AL QAEDA IN THE ISLAMIC MAGHREB (AQIM)BY: ANDREW GACOM

HISTORY OF AQIM• The group AQIM originated in 2006 but it’s roots date back even

further to the early 1990s

• AQIM is a subgroup that was formed out of the Armed Islamic Group of Algeria (GIA)

• GIA – was founded in the early 1990s by veterans from the war in Afghanistan in 1991

• Once the group was well established, after 1994 the group began to “expand its operations internationally, hijacking an Air France Flight in December 1994 and conducting a series of improved explosive devise (IED) attacks in France in 1995.” (Grobbelaar, 150)

• After 1996, the group began to attack closer to home and carried out a majority of their attacks in Algeria.

• GIA began to quickly split up due to disagreements over strategy, particularly in who the group would attack

Source: Grobbelaar, A. (2015). The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Africa Review, 7(2), 149-161. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09744053.2015.1030870#.Vb_6N-49ZSU

HISTORY OF AQIM (CONT…)

GIA• One side of the group said attacks against civilians needed to end • The other side of the group wanted to continue to attack civilians• By 1997 “the group was seriously divided; support from foreign Islamist groups

dwindled as some of their activities were described as either un-Islamic, in the slaughter of innocent civilians, or of conspiracy with secularists in the security services.”(Grobbelaar, 150)

Salafist Group for Preaching & Combat was formed (GSPC)• “In 1998, following the internal divisions over the GIA’s strategy of attacking

civilians, GIA member, Hassan Hattab, broke away to found the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).” (Grobbelaar, 150)

• After the split of GIA, a majority of the members joined the GSPC• The GSPC then became the main threat and “anti-government force” within

Algeria• The GSPC’s ‘new’ strategy did not call for harming civilians

Source: Grobbelaar, A. (2015). The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Africa Review, 7(2), 149-161. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09744053.2015.1030870#.Vb_6N-49ZSU

HISTORY OF AQIM (CONT…)GSPC• promised to not attack civilians but rather focus strictly on only military targets

• Around 1998, Al Qaeda Central (AQC) supported the GSPC and soon after the GSPC committed to AQCs plan:

• Global jihad

• GSPC was still committed to dominating the local Algerian area seeking for setting up an Islamic state in Algeria

• The GIA and GSPC “were at the forefront of a campaign of terrorism, leading to the death of approximately 100,000 in the decade after the banning of the FIS electorate. Some of the Islamists in the GIA and GSPC had originally supported the FIS electoral attempt but saw the cancellation of elections as a sign to move forward with a militant strategy.” (Rabasa, 147)

• Development of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)• Post-verbal partnership of AQC and AQIM:

• AQIM altered it’s strategy; declaring war against the western influences• Reason: AQIM failed to establish an “Islamic State” as planned and decided to follow the

strategy of AQC

Source: Grobbelaar, A. (2015). The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Africa Review, 7(2), 149-161. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09744053.2015.1030870#.Vb_6N-49ZSUSource: Rabasa, A. (2004). Chapter Two: The Maghreb. In The Muslim World after 9/11 (pp.147-172). Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation

TIMELINE

GIA (1993-2004)

GSPC (1998-2007)

AQIM (2007-Present)

AQIM AREA OF OPERATIONS

• AQIM can be found predominately in Northwestern Africa

• The images below portray the AQIM influence in NW Africa

AQIM AREA OF OPERATIONS• Here is another map with more of a close-up view

• Multiple base sites: Northern Mali, Southern Algeria, Southern Libya, South Eastern Mauritania, Eastern Mali, Northern and Western Niger (Larémont, 245)

Source: https://www.stratfor.com/image/jihadist-militants-africa

IDEOLOGY | POLICY | GOALSAQIM –

• Salafi terrorist group -• Salafi: early forms of Islam during the time of Mohammad and his first 4 successors (caliphs)—630-660

B.C.• After these years, Islam became corrupted by innovations (bida) that were not in the original Islam

• Salafism is seen as the correct form of Islam according to AQIM and AQC• Believed that Mohammed was the perfect model of a Muslim and believe that people must follow

him in every aspect of Islam• Since AQIM verbally agreed to follow AQC, it is important to note the goals of AQC:

• AQC is a Salafi group that wants to revert to the early form of Islam and the only way to do that is through armed struggle “Defensive Jihad.” They try to obtain all of this through Terrorism.

• Salafism is a goal, jihad is a means, terrorism is the specific means

• Central Goal of AQIM – • “The central goal of AQIM is to oust the current Algerian government and install an Islamic Regime. This

intent is in line with Osama Bin Laden’s call to overthrow all secular governments in North Africa. AQIM members follow a Qutbist or an ‘offensive jihad’ notion of Salafist Islam, which is also ideologically aligned with Al Qaeda’s spiritual foundations.” (Mapping Militant Organizations, Stanford University)

• “AQIM wish to attack the “near enemy” of apostate Muslim governments and the Western ‘Far Enemy.” Their incorporation into Al Qaeda reflects previous cooperation and past joint attacks.”(Celso, 32)

• Focus on attacking the Algerian military to weaken security forces to help establish the caliphate the group wishes to lead

Source: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65Source: Celso, A. (2012). Al Qaeda's Post-9/11 Organizational Structure and Strategy: The Role of Islamist Regional Affiliates. Mediterranean Quarterly, 23(2), 30-41.

EARLY LEADERSHIP• Leaders for Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb throughout

the short history of the group:• Hassan Hattab –

• GIA commander in Kabylia • Opposed the GIA’s policy of attacks against civilians• Created the GSPC in 1998

• Osama Bin Laden was in talks with Hattab and supported the GSPC cause

• Shortly after the creation of the group he stated: “All those, in Algeria, who consider themselves part of Salafist Islam must join the ranks of the GSPC thus placing his new group in Al-Qa’ida’s ideological matrix.” (Lounnas, 812)

• After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Hattab was ousted as the leader

Source: Lounnas, D. (2014). Confronting Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghrib in the Sahel: Algeria and the Malian crisis. The Journal of North African Studies, 19(5), 810-827.

LEADER OF AQIM

• Abdelmalek Droukdel – • Took over as leader of the GSPC in 2004 shortly after Nabil

Sahraoui death (Nabil was the GSPC leader for only a year and did not accomplish much in the short time. That is why he is not mentioned here)

• “Droukdel emphasized the GSPC’s intention to engage the “far enemy” of Islam, (i.e., United States and European states), and his view of jihad was compatible with those of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri.” (Larémont, 244)

• Droukdel then merged the GSPC with AQC due to similar goals and interests

• AQIM was then formed under Droukdel in January of 2007.

Source: Larémont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, (4), 242-268.

AQIM AFFILIATES (CONT…)

Source: Hagan, Andreas. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and Their Networks.” American Enterprise Institute. 27 Mar. 2014. Web.

AQIM AFFILIATES (CONT…)

Source: Hagan, Andreas. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and Their Networks.” American Enterprise Institute. 27 Mar. 2014. Web.

AQIM AFFILIATES

Source: Hagan, Andreas. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and Their Networks.” American Enterprise Institute. 27 Mar. 2014. Web.

AQIM AFFILIATES (CONT…)

Source: Hagan, Andreas. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and Their Networks.” American Enterprise Institute. 27 Mar. 2014. Web.

RECRUITMENT/PROPAGANDA • During the GSPC era, media capabilities were at an all time low

• Hattab did not view media relations as an important factor in the growth of the group.• During this time online distributed magazines lacked organization, ‘popular’ authors, and focused too

much on solely Algerian government issues• Doing this led to less demands and decreasing popularity since the problems were not seen as a

‘global jihad’ issue• After Droukdel took over as leader and partnered with AQC, the propaganda capabilities grew

substantially • Media capabilities grew between 2007-2009 • Has had some issues arise regarding authenticity during this time period• Since then, AQIM formed a Media Production Group to handle all media related things

• Group: Al Andalus Institute for Media Production• This group seemed to alleviate authenticity problems

• Videos have become greater in length, more visual aspects such as photography and letters have been implemented into the videos and slideshows

• Videos portray training, beheadings, speeches from leaders preaching reasons for jihad, and photographs.

• According to M. R. Torres Soriano from the “Terrorism and Political Violence Journal,” he states:• “the greater and more effective AQIM media presence adds to the group’s attractiveness and

enhances its recruitment capacity in the Maghreb and beyond. Through the ‘‘media Jihad,’’ the Maghrebi branch of Al Qaeda can continue to cultivate a new image of strength, sophistication, and religious piety, which will allow it to increase its ability to attract the radical Muslim population keen to join the ranks of the Jihad against ‘‘crusaders and apostates.’’

Source: Soriano, M. (2010). The Road to Media Jihad: The Propaganda Actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Terrorism and Political Violence, (23), 72-88.

TACTICAL METHODS | SIZE• AQIM tactical methods and financial means go hand-in-hand

• According to the U.S. State Department, the size of the group is estimated to be less than 1000 members/fighters as of 2013

• Tactical Methods:• Primary focus: attack the State of Algeria

• Attacks against Algerian military targets, civilians, government officials, police, businesses and mass transit areas

• Conducted suicide bombings starting in 2007 (after verbal commitment to AQC)

• Employ kidnappings • The kidnappings occur in the Sahel area including Mali,

Mauritania and Niger and hold the individuals hostage for a large ransom (Stanford)

• According to the National Counterterrorism Center: “AQIM mainly employs conventional terrorist tactics, including guerilla-style ambushes, mortar, rocket, and IED attacks.” (NCTC)

Source: “Al-Qa’iDa in the lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).” National Counterterrorism Center. Web.Source: Krech, H. (2011). The Growing Influence of Al-Qaeda on the African Continent. Africa Spectrum, 46(2), 125-137.

Source: http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65 Source: State Department, U.S., “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013.” (2014): 1-318.

FINANCIAL MEANS • Financial Means –

• AQIM is self-sufficient with it’s own cash flow and profiting• One of the main sources of the funding derives from the cocaine trade

• “With its four wheel-drive jeeps, AQIM transports cocaine from West Africa—where the couriers bring it in from Colombia—through the Sahara to Egypt and or/ Tunisia. From there, the cocaine is smuggled into EU.” (Krech, 127)

• Estimated profit from drug trade: ~50 million Euros between 2007-2011 or $55.5 million U.S. dollars (Krech, 127)

• AQIM also funds itself through kidnappings and ransoms• “Typically, this group has focused its efforts primarily on kidnappings,

notably of American and European citizens.” (Ziajor, 4)• “The majority of AQIM's profits are from payments gained through

kidnappings, which remain the largest source of funding for AQIM terrorist operations within the Maghreb and the Sahel” (Ziajor, 5)

• Also moves and ‘trades’ undocumented workers/human trafficking for cash

• Profits are then used to fuel the organization in various ways like:• Training, weaponry, planning, expansion

Source: Ziajor, M., & Kremlin, J. (2012). Middle East. In Encyclopedia of Transnational Crime & Justice. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.

ALL KIDNAPPINGS COMMITTED BY AQIM AND GSPC FROM 2003-2011• September 11, 2003: The GSPC kidnaps thirty-two European tourists in Libya and takes them to Algeria. German

government pays five million dollar ransom.

• December 24, 2007: Four French tourists killed in Mauritania.

• February 22, 2008: Two Austrian tourists kidnapped near the Grand Erg dunes in Tunisia, subsequently moved to Mali. Austrian government allegedly pays 4 million dollar ransom. Hostages released.

• December 14, 2008: Two Canadian diplomats kidnapped on highway north of Niamey, Niger. Hostages released in exchange for AQIM prisoners in Niger.

• January 22, 2009: Five European tourists kidnapped in eastern Mali, near Niger border. AQIM says it released two of the hostages after four of their fellow militants are released from jail. One of the tourists, Edwin Dyer, a Briton, was killed after the government of Great Britain refused to release Abu Qatada, an Islamist militant of Palestinian origin imprisoned in Britain. The fourth tourist, a Swiss, was released after Swiss government allegedly paid ransom.

• September 11, 2003: The GSPC kidnaps thirty-two European tourists in Libya and takes them to Algeria. German government pays five million dollar ransom.

• December 24, 2007: Four French tourists killed in Mauritania.

• February 22, 2008: Two Austrian tourists kidnapped near the Grand Erg dunes in Tunisia, subsequently moved to Mali. Austrian government allegedly pays 4 million dollar ransom. Hostages released.

• December 14, 2008: Two Canadian diplomats kidnapped on highway north of Niamey, Niger. Hostages released in exchange for AQIM prisoners in Niger.

• January 22, 2009: Five European tourists kidnapped in eastern Mali, near Niger border. AQIM says it released two of the hostages after four of their fellow militants are released from jail. One of the tourists, Edwin Dyer, a Briton, was killed after the government of Great Britain refused to release Abu Qatada, an Islamist militant of Palestinian origin imprisoned in Britain. The fourth tourist, a Swiss, was released after Swiss government allegedly paid ransom.

Source above was copied and pasted from: Larémont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, (4), 242-268.

ALL KIDNAPPINGS COMMITTED BY AQIM AND GSPC FROM 2003-2011

**Total number has decreased over the yearsSource above was copied and pasted from: Larémont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, (4), 242-268.

ALL PARAMILITARY ATTACKS FROM 2004-2011

• February 12, 2004: GSPC attacked police patrol near Tighremt (Blida). Seven police officers killed and three wounded. • June 2005: GSPC attacked the Lemgheiti barracks of the Mauritanian army, which is an isolated military outpost in the extreme

northeast of the country. Fifteen Mauritanian soldiers were killed.• December 10, 2006: AQIM bombed a bus in the Bouchaoui forest on the outskirts of Algiers that was carrying British, Canadian,

and Americans workers for Brown & Root, an affiliate of Halliburton, which is a company based in the United States. One person killed and nine wounded.

• April 11, 2007: Triple suicide attack in Algiers killed thirty-three people and injures hundreds.• July 11, 2007: Suicide attack on outskirts of Algiers killed ten soldiers. • December 2007: AQIM killed four French tourists in Mauritania, leading to the cancellation of the Paris to Dakar motor rally. • December 2007: AQIM launched double suicide in Algiers, targeting offices of the United Nations and the Constitutional Court.

Forty-one people killed and 170 injured. • 2007: Morocco suffered bombings in Casablanca. No casualties. • February 2008: the Israeli Embassy in Nouakchott was attacked with gunfire without any mortalities. • September 2008: Mauritanian army patrol was attacked in Tourine. Twelve soldiers killed. • June-July 2009: Algerian army attacked at Tipaza. Eighteen killed. • June 2009: One American aid worker killed at Nouakchott. • July 2009: Malian army attacked at al-Wasra in northern Mali. Twenty- eight killed. • July 2010: Algerian army attacked along Algeria-Mali border. Eleven killed. • January 10, 2011: AQIM attacks a military vehicle in Tissemsilt province. One soldier killed. • February 5, 2011: Algerian soldier killed on road near Si Mustafa. • February 10, 2011: Gendarme of Republican Guard killed near Boumerdes. • March 4, 2011: Algerian army attacked near Djanet. Two killed. • March 14, 2011: Algerian army attacked near Djidjel. Two killed. • April 15, 2011: Algerian army outpost in Azagza, at the edge of the Yakouren forest. Ten soldiers killed. • April 16, 2011: Five soldiers and two militants killed in a firefight near Boumerdes. • May 13, 2011: Seven soldiers killed in an ambush near Djidjel.

Source above was copied and pasted from: Larémont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, (4), 242-268.

MAPPING THE AQIM ATTACKS FROM 2004-2011

**Created by Andrew Gacom on August 5th, 2015

STRENGTHS | WEAKNESSESStrengths –

• AQIM is self-sufficient and has the ability to profit off of it’s various modes of ‘businesses’ (i.e. kidnappings, drugs, weapons, and human trafficking)

• The fall of Gaddafi rule in Libya created increased opportunities to take over that geographical area

• The relationship between the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) and AQIM have potential to grow in a positive way`

• Hypothetical situation:• “With AQIM and LIFG now armed with munitions acquired from looting

President Muammar Qaddafi’s arms depots and with their ample cash acquired from kidnapping, narcotics trafficking, and contraband cigarettes, AQIM and LIFG would have both the armaments and the financial resources to be a considerable threat in the region and also in Europe, given the proximity of North Africa to Europe.” (Larémont, 263)

• Other governments in the NW Africa region, besides Algeria, do not want to get involved or help deter AQIM

• This gives AQIM potential for growth• Bearing the name “Al Qaeda” will always help with growth now and in the foreseeable

future• Al Qaeda is a household name and has created a global brand

Source: Larémont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, (4), 242-268.

STRENGTHS | WEAKNESSESWeaknesses -• Small in overall size

• Lacks ability to launch attacks outside the region on a regular basis like AQAP can

• With the death of Osama Bin Laden, Droukdal “refused to pledge allegiance to his successor Ayman al-Zawahiri, and while still an ‘Al Qaeda ‘franchise group,’ AQIM became autonomous from the ‘global’ jihadi matrix.” (Filiu, 89)

• The Al Qaeda brand name can also be its weakness• Droukdal’s refusal of allegiance to al-Zawahiri, will cause recruiting

to become more difficult• Hard to recruit on a large scale when attempting to sell a global

jihadi movement when in actuality it is very regionalized to NW Africa

Source: Filiu, Jean-Pierre. “The Fractured Jihadi Movement In the Sahara.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. 16 (2014): 86-98. Print.

COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS• Building Relationships -

• Military presence helps to deter AQIM • In the past, the Algerian Military has done a great job with increasing military

presence in the Algerian region• “A counterterrorism program that aims to weaken or eliminate AQIM cannot be

successful without the active participation and collaboration of the government of Algeria, which has the most effective military force in the region.” (Laremont, 258-259)

• Algeria needs to expand its counterterrorism efforts and collaborate with surrounding countries like Libya, Chad, Niger, Mauritania and Mali.

• If the countries within the Sahel region focus on protecting and enforcing it’s borders, AQIM trafficking can be decreased

• By doing so, AQIM’s financial resources will decrease which in turn will weaken the group financially

• U.S. and European militaries should implement multiple bases throughout the Sahel region for increased intelligence and security measures

• Would be in the best interest of both the U.S. and European countries to do this in order to increase stability in the region

• Attacks will happen regardless during this time frame, but limiting the overall presence of AQIM within the region will lower future risks of attack

Source: Larémont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, (4), 242-268.

COUNTERTERRORISM EFFORTS• Eliminating Propaganda –

• AQIM has had difficulty in the past of maintaining media and technological abilities

• Use the groups poor technological abilities against them and continue to follow and shutdown any websites that continue to pop up under different domains

• Use AQIMs ideologies against themselves• Create false websites and forums that attack the ideologies of the group to

turn individuals away from the group• Establish Governmental Structure –

• Terrorism groups like AQIM thrive on poor governments that do not threaten them with military or government means

• Many states through the region are either failed states or are in very poor governmental standing

• U.S. should build relationships with these countries and help fund a greater governmental structure--possibly a democracy

• Having a strong government that is aware of the issues throughout the country can provide futures and opportunities to individuals. By doing so, it is less likely these individuals will join a radical group and join its opportunities

• Strong government presence will lead to greater deterrence measures against AQIM moving forward and will help stabilize the region

PERSONAL ASSESSMENT• After reviewing how AQIM functions and the tactical methods employed by the group, there are some

possibilities of future attacks • AQAP and AQC are still a direct threat to the United States while AQIM remains secondary• AQIM needs to be taken very seriously still and the U.S. must assist with governmental and military

means in the region• Likelihood of a direct attack against the U.S. Homeland?

• Unlikely. The group seems to struggle with attacks off the mainland of NW Africa• AQIM also struggles to retain a high volume of followers like AQAP or AQC

• Likelihood of a direct attack against U.S. Bases or Embassies?• Likely. The group is very capable of producing an attack of various forms against a localized building

like a military base or an embassy• Why should the U.S. Care?

• Northwest Africa is a very large unstable region and must be maintained• Government instability and low-levels of interaction against groups like AQIM pose a huge risk to the

U.S. and it’s European allies• If this region successfully managed in the immediate future, the potential for future attacks will increase

resulting in hundreds of more deaths • Also, if region is left unstable it can increase the chances of AQIM establishing an Islamic state in the

region.• This would then cause a huge boost in the recruitment process allowing the group to acquire more

followers and fightersConclusion:

• The NW Sahel region of Africa needs to be closely monitored by the U.S. and its European Allies. AQIM has the power and potential to grow and without any type of government action against the group, there will be severe consequences to not only the Sahel region, but to the U.S. and its counterparts as well.

SOURCES1. “Al-Qa’iDa in the lands of Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).” National Counterterrorism Center. Web.

2. Celso, A. (2012). Al Qaeda's Post-9/11 Organizational Structure and Strategy: The Role of Islamist Regional Affiliates. Mediterranean Quarterly, 23(2), 30-41.

3. Filiu, Jean-Pierre. “The Fractured Jihadi Movement In the Sahara.” Current Trends in Islamist Ideology. 16 (2014): 86-98. Print.

4. Grobbelaar, A. (2015). The origins, ideology and development of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Africa Review, 7(2), 149-161. Retrieved from http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/09744053.2015.1030870#.Vb_6N-49ZSU

5. Hagan, Andreas. “Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Leaders and Their Networks.” American Enterprise Institute. 27 Mar. 2014. Web.

6. http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/groups/view/65

7. Krech, H. (2011). The Growing Influence of Al-Qaeda on the African Continent. Africa Spectrum, 46(2), 125-137.

8. Larémont, R. (2011). Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Terrorism and Counterterrorism in the Sahel. African Security, (4), 242-268.

9. Lounnas, D. (2014). Confronting Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghrib in the Sahel: Algeria and the Malian crisis. The Journal of North African Studies, 19(5), 810-827.

10. Rabasa, A. (2004). Chapter Two: The Maghreb. In The Muslim World after 9/11 (pp.147-172). Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation

11. Soriano, M. (2010). The Road to Media Jihad: The Propaganda Actions of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Terrorism and Political Violence, (23), 72-88.

12. State Department, U.S., “Country Reports on Terrorism 2013.” (2014): 1-318.

13. Ziajor, M., & Kremlin, J. (2012). Middle East. In Encyclopedia of Transnational Crime & Justice. Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications.