Allen W. Wood Preface and Introduction to Critique of Practical Reason

7/25/2019 Allen W. Wood Preface and Introduction to Critique of Practical Reason

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Allen W. Wood

Preface andIntroduction

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In his 1781 Preface to the Critique of Pure Reason, Kantassigned to this work the broadest possible aims: "In thisbusiness I have made comprehensiveness my chief aim inview and I make bold to say that there cannot be a singlemetaphysical problem that has not been solved here or atleast to the solution of which the key has not beenprovided" !#iii$% It might be supposed that in his secondcritical enterprise the Critique of Practical Reason!1788$ Kant would have attempted a similarcomprehensiveness regarding the problems of practical!or moral$ philosophy% &ut in fact the very reverse of thisis the case' the second (riti)ue is )uite narrow in itsaims and there is a great deal that falls under the

heading of moral philosophy that it discusses onlytangentially if at all%In this work for instance Kant took not a single step

further toward completing the system of moral philosophythat he had been promising for two decades under thetitle *+etaphysics of +orals*% ,ather like the Groundworkfor a Metaphysics of Morals !178-$ the Critique ofPractical Reason themati.es only foundational )uestionsin moral philosophy and deals with the application of

moral principles only incidentally / as an appendi# about


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"practical 0udgment" to the chapter clarifying the role ofthe end or *ob0ect* of action in practical reason !7/71$and again as part of the *doctrine of method* / but only

with the aim of "providing the laws of pure practicalreason with access to the human mind and in2uence onits ma#ims" !1-1$% 3nlike the Groundwork, however itsaims are not "foundational" in the sense that it isconcerned with formulating the fundamental principle ofmorality% nd the e#tent to which the second (riti)ue isconcerned even with establishing that principle is verymuch open to )uestion% ccording to the work itself itpresupposes the Groundwork as


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2 PREFACEANDINTRODUCTION 3

regards both "ac)uaintance" with the principle of dutyand its "0usti4cation" !8$%

5he chief purpose of the Critique of Practical Reason,

like that of the Critique of the Power of Judgmentpublished two years after it was instead to discuss therelationship between theoretical and practical philosophy%&ut whereas the third (riti)ue pursued this purpose bytreating two topics that were relatively une#plored withinKant*s philosophical enterprise !namely aesthetic0udgment and natural teleology$ the Critique of PracticalReason attempted to revisit and discuss more thoroughlya set of issues that had already been dealt with either in

the Critique of Pure Reason or in the Groundwork. 5heaim second (riti)ue could be thought of in fact as limitedto the completion of some )uite determinate "un4nishedbusiness" left over from these two works / business thatKant regarded as necessary to complete before thefoundations of his practical philosophy could be regardedas secure%

5he Critique of Practical Reason was 4rst conceived as anew section to be added to the Critique of Pure Reason in

its second edition of 1787% n announcement of the latter!in 6ovember 178$ declares that "5o the (riti)ue of purespeculative reason contained in the 4rst edition in thesecond edition there will be appended a criti)ue of purepractical reason" !Kr nd ed% "nmerkungen": in --'cf% riefwechsel 9 -/8/;$% &ut obviously in thecourse of preparing a second edition of the Critique ofPure Reason, it became evident to Kant that neither thetime allotted for completion of his revisions norreasonable boundaries of length for what was already avery long book would permit him to do things this way%3pon completion of the second edition he chose to writea diarve/?eder review of 178$%*


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@% % Pistorius in his review of the Groundwork, that Kantwas guilty of inconsistency in denying legitimacy to theuse of transcendent ideas such as freedom >od andimmortality in the 4rst (riti)ue and then afterwardgrounding his moral philosophy on the idea of freedom inthe Groundwork! Kant*s attempts to reply to this criticismcan be seen in the care he takes to elucidate therelationship between the moral law and the assertion oftranscendental freedom and the primacy of the practicalover the theoretical and also in the emphasis given to thepostulates of >od and immortality%

Aver half of the 1 pages of the Critique of Practical

Reason are in e% % 5ittel$namely that in the Groundwork the concept of the goodshould have been established prior to that of the moralprinciple%5hough Pistorius* review of the Groundwork ismentioned e#plicitly only once in it !8$ the Preface as a

whole seems preoccupied with his ob0ections%5he Preface may be conveniently divided into four parts%

5he 4rst and longest part =/8 discusses the relationbetween the 4rst and second (riti)ues% 5his part may beregarded as primarily directed at Pistorius* worry aboutKant*s inconsistency% Kant then proceeds to discuss morebrie2y !in a single paragraph$ the relation of the second(riti)ue to the Groundwork and to other possiblesystematic pro0ects in moral philosophy !8/;$% 5he third

part of the Preface !;/1$ discusses the relation of theo/retical and practical cognition within an architectonicconception of the mind*s faculties as a whole% 5his sectionbegins by addressing the ob0ection that the good shouldbe prior to the moral principle and e#tends to a more

=Pistorius' review was published in the Alle!eine deutsche "ibliothe#$%&1 (16) pp. **-*63.+. A. ,ittel ber errn /ants 0oralrefor! (ran#furt2$eipi 16).


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4.1 ,he Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique ofPractical Reason (3-)

"he task of a critique ofpractical reason. Kant opens witha 0usti4cation for the omission of the ad0ective *pure* fromthe title of his new work% 5his elucidation proceeds fromKant*s understanding of the pro0ect of a *criti)ue* ofreason and tells us a good deal about what he takes to beessential to this pro0ect and important about it% criti)ueof reason is a species of self/knowledge in which reasoncomes to understand its own sources e#tent andboundaries !Kr #i/#ii$% ,eason requires a critique only

insofar as it tends to misunderstand itself in such a way asto overstep its proper boundaries% In its theoretical usepure reason !reason used apart from everything empirical$re)uires a criti)ue because it generates ideas propo/sitions and arguments that lay claim to cognitions itcannot have and involve a misunderstanding of the truesources of the cognitions it does have% In its practical usehowever Kant thinks pure reason re)uires no criti)ue: ?orthe most it could claim in this domain is that it gives laws

to the will that are unconditionally valid and this claim is!in Kant*s view$ entirely correct and entirely 0usti4ed !=$%

In reason*s practical use it is not pure but empiricallyconditioned reason that stands in need of a criti)ue% ?orthis reason proceeds from our empirical desires and tendsto treat them as if they were legislative / either by cavilingwith the law of pure reason trying to cast doubt on it orat least on the strictness of its demands% 5his is what inthe Groundwork Kant called a *natural dialectic* of

practical reason which calls for moral philosophy as itsantidote !I B-$% 5he second (riti)ue proceeds )uiteconsistently with this presenting the Cialectic of Practical,eason in this light% Dpeci4cally doubts about thepossibility of the highest good are used to cast doubt uponthe validity of the moral law !11=/11$ involving a*subreption* that confuses the feeling of being determinedby the law with the ob0ective determination of the law by

pure reason !in this way attempting to substituteempirical grounds for pure rational ones$ !11$% 5he


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resolution of these doubts is based on preventing thisconfusion hence reasserting the reality and independenceof the pure moral law as a ground of the will*sdetermination !11/1B$%

In the Preface to the Groundwork Kant also spoke of a*criti)ue of pure practical reason* apparently referring tothe problematic involving the 0usti4ability of a belief intranscendental freedom as e)uivalent to a recognition ofthe validity of the moral law !I =;$% &ut although thephrase was used in the title to the 5hird Dection of theGroundwork, it is not employed within that section !eventhe word *criti)ue* is nowhere used in it$% Perhaps in 178-

Kant still had lingering doubts about the 0usti4ability of abelief in transcendental freedom and therefore of *purepractical reason* itself and was unsure how to presentthese convictions in a way that would pass critical muster%If so however then we may take the title of the second(riti)ue as an assertion that by 1788 he entertained themno longer%

#reedom as the keystone. In the second paragraph of the

Preface Kant takes the indisputable e#istence of purepractical reason as unconditionally legislative to bee)uivalent to the establishment of freedom !=$% @e stillunderstands freedom in a transcendental sense as "theunconditioned in the series of causal connection" !=$% Kantgoes on to assert that this concept of freedom "constitutesthe keystone of the whole structure of the system of purereason even of speculative reason" !=/$% 5he meaning ofthis pu..ling remark which has fascinated commentators

is far from clear' it appears to give the idea of freedom aprivileged place even in the Critique of Pure Reason thatwas not obvious or e#plicit in that work% &ut it might alsobe seen as an endorsement of an idea in the Groundworkwhich is often thought to have been repudiated in theCritique of Practical Reason$ namely that freedom isinseparable from all use of reason and necessarilypresupposed even in theoretical 0udgments !I 7/8$

(omparatively clearer !but only comparatively$ is Kant*sne#t important assertion about the concept of freedom


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that its real possibility is revealed through the moral lawand therefore it is the only idea of reason whosepossibility is cogni.ed a priori !$% Kant takes cognition%&rkenntnis', properly speaking to consist in an intuitedcontent grasped through concepts !Kr 1;E& ==' -1/-1E& 7-/7$% 5he real possibility of a concept is cogni.edwhen it is e#hibited how an ob0ect for the concept mightbe given in intuition ! 1;FE& /7=$% 5he realpossibility of empirical concepts can be cogni.ed onlythrough empirical cognition of their actuality or at least ofthe actuality of ob0ects to which they might applyconsonant with the laws of a possible e#perience ! 18E&

-$% 5he only concepts whose real possibility can truly becogni.ed a priori are those of mathematics since theirob0ects can be constructed !hence e#hibited$ a priori inpure intuition ! 77/7=E& 7--/7$% Ghen we cogni.ethe real possibility of a concept a priori in this way wealso "have insight" %einsehen' into it !Hogik I9 -$%

5he concept of freedom cannot be made to 4t there)uirements for a priori cognition of its possibility ifthese re)uirements are taken literally but Kant apparently

thinks that our awareness of freedom through theapodictic moral law of practical reason provides ananalogue or legitimate substitute which entities us to usethe same terms% 5hrough our awareness that we areunconditionally obligated to obey the moral law we cometo 0udge directly !as in an intuition$ the real !not merelylogical$ possibility of our obeying that law% Dince freedomof our will is the sole condition under which suchobedience could be possible this immediate 0udgment

gives us also the analogue to a cognition of freedom / an apriori e#hibition of the ob0ect of this concept in concreto.

&ecause the practical postulates of >od and immortalityarise through an obligation !to seek the highest good$ thatis grounded on freedom Kant says that these other ideasof reason "attach themselves to this concept of freedomJ"and by means of it get stability and ob0ective reality thatis their possibility is proved by this: that freedom is

actual" !$% bout these two other ideas of reason Kantthinks we can a(irm their ob0ective reality and are


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permitted to assert it but cannot cogni)e it or ha*einsight into it !/-$% Kant admits that it would be moresatisfying to reason in its speculative use if we couldproduce theoretical proofs for the ob0ective reality of ourconcepts of >od freedom and immortality% &ut theCritique of Pure Reason has shown that this cannot bedone !-$

+upersensible use of the categories by pure practicalreason.t this point in the Preface !-/$ Kant addressesPistorius* worry about inconsistency head on% @e concedesthat it is an "enigma" that we must deny ob0ective reality

to the supersensible use of the categories in speculationand yet grant them this reality with respect to the ob0ectsof pure practical reason" !-$% @is reply to the charge ofinconsistency lies in distinguishing a theoretical use of thecategories from a practical use of them: we deny theformer use but permit only the latter% Practical reasonthrough our awareness of moral obligation "furnishesreality to a supersensible ob0ect of causality namely tofreedom !though as a practical concept only form practical

use$ and hence establishes by means of a fact what couldthere in theoretical reasonJ only be thought !$%

Kant then argues that in drawing this distinction andusing it in this way the critical philosophy e#hibits acertain striking consistency with another of itscharacteristic doctrines: namely transcendental idealism%?or in denying the categories and in particular theconcept of freedom a theoretical use we are at the sametime denying its applicability to the world of phenomena

or appearances' and by permitting its practical use weare asserting its applicability to the world of noumena orthings in themselves

!/7$% mpiricists he charges could not allow the conceptof freedom even practical use because they would have totreat it as an empirical concept applicable to the world ofappearances where it has been denied all applicability bythe criti)ue of theoretical reason' but a critical moralist

who proceeds rationally may consistently allow it to be


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applied for practical purposes to a supersensible world !7/8$%

#reedom and the moral law. In the 4rst part of the Prefacethere is also discussion of the relationship between thepostulate of freedom and the validity of the moral lawwhich is sometimes taken to constitute a new anddistinctive approach to this topic as compared with theGroundwork. Practical reason he says "without anycollusion with speculative reason furnishes reality to asupersensible ob0ect of the category of causality namelyto freedom !although as a practical concept only for

practical use$ and hence con4rms what could there beonly thought through a fact -durch ein #aktum/ !$% 5hisis the 4rst statement of the famous !though mysterious$doctrine of the "fact of reason" which is sometimes heldto replace the Groundwork0s attempt to establish themoral law through appeal to the presupposition offreedom with a simple assertion of the moral law as a "factof reason" of which we are immediately aware% In Kant*sdiscussion of the relation of the second (riti)ue to the

Groundwork !8$ we will 4nd reason to doubt that thiscould have been Kant*s own self/understanding at anyrate% 5he Groundwork never attempted in any case toestablish freedom as a part of speculative philosophythrough any theoretical proof% In the Preface at least itremains utterly obscure what sort of "fact" Kant couldhave in mind and also how it could establish freedom%@owever it is fairly evident that in the above remark Kantis once again responding to a version of Pistorius* charge

of inconsistency% ?or he is claiming that transcendentalfreedom is established for practical on some basis otherthan the theoretical basis denied in the Critique of PureReason. 5hus the assertion of freedom in moral philosophyis entirely consistent with the 4rst (riti)ue*s denial of alltheoretical proofs of the ob0ective reality of freedom!along with the denial of such proofs regarding the otherideas of reason$%

Probably the most famous statement in the Preface onfreedom and the moral law is o


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a possible charge of inconsistency apparently di+D I -B$% @is answer here in the Preface tothe second (riti)ue is to say that freedom is the ratio

essendi of the moral law while the moral law is the ratiocognoscendi of freedom !$% 5he inconsistency is thereforeto be removed by distinguishing two senses of "condition"!or "ground" or ratio'. ?reedom grounds the moral law inthe sense that the moral law could not have beenencountered in us were we not free but we come to beac)uainted with our freedom only through our awarenessof the moral law%

Pro*isional e*aluation of 1ant0s reply to the charges ofinconsistency. In assessing Kant*s reply to Pistorius*charge of inconsistency it is only fair to keep in mind thatwe are discussing merely a programmatic account of it inthe Preface to the Critique of Practical Reason. Kant hasmuch more to say in answer to the charge later in the(riti)ue% &ut it is entirely fair to look critically at theprogram and identify the most serious problems Kant hasto solve if his response is to be convincing%

5he distinction between a "theoretical" and a "practical"use of categories such as causality and pure concepts orideas such as freedom needs clari4cation and it may alsostand in need of a kind of defense for which Kant hereprovides not even a hint% &oth "uses" of such conceptsappear to be theoretical at least in the sense that theyinvolve theoretical assertions: that the will is free thatthere e#ists a >od and that the soul is immortal% 5he

Critique of Pure Reason denied une)uivocally that therecould be either any empirical evidence or any a priori


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proof that the ideas of >od freedom and immortalityapply to any ob0ects either in the phenomenal or in thenoumenal world% Kant*s proposal that there is a practicaluse of these ideas must therefore consist in the claim thatthere is a kind of argument distinct from any form ofempirical evidence or rational proof that 0usti4es someclaim about the actual e2istence of a free will an ensrealissimum and an immortal soul / apparently anargument that 0usti4es us in believing in ob0ectscorresponding to these three ideas% &ut it is notimmediately evident / and nothing in the phrase "practical

use only" makes it any clearer / what sort of argument forsuch beliefs or assertions might be given once allempirical evidence and rational proof has been e#cluded%lso open to )uestion is Kant*s claim that his views can

be made consistent by appealing to his transcendentalidealist distinction between the phenomenal andnoumenal worlds% It certainly would seem to be inconsist/ent to assert of one and the same will that it is both freeand unfree% If

Kant*s claim is that nothing !hence no will$ can be a freecause if it belongs to the phenomenal world is bycontrast certainly consistent with his that something !awill$ is a free cause as a member of the noumenal world%&ut when we try to go beyond this and understand hisassertions to be about our wills the threat ofinconsistency very soon emerges again% ?or as moralagents we do not think of ourselves as being two distinctbeings !or persons or wills$ one of them unfree and theother free% Ge think that we ac)uire some informationabout ourselves as responsible moral agents throughe#perience / for instance the empirical information that Ihave kept this promise and broken that one% If thisinformation is to be relevant to 0udgments about the worthof my person then the being whom I take to be sub0ect tothe moral command to keep promises must be identicalwith the being about whom I have this empirical

information% If however the latter being as a member ofthe world of sense cannot be free then it would seem to


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follow that it also cannot be held accountable for itsactions and it would seem to make no sense to supposethat a rational imperative !one presupposing the freedomto obey it$ is even addressed to that being% If Kant meansto say that the phenomenal and noumenal beings areindeed one and the same but that one of them is free andthe other unfree then there is at least prima facie still aninconsistency% If he intends to deny the inconsistency onthe ground that we are are speaking of the same being intwo di


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both our awareness of moral obligation and our impres/sion that we are free are high/2own fantasies born ofmetaphysical self/conceit% 5hese doubts might beanswered either by a theoretical proof that we are free orby some demonstration of the validity of the moral lawthat renders that validity independent of thepresupposition of freedom% &ut Kant*s strategy does notappear to do either: it still seems to involve theestablishment of one dubious idea by appealing to anotheridea 0ust as dubious and )uite possibly dubious for 0ustthe same reasons%

Ane possible way out of this impasse might be theGroundwork0s suggestion that freedom is unavoidablypresupposed in all 0udgment !I 7/8$ includingtheoretical 0udgments !any 0udgments whatever evenskeptical ones$ about whether we are free% t least thiswould push those who doubt freedom to the point wherethey must admit that they are under an illusion even inthinking that their own doubts might be based on reasonsthus threatening fatalism skepticism about freedom and

skepticism about the moral law e)ually withunintelligibility or self/refutation% &ut those who see in thesecond (riti)ue*s "fact of reason" doctrine a new startingpoint for Kant*s treatment of freedom and the moral lawtypically regard him as having abandoned theGroundwork0s strategy on this point%

4.4 ,he Critique of Practical Reason in relation to

of practical philosoph ()

Kant*s discussion of the relation of the second (riti)ue tothe Groundwork is as remarkable as it is brief since itseems to contradict a number of ideas commonly heldabout the relation between the two works% 5he same

paragraph attempts to situate the Critique of PracticalReason in its relation to an entire system of practical


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philosophy or "a complete division -&inteilung/ of allpractical sciences" !8$%

Kant 4rst insists that the second (riti)ue like the 4rstitself constitutes a system of pure practical reason%" Itwas part of Kant*s aim in the 4rst (riti)ue to dealsystematically / that is completely e#haustively and con/clusively / with the entire set of philosophical )uestionsraised by the general problem of pure !theoretical$ reason!Kr #iii/#vi$% @is aim in the second (riti)ue isapparently no less with regard to an analogous set ofproblems about practical reason% 5his grounds his divisionof the second (riti)ue into a *Coctrine of lements* and a

*Coctrine of +ethod* and of the former into an *nalytic*and a *Cialectic*% &ut here in this brief section of thePreface Kant is concerned less with e#plaining thesedivisions than with distinguishing the second (riti)uefrom other possible systematic pro0ects in practicalphilosophy%

Kant asserts that the Critique of Practical Reason,"presupposes the Groundwork for the Metaphysics ofMorals, but only insofar as this constitutes preliminary

ac)uaintance with the principle of duty and provides and0usti4es a determinate formula of it' otherwise it stands onits own" !8$% 5he aim of the Groundwork itself howeverwas avowedly limited to "the search for and establishmentof the supreme principle of morality !5 =;$% Dupposingthat the Groundwork has succeeded in its aims it hasalready provided and 0usti4ed a "determinate formula" ofthe principle of morality% 5hus the second (riti)ue is heresaid to presuppose it precisely to the e#tent of its own

e#plicit aims% 5hus Kant seems to be saying that thesecond (riti)ue presupposes both the formulation and the0usti4cation of the moral principle rather than pro*idingthem% If that is right then we should not e#pect thesecond (riti)ue*s argument to contain any derivation ofany formulation of the moral law nor any 0usti4cation ofany such formula% Dtill less should we e#pect Kant to beo


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that in the second (riti)ue this 0usti4cation ispresupposed.

If this is Kant*s meaning !and it seems plainly to be$ thenit directly contradicts the claims of many scholars whothink they see in the second (riti)ue a di


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4.3 ,he practical facult (-14)

4esire and reason. In the ne#t phase of the Preface Kantdiscusses the nature of the human faculties to which he isgoing to direct his criti)ue% @is main point is )uite simple:Thefaculty of desire is the capacity of a living being tocause an ob0ect by means of its representation of thatob0ect% 4esire !for an ob0ect$ consists in therepresentation of that ob0ect accompanied by a feeling ofpleasure% &ut for some the feeling of pleasure is takenalways to be the ground of the desire for the ob0ect which!Kant says$ is e)uivalent to assuming that all practical

principles are empirical% Kant thinks that the traditionalformulations admit of another possibility: that pleasure inthe representation of an ob0ect might follow upon thedetermination of the will to pursue that ob0ect% In thatcase what grounds the desire and hence the conceptionof the good as the ob0ect of desire is a principle of the willthat precedes !in the order of grounds or reasons$ boththe desire and the conception of the good as its ob0ect !;$%

"he unity of reason. 5he other topic Kant takes up in thissection of the Preface is related in a fundamental way toall three (riti)ues and assumes increasing importance asKant proceeds in the critical enterprise% @e notes that inanaly.ing our faculties for the purposes of criticism "wecan begin only with the parts !1B$ that is with thespecial faculties of the mind% &ut then we must attend to asecond thing that is "more philosophical andarchitectonic, namely to grasp correctly the idea of the

whole and from this idea to see all those parts in theirmutual relation by means of their derivation from theconcept of that whole in the rational faculty" !1B$% Inparticular Kant is concerned with the whole of reasonitself in its theoretical and practical use% 5o show there isthis sort of unity or harmonious relationship between thetheoretical and practical uses of reason is 0ust anotherway of responding to Pistorius* charge of inconsistency%

In the second (riti)ue Kant*s strategy appears to be toshow that theoretical and practical reason harmoni.e at


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least in the minimal sense that their results do notcontradict one another / what is assented to or postulatedby practical reason is at least thinkable by theoreticalreason and cannot be disproved by it% @e is alsoconcerned to establish the primacy of practical reason sothat its e#tension to the ideas of >od freedom andimmortality also seems suitable to the respective functionsof reason% Anly two years later however in the Critique ofthe Power of Judgment, Kant was to undertake a di% ?eder that all cognition isempirical and none of it is a priori. 5his threatens thepro0ect of the 4rst (riti)ue with the prospect thatmetaphysics !synthetic a priori cognition through

concepts$ is not only bounded in its scope but utterlynone#istent% It threatens the pro0ect of the second(riti)ue even more fundamentally since the primary aimin this work is to curb the pretensions of empiricallyconditioned reason by showing that pure reason can bepractical of itself and hence that the fundamental andoverriding principle of practical reason is a priori.

Kant*s 4rst reply to this ob0ection is presented very

tersely in the passage 0ust )uoted% It is that there wouldbe something self/defeating in the attempt to argue


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against a priori cognition in general since such an argu/ment could consist only in a use of reason but what ittried to show would


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have to be e)uivalent to showing that there was no reasonat all% 5his is because "cognition through reason and apriori cognition are one and the same" !1$% 5his lastclaim can best be understood if we keep in mind that Kantunderstands a priori cognition as cognition that dependssolely on the mind*s own faculties% 5he full system ofhuman cognitions !whether theoretical or practical$ mustof course always involve both the activity of our facultiesand what is given to them from outside through thesenses% &ut our faculties alone / and in particular thehighest faculty of reason /provide the essential organi.ing

principles for such cognitions so that all cognitionwhatever must fundamentally involve principles of reasonin other words a priori cognition%

Kant*s second argument presented at much greaterlength in the Preface is fundamentally a repetition of thearguments for a priori theoretical cognition already givenat the start of the Critique of Pure Reason ! 1/1=E & 1/1;/$% 5hey consist in citing e#amples of cognitions thatwe undoubtedly have and arguing that these cognitions

must be a priori if they e#ist at all% 5he cognitions in)uestion include all those claiming strict universality ornecessity and especially the cognitions of mathematics%Kant also recogni.es as he did in the Critique of PureReason ! ;-E& 17$ that his defense of a priori cognitionamounts to the dismissal of a certain empiricist !andspeci4cally @umean$ philosophical pro0ect that attemptsto reduce the "ob0ective meaning of necessity" to a"sub0ective meaning of necessity" or a "necessity thought"

to a "necessity felt !1=/1$ / in the case of causalnecessity @ume calls the sub0ective principle "custom"!1=$%

Kant argues that @ume saved himself from totalskepticism by admitting at least mathematics as a priori,on the ground that mathematical propositions areanalytic%-@is charge is that a truly "universal empiricism

"

7 As so!e scholars have pointed out this !a be correct as an account of

the &nquiry, but it is 8uestionable as a description of u!e's position in


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fact have thoughts and make 0udgments but no principlesthat we could regard as having normative force% Duchprinciples Kant is alleging can arise only from our ownfaculties and especially from the faculty to which wemake 4nal appeal the faculty of reason%

@uman cognition both theoretical and practical arisesthrough the operation of our faculties with data giventhrough e#perience% 5he normative grounds of 0udgmentare principles given solely through our faculties hence apriori. @ence in order to understand ourselves as 0udgingon good grounds we must represent our 0udgments asconforming !or at least attempting to conform$ to valid

principles of 0udging that belong to our faculties and aretherefore a priori. "universal empiricism of principles"would therefore leave us with no normative basis for theudgments we make but at most a set of psychologicalregularities we are accustomed to follow in 0udging% 5hispoint connects with Kant*s 4rst brief argument againstempiricism which claimed that denying all a prioricognition would be "tantamount to wanting to prove byreason that there is no reason" !1$% Ge can now

understand the argument as follows: very proof !orrational argument of any kind$ represents itself asproviding grounds for 0udgment that accord with thenormative principles according to which a rational sub0ectshould 0udge% Anly by so representing itself can anargument claim that the person to whom the argument iscommunicated should accept its conclusion as a 0udgmentthat is well/grounded% universal empiricism ofprinciples however cannot represent the argument as

conforming to such normative principles of 0udgment orof re)uiring assent according to a "touchstone" ofudgment% t most it can depict those who draw itsconclusion as following regular patterns of 0udging thatare common among human sub0ects% In e


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5he 4nal paragraph of the Preface after dismissing thisuniversal empiricism as a position it is impossible to takeseriously ends by praising those who pursue it forengaging in an enterprise that is nevertheless capable ofilluminating rational a priori principles and thuscontributing to the tasks set for an age of criticism !1$%

4.7 Introduction (17-16)

5he Introduction to the Critique of Pure Reason was an

ambitious document that set itself the task of e#plicatingthe notion of synthetic a priori cognition and using it tode4ne both the general problem of pure reason and thetask of transcendental philosophy% 5he Introduction of thesecond (riti)ue proposes to do essentially the same tasksfor this new work but is nevertheless by contraste#tremely brief and )uite unambitious% Ge may take thisstriking fact as a measure of Kant*s estimate of therelative ease of de4ning and defending those tasks in the

case of a criti)ue of practical reason%5he Introduction consists of two paragraphs% 5he 4rst

contrasts the task of a Critique of Practical Reason withthe task of the Critique of Pure Dpeculative$ Reason. Itpoints out again !what was already said in the Preface$that in its practical use pure reason needs no criti)uesince its claim to be unconditionally legislative is entirely0usti4ed and liable to no e#cess or abuse% An the contrarythat claim even permits us to assert for practical

purposes the reality of a kind of causality !that offreedom$ which was found to be problematic in theCritique of Pure Reason !ID$% Kant then makes even moree#plicit than he did in the Preface the point that in thecase of practical reason it is not pure reason butempirically conditioned reason that re)uires criti)ue !1-/1$% Kant makes it clear that the task of criti)ue is alwaysto be carried out by reason according to standardssupplied by pure reason% In the title of the 4rst (riti)uetherefore the genitive !the criti)ue of pure reason$ was


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22 ALLENW. WOOD

simultaneously ob0ective and sub0ective: It was a criti)uecarried out on pure reason !with respect to its

have the e9ect he hopes for. e is also barred fro! trin to persuade us

that the e9ect of the aru!ent (the resultant s#epticis!) is ood for us

since that too would re8uire an aru!ent that confor!s to a touchstone

(or to nor!ative principles). Also if it is correct that to :ude is to

represent oneself to oneself as :udin accordin to nor!ative principles

(or a ;touchstone;) then e!piricist s#eptics !ust also represent those who

are convinced b their aru!ents as uilt of a #ind of self-deception when

the subscribe to the conclusion of those aru!ents.

transcendent claims$ by pure reason !using standards that

belong to reason itself wholly a priori'. In the second(riti)ue criticism is again carried out by pure reasonaccording to its own a priori standards but this time onempirically conditioned reason which e#hibits a tendencyto e#ceed its limits by claiming to be universallylegislative% 5his tendency is called "self/conceit" / it is theclaim of our inclinations and thus implicitly our self/loveto represent themselves as universally legislativewhereas these empirical grounds are always of

conditional validity and the 4nite self is always sub0ect tolaws re)uiring it to respect the e)ual claims of otherrational beings who are ends in themselves !7/7' 87$%

5he passage 0ust )uoted also shows that for Kant acriti)ue of reason is always motivated by speci4ctendencies of our rational faculty to transcend its properboundaries% @ere in the second criti)ue this tendencyappears to belong not to pure reason as such !as was thecase in the 4rst (riti)ue$ but to our speci4cally human

nature not only as 4nite but also as having this tendencyto self/conceit% In other words we see that the tendencyof human nature that the Religion was later to call a"radical propensity to evil" is the ground of our need toprovide a criti)ue of reason in its practical use%

5he second paragraph of the Introduction turns to thestructure of the second (riti)ue its division !like the 4rst$into a Coctrine of lements and a Coctrine of +ethod andthe former into an nalytic and a Cialectic% In relation tothe nalytic Kant makes the point that since in its


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practical use reason is unconditionally legislative itproceeds 4rst from principles !the moral law$ to concepts!the good$ "and only then where possible to the senses"!1$ whereas theoretical reason had to begin withsensible intuitions then proceed to concepts and 4nally toprinciples of reason !which were always only regulative$%5he brevity of the Introduction to the second (riti)ue isdue not only to Kant*s estimate of the relative ease of thetask to be accomplished in it' it is surely due in part to thefact that the Introduction is content to defer discussion ofsome di


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Allen W. Wood Preface and Introduction to Critique of Practical Reason

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Transcript of Allen W. Wood Preface and Introduction to Critique of Practical Reason