Allied Briefing

The Battle of Talavera

27th-28th July, 1809

“The unfortunate war in Spain ruined me.

All my reverses originated there.”

- Napoléon

Intelligence BriefingThe Strategic Situation:

Wellesley returned to Portugal in April 1809 to command the British army,

reinforced with Portuguese regiments trained by General Beresford. These new

forces turned Soult out of Portugal at the Battle of Grijó and the Second Battle

of Porto, and the other northern cities were recaptured by General Silveira.

Soult escaped without his heavy equipment by marching through the mountains

to Orense.

By late May 1809 the French armies were scattered across most of Spain. St.

Cyr’s VII Corps was in Catalonia in the far eastern corner. Suchet’s III Corps

was in Aragon. Mortier’s V Corps had moved into the eastern part of Old

Castile after the fall of Saragossa, and then west to Valladolid. Marshal Ney’s

VI Corps was occupied in the north west of Spain, attempting without success

to put down the Galician uprising. Marshal Soult’s II Corps had just been

expelled from Portugal, and by the end of the month had reached relative safety

in Spain. General Sebastiani’s IV Corps was south east of Madrid, keeping a

watch on the Spanish Army of La Mancha. Finally, Marshal Victor’s I Corps

was based on the Guadiana in Estremadura, with General Cuesta’s Spanish

Army of Estremadura gathering strength to his south.

Wellesley’s Plans:

Having defeated Soult, Wellesley’s next target was Victor’s I Corps.

While Victor was in Estremadura, Wellesley had a choice of two options – he

could attack along the line of the Tagus, and hope to beat Victor unaided, or he

could move south, join up with Cuesta at Badajoz, and attack Victor with his

Spanish allies. The first option was more risky, but did offer the chance of

trapping and destroying Victor’s army, while the second option was safer, but

was likely only to force Victor to retreat back towards Madrid and

reinforcements.

The Battle of Grijó – 11th May, 1809

Intelligence BriefingUnknown to Wellesley, Victor was already considering abandoning

Estremadura who was well aware that an advance along the Tagus might trap

him in Estremadura, where he was already running short of supplies.

In early June Victor asked King Joseph for permission to retreat north and take

up a new position around Plasencia, north of the Tagus, where he would be

able to find fresh supplies. At first Joseph refused, but on 10th June he finally

learnt that Soult had been forced out of Portugal, and thus that Wellesley was

free to turn his attentions elsewhere. Joseph and his chief of staff, Marshal

Jourdan, expected Wellesley to invade Spain from northern Portugal, along the

Douro towards Salamanca and Old Castile, and so they gave Victor permission

to make his retreat.

In the meantime Wellesley and Cuesta were exchanging plans. On 22nd May

Wellesley had written to Cuesta, asking him for suggestions on how the British

and Spanish could best cooperate. Cuesta replied offering a choice of three

plans and by 8th June Wellesley agreed to the third of those plans, in which the

British would advance along the Tagus, and capture the bridges across the

river, while Cuesta would harry the French from the south. However as Victor

was about to move back across the Tagus it was already too late for this to be

effective.

Discord in the Allied Camp:

Having first suggested this plan, Cuesta was now bitterly opposed to it. He

believed that Wellesley was about to be appointed Commander-in-Chief of the

Spanish armies, a post that had been left vacant since the start of the Spanish

uprising. Some efforts were indeed being made at Seville to bring this about,

but Wellesley himself was not in favour of pressing the idea. Unfortunately

Cuesta only knew that the idea had been suggested, and took up a hostile

attitude to Wellesley throughout the campaign.

2nd Battle of Porto – 12th May, 1809

Intelligence BriefingFor the moment Wellesley was unaware of any problems with Cuesta, and so with some misgivings agreed to Cuesta’s new plan where the Allies were to meet

up at Badajoz. From there they would then launch a frontal assault on Victor, while two flanking columns would make long marches around the French left and

right, in the hope of trapping them against the Tagus. The day after Wellesley agreed to this plan, or at least to march to Badajoz, the news of Victor’s retreat

finally reached him, and the planning had to begin again.

To Wellesley it was obvious what the Allies should do now. Cuesta had followed Victor to the Tagus, and the French and Spanish armies were facing each other

across the bridges around Almaraz. Wellesley saw that if he advanced east along the Tagus, there was a real chance that he could hit Victor’s right flank before

the French realised he was there. The Spanish and Portuguese guerrillas largely prevented the French from sending out scouting parties – they had effectively

isolated Soult in Portugal and Ney in Galicia for most of the spring, and now they hid Wellesley’s army from Victor and King Joseph. The French would not

discover that Wellesley had entered Spain at all until 9th July. Unfortunately Cuesta continued to object to any plan that Wellesley supported, and they would

not agree on a common plan until July.

By this time Victor’s retreat had brought Sebastiani’s IV Corps and Venegas’s Spanish Army of La Mancha into the picture. If Wellesley and Cuesta were to

have any chance of overwhelming Victor, they needed Venegas to keep Sebastiani occupied to the east; however by mid-July Sebastiani had managed to evade

Venegas and join up with Victor.

The Armies:

The French army was made up of four separate components. The main force consisted of Victor’s 19,000 strong I Corp and Sebastiani’s 15,500 strong IV

Corps. These forces had also been bolstered by the arrival of the reserve cavalry, eleven regiments of dragoons and one of hussars, and by King Joseph, with

the King’s Guard and every spare soldier to be found at Madrid. Together these forces contributed 11,000 men to the French force.

Facing this force was Sir Arthur Wellesley’s British army, and the Spanish Army of Estremadura. Wellesley’s 20,600 men had just expelled Marshal Soult from

the north of Portugal, and were confident of their abilities to beat the French. In contrast Cuesta’s Army of Estremadura had had suffered very heavy casualties

at Medllin and many of the 35,000 men he brought to Talavera were new recruits.

The Battlefield and the Allied Deployment:

During the short time Wellesley had been at Talavera, he had searched the local area looking for a suitable position for a defensive position. He had quickly

dismissed the line of the Alberche River, for the ground east of the river was higher than that to the west, so the Allies would have been overlooked by the

French. Instead he had chosen a position than ran north from Talavera itself, roughly following the line of the Portiña stream, to the hill known as the Cerro de

Medellin. This hill ran from west to east, rising to its highest point where it overlooked the Portiña. To the north of the hill was a narrow valley, also running

from west to east, and to the north of that valley was another line of hills, the Sierra de Segurilla.

Intelligence BriefingDespite being completely flat, the southern part of the line was very strong. Talavera was surrounded by olive groves, separated by stone walls, which made it

an excellent defensive position. Already aware that his Spanish allies were might not be reliable in the open, Wellesley had offered Cuesta this part of the line.

The Spanish front line was positioned in a sunken road and protected by stone walls, while the Spanish right was anchored in Talavera itself, which was still

surrounded by medieval walls. The Spanish second line followed the line of the Portiña, and was also protected by the stone walls.

The British line began in the stone walls at the Spanish left and ran to the top of the Cerro de Medellin.

The Night Actions - 27-28th July:

The fighting began on the afternoon of 27th July, with the combat of Casa de Salinas, which saw the leading French troops ambush Mackenzie’s division,

nearly catching Wellesley. Once Wellesley had extracted himself and the division from this trap, the Allies took up their positions along the battle line in the

expectation that the fighting was over for the day, but Marshal Victor made sure this would not be the case.

At 7pm Victor’s leading units arrived in front of the Allied lines. He decided to begin an artillery bombardment of the Allied lines, and at the same time sent

some light cavalry towards the Spanish, in an attempt to discover their positions. Well before the French were within range, the Spanish infantry responded

with a massed volley of musket fire. This initial volley caused four battalions of green Spanish infantry to break and flee. Cuesta’s cavalry soon brought most

of them back, and the French were unable to take advantage of their retreat, but it was not a promising start to the battle.

Victor’s next move was to make a night attack on the strongest point on the British lines, the summit of the Cerro de Medellin. The nine battalions of Ruffin’s

division were chosen to launch this attack, but due to the confusion of the night attack only three, the battalions of the 9th Léger, would play a major part in the

attack. If the British had been in the correct positions, then Ruffin’s attack could have ended in total disaster. Low’s brigade was on the lower slopes of the hill,

while the crest of the hill should have been held by the two brigades of Hill’s division (Richard Stewart’s and Tilson’s), but these last two brigades had actually

camped half a mile behind the lines, leaving the crest of the hill unguarded.

While the other two French regiments missed their targets, the 9th Léger smashed their way through Low’s brigade, and actually reached the crest of the hill. If

they had been able to hold that position, then the Allies may well have had to abandon their lines, for the French would have overlooked the entire position, but

the 9th Léger was not strong enough to hold off the hastily arranged British counterattack and the French were soon forced back to their starting positions.

That ended the serious fighting for the evening, but neither side had a restful night, and on a number of occasions the Allied line had to stand to arms in the

belief that a new French attack was on its way. Each case turned out to be a false alarm, and the next French attack would not come until after dawn on 28th

July.

Intelligence BriefingThe Morning Attack - 28th July:

Despite the failure of his night attack, Victor was still convinced he could capture the Cerro de Medellin without help from Sebastiani or King Joseph. The

French army now had three heads – Marshal Victor, King Joseph and Marshal Jourdan, the king’s chief of staff. Joseph and Jourdan had not yet decided to

attack, for the Allies were in a strong position and they knew that Marshal Soult was approaching from the north. All they had to do was wait for a few days,

and the Allies would be forced to retreat.

Victor did not share this opinion. He informed King Joseph that he would attack at dawn unless he received orders not to, and neither Joseph nor Jourdan were

ready to issue those orders….

British Order of Battle

Commander-in-Chief:

Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Wellesley

British Order of Battle

1st Division: Major-General John Coape Sherbrooke

1st Brigade - Brig Gen Henry Frederick Campbell

2nd Brigade - Brig Gen Alan Cameron

3rd Brigade - Brig Gen Ernst Baron Langwerth von

Simmern

4th Brigade - Brig Gen Ernst Baron Löw von

Steinfurt

2nd Division: Major-General Rowland Hill

1st Brigade - Maj Gen Christopher Tilson

2nd Brigade - Brig Gen Richard Stewart

British Order of Battle

3rd Division: Major-General Alexander Randoll

Mackenzie of Suddie

1st Brigade - Maj Gen Alexander Randoll

Mackenzie

2nd Brigade - Colonel Rufane Shaw Donkin

4th Division: Brigadier-General Alexander Campbell

1st Brigade - Brig Gen Alexander Campbell

2nd Brigade - Colonel James Kemmis

Cavalry Division: Lieutenant-General William Payne-

Gallwey

1st Brigade - Brig Gen Henry Fane

2nd Brigade - Maj Gen Stapleton Cotton

3rd Brigade - Brig Gen George Anson

Spanish Order of Battle

Commander-in-Chief:

Lieutenant-General Don Gregorio Garcia de la

Cuesta y Fernández de Celis, Captain-General of

Castilla

Spanish Order of Battle

Vanguard: Brigadier-General Don José Pascual de

Zayas y Chacón

Elements of 2nd Voluntarios de Cataluna;

Cazadores de Barbastro; Cazadores de Campo

Mayor; Cazadores de Valencia y Albuquerque &

Cazadores Voluntarios de Valencia Regiments

1st Division: Major-General Don Juan Berthuy, Marquis

de Zayas

Elements of Cantabria; Grenaderos Provinciales;

Canarias; Tiradores de Merida & Provincial de

Trujillo Regiments

2nd Division: Major-General Don Vicente Iglesias

Elements of 2nd Majorca; Velez-Malaga; Osuna;

Voluntarios Estrangeros & Provinciales de Burgos

Regiments

Spanish Order of Battle

3rd Division: Major-General Don Francisco Gómez de

Terán y Negrete, Marquis de Portago

Elements of Badajos; 2nd Cazadores de Antequera;

Imperial de Toledo; Provincial de Badajos &

Provincial de Guadix Regiments

4th Division: Major-General Don Rafael Manglano

Elements of Irlanda; Jaen; 3rd Sevilla; Leales de

Fernando VII; 2nd Voluntarios de Madrid &

Voluntarios de la Corona Regiments

5th Division: Major-General Don Luis Alejandro de

Bassecourt y Dupire

Elements of 1st Real Marina; Africa; Murcia;

Reyna & Provincial de Siguenza Regiments

Spanish Order of Battle

1st Cavalry Division: Lieutenant-General Don Juan de

Henestrosa

Elements of El Rey Cavalry; Calatrava; Voluntario

de Espana; Imperial de Toledo; Cazadores de

Sevilla; Reyna Dragoons; Villaviciosa Dragoons &

Cazadores de Madrid Regiments

2nd Cavalry Division: Lieutenant-General Don José

María de la Cueva y de la Cerda, Duke of Albuquerque

Elements of Carabineros Reales; Infante Cavalry;

Alcantara; Pavia Dragoons; Almanza Dragoons &

1st & 2nd Hussars of Estramadura Regiments

Scenario Map (5.5ft x 4ft – 22BW x 16BW)

Talavera is a town 2BW x 2BW in size and can be garrisoned.

The Tagus River is impassable to all units (except across the bridge).

The Porteña stream can be crossed by all units (difficult movement).

Due to the rough nature of the ground across the Cerro de Medellin, Cerro de Cascajal and Sierra de Segurilla,

cavalry are limited to the same movement rates as infantry for all purposes. Additionally all cavalry suffer a -1

modifier (in addition to any other modifiers) for all attacks for the same reason and also do not benefit from their

“shock” trait if they have it.

All “2nd contour” hilltops are considered as difficult ground for all troops (movement and combat is affected

accordingly)

Artillery fire from the Cerro de Cascajal can only reach 2BW along / onto the “2nd contour” hilltops of the

Cerro de Medellin or the Sierra de Seguvilla. Any units fired upon in those areas count as concealed for artillery

fire.

The ravine can be crossed by cavalry and infantry only (difficult movement). Cavalry units that attempt to

charge across the ravine must roll a D6 – on a throw of 1-3 they must halt their charge on the opposite side of

the ravine (from where the carge started) and lose a point of elan.

The redoubt created by the Allies atop the Pajar de Vergara provides “entrenchments” for a single unit when

attacked or fired on from the front (east).

British Initial Setup

No. 1: 4th Division (Campbell)

Set up as indicated on the game map along the stream north of the Spanish positions at Pajar de Vergera.

No. 2: 1st Division (Sherbrooke)

Set up as indicated on the game map along the stream south of the Cerro de Medellin.

No. 3: 3rd Division (Mackenzie)

Set up as indicated on the game map along the stream and southern slopes of the Cerro de Medellin.

No. 4: 2nd Division (Hill)

Set up as indicated on the game map along the crest of the of the Cerro de Medellin. Across from the Cerro de

Cascajal

No. 5: Cavalry Division (Payne-Gallwey )

Set up as indicated on the game map ~ 2BW behind the 4th & 1st Divisions

Spanish Initial Setup

No. 1: Vanguard Division (José Zayas)

Set up as indicated on the game map within 2BW of Talavera.

No. 2: 1st Division (de Zayas)

Set up as indicated on the game map within 1BW of Talavera.

No. 3: 2nd Division (Iglesias)

Set up as indicated on the game map North-East Talavera and East of the stream.

No. 4: 3rd Division (de Portago)

Set up as indicated on the game map South of the Pajar de Vergera and East of the stream.

No. 5: 4th Division (Manglano)

Set up as indicated on the game map North of Talavera, West of the stream and behind the 2nd Division

No. 6: 5th Division (de Bassecourt)

Set up as indicated on the game map, West of the stream and behind the 3rd Division

Spanish Initial Setup

No. 7: 1st Cavalry Division (de Henestrosa)

Set up as indicated on the game map ~2BW behind the 4th & 5th Divisions.

No. 8: 2nd Division (Albuquerque)

Set up as indicated on the game map ~2BW behind the 5th Division.

Noon ArmisticeDuring the battle both sides agreed to an armistice in order to allow for the casualties from the previous night and

mornings fighting to be recovered. This also allowed the troops to fill their canteens and avoid fighting under the noon-

day sun. Both sides also used this opportunity to re-deploy their forces in preparation for resuming the fighting. In order

to replicate this break in hostilities the following scenario rules apply:

Retire: The French player should pull his forces back so that a gap of 2BW exists between all units. There may be some

obvious exceptions to this where common sense should be used by the players (e.g. where the French hold an obvious

defensive / offensive position etc.).

Rally: All units with ≥2 casualties can attempt to regain 1x lost élan point (regardless of proximity to the enemy).

Players should roll 1x die per unit with a roll of 3+ rallying a lost point of élan.

Resupply: All Artillery units that were not destroyed will regain 1x ammunition point.

Redeployment: Before recommencing the battle at 2pm each army (French, British & Spanish) is allowed to redeploy

up to 2x Divisions by conducting a reserve move behind their own lines. Common sense should be used by the players to

determine what constitutes each sides defensive line. This move follows all reserve move rules with the exception that

the units need not be concealed at the start of the move (and can be “front line” units if the players so wish).

Scenario Notes

Allied Special Rules:

No. 1: All British units can use the “rally” rule (pg. 87)

No. 2: All Spanish infantry units start in entrenchments (pg. 84) facing east (i.e. towards the French). If a unit moves

(voluntarily or otherwise) then this benefit is lost for the remainder of the scenario.

No. 3: The British and Spanish act as separate commands for calculation and allocation of MO and for calculating break

points. If either Allied army reaches their break point then the game is lost for the Allies.

Victory Conditions:

Allies: The Allies win by breaking the French morale before the end of turn 42

French: The French win by breaking either the British or Spanish morale before the end of turn 42

Other Info:

Momentum :

French – 4x dice Spanish – 2x dice British – 3x dice

Game turns : The game last 42 turns (total). The game starts at 06:00 (turn 1) and ends at 20:00 (after turn 42). One turn is

about 20 minutes.