachelor of Arts in International Relations and English from Stanford University, “U.S.-Japan Space Policy: A Framework for 21st Century Cooperation”, CSIS Report, July 2003, https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/media/csis/pubs/taskforcereport.pdf****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Space policy is obviously only one of many issues that are important in the U.S.–Japan relations hip today. Security concerns in East Asia occupy the attention of policymakers in both countries on a daily basis. The United States is focused on increasing Japan’s operational and financial assistance for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Both countries are paying new attention to protecting against terrorist threats and ensuring the security of the global supply chain. Economic issues between the world’s two largest economies remain very important. Japan’s current bout with deflation and the United States’ slow recovery from recession are negatively impacting each other and the entire global economy. Other items on the bilateral agenda include trade negotiations, international development assistance, and global environmental issues.This is a crowded plate, but space policy belongs as a key part of this agenda, because it complements and reinforces the key priorities of the relations hip. The right bilateral space policy will lead to improved regional and international security, and have positive spillover effects on the two countries’ economies. Strong ties in space policy can serve as a pillar of strength at times in the future when the relations hip is under stress .

OS---Impact---Asia---Impact---2NCDisad outweighs:

Magnitude---offensive strike causes quick Asian war---the signal collapses alliances and causes Chinese and North Korean aggression that escalates

It goes global, sparks nuclear war, and turns the case---cooperation between the U.S. and China will crashDr. Brendan Taylor 18, Associate Professor of Strategic Studies at the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, PhD from the Australian National University, The Four Flashpoints: How Asia Goes to War, p. Google Books****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The incident was indeed no laughing matter. A highly acrimonious crisis in relations between the U nited S tates and China ensued.1What if this collision had instead involved Chinese and Japanese military aircraft, unleashing waves of virulent nationalism in both countries? Such a scenario is far from the stuff of fiction. As detailed in Chapter 3, Chinese and Japanese planes regularly engage in dangerous aerial encounters over the East China Sea. Or what would happen if, during the erratic Donald Trump presidency, Pyongyang believed Washington was readying its forces for pre- emptive military action, as it did during the 1993-94 North Korean nuclear crisis? Would Kim Jong-un be able to hold his nerve and not initiate an anticipatory strike? Or what if the Taiwanese Navy vessel that accidently fired an anti- shipping missile in the direction of the mainland in July 2016 had struck a Chinese rather than a Taiwanese craft? And rather than this incident occurring on the ninety-fifth anniversary of the Chinese Communist Party, what if it were to occur in the nationalistic atmosphere of the Party’s centenary in 2021?The risk of major war in Asia is much great er today than most individuals assume. All it would take is an accidental clash between the wrong two militaries, at the wrong place or the wrong time, and a highly dangerous escalation could occur . Asia has been lucky so far that it hasn’t.Serendipity has often played a critical role throughout history when leaders have walked back from the brink of war. In the documentary The Fog of War, Robert McNamara, who served as US defense secretary during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations, reflects on the part providence played in avoiding nuclear armageddon during the Cuban Missile Crisis: ‘At the end

we lucked out. It was luck that prevented war. We came that close to nuclear war at the end. Rational individuals: Kennedy was rational; Khrushchev was rational; Castro was rational. Rational individuals came that close to total destruction of their societies. And that danger exists today .’We should learn from McNamara’s wisdom. It would be imprudent to assume that Asia’s luck will hold indefinitely.Crisis slide: repercussions and reverberations

It is not only the danger of localised conflict in Asia that confronts us. The danger of ‘wide war’ in Asia is growing too, because this region is experiencing what the eminent Australian strategist Coral Bell once described as a ‘crisis slide’. As Bell wrote in the early 1970s:

There are periods in history when individual crises remain distinct, like isolated boulders rolling down a mountainside. Each may do some damage, and present some dangers, but they are events discrete in themselves ... There are other periods when the boulders, or the crises, not only come thick and fast, but seem, as it were, to repercuss off each other until the whole mountainside, or the whole society of states, begins to crumble.2

Bell pointed to two previous instances when such ‘crisis slides’ end ed in catastrophic conflict . The first was in

the lead-up to World War I, which was preceded by a series of international crises - the First Moroccan Crisis (1905-06), the First Balkan Crisis (1908-09), the Second Moroccan Crisis (1911) and the culminating crisis of July 1914, which was sparked by the assassination of Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand. Bell believed that this pattern of recurring crises backed Europe’s leaders into a corner from where they could see no way out other than conflict. She contended that a similar series of events - Hitler’s remilitarisation of the Rhineland (1936), his annexation of Austria and his occupation of the Sudetenland under the terms of the Munich Agreement (1938), the signing of the Pact of Steel between Germany and Italy, and Hitler’s invasion of Czechoslovakia

and Poland (1939) - also constituted a ‘crisis slide’ and left Britain and France with no option other than to declare war against Germany in September 1939, thus formally starting World War II.3Crisis slides of the kind that preceded the world wars are dangerous for three reasons. First, they make i nternational r elations more volatile . Governments become more antagonistic towards, and distrustful of, one another . As with the colliding boulders in Bell’s metaphor, these animosities intensify and begin to roll over into other areas . Second, governments increasingly harden their positions and become less inclined to cooperate or compromise with each passing crisis.

Every crisis inevitably generates ‘winners and losers’, and the lessons most losing governments take is that firmer diplomatic and strategic postures are needed to avoid losing face in future. Third, repeated crises have the seemingly paradoxical effect of generating an unhealthy level of complacency. As more crises are resolved short of war - even if their underlying causes are not - governments begin to disbelieve the possibility that they could end up waging full-blown conflict against one another.4

This book shows that the features of a crisis slide are evident in Asia today . After a period of relative calm

that stretched from the mid-1990s through the 2000s, crises around the four flashpoints have been coming thick and fast . The sinking of the ROKS Cheonan and North Korea’s bombing of Yeonpyeong Island took the Korean Peninsula to the brink of war in 2010. Tokyo’s nationalisation of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and Beijing’s provocative reactions had respected commentators talking up the prospects of Sino-Japanese conflict between 2012 and

2014. Similar claims were made about the S outh C hina S ea following the Scarborough Shoal and China-Vietnam oil rig crises of 2012 and 2014. This speculation has intensified following Beijing’s land-reclamation campaign, which has seen the development of military facilities on many of this area’s disputed land features. Today, after two decades of calm, tensions over Taiwan are resurfacing following the election of an independence-leaning president on the island. The clouds of danger also hang over the Korean Peninsula, despite Trump tweeting that this crisis has passed due to his summit with Kim Jong-un and that his fellow Americans can now sleep easy.

Asia war is the biggest impact---population and multiple nuclear threats cause extinction---and turns every impact Dr. Walter Russell Mead 14, Professor of Foreign Affairs and the Humanities at Bard College, “Obama in Asia”, The American Interest, 11/9/2014, http://www.the-american-interest.com/2010/11/09/obama-in-asia/****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The decision to go to Asia is one that all thinking Americans can and should support regardless of either party or ideological affiliation. East and South Asia are the places where the 21st century , for better or for worse, will most likely be shaped; economic growth , environment al progress , the destiny of democracy and success against terror are all at stake here . American objectives in this region are clear. While convincing China that its best interests are not served by a rash, Kaiser Wilhelm-like dash for supremacy in the region, the US does not want either to isolate or contain China. We want a strong, rich, open and free China in an Asia that is also strong, rich, open and free. Our destiny is inextricably linked with Asia’s; Asian success will make America stronger, richer and more secure. Asia’s failures will reverberate over here, threatening our prosperity, our security and perhaps even our survival .

The world’s two most mutually hostile nuclear states , India and Pakistan , are in Asia. The two states most likely to threaten others with nukes , North Korea and aspiring rogue nuclear power Iran , are there. The two superpowers with a billion plus people are in Asia as well. This is where the world’s fastest growing economies are. It is where the worst environmental problems exist. It is the home of the world’s largest democracy, the world’s most populous Islamic country (Indonesia — which is also among the most democratic and pluralistic of Islamic countries), and the world’s most rapidly rising non-democratic power as well. Asia holds more oil resources than any other continent; the world’s most important and most threatened trade routes lie off its shores. East Asia, South Asia, Central Asia (where American and NATO forces are fighting the Taliban) and West Asia (home among others to Saudi Arabia, Israel, Turkey and Iraq) are the theaters in the

world today that most directly engage America’s vital interests and where our armed forces are most directly involved. The world’s most explosive territorial disputes are in Asia as well, with islands (and the surrounding mineral and fishery resources) bitterly disputed between countries like Russia, the two Koreas, Japan, China (both from Beijing and Taipei), and Vietnam. From the streets of Jerusalem to the beaches of Taiwan the world’s most intractable political problems are found on the Asian landmass and its surrounding seas.Whether you view the world in terms of geopolitical security , environmental sustainability, economic

growth or the march of democracy, Asia is at the center of your concerns . That is the overwhelming reality of world politics today, and that reality is what President Obama’s trip is intended to address.

Our 1NC impact also says it causes China to escalate territorial disputes---they go nuclearRajesh Basrur 18. Professor of International Relations at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. 2018. “Avoiding Nuclear Crises in Asia.” (RSIS Commentaries, No. 011). RSIS Commentaries. Singapore: Nanyang Technological University. https://dr.ntu.edu.sg/bitstream/handle/10220/44333/CO18011.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=y****NCC’19 Novice Packet****History Repeating Itself? Though a serious crisis has not yet occurred, the confrontations conform to patterns of events leading up to past crises between nuclear powers. These include US-Soviet crises in

Berlin (1961) and Cuba (1962), Sino-Soviet border clashes in 1969, US - China fighting during the

Vietnam War (1964-69), the Kargil conflict between India and Pakistan in 1999, and a second crisis

between the two in 2001-02. All of these have featured tussles over territory , differences in political systems setting democracies against authoritarian polities (including a military-dominated hybrid regime in Pakistan); hostile image construction; and the pronounced use of rhetoric and threats aimed at each other but also at reinforcing domestic support. In each case, though, the prospect of a nuclear conflagration has induced a measure of caution – avoidance of major military thrusts (notable in the considerable fighting that took place in the 1969 and 1999 crises), the opening of negotiations between the two sides,

and, sometimes, explicit stabilisation agreements. The current episodes of brinkmanship and verbal duels exhibit the same pattern . In each case, as tensions have risen, a line of communication has been opened. North Korea has expressed a willingness to talk, while – despite hesitations – the United States has done the same; and North and South Korea have attempted to build bridges by coming together at the 2018 PyeongChang Winter Olympics. Chinese and Indian forces

wound down their confrontation and their Special Representatives met in December 2017 to defuse border tension s . And the Indian and Pakistani National Security Advisers met secretly at least four times in third countries to work toward stability. These

are encouraging developments, but we cannot be sanguine about their stabilizing effects. Potential To Spin Out of Control None of the three issues has approached resolution. North Korea and the US remain at loggerheads: the US announced on 16 January 2018 that it had deployed nuclearcapable B-52 and B-2 bombers in Guam and was preparing conventional forces for military action. Tensions remain high on the India-China border: Indian troops ejected a Chinese civilian road construction crew at Tuting in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed by China, in December 2017; and reports have come in that Chinese forces have built up their presence in Doklam. Cross-border firing between Indian and Pakistani forces continues to exact its human toll on the LoC. In each instance, notwithstanding moves to seek stability, the political differences that raised tensions remain in place . There are additional problems that could cause any of them to spin out of control . First, local military commanders may take initiatives , causing clashes that will be difficult to reverse . This applies not only to South Asia’s tension-ridden land borders , but also to the Northeast Asian

seas . Second, a local skirmish can quickly escalate owing to uncertainty about the adversary’s capability and the element of surprise . On land borders, the presence of radar-evading capabilities such as cruise missiles is a factor; the short distances separating India’s

forces from those of China and Pakistan place serious constrain ts with respect to response times . At sea (and above it for air forces), the absence of clear red lines is problematic in Northeast Asia.

Third, in the event that localised conflict does break out, it may quickly morph into

nuclear conflict amidst rising tensions if conventional attacks accidentally target nuclear forces or command and control systems . Finally, since all complex systems are subject to what sociologist Charles Perrow calls “ normal accidents ,” a false alarm of impending nuclear attack

during a crisis might set off a nuclear response . The erroneous missile alert in Hawaii on 13 January is a

warning that is hardly exceptional – such incidents have occurred regularly in the past. A similar error during a crisis could conceivably set in motion a series of escalatory reactions culminating in nuclear conflict .

OS---Assurance KeyJapan will develop offensive strike if U.S. reliability declines---the alliance assures them through security guarantees that provide protection, but the credibility of U.S. posture weakens from political missteps---that’s Wadsworth

They’ll go offensive if U.S. reliability declinesBrad Glosserman 8, Executive Director of the Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, “Japan Peers into the Abyss”, Japan Times, 3-24, http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20080324bg.html****NCC’19 Novice Packet****A complement to passive defenses is a conventional offensive strike capability that would allow Tokyo to destroy threats before they reach Japan. Tokyo has shunned such capabilities even though lawmakers conceded 50 years ago that they are constitutionally permissible. Defense specialists consider this an increasingly attractive option after the North Korean missile and nuclear tests. Such capabilities would likely be destabilizing and elevate concerns about Japanese intentions, however . The possibility of a preemptive strike could raise a potential adversary’s readiness to use its own forces, fearing that it had to “use em or lose em.”A third option is abandoning one of Japan’s three nonnuclear principles (which prohibit the production, possession or introduction of nuclear weapons on Japanese soil). It has been suggested that the U.S. station nuclear weapons in Japan, ensuring a stronger coupling of U.S. and Japanese interests. Japanese strategists are beginning to explore this option, although it is politically impossible at this time.Japan is increasingly insecure, and that insecurity reflects doubts about the U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense. A decision to go nuclear would be a clear sign that there is no faith in the U.S.U.S. policymakers are waking up to the growing uncertainty at the heart of the alliance, but repeated assurances of the U.S. commitment to the alliance — while welcome — aren’t enough. The U.S. needs frank and candid discussions with Japanese about the roots of their insecurity, how the nuclear deterrent works, and measures that can be taken to build Japanese confidence. This conversation would demonstrate U.S. seriousness about Japanese concerns and show respect for an ally by sharing information vital to its defense.While possession of nuclear weapons appears unnecessary and unwise given current circumstances, a nuclear debate would still be in Japan’s interest. It would help Japanese better understand the reasons for not acquiring such weapons and reconfirm Japan’s nonnuclear status. It could help forge a national consensus as anxieties mount. The U.S. must be a partner in this process since its behavior and perceived reliability will be the most important factor in the Japanese debate .

OS---Impact---Asia---A2: Asia War DefenseDefense doesn’t apply to Asian arms racing---it sparks conflict spirals that escalate through misperception and miscalc---nothing checksDr. Andrew T. H. Tan 15, Associate Professor in the Department of Security Studies at the University of New South Wales, Security and Conflict in East Asia, May 2015, https://www.routledgehandbooks.com/doi/10.4324/9781315850344-3****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Conclusion: implications of the arms race in East AsiaEast Asia’s arms race leads to the classic problem of the security dilemma , in which a state that is perceived as becoming too powerful leads to counter-acquisitions by other states. This results in misperceptions , conflict spirals , heightened tensions and ultimately open conflict , thereby destroying the very security that arms are supposed to guarantee (Jervis 1976). East Asia’s sustained economic rise since the end of the Korean War in 1953 and the lack of any major conflict since has lulled many into believing that growing economic interdependence will make war unlikely in that region (Khoo 2013: 47–48). However, this is a false premise as significant historical antagonisms have remained . Japan’s imperialism prior to 1945 and its

failure adequately to account for its past continues to stir up strong nationalist emotions in China and South Korea. In addition, the divisions between North Korea and South Korea are as strong and intractable as ever, leading to an arms race on the Korean peninsula.The situation is compounded by the weakness or absence of regional institutions , regimes and laws that could regulate interstate relations, build trust and confidence, and otherwise put a stop to the arms race. None of the distinctive confidence- and security-building measures which were in place in Europe during the Cold War and helped to calm tensions as well as contain the arms race exist in Asia. Within East Asia itself, the Six-Party Talks have focused only on the Korean issue and have not managed to stem North Korea’s open brinkmanship that in early 2013 almost brought the Korean peninsula to war again.The arms race in East Asia is dangerous owing to the increased risk of miscalc ulation as a result of misperception . Chinese policymakers appear to be convinced that Japan is dominated by right-wing conservatives bent on reviving militarism (Glosserman 2012). At the same time, there is also a perception within China that given its growing strength, it should now aggressively assert what it perceives to be its legitimate claims in the E ast and S outh

C hina S eas. Thus, China’s nationalist discourse perceives that the problems about disputed territory emanate from other powers, not China (Sutter 2012). The consequences of conflict between China and Japan , on the Korean peninsula or over Taiwan, however, will not stay regional . As a key player in East Asia, the USA , which has security commitments to Japan and South Korea, residual commitments to Taiwan, and troops on the ground in East Asia and in the Western Pacific, will be drawn in . The problem is that any conflict in East Asia is not likely to remain conventional for long. In fact, it is likely that it would rapidly escalate into a nuclear war because three of the key players , namely China , North Korea and the USA , possess nuclear weapons.

AFF Answers

Alliance Low---2ACOther fights derail. Hal Brands 19. Bloomberg columnist and the Henry Kissinger distinguished professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies. 1-30-2019. "Can U.S. alliances withstand Trump's venom?." Japan Times. https://www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/01/30/commentary/world-commentary/can-u-s-alliances-withstand-trumps-venom/****NCC’19 Novice Packet****After two years under rhetorical assault from U.S. President Donald Trump, America’s alliances have somehow held up. This year, however , the constraints on Trump’s anti-alliance instincts are falling away , and a mix of internal and external pressures are endangering several key alliances at once. This trend is most visible with respect to NATO . The trans-Atlantic alliance has been a target of Trump’s ire for decades. Since taking office, he has berated European leaders, waffled on America’s Article 5 commitment to protect allies, and even mused about withdrawing from the pact. Yet for two years, largely thanks to the initiative of Congress and the Pentagon, day-to-day relations with NATO remained relatively steady. The administration increased spending on military activities meant to deter Russian aggression. The alliance also took steps to improve its military readiness and address unconventional threats such as cyberattacks and information warfare. This progress, however, was largely dependent on the presence of committed, pro-NATO officials in the American bureaucracy. Those officials are becoming scarcer by the day. Secretary of Defense James Mattis is gone, replaced by an acting secretary — Patrick Shanahan — who seems more inclined to fulfill the president’s wishes. National Security Adviser John Bolton and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo are not anti-NATO, but their hostility to the European Union poisons their relationships with European colleagues. Less visibly, several key Pentagon and State Department officials responsible for the NATO portfolio — Assistant Secretary of Defense Robert Karem, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Thomas Goffus and Assistant Secretary of State Wess Mitchell — have left or will soon leave their posts. None of this means that Trump is likely to withdraw from NATO. Bipartisan support for a recent House resolution that seeks to

prevent Trump from unilaterally pulling out of that alliance is a clear warning of the political price he would pay for doing so.

The most likely scenario is that there will simply be less constructive leadership from Washington — less ability to propose new initiatives or even respond to allies’ ideas — at a time when NATO confronts major challenges from Russia and illiberalism is surging within the alliance. Things are no better on the other side of the world . The Japan -U.S. alliance has come through the first half of Trump’s term in stronger shape than one might have expected, given the president’s three-decade history of Japan-bashing. Yet the strains are subtly mounting . Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s assiduous personal cultivation of Trump did not prevent the president from peremptorily withdrawing from the T rans- P acific P artnership in his first week in office . Now, Abe fears that Trump may cut a grand bargain with China at Japan’s expense , or make a deal with No rth Ko rea that similarly ignores Tokyo’s security concerns. And while the challenges in the Japan-U.S. alliance are merely simmering , the problems may be coming to a boil in two other alliances. The U.S.- So uth Ko rea alliance is in crisis , as negotiations on the amount Seoul pays to defray the costs of the American troop presence have deadlocked . According to South Korean officials, U.S. negotiators asked for a dramatic hike in these payments, casting doubt on whether Washington was dealing in good faith. The fact that the U.S. side has asked for annual renegotiations — as opposed to a multi-year agreement — has heightened concerns that Trump will simply ask for more again next year. The resulting impasse may lead the Pentagon to stop paying South Korean contractors starting in the spring. It could also give an American president who has never liked the U.S. presence on the Korean Peninsula an excuse to begin reducing that presence . Last year, Congress passed legislation prohibiting the Pentagon from cutting U.S. troop levels in South Korea below 22,000 (from the current 28,000). That prohibition can be circumvented, however, if the secretary of defense certifies that doing so is in the national interest. Making the future of the alliance even more precarious is that this internal dispute is happening at a critical stage in U.S.- No rth Ko rea diplomacy . As the upcoming summit with Kim Jong Un approaches, Trump will surely be tempted to make a big

concession that will jump-start moribund negotiations on North Korean missiles and nukes. Given how little he cares for the U.S. troop presence in the first place — and given that he suspended U.S.-South Korean military

exercises after his previous summit with Kim — the president may try to kill two birds with one stone . He could withdraw some U.S. forces as a way of appeasing Kim and punishing the South Koreans for not paying up. Doing so would be a gift to Pyongyang, Moscow and Beijing: It would be a big step toward undermining the alliance with Seoul and America’s position in Northeast Asia. Finally, America’s most important alliance in Southeast Asia is also entering a danger zone. For years, the U.S. has refused to clarify whether the Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines covers the islands and reefs that Manila controls in the South China Sea. That ambiguity is meant to avoid writing a “blank check” that Manila might cash by provoking China. Yet given how rapidly China’s expansionism is shifting the balance of influence in the region, ambiguity is rapidly becoming untenable. Since 2012, when the U.S. failed to prevent Beijing from seizing control of Scarborough Shoal, Filipino officials have worried that Washington cannot deter the Chinese salami-slicing that is paring away their country’s sovereignty. Making matters worse, the U.S. has formally clarified its commitment to defending the Japanese-administered Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea, while evading questions about whether it has a parallel commitment to the Philippines. Further fueling the crisis is the fact that the Philippines now have a president — Rodrigo Duterte — who is openly skeptical of the value the U.S. defense

commitment provides. As a result of all this, Philippines Secretary of National Defense Delfin

Lorenzana has been signaling that Manila may re-evaluate its commitment to the Mutual Defense Treaty if Washington doesn’t clarify its position. Yet the Trump administration has so far been silent, perhaps because American officials sense that this issue will be a loser with a president who sees alliances as burdens. A position of continued American ambiguity will probably not lead Duterte to pull out of the alliance. But it may reinforce his belief that Chinese power will ultimately dominate Southeast Asia, and that Manila should accommodate rather than resist the inevitable. That, in turn, would make it far harder for the U.S. to rally the region against Chinese revisionism; it would subtly but unmistakably erode America’s position in Southeast Asia. To be fair, the crisis of this particular alliance is not really Trump’s fault. Reassuring an exposed ally — while also restraining that ally from unwise actions — would test the abilities of even a competent, committed administration. Yet the chances that things could turn out badly, with the Philippines or any of these allies, are only heightened by the fact that America currently has a hollowed-out administration led by this particular president. Since Trump took office, U.S. foreign policy wonks have worried that his presidency would be a period of grave peril for America’s alliances. This might be the year that proves them right .

Alliance Low---1ARIf alliances won’t survive the AFF, they wouldn’t survive Trump anyway. Zack Beauchamp 18. Beauchamp is a senior reporter at Vox, where he covers global politics and ideology, and a host of Worldly, Vox's podcast on covering foreign policy and international relations. 06-12-18. “How Trump is killing America’s alliances.” Vox. https://www.vox.com/world/2018/6/12/17448866/trump-south-korea-alliance-trudeau-g7****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The story of the past few days in news has become clear: It was America versus its allies . After President Trump’s meeting with Kim Jong Un, Trump announced that he would be suspending joint military exercises — “the war games ,” as he put it — with South Korea , as a gesture of goodwill toward the North. This seems to have come as a shock to America’s allies in Seoul : South Korean President Moon Jae-in’s office released a statement saying “we need to find out the precise meaning or

intentions of President Trump’s remarks,” implying they had no idea this was coming . The weekend before, at the G7 summit, a confab for leaders of seven wealthy democracies, Trump got into a fight with

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau over trade . When Trudeau criticized Trump’s imposition of new tariffs on steel and aluminum imports — saying “Canadians did not take it lightly” — Trump called him “very dishonest and weak ” on Twitter. Peter Navarro , one of his top trade advisers,

said on Fox News that there was “a special place in hell” for Trudeau . These two incidents aren’t the only times Trump has infuriated American allies in the past year. Just last month, he pulled the United States out of the Iran nuclear deal — a painstakingly negotiated agreement involving

several of America’s top European allies. Last June, he withdrew from the Paris climate agreement. And this all came amid constant carping about how America’s NATO allies needed to pay their “fair share,” and after Trump’s past musings about how he might not defend allies if they didn’t. Trump’s betrayal of South Korea and eruption at Trudeau are not one-offs , or events you can write

off as simple quirks of the president’s personality. It is part of a broader slate of Trump policies and diplomatic efforts that have , put together, fundamentally weakened America’s ties with its traditional allies — in ways that could have potentially disastrous consequences for the world. America’s alliances depend on the US’s reputation for upholding its agreements and treating its allies fairly. Trump’s blithe disregard for diplomacy and international agreements has damaged the US’s reputation in a way that some scholars worry may be irreparable. And a deep body of research on international relations suggests that the strength of America’s alliances in Europe and East Asia have played a pivotal role in preventing another world war. The more Trump mucks around with American alliances, the more unstable the world becomes — making a large military conflict more imaginable. Such a disaster hopefully will never happen. Indeed, it’s nearly impossible for most of us to imagine one happening now: We live in one of the most peaceful times in human history, with some of the lowest rates of deaths in conflict ever recorded. But that’s precisely the point: Our age is such an anomaly when it comes to conflict that we aren’t entirely sure what could trigger a return to the violent historical norm. Serious, lasting damage to the American-led alliance system might do the trick. And President Trump’s foreign policy could well be doing such damage. His

approach is so erratic , so contemptuous of America’s traditional way of doing business, that US allies are openly worrying in a way that we haven’t seen in modern history. This affects world politics at their most fundamental level , undermining an otherwise stable global system in ways that we are only dimly capable of perceiving. The past week’s news was a particularly naked demonstration of what had been, to date, one of the most subtle and insidious effects of the Trump presidency: an erosion of the foundations of the political system that defines — and protects — the modern world. Trump is attacking the heart of American alliances: trust In 1956, a leaked Defense Department memo proposing the withdrawal of US troops from Europe terrified European allies; German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer declared privately that “NATO is finished.” The Nixon administration’s diplomatic outreach to China in 1972 led both Japanese and South Korean policymakers to fear that the US would cut ties to curry favor with Beijing. Seoul even began a covert nuclear weapons program to defend itself in the event of American abandonment. These examples illustrate a common historical pattern: Alliances between a stronger state and weaker partners become at risk of collapse when the weaker state no longer feels like it can trust the stronger state. “An alliance may dissolve if its members begin to question whether their partners are genuinely committed to providing assistance,” Harvard scholar

Stephen Walt writes in a 1997 survey of the historical record. “This problem will be more severe when ... there is a large asymmetry of power among the member-states.” The US has prevented allies from truly losing faith in the past basically by reassuring them. Presidents promise allies that they’d never abandon them, and provide them tangible goods — like US troop deployments to their country, military assistance, or even trade agreements — to demonstrate America’s continuing commitment. America’s history of managing allies speaks to a fundamental truth about these agreements: They are grounded entirely in trust. Ultimately, an alliance is nothing but a promise: that the United States will defend its allies, either in Europe or East Asia, in the event of an unspecified future attack. There’s nothing an ally can do to force the United States into defending them; they just have to take America’s word for it. As a result, a country’s reputation for treating its allies well is crucially important to determining whether its alliances can work. A 2008 paper by Douglas Gibler, a professor at the University of Alabama, found that states that did not honor their commitment to allies in the past were considerably less likely to forge new alliances in the future. Trade pacts, environmental agreements, and the Iran nuclear deal don’t touch the core US promise in US military alliances — to defend allies in the event of an attack. But backing out of such accords does serious damage to Trump’s reputation as a trustworthy ally. Withdrawing the United States from major agreements and imposing tariffs on allies, all while cozying up to Vladimir Putin and sitting down with Kim Jong Un, tells US allies that Trump doesn’t feel particularly bound by formal agreements or the traditional thrust of US foreign policy. If he decides that an

agreement doesn’t put “America First,” he’s perfectly willing to kick it to the curb. Trump has openly said this in the past. In

July 2016, he told the New York Times that he would be willing to disregard Article 5 , the provision of NATO’s founding treaty committing allies to defending each other in the event of the attack. “If we are not going to be reasonably reimbursed for the tremendous cost of protecting these massive nations with tremendous wealth … then yes, I would be absolutely prepared to

tell those countries, ‘Congratulations, you will be defending yourself,’” Trump told the Times. Trump has tried to walk back

that kind of rhetoric as president. But his actions in the past year — especially the snap cancellation of longstanding military exercises with South Korea — make the threat of abandonment seem all too credible to allies . When NPR asked Tomas Valasek, the recently retired Slovak ambassador to NATO, if Trump would defend his country or another ally in the event of an attack, he couldn’t bring himself to say yes. “The honest answer is none of us quite knows,” Valasek said. “His heart is not into alliance. He has a zero-sum view of the world. He believes in no permanent friendships, no permanent allies. You know, that’s not the sort of mindset that prepares him well for sort of standing by the side of an ally in case of a crisis.” The result of Trump’s reputation for unreliability, then, is a weakening of American alliances. Allies will trust the United States less, and may start look ing for alternatives to depending so heavily on the United States. Enemies will see cracks in US alliances and may attempt to exploit them. “The liberal international order depends on us believing that agreements like treaties [and] international organizations have long-term staying power beyond leadership change,” Brett Ashley Leeds, a scholar of US alliances at Rice University, tells me. “The scariest part is the fact that [Trump] is creating so much uncertainty about what US policy is going to be.”

Resilient – 2ACPolitical commitments are resilient AND reassurance solves. Ellen Mitchell 8-13. Staff writer @ The Hill. 8-13-2019. "Pentagon chief stresses alliances; back home, Trump tears at them." TheHill. https://thehill.com/policy/defense/457175-in-indo-pacific-pentagon-chief-stresses-alliances-back-hometrump-tears-at-them?amp****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Defense Secretary Mark Esper stressed the importance of U.S. alliances during his inaugural foreign trip as Pentagon chief, though

the message was undercut by President Trump disparaging U.S. allies at the same time. Esper used terms like "ironclad" to describe the alliances between the U.S. and other nations while on a seven-day trip last week in

the Indo-Pacific. He stopped in Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Mongolia and South Korea. At the same time, Trump

was complaining that South Korea and Japan should pay a bigger share of the cost of

housing U.S. troops overseas and praising North Korean dictator Kim Jong Un . In South Korea, Esper on Friday met with top South Korean officials, noting that he came "to reaffirm that our United States-Republic of Korea alliance is ironclad." "It is the linchpin of peace and security both on the Korean Peninsula and in northeast Asia. Our two countries share a bond forged in combat," he told the South Korean defense minister. He also said the allies would continue to coordinate on North Korea and "go together in support of that vision by enhancing our already strong defense cooperation and continuing our work on

key areas of regional security." The message came a day after Trump wrote on Twitter that South Korea "agreed to pay substantially more money" to carry the costs required to base 28,500 U.S. troops in South Korea. "Over the past many decades, the U.S. has been paid very little by South Korea," he complained, adding that talks have already begun with South Korea on increasing the $990 million it now pays the U.S. for defense. On Saturday

Trump continued the line of thinking, tweeting that Kim had sent him a letter "complaining about the ridiculous and expensive" joint exercises between the U.S. and South Korea. But allies have learned to take such statements from Trump with a grain of salt , according to Pat Buchan, an Indo-Pacific security expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies think tank. "A lot of the anti-alliance rhetoric that has come out of this administration , particularly this president

as an individual ... is now seen by capitols as campaign rhetoric rather than policy or the direction

the United States is seeking to go down," Buchan told The Hill. "That said, obviously there remains many questions when we're traveling or speaking to counterparts from Australia, Japan, South Korea, it certainly remains a concern to them." Buchan added that Esper's trip was "very well received," due in large part to his credentials

and the Pentagon's long-standing stance of steering clear of politics. "Someone like Esper is very much seen by alliance capitols as a very strongly committed alliance manager ," he said. "You'll find that far more investment goes into people like Esper in terms of the face time that capitols seek than that with the president because they realize that there's campaign rhetoric and there's reality ." In addition, the timing of the trip - a major five-country tour over a week within his first month in office - "in of itself speaks volumes in alliance capitols of the level of U.S. commitment," Buchan said. Joshua Fitt, an Asia-Pacific expert with the

Center for a New American Security, said he saw a similar reaction from allies after Esper's trip. Esper was very clear about the role of our regional allies and partners as laid out in the Pentagon's National Defense Strategy, Fitt said. Because of that,

along with Esper's distinguished service record, "they can see that he really understands the importance of alliances and partnerships and cooperation, and I think that gives him the credibility with allies ... despite the inflammatory statements that the president makes," Fitt said.

Resilient – 1ARAll of their evidence is lazy punditry that is masking their lack of real reasons. Rob Glass & Jeffrey Lewis 18. Rob Glass runs the DebaterCast Podcast; Dr. Jeffrey Lewis is the Director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey and the founding editor of the Arms Control Wonk blog. 09-11-18. “DEBATERCAST EPISODE 04 – DR. JEFFREY LEWIS.” DebaterCast. https://www.policydb8.com/articles.html/interviews-and-profiles/debatercast/debatercast-episode-04-%E2%80%93-dr-jeffrey-lewis-r17/ ****NCC’19 Novice Packet****GLASS: Second question - how much attention do our allies paid to policies like no first use, and do you think they'd react to a shift in policy?

LEWIS: Hard to say . They all pay attention , they all have different attitudes about it. I tend to think

that we exaggerate the role that allies have because , in a lot of cases we’re having our own domestic debate . So what's really happening is people in Washington don't want no first

use, but instead of them taking the responsibility of making that argument , they point to the Japanese and say, I agree with you, but it would terrify our Japanese friends. Those discussions almost never take into account the actual complexity of the domestic politics in those allied countries . Usually I think arguments about what allies think are fronts for what the

speaker thinks , and have very little to do with allies. GLASS: Do we ever consult the allies in how we make our policy? LEWIS: Not really. Except people do definitely try to put allies up to saying things that they can then use. I think you see the very same people who were telling us how terrified, you know, the Japanese and South Koreans would be if the US were to cancel military exercises, for example, are now riding the Trump train and happily canceling military exercises . I think what that tends to illustrate is that those arguments are really tactical and that they don't have any deeper or lasting substantive value . They are the junk food of arguments .

Random fights don’t strain Japan relations---they’re resilientRodger Baker 19. Senior VP of Strategic Analysis, Stratfor. 5-30-2019. "The Contradictory Nature of U.S.-Japan Relations." Stratfor. https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/contradictory-nature-us-japan-relations****NCC’19 Novice Packet****U.S. President Donald Trump's Memorial Day weekend visit to Japan serves as a reminder of the complex relationship between the U nited S tates and Japan . In addition to ceremonial events, meeting the

new emperor and visiting U.S. military personnel, President Trump held discussions with Prime Minister Shinzo Abe

about trade frictions (driven by the United States' nearly $68 billion trade deficit with Japan) and regional security concerns ranging from North Korea to China to Iran. This contrast between bilateral trade competition and mutual security cooperation in many ways exemplifies the modern U.S.- Japan relationship. The Big Picture Japan is a critical component of U.S. defense architecture in the Indo-Pacific, but it is also a strategic economic competitor with the United States. The dual nature of this relationship creates a dynamic tension between the two allies, but an emergent China and a renewed U.S. focus on great power competition keeps the interests of Washington and Tokyo largely aligned , despite their trade disagreements . U.S.-Japanese security and economic interests have been intertwined and often at odds with one another. This has played out through recent history, from the time Commodore Matthew Perry's "Black Ships" sailed into Edo Bay in 1853, through the post-World War I distribution of territories and the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, to U.S. restrictions on Japanese access to key industrial resources in the late 1930s and beyond. This duality was further ensconced after World War II and has defined modern U.S.-Japanese relations. In what later became known as the Yoshida Doctrine, for then-Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida, Japan largely relegated its national security and defense to the United States and instead focused its resources and efforts on reconstruction and building a modern economy. Japan's strategic location in the Pacific gave Tokyo quite a bit of leeway in its relationship with the United States. The outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950 solidified Japan as a key component of the U.S. defense architecture to contain the spread of communism in Asia, with Japan

serving as an off-shore support base for U.S. operations in Korea and later in Indochina. The 1951 Security Treaty between the two, which would undergo several evolutions, provided basing rights for the United States and strengthened the importance of Japan in U.S. defense planning and posture. Japan's location also served U.S. efforts to bottle up the Soviet Pacific Fleet during the Cold War. Though Washington convinced Japan to stand up its Self-Defense Forces, Tokyo often held firmly to the Yoshida Doctrine, limiting its own indigenous military capacity while building up its economic might. Japan provided financial support for U.S. basing (effectively outsourcing its own national defense) and moved rapidly from an import substitution economy to that of an industrial powerhouse. The phrase "Made in Japan" underwent a radical transformation, from being a sign of cheap goods to an indicator of leading high-end technology and quality manufacturing. Initially, Japan's economic focus over security responsibilities drew quiet criticism from the U.S. over Tokyo not pulling its weight in the alliance, but until the early 1990s, this was mostly rhetoric rather than any serious bone of contention. Rising Trade Discord The first major crisis in trade between the United States and Japan began in 1973 with the Arab oil embargo, triggered by the Yom Kippur War. The resulting oil shock opened the way for a brief but significant surge in Japanese auto sales in the United States. Japanese car sales picked up again in the late 1970s, at a time when U.S. automakers were facing rising economic problems of their own, and the competition led to outbreaks of rhetorical (and at times literal) "Japan bashing," leading Tokyo to apply voluntary export restrictions by 1981 to try and ease trade tensions. The automotive industry was an early focus of competition, but throughout the 1980s it was the emerging high technology arena that became a key focal point. The rising trade dispute was further heightened by expanding Japanese investments in the United States, raising cries of America being sold to Japan. By the late 1980s, U.S. and Japanese trade frictions had come to a head. Inside Japan, a nascent sense of nationalism had emerged during the previous decade, and in 1989 then-Minister of Transport (and later Tokyo Governor) Shintaro Ishihara penned a book with Sony Chairman Akio Morita titled "The Japan That Can Say No." The book echoed the sentiment that Japan had left its national interests in U.S. hands for too long, and it was time for the country to stand up, assert its own position and say "no" to U.S. demands. Amid the small but significant camp calling for a stronger and more independent Japan, and given rising anti-Japanese sentiment in the United States, Washington used a combination of unilateral and multilateral

dialogues and diplomatic tools to chip away at what it portrayed as Japan's unfair trade practices. The mismatch

between U.S. security and economic interests that was obvious during Trump's visit to Japan is not an anomaly but a baseline element of the relationship between the two Pacific partners. The result was the floating of the Japanese yen, changes in investment and industrial policies, and as a secondary consequence the decline of Japan from a rapidly growing economic power to a country that slipped into 25 years of relative economic malaise. Significantly, Washington targeted the Japanese economy even in the midst of the Cold War, at a time when the United States was deeply at odds with the Soviet Union, and thus where the Japanese alliance was a critical security component. The apparent mismatch between U.S. security and economic interests that was obvious during Trump's recent visit to Japan, then, is not an anomaly but is rather a baseline element of the relationship between the two Pacific partners. Continuing a Pattern of Past Relations

In this context, what appears on the surface to be counterintuitive — engaging in strategic

competition with China while simultaneously attacking trade relations with key ally Japan — matches a pattern of past relations . The structure of the U.S. government and society frequently leads to seemingly contradictory policies on economic and national security interests, in contrast to countries

like China or even Japan in the 1960s through the 1980s. For Tokyo, this is not a new situation, nor is it one that the Japanese perceive as fundamentally straining their security relations hip with the

U nited S tates. In many ways, that aspect of the alliance is growing even more significant as Japan moves further away from its

strict interpretation of both the Yoshida Doctrine and the war-renouncing Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Tokyo no longer sees its national security as something to leave in U.S. hands, but neither does it see an advantage in breaking from the U.S. security orbit. Over the past several decades, Japan has slowly but steadily moved its defense capabilities from being a supplement to U.S. forces to be a complement to them. And, in some ways, it has even begun to take on some regional security responsibilities itself. This was driven by a combination of factors: The evolving North Korean security situation beginning in the late 1990s; the rise of China, particularly over the past decade; and by the more recent encouragement of the United States for its regional allies to take on more local responsibility. Washington wants to reframe burden sharing from primarily financial and basing support to concrete action, encouraging its allies and partners in the Indo-Pacific to take on more responsibility. And Japan is now ready to reemerge from its quarter-century malaise. Japan's strategic location, advanced technological know-how, and parallel interest in countering a rapidly rising China reinforce its ongoing and expanding security cooperation with the United States. At the same time, Tokyo's advanced economy and primary position as a

maritime trading nation continue to stir competition in its relations with the United States. It is this duality that defines U.S.-

Japan relations, and it is something that is unlikely to fade away any time soon.

AT: Dialogue LinksDialogue alone can’t collapse assurance---if it did, that would mean assurance is too fragile to sustain. Alexandra Bell 17. Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation. 11-24-2017. "A Nuclear Reckoning: Senators Ponder the President’s Power to Launch Armageddon." War on the Rocks. https://warontherocks.com/2017/11/nuclear-reckoning-senators-ponder-presidents-power-launch-armageddon/****NCC’19 Novice Packet****The topic of the hearing did cause some concern among members of the committee. Sen. Marco Rubio (R-Fla.)

said the senators should “tread lightly” on this topic, as the very discussion may cause America’s allies to doubt its commitment to defend them . That, in turn, could push them toward the development of their own nuclear weapons. Rubio also made the case for strategic ambiguity — the idea that a country can better deter a nuclear attack if there is no clear indication about when it would use nuclear weapons. Sen. James Risch (R-Idaho) concurred and heavily stressed that he saw the hearing as an “academic” exercise rather than a practical discussion. He then, perhaps inadvertently, contradicted assurances that had been made by the witnesses, asserting that laws, standards, and proportionality would not be considered in the heat of battle and that the president alone would make the decision to launch, quickly if necessary. Corker responded that this reality was the whole point of having the hearing in the first place. Of course, the United States should continuously assure its friends and allies that it keeps its word and its commitments. That said, it is unnecessary to fret over the mere discussion of these topics , as if U.S. extended deterrence guarantees had all the fortitude of Blanche Dubois . Asserting that discussions about current U.S. nuclear weapons policies are inherently dangerous is a particularly good way to make sure they are never discussed.

AT: Offensive StrikeAND, genuine shifts are blocked by politicsAdam P. Liff 18. Assistant Professor of East Asian International Relations in Indiana University’s School of Global and International Studies and an Associate in Research at Harvard University’s Reischauer Institute of Japanese Studies and Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies. 5-3-2018. "Japan’s Security Policy in the “Abe Era”: Radical Transformation or Evolutionary Shift?." Texas National Security Review. https://tnsr.org/2018/05/japans-security-policy-in-the-abe-era-radical-transformation-or-evolutionary-shift/****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Policy: More Status Quo than Revisionist When evaluating the cumulative significance of Abe-era national security revisions through a lens of continuity , rather than change , the durability of decades-old, fundamental pillars of Japan’s security posture emerges as strongly as the evolutionary nature of the post-2012 changes. Especially when considered against the backdrop of the transformative changes reshaping Japan’s regional security environment, the persistence of Japan’s self-imposed constraints on the development and employment of military power is striking. Appreciating these external factors and internal limits is essential to understanding Japan’s strategic trajectory, as well as the prospects for major change moving forward. On key issues where Abe’s government has sought major changes and faced domestic political resistance , it has either moderated its ambitions significantly, such as introducing globally unique limitations on exercising collective self-defense, or abandoned them, as was the case with collective security. When it comes to fundamental mainstays of Japan’s national security — such as the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance or Japan’s non-nuclear principles — continuity is the defining feature of government policy. Absent more fundamental changes to these core pillars, the idea that the Abe era thus far represents a radical inflection point in Japan’s postwar security trajectory loses significant credibility. First, and most essentially, Article 9 ’s original text remains untouched. Despite repeated declarations since 2012 that amending Article 9 is his government’s “historic task,” Abe has not only failed to achieve revisions, but by 2017 had dialed back his stated ambitions to such a degree that he was prominently criticized within his own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) for abandoning past LDP positions.76 The Abe government’s plan, announced in May 2017, aims to leave Article 9’s existing clauses untouched and proposes adding a new clause that states merely that the “existence” of the JSDF is constitutional.77 Since the JSDF has existed for 64 years, and an overwhelming majority of the Japanese public already believes it is constitutional, one is hard-pressed to conceive of a less ambitious revision. Furthermore, though to many contemporary observers the first revision of Japan’s 1947 Constitution seems more likely than ever before, public opinion remains, at best, ambivalent.78 Faced with various domestic political headwinds — including the reemergence of festering, though unrelated, scandals in spring 2018 — it is unclear whether Abe ’s government will be able to achieve even the modest addition it proposed last year. Article 9 is the linchpin of Japan’s national security policy, and without a more ambitious revision of its first and/or second clauses, other core aspects of national security policy are far less likely to be radically changed. The persistence of Article 9 in its current form is both a symptom and cause of Japan’s continued reluctance to employ JSDF personnel overseas , especially in operations that may require the use of lethal force. Since 1954, no JSDF personnel have died in combat. Even after six years of Abe’s leadership and changes, globally unique conditions remain on the use of force outside an unambiguous armed attack on Japan, and “exclusive defense” (senshu boei) remains Japan’s “fundamental policy.”79 To be sure, the Cabinet’s 2014 reinterpretation of Japan’s Constitution to enable the “limited” exercise of collective self-defense represents a historic policy shift. But even under the new interpretation, the Abe government agreed to impose three strict conditions bounding the circumstances under which Japan could actually exercise its collective self-defense right under international law. Most significantly, the armed attack suffered by the other state must itself pose an existential threat to Japan (kuni no sonritsu). What’s more, in the debate leading up to the Cabinet’s decision, Abe abandoned his hand-picked advisory panel’s recommendation to enable the JSDF to use force in U.N. Security Council-authorized collective security operations (such as the 1991 Persian Gulf War).80 When it comes to fundamental mainstays of Japan’s national security — such as the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance or Japan’s non-nuclear principles — continuity is the defining feature of government policy. Although new and historically significant legal authorities came into effect in 2016, severe restrictions remain on allowing JSDF personnel to use weapons in peacetime, and there is significant political reluctance to do so.81 In the historic deployment as part of the U.N. peacekeeping operation to South Sudan, Abe’s government withdrew the JSDF once the security situation deteriorated, presumably to avoid casualties abroad. The JSDF were withdrawn, then, without actually utilizing the new authority to “rush to rescue” (kaketsuke-keigo) — or using lethal (small-arms) force to come to the aid of other nations’ personnel.82 Article 9’s second clause has particular significance for Japan’s force development options. A Cold War-era self-imposed ban on the JSDF’s acquisition of “offensive” (kogekigata) platforms of the sort that major military powers such as the United States, China, and Russia procure as a matter of course (aircraft carriers, ICBMs, strategic bombers) has been sustained based on a judgment that these platforms would constitute “war potential” and exceed the “minimum necessary” for self-defense. Another fundamental pillar of Japan’s national security posture — the centrality of the U.S.-Japan alliance — not only remains in place but the Abe government has doubled down upon it . Relative to declarations from leaders in the 1970s, especially Yasuhiro Nakasone, who would become prime minister in the 1980s and who famously referred to the alliance earlier in his career as a “semi-permanent necessity” (haneikyuteki ni hitsuyo) and called for autonomous defense (jishu boei),83 calls for marginally more independent capabilities are hardly radical or even unique to Abe. In fact, they are generally supported in Washington. Even so, the 2015 revision of the Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation stipulates that the allies’ basic respective obligations under the 1960 security treaty remain unchanged. Deterring and, if necessary, responding to “an armed attack against either Party in the territories under the administration of Japan” remains the alliance’s primary mandate.84 Japan is still under no treaty obligation to support the U.S. militarily. This of course does not necessarily mean that it would not. And the 2015 security legislation does enable, based on a political judgment, significant expansion of JSDF logistical support for

U.S. operations, involvement in bilateral planning and exercises, and use of weapons in various peacetime contingencies. The aforementioned and now explicitly authorized “asset protection” mission reflected in the 2015 legislation expands the circumstances under which Japan can use weapons to defend a U.S. vessel under attack or that of other friendly nations if two conditions are met: that it is peacetime, and that the vessel is engaged in activities contributing to Japan’s defense. Even so, the JSDF can use weapons only to the extent necessary to repel the attack or to create an opportunity for retreat.85 As a practical matter, Japan’s defense spending is not rapidly increasing and remains a major hurdle to any ambitious expansion of JSDF capabilities, roles, or missions. Despite widespread media hype about the Abe government’s “record high” defense budgets since 2013, in nominal yen terms, Japan’s 2018 defense budget is roughly commensurate with its 1997 spending. By comparison, during the intervening two decades, China’s official defense budget surged from one-quarter of Japan’s spending to four times the size of Japan’s defense budget. Regardless of Abe and other political leaders’ stated ambitions, without significant increases in defense funding , more fundamental changes to JSDF force structure or employment will be difficult. One recent study suggested that at least 40 percent of the defense priorities delineated in the Abe government’s 2018 budget request are underfunded.86 The loosening of a long-standing ban on arms exports, which, in part, was intended to allow greater “bang for the buck” through economies of scale, has yet to attract any purchases of major platforms.87 Other longtime, self-imposed constraints have remained more or less in place. Perhaps most salient, in light of recent developments on the Korean Peninsula, is that Japan continues to rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. The Abe government has repeatedly said that Japan’s long-standing “three non-nuclear principles” (hikaku san gensoku) — non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory — remain the country’s “fundamental policy.”88 To be sure, in technical terms, Japan has long hedged against fears of U.S. abandonment and, in recent years, discussion has been more open about the possible need to move beyond these principles.89 But these debates are hardly unprecedented. Prime ministers since the 1950s have held that “defensive” nuclear weapons would be constitutional.90 Japan’s policies in this regard have not changed. This list, while not exhaustive, demonstrates that, despite important policy shifts initiated by the Abe administration since 2012, central pillars of Japanese security policy basically remain in place. Although significant in practical terms and historic in a national context, the Abe government’s alterations to Japan’s defense posture — up to and including limited collective self-defense — are best understood as evolutionary steps in response to a rapidly changing strategic environment. Despite Japan’s potentially volatile region, there is, as of yet, no clear evidence that the public would support more radical changes to Japan’s fundamental security principles, such as revising Article 9’s first or second clause to enable the abandonment of “exclusive defense” (senshu boei), much less pursuing autonomous military power outside a U.S.-Japan alliance framework, significantly ramping up defense spending, or acquiring nuclear weapons. Institutional Reforms: Evolutionary and Mainstream As discussed earlier, another major focus of national security reforms under Abe has been institutional; specifically, consolidating policy decision-making in the Cabinet, and the prime minister’s office in particular. Yet this trend also has a long legacy that predates Abe and is not unique to the LDP.91 Previous long-serving LDP prime ministers have been proactive champions of administrative reforms, including Nakasone, who was prime minister from 1982 to 1987, Ryutaro Hashimoto, who held the office from 1996 to 1998, and Koizumi, who led from 2001 to 2006. Abe has built on the legacy of these and other predecessors, including former DPJ prime ministers.92 Most prominently, the bills to establish the National Security Council (NSC) and the Bureau of Personnel Affairs received significant support from the DPJ.93 The founding of Japan’s NSC was an outgrowth of a reform movement dating at least to the 1970s. That movement accelerated significantly after the September 11, 2001, attacks as Japan was called on to adopt a more proactive role in international security affairs and as its regional security environment grew more complicated. In 1986, Nakasone had established a “Security Council” (now defunct) with similar objectives to those that motivated the establishment of the NSC in 2013. Subsequent administrations reformed it incrementally.94 Koizumi’s post-9/11 efforts, in which Abe played a central role as deputy and later chief Cabinet secretary, were of particular significance in centralizing foreign policy decision-making.95 After additional reforms during the leadership of the DPJ, the March 2011 “triple disaster” (the strongest earthquake in Japan’s history triggered the tsunami that led to the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant disaster) and other crises revealed the deficiencies of existing crisis management and other national security-relevant institutions. In 2013, Abe, the ruling coalition, and the DPJ joined forces to establish the NSC.96 Placed in historical context, Abe-era institutional reforms appear far less outside the mainstream than much of the contemporary discourse would indicate. Note also that with several high-profile exceptions mentioned earlier, most of Abe’s appointments related to national security have been relatively conventional. Although Article 68 of the Japanese Constitution requires only a majority of Cabinet ministers to be members of the Diet, all of Abe’s Cabinet-level national security appointments have been LDP politicians. Both foreign ministers in his second administration are generally considered to be more moderate than he is. Meanwhile, Abe’s chief foreign policy adviser, the National Security Secretariat secretary-general, is a retired Ministry of Foreign Affairs career diplomat. Although Abe’s most controversial intervention in bureaucratic personnel decisions, the appointment of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau director-general in 2013, was unprecedented, this Cabinet position has not historically been immune to political pressure. As Richard Samuels notes in a seminal 2004 study, powerful prime ministers in the past had pressured the bureau to achieve desired ends in national security policy. Most significantly, in the 1950s the bureau was pressured to declare that the establishment of the JSDF and, later, the possession of nuclear weapons would be constitutional, as long as they were for purposes of “self-defense.” In the 1980s, it judged arms exports to the United States constitutional. Nor has political frustration with the bureau been rooted strictly in the LDP. Since the end of the Cold War, influential politicians, including at least three who later became presidents of the erstwhile leading-opposition DPJ — Ichiro Ozawa, Naoto Kan, and Yoshihiko Noda — have criticized what they saw as overreach by the bureau. As Japan struggled to figure out its international role after 9/11, a LDP Diet member went so far as to introduce a bill in 2003 to disband the bureau. In Diet testimony, one of his colleagues told then-Prime Minister Koizumi, also a member of the LDP, “When interpretations of a bureaucratic agency of the government dominate the legislative process on such an issue as national security, it is a violation of the separation of powers among the three branches of government.” Perhaps most telling in the context of this study is the fact that, during his leadership campaign in 2002, Noda, a member of the DPJ who would later be Abe’s immediate predecessor as prime minister in 2011-2012, reportedly advocated for collective self-defense and pledged to appoint a sympathetic director-general of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. Noda’s predecessor as prime minister, Kan, a fellow member of the DPJ who led from 2010 to 2011, had previously argued that “the fact that the CLB serves as the highest interpretive authority on the Constitution is itself a violation of the Constitution.”97 Abe’s government has implemented major changes and flouted some norms concerning political influence over the bureaucracy. In particular, Abe was the first to decisively assert his will so conspicuously over bureaucrats of the Cabinet Legislation Bureau. But the sentiment that inspired him was neither unique to him nor limited to his party. Placed in historical context, Abe-era institutional reforms appear far less outside the mainstream than much of the contemporary discourse would indicate. This suggests that Abe may not be as exceptional as is often assumed — a finding with significant implications for the era that follows his administration. Accounting for Change … and Continuity: Japan’s Shifting Strategic and Political Context To properly assess the significance of security shifts under the Abe administration and their longer-term implications for Japan’s trajectory, they must be considered in their international and domestic context. Failure to do so risks excessive, or unwarranted, attribution of causality to specific individuals, like Abe, or to idiosyncratic factors, such as ideology. The available evidence suggests that any explanation of developments in the Abe era requires a nuanced assessment of the complex factors at play. A perceived worsening of Japan’s external security environment has created political space for incremental rationalization of security policy shifts and decision-making to confront these challenges, even as long-standing, if contested and weakening, normative and domestic factors continue to provide powerful incentives for ambitious leaders to moderate their policy goals. Japan’s Increasingly “Severe” External Security Environment Abe’s return to power in late 2012 occurred as major changes were developing in Japan’s regional security environment, creating a strategic context distinctly different from his first stint in office. Then, from 2006 to 2007, he failed to achieve most of his proposed national security reforms. More recently, of particular salience from Tokyo’s perspective have been the worsening threat from a nuclear-armed North Korea, China’s rapidly expanding military capabilities and newly provocative rhetoric and policies in the East China Sea, the growing prominence of qualitatively novel security challenges, including in the “gray zone” and cyber and space domains, and developments affecting alliance politics. North Korea From Japan’s perspective, over the past five years North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs have evolved from longer-term security concerns to clear and present dangers. To some observers, most notably Abe himself, the despotic, internationally isolated regime of Kim Jong Un poses a threat that is unprecedented in Japan’s postwar history.98 Since 2011, Pyongyang has conducted four nuclear tests, the most recent of which had an estimated yield of more than 100 kilotons (by comparison, the Hiroshima bomb in 1945 was roughly 15 kilotons). The previous North Korean regime sparked global alarm when it tested missiles in 1998, 2006, and 2009, but the Kim Jong Un regime has tested missiles at a rate that dwarfs that of its predecessor: 19 in 2014, 15 in 2015, 24 in 2016, and 20 in 2017.99 North Korean missiles have also become qualitatively more advanced and more mobile (making them easier to hide and more difficult to destroy). They are also longer-ranged, and capable of delivering larger — potentially nuclear — payloads. In 2017 alone, Pyongyang conducted its first thermonuclear test, provocatively launched missiles over Japanese territory and into Japan’s exclusive economic zone, and tested two intercontinental ballistic missiles it claimed could hit anywhere in the world, including Washington, D.C. North Korea also made specific threats against Japanese and U.S. bases. In January 2018, Abe summarized his take on the implications by saying “the security environment surrounding Japan is its most severe since World War II.”100 China Over the past decade, the degree to which Japanese elites and the public see China as a national security concern has increased significantly. At the time of Abe’s first term, from 2006 to 2007, few outside national security circles paid much attention to Beijing’s quiet development of the world’s most robust arsenal of conventionally-tipped ballistic missiles, or to various other “anti-access/area-denial” capabilities aimed at deterring U.S. intervention in a regional conflict. Fewer still paid attention to China’s vast sovereignty claims in the South and East China Seas — including of five islands administered by Japan. Furthermore, until a political crisis with Beijing over the contested islands in 2010, the concept of “gray-zone situations” was not a major concern of most Japanese strategists.101 Times have changed, and concerns about the security challenge posed by China are now mainstream and less abstract. In particular, those concerns deepened among the Japanese elite and broader public from 2009 to 2012, when Abe and his party, the LDP, were part of the opposition. Coupled with China’s symbolic replacement of Japan in 2010 as the world’s second-largest national economy, years of double-digit defense spending increases provided easily digestible evidence that the military balance of power was shifting. The day Abe’s

first administration collapsed in 2007, Beijing’s official defense budget — widely considered to underreport actual military spending — was 356 billion yuan (about $45 billion), roughly the same as Japan’s. By 2017, it was more than one trillion yuan (or $151 billion) — nearly quadruple Japan’s. Beyond Beijing’s long-standing nuclear arsenal, of particular concern to Japanese strategists is China’s world-leading arsenal of advanced, conventionally-tipped ballistic missiles, which are capable of hitting Japanese territory, including U.S. bases on Japan, as well as its increasingly modernized air force, navy, and marines, all of which dwarf Japan’s in quantitative terms and are, in some cases, already superior qualitatively. Beyond these broad trends, Beijing’s coercive rhetoric and policies following major political contretemps in 2010 and 2012 over the contested Senkakus presented to many Japanese observers a concrete and high-profile China-specific contingency scenario that would pose a direct potential threat to Japanese territory. Since September 2012 — just three months before Abe returned to office — Beijing’s employment of military and paranaval forces (especially its Coast Guard) to coercively challenge Japan’s effective administrative control of the islands has transformed the operational environment, introducing a major source of uncertainty and risk, and creating circumstances to facilitate a potential fait accompli.102 In response, Japan nearly tripled the frequency with which it scrambled fighters against approaching Chinese planes between 2012 and 2017, reaching an all-time annual high of 851 by April 2017.103 In the “gray zone,” between late 2012 and December 2017 Chinese government vessels entered the Senkakus’ territorial waters more than 600 times to assert Beijing’s sovereignty claim.104 For these reasons and others, such as concerns about Chinese military activities elsewhere in the East China Sea and Western Pacific, Japan’s 2017 defense white paper devotes 34 pages to commentary on concerns about China, including Beijing’s “attempts to change the status quo by coercion.”105 In short, during Abe’s time out of office and since his return in 2012, the nature and scope of the perceived challenge that China poses to Japan’s national security has transformed in highly visible ways.106 A wide array of political leaders, not just Abe, have called for countermeasures. Indeed, major shifts were adopted by the DPJ while Abe’s party was out of power from 2009 to 2012, and in the September 2012 LDP presidential election that Abe won, all five candidates campaigned on the importance of adopting a harder line against China.107 Changing Military Technology and the Growing Prominence of Cyber and Space Technological transformations have also shaped Japanese leaders’ perceptions of the regional security environment since Abe’s first administration. In particular, the proliferation of extremely fast ballistic and cruise missiles in Northeast Asia and the growing prominence of new security domains — space and cyber, in particular — have fundamentally changed the nature of and speed at which a security contingency could manifest and a political decision would need to be made about how to respond, as well as the national security interests that are potentially at risk. Meanwhile, China’s demonstrated willingness to use paramilitary forces to assert its territorial claims has introduced other novel deterrence challenges in the “gray zone.” Although public discourse often overlooks these key trends in favor of more conspicuous metrics, such as the construction of aircraft carriers or defense budgets, these changing aspects of the regional security environment are a major driver of reforms to Japan’s security policies and institutions, most of which were designed for far more conventional military threats during the Cold War. Alliance Politics The United States, Japan’s sole treaty ally, has played an important role in shaping Japan’s recent security reforms: First, for decades, Washington has called for Japan to adopt a more proactive security posture. This long-term trend found global impetus after 9/11. More recently, however, rapid changes to the security environment in East Asia have caused U.S. policymakers to return their focus to ways Japan can “do more,” not in terms of global operations (such as in Iraq and Afghanistan) but in the Asia-Pacific. Second, the emergence of qualitatively new threats combined with the relative decline in U.S. power have deepened long-standing Japanese insecurities. Although this trend significantly predates 2016, the Trump administration’s saber-rattling toward Pyongyang and its rhetorical ambivalence regarding U.S. global security commitments, coupled with North Korea’s rapidly advancing nuclear and missile capabilities, have exacerbated the uncertainties. Pyongyang’s apparent ability to threaten Los Angeles or Washington, D.C. with a nuclear-armed missile in particular has raised concerns about “decoupling” and the possible undermining of U.S. extended deterrence.108 Times have changed, and concerns about the security challenge posed by China are now mainstream and less abstract. One important consequence of this changing strategic environment can be seen in the tension inherent in Japan’s “alliance dilemma”:109 between Japan’s longstanding concerns about possible entrapment in U.S.-led wars if it gets too close and its fears that Washington may abandon its ally if it does not. In recent years, anxiety has shifted even further toward the latter. This concern about abandonment, in turn, has incentivized Tokyo to signal its commitment to a more “balanced” alliance (collective self-defense; asset protection) and to support U.S. Asia-Pacific strategy more broadly. The Abe administration supported key components of the erstwhile Obama-era “rebalance to Asia” such as the Trans-Pacific Partnership, and has proactively expanded ties with U.S. security partners in the Asia-Pacific and beyond. It has also championed the concept of the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” Thus, Japan’s strategic alignment decisions appear to be aimed at pulling the United States closer while Tokyo diversifies economic and security ties with other U.S. allies and partners. This stands in stark contrast to several other states in the region — the Philippines under the Duterte administration, for example — that appear to be hedging between China and the United States. After a brief flirtation with a more “independent diplomacy” by the short-lived administration of Prime Minister Yukio Hatoyama from 2009 to 2010,110 the foreign policies of Abe and his immediate predecessors manifest little ambivalence at either the popular or elite levels concerning which way Japan should align itself strategically.111 The Domestic Politics of National Security In light of this rapidly changing strategic environment, an emerging elite near-consensus among moderates and conservatives on the necessity of some reforms and greater public permissiveness regarding key security issues have created domestic political space for the Abe government to pursue its agenda. Nevertheless, widespread domestic political sensitivities concerning military affairs,112 combined with the deceptive limits of Abe and his party’s political mandate, also counsel pragmatic and significant restraint. The interaction of these domestic forces helps explain why Abe has achieved more than his predecessors yet still fallen short of his most ambitious objectives. Deepening Pragmatism A major trend of post-Cold War Japanese national security politics has been the replacement of the ideological, pacifist left as the major anti-LDP political force with a moderate, pragmatic center-left. Even before Abe returned in 2012, a basic consensus on the need for some national security reforms was coalescing among mainstream parties, whereas decades before there was much less support: Japan’s domestic institutions and policies were not up to the challenge of its increasingly complicated security environment. Accordingly, though they disagree on many specifics, and while resistance exists even within the LDP to some of the more ambitious efforts at change, in recent years support has grown across the political spectrum for incrementally rationalizing Japan’s institutions and force structure and posture in response to a changing threat environment, strengthening the U.S.-Japan alliance, and expanding security ties with other U.S. security partners. For example, between the end of the Cold War and the Koizumi administration, Japan’s Diet passed more than a dozen pieces of security-related legislation, significantly expanding the JSDF’s roles and missions as well as Japan’s ability to participate in international security affairs. Since 2012, the intermittent “salami slicing” has accelerated.113 The institutional and policy legacy of the left-of-center DPJ’s years in power from 2009 to 2012 provides compelling evidence that political support for many of these reforms not only predates Abe but is not exclusive to his conservative party. For example, it was the Noda administration, from 2011 to 2012, that initiated the review process that ultimately resulted in the landmark 2015 Guidelines for Japan-U.S. Defense Cooperation revision and that significantly loosened the 1976 “arms export ban” before the Abe government’s more conspicuous policy shift later. The DPJ had also been discussing establishing an institution like the NSC — something called for by the DPJ’s 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines. That 2010 document was also responsible for changing Japan’s basic defense orientation toward active deterrence and a highly mobile “dynamic defense force” able to expeditiously counter a threat anywhere in the country — including its remote southwestern islands — both shifts that the Abe government has built upon. It also mainstreamed the concept of gray-zone contingencies in Japan’s security lexicon, especially concerning a possible conflict in the East China Sea.114 Furthermore, the NSC — widely associated with Abe and considered his administration’s most significant post-2012 institutional reform — was actually part of a supra-partisan reform movement aimed at bolstering political leadership over the bureaucracy. After its landslide defeat in 2012, the DPJ even reportedly shared a draft NSC proposal with Abe, cooperated in compiling the bill that established the council in 2013, and voted in support of it (the legislation passed the Diet 213-18).115 Despite general support for certain incremental changes, since 2012 Japan’s domestic politics have been in disarray, with potentially significant implications for future reform efforts. On politically incendiary issues such as Article 9, major fault lines still exist between Abe and the opposition parties, and, though less appreciated, within the ruling coalition itself. Most recently, opposition party alignments have also been quite volatile, further clouding the waters. The erstwhile leading opposition left-of-center DPJ dissolved into smaller parties in 2016, a landmark event that has prompted a series of realignments across the opposition, with the dust yet to fully settle. On security affairs, key former members of the successor Democratic Party (which itself dissolved in May 2018) align more closely with the conservative LDP than with the nascent, more liberal offshoot Constitutional Democratic Party. Regardless of how opposition parties ultimately realign, however, significant backsliding on security reforms seems unlikely. The stark ideological “left-right” divide on security policy that defined Cold War-era national security politics is dying. Even the 2014 surge in voters who supported the left-wing Communist Party — which some pointed to as a resurgence of the ideological, pacifist left — appears to have been largely an artifact of formerly right-wing voters signaling opposition to the big two mainstream parties, not a backlash against Abe’s security agenda per se.116 Public Opinion The precipitous collapse of Abe’s first administration in 2007 indicates the risks of Cabinet instability and excessive prime-ministerial ambition in a country where pacifist and anti-militarist sentiments, however amorphous, remain strong.117 Yet the Japanese public’s views on security affairs — long a “third rail” of postwar politics — have moderated significantly over time, still more so in light of regional security developments. This has created a more permissive political environment for Abe’s agenda than was available a decade ago. Most remarkably, despite widely reported public protests and controversy, the backlash against the security reforms his administration has achieved so far has been ephemeral. Although the controversial July 2015 security legislation caused a major dip in his Cabinet’s support rating, within four months it was net positive again and remained so until unrelated political scandals emerged two years later.118 Meanwhile, especially since 2012, public opinion data suggest four important trends related to national security: widespread identification of China and North Korea as “critical” or “important” threats to Japan’s “vital interests,” exceptional affinity toward America and confidence in U.S. economic and military strength, persistent and deepening antagonism and threat perceptions regarding China (the obvious alternative alignment partner), and increasing certainty that the U.S.-Japan alliance and the JSDF are the best ways to ensure Japan’s security. Generally speaking, Abe’s moves have been more or less consistent with these trends.119 There was a striking drop in Japanese public confidence in the U.S. president after the 2016 election, but there is as of yet no clear indication it is translating into a major reduction of confidence in, or support for, the bilateral alliance.120 Despite this more permissive environment, however, public concerns about external security hardly give the Abe government a blank check. On high-salience issues where public opinion is more ambivalent or actively opposed — e.g., a fundamental revision of Article 9’s first two clauses or enabling the JSDF to use force in a scenario that does not constitute a clear threat to Japan — Abe appears to have significantly dialed back. Had the 2015 security legislation reflected what had been reported in months prior as Abe’s original ambitions concerning collective self-defense or collective security, public backlash probably would have been much more severe. The Abe government’s ability to read the political winds appears to have significantly improved since 2007. Rhetoric or personal ambitions aside, the defining feature of his administration’s national security policy agenda since 2012 appears to be pragmatic incrementalism. Domestic Political Headwinds and the Paradox of Abe’s Electoral “Success” Based on the most conspicuous metrics cited by many observers — Diet seat totals and Cabinet support rates — the LDP-Komeito ruling coalition’s five consecutive national election victories since 2012 appear to have given Abe’s government a sizable mandate. Meanwhile, the enervation and fractiousness of the opposition, coupled with widespread public frustration after the three-year experiment without the LDP in power from 2009 to 2012, would suggest the elimination of an otherwise potentially potent political constraint. Yet the reality is different: The LDP’s Diet strength masks significant domestic political weakness, which itself belies the

widespread and simplistic narrative of Abe and the LDP as “all-powerful” (Abe ikkyo). Paradoxically, the ruling coalition’s electoral success does not evince majority public support for the Abe administration, much less its national security agenda. In recent

elections, the LDP has benefited significantly from historically low voting participation across all age groups and apparent widespread public disillusionment with the options. Turnout in the “landslide” election in 2012 that enabled Abe’s return as prime minister was the lowest of the postwar period (59 percent) — a more than ten-point drop from the 2009 election. Turnout fell a further seven points in the 2014 general election.121 Meanwhile, between 1992 and 2012 voters who preferred the LDP over other parties shrank from a majority of the public to less than 20 percent. Voters with no party affiliation now make up the majority of the electorate.122 And a recent public opinion poll showed that among those who support the Abe Cabinet, the primary reason is a lack of alternatives.123 In short, while election results have granted Abe and the LDP robust backing among members of the Diet, other factors caution against making swift policy changes — especially on traditionally sensitive matters. Despite the LDP’s dominance of contemporary Japanese politics in terms of Diet seats, a significant minority of its Lower House candidates depend on Komeito, the LDP’s junior coalition partner, to get elected — a detail not widely appreciated outside Japanese journalistic and academic circles. It is no coincidence that the LDP and Komeito have cooperated in every national election since 1999 and ruled together in coalition whenever in power. Mutual stand-down agreements in single-member electoral districts are a vital source of both parties’ electoral success — and they inject a powerful codependence into the relationship. Given Komeito’s largely lay-Buddhist, pacifistic base, LDP ambitions on national security are constrained by a junior coalition partner that, despite its relatively small size, can exercise a virtual veto power.124 As Komeito brags to its supporters, this effectively makes it, though a much smaller party, a kind of “opposition within the ruling coalition” and a powerful internal “brake” on the Abe administration’s ambitions in the security domain.125 Despite this more permissive environment, however, public concerns about external security hardly give the Abe government a blank check. Although it is often overlooked outside Japan, Komeito’s role restraining the LDP’s security agenda is not new. This could be seen when Koizumi pursued a more ambitious global security agenda immediately after 9/11.126 In the Abe era, Komeito helped water down the Abe Cabinet’s 2014 resolution formally “reinterpreting” Article 9. In particular, it pressured the administration to impose the three aforementioned conditions on the exercise of collective self-defense, and to abandon a push to enable collective security operations. The Abe government’s May 2017 proposal for a revision of Article 9, which would leave its existing clauses untouched and add a new clause asserting the constitutionality of the JSDF’s existence, surprised many commentators for its lack of ambition. Even within the LDP, Abe was criticized for abandoning the party’s far more transformative 2012 revision proposal. In stark contrast, his 2017 proposal was based not on the longtime position of his party but, rather, on a proposal tabled a decade earlier by Komeito, which has long opposed changing Article 9’s existing clauses. These two high-profile, behind-the-scenes concessions to Komeito indicate the smaller party’s influence not only because Abe has said multiple times that enabling collective self-defense and revising Article 9 rank among his administration’s highest priorities but also because they constitute core goals written into the LDP’s founding charter 63 years ago. The implication seems clear: Barring the fracturing of the ruling coalition or some kind of major structural change, the LDP’s electoral dependence on Komeito is likely to continue to hamstring Abe and future LDP leaders in the security domain.127 Although the external security environment and Abe and his allies’ ambitions are undoubtedly major drivers of Japan’s evolving security posture, it is important to recognize the role that Komeito and other domestic political obstacles play as constraints on the administration’s agenda. It is also crucial for evaluating the prospects for major change in the years to come. With a transition to a new imperial reign in 2019 and the 2020 Tokyo Olympics just around the corner, the deck may be stacked against Abe achieving the more fundamental reforms he and his party have long sought — even if he is reelected in the September 2018 LDP presidential election.128

No ImpactOffensive strike wouldn’t escalate Alex Ward 19. Staff writer @ Vox. 4-30-2019. "Japan: the rise of its new militarism could change the world." Vox. https://www.vox.com/2019/4/30/18100066/japan-shinzo-abe-sdf-emperor-china****NCC’19 Novice Packet****Three main trends likely worry him the most. First, President Donald Trump promotes a less engaged America .

That’s led experts and officials I spoke to in Japan to wonder about the long-term health of the US-Japan alliance and may partly animate Tokyo’s desire to ensure it can take care of itself in the event the US doesn’t come to its defense. Second, Japan is unhappy about North Korea’s ability to attack Japan. Pyongyang hasn’t tested a missile or nuke since 2017, mainly because it doesn’t want to end diplomatic talks with the US and keep Trump happy. Still, Japan wants to ensure it can defend against an improving arsenal pointing its way. Third, and most importantly, China looms largest in the minds of Japanese officials as the long-term threat. That’s mostly due to its efforts to claim territory in disputed waters, its economic prowess, and military largesse. Having new and upgraded weaponry will help defend against and deter a possible attack. But with an eye to the future, it may also allow Japan to ably protect itself should a war with Beijing break out . Japanese officials balk at any suggestion that the country would ever get into a shooting war with China . “China has been our neighbor for thousands of years, and it’s going to be for thousands more,” the top diplomat said, reassuring me that Tokyo has no designs to use force against its regional foe despite Japan’s “more and more active” military. A top Japanese defense official made the same point in starker terms: “We can’t provoke China. That would be suicide for us.” But convincing China of Japan’s harmless intentions is proving to be a bit harder. “Such [a] move by the Japanese side is not conducive to the improvement and development of China-Japan ties or the peace and stability in the region,” Hua Chunying, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, said at a news conference in December. “We urge Japan to keep its commitment to the ‘purely defensive defense’ strategy, stay committed to the path of peaceful development and act cautiously in the area of military security,” she continued. It again highlights the problem Japan has breaking out of its postwar hangover without angering China. Should Tokyo develop too slowly, it could fall further behind Beijing in military strength. But if it arms too quickly, China and other adversaries may miscalculate and believe it’s laying the foundations for war. That, of course, would be the worst outcome. A war between China and Japan would almost certainly be the catalyst for a third

world war, some experts say. Luckily, Beijing doesn’t seem overly worried about Japan’s moves right

now. “China is biting its lip because it knows it can defeat Japan” in a fight, Green, who led the

Japan portfolio in George W. Bush’s National Security Council, told me. That may be why, last October, Chinese President

Xi Jinping agreed to meet Abe , the first bilateral meeting between the two countries in more than seven years.

Neither leader is happy with the other, partly over the islands dispute, but opening a dialogue could help both sides curb the rising tensions .