Al Qaeda and Jihadist Networks

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Chapter 11 AL QAEDA AND JIHADIST NETWORKS

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Al Qaeda and Jihadist Networks. Chapter 11. Learning Objectives: Chapter 11. Describe the rise of religious terrorism and its relationship to the Soviet-Afghan War. Summarize the important roles of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri . Outline the early history of al Qaeda. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

Transcript of Al Qaeda and Jihadist Networks

Page 1: Al Qaeda and Jihadist Networks

Chapter 11

AL QAEDA AND JIHADIST NETWORKS

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Describe the rise of religious terrorism and its relationship to the Soviet-Afghan War.

Summarize the important roles of Osama bin Laden and Ayman al Zawahiri.

Outline the early history of al Qaeda. Explain the structure and operations of al

Qaeda until September 11, 2001. Summarize al Qaeda’s political theology.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: CHAPTER 11

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Describe al Qaeda’s current franchise-style structure and current operational capabilities.

Outline the operations of franchises including AQAP, AQIM, and al Shabab.

Describe other forms of terrorism in Pakistan.

Summarize operations in other parts of Asia and the Pacific.

LEARNING OBJECTIVES: CHAPTER 11

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Saudi Arabia deemed to be an important ally to the US during the Cold War The central focus was a country’s stance

against the Soviet Union

The foundation of modern jihadist power grew from the Cold War Militant Islamic reformers used by Western

allies against communist countries

COLD WAR ORIGINS

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Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan State Department encouraged Arab and

other Islamic allies to send money and religious puritans (mujahedeen)

The US formed an alliance with Pakistan began to train and equip the mujahedeen

The mujahedeen were not united at the end of the Soviet-Afghan War

THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR

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bin Laden’s reputation began to grow as the mujahedeen searched for a continuing jihad

bin Laden was influenced by Sayyid Qutb’s thought (militant Islam)

Inspired by the mujahedeen of Afghanistan, bin Laden dropped out of college to join the Soviet-Afghan War

THE RISE OF OSAMA BIN LADEN

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bin Laden fell under the influence of Abdullah Azzam, a doctor of Islamic law

Azzam believed it was time for all Muslims to rise up and strike Satan

bin Laden financed mujahedeen operations and taught the guerrillas how to build field fortifications

bin Laden became a battlefield hero

BIN LADEN AND ABDULLAH AZZAM

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Dr. Ayman al Zawahiri was born into a prominent Egyptian family in 1951 He fell under the influence of violent religious

philosophy in high school after being exposed to militant interpretations of Islam

When Sadat signed a peace treaty with Israel, Zawahiri threw himself into the resistance

AYMAN AL ZAWAHIRI

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bin Laden took advantage of America’s inattention and Azzam’s waning power bin Laden began to recruit the mujahedeen al Zawahiri organized training camps & cells

bin Laden’s first cause was the Saudi government and its “corrupt” royal family

Saudi government allowed U.S. troops to be stationed in Saudi Arabia

EARLY HISTORY OF AL QAEDA

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fNEIY2bhhgo

Discussion: How would you describe bin Laden’s ability to hide

in the open, so to speak? bin Laden was considered, according to the video, to

be an integral part of a number of terrorist activities since 9/11 – would you say his death will curb future terrorist activities?

What do you think about the comments from some Pakistanis that US violated Pakistan sovereignty and that an unarmed man was shot?

THE DEATH OF BIN LADEN

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Three interrelated factors were prevalent in the rise of Islamic Group (IG): The 1981 assassination of Anwar Sadat The failure of Arab nationalism The decline of Arab socialism

The IG was connected with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing Sheik Omar Abdel Rahman

THE EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC GROUP

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The EIJ targeted the Egyptian government Zawahiri believed that the government

represented the near enemy The united jihadists could focus on the far

enemy: Israel, the U.S., and the West

The Egyptian government cracked down, and few people stepped forward to take up EIJ’s version of jihad

EGYPTIAN ISLAMIC JIHAD

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bin Laden’s entrepreneurial efforts gave him the freedom to finance and command the al Qaeda terrorist network

U.S. intelligence linked the bomb attack in Yemen to bin Laden

bin Laden claimed that he trained and supported the troops that struck the U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopter

BIN LADEN RETURNS TO AFGHANISTAN

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Seated in front of a camera, bin Laden declared war on the United States in 1996

In August 1998, bin Laden’s terrorists bombed the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania

Khalid Sheik Mohammed planned 9/11 and put the people in place to carry it out

DECLARING WAR ON THE U.S.

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Leadership connections are intact and dangerous.

Sageman’s theory of terrorist networks does not match the scholarly and applied literature about the subject.

Sageman has ignored important data. Sageman focused on individual behavior

instead of the way terrorist groups behave.

THE SAGEMAN-HOFFMAN DEBATE

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Hoffman misrepresented information in Leaderless Jihad.

The threat of terrorism is evolving. He reviews the literature on terrorism and

his methodology is correct. Leaderless Jihad focuses on groups, not

individuals.

THE SAGEMAN-HOFFMAN DEBATE

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Al Qaeda has become a franchise Central leadership operates in the tribal

areas of Pakistan The Haqqani network runs its own militias,

shadow governments, protection rackets, legitimate businesses, and terrorist groups

A significant number of al Qaeda operatives killed by the drones

DEGRADED LEADERSHIP AND THE AL QAEDA FRANCHISE

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The female jihad involves supporting male relatives, educating children in the ideology, providing support for operations, and assisting with financing

Bin Laden’s latest documents have called for women to actively join the jihad

Al Qaeda created a women’s suicide division in 2003

THE ROLE OF WOMEN

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BIN LADEN DOCUMENTS ONLINE

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http://www.npr.org/blogs/thetwo-way/2012/05/03/151925766/coming-up-bin-laden-documents-to-go-online?ps=rs

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Communications are central to the al Qaeda strategy; over half the battle is being waged in the media

al Qaeda runs a global marketing campaign in an attempt to capture the imagination and support of Muslims

al Qaeda is quick to exploit local issues and surround them with its own theology

THE VIRTUAL WAR

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Yemen’s conflicts: Struggle for control of the central government Rebellious southern region Growing presence of AQAP in the Marib

AQAP’s purpose is to unite Saudi Arabia and Yemen in one religious government

AQAP claimed responsibility for the attempted downing of a Northwest airliner outside Detroit on Christmas 2009

ARABIAN PENINSULA (AQAP)

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AQIM operates primarily along the coastal region outside of Algiers and in the Sahel desert area bordering Mali and Algeria The desert provides a vast area to recruit and

train potential operatives

AQIM claims loyalty and unity to al Qaeda; yet, in practice it does not take direction from Afghanistan or Pakistan

AL QAEDA IN THE MAGHREB (AQIM)

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Combined Joint Task Force, Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) Detects and disrupts terrorist activities before

the terrorists can commit violence Relies heavily on military force and national

security intelligence Close relationship with indigenous forces will

build a long-term partnership with governments in the Horn

THE HORN OF AFRICA

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During the Cold War, the U.S. used Somalia as a base against communism

Somalia served as a base for some of the al Qaeda operatives

Somalia became a quagmire of violent political chaos

al Shabab began an offensive in central and southern Somalia for the purpose of imposing its narrow brand of Islamic law on Somalia

THE HORN OF AFRICA

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http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VuKPR3ukGUg

Discussion: Have US War on terror policies contributed to

the deadly crisis in Somalia? This question was posed on the Website – did

you find the video to answer this question? Provide examples.

How much of a role did poverty play in this conflict? Support your position.

THE HORN OF AFRICA

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Islam teaches universal human love, submission to God’s will, & life of morality preparing for the final judgment of God Jihadists are doomed to failure because their

theology of violence does not convey the meaning of Islam

Confusion about mainstream Islam complicates attempts to understand jihadists

AL QAEDA’S POLITICAL THEOLOGY

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Pakistan became a country in 1947 Two international issues dominate

Pakistan: nuclear weapons and relations with the United States

Some Pakistani leaders support terrorism; others want to fight the jihadists

There is tension between Pakistan and India especially in the area of Jammu and Kashmir

PAKISTAN

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LeT is best known for its attacks in India It rejects all forms of Islam except its own

interpretation Pakistan officially banned the LeT in 2002

It operates under a series of different names

The LeT traditionally defined its operations around the Jammu and Kashmir conflict

LASHKAR-E-TAYIBBA (LET)

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Taliban seized control of Kandahar in 1994 and controlled 95% by 1997

As the Pakistani Taliban expanded the influence of the United States waned

The struggle to limit jihadist networks has shifted from American military and intelligence efforts to diplomacy

THE PAKISTANI TALIBAN

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Bangladesh The ports of Bangladesh have become centers

for international crime; the country has a strong internal jihadist movement

Thailand The Barisan Revolusi Nasional, Coordinate

(BRN-C), is leading the insurgency and carries a jihadist agenda

OTHER NETWORKS IN ASIA

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Indonesia The political situation in Indonesia provided a

climate for the growth of jihadist groups

The Philippines’ three terrorist groups: Moro National Liberation Front Moro Islamic Liberation Abu Sayyuf

OTHER NETWORKS IN ASIA

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The jihadist terror network al Qaeda was spawned in the late stages of the Soviet-Afghan War.

Osama bin Laden, the founder of the group, joined Egyptian Ayman al Zawahiri to expand the group in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan in 1996.

Al Qaeda quickly evolved into an international umbrella group, conducting large-scale attacks throughout the world.

CHAPTER TAKE AWAYS

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A Western military offensive in the wake of 9-11 changed the nature of al Qaeda’s structure resulting in differing leadership hubs and a more decentralized organization.

Although some operations were tightly structured and controlled, the nature of al Qaeda changed.

CHAPTER TAKE AWAYS

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Different regional groups formed in various parts of the world under the al Qaeda franchise.

Many of al Qaeda’s leaders, including bin Laden, have been killed by American attacks in Pakistan.

The group remains active mainly due to its franchised network and an alliance among Pakistani and Afghan allies.

CHAPTER TAKE AWAYS

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