Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-AQIS-10

C de Waart; CdW Intelligence to Rent [email protected] In Confidence

Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-AQIS-10

Why is There No Storm in Your Ocean1?With ISIS stealing its thunder, al Qaeda

declares jihad on India

What is AQIS up to or ordered to ready for ; The Real Reason al-Qaeda Is Establishing an India Branch; The terrorist outfit looks to be playing a long game. AQC’s long-term viability, indicating al-Qaeda’s possible intention to consolidate in the peripheral areas of the Greater Middle East (North Africa, South & Central Asia) while it waits for the ISIS phenomenon to run its course rather than attempting to challenge the upstart head on.

.Cees When Zawahiri announced the creation of AQIS he was globally ridiculed

and seen as a desperate effort to oppose Daesh. As I warned many times focus on Daesh allows AQ: AQIS to build the two largest training camp ever found in 14 years of Aghan war. We urgently need to stay focused on the larger enemy: AQ as they do have a plan. Bottom line is that this camp was built to be a high end training facility to prepare enemy personnel, for what? And what did we fail to see?

So why would Ayman al-Zawahiri, an extremely intelligent and careful man who was more instrumental in the planning of 9/11 than Bin Laden himself, and managed to survive almost 50 years of serving in Islamist terrorist organizations notorious for their attrition rates, come out after two years of media silence to announce such an apparently quixotic bid?Because AQIS isn’t about India – it’s about preserving al-Qaeda’s safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

The Pakistanis have already seen the worst imaginable times while dealing with violent extremism. Islamabad can't afford to give one last remaining of its four provinces to the Taliban and sectarian groups. If Sindh falls in the hands of Sunni extremists, the price the whole country will have to pay is going to be much higher than what they have paid so far.

So while many analysts may view the establishment of AQIS as an ill-fated reactionary maneuver in response to the ascendency of ISIS, it may be better to think of it as AQC digging in for the long haul in South and Central Asia. While its immediate dividends may be low, AQIS may prove to be a crucial component in ensuring AQC’s long-term viability, indicating al-Qaeda’s possible intention to consolidate in the peripheral areas of the Greater Middle East (North Africa, South & Central Asia) while it waits for the ISIS phenomenon to run its course rather than attempting to challenge the upstart head on.In short, proclamations about al-Qaeda’s irrelevance or imminent demise seem as premature today as they were at the outset of the Arab Spring. If there’s one thing al-Qaeda is good at it, it’s reinventing and reviving itself in response to changing circumstances. Counterterrorism experts would do well to take heed.

The rise of the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) to the forefront of the global jihadist movement challenges al Qaeda’s prominence and influence. The ISIS 1 http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/India/document/papers/Wts.pdf The general mandate of authority..

The farther back you can look, the farther forward you are likely to see.–Winston Churchill

CdW Intelligence to Rent of 13 03/05/2023

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/India/document/papers/Wts.pdf


counter-state that does away with the Iraq-Syria border, as well as its growing presence in such places as Libya, the Sinai, and Afghanistan, are proof of the group’s power and the effectiveness of its strategy. The leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr al Baghdadi, described al Qaeda’s leadership as individuals who have become misguided and who have misled the global jihadist movement. Yet, al Qaeda is not defeated. The core network remains and its leaders are committed to al Qaeda’s ideology. It continues to be active throughout the Muslim-majority world, and its affiliated groups in the Maghreb, Horn of Africa, Arabian Peninsula, and Syria continue to follow guidance from al Qaeda’s leader Ayman al Zawahiri. Zawahiri responded to Baghdadi’s challenge for leadership of the global jihadist movement, as competition between the groups escalated. On September 3, 2014, he announced the establishment of a new Pakistan-based affiliate that would oversee operations in the neighboring countries of India, Bangladesh and Myanmar: al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS).[ The announcement came just two months after the Islamic State’s declaration of a caliphate under Abu Bakr al Baghdadi (“Caliph Ibrahim”) on June 29, 2014. The establishment of AQIS was probably an attempt to unite the splintered jihadist movement in the Indian subcontinent, a region that is home to over 30 percent of the world’s Muslim population, where ISIS has yet to develop a significant presence.

Though the IGP did not reveal the identities of the “three terrorist organisations”, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) anti-sectarian intelligence chief Khurram Waris stated on October 13, 2015, …al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and LeJ [Lashkar-Jhangvi (LeJ)] which is now linked with the Middle Eastern terrorist group Daesh [known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/Islamic State, IS)] and working together, are involved in many terrorist activities in Sindh in the recent past, including murdering Police Officials in Karachi. AQIS was now leading the other two groups. All three groups in the Province are headed by commanders known only by their code names, Umer, Mistry and Bengali

What I think you have to do is challenge your assumptions here,” Campbell explained in his interview with Lamothe. “We struck a major al Qaeda sanctuary in the center of the Taliban’s historic heartland.” The Washington Post’s Dan Lamothe provides new reporting on the two large al Qaeda training facilities raided by US and Afghan forces in the Shorabak District of Kandahar earlier this month

Foreign jihadists, including members of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), are training at facilities in southern Helmand province in Afghanistan. The camps are used to prepare fighters to conduct attacks throughout Southeast Asia, according to reports reviewed by The Long War Journal.

But reporting in the Indian and Pakistani press indicates that the camps in Kandahar are not the only ones where al Qaeda is training inside Afghanistan. These same reports indicate that al Qaeda-linked groups, such as the Indian Muhajideen and Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, are also training in the district of Dishu in Baramcha.

“AQIS terrorists are provided assistance in Helmand from where they travel to Chaman, Quetta, Shikarpur and Karachi,”

Al Qaeda has “almost completely vacated Waziristan and Pakistan,” Raouf said in the recording. He explained that the “weight” of al Qaeda has been shifted to Syria and Yemen, because that is where al Qaeda’s efforts are most needed. But it is clear that al Qaeda has relocated senior leaders, including perhaps Raouf himself, to Afghanistan as well.

In the meantime, the debate over IS started, which created questions regarding the





presence of the world’s largest terrorist group in Bangladesh. As SITE Intelligence revealed that the IS claimed responsibility for both killings, the government, its policy-makers who always talked about a continued fight against the rise of militancy since they assumed power in 2009, and also police officials ruled out the presence of IS here.Interestingly, this is the same police who in the last one year, on a number of occasions, had claimed success in nabbing IS personnel on Bangladesh soil. Police chief Shahidul Haque in his latest statement denied the presence of any IS militant or network in Bangladesh. He seemed to have smelled a rat as he said SITE, which circulated the claim by IS, is run by a Jewish lady (Rita Katz). State Minister for Home Affairs Asaduzzman Khan also ruled out IS’s involvement in the killings and said the IS network does not exist in Bangladesh. Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, a survivor of a number of militant attacks and plots and a crusader against extremism, is also of the idea that IS links do not exists in this country. The Real Reason al-Qaeda Is Establishing an India Branch;

The terrorist outfit looks to be playing a long game.By Jordan Olmstead September 23, 2014On September 3, Ayman al Zawahiri, the leader of al-Qaeda Central (AQC) announced the establishment of a new branch: al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS). Zawahiri, often described as “long on words and short on charm” delivered a characteristically ambling and inchoate message. He explained how the new group was the “blessed result” of a two-year effort to consolidate various Al-Qaeda affiliates in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Baluchistan and India into one organization with the (ostensible) purposes of serving embattled Muslims in the region by establishing sharia law and “freeing the occupied land of Muslims.” The Indian states of Kashmir (the site of a six decade long secession struggle), Gujarat (where an infamous pogrom against Muslims occurred in 2002), and Assam (a state where Muslims are persecuted for allegedly being parasitic Bangladeshi immigrants), along with Burma and Bangladesh, are mentioned as loci for potential operations.Analysts are portraying this administrative re-shuffling as a desperate response to the existential challenge posed to AQC by the upstart ISIS, whose seizure of Northwestern Iraq and swaths of Eastern Syria has seemingly rendered al-Qaeda impotent and irrelevant in the eyes of many potential recruits (especially valuable Western ones) along with formerly dependable donors. Most of these analysts were underwhelmed by the prospect of a branch of al-Qaeda in India; in a representative statement, Peter Bergen deemed the idea of AQC opening a branch in India as “just crazy” given the previous inability of al-Qaeda to establish a presence in the country.Certainly, the likelihood of AQC attracting a meaningful following from India’s Muslims because of this move is low. Muslims only account for 13.4 percent of India’s population, so even if al-Qaeda wanted to establish a (counter)caliphate there, it would simply not be feasible. Also, the pan-Islamist ideology of al-Qaeda is unlikely to gain much traction in light of the hostile sentiments that most Indians, including the country’s Muslim population, generally harbor towards Pakistan, its neighboring Islamic state. Instead, India’s Muslim population is preoccupied with extremely particularized struggles: Kashmiris are concerned with wrangling independence or greater autonomy, while the Assamese are focused on fighting discrimination and persecution within the framework of the existing state.

Spectacular 9/11 style attacks are (or should be) off the table because they would likely stoke reprisal attacks against India’s minority Muslim community – fomenting





indigenous blowback/hostility against al-Qaeda rather than helping to net more recruits.Moreover, even if AQIS could magically conjure the 31,000 fighters ISIS has managed to wrangle (tellingly, only four are confirmed to have come from India), it would still fall short of being the largest security threat the government has faced in the last two decades: India struggled with a bloody separatist insurgency in Kashmir and is currently managing a Maoist Naxalite insurgency throughout Central India. The state is very experienced in dealing with rebellions. In short, al-Qaeda does not pose a meaningful threat to India and is unlikely to blossom there.The prospects seem even worse in neighboring Bangladesh, an overwhelmingly Muslim country formed after the 1971 war for independence from Pakistan. Hefazat e-Islam (a hardline Islamist group accused of using street violence to push out the current government and impose their vision of “Sharia Law”) wants to exercise a monopoly on local extremism; one of its senior leaders insisted “Bangladesh is not Pakistan”– somewhat ironically, considering Bangladesh used to be the East Wing of Pakistan – and that “al-Qaeda [wouldn’t] be able to make any impact if they opened a branch here.”

So why would Ayman al-Zawahiri, an extremely intelligent and careful man who was more instrumental in the planning of 9/11 than Bin Laden himself, and managed to survive almost 50 years of serving in Islamist terrorist organizations notorious for their attrition rates, come out after two years of media silence to announce such an apparently quixotic bid?Because AQIS isn’t about India – it’s about preserving al-Qaeda’s safe havens in Pakistan and Afghanistan. AQC faces pressure on multiple fronts on its home turf: ISIS is actively recruiting in Peshawar and ISIS flags are flying at anti-Indian rallies in Indian Kashmir. This encroachment cannot be allowed to pass without at least a token reply. More seriously, the Pakistani Army recently undertook an invasion of Northern Waziristan, home of the Pakistani Taliban, which provides shelter and support to AQC.Thus, the announcement of AQIS was largely directed at the Pakistani government. The new branch comprises a variety of terrorist groups, many of which either have extensive experience carrying out terrorist attacks within Pakistan, and/or have cordial relationships with elements of the Pakistani government because of their potential for use as proxies against India (of course, since this is Pakistan, there’s an almost laughable overlap between the two). Thus, al-Qaeda may be signaling they can be a strategic asset for elements within the Inter-Services Intelligence and defense establishment in exchange for some breathing room. Husain Haqqani, former Pakistani Ambassador to the U.S. doesn’t believe that this “play…will get much traction,” but AQC has more coercive options at its disposal.For instance, AQC could direct its AQIS affiliates to launch attacks against Pakistan in the event that the government gets too aggressive. This would be particularly unwelcome given the turbulence caused by the recent protests (ostensibly) over electoral fraud. This campaign may have begun: In early September, AQIS operatives almost managed to hijack a Pakistani frigate in Karachi, which was scheduled to depart on a joint-patrol with American frigates in the Indian Ocean. Once it got near to the American ships, AQIS planned to turn the frigate’s weapons system against the Americans, which could have sparked a major naval engagement against American and Pakistani ships.Alternatively, al-Qaeda could ratchet up tensions in Kashmir, and by extension, between India and Pakistan. Through its recent acquisitions, AQC now “owns” Asim Umar – possibly the single most significant asset gained in forming AQIS. While he has little operational experience, Umar is renowned for his intellect and oratorical abilities – al-Qaeda’s Barack Obama, if you will – and the organization has largely lacked a charismatic





voice since the 2011 death of Anwar al-Awlaki. But more significantly, according to a militant source interviewed by Reuters, Umar “has strong links [in Kashmir] and can deliver there” because he was in charge of his former organization’s Kashmir branch.The recent floods that devastated Kashmir are stoking anger against the Indian government for its supposedly disinterested response, perhaps providing AQC with an opening. Discontent is simmering, and a series of attacks against Indian targets could spark serious unrest. This could easily bring Narendra Modi, the hawkish Prime Minster of India, into loggerheads with Pakistan’s Nawaz Sharif – who has likely abdicated Pakistan’s foreign/defense policy portfolio to the military after the latter helped salvage his regime from a violent protest movement that threatened to storm his home. If AQC managed to destabilize the situation further, the prospects for level-headed conflict management are not high.Finally, AQC is signaling its fealty to the Afghan Taliban – its original patron. In his statement, al-Zawahiri notes that AQIS will report to Mullah Omar, the Afghan Taliban’s august spiritual leader. If Mullah Omar ends up exerting significant influence over AQIS, al-Qaeda could use Afghanistan to fight against “the near enemy” by supporting the Taliban’s efforts to carve out an Islamic state after the eventual withdrawal of U.S. forces in exchange for the provision of safe-havens.

So while many analysts may view the establishment of AQIS as an ill-fated reactionary maneuver in response to the ascendency of ISIS, it may be better to think of it as AQC digging in for the long haul in South and Central Asia. While its immediate dividends may be low, AQIS may prove to be a crucial component in ensuring AQC’s long-term viability, indicating al-Qaeda’s possible intention to consolidate in the peripheral areas of the Greater Middle East (North Africa, South & Central Asia) while it waits for the ISIS phenomenon to run its course rather than attempting to challenge the upstart head on.In short, proclamations about al-Qaeda’s irrelevance or imminent demise seem as premature today as they were at the outset of the Arab Spring. If there’s one thing al-Qaeda is good at it, it’s reinventing and reviving itself in response to changing circumstances. Counterterrorism experts would do well to take heed.Jordan Olmstead studies study Philosophy and Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Arizona.

Al Qaeda operates in southern Helmand provinceBY BILL ROGGIO AND THOMAS JOSCELYN | October 24, 2015 | Foreign jihadists, including members of al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), are training at facilities in southern Helmand province in Afghanistan. The camps are used to prepare fighters to conduct attacks throughout Southeast Asia, according to reports reviewed by The Long War Journal. The discovery of the training centers in Baramcha, a town in southern Helmand province, indicates that al Qaeda and affiliated groups are training in multiple regions of Afghanistan. Earlier this month, the US military raided two significant al Qaeda camps in the neighboring province of Kandahar. One of the facilities was approximately 30 square miles in size, according to a US military spokesman. [See LWJ report, US military strikes large al Qaeda training camps in southern Afghanistan.]But reporting in the Indian and Pakistani press indicates that the camps in Kandahar are not the only ones where al Qaeda is training inside Afghanistan. These same reports indicate that al Qaeda-linked groups, such as the Indian Muhajideen and Laskhar-e-Jhangvi, are also training in the district of Dishu in Baramcha. The training facilities in





Baramcha are likely tied to al Qaeda’s relocation from northern Pakistan into Afghanistan.AQIS, which was established in September 2014, is the newest regional branch of al Qaeda. It is led by Asim Umar, who was groomed by al Qaeda to assume a leadership position, and includes jihadists from several established groups in the region. The earliest plots conceived by AQIS focused on the Pakistani military and other security forces, as well as American and Indian interests.Since the beginning of the year, Pakistani authorities have carried out multiple raids against the group. However, according to Pakistani officials, AQIS has relocated a significant portion of its operations into Helmand. The move by AQIS was made in anticipation of the Pakistani military’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an offensive that began in June 2014. The offensive has targeted al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, including several from Central Asia. Some of these same organizations have helped fuel the Taliban’s advances in Afghanistan this year. In April, Pakistani officials announced that they had broken up an AQIS cell in Karachi. However, a senior Pakistani counterterrorism official, Mohammed Arif Hanif, said that the jihadist group was using Helmand as a hub for its operations. “AQIS terrorists are provided assistance in Helmand from where they travel to Chaman, Quetta, Shikarpur and Karachi,” Hanif said, according to Dawn. A young Bengali suicide bomber who had targeted Pakistani Rangers had been traced back to Helmand, according to Pakistani officials. They added that AQIS had “relocated from Waziristan to Helmand province.”In August, Dawn again reported that the Taliban was “sheltering” al Qaeda in Helmand. “The bond between us and our Taliban brothers is a solid ideological bond. They opted to lose their government and family members just to protect us,” Qari Abu Bakr, who works for As Sahab, al Qaeda’s propaganda arm, was quoted as saying. “There is no question of us moving apart now after going through this war together. Our common enemy does not know what is coming its way,” he added.Al Qaeda has announced its relocation out of northern Pakistan. Earlier this month, an audio message featuring Hossam Abdul Raouf, a veteran al Qaeda leader who is close to Ayman al Zawahiri, was released online. Al Qaeda has “almost completely vacated Waziristan and Pakistan,” Raouf said in the recording. He explained that the “weight” of al Qaeda has been shifted to Syria and Yemen, because that is where al Qaeda’s efforts are most needed. But it is clear that al Qaeda has relocated senior leaders, including perhaps Raouf himself, to Afghanistan as well.In July, the US killed Abu Khalil al Sudani, one of Osama bin Laden’s and Ayman al Zawahiri’s closest compatriots, in an airstrike in Paktika province. In October 2014, another veteran al Qaeda commander, Abu Bara al Kuwaiti, perished in a US airstrike in Nangarhar province. The training facilities in Baramcha are, therefore, almost certainly part of al Qaeda’s broader effort over the past few years to entrench its operations inside Afghanistan once again.

Taliban control Dishu, training camps established The conditions are ripe for al Qaeda and affiliated groups to train at camps in Baramcha. The Afghan government admitted that the wider Dishu district is under the control of the Taliban, The New York Times reported in June. In 2014, Pajhwok Afghan News reported, citing Afghan police officials, that Taliban “training camps and hideouts of drug smugglers were operational in [the] Dishu and Khanishin districts” in Helmand. “[T]he rebels had established training centers in the Baramcha area of Dishu district,” the Afghan news agency said in February of that year. The Taliban and al Qaeda have used Baramcha to host training facilities because the town is located in the remote southern district and borders Pakistan’s Baluchistan province. The Afghan military and police find it difficult to project power in





the area, and jihadists can quickly cross the border into Pakistan if threatened. The town is across the border from the Gerdi Jangal refugee camp, where one of the Taliban’s four regional military shuras is based.The US military noted in October 2010 that Baramcha was a key node for the Taliban and “foreign fighters,” a term the US military often uses to mean al Qaeda. “The area is a Taliban command and control area that consists of narcotics trafficking, weapons and ammunition storage, improvised explosive device factories, and foreign fighter training areas,” the now-defunct International Security Assistance Force noted in a press release announcing an operation to clear the Taliban and allied jihadists from the town. US Marines and Afghan troops ultimately cleared Baramcha, but after US forces withdrew from the area in 2012, it quickly slipped back under the Taliban’s control, and the jihadists’ camps were back in operation.

Jihadists train in Baramcha The Pakistani and Indian press have identified several jihadists who have passed through Baramcha for training over the past several years. On Oct. 7, the Islamabad-based Daily Express reported that police captured Saeedullah, “an important member of Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent.” According to police, Saeedullah (AKA Rizwan Mullah, Choti Dunya), who was arrested in Karachi, “confessed that he had received training from Amir Jawad in Baramcha city of Afghanistan.” In April 2014, The Indian Express reported that two Pakistanis from Karachi, Abdul Waleed Rind and Fahim, were recruited by Riyaz Bhatkal, who was identified as the founder of the Indian Muhajideen. The two Pakistani jihadists, who were captured inside India in March 2014 before they could attack Indian soldiers, attended separate training camps in Baramcha. “The training routine for Fahim and Waleed, even though they went separately to different camps, was quite similar – a 15-21 day capsule with three days dedicated to assembling and disassembling the AK-47, three days to do the same with 9 mm pistols, two days on grenades and ways to throw them,” The Indian Express reported. “The remaining days were used for physical training and endurance.”And in August 2015, The Friday Times, a Lahore-based publication, reported that Abdul Kabeer Shakir, a leader in Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ), is “providing financial and other assistance” to “assassins” that are targeting Pakistani Shiites. ASWJ is the new name for the radical anti-Shiite Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP), which is closely allied with Lashkar-e-Jhangvi and other Pakistani terrorist groups.“A source in law enforcement said the people involved in sectarian killings usually received training at a bordering village named Baramcha,” The Friday Times reported.Bill Roggio

What I think you have to do is challenge your assumptions here,” Campbell explained in his interview with Lamothe. “We struck a major al Qaeda sanctuary in the center of the Taliban’s historic heartland.”

“It’s a place where you would probably think you wouldn’t have AQ. I would agree with that,” Campbell said, according to the Post. “This was really AQIS, and probably the largest training camp-type facility that we have seen in 14 years of war.” Bottom line is that this camp was built to be a high end training facility to prepare enemy personnel. This camp is unique in its level of technical training. The training camp was broken down by basic and advance training areas. Training ranged from physical fitness, weapons training (small arms to advanced explosive training, indirect fire), chemistry to produce advanced explosives, and higher level sniper training

The foreign minister of Tunisia – which has seen thousands of its youth join extremist groups in Syria and elsewhere – said on Friday that unlike the past, modern terrorism has “no boundaries.” “We did not overcome the threat because in the past, we





looked at terrorism and tackled it as if it was an isolated phenomenon. But today, it has multiple forms and no boundaries,” Taieb Baccouche said

The Islamic State and its jihadist rival Al Nusrah Front, al Qaeda’s official branch in Syria, are training forces to conduct urban warfare at camps inside Syria.

KABUL, Afghanistan — A multi-day operation in southern Afghanistan this month that involved 200 Special Operations forces and scores of American airstrikes targeted what was “probably the largest” al-Qaeda training camp found in the 14-year Afghan war, the senior U.S. commander in Afghanistan said on Friday. Army Gen. John F. Campbell, the four-star officer in charge of the U.S. war effort, said the camp was used by AQIS, an acronym for al-Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent. The group’s formation was announced last year by al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri, and is believed to be based in Pakistan and focused on India, Pakistan and other nations in southern Asia.

Al Qaeda’s Kandahar training camp ‘probably the largest’ in Afghan WarBY THOMAS JOSCELYN | October 31st, 2015 | The Washington Post’s Dan Lamothe provides new reporting on the two large al Qaeda training facilities raided by US and Afghan forces in the Shorabak District of Kandahar earlier this month. Lamothe interviewed Gen. John F. Campbell, who oversees the war effort in Afghanistan. And Campbell confirmed that the camps were run by al Qaeda, with one of them being extraordinarily big.“It’s a place where you would probably think you wouldn’t have AQ. I would agree with that,” Campbell said, according to the Post. “This was really AQIS, and probably the largest training camp-type facility that we have seen in 14 years of war.”AQIS stands for Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, the newest regional branch of al Qaeda’s international organization. Ayman al Zawahiri, the emir of al Qaeda, announced the establishment of AQIS in September 2014. AQIS has attempted some pretty daring plots against the Pakistani military, but like al Qaeda arms elsewhere appears to be devoting most of its resources to the jihadists’ insurgencies in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other countries. As we reported on Oct. 13, US military officials said that one of the two al Qaeda camps was nearly 30 square miles in size – an astonishing figure. More than 200 US troops and Afghan commandos, supported by 63 airstrikes, were required to assault the facilities. Brigadier General Wilson Shoffner, a US military spokesman, was quoted in a press release as saying that the raids included “one of the largest joint ground-assault operations we have ever conducted in Afghanistan.” Shoffner added, “We struck a major al Qaeda sanctuary in the center of the Taliban’s historic heartland.”Taking out an al Qaeda camp of this size, over several days, likely required extensive planning. And Campbell said as much in his interview with Lamothe. “We looked at it for a while to make sure we reduced the risk to the forces that go in on a target like that,” Campbell said. “It was a very complex target set over several days.” Campbell explained to the Post that the Shorabak camps “were discovered after a raid this summer on another al Qaeda facility in the Barmal district of eastern Afghanistan’s Paktika province.” Interestingly, that is where Abu Khalil al Sudani, one of al Qaeda’s most senior figures, was killed in July. Indeed, intelligence recovered from the facility associated with Sudani





may have been used to locate the Shorabak camps. The timing is consistent with reporting by CNN’s Barbara Starr, who cited an email from “coalition forces.” On Oct. 21, Starr reported that the massive camp in Shorabak “had been operating since last November — and the US didn’t learn the full details about the site until July.” That is the same month as the strike against Sudani. According to Starr, the “coalition” explained that “several hundred hours of surveillance” were carried out between July, when the camps were discovered, and Oct. 7, when the joint American-Afghan raids were first launched.The “coalition sources” cited by CNN provided these details on the larger of the two camps: Bottom line is that this camp was built to be a high end training facility to prepare enemy personnel. This camp is unique in its level of technical training. The training camp was broken down by basic and advance training areas. Training ranged from physical fitness, weapons training (small arms to advanced explosive training, indirect fire), chemistry to produce advanced explosives, and higher level sniper training.All of this raises troubling questions. Why weren’t the facilities in Shorabak discovered before July 2015, especially given that one of them was almost 30 square miles in size? US officials have long maintained that al Qaeda has a negligible presence in Afghanistan and was confined to the country’s east. Why didn’t the US know that al Qaeda had major operations ongoing in southern Afghanistan. “What I think you have to do is challenge your assumptions here,” Campbell explained in his interview with Lamothe. “Things change, and what was good here in 2010 or 2011 may not necessarily be good today as far as the enemy. It is true that al Qaeda fighters have streamed into Afghanistan from northern Pakistan. And al Qaeda has relocated its operations not just into Kandahar, but also into Helmand. As we reported on Oct. 24:Since the beginning of the year, Pakistani authorities have carried out multiple raids against [AQIS]. However, according to Pakistani officials, AQIS has relocated a significant portion of its operations into Helmand. The move by AQIS was made in anticipation of the Pakistani military’s Operation Zarb-e-Azb, an offensive that began in June 2014. The offensive has targeted al Qaeda and affiliated jihadist groups, including several from Central Asia. Some of these same organizations have helped fuel the Taliban’s advances in Afghanistan this year.Thus, al Qaeda’s relocation from northern Pakistan to Afghanistan has undoubtedly increased its footprint in the latter country since early 2014. But the reality is that the US intelligence community and military underestimated al Qaeda’s presence in Afghanistan even prior to that time. An analysis of press releases issued by the now defunct International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) from 2007 to 2013 demonstrates that al Qaeda and allied groups maintained significant cadres of jihadists in the country during that span. Declassified files recovered in Osama bin Laden’s compound show that al Qaeda operated in multiple Afghan provinces in the months leading up to the May 2011 Abbottabad raid. So, the US should “challenge” its assumptions as “[t]hings change,” especially because those assumptions were wrong all along.Thomas Joscelyn is a Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the Senior Editor for The Long War Journal.

Pakistan: Malignant Brew In Sindh – Analysis OCTOBER 21, 2015 By Ambreen





Agha*On October 13, 2015, at least four persons, including two terrorists, were killed in separate incidents of violence in Karachi, the provincial capital of Sindh. In one incident, Karachi Metropolitan Corporation’s (KMC) Additional Director, Arshad Hussain, was shot dead near Askari Park in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town. Two terrorists, identified as Zohaib and Mahmood, were killed in two separate Police encounters in the Kalari and Chakiwara areas of Lyari Town. Zohaib, affiliated with the Wasi Lakho Gang, was reportedly involved in killing of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) Member of Provincial Assembly (MPA), Waja Kareem Dad, on August 17, 2011 in the Kharadar area of Saddar Town. Mahmood was associated with the Baba Ladla Gang. In another incident, Police recovered an unidentified dead body from Gulshan-e-Ghazi area of Baldia Town.On October 8, 2015, two Police Officials, identified as Head Constable Abdul Ghafar and Constable Pervaiz Ali, were shot dead while they were on a routine patrol near Char Minar within the limits of the New Town Police Station in the Bahadurabad area of Gulshan Town. In another incident, a traffic Policeman identified as Rehan Sarwar was killed at his residence in the Aram Bagh area of Saddar Town.On October 7, 2015, a ‘criminal’, identified as Amir Baloch, son of Shah Jehan Baloch, was killed in retaliatory firing by the Police that had come under attack by him and his accomplices while patrolling the Garden West Road area, adjacent to the Lyari Expressway. The Police recovered one TT pistol and five rounds of ammunition from his possession. Amir’s other accomplices, however, managed to escape. Amir was associated with the Lyari Gang.According to partial data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management (ICM), Karachi has recorded a total of 627 terrorism and gang-related fatalities, including 314 civilians, 45 SF personnel and 268 terrorists/criminals in the current year (all data till October 18, 2015). In the corresponding period of 2014, the number of such fatalities stood at 1,012 fatalities, including, 658 civilians, 117 SFs and 237 terrorists/criminals.ICM data confirms that gang and terrorism-related fatalities in the city have decreased considerably since the launch of ‘targeted action’ on September 5, 2013. Since then, Karachi has recorded 2,233 terrorism and target killing fatalities, including 1,296 civilians, 722 terrorists/criminals and 215 Security Force (SF) personnel (data till October 18, 2015). During the corresponding period prior to the start of the action, there were 3,259 fatalities, including 2,762 civilians, 240 terrorists/criminals and 257 SF personnel. Though there was a 31.48 per cent decline in the total, the decline in SF deaths was much smaller, at 16.34 per cent. According to a detailed report released on July 8, 2015, by the Pakistan Rangers in Sindh, since the launch of the ‘targeted action’ on September 5, 2013, the Rangers had carried out 5,795 operations during which they had apprehended 10,353 suspects and recovered 7,312 weapons and 348,978 rounds of ammunition. The Rangers also traded fire with suspected ‘criminals’, engaging in a total of 224 ‘encounters’, in which 364 suspected criminals were killed and another 213 were arrested. The Rangers also arrested 82 abductors and in the process secured the release of 49 abducted persons from captivity. In addition, a total of





826 terrorists, 334 ‘target killers’, and 296 extortionists were arrested during this period.On September 4, 2013, the Federal Cabinet had empowered the Rangers to lead the ‘targeted action’ with the support of the Police, against criminals involved in the “four heinous crimes of target-killing, kidnapping, extortion and terrorism”. Federal Minister of Interior Chaudhry Nisar Ali Khan, laying emphasis that this was to be a ‘targeted action’ or ‘exercise’, rather than an operation, had announced that a committee headed by the provincial Chief Minister Syed Qim Ali Shah would “manage, administer and control” the action.Despite the decline in fatalities, there is much to suggest that the ‘targeted operation’ is yet to create an environment of security in Karachi. On the completion of two years of the ‘exercises’ on September 4, 2015, Karachi Police Chief Mushtaq Mahar admitted that a significant presence of sleeper cells of terrorist groups in the provincial capital. Similarly, on October 12, 2015, Inspector General of Police (IGP), Sindh, Ghulam Hyder Jamali, had warned that “three terrorist organisations” operating in a nexus were planning to carry out attacks in Karachi in the month of Muharram (First month of the Islamic Calendar. It is the period of mourning by the Shia Muslims). Muharram started on October 15, 2015.Though the IGP did not reveal the identities of the “three terrorist organisations”, the Counter-Terrorism Department (CTD) anti-sectarian intelligence chief Khurram Waris stated on October 13, 2015,…al-Qaeda in Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and LeJ [Lashkar-Jhangvi (LeJ)] which is now linked with the Middle Eastern terrorist group Daesh [known as Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS/Islamic State, IS)] and working together, are involved in many terrorist activities in Sindh in the recent past, including murdering Police Officials in Karachi. AQIS was now leading the other two groups. All three groups in the Province are headed by commanders known only by their code names, Umer, Mistry and Bengali. They have been accused of being involved in killings and other terrorist activities in Hyderabad and Karachi Districts. They were responsible for the recent killing of traffic Policemen in Karachi…The interrogation of the arrested militants further revealed that the groups were also generating funds for their organisations by committing robberies and kidnappings-for-ransom, extorting traders, and collecting donations using fake madrassa receipts.Five traffic Policemen have been killed in Karachi in the current year. The first such incident was recorded on August 30, 2015, when two traffic Policemen, identified as Nizam Hussain and Shair Muhammad, were killed by unidentified militants near the Sunday Bazaar in the Metro Shopping area in Gulshan-e-Iqbal Town. On September 2, 2015, a traffic Police Constable was shot dead and two others sustained injuries when unidentified militants opened fire at them in the Site-B area of SITE Town. A traffic Police Official, identified as Assistant Sub-Inspector (ASI) Zulfiqar, was shot dead near Malir Kala Board in the Malir Town on September 30, 2015. A traffic Policeman, identified as Rehan Sarwar, was killed at his residence in the Aram Bagh area of Saddar Town on October 8, 2015.Policemen from other divisions are also being targeted. On September 30, 2015, Lyari Superintendent of Police (SP), Aftab Nizamani, survived an attempt on his life while two attackers were killed by the Police in retaliatory firing in the Chakiwara area of Lyari Town. Karachi-West Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Azfar Mahesar, noted, on September 2, 2015, that “a new wave of targeted killing of Policemen” has begun.The active presence of IS in the city has also been confirmed, with IGP Jamali confirming, on October 12, 2015, that the group was operating in Sindh and had established links with LeJ, and that IS and LeJ were involved in the May 13, 2015, Safoora Goth carnage in





Gulshan Town, where 45 Ismaili Shias travelling in a chartered bus were killed. This incident manifested the first and sudden emergence of IS activity in Karachi.On October 13, 2015, a list prepared by the Karachi East SSP’s office reportedly mentioned 53 suspected terrorists who were operating in a manner bearing the hallmark of Daesh. According to the report these terrorists belonged to different parts of the country and were based in Karachi.Much earlier, confirming the presence of IS, in a ‘secret information report’ submitted by the Balochistan Government to the Federal Government, dated October 31, 2014, the Provincial Government had warned of increased IS footprints. The report from the Home and Tribal Affairs Department of Balochistan stated,It has been reliably learnt that Daesh has offered some elements of Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Ahl-e-Sunnat Wal Jamat (ASWJ) to join hands in Pakistan. Daesh has also formed a ten-member Strategic Planning Wing.IS is, consequently, no more a perceived threat, and has matured into a real danger. It has augmented its strength by aligning itself with splinter groups of mainstream terrorist organizations operating in Pakistan, making the situation all the more precarious.Indeed, accepting the danger, Chief of Army Staff (CoAS) General Raheel Sharif in a meeting with the Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif on September 1, 2015, reaffirmed the resolve that the ‘targeted operation’ in Karachi would continue, irrespective of its political fallouts. Similarly, President Mamnoon Hussain stated on September 30, 2015, that the ‘targeted action’ in Karachi would continue till the ‘complete restoration of peace and elimination of terrorism’.Curiously, IGP Jamali claimed, on October 4, 2015, that “peace and order has been restored in the metropolis by eliminating terrorism, target killing and extortion.”Karachi has long been known as “the most dangerous mega-city in the world”, but the ‘targeted action’ has clearly impacted on the will, capacity and activity of the terrorist-criminal nexus in the city. There has, moreover, been no serious terrorist attack in the metropolis since the May 13, 2015, Safoora carnage. Dangers, nevertheless, persist, and the presence of terrorist organizations and particularly the emergence of Daesh (IS), are grounds for some alarm, as is the nexus between Daesh, AQIS, TTP and LeJ. These actors, with their wider national and global networks and agendas, retain enormous potential for state destabilization. *Ambreen Agha Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Regards Cees Early Oct The al Qaeda Indian Subcontinent (AQIS), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) which is now linked with the Middle Eastern terrorist group Daesh, working together, are involved in many terrorist activities in Sindh in the recent past including murdering police officials in Karachi, counter-terrorism department anti-sectarian intelligence chief Khurram Waris told The News. He added that AQIS was now leading the other two groups.Militants arrested by the counter-terrorism department in raids conducted in different parts of the province have disclosed during interrogation that the nexus had formed three groups in the province headed by commanders known only by their code names - Umer, Mistry and Bengali – involved in killings and other terrorist activities in Hyderabad and Karachi.They were responsible for the recent killing traffic policemen in Karachi and also the attack on a bus carrying members of the Ismaili community in the Safoora Goth area of the city. Waris said the groups were also generating funds for their organisations by committing robberies and kidnappings for ransom, extorting traders, and collecting donations using fake madrasa receipts.





The LeJ set-up; The LeJ is headed by its commanders Dilawer and Malik Tasaduq in Karachi and other parts of the province but have been in hiding since the law enforcement agencies launched a crackdown and there are reports that they have taken refuge in upcountry areas. Notorious terrorist Naeem Bukhari is looking after the organisational matters of the LeJ and recruiting wanted terrorists with bounties on their heads as well as young men to reconsolidate the group. He is also preparing terrorists for carrying out attacks in Karachi during Muharram. Besides, Bukhari has hired expelled militants who were involved in Afghanistan war and members of the Ilyas Kashmiri group. AQIS Sindh commander Abdullah alias Abdullah Aziz is also using similar tactics. The official said AQIS and other outfits, following the military operation against them in Khyber Agency, temporarily shifted their headquarters to the hilly areas of Balochistan and had also joined hands with the banned Baloch Liberation Army. The militants, who were earlier working for Lashkar-e-Tayyaba (LeT) and expelled over their involvement in criminal activities, were hired by AQIS. “Most of these ex-LeT members are Karachi-based,” Waris added. The official said presently the presence of the three groups’ nexus had been detected in Hyderabad, on the outskirts of Karachi as well as its inner areas including Shah Faisal, Gulshan-e-Iqbal, Gulistan-e-Jauhar, North Nazimabad, Sharea Noor Jehan, and North Karachi. “The leaders of these groups are in Balochistan and instruct their terrorists to attack personnel of the law-enforcement agencies in Karachi,” he added. However, police, Rangers and intelligence agencies they have damaged their network and many of their leaders have either been killed or arrested.” Waris said to avenge the killing and arrest of their leaders and intimidate the law enforcement agencies, terrorists were attacking them with grenades and improvised explosive devices. “Weapons, explosives, and other material for making bombs are transported from Balochistan to Karachi. We are working hard to stop their supplies,” he added.




Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-AQIS-10

Documents

Transcript of Al-Qaeda chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 4-1-AQIS-10