1 Index S. No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. Name Mr. Manmohan Singh Mr. P Chidambaram Mr. Pranab Mukherjee Mr. Sharad Pawar Mr. S M Krishna Mr. Kamal Nath Mr. Praful Patel Mr. Vilasrao Deshmukh Mr. Virbhadra Singh Mr. Kapil Sibal Mr. Salman Khurshid Mr. G K Vasan Mr. Farooq Abdullah Mr. M K Alagiri Mr. S K Shinde Page No. 2-4 5-29 30-33 34-37 38-40 41-43 44-48 49-52 53-54 55-58 59-63 64-65 66 67 68-79

2 Dr. Manmohan Singh Dr. Manmohan Singh is the Prime Minister since May 2004 and was personally in-charge of the Coal Ministry from November 2006 to May 2009. Under his watch a major coal allocation scam took place which allowed private firms to make windfall gains, as is clear from the facts that are now out in the public domain and the report of the CAG. The average allotment of coal blocks was 3-4 per year until a few years back. But this number shot up drastically to 22-24 during 2006-09 when Dr. Singh was in charge, raising questions about the manner in which these allotments were made. All the allotments were made without transparency, without protecting the interest of public exchequer, and without any competitive process. A comprehensive note on competitive bidding for the allocation of coal blocks was given by the Coal Secretary to the Minister of State for Coal on 16 July 2004. It noted the substantial difference between the price of coal supplied by Coal India Limited (CIL) and the cost of coal produced through captive mining. This ensured a "windfall gain" to the party which was allocated a captive block. That same month, the Minister of State sought clarification on what he feared would be "likely opposition from the power sector". The Coal Secretary was explicit that the existing system of allocation, even with modifications, would not be able to achieve the objectives of revenue maximisation, transparency and objectivity in the allocation process. However, rather than accept this advice, in September 2004, the PMO forwarded a note detailing what it claimed were certain disadvantages of the proposed system. Subsequently, the Coal Secretary remarked that "there was hardly any merit in the objections raised" by the PMO. The secretary also highlighted some of the "pulls and pressures" experienced by the screening committee during the decision making process and stressed that all pending applications were recommended on the basis of competitive bidding, and that allocations should be made on such a basis. This recommendation was ignored by the PMO. The CAG draft report remarked that steps could have been taken to allocate coal blocks through competitive bidding well in September 2004 itself. In October 2004, the MoS again argued that the proposal for competitive bidding may not be pursued as the Coal Mines (Nationalisation)

3 Amendment Bill 2000 was pending in the Rajya Sabha with stiff opposition from trade unions. He also disagreed with the opinion that the screening committee could not ensure transparent decision making. He said that this was "not an adequate ground for switching over (to) a new mechanism". The matter was once again put before the PMO, after which, 28 June 2004 was decided as the cut-off date for considering applications as per the current policy rather than the proposed policy. In March 2005, the Coal Secretary again put up a note to the PM stating that if the revised system was not put in place quickly enough, pressure would again mount on the government for continuing with the existing procedure. Subsequently, the PMO in August 2005 asked the coal ministry to amend the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act 1973 before the new system became operational. "Since this was likely to take considerable time it was decided that the coal ministry would continue to allot coal blocks for captive mining through extant screening committee procedure till the new competitive bidding procedure became operational," the note states. Again in November 2005, the MoS said that the PMO had taken a view to amend the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, which was a "time consuming exercise and as such allowed the department to proceed with the existing system" ... "there was no immediacy..." In April 2006, it was decided to amend the MMDR Act so that the system of competitive bidding could be made applicable to all minerals. Later on, delaying the matter further, the MoS opined that the issue of amendment should be "revisited" as it had the potential to become controversial. Finally, the bill to amend the MMDR Act was introduced in Parliament in October 2008 and passed in August 2010. While the amendment to ensure coal allocation by auction remained in abeyance because of the Dr. Singhs interventions as head of the Cabinet and in-charge of the coal ministry, 24 blocks were allocated in 2005, 53 in 2006, 52 in 2007, 24 in 2008 and 16 in 2009. Interestingly, postamendments, only one coal block was allocated in 2010, and not even one in 2011. Obviously there was a rush for coal blocks allocated under the old, noncompetitive, system. As on June 2004, only 39 coal blocks stood allocated. "But since July 2004, 155 coal blocks were allocated to government and private parties following the existing process. The CAG in its draft report has pegged the losses running in lakhs of crores. A copy of the relevant chapter of the report is annexed as Annexure A. It is understood the final

4 report is similar to the draft report. The final report though has been submitted to the Government, the Government chose not table it in the Budget session of Parliament. The above facts clearly show that the Dr. Singh abused his position to give huge pecuniary benefits to private parties, which is an offence under Section 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act. Therefore the said matter needs a thorough independent investigation.

5 Mr. P Chidambaram Mr. P Chidambaram was the Finance Minister from May 2004 to November 2008 and has been Home Minister since December 2008. This note against him is divided into 5 heads: 1. Pricing of 2G Spectrum 2. Allowing sale of equity by Swan and Unitech 3. FIPB approval of Hutch-Vodafone 4. FIPB approval of Aircel-Maxis 5. Unwarranted attempts to withdraw prosecution 1. PRICING OF 2G SPECTRUM Mr. Chidambaram as Finance Minister overruled the officers of his own Ministry who favoured auction / market-based pricing of spectrum, and instead allowed the 2G scam to take place. He also, in no time, revised his position from giving away 4.4 Mhz of spectrum at 2001 prices, to giving away 6.2 Mhz of spectrum at 2001 prices thus forcing an additional loss on the exchequer. The Finance Secretary in a letter dated November 22, 2007 (Annexure A1) to the Telecom Secretary had stayed any further allocation of spectrum. The communication states, Meanwhile, all further action to implement the above licenses (cross-over technology) may please be stayed. A copy of this letter was marked to Mr K.M. Chandrasekhar, Cabinet Secretary, and Mr Rohit Kansal, PS to Mr. Chidambaram. On November 29, 2007 (Annexure A2), Telecom Secretary replied to Finance Secretary justifying the issuance of cross-technology licenses on 2001 rates. On this letter, an officer in Finance Ministry noted, No reply as to why a matter with financial implications has not been referred to MoF. On 7th December 2007, an agenda for the meeting of the full Telecom Commission was prepared, which did not list spectrum pricing as an item. However, this meeting was not held. On 12.12.2007, the MoF officers wrote to the DoT, seeking details/documents related to the letter of the DoT Secretary dated 29th November 2007. On 13th December 2007, in response to a letter from the Director (Infra)-MoF, the DoT replied (Annexure A3), enclosing copies of: The cabinet note of 2003; the cabinet decision in this regard; the DO from the DoT Secretary to the Finance Secretary of November 2007. The Cabinet note and decision with regard to spectrum pricing, which had been cited by the DoT Secretary on 29th

6 November 2008 was received by the MoF. Section 2.1.2(3) clearly stated: The Department of Telecom and the Ministry of Finance would discuss and finalize spectrum pricing formula, which would include incentive for efficient use of spectrum as well as disincentive for sub-optimal usages. From the above, it was clear that the MoF officials were fully aware that unless such concurrence based on discussion and finalization of spectrum pricing formula between the DoT and the MoF had been established, the DoT could not move ahead and allocate spectrum at 2001 rates in 2007/08. Alarmed by press reports between October and December 2007 of Raja's potential manipulation of cut-off date, FCFS, and the imminent issuance of LoIs, MoF officials prepared a Position Paper on Spectrum Policy dated January 3, 2008, which was attached to a covering note dated January 9, 2008 (Annexure A4) of the Additional Secretary (EA), Finance Ministry. This paper was to be presented in the Telecom Commission meeting that was to take place on January 9, 2008, which was postponed to January 15, 2008 at the last minute. In the paper, the Finance Ministry had recognized that 575 applications were pending and therefore had insisted that the price of spectrum must reflect spectrums scarcity value determined through auction. The relevant parts of this note are reproduced below: Extracts of notes dated January 9, 2008 of Additional Secretary (EA), of Finance Ministry 6.3 Given the fact that there are reportedly over 575 applications pending with DoT (including 45 new applicants) there is a case for reviewing the entry fee fixed in 2001. This is an administratively fixed fee. Therefore any change should be governed by transparent and objective criteria applicable uniformly to all new entrants. 8.1 The most contentious issue relates to spectrum allocation.

There is no disagreement that the price charged for spectrum should be based on its scarcity value, efficient usage and that the process of allocation should be transparent and fair. The payment is for a real economic resource. It is not a fee. According to DoT it is closer to royalty charged on Coal, Crude and Natural Gas. 8.4 The most transparent method of allocation of spectrum

would be by auction. However, there are two caveats to the auction method.

7 (a) The ways in which the existing licensees in GSM and CDMA would be eligible to participate in the auction vis-a-vis the new entrants; and (b) The advantages and disadvantages of the method itself. A detailed table is placed at Annexure V. The possible non-optimal outcomes can be taken care of by prescribing suitable rules of auction before the bid in a transparent manner applicable to all eligible bidders. Any other method for allocating spectrum, being a scarce resource, would be economically inefficient. 9.1 . Nevertheless, regardless of the allocation criteria, auction

has been recommended with transparent rules as the most suitable method of allocating spectrum. The quantum, of spectrum available for auction in 2G is to be decided by DoT. Also, the above said note clearly states that Mr. Chidambaram was personally keeping a watch on the spectrum issues through the media reports. The note stated that, FM had instructed that the prolific Press reports over the last two months relating to pricing of spectrum and the "Telecom Wars" may be tracked. A sample of the press reports of that time that had complete blown the lid over the manipulations and illegalities that were being done by the DoT much before the issue of LoIs are annexed as Annexure A5. There were tens of other similar reports appearing in the press during October 2007 to January 2008. So, Mr. Chidambaram was fully aware of the complete developments that were taking place in the Department of Telecommunications (DoT). He was also aware that the TRAI recommendations (that DoT claimed to be following) were never approved by the full Telecom Commission of which Finance Secretary is a Member. Additionally, that Member (Finance) on the Telecom Commission had objected to Mr. Raja's moves by opposing the 2001 entry fee vide her note on file dated 30th November 2007. The DoT issued 122 Letter of Intents (LOIs) for Universal Access Service (UAS) licenses on January 10, 2008; these LOIs were converted into licenses only during February 27, 2008 to March 7, 2008; and the spectrum allocation started only from April 22, 2008 and completed on May 6, 2009 (Annexure A6). During this period, Mr. Chidambaram had enough time to stop the scam. However, instead, he facilitated the same by silencing the stand of his officers on the issue of spectrum pricing.

8

Just before the Telecom Commission meeting that was scheduled for January 15, 2008, Mr. Chidambaram wrote a note for the Prime Minister (Annexure A7). Instead of being straightforward, Mr. Chidambarams note was aimed to hide the illegalities in the award of licenses. In this regard, the relevant extract of the note where he categorically exempts the revision of entry fee is reproduced below: 9. This note does not deal with the need, if any, to revise entry fee or the rate of revenue share. This note deals with spectrum charges for 2G spectrum. 10. Spectrum is a scarce resource. The price of spectrum should be based on scarcity value and efficiency of usage. The most transparent method of allocating spectrum would be through auction. The method of auction will face least legal challenge. If the government is able to provide sufficient information on availability of spectrum, that would minimize the risks and consequently, fetch better prices at the auction. The design of the auction should include a reserve price. Through the above note, Mr. Chidambaram also put a lid on the issue of entry fee for start-up spectrum and of payment by existing operators towards excess spectrum from a retrospective date, probably to appease them so that they do not raise the issue of the scam in awarding new licenses. In this regard, the relevant extract of the note is reproduced below: 13. This leaves the question about licensees who hold spectrum over and above the start up spectrum. In such cases, the past may be treated as a closed chapter and payments made in the past for additional spectrum (over and above the start up spectrum) may be treated as the charges for spectrum for that period. However, prospectively, licensee should pay for the additional spectrum that they hold, over and above the start-up spectrum, at the price discovered in the auction. This will place old licensees, existing licensee seeking additional spectrum and new licensees on par so far as spectrum charges are concerned. Thereafter, both Mr. Chidambaram and Mr. A Raja met on January 30, 2008 (Annexure A8) to discuss the issue of licensing and spectrum pricing. In this meeting, Mr. Chidambaram announced the closure of the issue of reviewing the Entry Fee of 122 LoIs already issued by DoT. Even

9 after issuance of LoIs, A Raja did not convert the LoIs into licenses until he got clearance from Mr. Chidambaram. The gist of the discussions is as follows: 4. It was noted that there is a mismatch in the demand and supply of spectrum across circles. Redressing this mismatch will be another policy imperative; 5. FM said that for now we are not seeking to revisit the current regimes for entry fee or for revenue share. However, in the meantime, since the issue of spectrum pricing was apparently not settled at the Telecom Commission level, the officers in both the ministries (Telecom and Finance) kept the discussions on. The Secretaries of both the ministries had four rounds of discussions in February 2008. In this regard, on February 8, 2008 Telecom Secretary sent an Approach Paper on Spectrum Charges to Finance Secretary (Annexure A9). This note revealed that the Finance Ministry officials were keen to stop the allocation of spectrum to the LoI holders. Also, the DoTs position was: i) that it agreed with the MoF that it was legally possible to auction start-up spectrum (Para 2.1); ii) that license conditions imply that start-up spectrum of 4.4 MHz would be available contractually (Para 2.1.1, 2.1.2); and iii) that it agreed with the MoF that spectrum beyond 4.4 MHz until 6.2 MHz (additional 1.8 MHz) could be charged at a pro-rata basis. The relevant part of this note is reproduced below: Extract of Telecom Secretarys letter dated February 8, 2008 to Finance Secretary 2.1 Secretary (Finance) was of the opinion that auctioning is legally possible for initial allotment of spectrum of 4.4 MHz. Secretary (DoT) explained that auction of spectrum of 4.4 MHz though may be legally possible but it would not be practical proposition to auction or fixing a price for 4.4 MHz spectrum due to following: 2.1.1 As per clause 43.5 (i) of UAS License, which provides that: initially a cumulative maximum of upto 4.4 MHz +4.4 MHz shall be allocated in the case of GSM based systems. It implies that when a service provider signs UAS License he understands that and contractually he is eligible for initially a cumulative maximum of 4.4 MHz subject to availability. 2.1.2 120 LOIs have been issued and the Department is contractually obliged to give them start up spectrum of 4.4 MHz under UASL.

10 3.1.4 3.1.5 It is however, proposed to price the spectrum of 1.8 MHz The Department is of the view that it would be appropriate to a

beyond 4.4 MHz upto 6.2 MHz. levy the charge for enhancement of the quantum of spectrum beyond the initial 4.4 MHz. For an additional spectrum of 1.8 MHz making a total of 6.2 MHz spectrum acquisition charge may be on pro-rata basis i.e. Rs. 378 crores pan-India. It will be charged only to new allottees as the existing ones have got the spectrum as per license agreement. On receiving the note of 8th February 2008, the MoF officials knew that the DoTs representation of contractual rights of LoI holders (Para 2.1.1, 2.1.2) was farcical and a gross misrepresentation simply because LoI holders were neither licensees nor did they hold licenses until 27th February 2008. After the above stated letter from Telecom Secretary, the officials in the Finance Ministry to counter the above also made an internal note dated February 11, 2008 (Annexure A10) reiterating their stand of market-based spectrum pricing of 4.4 MHz spectrum agreed to be allotted to 122 LoI holders. The relevant part of this note is reproduced below: 30. Ministry of Finance differs from the above position of DoT.

There is no contractual obligation to allot a start-up spectrum of 4.4 MHz to every licencee free of cost. The entire range of the spectrum allotted should be priced. The issue of level playing field can be addressed by charging this price even on existing operators. 31. Moreover, the differentiated pricing suggested by DoT, viz. one price for spectrum between 4.4 and 6.2 MHz and a different price for spectrum beyond 6.2 MHz will be clumsy, nontransparent and legally questionable. It will be neat and transparent to fix a single circle-specific price for spectrum across the entire bandwidth. Between 27th February and 7th March 2008, even as MoF officials fought a valiant battle to protect the exchequers revenue, not just with the DoT but with their own Minister, Mr Raja went ahead and issued 122 licenses. This could have easily been prevented by the FM if only he had stood by his officials. But all his notes and agreements (15th January and 30th January 2008) were against revising entry fee.

11 On 7th April 2008, the Finance Secretary discussed with the DoT Secy and the FM the note on the issue of entry fee/spectrum pricing (Annexure A11). He noted that: Pricing of spectrum: DoT is agreeable to pricing of spectrum beyond 4.4 MHz but wants this to be deferred till auction of 3G and WiMax is completed. In our note, we suggested pricing of all spectrum including spectrum already allocated. Is there a case for deferring this decision? Is there merit in disclosing the pricing intention right now if actual implementation is deferred? It is thus clear that the Finance Secretary was uncomfortable about diluting the MoFs position and more so on the merits in disclosing the pricing intention right now if the actual implementation is to be deferred. The Finance Secretary also noted on the covering letter: I have only communicated the gist of this to Secretary, Department of Telecom. The FM said that he will also speak to Minister of Communications. On the same day of 07.04.2008 , the FS noted on a file noting (Annexure A12) continued from 3rd April 2008 that: 2. FM agreed that spectrum usage charge should be increased reflecting the scarcity value of spectrum as indicated in our note of 11th February, 2008. 3. On pricing of spectrum, FMs view is that we must insist, in principle, on pricing spectrum (beyond 4.4 MHz) although details can be worked out after the auction of 3G spectrum. This was the first clear dilution of the MoF officers position on specifically pricing start-up spectrum on the instructions of Mr. Chidambaram. Mysteriously, Mr. Raja did not start the process of allocating spectrum at this stage. Clearly, he needed a written confirmation from the MoF to begin the process of allocating 4.4 MHz of start-up spectrum at 2001 rates. On 8th April 2008, one month after licenses had been awarded, an OM (Annexure A13) which reflected the MoFs original position of 11th February 2008 on the issue of subjecting the entire spectrum to specific pricing was issued to the DoT Secretary by the Director, MoF. This note came to light in the media on 9th April 2008, and the DoTs position vis-vis that of the MoFs view were highlighted. Immediately on seeing the media coverage, the officer was reprimanded and was forced to withdraw and re-draft the said OM (Annexure A14). The difference between what the original OM stated and what the officer was directed to re-draft could not have been more stark. The original OM required the entire range of

12 spectrum to be specifically priced. The revised OM, which was prepared on 9th April 2008 but presented with a date of 8th April 2008, specifically sought to exclude start-up spectrum upto 4.4 MHz from being specifically charged, therefore ensuring that the entry fee of 2001 that was fixed by telecom Minister in 2008 was not revised. The contrast is as below: New OM dated April 8, 2008 4(1) Any allotments to licensees of 4(1) Any Allotments of Spectrum to access spectrum subscriber access subscriber licensees under UASL regime under may henceforth be specifically priced and Original OM dated April 8, 2008

UASL regime beyond the charged for. The charge may be determined, initial start up allocation of Circle wise, by adopting the Entry Fee, fixed 4.4. MHz may henceforth be for that circle in 2003-04, and thereafter specifically priced and inflating it by the multiplier, which charged for. Details in this represents the growth in aggregate AGR per regard can be worked out. MHz between 2003-04 and 2007-08; hence, for a Pan India operator, the Circle fee fixed in 2003-04 (Rs. 375 Crore per MHz) would be inflated by a multiple of 3.5 (which represents the growth in AGR/MHz between 2003-04 and 2007-08) to yield the new Spectrum price of Rs. 1,312 Crore per MHz (approximately). 4(3) The price determined as above may be made applicable to both the new and existing operators; such operators who do not intend to pay the new charges may be given the the option of surrendering spectrum 4(2) The price determined as above may be made applicable to both the new and existing operators; moreover, the entire range of spectrum allotted may be charged, for both new and existing operators; such operators who do not intend to pay the new charges may be given the option of surrendering the Spectrum allotted to them.

allotted to them.

On 10th April 2008, not only was the officer who sent the original OM made to apologize in writing, but in fact seemed to be severely reprimanded and forced to provide a detailed explanation to the FM as to why the original OM, which reflected the views of the MoF officers/note of 11th February 2008, was sent out (Annexure A15). The note also reveals how the OM was personally delivered by the officer to the Wireless Advisor in the DoT,

13 who received it on behalf of the DoT Secretary. The DoT then did not to process the original version of the OM in the DoT file. The Joint Secretary (Infra) in the MoF spoke personally to the DoT Secretary asking for the withdrawal of the original OM and the request was exceeded to by DoT Secretary Shri Behura. While all this occurred on 9th April 2008, the new diluted/modified OM was mysteriously pre-dated one day earlier to 8th April 2008 to give an appearance that DoTs records and files were in order. On the above note, on 16th April 2008, the FM wrote a 3-para note accepting the apology of the officer but only pointed to nomenclature and title mistakes in the OM. He wrote: That apart, the draft note received from DoT was indeed considered by me on 11.3.2008. Thereafter, that file containing the draft note from DoT and the proposed OM was not put up to me. What was considered was only a non-paper given to me by the Minister of Telecommunications on which I had been informed by the FS that the DEA would send a non-paper containing our views. It is in this context that the note for discussion was prepared: a discussion took place; and I had indicated my views on the margin of that note. Logically this should have been followed by sending a non-paper to DoT. However, if there was an intention to send a formal OM containing our views on the draft note for Cabinet received from DoT, the file should have been put up to me and my signature obtained. I may note that I was in office on 8.4.2008 and 9.4.2008. Such errors should be avoided in future. Having forced the officers to replace the original OM and change the MoFs position, Mr. Chidambaram on April 21, 2008 forwarded a non-paper indicating the views of the Ministry of Finance on spectrum related matters to Mr. A Raja (Annexure A16). This non-paper was silent about on the issue of entry fee for start-up spectrum for 122 licenses already issued. The discussion conveniently shifted to charging for spectrum beyond 4.4 MHz. In this letter, he proposed a meeting with Mr. Raja before communicating their conclusion to the Prime Minister. That means, till then the two ministers had already decided not to charge for spectrum for 122 Licenses already issued. Extracts of Mr. Chidambarams letter dated April 21, 2008 to A Raja As you are aware, based on your non-paper on spectrum charges, Finance Secretary has held discussions with Secretary, Ministry of Communications & Information Technology. Based on those discussions, I enclose a non-paper containing our views on issues relating to 2G spectrum and issues relating to 3G / WiMax Spectrum.

14 2. After you have had an opportunity to examine the same,

may we meet and discuss and reach some conclusions? These conclusions could then be presented to the Hon'ble Prime Minister. Pricing of 2G spectrum DoT is agreeable to pricing of spectrum beyond 4.4 MHz but wants this deferred until auction of 3G and WiMax is completed. An in-principle decision on this issue may be taken at this stage itself, with details to be worked out later. Immediately after the above note, the DoT started allocating start-up spectrum of 4.4 MHz to all the new operators from April 22, 2008. Thereafter, Mr. Chidambaram instructed the Finance Secretary to meet the Telecom Secretary to carry forward the discussion. The two met on April 24, 2008. After this meeting, strangely, Finance Ministry took a u-turn and agreed not to charge even for spectrum allocated upto 6.2 MHz. . This meant an additional 1.8 MHz over and above the 4.4 MHz as an additional concession against the explicitly terms between the DoT and the MoF officials in their letters of 8th and 11th February 2008. The Finance Secretary issued an updated note on this on April 29, 2008 (Annexure A17), a copy of which he handed over to Mr. Chidambaram. The same position is reflected in a Brief Note dated May 28, 2008 prepared by the MoF for Mr. Chidambaram before his meeting with Mr. Raja on May 29, 2008. They then met on May 29, 2008 and again on June 12, 2008. Thereafter, on July 4, 2008, Mr. Chidambaram, Mr. Raja, Telecom Secretary, and Finance Secretary had a joint meeting with the Prime Minister. This was their first ever meeting on the spectrum issue after the award of 2G scam. By this time, LOIs were already issued (Jan 10, 2008), LoIs were converted into Licenses (Feb 27, 2008 to Mar 7, 2008), and the allocation of start-up spectrum was already started (from April 22, 2008). In the meeting, a note was submitted to the Prime Minister, which was more in the nature of informing him what was already agreed and done. No further approvals were required, as has become clear from the PMs statement in the Rajya Sabha on 24th February 2011. The specifics of the discussion are reflected in the Finance Secretarys note of July 6, 2008 (Annexure A18). Relevant part of the note dated July 6, 2008 states, It is legally and administratively tenable to impose a two part tariff for Spectrum: a fixed, one-time "upfront" spectrum price for allowing the allottees to use a public resource for private profit; and, a recurring spectrum usage charge, whereby Government

15 shares the profits accruing to the operator. However, due to historical legacy reasons, spectrum allocations upto 6.2 MHz for GSM (5 MHz for CDMA) shall not be charged both from new and existing operators. The change in stand by Mr. Chidambaram has also been adversely commented by the CAG in its report dated November 16, 2010 that states: The Hon'ble Finance Minister also held the view (15 January 2008) that Spectrum is a scarce resource. The price for spectrum should be based on its scarcity value and efficiency of usage and the most transparent method of allocating spectrum would be through auction. However, the Hon'ble Finance Minister after the issue of 121 LOIs by the DoT suggested in January 2008 to treat the previous issue of licences as a closed chapter and recommended that the price of spectrum be discovered through an auction process in future. Relevant extract from the CAG report is annexed as Annexure A19. On February 16, 2011 (Annexure A20) the Prime Minister held a briefing with select media persons in which he confirmed that the two ministers were in agreement with each other. The briefing states, And this was also discussed with the Finance Ministry because in terms of the Cabinet decision of 2003 the pricing and allocation of spectrum was to be settled between the Ministry of Finance and the Telecom Dept. Initially, of course, the Finance Ministry did ask for a high price of spectrum but after many discussions, the two ministries agreed that as far as 2G is concerned, we have to live with the present system particularly with regard to the amount of spectrum that is built and embedded into a license agreement. So this is the background why I did not proceed further with this matter of pricing of spectrum, because if the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of Telecom both agree and they have the obligation of the Cabinet Decision of 2003 to decide on the matter and also since TRAI is an expert body and Telecom Commission has experts, if all of them are of the same view, I did not feel I was in a position to insist that auctions must be insisted. Prime Minister also told Rajya Sabha on 24.02.2011 that The government policy on pricing of spectrum was taken on basis of the Cabinet decision of 2003, which specifically left this issue to be determined by the Ministry of Finance and the Ministry of Telecommunications. He further added the

16 two Ministers had agreed because of legacy considerations and I accepted the recommendation. Former Finance Secretary in his statement on March 5, 2011 (Annexure A21) to the CBI has confirmed the entire sequence of events and the relevant file notings. Thereafter, on March 25, 2011 (Annexure A22), the finance ministry under its new minister, released an O.M. to the Prime Minister Office titled, Chronology of basic facts related to pricing and allocation of 2G spectrum. This paper (that was drafted after interministerial consultations and refers to about 40 documents) indicts the then Finance Minister in clear terms and confirms the events as are documented above in this application, including (in Para 17) the fact that even after licenses had been issued, the 2G scam could have been prevented by invoking Clause 5.1 of the UAS license. Firstly, the said O.M. notes that Mr. Chidambaram had four months to stop the scam even after the issuance of 122 Letter of Intents (LoIs) by telecom ministry on January 10, 2008. The LOIs were converted into licenses during February 27 to March 7, 2008, while the spectrum was allocated only from April 2008 onwards. Secondly, in the meeting of Telecom Commission held on January 15, 2008, the representative of the finance ministry did not bring up the revision of the 2001 entry fee for start-up spectrum. Thirdly, simultaneously, in a secret note of January 15, 2008 to the PM, P Chidambaram had stated that this note was not seeking to revise the entry fee, and that in future all spectrum beyond start-up should be auctioned, and the spectrum allocated in the past be treated as a closed chapter. Fourthly, Mr. Chidambaram had a meeting with the accused Mr. Raja on January 30, 2008, in which Mr. Chidambaram specifically stated that he was not seeking to revisit the current regime for entry fees and revenue share. Fifthly, in February 2008, the FS informed the Secretary, DoT that auctioning start-up spectrum was legally possible. Sixthly, on February 11, 2008 the MoF officers rejected the DoTs proposal of 8th February 2008 and instead proposed to charge the entire range of spectrum for all telecom operators, new or old, by indexing it with the increase in telecom revenues during the period 2003-04 to 2007-08. Seventhly, the FM forced the FS to change the MoFs position with regard to specific charge/auction of spectrum till 4.4 MHz based on which the MoF took a u-turn and wrote a modified OM to the DoT on 9th April 2008 (but dated 8th April, 2008), agreeing to specifically price spectrum only beyond 4.4 MHz toeing Mr. Chidambarams line. Eightly, on April 21, he 2008 Mr. Chidambaram had written to Mr Raja, and in this letter,

17 mentioned only about pricing of spectrum beyond 4.4 MHz. And finally, even this agreement between the DoT and the MoF was reversed within 3 days, and it was decided to price spectrum only beyond 6.2 MHz, thus placing an additional approximate 500 MHz (280 licenses x 1.8 MHz) outside the pricing range, in spite of this being an offer by the DoT itself vide its letter of 8th February 2008. In that, the MoF was forced to grant concessions even ahead of the DoTs own proposals. The Government of India issued a press release on 10.12.2011 (contrary to the PMs media statement of 16th February 2011, and his statement in the Rajya Sabha on 24th February 2011, and the DoT affidavit of 11th November 2010) strongly defending Mr. Chidambaram by stating: It will be clear from the foregoing sequence of events that Shri P Chidambaram was in no way responsible for the issue of LoIs on January 10, 2008 or the charging of entry fee of about Rs.1650 crore. In fact, the record will show that the Ministry of Finance had no knowledge that the LoIs would be issued on January 10, 2008. A copy of the said official press release is annexed as Annexure A23. The fact that Government took a false defense shows that it has a lot to hide and therefore further investigation becomes imperative. It is to be noted that Mr. Raja has been charge-sheeted by the CBI for fixing low spectrum price. Mr. Chidambaram, as the above facts show, was equally guilty of the same.

2. Allowing sale of equity by Swan and Unitech Both Swan and Unitech had obtained 2G licenses and spectrum in 2008 at throwaway prices because of the connivance of Mr. Chidambaram and the then Telecom Minister Mr. Raja. That was the first part of the 2G scam. The second part of the 2G scam took place later in 2008. Mr. Chidambaram allowed the companies like Swan and Unitech to sell off their stakes, without charging any Governments share of its premium on account of spectrum valuation and without enforcing his own agreement with the then Telecom Minister dated 30.01.2008. On 30.01.2008, Mr. Chidambaram and Mr. Raja met and concluded that 14 operators were too many for the Indian market and that several of the new entrants had come in for speculative reasons. Further, they knew full well that these companies would enter into M&As and make windfall

18 profits because of the premium linked to the spectrum that they had received in 2008 at 2001 prices. They made detailed notings and agreements about how such premium resulting from M&As, being linked almost entirely to the value of spectrum, must be appropriately subjected to a governments share and after proper and official valuations. No M&A in the telecom sector can take place without the consent of the DoT, as per the license conditions. On 30th January 2008, in his documented meeting (annexed above) with Mr. Raja 20 days after the 2G scam took place and LoIs had been granted, but no licenses or spectrum allocated yet, a detailed discussion on spectrum and M&As occurred. The notes from the meeting between the FM, the MoCIT, and attended by the Finance Secretary and the DoT Secretary concluded on the issue of M&As, speculative operators, and protecting government revenues that: 2.4. In case of M&A, getting part of the valuation for government as premium for spectrum, to avoid hoarding as well as spectrum trading: In view of very large number of new operators, it is expected that some of these companies might have obtained licenses as speculative venture. Hence, some mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are likely to take place after some time, which de facto, would amount to spectrum trading, as large part of such companys valuation may be on account of the spectrum held by them. This spectrum trading is not desirable and needs to be regulated. Besides, the general conditions in service license and other guidelines for M&As, clear detailed Guidelines needed to be evolved and announced regarding the M&As, especially the amount of spectrum which the merged entity would be allowed to retain alongwith other criteria such as other details in this regard; companys valuation by consultants/valuers appointed by govts approval/consent/concurrence; and then payment of a part of the valuation to govt. as premium for spectrum, etc. The above clearly shows that both ministers were specifically aware that M&As would lead to windfall gains for these companies. In fact, the Supreme Court, in its judgment dated 2nd February 2011 in WPC 423/2010 cited as ((2012) 3 SCC 1) while cancelling the 2G licenses has held on the issue of sale of stakes by these companies that: This becomes clear from the fact that soon after obtaining licenses, some of the beneficiaries off-loaded their stakes to others in the name

19 of transfer of equity or infusion of fresh capital by foreign companies, and thereby made huge profits. We have no doubt that if the method of auction had been adopted for grant of licenses which could have been the only rational transparent method for distribution of national wealth, the nation would have been enriched by many thousand crores. In fact, the CBI, in its charge sheet of 2nd April 2011 in the 2G scam matter, has, in Section C (dual technology approvals and spectrum allocation), clearly specified a gain of Rs. 2,342 crores to the promoters of Unitech Wireless, and in the case of Swan-Etisalat, it specifies a premium of Rs. 275.7178 on each share. The CBI itself, as a part of the criminal conspiracy, has shown massive profits made by these companies. Further, the same has been accepted by the Learned Special Judge of the CBI Court in the order framing charges of 22nd October 2011, where he has concluded: ...M/s Swan Private Limited and M/s Unitech Limited, and thereby two companies obtained pecuniary advantage to the tune of Rs. 7,105 crore by offloading their shares.... On 8th February 2008, the DoT submitted an approach paper (annexed above) in which it also specifically addressed the issue of M&As, in that: In view of this we need to have clear guidelines relating to M&A. We also need to consider fees on account of transfer of spectrum to a merged entity. In the event of M&A, the transfer charge to the government has not been considered by TRAI in their recommendation of August 2007. This is a complex issue requiring detailed deliberation and consultation. Therefore, the issue of quantum of fees that the government would get on account of transfer of spectrum during M&As need to be referred to TRAI. Based on the recommendations of TRAI on the above issue, DoT will take appropriate decisions within a specified period and issue clear and transparent guidelines for M&A including transfer charges for spectrum. On 11th February 2008, in the DoTs internal note (annexed above) prepared based on the meeting between the FM and the MoCIT on 30th January 2008, three rounds of discussions between the FS and the DoT Secretary as well as the approach paper of the DoT dated 8th February 2008, it was concluded that M&As were expected and that the government must find a way to protect its revenues. It specifically stated that:

20 One question that arises is whether the government should get premium out of an M&A transaction. Since spectrum has not been auctioned but priced heuristically, it is likely that rent if any, involved in the price of spectrum will form part of the M&A transaction. On 28th May 2008, one day before a scheduled meeting between Shri Chidambaram and Shri Raja, a briefing note was prepared for the FM (Annexure A24) in which, again, on the issue of government revenue from M&As, it was stated that: 10. DoT have issued notification on April 22, 2007 on guidelines for intra circle merger of cellular mobile telephone service (CMTS)/unified access service (UAS) licenses (copy attached). The guidelines mandate: a) Spectrum transfer charge to be payable as specified by government. 11. DoT may be advised that the fixation of spectrum transfer charges shall be in consultation with DEA. It is a matter of record that Mr. Chidambaram and Mr. Raja met on 29th May 2008, on 12th June 2008 and finally with the PM jointly on 4th July 2008. However, from the notes of this meeting dated 6th July 2008, it is clear that the entire issue of subjecting M&As to the governments share of the premium from the sale of spectrum / spectrum transfer charge was specifically left out of the discussion. On 23rd September 2008, Swan Telecom, which had received spectrum in only 9 out of the 13 circles in which it had received licenses, entered into an M&A transaction with Etisalat International. Similarly, on 29th October 2008, Unitech entered into an M&A transaction with Telenor even though it had received spectrum in only 13 out of the 22 circles. In the days following these transactions, several press clippings appeared exposing the loss to the exchequer, and questioning the governments move of allocating spectrum at 2001 prices, including the false promise of doing so under the pretext of affordability and increasing teledensity etc. The articles clearly questioned the loss to the exchequer. A sample of these press clippings is annexed as Annexure A25 (colly). On 4th November 2008, under pressure from the media, Swan and Unitech were forced to report about the transactions to the DoT (Annexure A26 and Annexure A27 respectively). The intimation of the two companies showed that the only asset that they possessed at the time of the massive valuations during the M&A was the promise of spectrum. They did not

21 even have spectrum in all their circles, and consequently, did not have any telecom infrastructure or equipment either. They had no customers and therefore no revenues either. It was clear from their own letters that the entire valuation and the pecuniary advantage was linked to the price of spectrum in 2008. This, in fact, is exactly what had been expected and documented in the conclusions reached between the FM and Mr. Raja in their meeting of 30th January 2008 which were then repeated in the DoTs and MoFs notes/letters of 8th February, 11th February, and 28th May 2008. Under continued pressure from the media, Mr Raja held a meeting with the FM and the PM. In this meeting, he obviously received the support of the FM. In a complete U-turn of their earlier agreement of 30th January 2008, documents suggest that the FM passed off these transactions as mere infusion of equity under the FDI rules. This free passage for Swan and Unitech became a cause of additional and massive loss to the exchequer. On 5th November 2008, Mr Raja penned down a one-page note (Annexure A28), describing his meeting with the FM and the PM. In face of the media articles pointing to the unlawful enrichment and specified that: In a meeting, the Hon'ble Finance Minister clarified that the dilution of share to attract foreign investment for business expansion did not amount to sale of license and as such these companies did their share dilution as per corporate laws. Nevertheless, I suggest that in order to remove suspicious clouds in the minds of media and people, Telecom Commission may deliberate this issue and restrict outright sale of licenses and selling of stake by promoters to second party for money. Thereafter on November 7, 2008 the DoT in a Press Release (Annexure A29) justified the part-equity sale of Swan and Unitech to Etisalat and Uninor. They claimed This matter has been discussed and clarified with the Finance Minister. The same thing is mentioned in a note dated November 7, 2008 (Annexure A30) that was prepared by the DoT for Full Telecom Commission meeting. Thus Mr. Chidambaram, apart from giving spectrum to shady companies at low prices, also allowed them to sell it off at many times the said price, thus allowing them to make windfall gains. The above facts clearly demonstrate that the actions of Mr. Chidambaram led to massive loss to the public exchequer and a corresponding gain to a few private companies and individuals, and those decisions were also detrimental to public

22 interest. Therefore, he clearly abused his position to the benefit a few private parties, which is a clear offence under Section 13 (1) (d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act.

3. FIPB approval to Hutch-Vodafone The Government had capped the Foreign investment in Indian telecom operating companies through direct and indirect route at 74 per cent. However, Hutchison Essar Limited (HEL), an operator that provided telecom services across India, breached this condition with Foreign Investment in HEL as high as 89 per cent. Hutchison Telecommunications International Limited (HTIL), a Hong Kong based company, had 67 per cent in HEL while Essar through its Mauritius based companies had 22 per cent equity in HEL. HTIL though had 67 per cent foreign investment but it had declared to Indian authorities that it had only 52 per cent. The remaining 15 per cent it held through three Indian entities (Mr Analjit Singh, Mr Asim Ghosh, and IDFC). The above breach came to light only when HTIL announced the sale of its entire equity of 67 per cent to Vodafone of UK on February 11, 2007. This is revealed in Vodafones Press release dated February 11, 2007 (Annexure A31), and also Hutchison announcement on Hong Kong Stock Exchange through a presentation paper dated February 22, 2007 (Annexure A32). Telecom Watchdog, an NGO, immediately brought this to the notice of the concerned agencies in India including the Enforcement Directorate (Annexure A33). Thereafter, the Department of Economic Affairs (DEA) under Ministry of Finance held detailed discussions with all the concerned parties Hutchison, Vodafone, and all the three Name Lenders. Vodafone vide its letter dated March 14, 2007 confirmed its intention to acquire 67 per cent stake (Annexure A34). The DEA also sought the opinion of RBI and Law Ministry on this issue. It circulated the details to all the Members of the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) for their comments. However, all the other Members of the FIPB authorized DEA to investigate. At this stage, Hutch realized the gravity of this situation. On March 15, 2007 Hutch agreed to pay $415 million to Essar in a conditional Settlement Agreement with Essar (Annexure A35). This was primarily to secure Government permissions. Out of this 90 per cent ($373.5 million) was immediately paid and the balance 10 per cent ($41.5 mn) was to be paid later.

23 On the other hand, responding to DEAs queries, the RBI in its letter dated March 20, 2007 called this as a serious violation, and said it requires further investigation (Annexure A36). However, Law Ministry gave a different opinion and said it was not in violation of FIPB. With all these inputs, including that of Law Ministrys opinion, the DEA on April 26, 2007 had concluded that HTIL had 15 per cent benami shares. However, on April 27, 2007, the Finance Minister Mr P Chidambaram called these DEA officers in his office including the Finance Secretary. Later, on the same evening, the FIPB held a meeting. Most of the Members of FIPB recorded their serious observation, but allowed transfer of only 52 per cent of Hutch to Vodafone, while it rejected 15 per cent share transfer to Vodafone. Under pressure, it did not act and remained silent on the benami holding. This is revealed in the notings of DEA received under the RTI Act (Annexure A37). On May 7, 2007 the FIPB gave conditional permission to Vodafone to purchase 52 per cent of Hutch while putting restriction on the sale of benami 15 per cent (Annexure A38). However, without caring for this condition, Vodafone executed the purchase as per original plans and purchased the entire 67 per cent. This violation too was again immediately brought to the government agencies including Mr A Raja, the then Telecom Minister (Annexure A39). However, no action was taken. Later on, Vodafone also entered into another agreement with Essar called Amended and restated Shareholders Term Sheet dated August 24, 2007 by way of which it has fixed how to share cost if at a later stage the Government finds that the shareholding is benami (Annexure A40). This agreement has capped Essars liability to $415 million that it has received from Hutch under the above stated conditional Settlement Agreement. In other words, if Essar is unable to secure the complete go through, it must return $415 million to Vodafone. For extending support, Vodafone also arranged a loan of $3.5 billion Term Loan on its sureties for Essar. For this, Essar, Vodafone, and banks entered into agreement in September 2007 (Annexure A41). This agreement also reveals that Vodafone has purchased 67 per cent from Hutch. It also elaborates how to deal with a situation when the Government finds that they have 15 per cent benami shares. Later, on February 13, 2009, the government relaxed Foreign Investment cap through Press Release No. 2 of 2009. This allowed further formal taking over of another 6 per cent by Vodafone from the Name Lenders Mr Asim Ghosh (2.29 pc) and Mr Analjit Singh (3.71 pc) out of the total 15 per cent benami by paying them a substantial money for lending their names.

24 Vodafone paid Mr Asim Ghosh Rs 329.5 crore and Mr Analjit Singh Rs 533.3 crore. Thus, together they sold 6 per cent for Rs 862.8 crore. This works out to be Rs 143.8 crore per one per cent of HEL/VEL. This means the valuation of 100 per cent of HEL/VEL was just Rs 14,380 crore. This is highly undervalued. This substantiates the allegation that these are just Name Lenders, and the payment was made by Vodafone to them as their booty for lending their Names. Thus, from the above it is clear that the Finance Ministry officials maintained the same position even just a day before the FIPB meeting was scheduled for April 27, 2007. On that morning, Mr P Chidambaram called these officers in his chamber, and after that these officers took u-turn and granted permission Vodafone to buy only 52%. The FIPB communicated this to Vodafone in May 2007. complaints. It is also clear that, in March 2007, Hutchison, in an agreement with Essar, agreed to pay $415 million to Essar for arranging government permissions. This agreement was restated by Vodafone after they purchased 67% equity, and Essar agreed to return all the money in case it fails to do so. So, this was apparently the bribe money ($425 mn) that was prima facie used by Essar to purchase permissions. These above facts therefore undoubtedly need a thorough independent investigation. But, Vodafone continued with its acquisition plan of 67%. The Government did not do anything despite the

4. FIPB approval to Aircel-Maxis Under the law, foreign share holding of a telecom company cannot be more than 74%. Any foreign investment of 50% or more have to be cleared by the Foreign Investment Promotion Board (FIPB) which is headed by the Finance Minister. The first job of the FIPB is to ensure that the FDI cap of 74% is not violated. Maxis, a Malaysian company, purchased an Indian telecom company called Aircel and its investment was almost 100%. But to circumvent FDI cap of 74%, it routed the balance investments through Chennai based Reddy Group (Apollo Hospital). To the Indian authorities, Maxis maintained that it has only 74% in Aircel. This FDI violation can also be established from the fact that Maxis invested several thousand crores of

25 Rupees in Aircel, whereas Reddys investment is just Rs 34.17 crore for a stake as high as 26% in Aircel. CBI has now filed an FIR on the above transaction (Annexure A42). The said FIR states: M/s Aircel was taken over by M/s Maxis Communications through its subsidiary M/s Global Communications along with its India partner M/s Sindiya Securities vide a complex equity structure giving them 74% and 26% stake in M/s Aircel Televentures Ltd. respectively. Whereas the investment made by them were US $ 792.41 million and US $ 7.59 million respectively thereby giving M/s Global Communications an economic interest of 99.3% in M/s Aircel Televentures Ltd. Even to the Bursa Malaysia Stock Exchange, Maxis in its quarterly report ended March 31, 2006 has declared that it has 99.3% investment in Aircel. (Annexure A43) But despite the above well-known facts Mr. Chidambaram went ahead and accorded FIPB clearance on 03.10.2006. (Annexure A44). Also after complaints were filed regarding this FDI cap violation, no inquiry was done or ordered by Mr. Chidambaram or the DoT. After the Maxis took control over Aircel, Mr. Maran got spectrum pricing out of agenda of the Group of Ministers (GoM). The record shows the Finance Ministry under Mr. Chidambaram maintained a temporary silence on the issue of spectrum pricing being dropped from the GoM between February 2006 and February 2007. This was the same period in which Maxis received two sets of FIPB clearances in January-March and September-October 2006, followed by 14 licences between December 5 and 14, 2006, along with the promise of linked 2G spectrum at 2001 rates on a first come, first served basis. Aircel paid Rs. 1,399 crore for these 14 licences which the CAG, in 2010, valued at roughly Rs. 13,000 crore. Once Aircel had secured its licences, the Finance Ministry suddenly went back to arguing that spectrum pricing be included in the ToRs of the GoM on spectrum. While the above was happening, Mr. Karti Chidambaram (son of Mr. Chidambaram)s company M/s Advantage Strategic Consulting gave a mysterious loan of Rs. 26 lakhs to Aircel. Around this time there was a 5% (Rs 18 lakhs) increase in Aircels share capital. These shares were

26 apparently allotted to companies linked with Mr. Karti Chidambaram. Documents on this along with a summary are annexed as Annexure A45. After the above facts came to light, Mr. Chidambaram argued that Karti's Ausbridge came to Advantage Strategic Consulting only in 2008/2009 by taking 67% shares. The Loans and Advances to Aircel took place somewhere before 31 March 2006 and at that time Mr. Karti had no role in M/s Advantage. But the Attached Annual Return 2006-2007 of Karti's Ausbridge Holdings (where Mr. Karti holds 94% share) shows that their email id as: advantconsult@gmail.com (Annexure A46). And Advantage Strategic Consulting's Letter Head available at RoC says their website is www.advantconsult.com (Annexure A47). The above facts leave no room for doubt that a thorough and impartial investigation is necessary in this case.

5. UNWARRANTED ATTEMPTS TO WITHDRAW PROSECUTION Mr. Chidambaram was known to one Mr. S P Gupta, a Delhi based hotelier. Mr. Chidambaram had also appeared for him several times a lawyer, including in cases where Mr. Gupta had sought quashing of FIRs against him. Mr. Chidambaram had appeared for him till 2004 when he became a minister. As many as four FIRs were registered against Mr. Gupta and others. In all the cases Delhi Police had filed detailed chargesheets leveling serious charges against Mr. Gupta and the trial court had taken cognizance. Mr. Gupta had gone right up to the Supreme Court to get the investigations and/or the chargesheets quashed. His all petitions and appeals had been rejected. But as soon as Mr. Chidambaram took over as Home Minister, Mr. Gupta wrote to his Ministry seeking withdrawal of the cases against him. Soon thereafter, Mr. Chidambaram instructed the Delhi Police (which works under him) to withdraw all the cases against Mr. Gupta. This is a clear case of abuse of ministerial power to benefit an industrialist facing 4 chargesheets. After the above facts became a big public scandal, the order to withdraw the prosecution has been revoked. There are four cases registered by Delhi Police against Mr. S P Gupta and other private individuals. In all the four cases, chargesheets had been filed, the trial court had taken cognizance, and the High Court and Supreme

27 Court had dismissed challenges to the FIR & chargesheets. Facts of the case are as follows: FIR No. 90/2000 a) FIR was registered on 14.02.2000 b) Chargesheet was filed on 17.01.2003 u/s 420/406/409/468/471/477-A/120-B IPC: It charged Mr. S P Gupta and others of M/s Sunair Hotels, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi with cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery, falsification of accounts and criminal conspiracy. c) Trial Court took cognizance of chargesheet and issued summons to accused on 18.01.2003 d) Notice was issued on 04.03.2003 by Delhi High Court on petition challenging chargesheet e) Supplementary Chargesheet was filed on 18.08.2005 f) HC petition challenging chargesheet withdrawn on 04.03.2010 g) HC petition challenging summons dismissed on 04.06.2010: The HC order states Learned counsel for the petitioner states that they should be permitted to question and to challenge the summoning order which was passed on 18.01.2003 on merits. I do not think this should be permitted. As noticed above, the summoning order was challenged in petitions which had remained pending in this court from 2003/2006/2007 till 04.03.2010. The petitioner then withdrew these petitions as pointed out above. It will not be proper to allow the petitioner to once again raise the same questions after they had withdrawn the petitions, which had remained pending in the High Court for 3-6 years. In these circumstances the petition is dismissed. h) SC dismissed appeal and upholds above HC order on 09.08.2010 FIR No. 99/2002 a) FIR was registered on 19.02.2002 b) HC dismissed petition against the FIR on 24.03.2005 c) SC dismissed appeal challenging above HC order on 03.07.2006 d) Chargesheet was filed on 16.01.2007 u/s 420/406/409/424/467/ 468/471/471A/120-B IPC It charged Mr. S P Gupta and others of M/s Sunair Hotels, Barakhamba Road, New Delhi with cheating, fraud, criminal breach of trust, forgery, falsification of accounts and criminal conspiracy. e) Trial Court took cognizance and issued summons to accused on 12.03.2007

28 f) HC petition challenging chargesheet was withdrawn on 04.03.2010 FIR No. 148/2002 a) FIR was registered on 28.02.2002 b) Chargesheet was filed on 17.01.2006 500/120-B IPC: u/s It 384/406/409/417/422/465/468/471/

charged S.P. Gupta and others for extortion, criminal breach of trust, cheating, fraud, forgery and criminal conspiracy c) Trial Court takes cognizance and issues summons to accused on 13.02.2006 d) Supplementary Chargesheet was filed on 22.10.2007 e) HC dismisses petition challenging summons on 02.07.2009 f) SC dismisses appeal against the above HC order on 29.01.2010 g) HC petition challenging FIR was withdrawn on 04.03.2010 FIR No. 315/2005 a) HC directs registration of FIR on 24.08.2005. The HC order states: It is submitted that certain official files regarding the Department of Company Affairs have been recovered from the accused persons but no action has been taken by the police Having heard counsel for the petitioner, in the event, during investigation and search/seizure, any document or register is seized relating to Department of Company Affairs and cognizable offence is disclosed, the police, shall register an FIR and proceed in accordance with law. b) Petition seeking quashing of FIR dismissed as withdrawn by HC on 04.03.2010 c) Chargesheet filed on 30.08.2011 u/s 380/411/120-B IPC: It charged S. P Gupta and others for committing theft and criminal conspiracy. d) Trial Court takes cognizance and issues summons on 15.09.2011 Mr. S P Gupta and others had been chargesheeted by the Delhi Police of which trial court had taken cognizance for inter-alia: a) b) c) d) Misusing the names of Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and Mrs. Sonia Forging letters of many Members of Parliament Stealing of 21 files from Ministry of Corporate Affairs Many instances of cheating, forgery and fraud Ganhi on the letter-heads.

29 Chidambaram seems to have put pressure on the Delhi government to drop three FIRs against Mr Gupta. An application was filed on behalf of the Delhi Government to withdraw some of these cases. However, the application for withdrawal was itself withdrawn after this scandal hit the media. He thus abused his position as the Home Minister to get cases against his erstwhile client withdrawn after his client failed to have them quashed through the courts. Copies of the newspaper reports are annexed as (Annexure A48). This also amounts to criminal misconduct and needs a thorough investigation.

30 Mr. Pranab Mukherjee In July 2005, the Indian Express published a report that some documents belonging to the Navy were leaked through a pen drive. This pen drive was later found in the house of a Navy officer Wing Commander SL Surve. These documents had been shared with Mr. Abhishek Verma, Mr. Ravi Shankaran and Mr. Kulbhushan Prashar accused in various defense scams. In its investigations the Navy found three commanders, Mr. Bijender Rana, Mr. Vinod Kumar Jha and Captain Kashyap Kumar, guilty and they were sacked in December 2005. The investigation revealed that the officers had leaked sensitive information about countrys naval strategy and therefore put the security of the nation under threat. Despite the findings of the Navys investigation no action was taken against the trio Mr. Abhishek Verma, Mr. Ravi Shankaran and Mr. Kulbhushan Prashar. Neither was the case handed over to the CBI. The matter was closed. The Outlook in 2006 came out with its stories stating that the leaked documents also contained information about the money exchanged as commission in Scorpene submarine. During the investigation of the Navy document leak many emails were also found which indicate that the deal to procure the Scorpene submarines which was entered into between the UOI and Thales (a French Company) on 7th October 2005 was mediated by the middlemen who have negotiated substantial commissions in the deal extensively on behalf of persons in the Government and the ruling party in total violation of the policy of the Defense Ministry which prohibits involvement of any un-registered middlemen in any Defense deal. Copies of the stories published in Outlook Magazine on 20th Feb. 2006 and 27th Feb. 2006 are enclosed herewith as Annexure A (Colly). In one of the emails, Mr. Verma wrote to chief of Thales (the French company which had bagged the contract for the Scorpene submarine) in response to his questions: Question 1: He would like to talk to a person nominated by the government like a treasurer of the Congress party or any similar person. Because four per cent commission was impossible. To which Mr. Verma replied: After meeting those two people he would have to talk to me. I hope Thales doesnt feel that Congress party has some shop and he is talking to them. I will represent them (Congress) in the entire deal. According to Thales how much are they willing to spend on the project? On July 13, 2005, chief of Thales sent a mail to Mr. Verma which elaborates on the graft money given to him as commission. Below is the email: Dear Abhishek,

31 We have made arrangements for paying 4% commission to your

representatives on the Scorpene deal. Please tell your lawyers to contact us for the paper work. Jean Paul Perrier Despite such incriminating evidence of graft and putting the security of the nation in danger the then defense minister Sh. Pranab Mukherjee didnt give orders for investigation into the Scorpene submarine deal. Ironically, the government gave orders to CBI to investigate how the documents got leaked but didnt ask it to investigate the corruption charges in those documents. Copies of some of these emails are enclosed herewith as Annexure B (Colly). Ironically, on 12th February 2006, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee, who was then Defense Minister, said in a TV interview that there was no need to act against these men as the information that was leaked pertained to the commercial activities of the Navy. According to him it was commonplace for brokers to indulge in such acts in order to gain information pertaining to commercial activities. Copy of the interview telecast on a TV channel is enclosed herewith as Annexure C. After this, Mr. Ravi Shankaran was even given permission to leave the country. After much hue and cry, the government was forced to order the CBI inquiry in Navy War Room leak case but again Sh. Pranab Mukherjee made a statement in the Parliament that this inquiry was not in respect of Scorpene Submarines. Copy of the statement made by Sh. Mukherjee in the Parliament on 18th Feb. 2006 is enclosed herewith as Annexure D. In its charge sheet against Abhishek Verma and other accused in Navy War Room leak case, the CBI clearly stated that the information that was leaked was sensitive and could have posed a threat to nations security. The documents contained information about the future purchases and preparedness of the Indian Navy. Even though no investigation regarding Scorpene deal has been done by the CBI, the facts which have emerged from the said charge-sheets of the CBI corroborate many of the aforementioned allegations. As per the charge sheet, Abhsihek Verma was associated with Atlas Group of companies, which deal in defense supplies and whose main source of income is through foreign remittances. It says that he received pecuniary benefits from the foreign companies having interest in various defense procurements. It has been clearly established that Ravi Shankaran, Kulbhushan Parashar and Abhishek Verma were very close to each other and all of them were associated with Atlas group of companies which deal in defense supplies. It has been established by both the chargesheets that Abhishek Verma, Kulbhushan Parashar and Ravi Shankaran were three

32 civilian beneficiaries of War room Leak. One of the most revealing finding in the second charge-sheet is the business connection of M/s Atlas Defense Systems with Thales Group of companies. Further, the second Charge sheet also proves that Abhishek Verma has connection with Ms. Gwendolyn Berger who was acting as International Liaison Officer for Thales as apparent from her business card. It appears from the 1st chargesheet that much of the evidence was destroyed because of delay in ordering an investigation. Copies of the charge sheets filed in Navy War Room leak case are enclosed herewith as Annexure E (Colly). A Public Interest Litigation was filed by an organization viz. Centre for Public Interest Litigation in the Delhi High Court seeking an independent investigation into the allegations of payment of commission in the Scorpene submarine deal. Pursuant to the High Court order the CBI conducted a preliminary enquiry and filed a report before the court. It appears that the CBI did not do any investigation into the emails, phone records of the accused etc. and closed the case saying that no evidence was found. The petitioner in the said PIL specifically asked for the CBI report but the same was denied by the CBI claiming privilege. However it appears from the email of C Edmonds Allen dated 16th April 2012 that the aforementioned report was given to Abhishek Verma who was one of the accused. Copy of C Edmonds Allen email dated 16th April 2012 along with its attachments is enclosed as Annexure F (Colly) Thus, the involvement of Mr. Pranab Mukherjee in the Scorpene scam is apparent from the following facts: He was the defense minister who signed the Scorpene submarine contract, and seems to have allowed Abhishek Verma to operate as a middleman in this deal even though the official policy of the government was to bar the middlemen in such contracts. After the Navy war room leak was discovered, and the question arose about the action being taken against the civilians like Abhishek Verma, Ravi Shankaran and Kulbushan Parashar, who were involved in the leak Pranab Mukherjee sought to downplay by falsely stating that the leaked information was only of commercial nature. He took not steps to prevent the civilians involved in the leak from leaving the country and they were allowed to leave the country He did not order any investigation in the Scorpene deal despite the Outlook magazines detailed expose on the issue. Under his watch, the CBI did a whitewashing preliminary enquiry, and claimed privilege over the preliminary enquiry report while secretly sharing it with the accused Abhishek Verma.

33 Despite Abhishek Vermas partner Edmonds writing to the ED and the CBI agreeing to share a lot of incriminating evidence against Abhishek Verma and his role as a defense middleman, Mr. Pranab Mukherjee took no steps to have the matter investigated. The aforementioned facts prima facie constitute an offence under the Prevention of Corruption Act and therefore a thorough and fair investigation is required.

34 Mr. Sharad Pawar Accused of having close ties with some of the most dangerous criminals of the country: In 2002 and 2003, Mr. Sudhakar Rao then minister in Maharashtra alleged that Mr. Pawar asked him to be lenient against gangster Papu Kalani a criminal turned politician. Mr. Rao also alleged that Mr. Kalani and Mr. Hitendra Thakur were given tickets at the behest of Mr. Pawar. Annexure A He was also accused of having relations with underworld don Dawood Ibrahim in the past and currently he is accused of having ties with 2G scam accused Shahid Balwa. Copy of the Indian Express report, Outlook report and excerpts of the book Lucknow Boy written by Vinod Mehta is annexed as Annexure B (Colly) Abdul Karim Telgithe prime accused in the Telgi scam had admitted during the Narco-analysis test that the Rs 60,000 scam was a brain child of Mr. Pawar. Copies of the newspaper reports are annexed hereto as Annexure C (Colly). Wheat Import Scam: - Mr. Pawar is accused of having given permission to private and international companies to directly buy wheat from the farmers. This led to a complete sell out of the FCI stock, and there was nothing left to distribute through the ration shops. Therefore, the wheat for consumption of common people had to be imported. While the government had set a price of Rs 850 per ton for procuring from farmers; it went ahead and imported wheat at more than Rs 1400 per ton and mostly through select private companies. The government did not purchase wheat at higher prices from the farmers directly. A copy of the detailed not on this scam which had been issued in 2007 by Dr Kirit Somaiya who also sent a complaint to CVC on this is annexed as Annexure D. Ironically, wheat imported from these companies was rotten and not fit for human consumption. Copy of the lab reports of State Public Health Laboratory of May-Jun 2008 confirming the same are annexed as Annexure E. Politicians across all parties raised a hue and cry on the issue, but no investigation was initiated into the scam. Pulses Import Scam: The Government of India in order to bridge the gap between demand and production of pulses introduced two schemes for import and distribution of pulses in the year 2006 and 2008. This was to be done through four public agencies viz. NAFED, MMTC, PEC Ltd. and STC. The import would have also checked the rise in the price of pulses. However, it was found that this policy ended up benefitting four big private traders at the cost of the public trading companies. As much as 6.08 lakh MT of pulses were sold to these private companies. According to the CAG

35 report the public trading agencies incurred total loss of Rs 1201 Crore in importing pulses but domestic prices did not fall as supplies were not promptly made to the market. The CAG report further pointed out that the Ministry of Consumer Affairs Food and Public Distribution headed by Sharad Pawar failed to identify appropriate channels for the distribution of imported pulses. Instead of selling the imported pulses to people through the public distribution system, they were sold to private companies at a rate lower than the buying price and these companies in return sold the pulses at the higher market rates. Out of the total loss of Rs 1201 Crore, loss of Rs 897 Crore was incurred due to the import of Yellow Peas in 2007 as it was imported without much deliberation. The Government decided to import Yellow Peas on the ground that they were reasonably good substitute for other types of pulses and there prices were comparatively lower. However, the peas did not find many takers in the domestic market and were sold after considerable leading to aforementioned heavy losses to the importing agencies. Despite this, the agencies continued to import the peas during the subsequent years even when they had huge unsold stocks. Copies of the India Today report is annexed as Annexure F and relevant CAG report is enclosed herewith as Annexure G. LAVASA Scam Lavasa is a massive 25,000 acre hill station, valued at tens of thousands of Crore, is being developed in the eco sensitive areas of Western Ghats. The Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi in its order 17th January, 2011 concluded as under: "The discussions and analysis clearly brings out the fact that M/s LCL is in violation of the (i) of the EIA Notification, 1994 (ii) EIA Notification, as amended in 2004; and (iii) the EIA Notification of 2006. The site visit Report has brought out the nature and magnitude of the environmental damage caused by the project. As such, the construction activity is unauthorized, being in violation of the above three Notifications and is also environmentally damaging." Copy of the Order dated 17th January, 2011 of the Ministry of Environment and Forests is annexed as Annexure H In this reference, among many other serious issues, the following points become apparent: 1. The initial directors of Lavasa Corporation, inter alia, were Supriya Sule, daughter of Sharad Pawar and her Husband Sadanand Sule having about 21 per cent shares. Supriya Sule has been Member of Parliament for two terms. There were certain other persons who are

36 known to be close to Sharad Pawar who too were Directors of the Company. This clearly shows the intimate connection of Sharad Pawar with Lavasa whose construction has been declared to be unauthorized by no less than a statutory entity. 2. Supriya Sule her husband sold their shares around the year 2006 on highly undervalued rates. This is apparent from the fact that the net worth of Sule as declared before the Election Commission did not undergo a major quantum of change between the year 2004 and 2009. For a massive company having enormous land assets, the worth of such shares were hundreds of Crores which were not reflected in the property declaration before the Election Commission. 3. When the illegal construction was going on, Sharad Pawar who had no statutory role to play in the construction since he was a Central Minister, held a meeting in Lavasa where many concessions were granted. When the project was unauthorized and which has been declared illegal through a statutory order, this interference of Sharad Pawar in the matter was highly disturbing. The minutes of the meeting held are enclosed as Annexure I 4. Precious land of the irrigation department was given to Lavasa at a pittance, without any auction, by the then Irrigation Minister and now Deputy Chief Minister Ajit Pawar, who is a nephew of Sharad Pawar and in blatant violation of the Maharashtra Land Revenue (Disposal of Government Land) Rules, 1971. Stern objections were raised by the conscientious Revenue Secretary Ramesh Kumar, on which no action was taken. The office note in this reference is being obtained. For the reason of this stand taken by whistle-blower Shri Ramesh Kumar, Government of Maharashtra has victimized Ramesh Kumar by refusing to go ahead in his appointment as Member Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal even though the statutory Selection Committee recommended his name. 5. It is also a known fact that Sharad Pawar personally took up the matter, with the Environment Minister Ms. Jyanti Natrajan on Lavasa, immediately after the uncompromising minister Jayram Ramesh left the government. Ms. Natrajan obliged Pawar and granted Environment Clearance under highly suspicious circumstances. Ms. Natrajan took the unprecedented act of granting Environment Clearance on a construction project where the Competent Authority for granting Environment Clearance on construction projects is the Maharashtra State Level Environment Impact Assessment Authority and not the Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi. She also made the unprecedented order,

37 where she granted Environment Clearance without Lavasa following the due procedure of public hearing and when the Ministry of Environment and Forests, New Delhi order itself stated that the construction took place in violation of the Environment Impact Assessment of 1994, where there was no provision to grant Environment Clearance without public hearing. It was misuse of political power apparent allover 6. The Environment Department of Government of Maharashtra, under the control of Environment Secretary, Valsa Nair Singh, extended an enormous favour to Sharad Pawar by launching prosecution against the Lavasa Corporation and its current Directors only. Ms. Valsa spared Supriya Sule from prosecution even though when the violation took place around the year 2004, Ms. Sule was the Director of Lavasa. Incidentally, Ms. Valsa is also involved in the Adarsh scam and the CAG has blamed the conduct of Environment Department as 'wilful'. Ms. Valsa as the Chairperson of the Maharashtra Coastal Zone Management Authority, had got a show cause notice issued against Adarsh on a complaint made in August, 2008 and then she sat over the matter till the scam became open in late 2010. Notwithstanding the favour bestowed on Lavasa, Ms. Valsa has not only been spared from action in the Adarsh case, but has also been allowed to stay as Environment Secretary for more than 3 years when the law as contained in the Maharashtra Government Servants Regulation of Transfer and Prevention of Delay in Discharge of Official Duties Act, 2005, stipulates that an officer need to be transferred in 3 years. In this way, during the illegally extended tenure of Ms. Valsa, relatives of Sharad Pawar, were spared from prosecution by Ms. Valsa. 7. There are a host of other violations related to many other legislations and which all would not have happened but though the invisible hand of powerful people. The aforementioned facts prima facie constitute offences under Prevention of Corruption Act and therefore a thorough and fair investigation is required into Mr. Sharad Pawars role in: 1. Telgi Stamp Scam 2. Wheat Import Scam 3. Pulses Import Scam 4. LAVASA Scam

38 Mr. S M Krishna S.M. Krishna was the Chief Minister of Karnataka from 1999 to 2004. He has been serving as the Minister of External Affairs since 2009. The Government of Karnataka under Mr. Krishna in its orders dated 15.03.2003 de-reserved for private mining an area of 11,620 square kilometres in the State, meant for State exploitation/mining and notified the surrender of an area of 6,832.48 hectares of prime iron ore land respectively, which has paved way for distribution of public assets to select private entities. The entire exercise was undertaken in a matter so as to benefit only a select few entities. The Lokayukta of Karnataka in his report dated 18.12.2008, went into the depth of the entire issue and gave a detailed report on the said scandal. Relevant chapter of the said report is annexed as Annexure A. The said report stated: The information wanted by the Cabinet Section was whether the statement in the Cabinet note that de-reservation is proposed in forest areas which have lost vegetative cover is factually correct. That information has not been furnished by the Forest department. Cabinet section did not pursue the matter. Without getting that information the subject was placed before the Cabinet and the proposal was approved by the Cabinet. The Cabinet has not been informed of all relevant and necessary facts. De-reservation order as such is not found in file but a notification dated 15-03-2003 informing the public that those lands are available for allotment to the public is found in the file. It is clear from the above that though the considered decision of the Government was not to de-reserve forest land and strategic mineral bearing areas like iron-ore, manganese, chromate and lime-stone, that aspect was not properly verified and reserve forests and State forests and strategic mineral bearing areas have been de-reserved. On the basis of the facts stated in this report, a complaint was lodged against Mr. Krishna and others alleging that during his tenure as the Chief Minister of Karnataka, he had de-reserved thousands of acres of reserve forest land in Bellary and elsewhere and sanctioned it to private companies in the year 2003, despite contrary decisions of the then Minister for Forests and the then Secretary to the Government, Forest Department, who had expressed disagreement for de-reservation. These acts resulted in destruction of vast forest area and led to large scale illegal mine. SM Krishna clearly abused his position as the Chief Minister of Karnataka and illegally amassed wealth in the name of his family members, including children, in- laws and in the names of erstwhile very close fellow cabinet members. The de-reservation order which is stated to be the decision of

39 cabinet meeting held on 16.12.2003 has been destroyed. The notification dated 15.03.2003, notifying the public about availability of de-reserved forest lands to public was found in the file. It is alleged that even the notification is not in conformity with the Forest (Conservation) Rules, 2003 which under Rule 6 requires mandatory approval by the State Government. The malafide, illegal and anti state, corrupt intention of dereserving forest area vide notification dated 15.03.2003 is demonstrated by sudden spurt of issue of 82 permits in the year 2004 and 59 permits in the year 2006. The above acts were the beginning of destruction of reserved forest area and advent of illegal mining in the state of Karnataka, particularly, in the District of Bellary. On the said complaint, the Special Court, Bangalore vide order dated 03.12.2011 referred the matter to Lokayukta Police for investigation. The said order is annexed as Annexure B. He held: In the overall circumstances of the case, after perusing the complaint, list of documents and the references made in the compliant with reference to documents, I consider that it is just and proper that a thorough and fair investigation by the Competent authority is necessary in the ends of justice, law and transparency. It is to be noted that Mr. Krishna had neither been summoned nor arrested. Only an investigation had been ordered. But to prevent even that he approached the Karnataka High Court. On careful consideration of the report of the Lokayukta and the events preceding cabinet meeting held on 16.12.2002, consequent notification issued on 15.03.2003, the High Court of Karnataka in its order dated 20/01/2012 in Criminal Petition No. 6920/2011, which sought quashing of the complaint, opined that in the matter of de-reservation of an area of 11797 square kilometers, there has been contravention of relevant provisions of Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 and Forest (Conservation) Rules, 2003. The High Court held: We are but unable to appreciate that the Lokayukta report cannot be a basis for initiating any lawful action against those who are involved in unlawful acts in an illegal manner. One should not forget that the office of the Lokayukta is held by a former judge of the Apex Court. It is difficult to assume or presume that the said high authority would give a report without any material evidence whatsoever. Therefore we are unable to digest the contention that the Lokayukta report cannot be a basis for even to initiate an action against an illegal act. The High Court accordingly upheld the order for investigation into the allegations. A copy of the order of the Honble High Court is annexed as Annexure C.

40 Against the said detailed order of the High Court, Mr. Krishna approached the Supreme Court seeking an immediate stay of the investigation. Supreme Court has stayed the said investigation and the matter is pending. The order of the Supreme Court is annexed as Annexure D. The above shows the extent to which Mr. Krishna went to ensure that no investigation takes place on the issue of de-reservation of forest land, leading to a conclusion that he has a lot to hide. The facts as brought out by the Lokayukta report leave no room for doubt that a thorough investigation is necessary in the case.

41 Mr. Kamal Nath Rice Export Scam In October 2007, the central government had imposed a ban on export of any kind of rice except Basmati rice. This decision was taken so as to decrease the inflation in the country. There was an apprehension that the availability of rice will decrease in the ration shops. To prevent this scarcity the government took the decision of imposing the ban. Everybody appreciated this step taken by the government of India. India is a huge exporter of rice in the international market. As soon as India stopped the export of rice, the price of rice in the international market increased from $350 per ton to $1000 per ton. During this time it has come to light that a few selected private companies were allowed to circumvent this ban and make huge killing of around Rs 2500 crore. Mr Kamal Nath, who was the commerce minister at that time, figures prominently in the scam. Within three months of imposing the ban on the export of rice, in Jan 2008, the central government stated that the ban imposed on export of rice had led to scarcity in many poor countries and hence on the basis of humanitarian grounds, India should export the rice to those poor countries at subsidized prices. As soon as the news came out, 21 African countries sent letters to the foreign ministry desiring to purchase rice from India. The Governments of Sierra Leone and Ghana wrote to our ministry that rice should be made available to them at low cost. Usually, such trades happen between two governments. However, in this matter these foreign governments mentioned some private companies in India and asked Indian government to export rice through these companies only instead of sending rice directly to their country. Usually, in such matters governments companies like STC, MMTC, PEC Ltd. etc export the material from the Indian government, but in this case rules were kept aside and the Indian Government gave the permission to buy and export the rice to these private companies. Indian Government didnt even have the control on what price those companies bought the rice from India and at what price it was sold to those countries. Not just this, the Indian Government didnt even care to check whether the rice, after going out of India, reached those countries or ended up in the open market. It came to light that the companies sold the rice to those countries on International rates. If those countries wanted to buy the rice on international rates only, then what was the need for them to buy it from India only? They could have bought rice from the international