Al-Shajarah Journal Article Final Draft

Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Use of Reason in ʿIlm al-Kalām and Uṣūl al-Fiqh

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa

PhD Candidate Institute of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies

University of Edinburgh

e-mail: [email protected]

Al-Shajarah Journal of The International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization Volume 16.1 (2011): 1-46

November 2010

Mohamed Ahmed Abdelrahman Eissa 2

This study examines and compares Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s use of reason in ʿilm al-kalām and

uṣūl al-fiqh. Very few details are known about the life of Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b.

al-Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044). This is clear in the extremely brief entries about him in the

medieval biographies of Muslim scholars and intellectuals that include an entry on him: in most

cases his entry does not exceed few lines.1 However, we know that Abū al-Ḥusayn is an

influential Ḥanafī-Muʿtazilī jurist and theologian.2 He is a member of the Bahshamiyyah sub-

* This paper is a modified version of my masters dissertation submitted to the Institute of Islamic and Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Edinburgh in July 2009. I would like to thank Dr. Andrew Marsham, Dr. Christian Lange, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier versions of this article. 1 For example, see Abū ʿAbd Allah Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348 or 753/1352-3), Siyar Aʿlām al-Nubalā’, ed. Shuʿayb al-Arnā’ūt and Muḥammad al-ʿIrqisūsī (Beirut: Mu’assasat al-Risālah, 1413 A.H.), 17:587, in CD-ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr li-Kutub al-Turāth al-ʿArabī wa-l-Islāmī, 4th ed. (Amman: Markaz al-Turāth li-l-Barmajiyyāt, 2007-8). Hereafter I refer to this database as CD-ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr; Shams al-Dīn Aḥmad b. Khallikān (d. 681/1282), Wafayāt al-Aʿyān wa-Anbā’ Abnā’ al-Zamān, 7vols., ed. Iḥsān ʿAbbās (Lebanon: Dār al-Thaqāfah, n.d.), in CD-ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr; Shams al-Dīn Muḥammad b. Aḥmad al-Dhahabī, Mizān al-ʿItidāl fī Naqd al-Rijāl, 8 vols., ed. ‘Alī ‘Awaḍ and ‘Ādil ʿAbd al-Mawjūd (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-‘Ilmiyyah, 1995), 6:266, in CD-ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr; ʿAbd al-Qādir b. Abī al-Wafā’ al-Qurashī (d. 775/1374), al-Jawāhir al-Muḍiyyah fī Ṭabaqāt al-Ḥanafiyya, 2 vols. (Karachi: Mir Muḥammad Kutub Khānah, n.d.), 2:93-4, in CD-ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr; Abū al-Saʿd al-Muḥsin b. Karāmah al-Jushamī (d. 484/1101), Sharḥ al-ʿUyūn, in Fu’ād Sayyid, ed. Faḍl al-Iʿtizāl wa-Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah (Tunis: al-Dār al-Tūnisiyyah li-l-Nashr, 1974), 387; ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad (d. 415/1025)/ Aḥmad b. Yaḥyā b. al-Murtaḍā (d. 840/1437), Firaq wa-Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah , ed. ‘Alī Sāmī al-Nashshār and ʿIṣām al-Dīn ʿAlī (Alexandria: Dār al-Maṭbūʿāt al-Jāmiʿiyyah, 1972), 125-6. This last book is composed of 12 ṭabaqāt of Muʿtazilī scholars. As the editors note in their introduction, ʿAbd al-Jabbār is the author of the first ten ṭabaqāt, whereas the last two ṭabaqah were later added by Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Abū al-Ḥusayn is mentioned in the twelfth ṭabaqah added by Ibn al-Murtaḍā. 2 Modern scholars disagree whether Abū al-Ḥusayn is a Ḥanafī or a Shāfiʿī. M. Bernand, C. Brockelmann, and F. Sezgin believe that he is a Shāfiʿī. See, Marie Bernand, L’accord Unanime de la Communauté comme Fondement des Statuts Légaux de l’Islam (Paris: J. Vrin, 1970), 136; Carl Brockelmann, Geschichte der Arabishcen Litteratur Esrter Supplementband (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1937), 1B:669; Fuat Sezgin, Geschichte des Arabischen Schrifttums (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975), 1:627. Also see, Muṣṭafā b. ʿAbd Allah al-Qusṭanṭīnī (Ḥajjī Khalīfa), Kashf al-Ẓunūn ‘an Asāmī al-Kutub wa-l-Funūn (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1992), 2:1732, in CD ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr. On the other hand, M. Hamidullah, W. Madelung, W. Hallaq, and C. Melchert hold that he is a Ḥanafī. See, Muhammad Hamidullah, introduction to Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. al-Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, ed. Muhammad Hamidullah and others (Damascus: al-Maʿhad al-ʿIlmī al-Faransī li-l-Dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyyah, 1965), 24-5; Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd edition, s.v. “Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī” Hereafter I refer to the 2nd edition of the Encyclopaedia of Islam as EI2 and the third edition as EI3; Wael Hallaq, “A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise on Juridical Dialectic,” Muslim World 77 (1987), 1; Christopher Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools of Law (Leiden: Brill, 1997), 85. Also, see Ibn Abī al-Wafā’ al-Qurashī, al-Jawāhir al-Muḍiyyah, 2:93-4. There is compelling evidence proving that Abū al-Ḥusayn is a Ḥanafī. For example, Abū al-Ḥusayn defends the Ḥanafī definition and use of istiḥsān in reaching fiqhī conclusions. This supports the conclusion that he is a Ḥanafī especially that this legal method is usually criticized in Shāfiʿī uṣūl al-fiqh literature whereas it is usually defended in Ḥanafī ones. For Abū al-Ḥusayn’s defense of istiḥsān, see his al-Muʿtamad , 838-41. For Shāfiʿī criticisms of istiḥsān, see for example Abū Isḥāq Ibrāhīm b. ʿAlī b. Yūsuf al-Firūzabādī al-Shīrāzī (d. 476/1083), Sharḥ al-Luma‘, ed. ʿAbd al-Majīd Turkī (Beirut: Dār al-Gharb al-Islāmī, 1988),969-74; Abū Muẓaffar Manṣūr b. Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Sam‘ānī (d. 489/1096), Qawāṭi‘ al-Adillah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 5 vols, ed. Muḥammad Ḥasan Ismāʿīl al-Shāfiʿī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1997), 4:514-22. For Ḥanafī justifications of


school which is part of the Basran branch of the Muʿtazilah before he forms his own Muʿtazilī

sub-school that is named al-Ḥusayniyyah.3 The Muʿtazilī biographer al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī (d.

484/1101) describes Abū al-Ḥusayn as the leading Muʿtazilī of his age.4 Ibn Khallikān (d.

681/1282), Shams al-Dīn al-Dhahabī (d. 748/1348 or 753/1352-3), and Ibn Khaldūn (d.

808/1406) all praise Abū al-Ḥusayn’s works in uṣūl al-fiqh.5 Among the modern scholars, Wael

Hallaq describes Abū al-Ḥusayn’s al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh as a milestone in the

development of legal theory.6 Wilferd Madelung says that al-Muʿtamad became widely

influential outside the Ḥanafī-Muʿtazilī tradition.7 Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology is not less

significant. Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209) notes that in his time all surviving Muʿtazilah

belonged either to the Bahshamiyyah or al-Ḥusayniyyah Muʿtazilī sub-schools.8 In addition,

Madelung’s and S. Schmidtke’s recent studies show that Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theological thought

has a considerable impact on Imāmī, Zaydī, and Qarrā’ī (Karaite) Jewish theology.9

istiḥsān, see Abū Zayd ʿUbayd Allah b. ʿĪsā al-Dabūsī (d. 430/138-9), Taqwīm al-Adillah fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, ed. Khālid al-Mīs (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 2007), 404-6; Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. Abī Sahl al-Sarakhsī (d. 490/1097), Uṣūl al-Sarakhsī, 2 vols. ed. Abū al-Wafā al-Afghānī (Beirut: Dār al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyyah, 1414/1993), 2:199-208. For more arguments establishing Abū al-Ḥusayn’s Ḥanafī orientation, see Hamidullah’s introduction to Abū al-Ḥusayn’s al-Muʿtamad p. 24-5. 3 Fakhr al-Dīn Muḥammad b. ʿUmar al-Rāzī (d. 606/1209), ʿItiqādāt Firaq al-Muslimīn wa-l-Mushrikīn (Cairo: Maktabat al-Kuliyyāt al-Azhariyyah, 1978), 42. For more information on the Basran and the Baghdadi Muʿtazilah , see Rashīd al-Khayyūn, Muʿtazilat al-Baṣrah wa-Baghdād (London: Dār al-Ḥikmah, 1997). For more details on the Bahshamiyyah, see Margaretha T. Heemskerk, Suffering in Mu‘tazilite Theology (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 14-35. 4 Al-Jushamī, Sharḥ al-ʿUyūn, 387; ʿAbd al-Jabbār/Ibn al-Murtaḍā, Firaq wa-Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah , 125; Ibn Khalikān, Wafayāt al-Aʿyān, 4:271; Al-Dhahabī, Mizān al-Iʿtidāl, 6:266. 5 Al-Dhahabī, Siyār Aʿlām al-Nubalā’, 17:588; Ibn Khallikān, Wafayāt al-Aʿyān, 4:271; ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Muḥammad b. Khaldūn (d. 808/1406), Muqaddimat Ibn Khaldūn, 5th ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Qalam, 1984), 455, in CD ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr. 6 Hallaq, “A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise,” 197. 7 EI3, s.v. “Abū l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī.” 8 Al-Rāzī, Iʿtiqādāt Firaq al-Muslimīn, 42. 9 For more information on the influence of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology on Imāmī and Zaydī thought, see Wilferd Madelung, “Imāmism and Muʿtazilite Theology,” in Religious Schools and Sects in Medieval Islam, ed. Wilferd Madelung (London: Variorum, 1985), VII, 27. For more details on his influence on Qarrā’ī Jewish theology, see Wilferd Madelung and Sabina Schmidtke, Rational Theology in Interfaith Communication (Leiden: Brill, 2006); idem, “Yūsuf al-Baṣīr’s First Refutation (Naqd) of Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Theology,” in A Common Rationality: Muʿtazilism in Islam and Judaism, ed. Camilla Adang, Sabine Schmidtke, and David Sklare (Würzburg: Ergon Verlag in Kommission, 2007): 229-96; Sabina Schmidtke, “The Karaites Encounter with the Thought of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044): A Survey of the Relevant Materials in the Firkovitch-Collection, St. Petersburg,”


Despite the importance of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s legal and theological heritage, his thought

received little attention from modern scholars. Among the few who studied his legal heritage is

Marie Bernand who examined his concept of consensus (ijmāʿ) and C. S. el-Tobgui who studied

aspects of his concept of legal reasoning (qiyās).10 W. Hallaq translated Abū al-Ḥusayn’s Kitāb

al-Qiyās al-Sharʿī.11 However, his translation does not include an analysis of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s

perception of legal reasoning.12 Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology received relatively more attention

than his legal heritage. W. Madelung, E. Giannakis, M. McDermott, and S. Schmidtke are the

only scholars, I am aware of, who wrote articles focusing on aspects of his theology and/or

philosophy.13 None of the previous studies attempted to particularly study the relation between

Arabica 53 (2006):108-42. Some parts of this article are translated in Arabic and were published earlier in Sabina Shmidtke, “Mūwājahāt al-Qarrā’īn maʿa Fikr Abī al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī,” al-Tasāmuḥ (2005): 224-36. 10 M. Bernand translated Abū al-Ḥusayn’s chapter on consensus from his al-Muʿtamad (p. 459-540). She concludes her translation with a chapter analyzing Abū al-Ḥusayn’s perception of consensus and comes to the result that his concept of consensus is similar to the Sunni one. See, Marie Bernand, L’accord Unanime. Bernand also wrote two articles on the concept of consensus of the Mu‘tazilī scholar ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī (d. 415/1024) who is Abū al-Ḥusayn’s most famous teacher. In her studies she includes detailed information on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s consensus. See, Marie Bernand, “L’Iğmāʿ chez ʿAbd al-Ğabbār et l’objection d’ An-Naẓẓām,” Studia Islamica 30 (1969): 27-38; idem, “Nouvelles Remarques ser l’Iğmāʿ ches le Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Ğabbār,” Arabica 19 (1972): 78-85. C. El-Tobgui compares Abū al-Ḥusayn’s acceptance of the probative value of qiyās to the rejection of Ibn Ḥazm al-Ẓāhirī (d. 456/1064) of this legal tool. He concludes that their disagreements over the authority of qiyās are a result of their epistemological and theological disagreements. See, Carl Sharif El-Tobgui, “The Epistemology of Qiyās and Taʿlīl between the Muʿtazilite Abu ‘l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and Ibn Ḥazm al-Ẓāhirī,” UCLA Journal of Islamic and Near Eastern Law 2, no. 2 (2003): 281-354. 11 Hallaq, “A Tenth-Eleventh Century,” 197-228. Kitāb al-Qiyās al-Sharʿī is a short treatise on legal reasoning published with Abū al-Ḥusayn’s al-Muʿtamad , see Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad , 1029-50. 12 Translating qiyās as legal analogy is more common. However this translation is problematic due to the fact that –as noted by W. Hallaq- there are other non-analogical arguments that are subsumed under qiyās e.g. syllogistic, inductive, deductive, and linguistic arguments. Therefore, I prefer legal reasoning as a translation for qiyās. For more details see, Wael Hallaq, “Non-Analogical Arguments in Sunni Juridical Qiyās,” Arabica 36.3 (1989): 286-306. 13 Wilferd Madelung. “Abū al-Ḥusayn Al-Baṣrī’s Proof for the Existence of God,” in Arabic Theology, Arabic Philosophy from the Many to the One, ed. James Montgomery (Leuven: Peeters Publishers, 2006): 273-8; E. Giannikis, “The Structure of Abu l-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī’s Copy of Aristotle’s Physics,” ZGAIW 8 (1993): 252–8; Martin J. McDermott, “Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on God’s Volition,” in Culture and Memory in Medieval Islam: Essays in Honor of Wilferd Madelung (London: Taurisian Association with the Institute of Ismaili Studies, 2003): 86-93; Sabine Schmidtke, “Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī and his transmission of biblical materials from Kitāb al-Dīn wa-l-dawla by Ibn Rabbān al-Ṭabarī: The evidence from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Mafātīḥ al-ghayb,” Islam and Christian-Muslim Relations 20 ii (2009): 105-118; idem, “Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī on the Torah and its Abrogation,” Mélanges de l’Université Saint Joseph 61 (2008): 559-80. For more information on Schmidtke’s research on Abū al-Ḥusayn, see footnote number 8.


reason and revelation in Abū al-Ḥusayn’s thought.14 Moreover, none attempted to particularly

investigate and compare Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of rational methods in uṣūl al-fiqh to his use of

rational methods in kalām. In this study I conduct this comparison and underline the differences

and similarities in the role he awards to reason in uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām. One must note that

analyzing the relation between reason and revelation in Islam is far beyond the scope of this

research. This research rather particularly focuses on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s contributions to this

question. However, this research will use Abū al-Ḥusayn’s conclusions as a case study to

challenge a dominant trend among modern historians that usually divide Muslim scholars and

schools of law and theology into scripturalist and rationalist schools, more on this below.

To analyze the role of reason in Abū al-Ḥusayn’s thought I ask the following questions:

how far does Abū al-Ḥusayn use reason to reach his fiqhī and kalāmī conclusions? How different

is the role of reason in each discipline? What are the factors that determine the role reason plays

in kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh? Is it possible to categorize him as either a rationalist or a scripturalist?

To answer these questions, I divide my study into two sections. The first section examines Abū

al-Ḥusayn’s methods in using rational arguments to form his kalāmī positions. I do so by

analyzing how he supports his kalāmī conclusions and explain what type of evidence he accepts

as eligible in kalām. In this section I argue that Abū al-Ḥusayn holds that reason, rather than

revelation, is the only eligible source of knowledge for the kalām issues that are relevant to

proving the veracity of revelation. This approach appears to undermine the role of revelation in

certain kalām topics. Nonetheless, I note that Abū al-Ḥusayn’s dependence on reason as a source

of information on the kalām issues that are relevant for establishing the authority of revelation is

motivated by dialectical reasons and not a result of an inherent position that elevates reason over

14 C. S. el-Tobgui in his “The Epistemology of Qiyās” touched upon this question but did not analyze it on the same scale I plan to do here.


revelation. Moreover, he does not consider revelation the anti-thesis of reason. For him, both

mediate the same truth and there is no inherent contradiction between them.

The second section investigates Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of reason and rational methods in

uṣūl al-fiqh as a means to reach fiqhī conclusions. This section evaluates how far he depends on

rational methods in comparison to scriptural ones in uṣūl al-fiqh. My analysis reveals that he

awards revelation relatively more authority in uṣūl al-fiqh than in kalām. However, Abū al-

Ḥusayn’s dependence on revelation in uṣūl al-fiqh does not mean, as will be shown, a rejection

of reason. He depends more on revelation in the uṣūl al-fiqh matters that reason is incapable of

addressing. Also the dialectical considerations that necessitate his dependence on reason in some

aspects of kalām are not as present in uṣūl al-fiqh. This allows him to relatively award revelation

more authority in uṣūl al-fiqh. In addition, the rational investigation of the Divine attributes, as

will be mentioned in section one, already established the veracity of revelation, therefore humans

should trust revelation as a source of guidance.

In my conclusion I show that attempting to categorize Abū al-Ḥusayn as a rationalist or a

scripturalist is misleading, rather he is both. He acknowledges the role of reason and revelation,

but each has a different role to play that is dictated by dialectical considerations. I show that

revelation and reason fulfill different tasks in his kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh and that he does not

attempt to favor one over the other. An attempt to categorize Abū al-Ḥusayn, and probably most

medieval Muslim jurists and theologians, as a rationalist or a scripturalist is misleading. Such an

analysis is shallow and fails to understand the complexities of Muslim theology and law.

I have mentioned that in this article I intend to use Abū al-Ḥusayn’s ideas on reason and

revelation to challenge a broader tendency among modern historians of Islam. In my comparison


of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of reason in kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh I try to avoid the rationalist vs.

scripturalist dichotomy that for long dominated the modern study of Islamic thought. Modern

Islamicists frequently tend to categorize Muslim scholars and schools of law and theology as

either rationalists or scripturalists. They often imagine an ongoing battle between a scripturalist

Islam and a rationalist one. For example, A. Wensinck spoke of a war between rationalism and

“orthodoxy” in which the spricturalist “orthodox” branch came out victorious.15 G. Makdisi

speaks about a Sunnī traditionalist revival in the fifth/eleventh century in which “the forces of

Traditionalism fought against the forces of Rationalism of all shades.”16 More recently, C.

Melchert states that from “the later eighth century to the beginning of the tenth, there raged

fierce controversy between those who would found their jurisprudence exclusively on the hadith,

aṣḥāb al-ḥadīth traditionialists, and those who reserved a leading place for common sense, aṣḥāb

al-ra’y.”17

This polarizing dichotomy is also present, although with less effect, among some Middle

Eastern scholars of Islam. In his famous book Fajr al-Islām, Aḥmad Amīn speaks about a

vehement dispute in early Islamic law between those who depend more on reason (ahl al-ra’y)

and those who depend more on Prophetic traditions (ahl al-ḥadīth) in reaching their legal

conclusions (kān al-nizāʿ bayn al-madrasatayn shadīdan).18 Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd uses violent

terminology such as battle (maʿraka) and conflict (ṣirāʿ) to describe the relationship between ahl

15 Arent Jan Wensinck, The Muslim Creed (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1932), 83. Using terms like “orthodox” in an Islamic context is problematic, however I am here using Wensick’s terminology. 16 George Makdisi, “The Sunnī Revival,” in Islamic Civilization 950-1150, ed. D. H. Richards (Oxford: Bruni Cassirer, 1973), 157. This idea often appears in G. Makdisi’s writings, for example see his “Law and Traditionalism in the Institutions of Learning of Medieval Islam,” in Theology and Law in Islam, ed. G. E. von Grunebaum 2nd Giorgio Levi Della Vida Biennial Conference 9-10 May 1969 UCLA (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1971), 75, 86; idem, “Asha‘rism and the Asha‘rites in Islamic Religious History I” Studia Islamica 17 (1962), 37-80; idem, “The Juridical Theology of Shāfiʿī: Origins and Significance of Uṣūl al-Fiqh,” Studia Islamica 59 (1984): 5-47. 17 Melchert, The Formation of the Sunni Schools, 1. 18 Aḥmad Amīn, Fajr al-Islām, 2nd ed. (Beirut: Dār al-Kitāb al-ʿArabī, 1969), 244. For the whole section on both tendencies, see p. 234-45.


al-ra’y and ahl al-ḥadīth. He pictures their “battle” as one between rationalism and

scripturalism.19 The above, and many other, modern scholars of Islam often analyze the history

of Islamic law and theology through this dichotomy enforcing upon themselves a misleading

typology that would deem a scholar, a school of law, or theology as either rationalist or

scripturalist.

Unlike the previous scholars, more recent ones have noticed the deceitfulness of this

naïve dichotomy. For example A. K. Reinhart, in his Before Revelation, studied how Muslim

jurists assess human actions before the advent of revelation, whether actions are proscribed,

prescribed, or neutral. He argues that this debate is not between rationalists and traditionalists.

Reinhart, convincingly, argues that it is rather “between an optimistic view of Providence and

pessimistic one, and between an archaic position and an innovative one.”20 Moreover, Anver

Emon recently wrote Islamic Natural Law Theories in which he examines the role of reason in

pre-modern Muslim law.21 In this book he argues against scholars such as G. Makdisi and P.

Crone who hold that Islamic law is only based on Divine discretion and does not have a concept

of natural law and reason. Emon suggests that the majority of pre-modern Muslim scholars,

regardless of their theological and legal disagreements, acknowledge the role reason plays in the

law making process.

Reinhart’s and Emon’s studies show that it is misleading to imagine that Muslim jurists

and theologians are trenched in two warring ditches, one rationalist and the other scripturalist.

19 Naṣr Ḥāmid Abū Zayd, al-Imām al-Shāfiʿī wa-Ta’sīs al-Idīlūjiyyah al-Wasaṭiyyah, 2nd ed. (Cairo: Maktabat Madbūlī, 1996), passim. 20 A. Kevin Reinhart, Before Revelation: The Boundaries of Muslim Moral Thought (Albany: Sate University of New York Press, 1995), 39. 21 Anver Emon, Islamic Natural Law Theories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). His earlier article “Natural Law and Natural Rights in Islamic Law,” Journal of Law and Religion 20 (2004 -2005): 351-395 includes a brief account of some of the major arguments of his book.


The current study builds on their arguments and suggests that modern scholars of Islam should

escape the trap of this dichotomy that dictates general and simplistic conclusions. Abū al-Ḥusayn

presents a perfect case study to question the dominance of this dichotomy. He is both a Muʿtazilī

and a Ḥanafī. The Ḥanafiyyah are usually imaged as the rationalist school within the Sunnī legal

system, whereas the Muʿtazilah are imaged as the proponents of rationalist theology. Here I

argue that Abū al-Ḥusayn, probably like most medieval Muslim jurists and theologians, accepts

the authority of both reason and revelation, but he awards each a different role to play depending

on the dialectical context of his uṣūl al-fiqh or kalām argument. For him, neither reason nor

revelation has unconditional authority and neither is neglected for the sake of the other, both are

complementary and authoritative. Once again, this research does not attempt to tackle the issue

of reason and revelation in Islam in general. However, this research mainly sheds light on Abū

al-Ḥusayn’s contribution to this debate and tests modern perceptions of this debate against his

conclusions.

In my examination of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s methods in uṣūl al-fiqh I mainly draw upon his

magnum opus al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh which was written during the lifetime of his teacher

ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī (320-5/932-7 - 415/1025).22 In the same publication the

editors also published two treatises in uṣūl al-fiqh written by Abū al-Ḥusayn namely Kitāb

Ziyādāt al-Muʿtamad and Kitāb al-Qiyās al-Sharʿī all published in a two volumes book under

the title of Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh.23 To study Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of reason in

kalām I also referred to his al-Muʿtamad. Although it is not a book on kalām, Abū al-Ḥusayn

briefly and sporadically mentions in it his positions on the evidence eligible for deducing kalām

22 See footnote number 4 in Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 23. It was Heemskerk who drew my attention to this note, see Heemskerk, Suffering in Muʿtazilite Theology, 44. 23 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 991-1028, 1029-50. Kitāb Ziyādāt al-Muʿtamad and Kitāb al-Qiyās al-Sharʿī respectively.


conclusions, including reason. Second, there is Abū al-Ḥusayn’s partially extant book Taṣaffuḥ

al-Adillah; in this book he mainly criticizes some of the Muʿtazilī kalām arguments that he

rejects and mentions his own positions.24 Unfortunately, both books do not include enough

details on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s kalām. Therefore, I am forced to refer to books by his Muʿtazilī

teacher ʿAbd al-Jabbār al-Hamadhānī (known as Qāḍī al-Quḍāh ʿAbd al-Jabbār) in an attempt to

uncover some of the contemporary Mu‘tazilī kalām positions and ascertain some of the details

relevant to Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology.

Abū al-Ḥusayn and ʿAbd al-Jabbār both belong to the Bahshamiyyah sub-school of the

Muʿtazilah before Abū al-Ḥusayn established his own Mu‘tazilī sub-school. I do not assume that

both scholars have the same positions on all kalām topics, because we know that this is not the

case.25 However, I only refer to ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s books (mainly his master piece al-Mughnī) in

the cases where it is clear from his and Abū al-Ḥusayn’s writings that both scholars expressed

similar if not identical theological opinions.26 This method is mainly adopted in two cases. First,

in case Abū al-Ḥusayn very briefly states his theological position without much details. If ʿAbd

al-Jabbār adopts the same position and mentions his own views in more details, I refer to his

books to know the missing details about Abū al-Ḥusayn’s position. A position that he already

mentioned –but only briefly- in his works. Second, in most of the theological doctrines I

examine, Abū al-Ḥusayn usually expresses his theological position without mentioning his

detailed argument in support of it. In such cases, I refer to ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s writings to obtain

24 Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, ed. Wilferd Madelung and Sabine Schmidtke (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006). 25 For more information on the differences between both Muʿtazilī scholars, see Madelung, Rational Theology, 1-12; EI3, s.v. “ʿAbd al-Djabbār.” 26 ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Ahmad al-Hamadhānī, al-Mughnī fī Abwāb al-Tawḥīd wa-l-ʿAdl, 20 vols. ed. Ṭaha Ḥusayn and others (Cairo: Wizārat al-Thaqāfah wa-l-Irshād al-Qawmī, 1960-). When referring to ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s writings a source of information on some aspects of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology, I always present evidence showing that both scholars hold similar if not identical theological positions. For example, see pages 18-21, 35-6 of this article.


more details on the nature of the arguments that Abū al-Ḥusayn might have used to reach and

support his theological positions, positions that Abū al-Ḥusayn already expressed in his books

but only briefly. Thus, I do not refer to ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s writings to determine Abū al-Ḥusayn’s

theology, but only to ascertain some of the missing details that Abū al-Ḥusayn left unmentioned

in his discovered books. Nonetheless, one must admit here that information on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s

theology inferred from ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s books will inevitably remain somewhat speculative.27

My use of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s writings as an auxiliary source of information on some

aspects of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology might open my choice of Abū al-Ḥusayn as the case study

here for question. Is ʿAbd al-Jabbār a more suitable choice for this research rather than Abū al-

Ḥusayn specially that his theology is known in more details than Abū al-Ḥusayn’s? I would

negatively answer this question, for a number of reasons. First, in case I chose ʿAbd al-Jabbār as

my case study I would run into a similar problem. None of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s books on uṣūl al-

fiqh have been hitherto discovered.28 Volume seventeen of his al-Mughnī addresses some aspects

of uṣūl al-fiqh. However, ʿAbd al-Jabbār repeatedly all through this volume explicitly states that

this volume is not intended as a book on uṣūl al-fiqh but only as a brief account of the uṣūl al-

fiqh issues that are relevant to theology. He also frequently states that in this volume he only 27 There is an uṣūl al-fiqh manuscript that is erroneously attributed to Abū al-Ḥusayn. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Abū Zunayd edited and published MSS vat. ar. 1100 from the Vatican Library and indentified it as Abū al-Ḥusayn’s Sharḥ al-ʿUmad which is suppose to be a commentary on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s hitherto undiscovered book al-ʿUmad. Abū Zunayd admits that identifying the manuscript was not easy especially that the first and last pages are missing leaving the manuscript anonymous. However, W. Madelung argues that vat. ar. 1100 is not Sharḥ al-ʿUmad but rather al-Mujzī fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh authored by the Zaydī scholar Abū Ṭālib Yaḥyā b. al-Ḥusayn al-Nāṭiq bi-l-Ḥaqq (d. 424/1033). What conclusively supports Madelung’s opinion is the discovery of further manuscripts of al-Mujzī fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh (e.g. MSS. ar. E. 409 preserved in Biblioteca Ambrosiana) that are identical with the manuscript Abū Zunayd erroneously identified as Abū al-Ḥusayn’s Sharḥ al-‘Umad. The evidence against Abū Zunayd’s identification is compelling therefore I do not use vat. ar. 1100 as a source of information on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s thought. For Abū Zunayd’s argument, see ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Abū Zunayd, introduction to Abū al-Ḥusayn Muḥammad b. ‘Alī b. Ṭayyib al-Baṣrī (d. 436/1044) [pseudo], Sharḥ al-ʿUmad, 2 vols., ed. ʿAbd al-Ḥamīd Abū Zunayd (Medina: Maktabat al-‘Ulūm wa-l-Ḥikam, 1410/[1990]), 22-5. For Wilferd Madelung’s argument, see his Der Imam al-Qasim b. Ibrahim (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1965), 178-80. It was Sabine Schmitdke who informed me of the Biblioteca Ambrosiana manuscript in a personal e-mail correspondence on the 20th of March 2010. 28 Al-Ḥākim al-Jushamī mentions three of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s books on uṣūl al-fiqh namely al-Nihāya, al-ʿUmad, and Sharḥ al-ʿUmda. See, al-Jushamī, Ṭabaqāt al-Muʿtazilah , 368.


mentions his uṣūl al-fiqh positions briefly. He repeatedly refers the reader to his other books on

uṣūl al-fiqh to ascertain more details on his positions.29 This problem is further complicated

when we know that volume seventeen of al-Mughnī is only partially extant. The editor

speculates that one third of the manuscript is missing.30 To ascertain some of the missing details

on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s uṣūl al-fiqh I will have to refer to his contemporaries’ writings on legal

theory such as Abū al-Ḥusayn’s book al-Muʿtamad. In this case I would be adopting a similar

methodology to the one I already adopted in this research to gather some of the missing details

on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology. In case I chose ʿAbd al-Jabbār as my case study I will have

detailed information on his theology but I will face a shortage of information on his uṣūl al-fiqh

and refer to his contemporaries’ books to treat this lacuna. In case I chose Abū al-Ḥusayn I will

have detailed information on his uṣūl al-fiqh but face a shortage of information on his theology

and also refer to his contemporaries’ writing to fill a similar lacuna. However the next two

reasons make Abū al-Ḥusayn rather than ʿAbd al-Jabbār a better choice for this study.

Second, my choice is also motivated by the relative shortage of studies on Abū al-Ḥusayn

if compared to the ones on ʿAbd al-Jabbār. There are numerous studies on ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s

legacy. The number of studies on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s thought dwarf when compared to the ones

conducted on his teacher’s legacy. Therefore I chose to rather focus on Abū al-Ḥusayn and shed

more light on his thought that still remains relatively in the shade. Third, ʿAbd al-Jabbār is a

Shāfiʿī scholar whereas Abū al-Ḥusayn adopts the Ḥanafī madhhab. As previously mentioned,

the Ḥanafī School of law is usually stereotyped as the most rational school among the four Sunnī

Schools of law. The Shāfi‘ī madhhab does not have this reputation. Therefore, I preferred to

29 For example see, ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:46, 91-2, 102-3, 116, 152, 245, 279, 295, 325, 327, 328, 338, 352. Also see the editor’s comments in his introduction to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:4-5. 30 See the editor’s introduction to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:3-4.


study the role of reason and revelation in the thought of a scholar who belongs to a madhhab

usually credited with relatively more appreciation of reason than other schools of law. Abū al-

Ḥusayn’s legal orientation will better serve the questions I am posing in this study. It will help

me show that even a scholar who belongs to supposedly rationalist legal and theological schools

accepts the authority of revelation in the same vehement of any other scholar who belongs to the

other schools of law and theology.

One final point in this regard, I have used the books of ʿAbd al-Jabbār as a source of

information on some aspects of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theology because both are contemporaries and

–for some time- both belonged to the same Muʿtazilī sub-school.31 I deliberately avoid using the

few available writings of earlier Muʿtazilī theologians as a source of information on Abū al-

Ḥusayn’s Muʿtazilī theology. Using the writings of earlier Mu‘tazilī scholars to gather

information on a later Muʿtazilī theologian would entail an assumption that the Muʿtazilah are

one unified group with only one unanimously accepted and unchanging theology. An assumption

that is quite questionable. Medieval heresiogarphies inform us that there are at least seventeen

Muʿtazilī sub-schools.32 We also know that Mu‘tazilī theology probably existed –even in an

embryonic form- since the second/eighth century. It is inconceivable that despite the presence of

many Mu‘tazilī sub-schools and the different historical contexts in which different Muʿtazilī

scholars lived in that they all would adopt only one monolithic theology. Therefore it would be a

31 I only referred once to Rukn al-Dīn Maḥmūd b. Muhammad al-Malaḥmī (d. 536/1141), Kiṭāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, ed. Martin McDermott and Wilferd Madelung (London: al-Hoda, 1991) for information on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s interpretation of a tradition attributed to the Prophet that have theological references. See p. 26-7 of this article. Also see footnote 73 of this article for my justifications for referring to Ibn al-Malaḥmī’s book in this context in particular. 32 For example Fakhr al-Dīn al-Razī mentions seventeen Muʿtazilī sub-schools, see al-Rāzī, Iʿtiqādāt, 23-42; Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-Qāhir b. Ṭāhir b. Muḥammad al-Baghdādī (d. 429/1037) mentions eighteen schools, see his al-Farq bayn al-Firaq, ed. Muḥammad ʿUthmān al-Khisht (Cairo: Maktabat Ibn Sīnā, 1989), 104-177; Abū al-Muẓaffar al-Isfarā’īnī (d. 471/1078) mentions eighteen sub-schools, see his al-Tabṣīr fī al-Dīn wa-Tamyīz al-Firqah al-Nājiyyah ʿan Firaq al-Hālikīn (Cairo: al-Maktabah al-Azhariyyah l-l-Turāth, 1999), 53-82.


methodological fallacy to refer to earlier Muʿtazilī authors to gain more information on Abū al-

Ḥusayn’s theology. Moreover, along the same lines, the conclusions of this paper are limited to

Abū al-Ḥusayn’s thought. This research is based on the theological writings of ʿAbd al-Jabbār

and Abū al-Ḥusayn, therefore claiming that its conclusions apply to the whole Muʿtazilī School

would be an unwarranted generalization.

Before going any further it might be useful to start with a definition of the terms

revelation and reason. Revelation is the term I use in reference to the Qur’ān and the Prophetic

Sunnah. I also use revelation as a translation of the terms sharʿ and samʿ that Abū al-Ḥusayn

uses to refer to the Qur’ān and the Prophetic Sunnah. The use of the word revelation in reference

to Prophetic Sunnah might be problematic. Muslim scholars do not usually consider the

Prophetic Sunnah to be the verbatim word of God, whereas they unanimously accept the Qur’ān

as such. Thus it is easier to apply the word revelation to the Qur’ān. Therefore, my reference to

the Prophetic Sunnah as revelation proper is only an approximation.33

The term reason is more complex. I use reason to translate the Arabic word ‘aql. Some

modern anthropologists such as S. Tambiah and P. Winch have already noted that there is no one

definition of rationality and there is no one yard stick by which scholars can judge the rationality

of cultures other than their own.34 Winch describes enforcing one cultural definition of

rationality on another as a “category mistake.” For him, and many others, different cultures in

33 Reinhart made a similar comment, see his Before Revelation, 185. 34 Stanely J.Tambiah, Magic, Science, Religion and the Scope of Rationality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), especially 111-39; Peter Winch, “Understanding a Primitive Society,” in Rationality, ed. Bryan R. Wilson (1970; reprint, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974): 78-111; Peter Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1958). It is Tambiah who drew my attention to Winch’s discussion of this problem. However, one must say that Tambiah does not agree with Winch on many points (see his critical remarks in p. 121-30). Moreover, Tambiah’s and Winch’s comments are expressed in relation to anthropological studies of primitive tribes who lived during the two previous centuries. The study of medieval Islam is categorically different. However their comments on the difficulties of defining reason and rationality are applicable to the study of the role of reason in any culture and society in the past and the present.


different periods of time have different understandings of rationality. To apply a modern

understanding of rationality to a medieval one would be a “category mistake” that will lead to

misunderstanding the role and the meaning of reason in an intellectual context of the past. As it

is well known among modern scholars of Islam, there are different Muslim pre-modern

understandings of rationality and there is an extensive modern literature engaging with it.

Winch’s concerns might be taken for granted, however the presence of the rationalist vs.

scripturalist dichotomy among modern scholars of Islam show that his criticisms of other

anthropologists applies to modern scholars of medieval Islam as well. To avoid committing this

“category mistake” I am here only concerned with the Muʿtazilī definition of rationality and

particularly that of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s.

Unfortunately, Abū al-Ḥusayn, in his discovered books, does not leave us a clear

definition of reason. Therefore, in a hesitant attempt to ascertain his definition of reason, I

mainly refer to the Basran Muʿtazilī (especially ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s) definition of the term. In

general, it seems that the Basran Muʿtazilah saw that ʿaql is knowledge. Abū al-Ḥusayn notes

that the Muʿtazilah define ʿaql as the knowledge that God creates in humans.35 Mahra Abū Saʿda

wrote that earlier Muʿtazilī scholars, such as Abū ʿAlī al-Jubbā’ī (d. 303/915-6) and his son Abū

Hāshim (d. 321/933) accept this understanding of ʿaql.36 On similar terms, A. N. Nādir says that

the Muʿtazilī scholar Abū al-Hudhayl al-ʿAllāf (died between 226/840-1 and 235/849-50)

defines reason as the power to acquire knowledge.37 The famous Muʿtazilī scholar ʿAbd al-

Jabbār al-Hamadhānī defines reason as “an aggregate of knowledge, once it occurs in the one

who is accountable (al-mukallaf, i.e. humans who are expected to follow religious injunctions) 35 Abū al-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, 78. 36 Mahra Abū Saʿda, al-Ittijāh al-ʿAqlī fī Mushkilat al-Maʿrifa ʿind al-Muʿtazilah (Cairo: Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī, 1993), 80. 37 Albīr Naṣrī Nādir, Falsafat al-Muʿtazilah : Falāsifat al-Islām al-Asbaqīn, 2 vols. (n.p.: Maṭbaʿat al-Rābiṭah, 1951), 2:34.


his rational speculation and inferences become sound and he becomes capable of performing his

religious duties.”38 ʿAbd al-Jabbār sees that this knowledge is mainly innate created by God in

humans.39 He argues that the knowledge(s) that comprise reason is the one(s) necessary for

performing religious duties and without which the acquisition of further knowledge is

impossible.40 It is also the knowledge indispensable for a basic understanding of the ontological

realities of the world. Furthermore, it is the necessary knowledge (al-ʿulūm al-ḍarūriyyah)41

required for a basic understanding of ethical and deontological norms such as knowing that

injustice is evil, justice is good, and that thanking the benefactor is a duty.42 In sum, reason or

ʿaql are the innate knowledge that differentiate between a sane and an insane person. Reason is

the knowledge that makes humans aware of their ethical and deontological obligations and thus

allows them to conform to the social values of their social contexts. Reason is also the

foundational knowledge that is necessary for gaining further knowledge.43

One must note that we have been mainly considering the Basran Muʿtazilī definition of

reason. Unfortunately, for the moment, we can not be sure whether or not Abū al-Ḥusayn agrees

with this definition. His hitherto discovered works do not offer a concrete definition for reason.

As mentioned above Abū al-Ḥusayn says that the Muʿtazilah define reason as knowledge created

by God in humans. He attributes this definition to the Muʿtazilah without categorically rejecting

it. He only objects saying that the knowledge that composes reason is not always innate but is

partially innate and partially acquired.44 If he rejects the idea that reason is an aggregate of

38 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 11:375.

ف صح منھ النظر واال" "ستدالل والقیام بأداء ما كلفالعقل ھو جملة من العلوم المخصوصة، متى حصلت في المكل 39 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 11:371-2. 40 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 11:379. 41 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 11:387. 42 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 11:375. 43 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 11:386. 44 Abū al-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, 78.


knowledge he would have mentioned this objection as well. Given this, it might be safe to

assume that, as a Basran Muʿtazilī, Abū al-Ḥusayn adopts the Basran Muʿtazilī definition of

reason mentioned above.45 The use of this reason unaided by revelation to acquire fiqhī and

kalāmī knowledge is the subject of this research. In the next section I particularly focus on Abū

al-Ḥusayn’s use of reason to reach and support kalāmī conclusions.

ABŪ AL-ḤUSAYN’S USE OF REASON IN KALĀM : THE LIMITS ON REVELATION

ʿIlm al-kalām is a discipline that investigates theological issues related to the nature of God, His

relation with humans, and political authority (imāmah). It is also a discipline concerned with

metaphysical, ontological, and cosmological questions. A specialist in ʿilm al-kalām (sg.

mutakallim/ pl. mutakallimūn) usually expresses him/her self in the language and terminology

common among the ancient Hellenistic philosophers. ʿIlm al-kalām also has a polemical and an

apologetic function, a mutakallim is often engaged in polemical debates against non-Muslims

and Muslims belonging to other sects in defense of his/her understanding of Islam. It is difficult

to find an accurate translation for ʿilm al-kalām, however a common one is theology. This

translation is only an approximation and I plan to use the Arabic term and its approximate

English translation interchangeably.46

45 In the second section, I explain another definition of reason that Abū al-Ḥusayn and other Muʿtazilah hold. As will be mentioned in more details, Abū al-Ḥusayn believes that any proper rational investigation must inevitably lead to the Mu‘tazilī understanding of Divine unity and justice, and in this sense reason becomes the same as those two theological concepts. Any contradiction with both principles is not only a contradiction with the Muʿtazilī creed, but is also a contradiction with “correct reason.” In this sense, Divine unity and justice becomes part of the “knowledges” that comprise reason, see p. 23-4 of this study. 46 For more details on the definition of ʿilm al-kalām, see Abū Naṣr Muḥammad al-Farābī (d. 339/950), Iḥṣā’ al-ʿUlūm, 2nd ed., ed. ʿUthmān Amīn (Egypt: Maṭbaʿat al-I‘timād, 1949), 107-8; Saʿd al-Dīn Masʿūd b. ʿUmar al-Taftazānī (d. 793/1390), Sharḥ al-Maqāṣid min ʿIlm al-Kalām, 2 vols. (Pakistan: Dār al-Maʿārif al-Nuʿmāniyyah, 1401/1981), 1:18; Ibn Khaldūn, Muqaddimat ibn Khaldūn, 458-60; Aḥmad Maḥmūd Ṣubḥī, Fī ʿIlm al-Kalām: al-


The attributes of God (al-ṣifāt) are an integral part of ʿilm al-kalām. Both Abū al-Ḥusayn

and ʿAbd al-Jabbār argue that reason should play the primary role in investigating this aspect of

ʿilm al-kalām. ʿAbd al-Jabbār often argues that humans cannot prove and appreciate the authority

and veracity of revelation until they first know the attributes of the God who sent this revelation.

Therefore he concludes that the Divine attributes are among the primary evidence necessary to

establish the authority of revelation.47 Abū al-Ḥusayn’s position is very similar: he says that

humans will not be certain that revelation is trustworthy and infallible until they first know that

God Himself is infallible, just, and does not need to commit evil. Thus before knowing those

Divine attributes (and related kalām issues) revelation has no authority. Therefore, Abū al-

Ḥusayn argues that humans are left only with unaided reason to investigate the nature of God and

His attributes.48 He adds that since the Divine attributes are important evidence to establish the

authority of revelation, referring to revelation to ascertain the attributes of God would rest the

authority of revelation on a petitio principii. For that reason, from a dialectical perspective, it

does not make sense to refer to revelation to discover the Divine attributes and then later use the

Divine attributes to establish the authority of revelation. Furthermore, it does not make sense to

refer to God’s Words to prove His good and just attributes. Abū al-Ḥusayn suggests that in order

to avoid this logical fallacy, reason, instead of revelation, should be used to investigate any

kalām issue that is necessary to establish the authority and veracity of revelation.49 His position

Muʿtazilah (Beirut: Dār al-Nahḍa al-ʿArabiyyah, 1405/1985), 15-8; H. A. Wofson, The Philosophy of the Kalam (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), 1-42; EI2, s.v. “ʿIlm al-Kalām.” 47 ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, Mutashābih al-Qur’ān, ed. ‘Adnān Zarzūr (Cairo: Dār al-Turāth, 1969), 36; ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 12:166, 16:395, 17: 93, 315, 393. 48 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 886-7, 910. 49 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 887.


on this point is common among other Muslim theologians including ʿAbd al-Jabbār who

expresses identical views on this issue.50

Among the Divine attributes that Abū al-Ḥusayn and ʿAbd al-Jabbār believe to be crucial

for establishing the authority of revelation are Divine unity and justice (al-tawḥīd wa-l-ʿadl).

Both scholars argue that Divine unity and justice are necessary to prove that God’s revelation

includes neither evil nor injustice. They argue that without precluding evil and injustice from

revelation it is impossible to establish its usefulness and probative value. In the following pages,

I explain their arguments linking Divine unity and justice to proving the probative value of

revelation.

For the Muʿtazilah, Divine unity is more than an assertion of monotheism.51 Their

understanding of Divine unity leads to other theological consequences such as the rejection of

corporeality (tajsīm) and an assertion of the createdness of the Qur’ān.52 Their rejection of

corporeality (i.e. God does not have a material body) led them to reject any anthropomorphic

description of God because they consider anthropomorphism as tantamount to corporeality.53

50 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 14:151-2, 17:93; Richard Frank, “Knowledge and Taqlīd: The Foundations of Religious Belief in Classical Ash‘arism,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 109 (1989): 37-62. 51 W. Montgomery Watt, Islamic Philosophy and Theology, 2nd ed. (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2003), 48. 52 For a detailed explanation of the Muʿtazilī concept of Divine unity and its theological consequences, see ʿ Abd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī [Mānkdīm Shashdīw d. 425/1034], Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah, ed. ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān (Cairo: Maktabat Wahbah, 1988), 149-298; Majid Fakhry, A History of Islamic Philosophy, 3rd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2004), 57-64. In relation to Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah, it is now widely accepted that A. ‘Uthmān wrongly identified the edited manuscript as ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah. D. Gimaret wrote an article arguing that the edited manuscript is rather Mānkdīm’s commentary on and paraphrastic reproduction of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s original book Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah. After reading the book it became clear to me that the manuscript ʿUthmān edited includes the words of two authors and not only one, which makes Gimaret’s identification more plausible. In all cases, I only refer to Sharḥ al-Uṣūl al-Khamsah to understand the contemporary Muʿtazilī positions from certain theological questions and not to investigate ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s thought in particular. For more on ʿUthmān’s argument that the manuscript is ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s, see ʿAbd al-Karīm ʿUthmān, introduction to ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ, 25-8. For Gimaret’s argument, see D. Gimaret, “Les Uṣūl al-Hamsa du Qāḍī ʿAbd al-Jabbār et leurs Commentaires,” Annales Islamologiques 15 (1979): 47-96. 53 For example, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār b. Aḥmad al-Hamadhānī, al-Mukhtaṣar fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, in Muḥammad ʿAmārah, ed. Rasā’il al-ʿAdl wa-l-Tawḥīd (Cairo: Dār al-Hilāl, 1971), 184-90.


ʿAbd al-Jabbār sees that disproving corporeality is vital for establishing the authority of

revelation. He argues that the main evidence proving that God does not commit evil is that He is

totally self sufficient (ghanī) and is never in need (ḥājah) and thus He has no need or motivation

to commit evil. He then links self sufficiency with non-corporeality and makes the authority of

revelation contingent on both concepts. ʿAbd al-Jabbār states that revelations from a corporeal

being can not be taken for granted as good and just. He argues that any corporeal body is

insufficient (muḥtāj) and thus might commit evil to satisfy its needs. ʿAbd al-Jabbār adds that an

insufficient being might then commit evil and injustice to satisfy the needs of its corporeal body

and maintain its existence. A revelation from such a being cannot then by default be trusted

because there is a possibility that this corporeal being might commit injustice or evil in its

revelations. Therefore, evil and injustice can not be categorically precluded from the revelations

of such a being. Revelations from such a being do not warrant the complete trust of the human

mind. ʿAbd al-Jabbār concludes that revelations only from a totally self-sufficient being who will

never need to commit evil to survive can be taken for granted as trustworthy and free from evil.54

Through this argument ʿAbd al-Jabbār makes the authority and veracity of revelation contingent

on upholding the non-corporeality of God.

In none of his discovered works does Abū al-Ḥusayn explicitly connect non-corporeality

with self-sufficiency. However, it can be inferred from his writings that he would agree with

ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s statements mentioned in the previous paragraph. In al-Muʿtamad, Abū al-

Ḥusayn says that among the conditions to accept the performance of the religious duties (takālīf)

mediated by revelation is to know that this revelation originates from a self-sufficient Being who

54 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 4:19-33, 6:177-80.


has no need to commit evil.55 He also says that proving the authority of revelation depends on

first establishing the self-sufficiency of God.56 Abū al-Ḥusayn adds that self-sufficiency ensures

the usefulness of revelation. He believes that self-sufficiency guarantees that nothing can either

benefit or cause harm to God, therefore God’s orders and prohibitions mentioned in His

revelation are not for His own benefit but for the benefit of His creatures including humans,57

and therefore are worthy of being followed. Also, in his Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, Abū al-Ḥusayn

states that self-sufficiency is among the crucial conditions to know that God will not commit

evil.58 Abū al-Ḥusayn makes these statements while attempting to prove the probative value and

usefulness of revelation. It is clear here that for Abū al-Ḥusayn the authority of revelation is

contingent on first establishing that it comes from a self-sufficient Being. It is obvious that Abū

al-Ḥusayn’s statements here are very similar to ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s statements in which he makes

the rejection of corporeality vital to establish the trustworthiness of revelation. Therefore, it

seems that both scholars believe that Divine unity (specially the rejection of corporeality) is

necessary to prove the veracity of revelation, and thus, in order to avoid a circular argument,

revelation should not be used to investigate Divine unity, because Divine unity will be later used

as evidence for the authority of revelation. Therefore, given this dialectical context, reason is the

only tool that is logically capable of addressing issues related to Divine unity.

A similar argument is made to show that Divine justice is crucial for establishing the

authority of revelation. Again the Muʿtazilī perception of Divine justice is not just a simple

assertion of God’s adherence to objective criteria of justice. It necessitates other theological

55 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 908.

لف التي معھا یمكن االستدالل على األحكام، ھي كونھ عالما بقبح القب" یح، وبوجوب الواجب، وبأنھ عالم غني عن فعل القبیح وعن اعلم أن صفة المك "اإلخالل بالواجب

56 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 887. 57 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 80-2. 58 Abū al-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, 96.


consequences such as free will (qadar), the concept of God’s adherence to the optimum benefit

of humans (al-ṣalāḥ wa-l-aṣlaḥ),59 Divine benevolence (luṭf), Divine wisdom (ḥikmah).60 ʿAbd

al-Jabbār states that Divine justice (and its theological consequences) is indispensable to

preclude the possibility that revelation will contain evil or injustice.61 Abū al-Ḥusayn holds the

same position. He says that Divine wisdom (one of the theological consequences of Divine

justice) is important to prove the usefulness of revelation.62 God’s wisdom is necessary to rule

out the possibility that He will do futile or evil acts. Therefore, the belief that God’s revelation is

free from futile orders and pointless prohibitions is contingent on first establishing that God is

wise and just.63 Divine justice is thus necessary to establish the authority and usefulness of

revelation. For that reason, depending on revelation to prove Divine justice and its theological

consequences would rest the authority of revelation on a circular argument. To avoid such a

dialectic fall, Abū al-Ḥusayn argues that reason rather than revelation is the only suitable tool to

investigate issues related to Divine justice and wisdom. Referring to revelation to establish those

theological tenants would be referring to God’s words to establish His wisdom and justice. Such

an argument would not stand any logical scrutiny.

Unfortunately, in his published books, Abū al-Ḥusayn does not mention the rational

arguments by which he reached his belief in Divine unity and justice. However, as can be

inferred from his al-Muʿtamad and Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, Abū al-Ḥusayn is very explicit in his

59 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 80-2. According to this Mu‘tazilī concept, God will always create and put humans in the best situation (al-aṣlaḥ) and will always guide them, through revelation, to their best interest (ṣalāḥ). For more details, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 14:7-180; idem, Sharḥ, 518-28. 60 For a detailed explanation of the Mu‘tazilī concept of Divine justice and its theological consequences, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ, 299-528. For a detailed description of the Muʿtazilī understanding of Divine benevolence see volume thirteen of ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s al-Mughnī. 61 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mutashābih, 9, 33. 62 Abū al-Ḥusayn, Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, 112. 63 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 180-1, 371, 405, 551.


belief in Divine unity and justice and their theological consequences. Since he believes that only

reason can prove Divine unity and justice and their theological consequences, and since he

believes in those two theological principles, then it follows that he believes that the Muʿtazilī

perception of Divine unity and justice is compatible with objective reason. This brings up

another Muʿtazilī definition of reason. For Abū al-Ḥusayn, and many other Muʿtazilah, any

“correct” rational investigation of the nature of God will only lead to the Muʿtazilī understanding

of Divine unity and justice. Any rational effort leading to different theological conclusions would

be corrupt. In their works when Abū al-Ḥusayn and ʿAbd al-Jabbār speak about compatibility

with reason (ʿaql), they are in fact referring to compatibility with their perceptions of Divine

unity and justice and their theological consequences, and not to compatibility with an objective

rational criteria that is free from doctrinal presumptions. Therefore, for them (and probably other

Muʿtazilah as well), predestination and anthropomorphism are not only incompatible with the

Muʿtazilī creed, but are a challenge to the veracity of revelation and in discrepancy with “correct

reason”. This shows that among the “knowledges” that comprise reason Abū al-Ḥusayn and

ʿAbd al-Jabbār would include knowledge and belief in the Muʿtazilī perceptions of Divine unity

and justice.

Abū al-Ḥusayn, and the Muʿtazilah in general, consider Divine unity and justice (and

their theological consequences) fundamental to establishing the veracity of revelation, therefore

for dialectical reasons revelation is not a valid source of information on them. Abū al-Ḥusayn

does not reject revelation because it is inherently incapable of establishing these theological

positions. He refers to revelation to establish any other kalām position that he considers not to be

relevant to proving the authority of revelation.64 His dependence on reason in such theological

64 For example, see Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 888; idem, Taṣaffuḥ Al-Adillah, 77.


topics is motivated by his desire to avoid any logical fallacies and maintain the soundness of a

rational argumentation for the authority of revelation.

HARMONIZING REVELATION WITH REASON

Abū al-Ḥusayn’s dependence on reason does not mean that he totally neglects revelation. He has

to come up with theories to show that his rationally acquired Muʿtazilī creed is in harmony with

revelation. This problem is particularly pressing because there are some aspects of revelation that

appear to be in contradiction with the Muʿtazilī perception of Divine unity and justice, such as

the Qur’ānic verses and traditions attributed to the Prophet that describe God in anthropomorphic

terms or the ones that seem to uphold predestination.65 Abū al-Ḥusayn has to explain the

existence of such texts without compromising his Muʿtazilī creed. Before going into his

justifications, it is useful to give some brief definitions of the terms important for understanding

his arguments. In terms of authenticity there are two types of textual evidence. First the

conclusively authentic texts (qaṭʿī al-thubūt), those are the textual evidence that Muslim scholars

believe to be beyond any doubt authentic. The only two types of conclusively authentic textual

evidence are the Qur’ān and the mutawātir Prophetic traditions. The mutawātir Prophetic

traditions are ones narrated by a large number of unrelated people whose “unrelatedness” would

65 For the Qur’ānic verses that might be used to support anthropomorphism, see for example 2:115, 20:39, 38:75. For traditions attributed to the Prophet that might be used to support anthropomorphism, see for instance Muḥammad b. ʿĪsā al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892), Sunan al-Tirmidhī, ed. Aḥmad Shākir and others (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al-ʿArabī, n.d.), 5:366, in CD-ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr. For the Qur’ānic verses that might be used to support predestination, see for example 9:51, 13:22, 57:22. For traditions that might be used to support predestination, see for example Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj (d.261/875), Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, ed. Muḥammad ʿAbd al-Bāqī (Beirut: Dār Iḥyā’ al-Turāth al- ʿArabī, n.d.), 2037-42. CD-ROM al-Jāmiʿ al-Kabīr.


make it impossible for them to collude to forge a tradition.66 Second, there is the inconclusively

authentic textual evidence (ẓannī al-thubūt); most traditions attributed to the Prophet are of this

type, they are usually called āḥād traditions.67 Specialists in the discipline of ḥadīth have

established criteria to evaluate the authenticity of the āḥād traditions. The ones that do not fulfill

these authentication criteria are discarded as fake (mawḍūʿ), āḥād traditions that fulfill the

authentication criteria are considered to be only most probably and not conclusively authentic.68

Abū al-Ḥusayn is aware that there are a number of inconclusively authentic textual

evidence (mainly āḥād traditions attributed to the Prophet) that are in contradiction with the

Muʿtazilī perceptions of Divine unity and justice. However, he explicitly states that any āḥād

tradition attributed to the Prophet that supports anthropomorphism or predestination must

definitely either be a result of a later fabrication or an error in transmission.69 In several

occasions in al-Muʿtamad, Abū al-Ḥusayn also says that any āḥād tradition attributed to the

Prophet that is in contradiction with “reason” must be inauthentic, because the Prophet would

never utter words that are in contradiction with “reason”.70 As mentioned above, it can be easily

inferred that what Abū al-Ḥusayn means by reason is not objective reason that is free from any

theological presumptions. For him, reason includes a belief in the rationally acquired Muʿtazilī

principles of Divine unity and justice and their theological consequences.

66 For more details on mutawātir traditions, see Aḥmad b. ʿAlī b. Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī (d. 852/1449), Nuzhat al-Naẓar fī Sharḥ Nukhbat al-Fikr fī Muṣṭalaḥ Ahl al-Athar, ed. Ḥamdī al-Dimirdāsh (Mecca: Maktabat Niẓār Muṣṭafā al-Bāz, 2000), 25-30; Abu al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 547-8, 552-3, 558, 561, 565-6; EI2, s.v. “Tawātur.” 67 Abū ʿAmr b. al-Ṣalaḥ (d. 643/1245), Muqaddimat ibn al-Ṣalaḥ wa-Maḥāsin al-Iṣṭilāḥ, ed. ʿĀ’ishah ʿAbd al-Raḥman (Cairo: Dār al-Maʿārif, 1990), 454. 68 For more details, see Ibn Ḥajar al-ʿAsqalānī, Nuzhat al-Naẓar, 39; EI2, s.v. “Khabar al-wāḥid.” Āḥād traditions are also further divided into ṣaḥīḥ, ḥasan, and ḍaʿīf traditions according to the reliability of their narrations. On those last categories and further classifications, see Ṣubḥī al-Ṣāliḥ, ʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth wa-Muṣṭalaḥuh (Damascus: Maṭbaʿat Jāmiʿat Dimashq, 1959), 141-67. 69 This approach is best demonstrated in Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 549-50. 70 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 549-50, 570-3, 641-2, 1028.


However, Abū al-Ḥusayn does not always rush to declare an alleged Prophetic tradition

as inauthentic, he says that before the tradition is disallowed, a scholar should try to see if the

tradition in question could be allegorically interpreted (tu’awwal) in a way that would make it

compatible with “reason”. Only after this process of ta’wīl fails to harmonize the alleged

tradition with “reason,” should the tradition in question be declared inauthentic.71 It is worth

noting that in this context the Arabic term that Abū al-Ḥusayn uses for the word interpretation is

ta’wīl and not the more commonly used term tafsīr. Ta’wīl is used by some medieval scholars to

refer to allegorical interpretations that do not remain faithful to the exoteric meanings of the

verse, whereas tafsīr is usually limited to an exoteric interpretation of a Qur’ānic verse.72

I found only one example in which Abū al-Ḥusayn is reported to have performed ta’wīl

of an āḥād tradition attributed to the Prophet. Rukn al-Dīn b. al-Malaḥmī (d. 536/1141) records

Abū al-Ḥusayn’s ta’wīl of an alleged Prophetic tradition that is used to support the beatific vision

of God on Judgment Day.73 In this tradition it is reported that the Abū Dharr al-Ghifārī (d.

32/652-3) asked the Prophet if he saw God. There are two versions of the Prophet’s reply, the

first is, “Light, I saw [it]”, whereas the second is, “Light! How can I see it?” According to Ibn al-

Malaḥmī, Abū al-Ḥusayn prefers the second version, because it is in harmony with the Muʿtazilī

71 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 549-50, 570-3, 641-2, 1028. Interestingly, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s Muʿtazilī student Mānakdīm Shashdīw mentions an identical method to deal with such āḥād traditions, see ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Sharḥ, 770. 72 For more details on the different definitions of the terms ta’wīl and tafsīr, see Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūtī (d. 911/1505), Al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, 4 vols. (Cairo: Maktabat al-Ṣafā, 2006), 4:138-40. 73 In his al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, Ibn al-Malaḥmī says that the first part of his book is an abridgement of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah. Ibn al-Malaḥmī adds that he rarely disagreed with Abū al-Ḥusayn’s theological teachings, and when he did he made it clear to the reader (p. 5). In their introduction to al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, the editors state that Ibn al-Malaḥmī is the 6th/12th century main representative of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s Mu‘tazilī sub-school (p. vi). Therefore, Ibn al-Malaḥmī’s al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīn seems to be a relatively reliable source of information on Abū al-Ḥusayn in this specific context. See, Ibn al-Malaḥmī, Kitāb al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīn.


rejection of the beatific vision.74 However, Ibn al-Malaḥmī says that Abū al-Ḥusayn does not

reject the authenticity of the first version, instead Abū al-Ḥusayn is reported to have stated that if

the Prophet actually uttered the first reply, then this must be a reference to seeing the Angel

Gabriel or that the Prophet saw “light” but did not see God Himself.75 In this example, Abū al-

Ḥusayn does not rush to declare the first reply as fake. He rather prefers to abandon its literal

meaning and came up with another interpretation that makes the alleged tradition compatible

with the Mu‘tazilī perception of Divine unity.

It is relatively easy to declare an inconclusively authentic tradition fake, however this

method is not possible when dealing with conclusively authentic textual evidence that are in

contradiction with Divine unity and justice. Unfortunately, neither in al-Muʿtamad nor in

Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah does Abū al-Ḥusayn inform his readers how he explains the existence of

Qur’ānic verses that appear to be in contradiction with the Muʿtazilī understanding of Divine

unity and justice. As mentioned above Abū al-Ḥusayn believes that the Prophet would never

utter words that are in contradiction with Divine unity and justice. It is then reasonable to assume

that Abū al-Ḥusayn also believes that the Qur’rān would never bring information that are in

contradiction with Divine unity and justice as well. However, as mentioned earlier, there are

several Qur’ānic verses that seem in contradiction with both Mu‘tazilī principles. Abū al-Ḥusayn

does not mention how he intends to resolve this dilemma. However, ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s words

might offer some insights on the methods Abū al-Ḥusayn might have adopted to deal with such

verses.

74 A number of Muʿtazilī scholars argue that accepting the beatific vision will lead to accepting that God has a corporeal body, therefore they reject it. See, for example ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s argument in his al-Mughnī, 4:140. 75 Ibn al-Malaḥmī, al-Muʿtamad fī Uṣūl al-Dīn, 486-7.


ʿAbd al-Jabbār explicitly states that some Qur’ānic verses might appear to be in

contradiction with the rationally acquired Muʿtazilī main theological principles, such verses he

considers to be mutashābih, whereas he considers the verses that are explicitly in harmony with

the Muʿtazilī five principles to be muḥkam,76 and concludes that all mutashābih verses must be

interpreted in harmony with the muḥkam ones regardless of the literal meaning of the mutashābih

verses.77 This means that even the Qur’ānic verses that their literal meaning would appear to be

in contradiction with Muʿtazilī theology will be allegorically interpreted to harmonize them with

the Muʿtazilī creed. By this exegetical method, all Qur’ānic verses would be interpreted in

harmony with Divine unity and justice, including those with an apparent literal meaning in

contradiction with both principles. Given Abū al-Ḥusayn’s advise to allegorically interpret āḥād

traditions that seem in contradiction with “Muʿtazilī reason” before declaring them fake, it seems

safe to assume that Abū al-Ḥusayn would have accepted ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s method in dealing with

the Qur’ānic verses that seem in contradiction with Divine unity and justice.

Unfortunately, Abū al-Ḥusayn’s writings do not explicitly reveal why revelation should

be interpreted according to the dictates of “correct reason” and not vice versa. It is also not

explicitly stated why reason is entitled to determine the authentic parts of revelation, and not

revelation that would distinguish between correct and corrupt rational endeavors. At the same

time, Abū al-Ḥusayn makes it very clear that humans’ trust in revelation is based on the

76 There are a number of Qur’ānic verses that might be interpreted in a manner that supports freewill, for example 2:286, 18:29, 74:382. And other Qur’ānic verses that might be interpreted in a manner that rejects anthropomorphism, for example 42:11, 112:4. The five theological principles are the theological beliefs that the Muʿtazilah unanimously accept, among them is Divine unity and justice. The remaining three are the promise and the threat, the intermediate position, and commanding the good and forbidding the evil. However, the Muʿtazilah differ on the details pertaining to these broad theological doctrines. 77 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, Mutashābih, 7. Muḥkam and Mutashābih are two exegetical terms. The first is usually used to refer to unequivocal Qur’ānic verses, whereas the other is usually used to refer to equivocal Qur’ānic verses or ones that their connotations are unclear. This is an oversimplified explanation, for more details, see Ṣubḥī al-Ṣāliḥ, Mabāḥith fī ʿUlūm al-Qur’ān, 5th ed. (Beirut: Dār al-ʿIlm li-l-Malayīn, 1968), 281-6.


rationally acquired Muʿtazilī understanding of Divine unity and justice. Humans trust revelation

because God is wise, just, and self sufficient. These Divine attributes (that are established by

rational arguments) ensure that God will not commit evil, injustice, and futile acts. This

guarantees that His revelation is free from evil and error. Moreover, this assures that God’s

proscriptions and prescriptions are not futile or harmful rather they are beneficial and aim at

avoiding harm.78 If those principles are undermined then the authority of revelation will be

undermined as well. Thus, it makes sense to find Abū al-Ḥusayn always keen to interpret

revelation in harmony with Divine unity and justice. From his point of view, it would not make

sense to find revelation bringing information that would undermine its own authority and

veracity.

ʿAbd al-Jabbār’s statements are even more explicit. He states that the authority of

revelation is based on the rational arguments that support the Muʿtazilī understanding of the

Divine attributes (i.e. Divine unity and justice). Therefore he argues that it is inconceivable that

revelation would contradict those rationally acquired principles because they are the main

evidence proving the veracity of revelation. If revelation contradicts those rationally acquired

principles it would undermine the evidence that supports its own authority. Therefore, the Qur’ān

and the Prophetic Sunnah must always be in harmony with Muʿtazilī reason. It would not make

sense to interpret the Qur’ān and the Prophetic Sunnah in contradiction with “reason” because

contradiction with “reason” would undermine their own authority. Furthermore, it is impossible

that the Qur’ān and the Prophetic Sunnah would include information that undermines their own

authority. Since Divine unity and justice is the main evidence establishing the authority of

78 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 179-81, 284, 371, 405, 419, 551, 886-8, 908, 931.


revelation,79 therefore revelation cannot be used as evidence to disprove the same evidence (i.e.

Divine unity and justice) that proved its own veracity.80 Therefore the correct interpretation of

revelation is always the one that will keep revelation in harmony with reason. Thus, on kalām

issues that are relevant to Divine unity and justice, “reason” determines the authentic parts of

revelation and determines the correct interpretation of revelation as well. On this point, ʿAbd al-

Jabbār and Abū al-Ḥusayn (and probably other Muʿtazilah) are in agreement.

This theory places reason on top of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s epistemic hierarchy of evidence in

kalām. Reason becomes the decisive factor in identifying the authentic Prophetic traditions and

determining the correct interpretation of revelation. Nonetheless, it is important to note that Abū

al-Ḥusayn does not believe that reason is superior to revelation. He rather adopts this epistemic

hierarchy of evidence in kalām for dialectical reasons. To maintain a sound rational argument for

the authority of revelation, Abū al-Ḥusayn has to avoid depending on revelation to establish the

Divine attributes. The Divine attributes themselves will be later used to establish the authority of

revelation. This epistemic hierarchy of evidence is adopted to avoid grounding the authority of

revelation on a circular argument and not because he holds that reason is superior to revelation.

In uṣūl al-fiqh Abū al-Ḥusayn adopts a slightly different epistemic hierarchy of evidence. The

next section examines Abū al-Ḥusayn’s epistemic hierarchy of evidence in uṣūl al-fiqh and

compares it to his hierarchy of evidence in kalām.

ABŪ AL-ḤUSAYN’S USE OF REASON IN UṢŪL AL-FIQH

79 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 12:166, 16:395, 17:315, 393. 80 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 17:93.


To conduct this comparison, I mainly investigate Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of reason in relation to

revelation in reaching fiqhī conclusions. I conduct this investigation by analyzing a number of

uṣūl al-fiqh questions. In this section, I argue that revelation has more authority in his uṣūl al-

fiqh than in his kalām. However, his dependence on revelation in uṣūl al-fiqh does not mean, as

will be shown, a rejection of reason. He depends more on revelation in the uṣūl al-fiqh matters

that reason is incapable of addressing. Also the dialectical reasons that necessitate his

dependence on reason in some aspects of kalām, especially the Divine attributes, are not present

in uṣūl al-fiqh and this allowed him to award revelation more powers in it. However, I argue that

attempting to categorize Abū al-Ḥusayn’s uṣūl al-fiqh as rationalist or scripturalist is misleading.

Rather, his uṣūl al-fiqh appreciates reason and revelation, but each has a different role to play,

and for him both are indispensable.

On the macro level uṣūl al-fiqh (usually translated as legal theory and I plan to use the

Arabic term and its English translation interchangeably) are the “theoretical and philosophical

foundation[s] of Islamic law.”81 On the mircro level, uṣūl al-fiqh are the methods jurists use to

read and interpret the Qur’ān and the Prophetic Sunnah to reach and support their fiqhī

conclusions. Uṣūl al-fiqh are the tools through which fiqh is formed and through which the

Qur’ān and Prophetic Sunnah produce positive laws that Muslims can apply in their daily lives.

In addition to the Qur’ān and the Prophetic Sunnah, consensus and legal reasoning also serve as

uṣūl al-fiqh methods to form fiqhī regulations.82 Fiqh is the positive laws that uṣūl al-fiqh

81 Wael Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), vii. 82 For more details on the definition of uṣūl al-fiqh, see Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad , 10-1; al-Shīrāzī, Sharḥ al-Lumaʿ, 157-63; Abū al-Maʿālī al-Juwaynī (d. 478/1085), al-Burhān fī Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 2 vols. ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAẓīm al-Dīb (Mansoura: al-Wafā’, 1418 H), 78-9; Abū Ḥāmid Muḥammad b. Muḥammad al-Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), al-Mustaṣfā min ʿIlm al-Uṣūl, ed. Ḥamza b. Zuhayr Ḥāfiẓ (Medina, 1413/1992), 1:5; Muḥammad al-Khuḍarī, Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 6th ed. (Cairo: al-Maktabah, al-Tijāriyyah, al-Kubrā, 1389/1969), 14-20; ʿAbd al-Wahhāb Khallāf, ʿIlm Uṣūl al-Fiqh, 8th ed. (n.p.: Maktabat al-Daʿwah al-Islāmiyyah, n.p.), 12-5. The definition I adopt here indicates that the function of uṣūl al-fiqh is to both construct new laws and justify current ones. However, some recent historians


produce. Uṣūl al-fiqh are abstract regulations whereas fiqh is the body of exact rules and

regulations deduced from revelation (via uṣūl al-fiqh) that Muslims are expected to follow.

To understand the evidence and the process through which Abū al-Ḥusayn reaches his

fiqhī conclusions I start by examining his moral epistemology.83 His trust in revelation is based

on his rationally established theology. As mentioned in the previous section, the rationally

acquired Muʿtazilī concept of al-aṣlaḥ is based on the idea that God’s wisdom and justice makes

Him act in the best benefit of His creatures. This concept, Abū al-Ḥusayn argues, necessitates

that God will always refrain from issuing purposeless, evil, or harmful orders.84 Therefore, Abū

al-Ḥusayn concludes that all revelational stipulations, by default and based on his rational

theology, must lead to benefit (maṣlaḥah)85 and fend off harm (fasād).86 Abū al-Ḥusayn, as Carl

El-Tobgui notes, sees that there is a “symbiotic” relationship between revelation and maṣlaḥah.87

Abū al-Ḥusayn explicitly says that God’s orders are for the wellbeing of humanity.88 Therefore

humans can safely depend on it to mediate moral assessments of human actions, because what

revelation condones is by default good and beneficial and whatever it condemns is always

repugnant and harmful.

argue that legal theory is not a tool that creates new laws but one that only justifies current laws, for example see Sherman Jackson’s argument in his “Function and Formalism: Toward a Functional Analysis of Usul al-fiqh,” in Studies in Islamic Legal Theory, ed. Bernard Weiss (Leiden: Brill, 2002): 177-201. For an argument that supports my definition, see Wael Hallaq, “Considerations on the Function and Character of Sunni Legal Theory,” Journal of the American Oriental Society 104.4 (1984): 679-689. 83 Marcus Singer defines moral epistemology as “the discipline, at the intersections of ethics and epistemology, that studies the epistemic status and relations of moral judgments and principles. It has developed out of an interest, common to both ethics and epistemology, in questions of justification and justifiability in epistemology, of statements or beliefs, and in ethics of actions as well of judgments of actions and also general principles of judgments.” For more details see his article in The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, s.v. “Moral Epistemology.” Also, see The Online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, s.v. “Moral Epistemology.” 84 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 78, 80, 180. 85 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 573-4, 713. 86 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 908, 988. 87 El-Tobgui, “The Epistemology of Qiyās,” 318. 88 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 80-1.


Abū al-Ḥusayn’s trust in revelation is clear in his argument for the goodness (ḥusn) of

and benefit behind religious rituals (ʿibādāt) ordained by revelation. He states that all religious

rituals are Divinely ordained for the benefit of Humanity.89 In his al-Muʿtamad, he does not

attempt to rationally prove that the religious rituals ordained by revelation are good and

beneficial. Instead he argues that God’s wisdom necessitates that He will not burden humans

with obligations without a reward, will not issue futile orders, and prevent Him from issuing

harmful orders.90 He adds that God’s wisdom necessitates that all of His prescriptions are for the

benefit of humans including the religious rituals. Therefore, it is taken for granted that the

performance of religious rituals is good and beneficial.91 However, Abū al-Ḥusayn states that

unaided reason is incapable of discovering the good nature in and benefit behind rituals such as

the five daily prayers and fasting during Ramaḍān, only revelation can do this task.92 For

example, unaided reason cannot inform humans of the reasons why it is obligatory [and thus

beneficial] to fast on the first day of Ramaḍān whereas it is not blameworthy [thus not harmful]

not to fast one day before Ramaḍān.93 Such ritualistic details, the benefit that they bring, and the

harm caused by omitting them can only be known by revelation and not through any rational

effort. This is also true about other religious proscriptions such as the prohibition of consuming

intoxicants and blood. Abū al-Ḥusayn says that pure reason does not prohibit these acts and does

not consider them harmful.94 However, since revelation proscribes them, they must be harmful.

89 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 403-5, 574, 710, 888-9. 90 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 80-1, 178-80. 91 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 405. 92 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 888-9. Elsewhere Abū al-Ḥusayn explicitly says that unaided reason would have considered the five daily prayers as futile, see his al-Muʿtamad, 682. Only revelation is capable of discovering the benefits behind such a ritual. 93 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 888. He also adds that reason can not ascertain the details necessary for performing the five daily prayers such as the number of prostrations required for each prayer, see his al-Muʿtamad, 724. 94 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 301, 725-6, 813.


This symbiotic relationship between revelation, on the one hand, and benefit and

goodness on the other should not mislead us to conclude that Abū al-Ḥusayn believes that

actions become good or repugnant just because of a revelatory stipulation. This problem is

complicated by Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of the terms ʿillah and wajh (defined below). In his

discussion of taʿlīl (i.e. knowing the ʿillah behind a fiqhī judgment (ḥukm) in order to perform

qiyās),95 he argues that an ʿillah sharʿiyyah (i.e. ʿillah known or inferred from revelation) might

be the wajh96 of benefit (maṣlaḥah) behind performing certain acts, and therefore there is no

maṣlaḥah in this act before the advent of revelation.97 This might suggest that for Abū al-Ḥusayn

certain acts are not essentially beneficial or good and they only acquire their aspect (wajh) of

goodness or repugnancy after the advent of revelation.

The word wajh is of importance here and deserves some attention. Reinhart notes that the

Basran Muʿtazilah believe that the wajh of an act is “part of the ontological composite that

constituted the nature of a thing or act; yet the wajh was only tenuously a part of the act’s

existence.” Reinhart adds that the Basran Muʿtazilah came up with this idea to correct the rigid

moral theory of the Baghdadi Muʿtazilah who wish

95 ʿIllah is the reason behind the fiqhī judgment as mentioned or inferred from a text (naṣṣ). The ʿillah is used to extend the same judgment mentioned in the text to another similar case not covered by the text, this process is called qiyās. The case covered by the text is called aṣl while the case to which the judgment is transferred is called farʿ. For more details on these terms and their use in qiyās, see Hallaq, “A Tenth-Eleventh Century Treatise,” 197-206. For Abū al-Ḥusayn’s definitions of ʿillah, see Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 704-5. For his definition of aṣl, see Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 701-3. 96 R. Frank translates the term wajh as “the manner of the act’s occurrence.” See, Richard Frank, Beings and their Attributes: The Teaching of the Basrian School of the Muʿtazila in the Classical Period (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1978), 126, 131-5; idem, “Reason and Revealed Law: A Sample of Parallels and Divergences in Kalām and Falsafa,” in Philosophy, Theology, and Mysticism in Medieval Islam, ed. Dimitri Gutas (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), VII 125. George Hourani translates this term as ‘ground’ or ‘aspect’, for his discussion of the term, see his Islamic Rationalism The Ethics of ʿAbd al-Jabbār (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 62-89, 104-8, 121-2. A. Reinhart translates wajh as ‘aspect,’ see his Before Revelation, esp. 146. Here, I adopt the term ‘aspect’ as a translation of the technical term wajh. 97 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 714-5.


to lodge…[the acts’] moral quality within its very being, to make the moral quality part of what made it what it was. For the Basrans, such a theory entailed too rigid a view of the act’s moral qualities –since, consequently, similar acts could not differ in value though they differed in context. Yet the Basrans were unwilling to divorce the acts’ being entirely, for this might entail the inability of the mind to perceive its qualities. 98

Instead the Basrans come up with the concept of wajh to mitigate the Baghdadi position and be

able to contextualize each act. Here Reinhart bases his discussion of the term wajh mainly on

Richard Frank’s discussion of it,99 and both heavily depend on books authored by ʿAbd al-

Jabbār, mainly al-Mughnī. Abū al-Ḥusayn does not discuss the term wajh in any of his published

books. Nonetheless, his definition and discussion of goodness (ḥusn) and repugnance (qubḥ) in

al-Muʿtamad and Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah makes it clear that he thought that the wajh of an act is the

factor that causes an act to be either good or repugnant.100 What is not clear from Abū al-

Ḥusayn’s definitions is whether revelation awards this wajh to the act or it only discovers it in

the act. If it awards it to the act then revelation is the only source of goodness or repugnancy of

an act not the act’s essential being. If revelation only discovers it, then revelation only discovers

an aspect (wajh) already in the act that unaided reason was only incapable of noticing.

Abū al-Ḥusayn’s teacher ʿAbd al-Jabbār is more explicit on this point. He holds that

revelation only discovers the wajh of goodness or repugnancy of an act and does not award it to

the act.101 There are three passages indicating that Abū al-Ḥusayn agrees with his teacher. Abū

al-Ḥusayn says that “for an order (amr, i.e. a religious prescription) to be good, it must add

another good character (ṣifah) to a [already] good action.”102 Here Abū al-Ḥusayn is saying that

revelation will add another good character to what is already a good action. This suggests that he

98 Reinhart, Before Revelation, 146. 99 Frank, Beings and their Attributes, 126, 131-5; idem, “Reason and Revealed Law,” VII 125. 100For example, see Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 1003; idem, Taṣaffuḥ al-Adillah, 89-92. 101 ʿAbd al-Jabbār, al-Mughnī, 14:22-3. Also see Hourani, Islamic Rationalism, 33-4. 102 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad , 177.


does not believe that revelation randomly awards the wajh of goodness or repugnancy to an act.

Revelation rather confirms the goodness of and adds another good aspect to an already good act.

Second, he says that for a prohibition to be good, the prohibited act must be evil.103 Again, this

indicates that he believes that any Divine proscription prohibits an act that is already evil and the

act does not become evil simply because of the Divine proscription. Finally, Abū al-Ḥusayn says

that the Wise (i.e. God) will not issue an order unless there is a benefit that will be accumulated

from this order.104 He also adds that Sharīʿah is prescribed either to ensure a benefit or fend off a

harm.105 Both statements indicate that he believes that God issues an order or a prohibition to

maintain a certain benefit or avoid a harm and not because of a random fiat. These statements

indicate that Abū al-Ḥusayn, probably like most Muʿtazilah, does not believe that acts become

good and evil just because a Divine decree. God issues orders and prohibitions in response to the

good (and useful) or evil (and harmful) nature of these acts.

Nonetheless, it is not accurate to describe Abū al-Ḥusayn’s moral assessment scheme as

either rationalist or scripturalist. Unlike the stereotypical view of the Muʿtazilah, Abū al-Ḥusayn

adopted an “intermediate position” between the rational and revelational moral assessments of

human acts. Revelation will condone what is condoned by reason and will condemn what is

condemned by it. Nonetheless, unaided human reason is, in some cases, incapable of discovering

the good and repugnant nature of certain actions, in such cases revelation is the ultimate guide.

As mentioned in the previous section, Human’s trust in revelation is supported by rational

theological arguments, thus the authority of revelation is based on reason. Since Muslims trust

revelation, and know that revelation is always in harmony with reason, therefore they should

103 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 182. 104 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 405. 105 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 586.


follow it knowing that it will lead to good and beneficial acts. Abū al-Ḥusayn’s moral

epistemology uncovers the interdependence of reason and revelation in his uṣūl al-fiqh. In fiqh

and uṣūl al-fiqh, revelation needs reason as evidence for its authority, and reason needs

revelation to ascertain the ethical and deontological value of actions that reason is incapable of

ascertaining.

REASON AND REVELATION IN INTERACTION

The role Abū al-Ḥusayn awards to reason and revelation in uṣūl al-fiqh reveals the

interdependent relationship between them in his thought. This interdependence will be further

demonstrated by discussing four uṣūl al-fiqh issues. First, the Sharʿī judgment (ḥukm Sharʿī) of

actions before the advent of revelation, are they permitted, proscribed, or neutral?106 Abū al-

Ḥusayn sees that, in the absence (or silence) of revelation, reason has the ability to distinguish

between the useful, thus permitted, and the harmful, thus proscribed, acts.107 His position is again

based on the rationally acquired theological concept of al-aṣlaḥ according to which God will

always act in the best interest of humans. Therefore, Abū al-Ḥusayn argues that God will

constantly provide humans either with rational or revelatory evidence to warn them against

harmful acts.108 Therefore, if revelation is silent on an issue, he assumes that reason has the

ability to reach the right judgment on this issue. Otherwise, God would have left humans

unguided, and for Abū al-Ḥusayn the concept of al-aṣlaḥ necessitates that God will never leave

humans unguided.

106 For more on this question, see A. K. Reinhart’s Before Revelation. 107 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 868-79. 108 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 869.


Abū al-Ḥusayn goes one step further, he declares that, in the absence of revelation, any

rational judgment (ḥukm ʿaqlī) is just as valid as a revelatory one (ḥukm Sharʿī).109 Revelation is

silent on many issues and numerous novel cases always appear that are not addressed by

revelation. On these issues Abū al-Ḥusayn awards reason a free hand. However, he makes it

clear that rational judgments are valid until altered by revelation.110 In other words, reason can

offer fiqhī assessments in the silence of revelation and not in contradiction to it, and in case of

contradiction revelation will alter the rational judgment.111 For example, Abū al-Ḥusayn says that

there is no rational proof for the infallibility of the consensus (ijmāʿ) of the Muslim ummah.

Reason does not distinguish it’s consensus from that of other nations. Nonetheless, revelation

informs Muslims, according to Abū al-Ḥusayn, that their consensus is unique and infallible.112

He also adds that there is no rational basis for the prohibition of consuming intoxicants113 and

blood,114 nonetheless revelation proscribed both. Therefore, they must be harmful. At the same

time, he does not believe that revelation arbitrarily imposes obligations on humans. As

previously mentioned, reason has established Divine wisdom and justice. Therefore, as Abū al-

Ḥusayn argues, all Divine orders are good, beneficial, and not arbitrary. Moreover, reason has

established the veracity of revelation, therefore humans already know that revelation is

trustworthy. Thus he allows revelation to alter reason without stripping reason of its authority in

fiqh. His presumptive position is that reason could issue valid judgments, unless revelation

interferes. Revelation has enough authority to alter reason not because it can arbitrarily do so, but

109 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 579, 583 "ما وجب في العقل فھو من الدین" "اباحة ذلك في العقل تجري مجرى اذن سمعي" 875 , . 110 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 715 "العقل یقتضي الحكم ما لم ینقلنا عنھ دلیل شرعي" . Similar statements are produced on p. 11, 908-9, 1015. 111 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 399, 424. 112 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 336. 113 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 888. 114 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 301.


because rational theological arguments have already established the veracity and goodness of

revelation.

The only case in which reason is allowed to alter a fiqhī stipulation dictated by revelation

is when this stipulation contradicts Divine justice which for Abū al-Ḥusayn is among the rational

basis on which the authority of revelation rests. This is done by allowing reason to particularize

(takhṣīṣ) revelation.115 Because Divine wisdom and justice are among the indispensable evidence

that proves the authority of revelation, any literal interpretation of revelation that would

undermine Divine wisdom must be erroneous. This is also valid in fiqh. Abū al-Ḥusayn states

that we already know that God is wise. Therefore, any fiqhī obligation ordained by revelation

that will undermine God’s wisdom must be particularized, because we know that a wise God will

never issue unwise obligations.116 He mentions the example of intolerable religious obligations

(taklīf mā lā yuṭāq). Since imposing intolerable obligations is unwise, therefore God will never

issue such obligations. Revelation places general obligations on all Muslims. However, children

and the insane should be excluded (through particularization) from these general obligations.

Young children and the insane cannot understand revelation, therefore they are relived from

religious duties until they gain the mental abilities necessary to understand revelation. Requiring

children and the insane to follow revelation is unwise,117 and God will never issue unwise and

harmful obligations.118 Abū al-Ḥusayn considers their exclusion to be necessary to maintain the

veracity and authority of revelation. If God were to be proven unwise, then His revelation will be

deprived of its authority. For dialectical reasons, reason is allowed to particularize general

115 W. Hallaq defines takhṣīṣ as “the exclusion from the general of a part that was subsumed under that general.” See Hallaq, A History of Islamic Legal Theories, 45-6. 116 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 284. 117 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 272. 118 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 405.


revelatory obligations that will undermine the authority of revelation. Reason is again utilized to

maintain the authority and veracity of revelation. This is the only case in uṣūl al-fiqh in which

reason has more authority than revelation.

The second uṣūl al-fiqh issue I study is the concept of preponderance (tarjīḥ).119 Abū

al-Ḥusayn defines tarjīḥ as declaring one inconclusive (and/or equivocal) evidence (amārah)

as stronger than another.120 Tarjīḥ is used by jurists to resolve the problem of the existence of

conflicting textual evidence by adopting one and forsaking the other. Here I examine Abū al-

Ḥusayn’s methods of tarjīḥ between conflicting traditions attributed to the Prophet. He says

that where a jurist faces two contradicting traditions ascribed to the Prophet the jurist is

required to give preponderance to one over the other as authentic or more relevant to the case

in question. He also says that in such a case, a scholar should prefer the tradition with the

more reliable chain of narration (isnād). If both have equally reliable chains of narration, a

scholar should prefer the particular (khāṣṣ) to the general (‘āmm) tradition. If this fails then

the jurist should investigate whether one tradition has abrogated (nasakh) the other. Finally,

if this does not help, the scholar should see if both traditions mention optional regulations.121

When all those attempts fail to identify the epistemically stronger tradition, Abū al-Ḥusayn

suggests following the tradition that is in contradiction to the judgment of reason. He advises

the reader not to assume that the tradition in harmony with reason is more worthy of being

followed, because, in his opinion, it makes more sense that the Prophet would only teach

humans what they cannot know by their independent reason.122 Only when this final attempt

119 Here I borrow Hallaq’s translation of the term tarjīḥ that he used in his A History of Islamic Legal Theories. 120 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 844-5. 121 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 672. 122 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 679-84.


fails to distinguish the tradition worthy of being followed should the jurist follow the one in

harmony with reason.123

A third way to analyze Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of reason in uṣūl al-fiqh is by examining

his epistemic hierarchy of evidence through which fiqhī conclusions may be reached; i.e.

what types of evidence produce more reliable knowledge. It seems that Abū al-Ḥusayn has

two epistemic hierarchies, one for kalām and another for uṣūl al-fiqh. In theology he awards

reason relatively more authority than revelation. This is not exactly the case in uṣūl al-fiqh, in

which he seems to award textual evidence relatively more authority than rational ones. In his

uṣūl al-fiqh reason and rationally oriented evidence (such as qiyās) are always ranked below

textual evidence; they are kept at the bottom of his epistemic hierarchy of evidence used to

reach fiqhī conclusions.

This hierarchy is obvious in the relation between rational evidence and āḥād

Prophetic traditions. Abū al-Ḥusayn, like many other jurists, states that āḥād traditions only

yield suppositional (ẓannī) knowledge,124 and therefore he, like others, puts them in an

inferior position to conclusive (qaṭʿī) evidence such as the Qur’ān and mutawātir Prophetic

traditions. In fact, āḥād Prophetic traditions are at the bottom of his epistemic hierarchy; all

other evidence is preferred to them. However, the only kind of evidence that is inferior to

āḥād Prophetic traditions is the rationally acquired evidence. For example, he says that āḥād

Prophetic traditions are not allowed to abrogate any Qur’ānic verse, because the Qur’ān is

conclusively authentic, whereas āḥād traditions are inconclusively authentic.125 In addition,

āḥād Prophetic traditions are not allowed to abrogate mutawātir ones for the same reason.

123 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 672. 124 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 549-50. 125 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 430, 648.


According to Abū al-Ḥusayn, the only kind of evidence that āḥād Prophetic traditions can

overrule are rational ones.126 Āḥād traditions have only suppositional (ẓannī) epistemic value

and occupy a low status in Abū al-Ḥusayn’s epistemic ladder, and they can neither abrogate

the Qur’ān nor the mutawātir Prophetic traditions. Nonetheless, they can abrogate rational

evidence. This shows that rational evidence occupy a low status in his hierarchy of evidence,

even lower than āḥād traditions. Therefore rational evidence seems to be at the very bottom

of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s epistemic hierarchy of evidence used in fiqh, in a position below all

textual evidence.

A similar hierarchy is noticed when analyzing Abū al-Ḥusayn’s views on the

relationship between qiyās and textual evidence. Although qiyās in fiqh has to be based on

textual evidence, it includes a considerable amount of rational speculation. His discussion of

the relation between qiyās and āḥād traditions show that he considers qiyās to have less

epistemic value than āḥād Prophetic traditions. He explicitly states that in case of a

contradiction between qiyās and any textual evidence (khabar) a scholar is advised to follow

the textual evidence.127 Moreover, like many other legal theorists,128 Abū al-Ḥusayn

discusses the different types of ʿilal on which a qiyās judgment can be based. His discussion

of the types of ʿīlāl reveals, again, his preference for textual evidence in uṣūl al-fiqh to

evidence that includes a wider margin of rational effort. Abū al-Ḥusayn speaks about two

kinds of ʿilāl, first ‘illah manṣūṣah which is an ʿillah that is explicitly mentioned in the aṣl

and the jurist does not have to use his reason to ascertain it. Secondly, an ʿillah mustanbaṭah

which is an ʿillah that is not explicitly mentioned in the aṣl, and a jurist has to rationally infer 126 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 443-4, 446-7. 127 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 717. 128 Again, here I borrow the term Hallaq uses in his A History of Islamic Legal Theories to refer to Muslim jurists specialized in uṣūl al-fiqh.


it from the aṣl. Both types of ʿilal can be used to reach a judgment through qiyās, however

Abū al-Ḥusayn prefers the ʿillah manṣūṣah to the mustanbaṭah, and says that the manṣūṣah is

more reliable than the mustanbaṭah.129 This shows his preference to a judgment reached

through a qiyās that includes less rational speculation. In sum, it seems that he always prefers

to rely on textual evidence rather than rationally oriented ones to reach fiqhī judgments. This,

to me, shows that in his uṣūl al-fiqh rationally oriented evidence has an inferior status to the

textual ones.130

CONCLUSION

The comparison of Abū al-Ḥusayn’s use of reason in kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh shows that he has

two different methods in using reason one for uṣūl al-fiqh and another for kalām. In kalām,

reason enjoys more authority than revelation. However, his dependence on reason is not a

rejection of revelation, nor does he hold the superiority of reason over revelation in kalām. He

sees that many kalām issues, especially the Divine attributes, are necessary to establish the

veracity of revelation. Using revelation to establish the kalām issues that will later be used to

prove the authority of revelation grounds the authority of revelation on a circular argument. To

avoid this logical fallacy and maintain a sound rational argumentation for the authority of

revelation, he has to depend on reason rather than revelation in his investigation of the kalām

issues that are relevant for establishing the authority of revelation. Furthermore, he believes that

both reason and revelation produce the same “truth,” and that there is no inherent contradiction

129 Abū al-Ḥusayn, al-Muʿtamad, 847. 130 El-Tobgui also discusses Abū al-Ḥusayn’s epistemic hierarchy of evidence used in fiqh, and concludes that textual evidence enjoy more authority than rational ones in Abu al-Ḥusayn’s fiqh. See “The Epistemology of Qiyās,” 319.


between them. Any apparent contradiction between reason and revelation is a result of

misinterpreting revelation or a text wrongly considered to be part of it. At the same time, he

holds that revelation must be interpreted in harmony with reason and not the opposite. Mainly

because rational evidence is the main proof for the authority of revelation, therefore he argues

that it does not make sense that revelation would contradict the rational evidence that proves its

authority.

Whereas in uṣūl al-fiqh the dialectical motives that encourage Abū al-Ḥusayn to depend

more on reason is not as present as they are in theology. Therefore, in his uṣūl al-fiqh revelation

enjoys relatively more authority than reason. This does not mean that Abū al-Ḥusayn rejects the

use of rational evidence in to reach fiqhī conclusions. After all he assumes that all rational fiqhī

judgments are valid as long as they do not contradict revelation. Also, kalām rational arguments

are the main support for the authority of revelation in uṣūl al-fiqh and fiqh, and in this sense

revelation is indebted to reason. Since the authority of revelation has already been rationally

established, then it follows that humans can safely follow revelation even if sometimes they fail

to rationally ascertain the grounds of the revelatory stipulations. For Abū al-Ḥusayn, humanity’s

trust in revelation is not a fideistic belief in its authority, after all humans did not trust revelation

until reason proved that it deserves their trust.

This trust in the authority of revelation does not mean that revelation can arbitrarily

condone and condemn actions. All proscriptions and prescriptions communicated by revelation

are for the benefit of humanity. However, Abū al-Ḥusayn is aware that some of the revelatory

stipulations, such as the religious rituals and dietary regulations, are contrary to what reason will

consider necessary and beneficial. For him, this does not prove that revelation issues irrational

stipulations, rather this shows the incapability of the unaided human mind to understand the


rationale behind those revelatory provisions. Again this symbiotic relationship between goodness

and revelation in fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh is supported by the Divine attributes of unity and justice,

two concepts reached by rational speculation. Divine unity and justice guarantee that revelation

is good, infallible, and free from evil. Unlike kalām, in fiqh and uṣūl al-fiqh reason is interpreted

in harmony with revelation, and not the opposite. This is because, firstly, in most fiqh and uṣūl

al-fiqh matters there are no dialectical reasons that force certain rational conclusions on

revelation. Secondly, as mentioned above the authority of revelation has already been established

by kalām rational arguments that established the justice and wisdom of God, then there is no

need to put revelation to further rational investigations.

Thus, it is inaccurate to describe Abū al-Ḥusayn’s kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh as either

scripturalist or rationalist. For him, reason and revelation are in need of each other and each play

an indispensable role in his thought. Moreover, he does not have one fixed method in using

reason in both kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh. The role of reason in each discipline is mainly determined

by the dialectical context of the question being addressed. Reason plays a primary role in

investigating the theological issues that are relevant for establishing the authority of revelation.

In other theological issues revelation plays an equally important role. This is also true about uṣūl

al-fiqh matters. In the uṣūl al-fiqh matters that are relevant to establishing the authority of

revelation, reason has the upper hand. In uṣūl al-fiqh matters that are not relevant for such a task,

revelation has the upper hand. Furthermore, the authority of revelation is indebted to the rational

investigation of the Divine attributes. This does not mean that reason is the ultimate guide on all

religious matters. He believes that reason is sometimes incapable of ascertaining the rationale

behind some of the religious stipulations. All religious stipulations that are not relevant to

establishing the authority of revelation are to be decided by revelation. Therefore, Abū al-


Ḥusayn is both a scripturalist and a rationalist. He does not have one categorical position from

reason or revelation that is applicable to all uṣūl al-fiqh and kalām topics. His position from the

role of reason is rather determined by the dialectical framework of each argument.

This study focuses primarily on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s contributions to the debate around the

role of reason and revelation in law and theology. It does not attempt to address this debate in the

different Muslim legal and theological systems in general. Such an attempt would require a much

more extensive and broader study. The main aim here is to shed more light on Abū al-Ḥusayn’s

contributions to this debate and test his conclusions against the rationalist vs. scripturalist

paradigm that is dominant within modern scholarship of Islam. Abū al-Ḥusayn’s ideas explained

above show that it is erroneous to use rationalism and scripturalism as absolute typologies to

classify him and analyze his thought; this might be also true about many other medieval Muslim

jurists and theologians. To study Abū al-Ḥusayn’s thought through the prism of this dichotomy

pre-determines an either or conclusion. Such polarizing conclusions are simplistic and fail to

understand the complexities of the legal and theological debates current among medieval Muslim

scholars. The debate is not about the authority of reason or revelation. It is rather about how to

use reason and revelation to reach religious conclusions, how to maintain a rational argument for

the authority of revelation, and a debate around which kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh issues are relevant

for this argument.

Labeling medieval Muslim scholars and schools of thought (both legal and theological)

as rationalist or scripturalist will not help in understanding medieval Muslim theology and law.

Such an approach will rather pre-determine misleading conclusions. The Muʿtazilah in kalām

and the Ḥanafiyyah in fiqh have been always considered the proponents of rationalism, whereas

the Ashaʿriyyah in kalām and the Ḥanābilah in fiqh have been considered the representatives of


scripturalism. Modern scholars of Islam should free themselves from this polarizing typology.

Adhering to this naïve typology will prevent them from focusing on and appreciating the real

questions and debates that are current among the medieval Muslim jurists and theologians.

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