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Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part-6-5-Kurds.

The Kurds Are Building a Country With Every Victory Over ISIS

While we, the West are watching somewhere else. The recent run of victories in Syria illustrates the Kurds’ battlefield capabilities. Six months after winning in Kobani, the Turkish border town where as many as 1,000 ISIS fighters died, Syrian Kurd fighters on June 15 took another border town, Tel Abyad, creating a corridor on Syria’s northern border and—far more important—cutting off the main supply line to Raqqah, ISIS’s capital 60 miles due south. On Tuesday, the Kurd forces—a Syrian affiliate of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party, or PKK—seized a military base known as Brigade 93, as well as the town adjoining it, Ain Issa. The victories put them within 30 miles of Raqqah.

The Kurds fight so well largely because, in addition to trying to defeat an extremist enemy, they’re fighting for something—a country of their own. The future Kurdistan may be severely buffeted across Arab portions of the Middle East—neither Yemen nor Libya have functioning central governments, and both Syria and Iraq exist largely as shards of sect, tribe and ethnicity. But the Kurds, despite their large numbers (about 30 million worldwide), as well as their shared language, culture and identity, have never had a nation. But they’re getting closer to one with every battle.

Preventing Kurdish forces from taking advantage of U.S. and Turkish airstrikes in the area is “red line” for Turkey as it steps up to play a greater role in battling Islamic State, a Turkish official said Monday.

U.S., Turkey Agree to Keep Syrian Kurds Out of Proposed Border Zone Understanding meant to reassure Ankara government Source: Institute for the Study of War ISTANBUL—The U.S. and Turkey have reached an understanding meant to assure the Ankara government that plans to drive Islamic State militants from a proposed safe zone in northern Syria won’t clear the way for Kurdish fighters to move in. Officials from both countries on Monday disclosed details of the discussions that grew out of Turkey’s recent decision to step up its cooperation with the U.S. in the fight against Islamic State.The U.S.-led coalition fighting the extremist group has conducted numerous airstrikes over the past year to back the Kurdish YPG militia in northern Syria, which has proved to be the most effective ground force fighting Islamic State. But the U.S.-allied Turkish government is embroiled in a decades-old conflict with its own Kurdish minority. Turkey has resisted

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working with the YPG out of concern that the militants are laying the groundwork for the creation of a new Kurdish nation along Syria’s northern border with Turkey.Two weeks ago, Turkey agreed to launch airstrikes targeting Islamic State fighters in Syria and allow the U.S. to use bases on its soil for the first time to do the same. At Turkey’s urging, the U.S. agreed to use airstrikes to protect a border zone free of Islamic State and controlled by moderate Syrian rebels.Before Syria’s war erupted four years ago, the country’s Kurds were concentrated in three enclaves spread along the northern border. Over the past year, they have risen up to beat back advancing Islamic State fighters, most notably in the border town of Kobani.The YPG advances have allowed Kurdish forces to establish authority over more Syrian territory than before the war, according to the Institute for the Study of War, which tracks control of land in the fight against Islamic State. In recent months, backed by U.S. airstrikes, the YPG has forced Islamic State fighters out of 2,000 square miles of territory in northern Syria—an area the size of Delaware—according to the U.S. military. Since regime forces withdrew from Kurdish areas, the Syrian Kurds have secured a degree of newfound autonomy that has fueled aspirations for independence across the region. They have set up their own administration and defense forces that have started taking responsibility for security in the three Kurdish cantons. The YPG victory over Islamic State in the town of Tal Abyad this summer established a physical link between two of the three Kurdish cantons in northern Syria for the first time.The Syrian Kurdish militia has pushed toward the eastern banks of the Euphrates River, the edge of Islamic State-controlled areas on the other side. The border zone the U.S. and Turkey want to set up is on the western side of the river. YPG leaders said Monday they would work closely with allies, including the U.S.-led coalition and moderate rebel forces such as the Free Syrian Army or FSA, in the fight against Islamic State—also known as ISIS or ISIL.However, they said they had made no commitment not to cross the Euphrates. “The initial plan is to move to liberate the western side of the Euphrates once the areas to the east have been cleared of ISIS,” said Idres Nassan, a senior Kurdish official in Kobani. “But the YPG is acting in coordination with the local groups, such as the FSA and other groups fighting ISIS, as well as the coalition members.”Preventing Kurdish forces from taking advantage of U.S. and Turkish airstrikes in the area is “red line” for Turkey as it steps up to play a greater role in battling Islamic State, a Turkish official said Monday. Keeping Kurdish fighters from moving farther west restricts America’s ability to work in northwestern Syria with a Kurdish militia that has proved an effective fighting force. And it puts more pressure on the U.S. and Turkey to find an alternative capable of filling the void.The challenges the anti-Islamic State coalition faces in developing that fighting force became clear last week when al Qaeda-linked militants attacked U.S.-backed rebels in Syria. The Nusra Front ambushed American-trained fighters, abducted some of their top leaders and vowed to prevent the group from rising up as an effective rival.In response to the attack, the U.S.-led coalition carried out airstrikes to prevent the American-trained rebels in Syria from being overrun. The battles marked an early setback for the Pentagon’s fledgling efforts to create a reliable new ally in Syria to match the effectiveness of Kurdish forces.In parallel with its new military strikes against Islamic State, Turkey has targeted bases in northern Iraq used by the outlawed Kurdish separatist group PKK.The deadly airstrikes came in response to increased attacks by the PKK against Turkish security forces that are threatening a fragile peace process.While the PKK is closely aligned with the YPG in Syria, Turkey and the U.S. have classified the former as a terrorist group and the latter as key allies in the fight against Islamic State.

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The area where Turkey hopes to establish the border zone is filled with ethnic Turkmen and Arabs and Turkish leaders fear that the Kurdish fighters will try to drive them out.“That’s a red line,” said one Turkish official. “There are almost no Kurds in the area that would be the ISIL-free zone. Forcing the issue would trigger a new wave of ethnic cleansing, which is unacceptable to us.” U.S. officials have offered Turkey reassurances that they won’t rely on the YPG in that area, but have sought to give themselves wiggle room to work with the Kurdish fighters in that area if the needs arise. “We have an agreement on the limits of the areas of operations,” said one senior U.S. official. “But the Turks are not unhappy that the YPG have taken much of the border.”The Turkish official said the government views the YPG as “more pragmatic and realistic” than the PKK. But he sent a blunt warning to the YPG not to challenge that red line.“They saw how Turkey reacted to the PKK terrorist attacks,” the Turkish official said. “They saw how Turkey responded to its own red lines. That should be some kind of deterrence for the YPG.” —Ayla Albayrak contributed to this article from Istanbul.

Kurdish Leader Wants Battle Areas Added To Iraq's Kurdish Region"We have given more than 1,000 martyrs to attach Sinjar to Kurdistan," President Massoud Barzani said. "We cannot stop until we liberate all of our land from the hands of the enemy and ensure the return of the displaced," he said.By RFE/RL August 04, 2015 Iraqi Kurds must maintain control of the city of Sinjar and other areas of northwestern Iraq they are fighting to liberate from the Islamic State, the leader of Iraq's autonomous Kurdish region said August 3."We have given more than 1,000 martyrs to attach Sinjar to Kurdistan," President Massoud Barzani said in a speech marking the anniversary of the fall of Sinjar to IS, which forced tens of thousands of Iraq's Yazidi religious minority to flee into the mountains."I demanded the [Kurdish Regional Government] establish a special administration in this area, and I will demand the Iraqi government to make Sinjar the center of the province," he said. Sinjar lies near the Syrian border and is not within the recognized borders of the three provinces controlled by the Iraq's Kurdish minority.  But the first major IS push in June 2014 saw Iraq's federal army collapse and abandon their positions in the area. The Kurdish peshmerga filled the vacuum and since then, the KRG has de facto expanded its control by around 40 percent. "Half of Sinjar and its outskirts still aren't liberated," Barzani said in Dohuk, which is the main city in western Kurdistan where many displaced Yazidis are settled . "We cannot stop until we liberate all of our land from the hands of the enemy and ensure the return of the displaced," he said. Barzani vowed to take vengeance on IS for its brutal treatment of Yazidis, who are neither Arabs nor Muslims and have a unique faith which IS considers to be polytheism and apostate. Tens of thousands of Yazidis were massacred and enslaved during the IS invasion, which was later described by the United Nations as "an attempt to commit genocide" and was one of the main justifications for the U.S.-led air campaign against IS that began days later. "We will hunt down those who committed this crime until the last one," Barzani said. "They have left thousands of bodies on the battlefield, but this is not enough in comparison with the crimes they committed."  According to the KRG figures, 1,280 Yazidis were killed in the IS offensive, 280 died due to the conditions they were subjected to, and 841 are still missing. More than 5,800 were also abducted by IS, which has used Yazidi girls and women as slaves. Just over 2,000 of them have managed to flee, the KRG said. The Yazidi community now counts 550,000 members in Iraq, including 400,000 of the more than three million people who have been displaced in Iraq since violence erupted at the beginning of 2014.

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C: Let us look back, GAZIANTEP, TURKEY— 22 June: Ankara has warned the United States and Western powers of red lines when it comes to the Kurds and their military advances against Islamic extremists in northern Syria, including a firm position the Kurds must not threaten the territorial integrity of Syria by seeking their own autonomous Kurdish State. There should also be no demographic changes or population shifts on the Syrian side of the border as a result of Kurdish military offensives against Islamic State, also known as ISIL, according to a policy document approved reportedly 1 by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan

With The liberation of Tikrit , the Iraqi army sets sights on Fallujah, Mosul; On April 1, the city of Tikrit was liberated from the extremist group Islamic State. The success in liberating Tikrit presents Iraqi leaders with their next choice — determining when to begin operations to retake Mosul and Anbar. 

“With These Guns We Will Return to Kurdistan*”: The Resurgence of Kurdish Jihadism . "It doesn't yet have official borders. But it is there, a reality. There is Kurdish authority running all the way from the Iranian border to close to the Mediterranean."

"There is a big struggle taking place in the region and no side will be immune to its sparks,". "If Arab states undermine Iran's interests in Yemen, then Iran will seek to retaliate in a place like Iraq or Syria, where it has established its presence." --- said Firsat Sofi, a KDP member in the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament. "The big challenge for Iraqi Kurds is to keep the balancing act that they have done so far," "One thing we should not forget about Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Kurds in general, is that they are not genuinely part of this sectarian ideological conflict in the Middle East."

The Kurds' quest for a homeland, Kurdish aspirations for statehood are being boosted by recent territorial gains during fighting in Iraq and Syria.

Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani called Islamic State (ISIS) military gains in Iraq and Syria a “surprise,” and warned that Erbil will sell its own oil if Baghdad fails to meet its financial obligations to the Kurds

“ISIS is a threat to everyone, not to us alone,” Barzani said in an interview with America’s CNBC news channel. “We managed to stop ISIS in Kurdistan and it was quite a surprise that ISIS was gaining ground after suffering so many defeats on our fronts.

He expressed pride that Kurdish forces have been pushing back ISIS with relatively outdated weapons, compared to the Iraqi army, which has enjoyed substantial financial and military support from the United States and Iran.

“Defeating ISIS is not easy. We have to all wait and see and hopefully they will be defeated in the future,” the Kurdish president said.

“Unfortunately, in term of weapons, we have not received the kinds of equipment that we have demanded and which is required to fight and defeat ISIS,” Barzani explained.

The Kurds' quest for a homeland, Kurdish aspirations for statehood are being boosted by recent territorial gains during fighting in Iraq and Syria. 27 Jun 2015 Kurdish aspirations for statehood are being boosted by recent territorial gains. Kurds are the most effective group standing up to ISIL. Kurdish fighters are again trying to fend off an attack by ISIL fighters on the border town of Kobane. And they recently captured Tal Abyad, a strategic border town which ISIL used to bring foreign fighters and supplies to areas they control inside Syria. The

1 http://www.voanews.com/content/turkey-warns-us-about-kurdish-advances-in-syria/2832298.html

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Kurds' fight is driven by their dream of a homeland of their own. They are scattered across the region and the world. Their quest for their own nation is boosted by the continuing wars in Iraq and Syria

WASHINGTON DC 26/5/2015  - Kurdistan Region President Masoud Barzani called Islamic State (ISIS) military gains in Iraq and Syria a “surprise,” and warned that Erbil will sell its own oil if Baghdad fails to meet its financial obligations to the Kurds.He blamed former Iraqi prime minister Nouri al-Maliki for the chaos in the country. “ISIS is a threat to everyone, not to us alone,” Barzani said in an interview with America’s CNBC news channel. “We managed to stop ISIS in Kurdistan and it was quite a surprise that ISIS was gaining ground after suffering so many defeats on our fronts. On our frontlines, ISIS retreated. So it was surprising to see the gains in Syria and Anbar province,” he added.Last week, ISIS fighters overran the city of Ramadi in Iraq’s Anbar and days later captured the historical town of Palmyra in Syria, calling into question the US strategy to defeat the militants. Commenting on long-standing budget and oil issues with the central government, Barzani said that the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) would go ahead with selling its own oil to bridge the budget deficit it is suffering because of Baghdad's reluctance to meet its financial obligations to Erbil.

"Either Iraq will commit to the signed agreement and pay the Kurdistan Region or, in another case, if they don't and fail to pay Kurdistan, we will be selling our own oil and collecting our own revenues," he said. Baghdad has failed to honor the terms of a deal with Erbil that was supposed to resolve a simmering dispute over budget payments to the KRG and Kurdish oil exports. Barzani was speaking in the Jordanian capital Amman, while participating in the World Economic Forum. He expressed pride that Kurdish forces have been pushing back ISIS with relatively outdated weapons, compared to the Iraqi army, which has enjoyed substantial financial and military support from the United States and Iran. “Defeating ISIS is not easy. We have to all wait and see and hopefully they will be defeated in the future,” the Kurdish president said. “It is not only a military challenge. We have to fight in other ways as well. We need to cut their supplies and roads; we need to fight them together. But what Kurdistan has done against ISIS, we are proud of,” he said.

Barzani also added that losing a battle is not tantamount to losing a war, expressing confidence that ISIS will be eventually defeated. The Kurdish president said it was Maliki who had turned the Iraqi army into a sectarian force, purging it of officers and soldiers from other non-Shiite communities in Iraq.“The people who were supposed to fight for the country did not have a cause. That was the main reason the Iraqi army did not succeed,” Barzani said. He praised the US for coming to Erbil’s assistance when ISIS began its onslaught against Kurdish forces last year, but insisted that Peshmerga forces have not received the US arms needed to beat the group. “I do feel that the US has done a lot for the Iraqi army. However, it was the Iraqi army that was unable not take best advantage of it.  We are very grateful, in fact, to the US for the support they provide to us,” Barzani said. “Unfortunately, in term of weapons, we have not received the kinds of equipment that we have demanded and which is required to fight and defeat ISIS,” Barzani explained. He said there is a “misperception” about the direct provision of weapons to the Kurds and hoped the US administration will change its policy of refusing to directly arm the Peshmerga.Washington has insisted on arming the Kurds through the central government in Baghdad. But since the war with ISIS began, Erbil has complained that deliveries have been stalled by Baghdad.  

German defense chief: We train Yezidi Kurds for ISIS battle

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By Rudaw ERBIL, Kurdistan Region — German Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen has reportedly decided to train Yezidi Kurds for the fight against ISIS, according to a report in the German Bild newspaper released Monday. “The German army is ready to set up a regiment to train Yezidis who want to liberate their occupied territories from the Islamic State in northern Iraq,” Bild said quoting Leyen.  “The Peshmerga will undertake the preparations of the regiment,” she said. “To do that, the Peshmerga will prove to the world that everyone aims to combat extremism and terrorism.” In a visit to the Kurdistan region in the beginning of 2015, Leyen said German military advisers and Peshmerga soldiers working together would enable them to assess the Peshmerga's needs in their fight against ISIS.  Following Leyen’s visit on January 12, a new batch of arms and ammunition was delivered to the Peshmerga by Germany.

Syrian Kurds' morale high but arms needed, YPJ commander, 'We're fighting ISIS to save human values', says Abdallah. 22 June, (ANSAmed) - ROME, JUNE 22 - The commander of the Syrian Kurdish Women's Defense Units (YPJ), Nessrin Abdallah, said on a visit to the Italian capital on Monday that morale was strong among her troops but that weapons were lacking. The Islamic State (ISIS), she noted, ''has more sophisticated weapons than we do.'' Abdallah was accompanied by a delegation of representatives from the Kurdish movement that defended and liberated Kobane/Ayn Al-Arab, a city in Syrian Kurdistan along the border with Turkey, and that created an experiment in democracy and self-government called Rojava. ''We do not consider the battle only a military struggle,'' she said. It is also '' a cultural, social and value-based one that gives us the possibility to build the basis of a new model of life in our territory. It is true, we fight against the patriarchal system, religious despotism and inequality between men and women in favor of freedom and equality for women, but ISIS is a threat to the entire world, and so our struggle is to save the values of humanity.'' ''In Tal Abyad the population was forced to leave to defend itself,'' said the commander, referring to the latest YPJ operation. ''The easiest possibility was to go to Turkey, but the borders were closed, and only after a rebellion was permission given to take in the refugees. We cleaned the streets and homes of the mines that ISIS had planted and called the population back. We are providing humanitarian assistance to everyone to facilitate their return home. We have also created an organization to help women that have suffered violence. Security has meanwhile been established. We do not have any intention of invading the territory, and it is inaccurate to speak of ethnic cleansing as some newspapers have. Anyone who wants to come and see what is happening is welcome. As People's Defense Units, our goal is to defend everyone, without distinction.'' ''The battles against ISIS were fierce and we have many injured, including ones seriously injured, and lack the conditions to treat them,'' she said. Abdullah underscored that she hoped the YPJ would receive medical aid from the international community as well. (ANSAmed).

The success in liberating Tikrit presents Iraqi leaders with their next choice — determining when to begin operations to retake Mosul and Anbar.  The next battle will be in Anbar, that confrontation does not require the degree of political consensus that will be necessary before the battle for Mosul can get underway, Mosul’s situation is more complex because of an overlapping of Kurdish peshmerga forces with units being trained by Atheel al-Nujaifi, the Mosul governor, with the help of Turkey and the United States. 

Is an independent Kurdish state possible? Denied self-rule after the First World War, Kurds are the largest ethnic group in the world without their own state. 22 Mar 2015. They were denied self-rule after the First World War, and they are the largest ethnic group in the

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world without their own independent state. But the Kurdish people continue to dream of independence. Kurdish forces are playing a key role in the war against ISIL. And now the jailed leader of Kurdish rebels is kick-starting a stalled peace process and calling for a new era in Turkish-Kurdish relations ISIL is attacking human history, culture, values and symbols. They are attacking the Kurds and other people and religious groups. They attack women, they sell women, and they kill people and behead them. Fighting against such a movement is the right thing to do. -- Commander Cemil Bayik of the Kurdistan Workers' Party, or the PKK.

Erdogan blasts West for destabilizing Syria by supporting Kurdish ‘terrorists’

Published time: June 11, 2015 Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has accused the West of destabilizing Syria by supporting Kurdish “terrorist groups,” while bombing Arabs and Turkmens. The impassioned remarks were made in Erdogan’s first appearance since the general election. He called on all political parties to act “responsibly” in forming a coalition government, after his Justice and Development Party (AKP) lost its parliamentary majority at the polls on June 7. "The West, which has shot Arabs and Turkmens, is unfortunately placing the PYD (the political wing of the YPG) and PKK in lieu of them," Erdogan said in a speech at the Ankara chamber of commerce. The Kurds have a strong presence in Syria, Iraq and Turkey and have proved a formidable enemy to Islamic State (IS), earning international backing for standing up to extremists. On the other hand, the ethnic group has been historically locked in a fierce struggle of wills with Turkey over its status as a nation. Meanwhile the Kurdish-linked People’s Democratic Party (HDP) has for the first time managed to get into the Turkish parliament.

(Reuters April 6) - Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi said the Baghdad government would work with Kurdish authorities to liberate the northern province of Nineveh from Islamic State militants. During his first visit to the Kurdistan region since becoming Prime Minister last year, Abadi said Baghdad and Erbil faced a common enemy and would improve ties to help confront the threat. "Our visit to Erbil today is to coordinate and cooperate on a joint plan to liberate the people of Nineveh," Abadi said at a joint news conference with Kurdish President Massoud Barzani. Abadi declined to lay out a timetable for the plan to retake Nineveh, of which Mosul is capital, in order not to lose the "element of surprise".

Iraqi Kurds struggle to avoid regional conflicts. Author: Mohammed A. Salih posted May 1, 2015 ERBIL, Iraq — As a coalition of Sunni Arab states led by Saudi Arabia targets Shiite Houthi forces and their allies in Yemen, Iraqi Kurds are watching with concern and caution, wondering how the repercussions of the region's deepening sectarian conflicts might affect them. Sandwiched geographically between opposing Shiite and Sunni regional powers such as Iran and Turkey, Iraqi Kurds wonder how long until they are dragged into the unfolding regional hostilities.  "If the struggle reaches its pinnacle and leads to an even deeper polarization, Kurds might be forced to become part of it," said Muthana Amin, a member of the Iraqi parliament from the Kurdistan Islamic Union. "If Kurds become part of this struggle, then we will be serving outside agendas and will end up empty-handed." In recent years, Kurds have shown signs of division in face of regional polarization. The eruption of the Syrian revolution in 2011 divided the largely united Iraqi Kurds regarding the Kurdish response to Syrian events. The two major Iraqi Kurdish groups, the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), appeared to be aligning themselves with opposite regional camps.

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The KDP, led by Iraqi Kurdistan President Massoud Barzani, adopted a pro-opposition stance, as did most of the Sunni states in the region, from Turkey to Saudi Arabia and Qatar. The PUK, led by former Iraqi President Jalal Talabani, refrained from supporting that policy and has been seen as closer to the Iran-led camp. While most other regional actors possibly chose allies based on sectarian identities, Iraqi Kurdish politics are hardly defined in terms of Sunni-Shiite affiliations. In fact, both the KDP and PUK are heavily dominated by secular elites. "It's their geopolitics that dictates their decisions," said Hiwa Osman, an analyst of Iraqi and Kurdish affairs based in Erbil. "The difference is understandable: The KDP lives on the border with Syria, the Islamic State [IS] and Turkey. The PUK lives on the borders of Iran and [the rest of] Iraq and has no borders with Turkey."

The occasionally divergent policies on important issues in Iraq and the region are due to longstanding mutual distrust between the parties. Instead of empowering the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) to formulate and direct Kurdish policy on Iraqi and regional issues, the KDP and PUK appear to be taking affairs into their own hands. While the KDP is advancing its vision through its control of KRG senior positions such as president and prime minister, the PUK acts relatively independently using its affiliated armed forces. The latter also has control over local administrations in Kirkuk and Sulaimaniyah provinces, putting it at odds sometimes with official KRG policy. For instance, while the KRG (and KDP) are against the formation of Iranian-backed paramilitary Popular Mobilization Units in areas under the Kurdish peshmerga's control, the PUK has adopted a more lukewarm position, allowing some units to operate in areas under PUK control.

During a civil war in the mid-1990s, the KDP and PUK fought over limited local resources. The KDP came to rely on Turkey for assistance, and later the Iraqi government, while the PUK enjoyed Iran's support. At the end of the bloody war in 1997, the two parties established separate spheres of dominance, with the PUK controlling southern Iraqi Kurdistan and the KDP controlling the north. Following the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime in 2003, the two armed Kurdish parties worked toward establishing a united administration, and demonstrated unprecedented unity in dealing with many national and regional issues. However, in more recent years, the two parties have pursued different policies vis-a-vis such crucial issues as dealing with the central government in Baghdad and the extent of their relationships with regional actors.

But when IS overran large parts of Iraq in June 2014, the KDP was initially reluctant to act against the group, viewing its emergence as an outcome of the Shiite-Sunni conflict among Iraqi Arab populations — a conflict that did not involve the Kurds. In contrast, the PUK set out to engage IS in northern Diyala province in June 2014, arguing that IS posed a threat to Kurdistan's security. 

Now that the Sunni Arab states, mostly from the Gulf, have formed a military and diplomatic coalition to check Iran's growing influence, Iraqi Kurds are asking how they will be impacted by the tectonic power shifts occurring in the region. "There is a big struggle taking place in the region and no side will be immune to its sparks," said Firsat Sofi, a KDP member in the Iraqi Kurdistan parliament. "If Arab states undermine Iran's interests in Yemen, then Iran will seek to retaliate in a place like Iraq or Syria, where it has established its presence." Despite the occasional leaning toward one regional power or the other, Iraqi Kurds have not become active members of regional conflicts. Whereas the Iraqi government has struggled to develop ties with Sunni Arab states and Turkey, the Kurdish region has been on relatively stable terms with Iran, Sunni Arab countries and Turkey, despite occasional ups and downs.

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Sofi believes that divisions among Kurds might make them susceptible to bend under intense regional pressures. Others are more hopeful. "The big challenge for Iraqi Kurds is to keep the balancing act that they have done so far," Osman said. "One thing we should not forget about Iraqi Kurdistan, and the Kurds in general, is that they are not genuinely part of this sectarian ideological conflict in the Middle East."

Amid the rapid destabilization, some see an opportunity if Kurds play their hand right. "In Kurdistan we are far smaller than our neighbors to be able to ignore any of them," said Saadi Pira, a prominent member of the PUK's political bureau. "But Kurds can benefit from such regional divisions, as they present opportunities as well." The Kurdish position in Iraq was strengthened when Shiite and Sunni Arabs in the country did not see eye to eye, thus allowing the Kurds to position themselves as king-makers. But it remains unclear if the Kurds can earn from broader regional Shiite-Sunni power struggles between powerful states. 

Islamic State Develops New Strategies to Destabilize the KRGPublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 6 March 20, 2015 By: Wladimir van WilgenburgKurdish Mullah Shwan al-Kurdi who now fights with the Islamic State (Source: Twitter account @vvanwilgenburg)In recent months, the Islamic State militant group has

started using ethnic Kurdish militants in operations against the security forces of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq and in its propaganda materials. Some Kurdish Islamic State militants have taken part in videoed killings. For instance, on January 26, Kurdish Islamist State militant Mofaq Asa’ad Askander was filmed beheading a captured Kurdish Peshmerga soldier in Mosul, shocking Iraqi Kurds (MEMRI, January 26). The presence of such Kurds in the Islamic State raises important questions: Could the Islamic State use these Kurds to conduct attacks inside the usually safe Kurdistan region, or to target Western troops presently training the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the KRG capital Erbil? Despite a few attacks, the answer appears to be no. Local and Diaspora Recruits According to Hemin Hawrami, a senior official in the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), around 300 to 350 young Iraqi Kurds have so far joined the Islamic State. [1] Other sources estimate around 500 joined the Islamic State in 2014 (Rudaw, February 27). Some recruits are students of former radical members from the Islamist movement in the Kurdistan region that developed in the 1980s while others had been involved in more recent militant groups. For instance, Mofaq Askander and his two brothers, Younis and Musa, were former Mosul-based operatives of al-Qaeda in Iraq and joined the Islamic State when it took the city in June (Rudaw, February 5). Another source of recruits are ethnic Kurds who became radicalized in the West, such as the 18-year-old ethnic Iraqi Kurd Muhammad Hadi, from the UK, who travelled to join the Islamic State in early 2014 (Daily Mail, June 29, 2014). So far, Kurds who have joined the Islamic State appear to have come mainly from inside Iraq, rather than from Kurdish populations in Turkey, Syria and Iran. Militant Operations Thus far, there have been a few significant attacks inside Kurdistan attributed to the Islamic State. On August 23, 2014, a bomb attached to a car wounded four people on the Erbil-Kirkuk road (Rudaw, August 23, 2014). The year before, on September 29, 2013, there was an attack against the Security Directorate in Erbil (KRG.org, September

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30, 2013). However, it is surprising that with a more than 1,000 kilometer frontline between Kurdistan and Arab-areas of Iraq, the Islamic State has not carried out more attacks in the KRG, using Kurdish radicals who can move with relative ease across the border. Nevertheless, there is the continuing potential for the Islamic State to use its Kurdish recruits’ knowledge of the local terrain and cultural-social knowledge in conducting suicide operations within Kurdistan. The Islamic State has also used Kurds in more conventional military operations on the fringes of Kurdish regions in Syria and Iraq, including in the Syrian town of Kobane (Ayn al-Arab in Arabic), where Kurdish Islamic State fighters were even led by a Kurdish commander known as Abu Khattab al-Kurdi, as well as in the Mosul area and Kirkuk (Vice, November 7, 2014). One reason for the Islamic State’s lack of attacks in the KRG is the work of the Kurdish security service, the Asayish. Despite the huge influx of displaced persons and the Asayish themselves fighting on the frontlines, there has not been an appreciable security vacuum for the Islamic State to exploit. Moreover, the Asayish has stepped up their monitoring of potential militants, and has arrested several Islamic State-supporters and sleeper cells. For instance, in January, the Asayish arrested six pro-Islamic State clerics in several locations, and has reportedly even deported some Kurdish families, who are from north of Erbil, after their two sons joined the Islamic State (Rudaw, February 27; Duhok Post, February 16). However, it is unclear how many suspected Islamic State militants and supporters have been arrested in total in Kurdistan. Moreover, the local awareness of Kurdish citizens to this potential threat has increased. It is difficult today for Kurdish radicals to even express sympathy with the Islamic State, since most locals would immediately report such suspicious behavior to the Asayish. Indeed, before the August attacks, there were some Kurds expressing sympathy for the Islamic State publicly. Now this seems to be impossible, and many conservative Islamists in Kurdistan have tried to distance themselves from the Islamic State since its expansion last year. Other radicals have preemptively left the region; one pro-Islamic State Kurdish preacher, Mullah Shwan al-Kurdi, reportedly joined the group in November, possibly fearing arrest by the Asayish (Rudaw, November 27). Social Media Propaganda Aside from direct military attacks, however, the Islamic State has in recent months also increased its use of Kurds in media propaganda operations aimed against the Kurdistan region. For instance, the group has published footage of the radical Kurdish preacher, Mullah Shwan al-Kurdi, taking part in operations against the Peshmerga on the outskirts of Kirkuk on January 31, in which he promised that the group would capture Erbil (Bas News, January 31). Al-Kurdi was also featured in an Islamic State propaganda video released in February showing captured Kurdish Peshmerga fighters dressed in orange jumpsuits in a cage. [2] The Islamic State also appears to have increased their social media messages in Kurdish in order to spread fear among the Kurdish population and to counter Kurdish media criticism of the group. These messages have also tried to show that the Islamic State is not against Kurdish Muslims, only secular Kurdish parties. For instance, one Islamic State statement published in January said that the Peshmerga are not fighting on behalf of religion, and that they have ties to Israel, United States and Iran: “They want to create Kurdistan as an independent state, with the help of the Jewish state and spread of democracy… They openly say that they don’t believe that state and religion should be united.” [3] This online recruitment effort by the Islamic State was one reason why the KRG temporarily shut down Twitter and Facebook access in the region in August 2014 (Middle East Eye, August 10, 2014). PSYOPs vs Kurdish Clerics In response, the KRG has used religious leaders to counter Islamic State propaganda, and help to discourage potential recruits (War is Boring, February

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9). In response, the Islamic State has threatened Muslim Kurdish leaders with death for declaring that slain Peshmerga are “martyrs.” However, according to a Kurdish senior advisor Abdulsalam Medeni, the Islamic State’s propaganda has found some resonance locally: “Some mullahs in the mosques during the Friday prayers send this message directly or indirectly… The grassroots Muslims think our government is not respecting Islamic traditions.” [4] Likewise, in March, in the Kurdish town of Bardarash, two Kurds were arrested for vandalizing a Peshmerga grave, writing on it “no God but Allah” (Bas News, March 12). Nevertheless, the number of Kurds joining the Islamic State has decreased since the militant group attacked the Kurdistan region (Rudaw, February 27). While many Kurdish Islamists sympathized with the struggle against Syrian President Bashar al-Assad in 2011 (which they viewed as a war between al-Assad and Muslims), they generally do not sympathize with the internal fights between jihadist groups, or with jihadist attacks on Kurds in Syria and Iraq. In addition, the allure of the Islamic State has diminished as the group has been increasingly pushed onto the defensive in 2015. Conclusion The impact of the Islamic State’s several hundred Kurdish members has, so far, been less than might be expected. The group has not been able to use these Kurds to take over Kurdish dominated areas, or to wage regular attacks inside Kurdistan. Indeed, with Western support, the Kurdish government has managed to maintain internal security, and security conditions have improved overall in Kurdistan since the Kurds managed to take back most Kurdish areas in Iraq from the Islamic State after August 2014. Meanwhile, the number of Kurdish recruits to the Islamic State has decreased due to effective Asayish actions, the security awareness of local citizens and because of the jihadist movement’s decreasing popularity among Islamist Kurds. In addition, the Kurdish government has effectively responded to the Islamic State’s propaganda attacks on its secular government. Despite this, however, a considerable number of Kurds remain active with the Islamic State in areas controlled by the group, and a limited risk of attacks by Kurdish radicals will therefore remain for the foreseeable future. Wladimir van Wilgenburg is a political analyst specializing in issues concerning Iraq, Iran, Syria and Turkey with a particular focus on Kurdish politics. Notes 1. Hemin Hawrami speech, “Kurdistan in Transition–Political reconfiguration in Rojava (Syrian Kurdistan) and South Kurdistan (Iraqi Kurdistan) in the wake of IS military setbacks,” Utrecht University, February 28, 2015. 2. Islamic State, “Healing the heart of the believers,” February 21, 2015, https://archive.org/details/ISIS.peshmerga.kirkuk. 3 Aseer Sunni al-Kurdi, “Peshmerga, a group full of hatred and unbelief,” January 3, 2015, http://justpaste.it/iqdx. 4. Author interview with Abdulsalam Medeni, a senior advisor to the Deputy Prime Minister of the Kurdistan region, March 13, 2015.

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BAGHDAD: Kurdish forces have prevented displaced Arabs from returning to disputed areas of Iraq that Kurdish leaders want to incorporate in their autonomous region over Baghdad's objections, a report said. Human Rights Watch warned the Kurdistan regional government against meting out "collective punishment of entire Arab communities" for ISIS' attacks. "Cordoning off Arab residents and refusing to let them return home appears to go well beyond a reasonable security response," said Letta Tayler, senior terrorism and counterterrorism researcher at the New York-based rights group. The HRW report said Kurdish forces have for months barred Arabs displaced by last year's ISIS offensive from returning to their homes in disputed areas.

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**9 July 2014, Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki accused the Northern autonomous Kurdish region of hosting terrorists spearheading an offensive that has overrun swathes of territory and sparked Iraq's worst crisis in years. "Honestly, we cannot be silent over this and we cannot be silent over Arbil being a headquarters for Daash (i.e. ISIL), and Baath, and Al-Qaeda and terrorist operations," Daash is the former Arabic acronym for the Islamic State terrorist group, while Baath refers to the banned party of executed dictator Saddam Hussein27 July 2014, United States based Kurds have opened a petition on the White House website calling on the Barack Obama administration to recognize Kurdistan independence.

**26 Feb 2015, Human Rights Watch warns Kurds using success against IS to extend territory By Robert Hackwill. Kurdish Peshmurga fighters may be restoring peace in northern Iraq, but not everyone in the villages they are liberating from Islamic militants are getting a fair deal alleges Human Rights Watch. It is claimed Kurdish residents are being allowed back home, while Arabs are not, with some losing their homes to Kurds. “At the checkpoint we’re asked “Arabic or Kurdish?” If he’s Kurdish, no problem, go inside. If Arabic, big problem,” said one young Arabic man. Erbil and Nineveh provinces are being monitored and patrolled by the Peshmurga, and Arab residents of the zones who fled the IS militants have been corralled into security zones and prevented from leaving, while Kurds are not. “There are no Arabs left. They ran away, so we stayed in their houses,” said one Kurd. “The Peshmerga took me to an Arab house and said I could stay there,” said another.The Kurds were warned about this policy in January by Human Rights watch.

“The Kurdish military forces recently began easing these restrictions in some areas they control in Northern Iraq, but they remain in place in many other areas,” said HRW’s senior researcher Letta Tayler. The Kurds claim a vast swathe of territory cutting through Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Iran as their homeland, but Arabs have always lived there, too.

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The Struggle for Syria’s al-Hasakah Governorate: Kurds, the Islamic State and the IRGC Publication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 7April 3, 2015 By: Nicholas A. Heras

Al-Hasakah-based Arabs declaring allegiance to the Islamic State in the light of Arab-Kurdish tensions (screengrab).The Islamic State’s attack on ethnic Assyrian Christian communities in the northeastern Syrian governorate of al-Hasakah in February and the subsequent kidnapping of approximately 220 Assyrian villagers has brought renewed international attention to the region and the complex ethnic and religious conflicts brewing there (Daily Star [Beirut], February 28; YouTube, February 23; al-Arabiya [Dubai], February 23). In addition, thousands of additional Assyrian villagers are believed to have been displaced from their homes by the fighting and forced to join members of their community in the city of Qamishli, in northeastern al-Hasakah governorate, near the Syrian-Iraqi border, while others fled to Lebanon (al-Arabiya [Dubai], March 5; al-Jazeera [Doha], February 28). An ethnically and religiously diverse region, al-Hasakah is emerging as a major focus of the country’s ongoing conflict, complicated by the governorate’s diversity, and the competition for power between a Kurdish-run autonomous regional government dominated by Partiya Yekitiya Demokrat (PYD—Democratic Union Party) that is in turn strongly influenced by the Partiya Karkeren Kurdistani (PKK—Kurdistan Workers’ Party) and communities loyal to the al-Assad government. The situation in al-Hasakah governorate is further complicated by the presence of Syrian security forces who are bolstered by Hezbollah and Iranian trainers, and Arab-majority armed opposition groups loyal to the Islamic State and other factions (YouTube, December 3, 2014). [1] Al-Hasakah governorate is an important battle space that influences the regional conflict against the Islamic State, as it is through al-Hasakah that the Islamic State connects its holdings in Raqqa, Syria and Mosul, Iraq. The province has broader significance to the region because it is the core territory in the autonomous, Syrian Kurdish-run administration that links Rojava (western Kurdistan) to the Kurdistan Regional Government in Iraq, with a potential long-term effect on the course of regional, transnational Kurdish nationalism. For the al-Assad government and its Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) patron, parts of al-Hasakah are its strongest remaining footholds in eastern Syria, providing a base of operations against the Islamic State and to fight back against the development of an independent or autonomous Kurdish-run administration in eastern Syria.

The Islamic State and Its Opponents The Islamic State’s recent kidnapping operation focused on 34 Assyrian villages northwest of the governorate’s capital al-Hasakah, centered on the town of Tal Tamar along the Khabur River, a tributary of the Euphrates, and located near the front-line between the Islamic State and the Kurdish-majority militia network of the Yekineyen Parastina Gel (YPG—People’s Protection Units) which are being supported by local, Assyrian-majority militias under the Sutoro (abbreviated from “Syrian Security Office”) organization (Daily Star [Beirut], March 3; YouTube, February 27; YouTube, February 26; YouTube, February 23). The Sutoro militias were formally organized in January 2013 under the command of the local Syrian Military Council, an ethnic Assyrian armed opposition body which is strongly influenced by the Assyrian ethnic activist organization the Syrian Union Party, after the withdrawal of Syrian military units from the area following clashes with YPG (ARA News [Sanliurfa], March 12; Assyrian International News Agency [al-Hasakah], February 28). Since then, the

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Suturo militias have fought against Arab-majority armed opposition groups, including militant Salafist organizations that have been powerful in this region such as the Islamic State, the al-Qaeda affiliate Jabhat al-Nusra (Victory Front) and Harakat Ahrar al-Sham al-Islamiya (Islamic Movement of the Free Ones of the Levant), with approximately 1,200 ethnic Assyrian fighters engaged in full-time security duties (Assyrian International News Agency [al-Hasakah], February 28; Orient News [Dubai], February 7). Recently, under pressure to secure the release of the remaining Assyrian villagers seized by the Islamic State, the leadership of the Assyrian Church of the East in al-Hasakah stated that it is against the members of its communities forming military alliances with the YPG, stressed that the hostages were civilians and asserted that church properties were forced to display the image of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad due to pressure from the regime’s security forces (ARA News [Sanliurfa], March 20). This indicates that although Assyrian armed groups are typically aligned with the YPG and are an important component of its local security structure, the continued strength of the Islamic State in Al-Hasakah governorate, and its ability to strike directly at Assyrian villages, as well as the increasing regime presence, are forcing vulnerable communities like the Assyrians to pragmatically assert their neutrality.

Ethnic Tensions A recent YPG offensive was recently launched in early March against Islamic State-controlled villages south of Qamishli, centered on the large town of Tal Hamis near the Syrian-Iraqi border. This offensive, which is concurrent and separate from a Syrian government-led operation in the same area, is further threatening the Islamic State’s control over strategic areas of the governorate that provide it with lines of supply and reinforcement between its territory in Syria and Iraq (YouTube, March 9; Daily Star [Beirut], March 3; YouTube, February 24). The YPG campaign south of Qamishli is being waged by both Kurdish and Arab fighters, particularly Arab tribal fighters who are organized into the Quwat al-Sanadid (Sanadid Force), which is drawn from local sections of the powerful, transnational Shammar tribal confederation (YouTube, March 1). Kurdish-Arab relations in the area of Tal Hamis, which had been under Kurdish control until it was seized by the Islamic State, have been strained throughout the Syrian conflict (Orient News [Dubai], September 30, 2014; al-Jazeera [Doha], September 18, 2014). For instance, the Islamic State has effectively used Kurdish-Arab tensions to rally Arab fighters in the area of Tal Hamis to rise up against the YPG. This led to a significant portion of the local Arab population declaring allegiance to the Islamic State (YouTube, February 18, 2014). The area is of strategic importance because of its proximity to the oil fields centered on Rmeilan in the southern Qamishli suburbs. In further evidence of ethnic tensions in the area, in the aftermath of the recent YPG campaign in Tal Hamis, local Arabs were reportedly violently displaced from their homes by Kurds and forced to flee to al-Hasakah city, Qamishli and other areas of the governorate (al-Jazeera [Doha], March 2). For the three major combatant coalitions in the governorate (the Syrian government and its auxiliaries, the Kurdish-led autonomous government and the Islamic State) securing the cooperation of local Arab tribal groups, which are a significant minority in al-Hasakah governorate, or neutralizing them, is key to securing long-term control over the province. [2] One effect of the reports of YPG (i.e. Kurdish) violence against Arab villagers in the area around Tal Hamis, even if the YPG was assisted by Arab forces, is to allow the Syrian government to present itself as a pan-ethnic unifying force, contrasting with the Kurdish-led autonomous government in al-Hasakah governorate. This narrative is being built into the newly announced loyalist political movement Jazirah Arabiya Sooria (Syrian Arab Jazirah [peninsula/island]), which is seeking to promote a pluralistic message, if heavily influenced by Ba’ath party principles of pan-Arab nationalism, to mobilize pan-ethnic dissent and action against the against the Kurdish-led administration in the greater northeastern region of Syria

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which is referred to as “al-Jazirah” (al-Akhbar [Beirut], March 3; Syria HR [al-Hasakah], March 2; Siraj Press [Qamishli], November 6, 2014). This evolving narrative of resistance against the Kurdish-led administration in al-Hasakah is important as the al-Assad regime ramps up its effort to expand its control in the governorate. Core to the Syrian military’s recent campaigns in al-Hasakah governorate are ongoing efforts to recruit, train and deploy local loyalist militias, primarily drawn from Sunni Arab tribes (ARA News [Sanliurfa], March 8; ARA News [Sanliurfa], October 5, 2014; ARA News [Sanliurfa], October 31, 2013). Although the national paramilitary organization of the Quwat al-difa al-watani (National Defense Force—NDF) has been important to the al-Assad government’s limited security regime in al-Hasakah, a more recent effort has been made to aggressively draw sections of the local Arab tribal population more firmly into the regime’s security structure to fight against the Islamic State and Arab-majority armed opposition groups around the governorate’s two major cities of al-Hasakah and Qamishli (ARA News [Sanliurfa], March 8; al-Alam [Tehran], March 5; Yekti Media [Qamishli], November 26, 2014; Siraj Press [Qamishli], November 6, 2014; ARA News [Sanliurfa], October 5, 2014; ARA News [Sanliurfa], October 31, 2013). The local implementer of this effort, reportedly working in collaboration with the Syrian Ba’ath Party’s Intelligence Bureau chief Ali Mamluk, is the Qamishli-based Tayy tribal Shaykh Muhammad al-Faris (Yekti Media [al-Hasakah], January 17; ARA News [Sanliurfa], May 17, 2014; Militant Leadership Monitor, March 2015). These growing, local loyalist militia forces clashed with YPG fighters in the city of al-Hasakah in January, which is believed to have resulted in the displacement of as much as 70 percent of the Kurdish residents of the city (ARA News [Sanliurfa], January 30; Rudaw [Erbil], January 21; Yekti Media [al-Hasakah], January 17). The IRGC-Quds Force (IRGC-QF) and Hezbollah trainers have reportedly been working to build the capacity of loyalist militias (Orient News [Dubai], March 3; Rudaw [Erbil], March 1; al-Jazeera [Doha], February 20; ARA News [Sanliurfa], October 31, 2014). Further, Syrian opposition activists in Qamishli, reporting to a credible Syrian opposition-sympathetic news agency, allege that the Sham Wings airline company owned by Rami Makhlouf, Bashar al-Assad’s first cousin and an important regime figure, has begun direct flights from Najaf, Iraq to Qamishli. The stated purpose of these flights is believed to be the transport and deployment of predominately Iraqi Shi’a fighters organized by the IRGC-QF effectively to the battlespace of northeastern Syria (Zaman al-Wasl [Qamishli], March, 20). The increased deployment of IRGC forces in the region would not be surprising; over the course of the Syrian civil war, IRGC-QF organized Shi’a fighters have been increasingly and more numerously deployed as an expeditionary force actively fighting for the regime in several key theaters of the conflict (Orient News [Dubai], March 9; al-Jazeera [Doha], February 25; al-Arabiya [Dubai], February 19; Syrian Reporter [Dara’a], February 11; al-Arabiya [Dubai], June 9, 2014; al-Arabiya [Dubai], December 13, 2013; YouTube, November 23, 2013). The IRGC-QF force provides an important source of additional manpower for loyalist forces to conduct attacks and to hold areas that have been cleared of enemy combatants. Increased IRGC-QF influence over the al-Assad government’s security posture in al-Hasakah, especially the deployment of significant numbers of the IRGC-QF’s forces, would be considered a serious threat to the dominance of the YPG in many areas of the governorate. [3] It would also be considered a direct threat by the PYD to the viability and existence of the Kurdish-led autonomous government structure that is the most powerful authority in al-Hasakah. [4] The potential stationing of an IRGC-QF expeditionary force and Hezbollah fighters in al-Hasakah over the long term, in coordination with a larger and more aggressive

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paramilitary force mobilized largely from local, loyalist Sunni Arab tribes, could thus force a widespread armed conflict between the YPG and regime forces. [5] Outlook The most likely significant impact of the current Syrian military campaign in al-Hasakah is the potential expansion of the al-Assad regime’s authority via local, primarily Sunni Arab tribal paramilitary militias that are supplemented by the training and likely the kinetic operational support of the IRGC-QF’s multi-national Shi’a force. The al-Assad government, with the deployment of IRGC-QF forces in al-Hasakah governorate, a secondary or tertiary theater for much of the conflict, is likely attempting to reestablish its predominant position in the governorate, and to sustain that position over the long-term. Pragmatic Sunni Arab tribal leaders, such as those organized by Shaykh Muhammad al-Faris, could join with the IRGC-QF and the Assad regime as a result of calculating that the trend towards greater involvement of Iran will continue, leading eventually to the success of the regime campaign against the Kurds and the Islamic State in al-Hasakah. They may therefore conclude that there is a greater long-term benefit to themselves and their tribesmen on joining the “winning” side sooner rather than later. A potential return of the regime’s predominance in al-Hasakah governorate, rather than the limited authority and patchwork military presence it has wielded over the course of the war, could allow it to limit or completely suppress the Kurdish-led autonomous government in the governorate. With the assistance of Iran and local Arab tribes, the al-Assad government could potentially be in position to dramatically reverse Kurdish social, political and cultural gains in the region. Meanwhile, YPG militias, which are predominately oriented towards seizing and holding territory that borders Kurdish-majority areas of al-Hasakah governorate, are likely to continue to seek to mobilize more Arabs into their forces. However, they will be hampered by local Arabs’ long-standing doubt toward the Kurds’ future intentions, fuelled by Syrian government counter-narratives of resistance against the Kurds, specifically over the ideological influence of the PKK on the YPD. The Syrian government could also succeed in mobilizing Arab and non-Arab, ethnic and sectarian minorities such as the Assyrians, Armenians and Circassians, against a Kurdish-led, autonomous region, backed by the threat of a reinvigorated, expanded, and sustained Syrian military presence in al-Hasakah governorate. The current campaign also presents the Syrian military with the opportunity to move more aggressively to reduce Islamic State control over the overwhelmingly Sunni Arab tribal villages in the southeastern area of al-Hasakah governorate near the Syrian-Iraqi border, particularly those on the Khabur River. If the al-Assad regime can achieve a sustained series of victories on the battlefield in al-Hasakah governorate, which would be won largely by the effort of its local auxiliaries and the IRGC-QF mobilized forces, it could establish a new security reality in the governorate that would have effects beyond reducing the local power of the Kurdish-led autonomous government and the Islamic State. For instance, stronger government control over al-Hasakah governorate, won with the help of the IRGC-QF, geographically expands the influence of the Syrian security forces to a position where it can co-opt local actors, especially Arab tribes, against its opponents. In addition, positioning regime assets and inserting IRGC-QF forces in northeastern Syria could not only limit the socio-political space for the U.S.-led train-and-equip program for opposition fighters, it would also put direct, regime-led pressure on the Islamic State strategic depth in Syria. In turn, this could position the al-Assad government and its IRGC-QF allies to the international community as essential partners for countering the Islamic State and other militant Salafist organizations, as has happened in Iraq. This would limit the military and diplomatic options for states currently calling for the removal of the current Syrian

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government and undermine the hopes of regional actors such as Saudi Arabia and its allies that are seeking a achieve a severe reduction in Iranian influence in the Middle East. Nicholas A. Heras is a Middle East researcher at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) and an associated analyst for The Jamestown Foundation. Notes 1. For more information about al-Hasakah governorate, see Nicholas A. Heras, “The Battle for Syria’s al-Hasakah Province,” CTC Sentinel, October 24, 2013, https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-battle-for-syrias-al-Hasakah-province. 2 For more information about the importance of Arab tribal groups in al-Hasakah and their conflicting loyalties, see Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Kurdish Enclaves in Syria Battle Islamist Militant Groups,” Terrorism Monitor, May 2, 2014, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[swords]=8fd5893941d69d0be3f378576261ae3e&tx_ttnews[any_of_the_words]=Pakistan%20Frontier%20Corps&tx_ttnews[pointer]=11&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=42303&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=741933e62cca606c82261295b58de18b#.VRbNRuEe1nA; Wladimir van Wilgenburg, “Kurdish Strategy Towards Ethnically-Mixed Areas in the Syrian Conflict,” Terrorism Monitor, December 13, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41754&cHash=bbedc896f6cefadf8d7284fe2c7fe764#.VRbM9-Ee1nA; Nicholas A. Heras and Carole A. O’Leary, “The Tribal Factor in Syria’s Rebellion: A Survey of Armed Tribal Groups in Syria,” Terrorism Monitor, June 27, 2013, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=41079&no_cache=1#.VRbNueEe1nA; Carole A. O’Leary and Nicholas A. Heras, “Syrian Tribal Networks and Their Implications for the Syrian Uprising,” Terrorism Monitor, June 1, 2012, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=39452#.VRbOPOEe1nA. 3. Viber interview with an ethnic Kurdish YPG fighter from Qamishli, March 15, 2015; Viber interview with an ethnic Kurdish YPG fighter from the village of Maabadi, near Tal Hamis, March 5, 2015. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.

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