All, Terms, And Predication in the Sophist Participation, Unknown, 2014

8/12/2019 All, Terms, And Predication in the Sophist Participation, Unknown, 2014

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Participation and Predication in the "Sophist" 251-260

Author(s): Richard J. KetchumSource: Phronesis, Vol. 23, No. 1 (1978), pp. 42-62Published by: BRILLStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4182028.

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Participationand Predication n the Sophist251-260

RICHARD J. KETCHUMWhilea greatdeal of progresshasbeen madein recentyears n bringing olight the philosophicalsense of the Sophistone problem, or clusterofproblems,has resistedanalysis.'The problem s thatPlato seemsto use aparticularormof sentenceambiguously; he fact thathe doesso seemstoreveala fundamental onfusionon Plato'spart.Itwill be easier for me to describe he problemas well as my strategynattempting o solve it, if I first ntroduce ome terminology. n theSophist,particularly251-260, Plato frequentlyappealsto the fact thatone Formparticipatesin another Form to explain or justify other claims.2Forexample,"Change s,because tpartakes f Being" 256A1)and"Motionsdifferentbecauseit partakesof the Different" 256B2-3).I will call thosesentenceswhichare eitherexplicitlyor implicitly ustifiedby an appealtoparticipation"first-order entences."Further,we find throughoutthedialogues sentences of the form "the F (is) . . ." where "the F" is (1) anabstractnounwith orwithout the definitearticleor(2) the definitearticlefollowed by a common noun, mass term,adjectiveor participle.3Somesuchsentencescan be paraphrasedwithout oss of sense as"the Form,theF (is) .... ," whilethe vastmajorityof themcannot."Beautys eternal" anbe so paraphrased. Thesophistis a wageearner" annot.I will call thosesentenceswhichcan be so paraphrased Form-predications."Now it is arguedthat Plato uses sentencesof the form"theF (is) ..sometimes o expressa Form-predicationnd sometimes o say somethingaboutthe natureof theF or perhapsaboutthe natureof particular 's.ThefactPlato vacillatesbetweenthesetwo typesof predicationnot onlyobsc-ures whateverphilosophicalpoint he maybe makingbut also showsthatPlatowas confusedaboutthe natureof Forms.I think,however,that there is a plausiblereadingof the Sophistwhichshows Platoto be in no way confusedas to the meaningof suchsentences.None of the first-order entencesof the Sophist, I will argue,are Form-predications.After arguingthatthe text forcesthisconclusionon us (PartI), I will try to make theconclusionplausible PartII) by describinga typeof predication,differentfrom Form-predication,n termsof whichall ofthe first-order entencesof the Sophistcan be consistentlyunderstood.Aconsequenceof my interpretations the rathersurprising hesis that no-42

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where in the Sophistwith the exceptionof those passagesin which thefriendsof the Formsare discussed,does Platomentionthe Formsof themiddledialogues.I will conclude(PartIII) by explaininghow I thinkthosepassageswhichseem to mention Formsare to be understood.

IA: It is repeatedly tatedor impledthat thesentence"Changerests" s false(252D6-8, 255A10-BI, 256B6-7). The Forms of the middle dialogues,however,areat rest.4Unless Platohas revisedthisaspectof his theoryofForms,"Motionrests" s not a Form-predication;t does not mean "TheForm, Motion, rests."There is in the Sophist itself some reason for believing that Plato nolonger thinks of Forms as unchanging. The Eleatic Stranger argues(248A-249A) hat thereis at leastan apparentcontradictionn the claims:(a) Formsare unchangingand (b) Formsareknown. For isn'ta thingthatbecomesknownaltered,at least in respect o its beingknown?The ES does not, however, conclude that Forms change. He merelyconcludes that changing things are beings. In fact, he immediatelyproceeds o argue(249B8-D4) hatthere mustbe thingswhichare at restifthere is to be intelligence.Thereis everyreason to believethat this argu-ment is intendedseriously.The passage,249B8-C8, s analagousto Par-menides135B n which,afteran aporeticdiscussioncriticalof thetheoryofForms,a centraltenet of that theoryis reaffirmed. n light of this reaffir-mationof thechangelessness f theobjectsof knowledge, t is doubtful hatPlato wouldsay that it is "by the greatestnecessity mpossible or Changeto rest," 252D9-10)if "Changerests"means"The Form,Change,rests."The Form, Change, n some respectsat least,is at rest.We neednot appealto Plato'spriorwritings,however, oshowthat n theSophist"Changerests" s not a Form-predication.At 255A10-B we aretold that change would rest if change partookof Rest, for in that casechange would be forced to become the opposite of its own nature.Thefalsityof "Changerests" s due to the fact that "Change"and "Rest"areopposites,a factwhich s irrelevanto the truthor falsityof "Change ests,"understoodas a Form-predication.The point is that Plato understands"Change ests"as a claimabout thenatureof change,or perhapschangingthings,not asa claim aboutthe natureof theForm,Change.Wedo not saywhatchange s when we say thatit rests. It is for thisreason that"Changerests" s false.Itis not in itselfimportant hatneither"Motionrests"nor"Restmoves"

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are Form-predications.What is important s that Plato makesit abun-dantlyclearthattheyare notForm-predications. heobjectsof knowledgeare at rest,we are told. But we are remindedthreetimesin verystronglanguage hatChangedoesnot rest.Thefalsityof "Change ests" tandsorfalls with the falsity of "Rest moves."Both of these sentencesare falsebecausetheymake an erroneousassertionabout the natureof changeandrestrespectively.Theyare notfalsebecause heymisrepresenthenatureofForms n generaland thus of theseForms n particular.The vast majorityof first-order entencesin the Sophistare,however,mostnaturallyunderstoodas Form-predications. orexample,Change ssaid tobedifferent from thesame)becauseChangepartakes nDifference(with respect to the same) (256B2-4).Contemporary cholarship is inalmostuniversalagreement hat"Change s different romthesame"heremeans"TheForm,Change, s different romthe Form,Sameness."But ifthis is correct how are we to understandPlato when he tells us twice(256B6-7and 255A10-B3)that if Change partookof Rest then changewouldrest.If the participation f one Form in another s usedto explainForm-predicationshen Motiondoes partakeof Rest. As a Form-predi-cation "Motionrests" s true. As mattersstand, however,we know thatparticipations not used at 256B6-7and255A10-B3as a potentialexplan-ationorjustificationof a Form-predication.t seemsthen that"Change sdifferent rom thesame"can not be, in thiscontext,a Form-predication.Thearguments strengthened f we acceptAckrill's onclusion hat"thewordsintroducedby &t give an expansionor analysis"of thewordsthatfollow.5 fPlato's alkof participations intended oinformhisreadershowa correspondingentence s to be understoodwe have evenmorereason obelieve thatthe first-order entencesarenot of radicallydifferent ypes.Iwill not argue the point here, but it is difficult to see what other philo-sophical ustification he references o participationmighthave.Of course t may be thatPlato,consciouslyor unconsciously,uses"par-ticipation" mbiguouslyor, if not ambiguously,at leastin a verymislead-ingfashion.6 trust hatthissuggestionwillbecome essattractive s I offerotherreasons orbelievingthat the first-orderentencesof theSophistarenot Form-predications.B:A furtherproblem orthose whowould read"Changes different romthe same"as a Form-predications that such a readingforcesus to seePlatoas using the predicate"is different"equivocally.If "Change s dif-ferent from the same"means"The Form,Change,is differentfromtheForm,theSame," hen"isdifferent rom"heremeans,"isnotidentical o"whetherPlatowas awareof this or not. But in 257B-258CPlatois dealing44



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with negative predication,or negatedpredicates,and here it seems dif-ference cannot be non-identity.Considerfor example: "8iy&p ,uilxoXbvix&auronreyy6ye6,a,Totv5oovx NXXovVOs t'TepOvEOTLVi ris Toi xaxoi3OVuEs"(257D10-l 1). If "e'Eipov"as the sense of non-identityhere then"Trs roU xaXoi 4Vaews"must (a) mean "the Form, Beauty"or (b) beshorthand or"everything hat is beautiful."Butthereis nothingwhichisdifferent only from the Form, Beauty. Nor is there anything which isdifferentonly from everythingwhich is beautiful.Understanding his sen-tence intensionally,as it no doubt should be, does not help matters.It isobviously not the case that to say thatsomething s not beautiful s to saythatit is different romnothingbuteach and everybeautifulthing.7EdwardLee, by stressing he analogy of the partsof Differenceto theparts of Knowledge,has providedwhat seems to me to be the best inter-pretationof 257C7-258A5 o date.8To makea long story short, the not-beautiful s (the) other than beautiful ust as mathematics s (the) knowl-edge or science of numbers. "The other than beautiful" is the correctanswer to the Platonicquestion"What s the not-beautiful?"To say thatsomething s not beautiful s to saythat it is other than beautiful.If this isPlato's point in 257C7-259A5 hen the sense of 258D10- 11 is clear eventhough its precise translation s not: "Each time we call something not-beautiful we say) that this is otherthan nothingbut beautiful;" r perhaps,"Whatwe call, from time to time, (the) not beautiful is (the) other thannothing than beautiful." Both translations, I think, reveal, albeit insomewhat tiltedEnglish, he sense of 258D 10-11.Needless to say, "isotherthan" in these translationsdoes not mean "is not identicalto." If on theother hand "Change s differentfrom the same" is a Form predication,then "different from" is used equivocally in the narrow space of twoStephanuspages;"TheDifferent"namestwo kinds,notone, thoughPlatonowhereas much hints that this is so.C: There is a corollary o this apparent nconsistency n the text. Assumethat"Change s different rom thesame" s a Form-predication. latotellsus that"Change s not the same"follows from this sentence(256A3-5).Soit seems, "Change is not the same" must also be a Form-predicationassertinghenon-identityof twoForms.The "is" n this sentence s the"is"of identityand on this all thecommentators eem to agree.9Plato,we alsoknow, thought that the sentence"Change s the same" is ambiguous.Hemakes it fairly clear that one of its meanings is "Change s the same (asitself)" (256Al 1-B ), a sentence in which the verb "to be" is the copula.The ambiguityof "Change s thesame" s then due to the ambiguityof theverb"tobe" and this is truewhetheror not Plato realized t. The problem s

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that there is very good reason to doubt that lato blamesthe ambiguityof"Change s the same"on an ambiguityof theverb "tobe". If he doesnot,we mustconclude that Plato was confusedas to the correctsolution of aproblem which was of his own making and which it was his expressedpurpose o solve. Thisconclusion,I take it, is to be avoided f possible.Owen10and Frede"lhave forcefullyargued that Plato does not dis-tinguish the "is"of identity fromthe copula in the Sophist.Rather thanrepeat these arguments n detail let me brieflysummarize he consider-ations which I thinkprove the point: (1) the verb"eivU" does not occuronce in the passage n which Platoexplains the consistencyof "Motion sthesame andnot thesame" 256A1-B4).12This it seems s poorpractice fthe verb "to be" is under scrutiny (2) "eIvaL" occurs only once in theproblem entence"Tiiv xivmnav8i TOCVTOV' EcvLaLviL[Li ToWnT6v".whichgainseems poor practice if the solution is to be that the verb is used withdifferentmeanings. 3) Ackrillargues hat 4LETEXELaT'pov TpoS. ." is thephilosophers'versionof "oivx ?'rTLV" when "E?TLV' iS the identitysign.13Surely the passage he appeals to to justify this reading, 256AlO-B4,demands hatwe see "ierLEXEL OkoXTEpvVpOS. . ."asthephilosophers' ersionof "is different from .. ." where the verb is the copula. Thus, "LETE''fOacripovrrpos.." becomes the philosophers'version both of a negativeidentity claim and an affirmativepredication. This again seems poorpractice if Plato is trying to point out to us the difference in meaningbetween the "is" of identity and the copula. (4) Plato's proof that "thedifferent"and "being"are not two names forone kind(255C8-EI)makesno sensewithout the assumption hat one andthe sameForm,Being, s insomesensespoken of when we uttersentencesboth of the form"TheF isG" and "TheF is the F"or "TheF is F".M. Fredetriesto avoidtheconclusionthat Platowasconfusedas to thecorrectdisambiguationof "Change s the same" by claimingthat Platodistinguishesnot two meaningsbut two uses of the verb "to be."114 tbecomes clear that Frede thinksof the difference in use as capable ofdetermining a difference in truth value: "Change is different,"forexample, is true or false dependingon the use of the verb "to be'".5Themeaning of the verb "to be" however, s said to be invariant.This inter-pretation eems to give back to Plato withone handwhat was takenfromhim withthe other.Some clarificationof Frede'sdistinctionbetweenuseandmeaning s at leastcalled for."Change s not thesame" s not a first-orderentence, .e.,one whichisjustifiedby participation. t does, however,follow from"Change s dif-ferentfromthe same"which is justified by participation256B1-4).The46



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inference rom "Change s differentfromthesame"to "Change s not thesame"is of coursevalid when both sentencesare understoodas Form-predications.Sincethereis strongevidence that neitherof these sentencesare Form-predications hat is needed is some other way of understandingthem that leaves theinferencevalid.A summaryof the argumentmay be helpful at this point. A: Change sdifferentbecauseChangepartakesof Differenceand Changewould rest fChange partookof Rest. Now, "Changerests" s not a Form predication.So, unless "participation"s used ambiguously,""Changes different romthesame"is not a Form-predication.B: Differenceor Otherness s calledupon both to explainwhy change s other hanthe same and to explainwhythe not beautiful s the other than beautiful. If "Change s other than thesame" is a Form-predication hen "difference" s used ambiguouslybyPlato. C: If Plato was not confused as to the correct disambiguationof"Change s the same" hen, it seems, neither"Change s not the same"nor"Change s different from the same" are Form-predications. f we are tomake sense of the text, we must explain the consistencyof "Change s andis not the same"withoutappealing o an ambiguity n the verb "to be" andthus withoutclaimingthat "Change s not the same"asserts he non-iden-tity of the two Forms.Suchthen is the evidence,presentedas forcefullyas I can, that first-ordersentencesare not Form-predications. he evidencecan be seen as showingthat the Sophist is replete with inconsistencies,confusions and inaccu-racies. I will presently ry to provide a more charitableview of it. Beforedoing so, however, et me indicatetwo solutions both of which misfire.The fact that "Changerests" s false suggests that the object-languagesentences of the Sophist are disguised universallyquantified statements("UQS" for short), or what Vlastos has called Paulinepredications.16 If"Changerests"means the UQS "(x) [x is changing D x is at rest]or thePaulinepredication"Necessarily x) lx is changingD x is at rest]" henit isplausiblysaid to be "by the greatestnecessity mpossible" 252D9-10) thatchange should rest.Everyattempt o interpret uch firstordersentencesas"Change s differentfrom the same" as Pauline predicationsor UQS's is,however, utile."(x)[x is changingD x is different romanything hat s thesame(as itself)]" s false. "(x)[xis changingD x is different rom theForm,Sameness]" s true enough but this can hardly be what is intended by"Change s different from the same." For "Change s the same as itself'(256A12-B1)but "(x)[xis changingD x is the same as the Form,Change]"is false.The possibilitiesare endlessbut I will not bore the readerany morethanI have alreadyby arguingagainsta thesis that is implausible o beginwith. 47



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Perhaps, he predicatesof the object anguage entencesare to be seen asserving o define the concept mentionedor expressedby the subject erm.-7Again this suggestionworks well for "Changerests.""Rests" n no wayserves to define "change",and thus "Changerests" s false. It is however,primafacie implausible o suggesteither that "is different rom the same"serves to define 'Change"or that Plato thought of such predicates n thisway. In fact, the text of the Sophist tself makes t clearthatparticipationsnot used tojustify definitionsor partialdefinitions.First,we are told that fthe F is differentthis is so by virtue of the fact that the F partakesofDifferencenot by virtueof the natureof the F (255E3-6).Buta definition,completeorpartial,answers hequestion"What s theF?"It istells uswhatthe nature of the F is. Second, there is a relationshipamongkindsmen-tioned n theSophistwhich s (a)distinct romparticipation nd(b) used tojustifyor explain sentenceswhichare definitional n nature:namely,thepart/whole relationshipof 257Cff. Mathematics s a part of the kind,Knowledge,and thus mathematics s (a) knowledge; t is the knowledgeofnumbers.The not-beautiful is a part of Othernessand thus the not-beautiful s (an) other; t is theother than beautiful.18n suchsentences hepredicates an easily be seen as serving o definetheirsubject erms.Theyare explainedby the part/wholerelation,however,not by the participationrelation. When not-being is defined at 258A7-E3 participationdropscompletelyout of the picture.Perhapswhat is needed is a type of predicationwhich(a) reflectscon-ceptual relations but (b) is weaker than the genus/species or definien-dum/definiens relation.There may be something n this suggestionbutasit stands it is so much philosophical doubletalk. I doubt that talk ofconceptual ies and concepts s muchcleareror more lluminating hantalkof participation nd Forms.

IIIn this section I hope to show: (1) that there is a type of predication,exemplified by sentences in both Greek and English,which is differentfrom Form-predication,UQS and Pauline predication; 2) that under-standing he first-order entencesof the Sophistas being of thistypesolvesor facilitates he solution of the problemsdiscussedabove.Inboth Englishand Greek, sentencesof the form"the F (is).. ." whichcannot plausibly be understood as UQS's or Pauline predicationsarecommon. Some examples of such sentences in English are: "Thewhaleswims" or "is a swimmer")."Thedefensiveback interceptspasses,""The48



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troikawas inventedby a Russian,"and "Love s different romrespect."1)9The existenceof a paralyzedor confined whale and an irresponsibleorimmoraldefensiveback does not falsifythe first two of these sentences."All troikaswere invented by Russians"seems not even to make goodsense unlessheard as "All kindsof troikawere inventedby Russians."The claim that two sentencesexemplifythe same type of predicationmay meanthat they can be similarlyparaphrasedntoquantificationaleseor some languagewhich makes the referent(s)of the subjecttermsmoreobvious.This iswhatI meantwhen I argued hat "Changerests"was not aForm-predication,on the grounds that its truth value changed whenparaphrasedas "The Form, Change,rests."It is fairly clear that by thiscriterionthe sentenceslisted above are of radicallydifferenttypes."Thewhale swims" plausibly becomes "Normal,healthy whales are able toswim" or, "Typically,whales are able to swim" or, "Whalesare able toswimalwaysor for the mostpart.""Typically,defensivebacksare able tointerceptpasses" s probably rue but seemssomehow to miss the point of"Thedefensive back interceptspasses."The point of the statementwouldmore ikelybe thatit is the functionor dutyof halfbacks o interceptpassesor that defensivebacks,whenacting n thecapacityof defensivebacks,tryto interceptpasses. It is not at all clear that"The troikawasinventedby aRussian"can be seen as a statementabouttroikas.Examplesneed not bemultipliedbeyond necessity. If one's criterionfor whether or not thesentences"The F is G" and "The H is J" arethe same typeof predicationsis that they are plausiblyparaphrased n the same way into statementswhich seem to mention F'sand H's respectively, hen the sentences istedabovearedifferent ypes of predications.There showevera way of understandinghese statements s being of thesame type. Some statementsof the form "The F is G" are plausiblyparaphrased y "TheF is a kindof - whichis G". I willcall thosewhichare paraphrasable n this way "kind-predications"as distinct from"Form-predications").willcall a Greek sentencea kind-predicationf itsEnglishtranslation s so paraphrasable. he blank in the aboveschema isto be filled by any termwhich answers hequestion"Whatkindof thing isthe F?"If no answer s immediately orthcoming,"thing" s to be suppliedin the blank.All of the sentences istedabove are kind-predications. The whale is akindof animalthat swims,""Thetroika s a kind of conveyancewhich wasinventedby a Russian," tc., fairlyobviouslypreserveboththe truthvalueand the sense of their originals.Form-predications re not, in general,kind-predications.20Thewhale is a kindof animalwhichis eternal," or,

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"is motionless") s false, or nonsense.While all sentencesof the form "TheF is G" which are plausibly understoodas UQS'smay also, it seems,beunderstoodas kind-predications,he conversedoes not hold. "The troikawas invented by a Russian" s a kind-predicationbut is not a UQS, forexample. Of course, whether or not a sentenceis a Form-predication,UQS, or a kind-predicationwill often have to be determinedby thecon-text. Many will remain ambiguous. "The Sophist possesses apparentknowledge" 233C10) for example can be understoodas either a kind-predicationor a UQS but not as a Form-predication. Change s differentfrom rest"can be see either as a Form-predicationr a kind-predication,but not as a UQS. The vast majorityof sentencesof theform"the F is .. ."whichare ntelligible o an ordinaryphilosophically nsophisticatedGreekor Englishspeakerare kind-predications.21omekind-predications ill beunintelligible o the man on the streetbecause heycontain echnical erms,e.g., "the different is ?rpos 'rTEpov"255D 1). Otherswill be difficult tounderstandbecause of their abstractness, .g., "Motion is." In general,however,one needs to hold no special theory of languageor ontologytounderstand kind-predication.I do not offer the distinction betweenForm-predications,UQS's,andkind-predications s a means of solving any pposophicalproblem.I dooffer it asan interpretive evice. I thinkthat thefirst-orderentencesof theSophist are kind-predications.That is, I thinkthat if the first-order en-tences found thereareunderstoodasbeingof a typewhich s intelligible othe philosophicallyunsophisticatedordinaryman, as Form-predicationsare not, the problems discussed in Part I either dissolve or becomemanageable. n PartIIII willarguethatPlatoasmuchas tellsusthattheseentences do not mention Forms.First,however, et us see whetheror notthey can all consistentlybe interpreted s kind-predications.A': "Changerests"understoodas a kind-predications false, as is "Restchanges"."The whale walks"and "Thewhale is a kind of animalwhichwalks"are false because they tell us nothingaboutwhat kindof thingthewhale is. For the same reason "Changerests,"and "Change s a kind ofthing that rests"are false. More importantly,"Change s different fromrest" s true understoodas a kind-predication. Change s a kindof thingwhichis differentfromrest"or "Change s a kindof thingwhichis otherthanrest"areobvious truth.Understood n thisway, "Change s differentfrom rest" sno moreorlessa statementaboutFormsthan"Changerests,"or "Thewhaleswims.""Change s different rom rest",unlike"Change sinvisible"and "Change s eternal," anbe seenas a commonplace ruthofeveryday English presupposingno particularphilosophical heories.The50



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same holds mutatismutandis or Greek.We have morecall to point outthings like "Love is differentfrom respect"and "Awe is differentfromreverence.""Changeis differentfrom rest"can, nevertheless,be under-stood as makingthe same sort of point, whatevera deeperanalysismayshow thatpoint to be.The fact that "Changeis at rest"and "Changeis different"can beparaphrasedn the same way into "kind-talk"n no way provesthattheverb "to be" occursunivocally n these twosentences.I knowof no wayofproving this. The fact that both of these sentences arekind-predications,however, should alleviate one's inclinationsto believe that it must occurequivocallyin them or that these two sentences must be understoodasexemplifyingradicallydifferenttypes of predications.C':We knowthat"Change s the same" s ambiguous, or"Change s notthe same" s not itscontradictory. t is fairlyclearthattheambiguityPlatosees in "Change s the same" can be at least partiallybroughtout by theEnglish paraphrases:"Change is the same (as itself)" and "Change issameness." t seems that a good case could be made forclaiming that theambiguityof "Changeis the same"is due to the fact that "thesame" isambiguous.This interpretation s particularlyattractivesince it is "thesame"and "not the same"'whichPlatotells us we do not "say n thesameway" when we say"Change s the sameand not the same."But Platodoesnot attribute he ambiguityof thissentence to the ambiguityof any parti-cular word in it. Whathe does is give one reasonforbelievingthatchangeis the same and anotherreasonfor believing that change is not the sameand leaves it at that. The fact that the reasons given are not themselvescontradictoryis no doubt intended to encourage us to accept withequanimity he apparentcontradiction.I think it willbe easier to see what is or isn't going on in 256A7-B4 f wefirstlook at a passagefromthe Euthyphron whichPlato makesa similarpoint. Euthyphrohas proposedas a definitionof the holy that"Whatallthe gods hate is unholy and what they all love is holy"(9D2-3).Socratespresentsan argumentagainstthedefinitionandconcludesas follows:

But if, dearEuthyphro, he pleasing-to-the-gods ndthe holy were thesame, then if the holy is loved because it is holy so too would thepleasing-to-the-gods e lovedbecause t is dear to the gods; and if thepleasing-to-the-godswere pleasingto the gods because it is loved bythe gods so too would the holy be holy throughbeing loved. But youseenowthat theopposite s thecase since they arecompletelydifferentfrom each other... and it seems,Euthyphro, hatwhen you answered

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the question, "What is holy?"you did not want to reveal to me itsbeing[oVoaial ou only told me a quality[i%Oos]f it, namely to beloved by all the gods ( IOE9-1B 1).In this passage it is clear that "the holy is loved by all the gods" isunderstoodby Plato to be true.This sentencedoes not, on the other hand,answer the question "What is (the) holy?" Understood as a proposedanswerto this question it is false. Plato, however, does not try to clarifymattersby distinguishing he meanings of words. He expresses the dis-tinction between the two ways of understanding his sentence by sayingthat it is a rraOosf the holy to be loved by the gods, but to be loved by thegodsis not theovixaof the holy. It is assumed hat "the G" is the answer othequestion"What s the F?" f and onlyif theG is theovi'aa f theF. Thereasonthat the pleasing-to-the-godss not the ovaot'af the holy is that theholyis different rom the pleasing-to-the-gods. he inference s not arguedfornorneed it be. It is simply assumedthatif "The F is different romtheG" then "The F is not (the) G." The inference is in no more need ofjustificationthan an instance of modusponens.That the holy is differentfrom the pleasing-to-the-godshas been proven by the failure of sub-stitutivityof thesepredicates alvaveritate.The sametechnique s used inthe Sophist.

Letme now return o the Sophist.The object-language entencesof theSophistI suggestarekind-predications.n the languageof the Euthyphrotheyasserta na'Oosf some subject.Plato as much as says thisat 255E4-6when he says that the kinds are different rom one anothernot by virtueoftheirownnaturebut becauseof participation.Change s different rom thesame not by virtue of its own nature but because of participation nDifference.If I tell you that Change is the same as itself or different romsamenessI do not tell you what the natureof change is, or whatkind ofthing change is, thoughI do tell you somethingabout thatnatureor kind.In thesameway, whenI tellyou that the Holy is loved by all the godsI donot tell you what the natureof the Holy is but I do tell you somethingabouttheHoly.Iamsuggesting hatwe understand Changes thesameasitself'or "Change s a kind of thingwhich is the same as itself'as analogousto"The Holyis loved by all the gods"or "TheHoly is a kindof thingwhich slovedby all the gods." Plato'suse of'"IrXeTLvL" in theSophist is analogousto hisuseof "'rraOos"n theEuthyphro.Heuses bothterms o signalthefactthat a particular entencesays somethingabouta naturebutdoes notstatewhat the nature is; it does not state the owVsia of the natureor kind inquestion.The fact thatChange s notthe same followsfromthefactthatChange s52



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different from the same. It is simplyand correctlyassumedboth in theSophist and in the Euthyphro hat a speakerof Greek will accept theinference.The questionas to whethertheverb"to be"meansthesamein"Change s the same"and"Change s not the same"simplydoesn'tarise.Ifthe Euthyphropassagecan be understoodwithoutassumingthat Plato ismakinga point about the meaningof the verb "to be" then so too canSophist256A2-B4."Change snot the same(Sameness)" snotakind-predication. Changeis a kind of thing which is not the same (or Sameness)" s not a happyparaphrase f "Change s not the same(Sameness)".Butthis is as it shouldbe. It is the denialof a purporteddefinitionof Change.Nor is "Change snot the same" ustifiedby participation.Rather, t followsfroma sentencethatis sojustified. "When wecallChange]not the same[wedo so]becauseof itsblendingwithdifference hroughwhich it is separated romthesameandbecomesnot thatbut different, o that t is onceagaincorrectly pokenof as 'not the same'." 356B2-4).LetmesummarizePlato'spointas I see it. "Change s the same" s a truestatementwhenunderstoodas a claim aboutthe natureof change.But it isfalsewhen understoodas a claimassertingwhat (the natureof) change is.Why? Because change is different from the same (Sameness)and thuschange is not the same(Sameness)."Change s thesame" s truebut doesnot answerthe question,"What s Change?"It is possible then to understand256A2-B4withoutassuming hatPlatois distinguishingmeaningsof theverb "tobe".TheargumentspresentednPartI of thispaperI think show thathe mustbe so understood.So muchthenforPlato'sviewof thematter.Can't tbe neverthelessmaintained hatthe "is" n "Change s thesame"simply s ambiguous? sn't t true,whetherPlato realizes it or not, that the truth value of "Change is the same"depends upon whetheror not the "is" here is the copula or the "is" ofidentity?B':For reasons hat will becomeobvious let me firsttryto answeranotherquestionraised n PartI of thispaper.Recall thatthere is some reason tobelieve that"isdifferent from"or "is otherthan" s usedambiguouslybyPlato.In "Change s other thanthe Same"(256A3), forexample, t seemsthat"is otherthan"has the senseof "is not identical o". At 257C10-11, onthe otherhand, it can'thave thissense. It ratherseemsto have thesense of"other than" as in "Medusa is other than beautiful." If, however,"Change"and "thesame" do not functionin this sentence as the propernamesof Forms,then"is different rom"does not havethe senseof "is notidentical to."Whatsense does it have then?Perhaps he sense of "is other

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than" in "Medusa s other thanbeautiful".I knowof no way of provingthat "isotherthan"occursunivocally n "Medusa s otherthanbeautiful"and,e.g., "respect s otherthanlove." I am fairlyconfident,however, hatthere s no way of showingthat it occurs n thesesentencesequivocally.Tobe sure, "Respect s not the same as love"is a reasonableparaphrase f6"Respects otherthanlove" while"Medusa s not the sameas beautiful"approachesnonsense.But reasonablenessof paraphrasedoes not showsameness of meaning. If it did we could show not only that "otherthan"means "snot"but also that "not" is ambiguous. For "Medusa is notbeautiful" s a reasonableparaphrase f "Medusa s otherthanbeautiful"and"Love s notrespect"s a reasonableparaphrase f "Love s otherthanrespect." f "otherthan"meansone thingwhen it occursbefore an adjec-tive and anotherthing when it occursbefore an abstractsubstantive tseemsthat "not"mustalso be ambiguous n thisway.Apart from the truth of these matters,it is clear that Plato sees noambiguity in these two uses of "other than." For Plato, "repos" has a sensebroadenough to includeboth whatwe callnon-identityaswell as whateversensethe Englishphrase"other han"hasin such sentencesas "Medusa sother than beautiful.""Not" he tells us signifies somethingdifferent(257B3-C3).He findsevidence forthisprinciple n thefact that"Change sdifferentfromthe same"entails"Change s not the same."He uses theprincipleto explain the fact that the not-beautiful is (the) other-than-beautiful.C': If"isotherthan" n "Change sotherthan thesame"doesnot mean"isnot identical o"then it seemsthere s no reasonforbelievingthat the "is"in "Change s not thesame (orSameness)"s the "is"of identity.Afterall,howis a statementasserting henon-identityof twoForms o follow fromastatementwhichisn'tabout Formsat all?If it makessenseto askwhetherornotPlatohelda theoryof Formswhenhe wrotethe earlydialogues hen"Change s not the same"can be understoodas analogousto "theholy isnot the god-loved"withoutassuming that the "is" of identity occursinthese sentences.Again, I know of no way of proving that the "is" in"Change s not the same"meansthe same as the "is" in "Change s thesame (asitself)."But I amfairlyconfidentthat there s no way to showthat"is"does not mean the same in these twosentences.To be sure, "Loveisnot the same as respect"is a reasonableparaphraseof "Love is notrespect." f this iswhat s meantbycalling"Love s not respect" nidentitystatementor thedenial of one, well and good. But it is quitemisleading odo so. For in "Change s not the same as the different,"understoodas akind-predication, thesame as" does not mean "identicalto". To claim54



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that it did would be to thinkof Platonismand the theoryof Formsas alogicalconsequenceof suchsentences.Up to this point I have argued that the first-order entences of theSophistarenot Form-predications. have allowedthattherearea numberof Form-predicationsn the Sophist;"Both(Changeand Rest) partakeoftheSame andtheDifferent," 355B3) sanexampleof a Form-predication.There is verylittlethat is 'unPlatonic' boutmythesisupto thispoint. Thetruthor falsityof the first-order entencesdependsin some sense on theexistenceof Formsand relationsamongthem.22

IIIThere s, however,a serioustextualobjection o my thesis whichmayhavebeen troubling the readerfor some time. The distinctionI have drawnbetweensentences ustified by participation, irst-order entenceson theone hand,and obviousForm-predicationsn the otheris not as sharpas Ihave made it appear.If the thesis of this paperis correct,then 255E4-6,256B1-4,B6-7,D8-9, D12-EI, 257A5-6,and259A6-8,to mentiononly themost obvious passages, are all a certain kind of nonsense. Consider259A6-8forexample:"Torv ETEpovRErotuXOVTOD 'OVTOS ?mTLzV &lt T(XV'T1Vrv9 >?EOEV, OV iVXrv YE OV T?XV &XX ?TTpOV." "TO ?TEpOV" is boththesubjectof theForm-predicationTO iEVETEpOV p?ETWtt0V TOV OVTOS"andthesubjectof thefirst-orderentence"o' >v ?E'pov ... ?aTL ... ETEpOV." It isas thoughone said,"Redis a colorandwhat mybookis," orperhaps"itispossibleforsomething obe red ustbecause t (i.e.,red) saproperty."TheE S constantlyspeaks as though the thing that participatesn "the G" isidentical o thethingthatis G becauseof thatparticipation.tseemsthatifthose sentenceswhich mentionparticipationare Form-predicationshenso too arethe first-order entences ustifiedby them.23

The correctanswer to this objection is, I think, that those sentenceswhich mention participationare not Form-predications,hat Plato no-wherein the Sophistrefersto the Forms of the middledialoguesexcept inthosepassageswhichdiscussthebeliefs of the friendsof the Forms.Anyone familiarwith the middledialoguesknows that Platouses theword "EI1os"to distinguish such things as justice, being, health, etc., fromsuch things as Socrates,a beautifulface, a bed, etc. Partof understandingwhatPlatomeansby "'Ethos"n thesedialogues s knowingwhatthingshewould call E'Mnnd what he would refuse to call ei';. Now clearlythisaspect of the meaning of the word is carriedover to the Sophist. In theSophist usticewould and Socrateswouldnot be called an a,8os.Onewho

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does not know this does not know what Plato means by the word "CtMos".Now, I thinkthat one understands ompletelywhat Platomeans by "Etlos"in the Sophist f he understandswhat thingsPlato would and what thingshe would notcallri&a.Hedoes not mean"intellgible,non-sensible,divine,eternal objectby virtue of partaking n which a sensibleobject comes tohave a certaincharacter" s he did in the middle dialogues.In theSophist,to speak of the E18os,?yvoS or 18Ea, hange, is just to speak of change. Platomay have believed thatjustice is eternal,divine, etc., when he wrote theSophist.But if he did, he did notsay or imply thathe did.When Platosays that the F partakesof the G he is saying ust that thekind-predication the F is G" is true. Put lessanachronistically, y "the Fpartakes f the G" Platomeans"'TheF is G' is truewhen understoodas asentence which(a) does not mentionthe Forms of the middledialoguesand(b) is not definitional,butrather,assertsa u6Oos f the F."I have in a sense alreadyargued or theinterpretation utlined nthelasttwo paragraphs.The first-order entences of the Sophistare not Form-predications.The syllipses isted above showthatsentences n whichPlatotells us thatone kindparticipatesn anothercannot be Form-predications.The interpretation f the last two paragraphsdescribeswhat is meant bysuch sentenceswhen reference to the Forms of the middle dialoguesistakenfromthem. I will try to strengthen he argumentas follows:First Iwill try to show that the Sophist makesgood philosophicalsense whenPlato's alk of participation nd kinds is understoodas I indicatedabove,i.e., that we can understandPlato'sphilosophicalmotivesfor speakingofformsparticipatingn one anotheron my interpretation. will thenarguethat Plato as much as tells his readersboth that he does not use the term"E'8Los"o refer o the Formsof the middledialoguesand thatto speakof aformparticipatingn another orm sjust tosay that acorrespondingGreeksentence s true.

I think hatAckrill24scorrect n arguing hat the"&&"insuch sentencesas "..T. aT11 y TiV TOXVTOV 8 TO IETEXELV aXv 7'VT' a'VTO (256A7-8) is the"&8&' of analysis.It makeslittle or no sense to think of the words intro-ducedby "6&&"as giving a reasonforbelieving,or a causalexplanationofthe factstatedby the precedingwords.Rather the wordsfollowing"&L&"give an analysisor expansionof the precedingwords.25The clauseintro-ducedby "61a' merely tell us how the precedingwords are to be under-stood. I haveargued hat theprecedingwords,first-orderentences,are tobe understoodas kind-predications.Plato'stalk of participation an beunderszood hen as a meansof indicatingto his readers hatcertainsen-tencesare to be understood skind-predications. urelynothing n thetext56



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demands hatPlato's alkof participation mountsto anymore thanthis.If Ed Lee is right, however,and I think he is, Plato speaksof Formspartakingnone anothernotonlyto indicate hat a correspondingentenceis not a Form-predication ut also to indicatethat it is not definitionalorquasi-definitionaln nature.26Participations contrastedwith the part/whole relationship. f the F is G because the F partakesof G, thenby "theF is G"one is not claimingthat it is theverynatureof theF to be G. If, ontheotherhand,the F isa partof theG, thenin Lee'swords, he G servestoconstitute he being of the F. The point can be made lessanachronisticallyby sayingthatif the F is a partof the G then the F is by itsverynatureG.

Thus Plato can easily be seen as using participation o indicate that asentence is neither a Form-predicationnor a definitional or quasi-definitionalpredication.Plato then could have had good reasons orspeakingof formsblendingon the present nterpretation. t is a device whichwhen used inconjunctionwithothersdistinguishesbetween types of predication.I also think that Plato as much as tells us that the words "W18os" nd

'4LITeXELv"no longer mean what they meant in the middledialogues. Anumberof passages n the Sophistcan be readas attemptson Plato'sparttodisassociate he argumentof the ES from the theory of Forms.First, Platoseemsto go out of his way to tell us that the Sophistwas writtenaftertheParmenides217C4-7),a dialoguein which, (a) the theoryof Formswascriticized, b) there is a long series of argumentsconcerningalmost ex-clusivelysentencesof the form "the F is G" which are clearlynot intendedas unambiguousForm-predications nd (c) it is suggested, f not stated,that the argumentsmentioned in (b) are about "e'e&1"135D8-E4).Theupshotof (b) and (c) is that Platohas alreadythereused the word"e?toS"notto refer o the Formsof the middledialoguesbut ratherasmeaning ust"such hingsasjustice, health, the one, etc." Second,the theoryof Forms sagaincriticized n the Sophist tself (248A4-249B6).The decisivepassage,however,is 251C8-D3: the ES introduces theurgument hat some kindsblend and some do not by telling us that the argument s directedto theprotagonistsof all theories previously mentioned and these include thetheoryof Formsas well as materialism.Here we are told explicitly hattheargumentswhich follow will presuppose he truthof none of thepreviouslymentioned theories. Surely an argument which assumes that the con-troversial heory of Forms is true could not reasonablybe said to beintended for, to be likely to convince, materialistswho doubt their exis-tence,27as well as monists and pluralistswho do not even considertheirexistence.The ES does not proceed to prove that forms exist.The argu-

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mentsthatsome kindsblend and some do not are egregiously allaciouswhenreadasarguments ortheirexistence.I do not see how one canavoidconcludingthat Plato did not think that the argumentsof 251D5-252E7proved that the Formsof the middle dialoguesblend, whateversuch aconclusionmightmean.The argument that Plato tells us what he means by "eZ8os"ndT'rExrLv"equires ome,but not much,readingbetweenthe lines. If theargumentof the precedingparagraphs correct henthereis nothingleftforPlatoto meanby "e'18os"xcept"justice, heone,health,etc."He couldof coursemeanmorethanthisby tellingus howhe intends o use theterm.But thishe doesnot do.Thisargument anbe strengthened.Platonowhereexplicitlydefinesthenew technicalterms 4JLyv1vvxL," "bffLXOLVWVELV,"etc. Nor does he explainexplicitly how to understandthe familiartechnical terms, ",ReTE'Xev,""pTaapXc436tveLv,"tc., which now occur in an entirely new context, i.e., onein which they expressa relationbetweenkinds.28Now surelyPlatomusthavebeenawareof thefactthatheowedhisreadersanexplanation f howthese termsare to be understood(This is seen by "readingbetweenthelines."). Plato must have known that his talk of blending etc. ismetaphorical r technicalandthatthe metaphor annotbe understoodbyextrapolation romearlierdialogues.If so, it is reasonable o assumethatthe "arguments"hatkindsblendwereintended n partto explainwhatismeantby "blending".If we look at the arguments hatkindsblend we find thatPlatoasserts"theF partakes f theG" on thegroundsof thetruthof "theF isG"wherethissentence 1) insomecasescannotbe understoodas definitionaland(2)in some cases cannot be understoodas a Form-predication nd (3) canalways be understoodas a kind-predication.Since all of the sentenceswhich are said to entail a blendingrelationcan be understoodas kind-predications t is reasonableto assume that Plato in these arguments stellingus thatblending ntroduceskind-predications. utlessanachronis-tically,blending ntroduces entenceswhich(a) arenotabouttheFormsofthe middledialoguesand (b) do notsaywhata thingis by itsverynature.The truthof "MotionblendswithRest"and"RestblendswithMotion"stands or falls with the truth of "Motion rests" and "Rest moves".252D32-0makes t clearthatneither"Motionrests"nor"Restmoves"9reForm-predications. heirfalsityfollowsfromthefactthatrestandmotionareopposites,a factwhich s irrelevanto theirtruthasForm-predications.

"Man sseparate romtheothersandby itself' entails"Manblendswiththe separate,the by-itselfand Being"(extrapolated rom 251B5-C6and58



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252B9-10). t is clear that "Man s separate. . ." is not a Form-predication.It is a consequenceof a philosophical heorywhich deniesthe existenceofpredication,a theorywhich is intelligiblewithoutassuming hat it is com-mitted to the theoryof Forms.Though Plato believes both of the abovesentences to be false, it is clear that participation s not here used tointroducea sentencewhichwould,if true,be definitional.Finally, "Motionis" and "Rest is" entail respectively"Motionblendswith Being"and "Restblendswithbeing"(251E7-252B6).29Motion s"isclearlynot definitionalon any readingof thetroublesome erb "to be".Wedo not explainthenatureof somethingby tellingsomeone thatthatnatureis.Noris "Motion s" a Form-predicationor the contextmakes tclearthatit is entailedby "Somethingmoves".Clearly"Somethingmoves"does notentail "theForm, Motion s" and Plato musthave known this. It is hard toargue that "Motion s" is a Kind-predicationdue to the vaguenessof thepredicate.Myownguess is that Platooften uses sentencesof the form "TheF is"to mean "There s such a thing as The F". "Somethingmoves"doesentail "There s such a thing as motion".This explanationof what is meantby "TheF is" also seems to fit 257E9-10and 258C2-3.Let me conclude by cautioningagainst a possible misunderstanding fmy argument. have triedto show that the E S does not mentionthe Formsof the middle dialoguesoutside the context of discussing he friendsof theForms.But the SOPHIST should not be read as repudiating he theoryofforms.The truthof that theory s irrelevant o the argumentof the Sophist.This is as it should be. A man who doubts the obvious, i.e., that there arefalse statements, s hardly going to be dissuaded by an argumentwhichpresupposesas controversial theoryas the theoryof Forms.University of California Santa Barbara1The problem has been discussed by R. Robinson, Plato'sEarlierDialectic,2nd Edition(Oxford, 1953),250-264; I. M. Crombie,An ExaminationofPlato's Doctrine:11, Plato onKnowledgeand Reality(London, 1963),401-410; M. Frede, "'Pradikation nd Existen-zaussage,"Hypomnemata,Heft 18, (1967) 9-99; and G. Vlastos,"On Ambiguity in theSophist" n Platonic Studies, Princeton,1973),270-322, among others,while it is alludedto by G. E. L. Owen,"Plato on Not-Being"in Plato I: Metaphysics ndEpistemology,G.Viastos, ed., (GardenCity, 1971), 233, note 20.2 1will assume thatJ. L. Ackrill, "Plato and the Copula: Sophist251-259" n Vlastos,ed.,op. cit., has shown that "Wri-xELv", ,X4TaXcvr,.v" and "xoLVwCVeV"with the genitive)are used synonymouslyby Plato. I also assume that "yivos","Eo80S"nd "'8sia" re usedsynonymously.3 I will speak of a sentence being of form "The F (is).. ." only where the context of thesentence makes t clear that the subjectexpression s not a definite description."(is). ." is

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intended to representany predicateexpressionwith or without thecopula.4 For the meaningsof "aor&os","xivlns" and theircognatessee G. Vlastos,op.cit., 272,n.5. While the argumentof this subsection is similar to those of Vlastos,Robinson andCrombie,considerationsof space prevent me from pointing out agreementsand disa-greements.0Op. it., 211-212.6 M. Frede(op.cit., 38) appeals to 260D6-E3as evidence that "partakes"s ambiguouslyused by Plato. But G. E. L. Owen (op. cit., p. 253, n. 51) has corrected the error.7M. Frede's op. cit., pp. 88-9) attemptto retainthesense of 'non-identity' or"'E'rEpov"nthe passage, I think, fails. He translates257D 10-1 as: "Was wir jeweils 'nichtschon'nennen, ist wesentlichverschiedenvom Schonen."The 'ist' is a definitional is','wesent-lich' is a translationof "ovxxXXoV LVOS . . A and 'Schbnen'means'was schon ist.'The passagesFredequotes tojustifyhistranslation f"oux&XXovrnvos. . .",Charm,167BII-Cl, 168D3-4and Sophist247E3-4,do not supporthis point. For each of thesepassagesretaintheir sense when this phrase is translated iterally.257D10-11does not.Also theevidenceFredecites fortranslating"rs ToDaXovOtaews" s "wasschbn ist" is,it seemsto me, weak.Granted thatin theSophist"4voLs f x"is often usedto meansimply"x", t does not follow that"x"functionsas shorthand or "what s x." One passageFredecites in supportof this translation n fact counts against his interpretation."i Oax'rpov40uLs" in i oaTOrpoV RLo 4vU0LS 10iVEraL xaraxiExcpRatr(a6aL" (257C7) can not mean "whatis different."8 "Plato on Negation and Not-Being in the Sophist," PhilosophicalReview,81 (1972)267-281.9Owen seems to agree with Frede on this point. Owen says that Plato distinguishesdifferent uses of the verb 'to be' (op. cit., 256) and that "The use of the verb 'to be' onwhich the E S restshis conclusion[thatMotion"is not, as a matterof identity,all thosethings whichit ispredicatively"Owen's talics)] s the connectiveuse distributedbetweenidentity and predication"(p. 254). On Frede, see below. Perhaps,however, Owen'sdisclaimer p. 251, n. 47) thatdisagreementwith Ackrillon the questionof Plato'shavingdistinguished senses of the verb 'to be', "does not at all carry disagreementon hissubstantial ssue, that Plato succeeds in distinguishingpredicationsfromstatementsofidentity," if correctlyunderstood, is an anticipationof my interpretation.See abovepp. 51ff.10Op.cit.257-8.11Op. it. 71-2.12 Whether "ov y&p6S.av ?'t;l iErv ViT-PravrTorvxexiRi -Ta'r6v, 6[oiws rdp1xadRv" is trans-lated as "whenwe call it the same and not the same"or as "whenwe say it (is) the sameand not the same" the point is the same. "-kTL"s at its most implicit n the explanation.13 Op. cit. 212-13.14 Op. Cit. 12-29. Frede, I think, has performed the importantfunction of clarifying255C8-E1. Being'and 'thedifferent'arenot twonamesfor thesamekindbecause Being'is both"'npbsrepov"and"xaO' {o'r"while 'the different' sonly "-rp6srrpov". Thatis, athing is both itself and other things,e.g., green, hot, tall; while a thing is differentonlyfrom thingsother than itself. But it in no way follows that the verb'to be' has two uses,particularlywhere difference in use determinesdifference in truth value. Perhapsananalogy will be helpful. "Is the same height as" might be distinguishedfrom"is tallerthan"by thesame argument.I am the same heightas myselfaswellas manyotherthingsbut I am only tallerthan thingsother than myself.Thus "theequi-tall"and "the taller"60



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are two names for differentkinds. Clearly t does not follow that "I am the sameheightasmyself' is true or false depending on the use of "the same heightas."15ibid. p. 69 and also Frede's comments on 255E14, pp. 67ff.16 Op. cit. 272-3.17 i.e., are the B2predicatesmentioned by Owen in "Didacticand Eristic n the Treatmentof Forms",Aristotleon Dialectic, ed. G. E. L. Owen, Oxford (1968), 108.18 There is an interestingdisanalogy between the relationshipof mathematics o knowl-edge and thatof the not-beautifulto difference.Mathematics s a kind of knowledge butthe not-beautiful s not a kindof differenceas, e.g., qualitativedifference s. Perhaps hisis Plato'spointin Statesman263B7-10:All kinds(e';CS)f x areparts Lipq)of x but not allpartsof x arekindsof x.19I discussEnglishsentences only to avoid havingto argueaboutthe specificmeaningsofsentences found in the dialogues. The following four sentences from the dialoguesexemplify respectively he same featuresas theirEnglish counterparts:"xaiy&ptvri1 fl TXarEdav&px'ilTOV&Ei rrXaoL&toVTaai &arro6vovapx&vTrowt,"Meno,80A6-7); "qxv'aVTLx6spkv&pxEpX;bL xaXC7sXpaE'raL" (Cratylus, 388C5); ".. .ek mla-TaiplqV To T-s xEOaXiS 46&pwAxov;;Charmides,155EI-2);"E'TEpOVi E'TLV TO pv TE Xvixo00ov Tis oranXwSav'rT" (Charmides,166B2-3).20There are of course the troublesome sentences "The invisible is not an object ofperception,""Theuncreated s eternal,"etc.21 The question as to whether or not those sentences which correspond o the part/wholerelation among Forms can also be understoodas kind-predications s difficult to answer.Let me assume that not only "Mathematics s a science"but also "Justice s a virtue"and"Red is a color" are truths reflecting the part/whole relationship. Only a philosopherwould have occasion to say "Mathematics s a kind of science which is a science."Butconsider "Mathematics s a kind of thing which is a science," "Justice s a kind of thingwhich is a virtue,"or "Red is a kind of thing which is a color." For my part I am temptedto respond,"No Justice s a kind of virtue.To say that it is a kind of thing whichis a virtuesuggeststhat ustice isn't a kind of virtue." t is at least true that "justice s a kindof virtue"is a far more natural paraphraseof "Justice s a virtue" than "Justice s a kind of thingwhich is a virtue."In the same vein, "The whale is a kind of swimmer" eemsobjection-able as a paraphraseof "The whale is a swimmer"on the grounds that thoughthe whalemay exemplifyone kind of swimmer, it is not one kind of swimmer, as, e.g., the animalthat swims by using tins and the animal that swims by using webbed feet are kinds ofswimmers. Be that as it may, it is not part of the thesis of this paper that sentencescorrespondingto the whole/part relationshipcannot also be understoodas kind-predi-cations. Plato makes it clear, I think, that he intends the whole/part relation to bedifferent from participation.He does not make it clear whether or not one sentencecanbe ambiguous between a kind-predicationand a quasi-definitional predication.I alsothink that we ought not expect a rote technique for determining whether or not aparticular sentence exemplifies one or the other of these relationships. If "&vxaTecraRiuv'qV"(253D6) and "`EpLexogivas"D8) are meant to signify the same as participation, hen253D5-E6 tells us that it is the philosopherwho, by dialectic, determineswhetheror notkinds are related by participationor as part to whole. I do believe however that thedifference between sentences justified by participation on the one hand and by thepart/whole relationship on the other is at least partially reflected in the differencebetween "The F is a kind of thing which G's" and "The F is a kind of G" respectively.22 The crux mentioned by Owen ("'Plato n Not-Being," op. cit., 233, n. 20.) may also be

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solved by my interpretation.To be sure, "rest","being", etc., do not function on myinterpretationas the names of abstractentities in the passagesmentioned by Owen:255E11-14, 256A3-5, D5-8. I am simply not sure howeverwhether or not my interpre-tationof these passagesrenders them consistent with Owen's interpretation f the pro-blematic256DIl-E6.23 Two of the apparent syllipses listed above involve the sentence "Motion rests"(255A10-B1and 256B6-7).Thus it seems that the objectionmust be faced by those whothink that "Motionrests" s not a Form-predication, iz.: Owen ("Platoon Not-Being,"op. cit., 267, additionalnote), Frede (op. cit., 34), Malcolm("Plato'sAnalysisof T6 ovandT6 yLiovin the Sophist,"Phronesis13(1967) 140-1,n. 21) andperhapsCrombie op.cit., p.410). The objection does not apply to Vlastoswho thinks that "If Motion partookof restthen motion wouldrest"means"IftheForm, Motion,partookof the Form, Rest, thentheForms, Motion and Rest, would be so related thateverything hat is in motion is at rest."(op. cit.,p. 274, n. 13).24 Op. cit., pp. 211-12.25 1disagreehoweverwith Ackrill's nterpretation f the typeof analysis ntroduced.Seeabove, p. 46. Frede (op. cit., 12-29) and Owen ("Plato on Not-Being", op. cit., 253-8) haveshown that Plato does not speak of participationto distinguishan existentialfrom acopulative meaningof the verb 'c'vtvaL."26 Op. cit., 267-281.27 The reformedmaterialistshave been convincedthat some thingsarenon-sensiblebuthave hardly beenconvincedthatthe full blowntheoryof Formsis true.28 The attempt to read "participation"n the Sophistas synonymouswith its use in themiddle dialoguesleads to readingfirst-order entencesas Form-predications.29 I readXr-yoL.v v oviUvas"wouldsay nothingtrue" nsteadof Ackrill's eading op. cit.,203) "would say nothingmeaningful."The argumentsof Ackrillare I thinkeasily met.Ackrill first points out thatthe argumentsaredialecticalshowing only thatif one holds agiven theory he must also admit that forms blend. When one is arguing for such anobvious truth as that some predicationsare trueor meaningful,however,I thinkthat noother typeof argument s available.Arethere premiseswhichare more obviousthanthisconclusion?Ackrill next objectsthat"it is completely mysteriouswhy the thesis that noforms combine should entail that the theories are false." I submit that it is equallymysteriouswhy the thesis shouldentail that the theoriesaremeaningless.To makesenseof thesearguments hey must be readas explanationsof what is meantby formblending.

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All, Terms, And Predication in the Sophist Participation, Unknown, 2014

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Transcript of All, Terms, And Predication in the Sophist Participation, Unknown, 2014