Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
Transcript of Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983107983144983137983152983156983141983154 983093
Al-Ghazālī and Kalām
The Conundrum of His Body-Soul Dualism
Ayman Shihadeh
My aim in this article is twofold First I shall interpret two discussions inal-Ghazālīrsquos main kalām compendiumal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād (The Balanced Bookon What-To-Believe) which appear discrepant with the substance dualism
espoused in some of his other works and instead seem to coincide with thematerialist ontology and anthropology of classical Ashʿarism1048625 Although bothdiscussions have already received a fair amount of attention the discrepancieshave hitherto remained either unresolved or unexplained The present studyshall attempt to resolve an ostensible discrepancy in one discussion and toidentify and explain a real and serious discrepancy in the other By doing so it
will shed light on the main dilemmas and sensitivities that al-Ghazālīrsquos sub-scription to substance dualism presented him in a kalām setting
Second I will advocate a more general point namely that interpretingal-Ghazālīrsquos kalām worksmdashincludingal-Iqtiṣād and to an extent the moreadvanced Tahāfut mdashmust take account of his views on the objectives and
workings of kalām in general983090 It will be argued that his low view of the disci-pline of kalām (low that is in comparison both to the earlier Ashʿarī high viewthereof and to his view of his own higher theology) a983142fects his choice of doc-trines defended and arguments deployed in al-Iqtiṣād as well as aspects of hisstyle of presentation These in turn will explain the incongruence between his
views in this work and positions championed in some of his other works
1 See Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo On al-Ghazālīrsquos body-soul dualism see
Kukkonen ldquoReceptive to Realityrdquo Treiger Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Gianotti
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash
67 Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecyrdquo idem ldquoReviewrdquo Hennig ldquoGhazali on Immaterial
Substancesrdquo Sīdbī Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Abū Saʿda al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-insāniyya
2 This point follows on from my earlier article ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo Both the present
study and this earlier article concentrate on al-Ghazālīrsquos kalām output rather than his theol-
ogy in general
copy 983147983151983150983145983150983147983148983145983146983147983141 983138983154983145983148983148 983150983158 983148983141983145983140983141983150 10486269830889830891048630 | 983140983151983145 983089983088983089983089104863098309110486339830959830961048633983088983088 9830929830919830889830959830921048633983088_983088 9830881048630
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983113 Iqtiṣād Eschatology
Our 10486781048681rst problematic passage occurs in the discussion on resurrection (ḥashr )
in the eschatological part of al-Iqtiṣād the main context in which the ontologyand nature of the spirit (rūḥ nafs) are normally propounded in a kalām source1048627Resurrection is treated in the section on doctrines characterised as beinga98314210486781048681rmed by revelation and con10486781048681rmed as possible by the mind (otherwiseknown as the samʿiyyāt ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo) which are alleschatological1048628 Al-Ghazālī de10486781048681nes resurrection as Godrsquos restoration (iʿāda) ofthe bodies of the dead on the Day of Judgement1048629 He a98314210486781048681rms the doctrine onthe basis of ldquounambiguousrdquo scriptural evidence and argues that the restora-
tion of human bodies is possible on the grounds that God was capable ofcreating them the 10486781048681rst time and hence must be capable of creating them asecond time983094 This is the standard Qurʾān-inspired theological argument1048631
Next he turns to the ontology of restoration particularly the manner in which the atoms and accidents of bodies are restored1048632 That some accidents of
the human body need to be re-created is obvious For when the body dies itimmediately loses its animate attributes such as life knowledge and volitionand as it decays it loses further accidents such as composition (tarkīb) colourand moisture Less obvious is whether God causes the atoms of the humanbody (and all other atoms of the world) to pass away as well and correspond-ingly whether resurrection involves the re-creation ex nihilo of both the bodyrsquosatoms and accidents or the restoring only of its accidents Both scenariosal-Ghazālī opines are rationally possible and both remain possible since nei-ther is supported by scriptural evidence983097
Delineating these models of the ontology of restoration leads to the prob-lem of the identity of the entities ldquorestoredrdquo (al-muʿād ) in particular whetherthe individual entity re-created in the resurrected bodymdashbe the entity an
atom or an accidentmdashwould be none other than (ʿayn) the individual entity
3 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213ndash15 Unless noted otherwise all references to al-Iqtiṣād are to the
edition of I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay published 1962 in Ankara On earlier Ashʿarite discussions
of the spirit see Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 436ndash7 465ndash74
4 Al-Ghazālī uses the standard label al-samʿiyyāt inal-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 92ndash4 118ndash22 The text
is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn 2199ndash202
5 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213
6 Ibid 2137 Cf Q 729 21104 3679 3681 5015
8 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213ndash14
9 The suspension of judgment on this point is a standard classical Ash aʿrite position See for
instance al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 374
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that existed in the body before it died or only a replica (mithl ) thereof Al-Ghazālī here defends bodily resurrection against the backdrop of Avicennarsquos
denial thereof in particular his view that an entity supposedly ldquoreturnedrdquo into
existence having gone from prior existence into non-existence is not the sameentity that existed before but only a replica10486251048624 In the case of accidents heexplains brie8520701048684y that this question poses no di98314210486781048681culty for him and his fellow
Ashʿarīs since ldquoin our viewrdquo (ʿinda-nā) no accident continues to exist ( yabqā)for more than one moment in the 10486781048681rst place as each accident must be re-cre-ated or ldquorenewedrdquo ( yatajaddadu) at each moment Accordingly the accidentldquorestoredrdquo (iʿāda) in an atom need not be the very same accident that existedtherein prior to the death of the body10486251048625 In this case the identity of the
individual human being will be preserved in his body ie in the atoms thatconstitute it As to the atoms although they too are susceptible to passingaway if God so wills the preservation of their identity will be guaranteedthrough their presence in Godrsquos knowledge An atom therefore can pass awayand then properly speaking be restored whereas a replica is an entity thatcomes to be having had no pre-existence1048625983090
The discussion of the ontology of resurrection and the identity of the indi- vidual restored leads to the passage that concerns us most Here is a translation
of the passage as it appears in the standard edition of al-Iqtiṣād
[para1] We have discussed this question (masʾala) [ie bodily resurrec-tion] at length in the Tahāfut [para2] To refute (ibṭāl ) [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [thismethod] a98314210486781048681rming (taqrīr ) that the soul which according to them doesnot occupy space continues to exist (baqā ʾ) [after the death of the body]and postulating (taqdīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body
whether it be the very same body of the individual or another This is a
forced consequent (ilzām) that does not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieve For that book was written to refute their doctrines not to a98314210486781048681rmtrue doctrines [para3] Rather since they considered what a human is he is with respectto his soul and that his involvement in the governance of a body is as it
were accidental to him and the body is an instrument for him we forcedthem (alzamnā-hum) given their belief that the soul continues to existto concede that they must a98314210486781048681rm the resurrection ( wujūb al-taṣdīq
10 Ibn Sīnā Shifā ʾ Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 cf Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282ndash3
11 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213ndash14
12 Ibid 214ndash15 On this point see Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 284
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bi-l-iʿāda) which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor other (badan min al-abdān) [para4] To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter
would lead us to investigate the spirit (al-rūḥ) the soul (al-nafs) life andthe reality (ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (al-muʿtaqadāt ) arenot suited to delving to these great depths in rational subjects(al-maʿqūlāt )10486251048627 Accordingly what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishingthe right balance of belief (al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm whatis taught in revelation10486251048628
This passage has been interpreted as indicating that in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī
espouses the materialist anthropology of classical Ashʿarism and opposes thephilosophical theory of the rational soul and that although he appears in theTahāfut to subscribe to the latter theory he does so only for the sake of argu-ment Some discussions in the Tahāfut indeed suggest that he does subscribeto this philosophical theory so his above remark that certain views expressedin the Tahāfut are not true expressions of his beliefs was taken to refer to thetheory as a whole10486251048629 This reading is represented by Marmura
The above statement speaks for itself Al-Ghazālīrsquos declaration that in theTahāfut he defended a doctrine that acknowledges the immateriality ofthe human soul simply for the sake of argument is quite explicit This isnot the doctrine he holds to be true The true doctrine is that of the kalām (in one of its versions)1048625983094
I will argue that this interpretation is erroneous A slightly di983142ferent reading isproposed by Richard M Frank who 10486781048681nds some ambiguity in the passage
13 That al-muʿtaqadāt here refers to relatively basic theological works meant to establish
creed (ʿaqīda) is con10486781048681rmed in other occurrences of the expression in al-Iqtiṣād (50 221
233 234) Compare this to the sense in which ldquoʿaqīdardquo refers to a genre
14 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 2151ndash10 (all translations are my own) An important variant will be
discussed below For earlier partial translations of this passage see Frank Al-Ghazālī and
the Ashʿarite School 55 Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74 Marmura ldquoBodily
Resurrectionrdquo 284ndash5 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo 1615 For a summary see Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 279ndash82 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 88 983142f
16 Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 285 cf 273ndash4 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashʿariterdquo 16
Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74
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That is as the basis of the argument in Tahāfut 10486251048631 he accepted their thesesthat (a) the soul does not die that (b) its relation to the body which itgoverns does not belong to it essentially but only temporarily but rather
(c) it uses the body as an instrument in order to show that one mustassert that the soul returns to govern a body He says that the premisesof the argument do not correspond to his own belief concerning what istrue Because of the way the paragraph is cast however it is not immedi-ately clear exactly what element or elements of the premises of theargument or its conclusion he may reject or accept10486251048632
Nonetheless Frank too reads the passage as a lsquodenial of something that he
manifestly believesrsquo namely lsquothe immateriality of the soulrsquo1048625983097 So the problem we are presented with is that according to one reading the above passagecontradicts views that al-Ghazālī expresses elsewhere since a materialist con-ception of humans contradicts the substance dualism championed in the Iḥyāʾʿulūm al-dīn ( Revival of the Religious Sciences) and other works and accordingto another reading it is ambiguous Neither reading attempts to explain theone or two arguments described
Let us take a closer look at this passage From the broader context it is clearthat ldquothis topicrdquo (para 1) denotes the problem of the restoration of the body whichal-Ghazālī treats in Discussion 20 of the Tahāfut It follows that ldquotheir doctrinerdquo(para 2)mdashthe philosophical doctrine said to have been refutedmdashrefers preciselyto Avicennarsquos denial of bodily resurrection which 10486781048681nds expression here in theaforementioned notion that once a thing passes away it cannot be broughtback into existence
Each of para 2 and para 3 describes rather ambiguously an argument through which the refutation is executed That a speci10486781048681c line of reasoning is being
described is con10486781048681rmed by the expression ldquowe followed a certain methodrdquo
(salaknā) which introduces para 2 The two descriptions could be referring to twodistinct arguments or to one and the same argument The verbal noun ldquoilzāmrdquo(para 2) and the verb ldquoalzamardquo (para 3) identify the reasoning involved in both casesas an ad hominem (ex concessis) argument which is a type of argument preva-lent in classical kalām9830901048624 An argument can be classed as ad hominem if inorder to refute another partyrsquos position the arguer premises the argument on
17 Referring to al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218983142f ed Bouyges 362983142f18 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 55ndash6
19 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56 65 91
20 I render ldquoilzāmrdquo as ldquoad hominem argumentrdquo in the sense of an argumentex concessis from
commitment rather than in the more popular sense of an attack on a personrsquos character
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one or more views held by the other party (the antecedent or antecedents)and concludes that they must concede another view (the consequent) whichis one way or another problematic to them The antecedent (or antecedents)
will be granted and the consequent will be a98314210486781048681rmed both for the sake of argu-ment So the arguerrsquos own position on the antecedents and the consequent isin principle of no immediate bearing on the argument
Now as shown in the synoptic table on p 119 the ad hominem argumentdescribed in para 3mdashto start with the least problematic of the two descriptionsmdashseems premised on two antecedents (a) the notion that ldquohumanrdquo (insān)properly speaking denotes the immaterial rational soul and that the bodyserves only as an instrument for the soul and (b) the view that the rational soul
is indestructible and hence survives the death of the body According to para 3the argument somehow provesmdashwe are not told exactly howmdashthat by sub-scribing to these two Avicennan views one must then concede a third viewnamely that after the death of its original body the soul must return to the gov-ernance of some body or other be that the very same original body or anentirely di983142ferent one This consequent contradicts Avicennarsquos views on thesoulrsquos immortality
The argument described in para 2 is harder to decipher Particularly problem-atic are the two verbal nouns ldquoa98314210486781048681rmingrdquo (taqrīr ) and ldquopostulatingrdquo (taqdīr )
which introduce the doctrines mentioned and link them together It seemsthat the argument described here starts by a98314210486781048681rming two doctrines (a) thesoulrsquos indestructibility such that it survives the death of the body and (b) thesoulrsquos immateriality These are the same two antecedents stated in para 3 Theconsequent too is the same as in para 3mdashnamely that the soul returns to the gov-ernance of the body to which it was originally connected or a di983142ferentbodymdashexcept that in para 2 this consequent is only ldquopostulatedrdquo (ie conceded aspossible) whereas in para 3 it is said to be entailed necessarily by the antecedents
What is described in para 2 is an unmistakably weaker argumentNotwithstanding this discrepancy I believe that para 2 and para 3 are meant to
describe one and the same argument given the correspondence between theantecedents and the consequent in both cases para 3 appears intended only toclarify the point made at the end of para 2 The discrepancy can be resolved if wemake a slight adjustment to the text of para 2 which is to swap the expressionsldquotaqrīr rdquo and ldquotaqdīr rdquo on the grounds that the two can appear very similar in
instead of their views (see Walton Ad Hominem Arguments 21983142f 104 983142f Shihadeh ldquoThe
Argument from Ignorancerdquo 196 n 75)
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some manuscript hands and that ldquotaqrīr rdquo in fact appears as ldquotaqdīr rdquo in somemanuscript copies9830901048625 The modi10486781048681ed reading would go as follows
[para2] To refute [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [this method]postulating (taqdīr ) that the soul which according to them does notoccupy space continues to exist [after the death of the body] and a98314210486781048681rm-ing (taqrīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body whether it be the
very same body of the individual or another
This reading has the advantage of being consistent with para 3 in that the arguerhypothesises the antecedents and a98314210486781048681rms the consequent forcing the oppo-nent to concede it as necessary (rather than merely as possible) As we shallsee however the original reading of para 2 is more consonant with the actual
21 As in one manuscript used for the 1962 edition (see al-Iqtiṣād 2152ndash3) and in 983117983123 Dublin
Chester Beatty Ar 3372 (983142f 56andashb) which is dated 5171123 Also two recent uncritical edi-
tions which use di983142ferent manuscript copies read lsquotaqdīr rsquo (ed al-Sharfāwī 2012 274 and
ed ʿImrān 2009 489) Neither edition however is furnished with a critical apparatus
983156983137983138983148983141 983093983089 Synoptic table analysing the argument described in each of parapara 2 and 3
Element Description para 3 para 2
Type of argument Ad hominem argument(ilzām)
10501811050183ا
ن984645 984644نأ
م
984647 ن
ه
ن984645 ل
ا
917501
1114109 1048573أ
ان
984643
984627
984645 ا نو
9846151050180 853573 984644نأ
ك
853572 ن984648 853575 917501 984647
ع
ن1048573
Antecedent I The human soul isimmaterial and separatefrom the body
984645او
ه
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180 نأ
984648 ر
نأ
984648 س
ن984647ر
ا
ن
984645984633 ا ن
و
ه
نن
ن
853572 ا
917501 نع
ش س
853572 853572 آ
نن
984648 853572 ن
ر
ا
917501 ع
1050151 1050179
ن
ح
984645
917501 ن [ ن984647 ن =] 1050183
10501811050183 ن984633
Antecedent II The soul survives thedeath of the body
ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
10501811050183 ا
917501 984647 984633 ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
984625
Consequent The soul returns to thegovernance of a body
whether it be its originalbody or a di983142ferent body
ص
1114109 ن
و
ن
ح
984648
1050169 و حن
ن
ك
853572 ن984648 853575
ا
917501أ
9846151050180 ان
ن
984645 نن
ن
أ
ن984647 ن ن
ن
أ
9846151050180
أ
ا
ه
ن
و
984633
917501 984647
ك
853572 ن ن
1050151 1050179 ء
و
984627
ن
ن
10501811050163
ن
ح
ن
917501و
ه
نن
853575
917501 ن 984648 أ
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180
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discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
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ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
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multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 229
983089983089983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
983113 Iqtiṣād Eschatology
Our 10486781048681rst problematic passage occurs in the discussion on resurrection (ḥashr )
in the eschatological part of al-Iqtiṣād the main context in which the ontologyand nature of the spirit (rūḥ nafs) are normally propounded in a kalām source1048627Resurrection is treated in the section on doctrines characterised as beinga98314210486781048681rmed by revelation and con10486781048681rmed as possible by the mind (otherwiseknown as the samʿiyyāt ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo) which are alleschatological1048628 Al-Ghazālī de10486781048681nes resurrection as Godrsquos restoration (iʿāda) ofthe bodies of the dead on the Day of Judgement1048629 He a98314210486781048681rms the doctrine onthe basis of ldquounambiguousrdquo scriptural evidence and argues that the restora-
tion of human bodies is possible on the grounds that God was capable ofcreating them the 10486781048681rst time and hence must be capable of creating them asecond time983094 This is the standard Qurʾān-inspired theological argument1048631
Next he turns to the ontology of restoration particularly the manner in which the atoms and accidents of bodies are restored1048632 That some accidents of
the human body need to be re-created is obvious For when the body dies itimmediately loses its animate attributes such as life knowledge and volitionand as it decays it loses further accidents such as composition (tarkīb) colourand moisture Less obvious is whether God causes the atoms of the humanbody (and all other atoms of the world) to pass away as well and correspond-ingly whether resurrection involves the re-creation ex nihilo of both the bodyrsquosatoms and accidents or the restoring only of its accidents Both scenariosal-Ghazālī opines are rationally possible and both remain possible since nei-ther is supported by scriptural evidence983097
Delineating these models of the ontology of restoration leads to the prob-lem of the identity of the entities ldquorestoredrdquo (al-muʿād ) in particular whetherthe individual entity re-created in the resurrected bodymdashbe the entity an
atom or an accidentmdashwould be none other than (ʿayn) the individual entity
3 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213ndash15 Unless noted otherwise all references to al-Iqtiṣād are to the
edition of I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay published 1962 in Ankara On earlier Ashʿarite discussions
of the spirit see Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 436ndash7 465ndash74
4 Al-Ghazālī uses the standard label al-samʿiyyāt inal-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 92ndash4 118ndash22 The text
is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyāʾ ʿulūm al-dīn 2199ndash202
5 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213
6 Ibid 2137 Cf Q 729 21104 3679 3681 5015
8 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213ndash14
9 The suspension of judgment on this point is a standard classical Ash aʿrite position See for
instance al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 374
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983093 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
that existed in the body before it died or only a replica (mithl ) thereof Al-Ghazālī here defends bodily resurrection against the backdrop of Avicennarsquos
denial thereof in particular his view that an entity supposedly ldquoreturnedrdquo into
existence having gone from prior existence into non-existence is not the sameentity that existed before but only a replica10486251048624 In the case of accidents heexplains brie8520701048684y that this question poses no di98314210486781048681culty for him and his fellow
Ashʿarīs since ldquoin our viewrdquo (ʿinda-nā) no accident continues to exist ( yabqā)for more than one moment in the 10486781048681rst place as each accident must be re-cre-ated or ldquorenewedrdquo ( yatajaddadu) at each moment Accordingly the accidentldquorestoredrdquo (iʿāda) in an atom need not be the very same accident that existedtherein prior to the death of the body10486251048625 In this case the identity of the
individual human being will be preserved in his body ie in the atoms thatconstitute it As to the atoms although they too are susceptible to passingaway if God so wills the preservation of their identity will be guaranteedthrough their presence in Godrsquos knowledge An atom therefore can pass awayand then properly speaking be restored whereas a replica is an entity thatcomes to be having had no pre-existence1048625983090
The discussion of the ontology of resurrection and the identity of the indi- vidual restored leads to the passage that concerns us most Here is a translation
of the passage as it appears in the standard edition of al-Iqtiṣād
[para1] We have discussed this question (masʾala) [ie bodily resurrec-tion] at length in the Tahāfut [para2] To refute (ibṭāl ) [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [thismethod] a98314210486781048681rming (taqrīr ) that the soul which according to them doesnot occupy space continues to exist (baqā ʾ) [after the death of the body]and postulating (taqdīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body
whether it be the very same body of the individual or another This is a
forced consequent (ilzām) that does not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieve For that book was written to refute their doctrines not to a98314210486781048681rmtrue doctrines [para3] Rather since they considered what a human is he is with respectto his soul and that his involvement in the governance of a body is as it
were accidental to him and the body is an instrument for him we forcedthem (alzamnā-hum) given their belief that the soul continues to existto concede that they must a98314210486781048681rm the resurrection ( wujūb al-taṣdīq
10 Ibn Sīnā Shifā ʾ Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 cf Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282ndash3
11 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213ndash14
12 Ibid 214ndash15 On this point see Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 284
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830891048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
bi-l-iʿāda) which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor other (badan min al-abdān) [para4] To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter
would lead us to investigate the spirit (al-rūḥ) the soul (al-nafs) life andthe reality (ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (al-muʿtaqadāt ) arenot suited to delving to these great depths in rational subjects(al-maʿqūlāt )10486251048627 Accordingly what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishingthe right balance of belief (al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm whatis taught in revelation10486251048628
This passage has been interpreted as indicating that in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī
espouses the materialist anthropology of classical Ashʿarism and opposes thephilosophical theory of the rational soul and that although he appears in theTahāfut to subscribe to the latter theory he does so only for the sake of argu-ment Some discussions in the Tahāfut indeed suggest that he does subscribeto this philosophical theory so his above remark that certain views expressedin the Tahāfut are not true expressions of his beliefs was taken to refer to thetheory as a whole10486251048629 This reading is represented by Marmura
The above statement speaks for itself Al-Ghazālīrsquos declaration that in theTahāfut he defended a doctrine that acknowledges the immateriality ofthe human soul simply for the sake of argument is quite explicit This isnot the doctrine he holds to be true The true doctrine is that of the kalām (in one of its versions)1048625983094
I will argue that this interpretation is erroneous A slightly di983142ferent reading isproposed by Richard M Frank who 10486781048681nds some ambiguity in the passage
13 That al-muʿtaqadāt here refers to relatively basic theological works meant to establish
creed (ʿaqīda) is con10486781048681rmed in other occurrences of the expression in al-Iqtiṣād (50 221
233 234) Compare this to the sense in which ldquoʿaqīdardquo refers to a genre
14 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 2151ndash10 (all translations are my own) An important variant will be
discussed below For earlier partial translations of this passage see Frank Al-Ghazālī and
the Ashʿarite School 55 Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74 Marmura ldquoBodily
Resurrectionrdquo 284ndash5 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo 1615 For a summary see Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 279ndash82 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 88 983142f
16 Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 285 cf 273ndash4 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashʿariterdquo 16
Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
That is as the basis of the argument in Tahāfut 10486251048631 he accepted their thesesthat (a) the soul does not die that (b) its relation to the body which itgoverns does not belong to it essentially but only temporarily but rather
(c) it uses the body as an instrument in order to show that one mustassert that the soul returns to govern a body He says that the premisesof the argument do not correspond to his own belief concerning what istrue Because of the way the paragraph is cast however it is not immedi-ately clear exactly what element or elements of the premises of theargument or its conclusion he may reject or accept10486251048632
Nonetheless Frank too reads the passage as a lsquodenial of something that he
manifestly believesrsquo namely lsquothe immateriality of the soulrsquo1048625983097 So the problem we are presented with is that according to one reading the above passagecontradicts views that al-Ghazālī expresses elsewhere since a materialist con-ception of humans contradicts the substance dualism championed in the Iḥyāʾʿulūm al-dīn ( Revival of the Religious Sciences) and other works and accordingto another reading it is ambiguous Neither reading attempts to explain theone or two arguments described
Let us take a closer look at this passage From the broader context it is clearthat ldquothis topicrdquo (para 1) denotes the problem of the restoration of the body whichal-Ghazālī treats in Discussion 20 of the Tahāfut It follows that ldquotheir doctrinerdquo(para 2)mdashthe philosophical doctrine said to have been refutedmdashrefers preciselyto Avicennarsquos denial of bodily resurrection which 10486781048681nds expression here in theaforementioned notion that once a thing passes away it cannot be broughtback into existence
Each of para 2 and para 3 describes rather ambiguously an argument through which the refutation is executed That a speci10486781048681c line of reasoning is being
described is con10486781048681rmed by the expression ldquowe followed a certain methodrdquo
(salaknā) which introduces para 2 The two descriptions could be referring to twodistinct arguments or to one and the same argument The verbal noun ldquoilzāmrdquo(para 2) and the verb ldquoalzamardquo (para 3) identify the reasoning involved in both casesas an ad hominem (ex concessis) argument which is a type of argument preva-lent in classical kalām9830901048624 An argument can be classed as ad hominem if inorder to refute another partyrsquos position the arguer premises the argument on
17 Referring to al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218983142f ed Bouyges 362983142f18 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 55ndash6
19 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56 65 91
20 I render ldquoilzāmrdquo as ldquoad hominem argumentrdquo in the sense of an argumentex concessis from
commitment rather than in the more popular sense of an attack on a personrsquos character
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
one or more views held by the other party (the antecedent or antecedents)and concludes that they must concede another view (the consequent) whichis one way or another problematic to them The antecedent (or antecedents)
will be granted and the consequent will be a98314210486781048681rmed both for the sake of argu-ment So the arguerrsquos own position on the antecedents and the consequent isin principle of no immediate bearing on the argument
Now as shown in the synoptic table on p 119 the ad hominem argumentdescribed in para 3mdashto start with the least problematic of the two descriptionsmdashseems premised on two antecedents (a) the notion that ldquohumanrdquo (insān)properly speaking denotes the immaterial rational soul and that the bodyserves only as an instrument for the soul and (b) the view that the rational soul
is indestructible and hence survives the death of the body According to para 3the argument somehow provesmdashwe are not told exactly howmdashthat by sub-scribing to these two Avicennan views one must then concede a third viewnamely that after the death of its original body the soul must return to the gov-ernance of some body or other be that the very same original body or anentirely di983142ferent one This consequent contradicts Avicennarsquos views on thesoulrsquos immortality
The argument described in para 2 is harder to decipher Particularly problem-atic are the two verbal nouns ldquoa98314210486781048681rmingrdquo (taqrīr ) and ldquopostulatingrdquo (taqdīr )
which introduce the doctrines mentioned and link them together It seemsthat the argument described here starts by a98314210486781048681rming two doctrines (a) thesoulrsquos indestructibility such that it survives the death of the body and (b) thesoulrsquos immateriality These are the same two antecedents stated in para 3 Theconsequent too is the same as in para 3mdashnamely that the soul returns to the gov-ernance of the body to which it was originally connected or a di983142ferentbodymdashexcept that in para 2 this consequent is only ldquopostulatedrdquo (ie conceded aspossible) whereas in para 3 it is said to be entailed necessarily by the antecedents
What is described in para 2 is an unmistakably weaker argumentNotwithstanding this discrepancy I believe that para 2 and para 3 are meant to
describe one and the same argument given the correspondence between theantecedents and the consequent in both cases para 3 appears intended only toclarify the point made at the end of para 2 The discrepancy can be resolved if wemake a slight adjustment to the text of para 2 which is to swap the expressionsldquotaqrīr rdquo and ldquotaqdīr rdquo on the grounds that the two can appear very similar in
instead of their views (see Walton Ad Hominem Arguments 21983142f 104 983142f Shihadeh ldquoThe
Argument from Ignorancerdquo 196 n 75)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830891048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
some manuscript hands and that ldquotaqrīr rdquo in fact appears as ldquotaqdīr rdquo in somemanuscript copies9830901048625 The modi10486781048681ed reading would go as follows
[para2] To refute [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [this method]postulating (taqdīr ) that the soul which according to them does notoccupy space continues to exist [after the death of the body] and a98314210486781048681rm-ing (taqrīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body whether it be the
very same body of the individual or another
This reading has the advantage of being consistent with para 3 in that the arguerhypothesises the antecedents and a98314210486781048681rms the consequent forcing the oppo-nent to concede it as necessary (rather than merely as possible) As we shallsee however the original reading of para 2 is more consonant with the actual
21 As in one manuscript used for the 1962 edition (see al-Iqtiṣād 2152ndash3) and in 983117983123 Dublin
Chester Beatty Ar 3372 (983142f 56andashb) which is dated 5171123 Also two recent uncritical edi-
tions which use di983142ferent manuscript copies read lsquotaqdīr rsquo (ed al-Sharfāwī 2012 274 and
ed ʿImrān 2009 489) Neither edition however is furnished with a critical apparatus
983156983137983138983148983141 983093983089 Synoptic table analysing the argument described in each of parapara 2 and 3
Element Description para 3 para 2
Type of argument Ad hominem argument(ilzām)
10501811050183ا
ن984645 984644نأ
م
984647 ن
ه
ن984645 ل
ا
917501
1114109 1048573أ
ان
984643
984627
984645 ا نو
9846151050180 853573 984644نأ
ك
853572 ن984648 853575 917501 984647
ع
ن1048573
Antecedent I The human soul isimmaterial and separatefrom the body
984645او
ه
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180 نأ
984648 ر
نأ
984648 س
ن984647ر
ا
ن
984645984633 ا ن
و
ه
نن
ن
853572 ا
917501 نع
ش س
853572 853572 آ
نن
984648 853572 ن
ر
ا
917501 ع
1050151 1050179
ن
ح
984645
917501 ن [ ن984647 ن =] 1050183
10501811050183 ن984633
Antecedent II The soul survives thedeath of the body
ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
10501811050183 ا
917501 984647 984633 ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
984625
Consequent The soul returns to thegovernance of a body
whether it be its originalbody or a di983142ferent body
ص
1114109 ن
و
ن
ح
984648
1050169 و حن
ن
ك
853572 ن984648 853575
ا
917501أ
9846151050180 ان
ن
984645 نن
ن
أ
ن984647 ن ن
ن
أ
9846151050180
أ
ا
ه
ن
و
984633
917501 984647
ك
853572 ن ن
1050151 1050179 ء
و
984627
ن
ن
10501811050163
ن
ح
ن
917501و
ه
نن
853575
917501 ن 984648 أ
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983093 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
that existed in the body before it died or only a replica (mithl ) thereof Al-Ghazālī here defends bodily resurrection against the backdrop of Avicennarsquos
denial thereof in particular his view that an entity supposedly ldquoreturnedrdquo into
existence having gone from prior existence into non-existence is not the sameentity that existed before but only a replica10486251048624 In the case of accidents heexplains brie8520701048684y that this question poses no di98314210486781048681culty for him and his fellow
Ashʿarīs since ldquoin our viewrdquo (ʿinda-nā) no accident continues to exist ( yabqā)for more than one moment in the 10486781048681rst place as each accident must be re-cre-ated or ldquorenewedrdquo ( yatajaddadu) at each moment Accordingly the accidentldquorestoredrdquo (iʿāda) in an atom need not be the very same accident that existedtherein prior to the death of the body10486251048625 In this case the identity of the
individual human being will be preserved in his body ie in the atoms thatconstitute it As to the atoms although they too are susceptible to passingaway if God so wills the preservation of their identity will be guaranteedthrough their presence in Godrsquos knowledge An atom therefore can pass awayand then properly speaking be restored whereas a replica is an entity thatcomes to be having had no pre-existence1048625983090
The discussion of the ontology of resurrection and the identity of the indi- vidual restored leads to the passage that concerns us most Here is a translation
of the passage as it appears in the standard edition of al-Iqtiṣād
[para1] We have discussed this question (masʾala) [ie bodily resurrec-tion] at length in the Tahāfut [para2] To refute (ibṭāl ) [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [thismethod] a98314210486781048681rming (taqrīr ) that the soul which according to them doesnot occupy space continues to exist (baqā ʾ) [after the death of the body]and postulating (taqdīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body
whether it be the very same body of the individual or another This is a
forced consequent (ilzām) that does not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieve For that book was written to refute their doctrines not to a98314210486781048681rmtrue doctrines [para3] Rather since they considered what a human is he is with respectto his soul and that his involvement in the governance of a body is as it
were accidental to him and the body is an instrument for him we forcedthem (alzamnā-hum) given their belief that the soul continues to existto concede that they must a98314210486781048681rm the resurrection ( wujūb al-taṣdīq
10 Ibn Sīnā Shifā ʾ Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 cf Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282ndash3
11 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 213ndash14
12 Ibid 214ndash15 On this point see Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 284
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830891048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
bi-l-iʿāda) which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor other (badan min al-abdān) [para4] To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter
would lead us to investigate the spirit (al-rūḥ) the soul (al-nafs) life andthe reality (ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (al-muʿtaqadāt ) arenot suited to delving to these great depths in rational subjects(al-maʿqūlāt )10486251048627 Accordingly what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishingthe right balance of belief (al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm whatis taught in revelation10486251048628
This passage has been interpreted as indicating that in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī
espouses the materialist anthropology of classical Ashʿarism and opposes thephilosophical theory of the rational soul and that although he appears in theTahāfut to subscribe to the latter theory he does so only for the sake of argu-ment Some discussions in the Tahāfut indeed suggest that he does subscribeto this philosophical theory so his above remark that certain views expressedin the Tahāfut are not true expressions of his beliefs was taken to refer to thetheory as a whole10486251048629 This reading is represented by Marmura
The above statement speaks for itself Al-Ghazālīrsquos declaration that in theTahāfut he defended a doctrine that acknowledges the immateriality ofthe human soul simply for the sake of argument is quite explicit This isnot the doctrine he holds to be true The true doctrine is that of the kalām (in one of its versions)1048625983094
I will argue that this interpretation is erroneous A slightly di983142ferent reading isproposed by Richard M Frank who 10486781048681nds some ambiguity in the passage
13 That al-muʿtaqadāt here refers to relatively basic theological works meant to establish
creed (ʿaqīda) is con10486781048681rmed in other occurrences of the expression in al-Iqtiṣād (50 221
233 234) Compare this to the sense in which ldquoʿaqīdardquo refers to a genre
14 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 2151ndash10 (all translations are my own) An important variant will be
discussed below For earlier partial translations of this passage see Frank Al-Ghazālī and
the Ashʿarite School 55 Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74 Marmura ldquoBodily
Resurrectionrdquo 284ndash5 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo 1615 For a summary see Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 279ndash82 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 88 983142f
16 Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 285 cf 273ndash4 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashʿariterdquo 16
Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
That is as the basis of the argument in Tahāfut 10486251048631 he accepted their thesesthat (a) the soul does not die that (b) its relation to the body which itgoverns does not belong to it essentially but only temporarily but rather
(c) it uses the body as an instrument in order to show that one mustassert that the soul returns to govern a body He says that the premisesof the argument do not correspond to his own belief concerning what istrue Because of the way the paragraph is cast however it is not immedi-ately clear exactly what element or elements of the premises of theargument or its conclusion he may reject or accept10486251048632
Nonetheless Frank too reads the passage as a lsquodenial of something that he
manifestly believesrsquo namely lsquothe immateriality of the soulrsquo1048625983097 So the problem we are presented with is that according to one reading the above passagecontradicts views that al-Ghazālī expresses elsewhere since a materialist con-ception of humans contradicts the substance dualism championed in the Iḥyāʾʿulūm al-dīn ( Revival of the Religious Sciences) and other works and accordingto another reading it is ambiguous Neither reading attempts to explain theone or two arguments described
Let us take a closer look at this passage From the broader context it is clearthat ldquothis topicrdquo (para 1) denotes the problem of the restoration of the body whichal-Ghazālī treats in Discussion 20 of the Tahāfut It follows that ldquotheir doctrinerdquo(para 2)mdashthe philosophical doctrine said to have been refutedmdashrefers preciselyto Avicennarsquos denial of bodily resurrection which 10486781048681nds expression here in theaforementioned notion that once a thing passes away it cannot be broughtback into existence
Each of para 2 and para 3 describes rather ambiguously an argument through which the refutation is executed That a speci10486781048681c line of reasoning is being
described is con10486781048681rmed by the expression ldquowe followed a certain methodrdquo
(salaknā) which introduces para 2 The two descriptions could be referring to twodistinct arguments or to one and the same argument The verbal noun ldquoilzāmrdquo(para 2) and the verb ldquoalzamardquo (para 3) identify the reasoning involved in both casesas an ad hominem (ex concessis) argument which is a type of argument preva-lent in classical kalām9830901048624 An argument can be classed as ad hominem if inorder to refute another partyrsquos position the arguer premises the argument on
17 Referring to al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218983142f ed Bouyges 362983142f18 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 55ndash6
19 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56 65 91
20 I render ldquoilzāmrdquo as ldquoad hominem argumentrdquo in the sense of an argumentex concessis from
commitment rather than in the more popular sense of an attack on a personrsquos character
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
one or more views held by the other party (the antecedent or antecedents)and concludes that they must concede another view (the consequent) whichis one way or another problematic to them The antecedent (or antecedents)
will be granted and the consequent will be a98314210486781048681rmed both for the sake of argu-ment So the arguerrsquos own position on the antecedents and the consequent isin principle of no immediate bearing on the argument
Now as shown in the synoptic table on p 119 the ad hominem argumentdescribed in para 3mdashto start with the least problematic of the two descriptionsmdashseems premised on two antecedents (a) the notion that ldquohumanrdquo (insān)properly speaking denotes the immaterial rational soul and that the bodyserves only as an instrument for the soul and (b) the view that the rational soul
is indestructible and hence survives the death of the body According to para 3the argument somehow provesmdashwe are not told exactly howmdashthat by sub-scribing to these two Avicennan views one must then concede a third viewnamely that after the death of its original body the soul must return to the gov-ernance of some body or other be that the very same original body or anentirely di983142ferent one This consequent contradicts Avicennarsquos views on thesoulrsquos immortality
The argument described in para 2 is harder to decipher Particularly problem-atic are the two verbal nouns ldquoa98314210486781048681rmingrdquo (taqrīr ) and ldquopostulatingrdquo (taqdīr )
which introduce the doctrines mentioned and link them together It seemsthat the argument described here starts by a98314210486781048681rming two doctrines (a) thesoulrsquos indestructibility such that it survives the death of the body and (b) thesoulrsquos immateriality These are the same two antecedents stated in para 3 Theconsequent too is the same as in para 3mdashnamely that the soul returns to the gov-ernance of the body to which it was originally connected or a di983142ferentbodymdashexcept that in para 2 this consequent is only ldquopostulatedrdquo (ie conceded aspossible) whereas in para 3 it is said to be entailed necessarily by the antecedents
What is described in para 2 is an unmistakably weaker argumentNotwithstanding this discrepancy I believe that para 2 and para 3 are meant to
describe one and the same argument given the correspondence between theantecedents and the consequent in both cases para 3 appears intended only toclarify the point made at the end of para 2 The discrepancy can be resolved if wemake a slight adjustment to the text of para 2 which is to swap the expressionsldquotaqrīr rdquo and ldquotaqdīr rdquo on the grounds that the two can appear very similar in
instead of their views (see Walton Ad Hominem Arguments 21983142f 104 983142f Shihadeh ldquoThe
Argument from Ignorancerdquo 196 n 75)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830891048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
some manuscript hands and that ldquotaqrīr rdquo in fact appears as ldquotaqdīr rdquo in somemanuscript copies9830901048625 The modi10486781048681ed reading would go as follows
[para2] To refute [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [this method]postulating (taqdīr ) that the soul which according to them does notoccupy space continues to exist [after the death of the body] and a98314210486781048681rm-ing (taqrīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body whether it be the
very same body of the individual or another
This reading has the advantage of being consistent with para 3 in that the arguerhypothesises the antecedents and a98314210486781048681rms the consequent forcing the oppo-nent to concede it as necessary (rather than merely as possible) As we shallsee however the original reading of para 2 is more consonant with the actual
21 As in one manuscript used for the 1962 edition (see al-Iqtiṣād 2152ndash3) and in 983117983123 Dublin
Chester Beatty Ar 3372 (983142f 56andashb) which is dated 5171123 Also two recent uncritical edi-
tions which use di983142ferent manuscript copies read lsquotaqdīr rsquo (ed al-Sharfāwī 2012 274 and
ed ʿImrān 2009 489) Neither edition however is furnished with a critical apparatus
983156983137983138983148983141 983093983089 Synoptic table analysing the argument described in each of parapara 2 and 3
Element Description para 3 para 2
Type of argument Ad hominem argument(ilzām)
10501811050183ا
ن984645 984644نأ
م
984647 ن
ه
ن984645 ل
ا
917501
1114109 1048573أ
ان
984643
984627
984645 ا نو
9846151050180 853573 984644نأ
ك
853572 ن984648 853575 917501 984647
ع
ن1048573
Antecedent I The human soul isimmaterial and separatefrom the body
984645او
ه
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180 نأ
984648 ر
نأ
984648 س
ن984647ر
ا
ن
984645984633 ا ن
و
ه
نن
ن
853572 ا
917501 نع
ش س
853572 853572 آ
نن
984648 853572 ن
ر
ا
917501 ع
1050151 1050179
ن
ح
984645
917501 ن [ ن984647 ن =] 1050183
10501811050183 ن984633
Antecedent II The soul survives thedeath of the body
ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
10501811050183 ا
917501 984647 984633 ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
984625
Consequent The soul returns to thegovernance of a body
whether it be its originalbody or a di983142ferent body
ص
1114109 ن
و
ن
ح
984648
1050169 و حن
ن
ك
853572 ن984648 853575
ا
917501أ
9846151050180 ان
ن
984645 نن
ن
أ
ن984647 ن ن
ن
أ
9846151050180
أ
ا
ه
ن
و
984633
917501 984647
ك
853572 ن ن
1050151 1050179 ء
و
984627
ن
ن
10501811050163
ن
ح
ن
917501و
ه
نن
853575
917501 ن 984648 أ
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830891048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
bi-l-iʿāda) which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor other (badan min al-abdān) [para4] To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter
would lead us to investigate the spirit (al-rūḥ) the soul (al-nafs) life andthe reality (ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (al-muʿtaqadāt ) arenot suited to delving to these great depths in rational subjects(al-maʿqūlāt )10486251048627 Accordingly what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishingthe right balance of belief (al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm whatis taught in revelation10486251048628
This passage has been interpreted as indicating that in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī
espouses the materialist anthropology of classical Ashʿarism and opposes thephilosophical theory of the rational soul and that although he appears in theTahāfut to subscribe to the latter theory he does so only for the sake of argu-ment Some discussions in the Tahāfut indeed suggest that he does subscribeto this philosophical theory so his above remark that certain views expressedin the Tahāfut are not true expressions of his beliefs was taken to refer to thetheory as a whole10486251048629 This reading is represented by Marmura
The above statement speaks for itself Al-Ghazālīrsquos declaration that in theTahāfut he defended a doctrine that acknowledges the immateriality ofthe human soul simply for the sake of argument is quite explicit This isnot the doctrine he holds to be true The true doctrine is that of the kalām (in one of its versions)1048625983094
I will argue that this interpretation is erroneous A slightly di983142ferent reading isproposed by Richard M Frank who 10486781048681nds some ambiguity in the passage
13 That al-muʿtaqadāt here refers to relatively basic theological works meant to establish
creed (ʿaqīda) is con10486781048681rmed in other occurrences of the expression in al-Iqtiṣād (50 221
233 234) Compare this to the sense in which ldquoʿaqīdardquo refers to a genre
14 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 2151ndash10 (all translations are my own) An important variant will be
discussed below For earlier partial translations of this passage see Frank Al-Ghazālī and
the Ashʿarite School 55 Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74 Marmura ldquoBodily
Resurrectionrdquo 284ndash5 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo 1615 For a summary see Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 279ndash82 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 88 983142f
16 Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 285 cf 273ndash4 Nakamura ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashʿariterdquo 16
Gianotti Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 74
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
That is as the basis of the argument in Tahāfut 10486251048631 he accepted their thesesthat (a) the soul does not die that (b) its relation to the body which itgoverns does not belong to it essentially but only temporarily but rather
(c) it uses the body as an instrument in order to show that one mustassert that the soul returns to govern a body He says that the premisesof the argument do not correspond to his own belief concerning what istrue Because of the way the paragraph is cast however it is not immedi-ately clear exactly what element or elements of the premises of theargument or its conclusion he may reject or accept10486251048632
Nonetheless Frank too reads the passage as a lsquodenial of something that he
manifestly believesrsquo namely lsquothe immateriality of the soulrsquo1048625983097 So the problem we are presented with is that according to one reading the above passagecontradicts views that al-Ghazālī expresses elsewhere since a materialist con-ception of humans contradicts the substance dualism championed in the Iḥyāʾʿulūm al-dīn ( Revival of the Religious Sciences) and other works and accordingto another reading it is ambiguous Neither reading attempts to explain theone or two arguments described
Let us take a closer look at this passage From the broader context it is clearthat ldquothis topicrdquo (para 1) denotes the problem of the restoration of the body whichal-Ghazālī treats in Discussion 20 of the Tahāfut It follows that ldquotheir doctrinerdquo(para 2)mdashthe philosophical doctrine said to have been refutedmdashrefers preciselyto Avicennarsquos denial of bodily resurrection which 10486781048681nds expression here in theaforementioned notion that once a thing passes away it cannot be broughtback into existence
Each of para 2 and para 3 describes rather ambiguously an argument through which the refutation is executed That a speci10486781048681c line of reasoning is being
described is con10486781048681rmed by the expression ldquowe followed a certain methodrdquo
(salaknā) which introduces para 2 The two descriptions could be referring to twodistinct arguments or to one and the same argument The verbal noun ldquoilzāmrdquo(para 2) and the verb ldquoalzamardquo (para 3) identify the reasoning involved in both casesas an ad hominem (ex concessis) argument which is a type of argument preva-lent in classical kalām9830901048624 An argument can be classed as ad hominem if inorder to refute another partyrsquos position the arguer premises the argument on
17 Referring to al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218983142f ed Bouyges 362983142f18 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 55ndash6
19 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56 65 91
20 I render ldquoilzāmrdquo as ldquoad hominem argumentrdquo in the sense of an argumentex concessis from
commitment rather than in the more popular sense of an attack on a personrsquos character
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
one or more views held by the other party (the antecedent or antecedents)and concludes that they must concede another view (the consequent) whichis one way or another problematic to them The antecedent (or antecedents)
will be granted and the consequent will be a98314210486781048681rmed both for the sake of argu-ment So the arguerrsquos own position on the antecedents and the consequent isin principle of no immediate bearing on the argument
Now as shown in the synoptic table on p 119 the ad hominem argumentdescribed in para 3mdashto start with the least problematic of the two descriptionsmdashseems premised on two antecedents (a) the notion that ldquohumanrdquo (insān)properly speaking denotes the immaterial rational soul and that the bodyserves only as an instrument for the soul and (b) the view that the rational soul
is indestructible and hence survives the death of the body According to para 3the argument somehow provesmdashwe are not told exactly howmdashthat by sub-scribing to these two Avicennan views one must then concede a third viewnamely that after the death of its original body the soul must return to the gov-ernance of some body or other be that the very same original body or anentirely di983142ferent one This consequent contradicts Avicennarsquos views on thesoulrsquos immortality
The argument described in para 2 is harder to decipher Particularly problem-atic are the two verbal nouns ldquoa98314210486781048681rmingrdquo (taqrīr ) and ldquopostulatingrdquo (taqdīr )
which introduce the doctrines mentioned and link them together It seemsthat the argument described here starts by a98314210486781048681rming two doctrines (a) thesoulrsquos indestructibility such that it survives the death of the body and (b) thesoulrsquos immateriality These are the same two antecedents stated in para 3 Theconsequent too is the same as in para 3mdashnamely that the soul returns to the gov-ernance of the body to which it was originally connected or a di983142ferentbodymdashexcept that in para 2 this consequent is only ldquopostulatedrdquo (ie conceded aspossible) whereas in para 3 it is said to be entailed necessarily by the antecedents
What is described in para 2 is an unmistakably weaker argumentNotwithstanding this discrepancy I believe that para 2 and para 3 are meant to
describe one and the same argument given the correspondence between theantecedents and the consequent in both cases para 3 appears intended only toclarify the point made at the end of para 2 The discrepancy can be resolved if wemake a slight adjustment to the text of para 2 which is to swap the expressionsldquotaqrīr rdquo and ldquotaqdīr rdquo on the grounds that the two can appear very similar in
instead of their views (see Walton Ad Hominem Arguments 21983142f 104 983142f Shihadeh ldquoThe
Argument from Ignorancerdquo 196 n 75)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 729
9830899830891048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
some manuscript hands and that ldquotaqrīr rdquo in fact appears as ldquotaqdīr rdquo in somemanuscript copies9830901048625 The modi10486781048681ed reading would go as follows
[para2] To refute [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [this method]postulating (taqdīr ) that the soul which according to them does notoccupy space continues to exist [after the death of the body] and a98314210486781048681rm-ing (taqrīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body whether it be the
very same body of the individual or another
This reading has the advantage of being consistent with para 3 in that the arguerhypothesises the antecedents and a98314210486781048681rms the consequent forcing the oppo-nent to concede it as necessary (rather than merely as possible) As we shallsee however the original reading of para 2 is more consonant with the actual
21 As in one manuscript used for the 1962 edition (see al-Iqtiṣād 2152ndash3) and in 983117983123 Dublin
Chester Beatty Ar 3372 (983142f 56andashb) which is dated 5171123 Also two recent uncritical edi-
tions which use di983142ferent manuscript copies read lsquotaqdīr rsquo (ed al-Sharfāwī 2012 274 and
ed ʿImrān 2009 489) Neither edition however is furnished with a critical apparatus
983156983137983138983148983141 983093983089 Synoptic table analysing the argument described in each of parapara 2 and 3
Element Description para 3 para 2
Type of argument Ad hominem argument(ilzām)
10501811050183ا
ن984645 984644نأ
م
984647 ن
ه
ن984645 ل
ا
917501
1114109 1048573أ
ان
984643
984627
984645 ا نو
9846151050180 853573 984644نأ
ك
853572 ن984648 853575 917501 984647
ع
ن1048573
Antecedent I The human soul isimmaterial and separatefrom the body
984645او
ه
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180 نأ
984648 ر
نأ
984648 س
ن984647ر
ا
ن
984645984633 ا ن
و
ه
نن
ن
853572 ا
917501 نع
ش س
853572 853572 آ
نن
984648 853572 ن
ر
ا
917501 ع
1050151 1050179
ن
ح
984645
917501 ن [ ن984647 ن =] 1050183
10501811050183 ن984633
Antecedent II The soul survives thedeath of the body
ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
10501811050183 ا
917501 984647 984633 ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
984625
Consequent The soul returns to thegovernance of a body
whether it be its originalbody or a di983142ferent body
ص
1114109 ن
و
ن
ح
984648
1050169 و حن
ن
ك
853572 ن984648 853575
ا
917501أ
9846151050180 ان
ن
984645 نن
ن
أ
ن984647 ن ن
ن
أ
9846151050180
أ
ا
ه
ن
و
984633
917501 984647
ك
853572 ن ن
1050151 1050179 ء
و
984627
ن
ن
10501811050163
ن
ح
ن
917501و
ه
نن
853575
917501 ن 984648 أ
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 829
9830891048626983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
That is as the basis of the argument in Tahāfut 10486251048631 he accepted their thesesthat (a) the soul does not die that (b) its relation to the body which itgoverns does not belong to it essentially but only temporarily but rather
(c) it uses the body as an instrument in order to show that one mustassert that the soul returns to govern a body He says that the premisesof the argument do not correspond to his own belief concerning what istrue Because of the way the paragraph is cast however it is not immedi-ately clear exactly what element or elements of the premises of theargument or its conclusion he may reject or accept10486251048632
Nonetheless Frank too reads the passage as a lsquodenial of something that he
manifestly believesrsquo namely lsquothe immateriality of the soulrsquo1048625983097 So the problem we are presented with is that according to one reading the above passagecontradicts views that al-Ghazālī expresses elsewhere since a materialist con-ception of humans contradicts the substance dualism championed in the Iḥyāʾʿulūm al-dīn ( Revival of the Religious Sciences) and other works and accordingto another reading it is ambiguous Neither reading attempts to explain theone or two arguments described
Let us take a closer look at this passage From the broader context it is clearthat ldquothis topicrdquo (para 1) denotes the problem of the restoration of the body whichal-Ghazālī treats in Discussion 20 of the Tahāfut It follows that ldquotheir doctrinerdquo(para 2)mdashthe philosophical doctrine said to have been refutedmdashrefers preciselyto Avicennarsquos denial of bodily resurrection which 10486781048681nds expression here in theaforementioned notion that once a thing passes away it cannot be broughtback into existence
Each of para 2 and para 3 describes rather ambiguously an argument through which the refutation is executed That a speci10486781048681c line of reasoning is being
described is con10486781048681rmed by the expression ldquowe followed a certain methodrdquo
(salaknā) which introduces para 2 The two descriptions could be referring to twodistinct arguments or to one and the same argument The verbal noun ldquoilzāmrdquo(para 2) and the verb ldquoalzamardquo (para 3) identify the reasoning involved in both casesas an ad hominem (ex concessis) argument which is a type of argument preva-lent in classical kalām9830901048624 An argument can be classed as ad hominem if inorder to refute another partyrsquos position the arguer premises the argument on
17 Referring to al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218983142f ed Bouyges 362983142f18 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 55ndash6
19 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56 65 91
20 I render ldquoilzāmrdquo as ldquoad hominem argumentrdquo in the sense of an argumentex concessis from
commitment rather than in the more popular sense of an attack on a personrsquos character
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983089983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
one or more views held by the other party (the antecedent or antecedents)and concludes that they must concede another view (the consequent) whichis one way or another problematic to them The antecedent (or antecedents)
will be granted and the consequent will be a98314210486781048681rmed both for the sake of argu-ment So the arguerrsquos own position on the antecedents and the consequent isin principle of no immediate bearing on the argument
Now as shown in the synoptic table on p 119 the ad hominem argumentdescribed in para 3mdashto start with the least problematic of the two descriptionsmdashseems premised on two antecedents (a) the notion that ldquohumanrdquo (insān)properly speaking denotes the immaterial rational soul and that the bodyserves only as an instrument for the soul and (b) the view that the rational soul
is indestructible and hence survives the death of the body According to para 3the argument somehow provesmdashwe are not told exactly howmdashthat by sub-scribing to these two Avicennan views one must then concede a third viewnamely that after the death of its original body the soul must return to the gov-ernance of some body or other be that the very same original body or anentirely di983142ferent one This consequent contradicts Avicennarsquos views on thesoulrsquos immortality
The argument described in para 2 is harder to decipher Particularly problem-atic are the two verbal nouns ldquoa98314210486781048681rmingrdquo (taqrīr ) and ldquopostulatingrdquo (taqdīr )
which introduce the doctrines mentioned and link them together It seemsthat the argument described here starts by a98314210486781048681rming two doctrines (a) thesoulrsquos indestructibility such that it survives the death of the body and (b) thesoulrsquos immateriality These are the same two antecedents stated in para 3 Theconsequent too is the same as in para 3mdashnamely that the soul returns to the gov-ernance of the body to which it was originally connected or a di983142ferentbodymdashexcept that in para 2 this consequent is only ldquopostulatedrdquo (ie conceded aspossible) whereas in para 3 it is said to be entailed necessarily by the antecedents
What is described in para 2 is an unmistakably weaker argumentNotwithstanding this discrepancy I believe that para 2 and para 3 are meant to
describe one and the same argument given the correspondence between theantecedents and the consequent in both cases para 3 appears intended only toclarify the point made at the end of para 2 The discrepancy can be resolved if wemake a slight adjustment to the text of para 2 which is to swap the expressionsldquotaqrīr rdquo and ldquotaqdīr rdquo on the grounds that the two can appear very similar in
instead of their views (see Walton Ad Hominem Arguments 21983142f 104 983142f Shihadeh ldquoThe
Argument from Ignorancerdquo 196 n 75)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830891048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
some manuscript hands and that ldquotaqrīr rdquo in fact appears as ldquotaqdīr rdquo in somemanuscript copies9830901048625 The modi10486781048681ed reading would go as follows
[para2] To refute [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [this method]postulating (taqdīr ) that the soul which according to them does notoccupy space continues to exist [after the death of the body] and a98314210486781048681rm-ing (taqrīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body whether it be the
very same body of the individual or another
This reading has the advantage of being consistent with para 3 in that the arguerhypothesises the antecedents and a98314210486781048681rms the consequent forcing the oppo-nent to concede it as necessary (rather than merely as possible) As we shallsee however the original reading of para 2 is more consonant with the actual
21 As in one manuscript used for the 1962 edition (see al-Iqtiṣād 2152ndash3) and in 983117983123 Dublin
Chester Beatty Ar 3372 (983142f 56andashb) which is dated 5171123 Also two recent uncritical edi-
tions which use di983142ferent manuscript copies read lsquotaqdīr rsquo (ed al-Sharfāwī 2012 274 and
ed ʿImrān 2009 489) Neither edition however is furnished with a critical apparatus
983156983137983138983148983141 983093983089 Synoptic table analysing the argument described in each of parapara 2 and 3
Element Description para 3 para 2
Type of argument Ad hominem argument(ilzām)
10501811050183ا
ن984645 984644نأ
م
984647 ن
ه
ن984645 ل
ا
917501
1114109 1048573أ
ان
984643
984627
984645 ا نو
9846151050180 853573 984644نأ
ك
853572 ن984648 853575 917501 984647
ع
ن1048573
Antecedent I The human soul isimmaterial and separatefrom the body
984645او
ه
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180 نأ
984648 ر
نأ
984648 س
ن984647ر
ا
ن
984645984633 ا ن
و
ه
نن
ن
853572 ا
917501 نع
ش س
853572 853572 آ
نن
984648 853572 ن
ر
ا
917501 ع
1050151 1050179
ن
ح
984645
917501 ن [ ن984647 ن =] 1050183
10501811050183 ن984633
Antecedent II The soul survives thedeath of the body
ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
10501811050183 ا
917501 984647 984633 ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
984625
Consequent The soul returns to thegovernance of a body
whether it be its originalbody or a di983142ferent body
ص
1114109 ن
و
ن
ح
984648
1050169 و حن
ن
ك
853572 ن984648 853575
ا
917501أ
9846151050180 ان
ن
984645 نن
ن
أ
ن984647 ن ن
ن
أ
9846151050180
أ
ا
ه
ن
و
984633
917501 984647
ك
853572 ن ن
1050151 1050179 ء
و
984627
ن
ن
10501811050163
ن
ح
ن
917501و
ه
نن
853575
917501 ن 984648 أ
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
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ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
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multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 629
983089983089983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
one or more views held by the other party (the antecedent or antecedents)and concludes that they must concede another view (the consequent) whichis one way or another problematic to them The antecedent (or antecedents)
will be granted and the consequent will be a98314210486781048681rmed both for the sake of argu-ment So the arguerrsquos own position on the antecedents and the consequent isin principle of no immediate bearing on the argument
Now as shown in the synoptic table on p 119 the ad hominem argumentdescribed in para 3mdashto start with the least problematic of the two descriptionsmdashseems premised on two antecedents (a) the notion that ldquohumanrdquo (insān)properly speaking denotes the immaterial rational soul and that the bodyserves only as an instrument for the soul and (b) the view that the rational soul
is indestructible and hence survives the death of the body According to para 3the argument somehow provesmdashwe are not told exactly howmdashthat by sub-scribing to these two Avicennan views one must then concede a third viewnamely that after the death of its original body the soul must return to the gov-ernance of some body or other be that the very same original body or anentirely di983142ferent one This consequent contradicts Avicennarsquos views on thesoulrsquos immortality
The argument described in para 2 is harder to decipher Particularly problem-atic are the two verbal nouns ldquoa98314210486781048681rmingrdquo (taqrīr ) and ldquopostulatingrdquo (taqdīr )
which introduce the doctrines mentioned and link them together It seemsthat the argument described here starts by a98314210486781048681rming two doctrines (a) thesoulrsquos indestructibility such that it survives the death of the body and (b) thesoulrsquos immateriality These are the same two antecedents stated in para 3 Theconsequent too is the same as in para 3mdashnamely that the soul returns to the gov-ernance of the body to which it was originally connected or a di983142ferentbodymdashexcept that in para 2 this consequent is only ldquopostulatedrdquo (ie conceded aspossible) whereas in para 3 it is said to be entailed necessarily by the antecedents
What is described in para 2 is an unmistakably weaker argumentNotwithstanding this discrepancy I believe that para 2 and para 3 are meant to
describe one and the same argument given the correspondence between theantecedents and the consequent in both cases para 3 appears intended only toclarify the point made at the end of para 2 The discrepancy can be resolved if wemake a slight adjustment to the text of para 2 which is to swap the expressionsldquotaqrīr rdquo and ldquotaqdīr rdquo on the grounds that the two can appear very similar in
instead of their views (see Walton Ad Hominem Arguments 21983142f 104 983142f Shihadeh ldquoThe
Argument from Ignorancerdquo 196 n 75)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 729
9830899830891048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
some manuscript hands and that ldquotaqrīr rdquo in fact appears as ldquotaqdīr rdquo in somemanuscript copies9830901048625 The modi10486781048681ed reading would go as follows
[para2] To refute [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [this method]postulating (taqdīr ) that the soul which according to them does notoccupy space continues to exist [after the death of the body] and a98314210486781048681rm-ing (taqrīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body whether it be the
very same body of the individual or another
This reading has the advantage of being consistent with para 3 in that the arguerhypothesises the antecedents and a98314210486781048681rms the consequent forcing the oppo-nent to concede it as necessary (rather than merely as possible) As we shallsee however the original reading of para 2 is more consonant with the actual
21 As in one manuscript used for the 1962 edition (see al-Iqtiṣād 2152ndash3) and in 983117983123 Dublin
Chester Beatty Ar 3372 (983142f 56andashb) which is dated 5171123 Also two recent uncritical edi-
tions which use di983142ferent manuscript copies read lsquotaqdīr rsquo (ed al-Sharfāwī 2012 274 and
ed ʿImrān 2009 489) Neither edition however is furnished with a critical apparatus
983156983137983138983148983141 983093983089 Synoptic table analysing the argument described in each of parapara 2 and 3
Element Description para 3 para 2
Type of argument Ad hominem argument(ilzām)
10501811050183ا
ن984645 984644نأ
م
984647 ن
ه
ن984645 ل
ا
917501
1114109 1048573أ
ان
984643
984627
984645 ا نو
9846151050180 853573 984644نأ
ك
853572 ن984648 853575 917501 984647
ع
ن1048573
Antecedent I The human soul isimmaterial and separatefrom the body
984645او
ه
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180 نأ
984648 ر
نأ
984648 س
ن984647ر
ا
ن
984645984633 ا ن
و
ه
نن
ن
853572 ا
917501 نع
ش س
853572 853572 آ
نن
984648 853572 ن
ر
ا
917501 ع
1050151 1050179
ن
ح
984645
917501 ن [ ن984647 ن =] 1050183
10501811050183 ن984633
Antecedent II The soul survives thedeath of the body
ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
10501811050183 ا
917501 984647 984633 ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
984625
Consequent The soul returns to thegovernance of a body
whether it be its originalbody or a di983142ferent body
ص
1114109 ن
و
ن
ح
984648
1050169 و حن
ن
ك
853572 ن984648 853575
ا
917501أ
9846151050180 ان
ن
984645 نن
ن
أ
ن984647 ن ن
ن
أ
9846151050180
أ
ا
ه
ن
و
984633
917501 984647
ك
853572 ن ن
1050151 1050179 ء
و
984627
ن
ن
10501811050163
ن
ح
ن
917501و
ه
نن
853575
917501 ن 984648 أ
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 829
9830891048626983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 929
9830891048626983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
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multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 729
9830899830891048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
some manuscript hands and that ldquotaqrīr rdquo in fact appears as ldquotaqdīr rdquo in somemanuscript copies9830901048625 The modi10486781048681ed reading would go as follows
[para2] To refute [the philosophersrsquo] doctrine we followed [this method]postulating (taqdīr ) that the soul which according to them does notoccupy space continues to exist [after the death of the body] and a98314210486781048681rm-ing (taqrīr ) that it returns to the governance of a body whether it be the
very same body of the individual or another
This reading has the advantage of being consistent with para 3 in that the arguerhypothesises the antecedents and a98314210486781048681rms the consequent forcing the oppo-nent to concede it as necessary (rather than merely as possible) As we shallsee however the original reading of para 2 is more consonant with the actual
21 As in one manuscript used for the 1962 edition (see al-Iqtiṣād 2152ndash3) and in 983117983123 Dublin
Chester Beatty Ar 3372 (983142f 56andashb) which is dated 5171123 Also two recent uncritical edi-
tions which use di983142ferent manuscript copies read lsquotaqdīr rsquo (ed al-Sharfāwī 2012 274 and
ed ʿImrān 2009 489) Neither edition however is furnished with a critical apparatus
983156983137983138983148983141 983093983089 Synoptic table analysing the argument described in each of parapara 2 and 3
Element Description para 3 para 2
Type of argument Ad hominem argument(ilzām)
10501811050183ا
ن984645 984644نأ
م
984647 ن
ه
ن984645 ل
ا
917501
1114109 1048573أ
ان
984643
984627
984645 ا نو
9846151050180 853573 984644نأ
ك
853572 ن984648 853575 917501 984647
ع
ن1048573
Antecedent I The human soul isimmaterial and separatefrom the body
984645او
ه
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180 نأ
984648 ر
نأ
984648 س
ن984647ر
ا
ن
984645984633 ا ن
و
ه
نن
ن
853572 ا
917501 نع
ش س
853572 853572 آ
نن
984648 853572 ن
ر
ا
917501 ع
1050151 1050179
ن
ح
984645
917501 ن [ ن984647 ن =] 1050183
10501811050183 ن984633
Antecedent II The soul survives thedeath of the body
ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
10501811050183 ا
917501 984647 984633 ن984647 ن ء 917501 984647ان
984625
Consequent The soul returns to thegovernance of a body
whether it be its originalbody or a di983142ferent body
ص
1114109 ن
و
ن
ح
984648
1050169 و حن
ن
ك
853572 ن984648 853575
ا
917501أ
9846151050180 ان
ن
984645 نن
ن
أ
ن984647 ن ن
ن
أ
9846151050180
أ
ا
ه
ن
و
984633
917501 984647
ك
853572 ن ن
1050151 1050179 ء
و
984627
ن
ن
10501811050163
ن
ح
ن
917501و
ه
نن
853575
917501 ن 984648 أ
س ا ن
أ
9846151050180
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 829
9830891048626983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048626 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983091 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
discussion in the Tahāfut So having proposed what seems in some respects acompelling modi10486781048681ed reading I must for now suspend judgement on it
983113983113 Correspondences with the Tahāfut and Avicennan Texts
The closest match in the Tahāfut al-falāsifa (The Incoherence of the Phi-losophers) for the argument described in the above passage from al-Iqtiṣād occurs in the 20th discussion on the philosophersrsquo denial of bodily resurrec-tion in the course of al-Ghazālīrsquos response to philosophical arguments againstthis notion983090983090 In both content and organisation the 10486781048681rst philosophical argu-
22 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218ndash220 ed Bouyges 363ndash6 Another argu-
ment that bears resemblance to the description appears in Discussion 19 (Tahāfut 202ndash5
335ndash9) among objections to Ibn Sīnārsquos theory that the human soul is incorruptible and
everlasting particularly his argument that since the soul exists independently of the
body which only serves as its instrument and since it has its own intellectual activity
which is independent of the body it does not pass away with the death of the body
(Tahāfut 201ndash2 333ndash4) The ad hominem argument in question starts from Ibn Sīnārsquos
views (i) that an individual human soul must have a connection (ʿalāqa) to an individual
human body that particularises (khaṣṣaṣa) one to the other and as al-Ghazālī puts it (ii)that the temporal origination of the human body is a condition (sharṭ ) only for the tem-
poral origination of the human soul but not for its continued existence (cf al-Shifā ʾ
al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 223ndash5 227ndash31 al-Najāt 378ndash86 on Ibn Sīnārsquos views on the soul-body
relationship see Druart ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Deathrdquo 259ndash73) For Ibn Sīnā since the body is only an accidental cause rather than an
essential cause for the origination of the soul it cannot be an essential cause for its con-
tinued existence Al-Ghazālī argues that on account of the same connection between the
body and the soul it is not unlikely (lā yabʿudu) that the body be a condition for the soulrsquos
continued existence (baqā ʾ) such that if this relation is severed the soul would cease toexist (Tahāfut 202ndash3 335ndash7) Even if as Ibn Sīnā maintains the connection between
each pair of body and soul is due to an obscure mutual correspondence (munāsaba
majhūla) between the two which connects both entities without making the soul onto-
logically dependent on the body as an e983142fect is to its cause it may ( laʿalla lā yabʿudu) still
be the case that this mutual correspondence be such in nature that its severance leads to
the passing away of the soul (Tahāfut 202ndash5 337ndash9) Ibn Sīnā writes that the mutual cor-
respondence is obscure to us (kha983142983145ya ʿ alaynā Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs 225
al-Najāt 378) If the soul passes away with the death of the bodymdashal-Ghazālī then
remarks without committing himself to this viewmdashGod may bring it back into existence when He resurrects the body He concludes that Ibn Sīnārsquos foregoing proof for the soulrsquos
surviving the death of the body is unreliable (lā thiqa bi-l-dalīl ) (Tahāfut 20418 3391)
There are important di983142ferences between this argument and the one described in
al-Iqtiṣād there is only partial overlap among the antecedents and the consequent here
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ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
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multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
ment is based closely often verbatim on Avicennarsquos refutation of theologicalconceptions of bodily resurrection in his eschatological work The Epistle onldquothe Returnrdquo for the Feast of Sacri983142983145ce (al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya 983142983145 l-maʿād ) a key
source that hitherto has remained unidenti10486781048681ed To this al-Ghazālī adds furthersub-arguments compiled from other Avicennan works especially al-Shifā ʾ The Avicennan argument as set out by al-Ghazālī is that all conceivable models of
bodily resurrection be they actually-held beliefs or purely hypothetical mod-els are impossible The following three models are eliminated in turn9830901048627
The 10486781048681rst model is that a human consists of the body alone animated by theaccident of life and that no soul exists so resurrection only involves restoringthe structure of the body and endowing it with life9830901048628 This view is rejected by
Avicenna on the aforementioned grounds that since the individual humanbeing ceases to exist after death the ldquorestoredrdquo body would not in fact be thesame as the original body but only a replica thereof which is created anew(ustuʾnifa)9830901048629 Restoration in the sense of re-existentiation is inconceivable
The second model is that a human consists of body and soul (nafs) that thesoul survives the death of the body and that God resurrects the individual byreconstituting his or her body out of its original particles and returning thesoul to it983090983094 There is no indication whether the soul hypothesised here is mate-rial or immaterial This model is rejected on the grounds that the ldquooriginalparticlesrdquo of the body are either those that constituted it at the moment ofdeath or those that remained constant in the body throughout the individualrsquoslife The former possibility cannot be the case as it implies that some inhabit-ants of heaven would be emaciated or mutilated a truly discommodious stateof a983142fairs The latter too can be eliminated on the grounds that the particles ofone human body can become constituents of another either directly throughcannibalism or indirectly through the food chain and that a particle constitut-ing one bodily organ can be cycled within the body to become a constituent of
is that the soulrsquos existence may be dependent on its connection to its original body as
opposed to any body whatsoever
23 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash63 cf Ibn Sīnā
al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 21ndash97 ed ʿĀṣī 91ndash114
24 This conception of man is found in earlier Ashʿarism and is attributed to Abū l-Ḥasan
al-Ash aʿrī and al-Bāqillānī see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 466ndash7025 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215ndash17 ed Bouyges 356ndash7 358ndash60 cf Ibn
Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt 28ndash29 Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 63ndash69
ed ʿ Āṣī 103ndash4
26 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048626 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983093 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048626 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
multiple other organs in succession and hence would need to be returned toall these organs at once9830901048631
The third is that a human consists of body and soul that the soul survives
the death of the body and that resurrection involves restoring the soul to abody which need not consist of the matter of the original body9830901048632 Again thereis no clear indication whether the soul hypothesised here is material or imma-terial983090983097 The philosophers reject this model on two grounds First since humansouls are in10486781048681nite in number they would need an in10486781048681nite number of bodieshowever the world contains only a 10486781048681nite amount of matter10486271048624 Second thenotion that after a soul departs from a body it promptly becomes connectedto a di983142ferent bodymdashotherwise known as metempsychosis (tanāsukh)mdashis
disproved on the grounds that the soul can only become connected to spe-cially-prepared matter ie a newly-formed foetus This however is impossiblefor once a new foetus takes form it will necessarily receive a newly-originatedsoul from the celestial principles and no individual foetus can receive twosouls at once10486271048625 All three models are theological in the sense that they assume that God actsdirectly and voluntarily on particular material objects So from the point of
view of dialectical tactics the easiest and most e98314210486781048681cient response would havebeen for al-Ghazālī to do exactly the same as he does in al-Iqtiṣād that is todefend the lowest common denominator among the three models which isbodily resurrection as taught in revelation and to avoid discussing the soul1048627983090
Nonetheless he chooses to base his response on the third model He doesthis by proposing a hypothetical account of bodily resurrection on the basis ofthis model and challenging the philosophers to refute it
27 Ibid ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 360ndash2 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Luc-chetta 77ndash81 ed ʿĀṣī 107ndash8
28 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 215 ed Bouyges 357
29 I take the expression ldquomatterrdquo (mādda) here (Tahāfut 21720 35711) to be simply a refer-
ence to the matter of the body rather than an intentional indication that the soul is
immaterial
30 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217 ed Bouyges 362 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risāla
al-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 69 ed ʿĀṣī 104 On this problem see Marmura ldquoAvicenna and
the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
31 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 218 ed Bouyges 362ndash3 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Risālaal-Aḍḥawiyya ed Lucchetta 83ndash85 125ndash37 ed ʿĀṣī 109 122ndash5 idem al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt
al-Nafs 233ndash4
32 This is the same as the 10486781048681rst of the three models without the denial of the existence of the
soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048626 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How would you disprove one who chooses the last alternative and holdsthat the soul continues to exist after death that it is a self-subsisting sub-stance and that this view is not contrary to revelation but indeed is
evidenced in revelation10486271048627
He goes on to cite a selection of relevant revealed evidence To substantiate hischallenge the third model is then developed along philosophical lines thesoul hypothesised here is explicitly stated to be a separate immaterial sub-stance So it survives the death of the body which serves merely as itsinstrument The identity of the individual is preserved in the continued exis-tence of the soul rather than in the body So resurrection can occur by restoring
the soul
to a body whichever body this may be whether it be [composed] of thematter of the original body or a di983142ferent matter (raddu-hā ilā badan ayybadan kāna sawāʾ kāna min māddat al-badan al-awwal aw min ghayrihi )or from matter created anew For [the individual] is what he is by virtueof his soul not his body ()10486271048628
So although the restored bodymdashrestored that is directly by Godrsquos powermdash would only be a replica of the original body the individual would nonetheless
be properly-speaking ldquorestoredrdquo (kāna dhālika ʿawdan muḥaqqaqan) Al-Gha-zālī claims that this philosophically-inspired hypothetical model can plausiblybe argued to be in accordance with the teachings of religion although it isnot immediately clear in this passage whether or not this re8520701048684ects his ownconviction Al-Ghazālī then turns to the two philosophical counterarguments he men-tioned earlier10486271048629 The 10486781048681rst which argues from the in10486781048681nite number of souls is
confuted on the grounds that it assumes that the world is pre-eternal a phi-losophical theory that had already been refuted in the 10486781048681rst discussion ofthe Tahāfut To the second counterargument which proceeds by equatingbodily resurrection to metempsychosis he gives two responses First referringto bodily resurrection as ldquometempsychosisrdquo is mere name-calling and henceof no consequence The philosophers may call it ldquometempsychosisrdquo if they
wished as long as it is clear that the theological doctrine that al-Ghazālīdefends involves the soulrsquos return to a body in the hereafter rather than in this
33 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 217ndash18 ed Bouyges 363
34 Ibid ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364
35 Ibid ed Marmura 219ndash20 ed Bouyges 364ndash6
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world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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9830891048626983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
world Second the claim that when a body becomes prepared to receive a soulone will be brought into being by the celestial principles hinges on the theorythat the soul comes into being by natural causality rather than by the activity
of a voluntary agent however the theory of natural causality has already beendisproved earlier in the Tahāfut Moreover by the same natural theory of thesoulrsquos origination it is conceivable (lā yabʿudu) that a new soul would only bebrought into being in the absence of an already existing soul ready to becomeattached to the body The obvious di98314210486781048681culty here is that the soul should becomeconnected to another suitably-prepared body not in the hereafter but in this
world as soon as it departs from its original body Al-Ghazālī resolves thisproblem by proposing that it is possible that the preparedness required for the
ldquoreturnrdquo to matter of a soul that had already become perfected through manag-ing a body be di983142ferent from the preparedness required by a newly-generatedsoul to become connected to matter and that it is hence possible that all thecauses and conditions of preparednessmdashknown only to Godmdashfor the formertype of soul to return to a body can only come about in the hereafter not in this
world He feels justi10486781048681ed here to propose that aspects of the body-soul connec-tion are known only to God because in Discussion 19 he already cited
Avicennarsquos own remark that the connection is in some respects ldquoobscurerdquo1048627983094
983113983113983113 Conviction versus Hypothesis
This response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the notion of bodily resurrection fol-lows in broad outline the standard classical Ashʿarī pattern of dealing withldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) also encountered in al-Iqtiṣād that is to a983142ford reason the role of establishing whether 983160 is possible and thento a98314210486781048681rm 983160 on the basis of revealed evidence Al-Ghazālīrsquos response consists of
the above-described rational hypothesis concerning the nature of humans andthe afterlife combined with scriptural evidence a98314210486781048681rming it as true (though
with a quali10486781048681cation as the present section will reveal) ldquoThis is taught in revela-tion and is possible therefore it must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo ldquoWhat revelationteaches must be a98314210486781048681rmed as truerdquo10486271048631
36 See n 22 above37 al-Ghazālī Tahāfut al-falāsifa ed Marmura 22014f and 2202 ed Bouyges 3658 3667f
Cf ibid 2198 3642f ldquo and that is possible (mumkin) by rdquo which follows a succinct
interpretation of scriptural teachings on the afterlife and introduces an explanation of
their possibility
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983093 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983093 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
How does this hypothetical model of the afterlife prove Avicenna wrongOr to throw the problem into sharper focus How could an argument premisedat several points on theistic doctrines that an Avicennist adversary would
never concede prove anything against him The doctrines in question are thecreation of the world in time the denial of the natural origination of the soulthe notion that God is a voluntary agent who acts directly on physical objectsand the view that revelation is a source of theological knowledge Yet I propose that although it is constructed on al-Ghazālīrsquos own rather thanthe philosophersrsquo terms the argument is to a certain extent legitimate For itis set out defensively as a response to Avicennarsquos refutation of the theologicalnotion of bodily resurrection rather than o983142fensively as a refutation of a posi-
tive Avicennan doctrine It demonstrates that bodily resurrection is notimpossible but a logical possibility though only if set against the framework ofthe arguerrsquos own theistic system with which this view is shown to be coherentThis defensive objective justi10486781048681es al-Ghazālīrsquos resort in the model postulated toelements rooted in theistic doctrines that were already defended earlier in thebook Had his immediate purpose been to refute a positive Avicennan doc-trine he would not have been justi10486781048681ed to premise his argument on any viewsthat had not already been conceded by the philosophers
The argument is particularly resonant with the description in the originalreading of para 2 in the above-quoted passage from al-Iqtiṣād an immaterial soulis ldquoa98314210486781048681rmedrdquo as a starting point and the soulrsquos return to a body be it its originalbody or a di983142ferent one is then ldquopostulatedrdquo By showing that no impossibilityfollows from this ldquopostulationrdquo al-Ghazālī proves that the soulrsquos return to abody is possible However the argument does not match the description in para 3in which it is claimed that the philosophers are ldquoforced to concede that theymust a98314210486781048681rm ( wujūb al-taṣdīq bi-) the resurrectionrdquo Nor for that matter does itmatch the modi10486781048681ed reading of para 2 So the actual argument in the Tahāfut is by
no means an ad hominem argument (ilzām) as claimed in both para 2 and para 3 butin fact a much weaker argument which shows that if certain non-philosophi-cal Ashʿarī doctrines are granted one must then concede the possibility ofbodily resurrection The argument is portrayed in al-Iqtiṣād as much morepotent than it really is10486271048632
38 By contrast the two ad hominem arguments described in the discussion of the pre-eter-nity of the world in al-Iqtiṣād (p 104ndash5) are genuinelyad hominem (cfTahāfut al-falāsifa
ed Marmura 25 26ndash7 ed Bouyges 42ndash3 45ndash6) Both arguments incidentally are pre-
mised on the classical kalām all-or-none principle (on which see my ldquoArgument from
Ignorancerdquo 194 211ndash14)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
The above reading raises the question whether the views that constitute theeschatological model that al-Ghazālī sets out are purely hypothetical andmooted for the sake of argument or whether they re8520701048684ect actual commitments
of his I propose that they are a mixture of conviction and hypothesis as Iexplain in what follows Al-Ghazālīrsquos choice to develop an eschatologicalmodel on the basis of the third conception of the nature of humans and theafterlife cumbersome and heavy on philosophical content as it is rather thanthe minimal common denominator as he does in al-Iqtiṣād must either servea serious dialectical purpose or attest a genuine preference for this model Theformer possibility can be eliminated on the grounds that the argument inquestion is in fact not ad hominem and hence does not include any Avicennan
views conceded for the sake of argument It follows that the eschatologicalmodel postulated consists of views that are either fully or partly representativeof al-Ghazālīrsquos own views It cannot be fully representative of his views sincehe tells us that one or more views ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo (para 2) So it is only partly representative And I propose that the viewsto which he is committed are the main central theses (roughly correspondingto the brief initial outline of the third conception of humans and the afterlife)1048627983097above all the doctrines of the immaterial rational soul the soulrsquos surviving thedeath of the body and its posthumous return to a body10486281048624 As to the view or views that ldquodo not correspond to what we ourselvesbelieverdquo this to my mind is an element of the hypothetical process through
which the soul returns to a body which al-Ghazālī sets out in response to the Avicennan refutation of all three theological conceptions of human ontology
and the afterlife More speci10486781048681cally it is the notion that the body to which thesoul returns is not necessarily the body to which it was originally connectedbut can possibly be an entirely other lump of matter This notion is mentionedtwice explicitly in the passage in question in al-Iqtiṣād ldquo it [the soul] returns
to the governance of a body whether it be the very same body of the individual oranother rdquo (para 2) and ldquo the soul returns to the governance of some body or other
39 See p 122 above
40 That said the philosophical doctrine of the absolute indestructibility and hence eternity
(sarmadiyya) of the soul is refuted (ibṭāl ) in Discussion 19 Compare this to al-Ghazālīrsquos
opposition to the doctrine of the post-eternity of the world (abadiyya) in the second dis-
cussion of the Tahāfut By contrast the immateriality of the rational soul is not refutedthough the philosophersrsquo proofs for it are challenged in the 18th discussion Al-Ghazālī
may have believed that the soulrsquos continued existence following the death of the body is
not necessary but dependent on Godrsquos will a question that falls outside the scope of our
present study
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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983089983091983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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(badan min al-abdān)rdquo (para 3)10486281048625 In the broader context of the passage this is themost relevant element of the supposed ad hominem argument (if for amoment we take this characterisation of the argument at face value) For as
we have seen in Part 983113 above1048628983090 the preceding discussion in al-Iqtiṣād recog-nises as possible only two theories of restoration according to one accidentspass away but atoms do not so the individualrsquos body is reconstituted out of itsoriginal atoms according to the other theory God annihilates the whole worldand then recreates it including human bodies ex nihilo and the identity of theoriginal matter of an individualrsquos body is preserved in Godrsquos knowledge Bycontrast in the model hypothesised in the Tahāfut atoms do not pass awayand the individual body may be reconstituted out of any atoms be they its
original atoms or altogether di983142ferent ones Moreover the soulrsquos return to abody seems to be a natural process since it depends on the readiness of matteralbeit perhaps with an element of direct divine activity This model asal-Ghazālī himself admits is precariously close to metempsychosis (tanāsukh)a heretical doctrine that he would never genuinely concede or wish to be asso-ciated with
This reading is con10486781048681rmed by the sense in which ldquoilzāmrdquo occurs in para 2 (againreading the text at face value) This term can refer either to an ad hominem argument as a whole (the process of forcing the opponent to concede such andsuch) or more narrowly to the view that the opponent is forced to concede(the consequent) In the clause ldquoan ilzām that does not correspond to what weourselves believerdquo it most likely refers to the consequent since belief normallyconsists of an assertion rather than an argument This is echoed in para 3 ldquoweforced [the philosophers] (alzamnā-hum) to concede that they must a98314210486781048681rmthe resurrection which is for the soul to return to the governance of some bodyor otherrdquo It is therefore precisely the consequent that ldquodoes not correspond to
what we ourselves believerdquo
So the view that al-Ghazālī a98314210486781048681rms in the Tahāfut for the sake of argument without actually subscribing to it is not the theory of the immaterial soul but
only the process through which the soul becomes reconnected to a body Thisreading suggests that when he wrote the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād the authorhad already adopted the theory of the immaterial soul but had not fully
worked out a solution to the knotty problem of the process of bodily resurrec-tion and the soulrsquos return to the body He hazards a wild guess of such a processin order to complete his hypothetical eschatology but leaves it as a speculative
41 These echo al-Ghazālī Tahāfut ed Marmura 219 ed Bouyges 364 See n 34 above
42 See pp 114ndash15 above
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and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983091 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830891048626983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
and conjectural possibility unsupported by scriptural evidence10486281048627 Later whenhe writes al-Iqtiṣād to a signi10486781048681cantly di983142ferent crowd of readers he 10486781048681nds it nec-essary to spell out this non-commitment explicitly
983113983126 The Economy of Knowledge
Although in al-Iqtiṣād al-Ghazālī does not dissociate himself from the doc-trine of the immaterial soul he e983142fectively distances himself from it by asso-ciating it with the philosophers as he introduces it with ldquoaccording to themrdquo(ʿinda-hum) (para 2) This combined with the fact that in the same discussion he
propounds a thoroughly materialist eschatology has led recent commentatorsto conclude that in this work al-Ghazālī champions a classical-Ashʿariteanthropology as opposed to the philosophically-in8520701048684uenced substance dualismhe clearly espouses in other works10486281048628 This interpretation is seriously o983142f themark albeit probably precisely the sort of reading that the author himself
wanted most of his readers to arrive atThe confusion is resolved once we consider the distinction that classical
Ashʿarīs make between the human body and the spirit (rūḥ nafs) which too ismaterial though whether it consists of atoms or accidents was a matter of dis-agreement Some including al-Juwaynī considered the spirit to consist ofatoms that are seeded in the body but are not of the body Life knowledgethinking and perception are explained as attributes of the body rather than ofthe spirit which has no activities of its own Consequently the punishmentand inquisition of the tomb are experienced not by the spirit which departsfrom the body at death but by the bodymdashor only a part thereof often said tobe some atoms of the heart (literally)mdashin which God creates life and percep-tion10486281048629 Now what al-Ghazālī does in al-Iqtiṣād is to take advantage of the
duality already present in earlier Ashʿarism (where as mentioned it is entirelymaterialist) and to concentrate exclusively on eschatological occurrences thattake place in the body including the restoration of the body the punishment it
43 So al-Ghazālīrsquos statement that ldquothis is taught in revelation (al-shar ʿ)rdquo (Tahāfut 220 365
366) refers to body-soul dualism and bodily resurrection but not the process as such on
which there is nothing in revelation44 See for instance Marmura ldquoBodily Resurrectionrdquo 282 285 and Gianotti Unspeakable
Doctrine of the Soul 68 983142f
45 On this subject see my ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropologyrdquo 443ndash9 465ndash74 On that a sound
bodily structure is not a condition for life and other animate attributes see also 451 983142f
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experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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98308910486261048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
experiences in the tomb and the inquisition by Munkar and Nakīr1048628983094 Whetherhe believes the soul to be material or immaterial al-Ghazālī can still plausiblymaintain that these occurrences all take place in the body Yet the book says
nothing on the nature of the soul It is nowhere said to be material nor in factcan its materiality be inferred simply from al-Ghazālīrsquos views on posthumousoccurrences in the body For it is perfectly arguable that all his views on theoccurrences involved in bodily eschatology can 10486781048681t like small pieces of a jigsawpuzzle into a larger dualist theory of the nature of humans and the afterlife in
which the soul is elevated to the status of an immaterial substanceThat al-Ghazālī refrains from expressing any views on the soul in this book
is con10486781048681rmed explicitly in the concluding part of the above-quoted passage
from his discussion on resurrection He writes (para 4)
To discuss this subject further to get to the truth of the matter would leadus to investigate the spirit (rūḥ) the soul (nafs) life and the reality(ḥaqīqa) of each However creedal works (muʿtaqadāt ) are not suited todelving to these great depths in rational subjects (maʿqūlāt ) Accordingly
what we have said su98314210486781048681ces for establishing the right balance of belief(al-iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād ) in order to con10486781048681rm what is taught in revelation
Al-Ghazālī clearly has more to say on the ontological and anthropologicalaspects of the afterlife but chooses to include none of it in his kalām work noteven a statement on whether the soul is material or immaterial He explainshis evasiveness by pointing out that creedal compendia are not the appropri-ate framework to treat these subjects which he characterises as (i) di98314210486781048681cult and(ii) rational10486281048631 The echo of the bookrsquos title in the concluding sentence under-scores the economy of theological truth that determines its intended scopeand consequently the exclusions The expression ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo refers to striking the
right balancemdashie moderationmdashin the exposition of theology which can beanalysed in terms of the disciplinersquos means and objectives10486281048632
The balance in the epistemological ldquomeansrdquo lies in the soundly-structuredapplication of rational and revealed evidence which steers clear of the two
46 The ldquopartrdquo ( juz ʾ) of the heart or the internal parts (bāṭin) mentioned in this context
(al-Iqtiṣād 216ndash18) is simply one or more atoms of the body Al-Ghazālīrsquos treatment of
these subjects is consonant with earlier Ashʿarī views and language47 On rendering ldquomuʿtaqadāt rdquo as ldquocreedal worksrdquo see n 13 above
48 For earlier discussions of the sense intended by ldquoiqtiṣād rdquo here see Makdisi ldquoThe Non-
Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo 249ndash50 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿ arite
School 71 983142f
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983089983091983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048626 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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extremes of 10486781048681deism and excessive rationalism which oversteps its bounds rep-resented respectively by traditionalist theology and philosophy A case in pointis that in al-Iqtiṣād the primary doctrines of theology (eg the existence of
God His attributes and the possibility of prophecy) are established in keeping with classical Ashʿarism on strictly rational grounds whereas in certain othertopics the role of reason is reduced to the task of recognising the possible fromthe impossible while revelation is promoted to being the principal source ofknowledge As to the ldquoobjectiverdquo of kalām al-Ghazālī considers it to consist of the cor-roboration and defence of the core doctrines of orthodoxy against the speciousdoctrines and arguments of opposing schools of thought for the bene10486781048681t of
educated but non-specialist believers1048628983097 Assent is required to the bare mini-mum of doctrines using the minimum amount of evidence which spares suchbelievers having to delve deeper (taghalghul ) into and to get to the truth of(taḥqīq) more advanced theological questions through critical enquiry (baḥth)
Al-Ghazālīrsquos theological ldquomoderationrdquo in this respect contrasts with the classi-cal Ashʿarī position that kalām is the exclusive path to theological knowledgeand not merely a defensive shield for orthodoxy To him it is only an art (ṣanʿa)geared 10486781048681rst and foremost to dialectic ( jadal ) and persuasion (iqnā ʿ) Knowl-edge (ʿilm) is obtained not by means of kalām but through a higher theologyreserved for the quali10486781048681ed few
That said the views that he supports in one genre should as much as possi-ble dovetail with those advanced in a di983142ferent genre the two sets of viewsalbeit often disparate should ideally 10486781048681t into a structured and more or lesscoherent larger system although this coherence is often not so obvious whenconsidered from the lower strata of the system Al-Ghazālī in my view strivesto maintain consistency among the views put forth in his di983142ferent worksHowever I say that he tries to do this ldquoas much as possiblerdquo because he achieves
this in varying degrees of success as we shall see in the next section10486291048624Now al-Ghazālīrsquos claim to have struck the ldquoright balancerdquo in his treatment of
resurrection refers to both the means and objectives of the book First follow-ing earlier Ashʿarīs he bases eschatological doctrines primarily on the teachingsof revelation restricting the role of reason to ascertaining the possibility of the
49 Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
50 I propose this reading as an alternativemdashone that is charitable but criticalmdashto both thetraditional (medieval and contemporary) view that al-Ghazālīrsquos oeuvre is thoroughly self-
contradictory and disingenuous and the contrary view that everything in his systemmdash
novel complex and ambitious as it ismdash10486781048681ts neatly and readily into place Much of his
system was still work in progress
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occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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983089983091983091 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
occurrences and states of a983142fairs in question and to refuting unorthodox doc-trines Second it contains the minimum amount of investigation needed tocon10486781048681rm the eschatological teachings of scripture (namely proving the possi-
bility of bodily resurrection) and refrains from more advanced and in thiscontext unnecessary research aimed at discovering the realities of the soulthe spirit and life So the picture painted in al-Iqtiṣād is partial and governed bythe limitations of the bookrsquos scope and objectives The eschatological viewspropounded though remarkably consonant with classical Ashʿarī doctrinesare meant to represent not al-Ghazālīrsquos full doctrine of the afterlife but onlyone partmdashthe corporeal partmdashthereof they are arguably not incompatible
with the body-soul dualism advocated in other works though it goes beyond
the scope of our present study to argue this in detailIt is little wonder therefore that al-Ghazālī classes psychology and anthro-pology among ldquorational subjectsrdquo (maʿqūlāt ) (para 4) a label that comes into sharpcontrast 10486781048681rst with ldquomatters known through revelationrdquo (samʿiyyāt ) the broadrubric under which the human spirit and eschatology are normally included inkalām works and second with ldquocreedal worksrdquo (muʿtaqadāt ) in general whichcon10486781048681rms that the subject belongs to higher theology not to kalām In other
words approaching psychology as a rational subject would be out of place inal-Iqtiṣād since it contrasts with the ldquomeansrdquo namely the classical Ashʿarī viewthat the soul is knowable through revelation rather than reason and the ldquoobjec-tivesrdquo namely establishing the core doctrines of orthodoxy and avoidingsuper8520701048684uous and complex investigation So unlike earlier Ashʿarīs al-Ghazālīsubscribes to a fundamentally rational theory of the soul one moreover in
which a distinction is made between the soul (nafs) ie the human soul andthe spirit (rūḥ) ie the pneuma10486291048625 What becomes evident in para 4 is that despitehis evasiveness al-Ghazālī o983142fers a subtle yet unambiguous hint that he iscommitted to the theory of the rational soul and that he discusses it in other
more relevant and more advanced works
983158 Iqtiṣād General Ontology
Al-Ghazālī has a further more pressing motive to omit any reference to imma-terial souls in al-Iqtiṣād which probably also partly explains the conspicuous
51 Earlier Ashʿarīs a98314210486781048681rm the spirit primarily on the basis of scriptural evidence of its exis-
tence they use ldquonafsrdquo and ldquorūḥrdquo interchangeably (Shihadeh ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropol-
ogyrdquo 465 983142f) On al-Ghazālīrsquos distinction between the rational soul and the pneuma in the
Iḥyā ʾ see Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 56
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absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983091 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048626 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
absence of a direct discussion of the subject in a book such as the Iḥyā ʾ to whose objectives this subject seems highly germane For this we need to turn
to the 10486781048681rst two theological doctrines treated in his kalām compendium namely
the creation of the world ex nihilo and the existence of God the context in which atomism is normally introduced in classical kalām sources1048629983090Several points in the chapter on Godrsquos existence register quite explicitly
al-Ghazālīrsquos commitment to the atomism of earlier Ashʿarīs most obviously hisde10486781048681nition of ldquothe worldrdquo (al-ʿālam) as everything (kull mawjūd ) other thanGod by which ldquowe mean all bodies and their accidentsrdquo10486291048627 Another case inpoint is his division of beings into space-occupying ones (mutaḥayyiz) whichare either atoms ( jawhar ) or bodies agglomerated of atoms and beings that are
not space-occupying which either subsist in atoms or do not subsist in anysubstrate but are self-subsisting the former are the accidents the latter cate-gory includes only God10486291048628 This division of beings of course leaves no room forcreated immaterial beings including immaterial human souls Frank tries toresolve the contradiction between this general ontology and substance dual-ism by concentrating on al-Ghazālīrsquos application of the expression ldquo jawhar rdquo
which he attempts to interpret in a way that allows for the possibility of cre-ated immaterial entities10486291048629 He argues from details that al-Ghazālī leaves unsaidin al-Iqtiṣād comparing the text both with some of his other works includingnon-kalām texts and with earlier Ashʿarī sources For instance he points outthat ldquonowhere in the Iqtiṣād () does al-Ghazālī say of the jawhar that as suchit has volume (ḥajm) as does al-Juwaynī ()rdquo1048629983094 and that ldquoal-Ghazālī conspicu-ously avoids asserting the traditional thesis that created beings must eitheroccupy space or reside in subjects that occupy space () as does al-Juwaynī()rdquo10486291048631 As it happens the latter point is factually incorrect for as I have justmentioned al-Ghazālī does assert this traditional view10486291048632 Frankrsquos reading ashas already been rightly remarked ldquomakes too much of too littlerdquo1048629983097 as none of
the evidence he provides in this regard is of consequence However the more
52 As I intend to show in a forthcoming study the philosophical theory of the rational soul
had several problematic implications in the context of classical kalām The implication
discussed here is in my assessment the most pertinent in al-Iqtiṣād
53 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
54 Ibid 24
55 Frank Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School 48ndash55
56 Ibid 5357 Ibid 55
58 See for instance the statement that every existent other than God is either a body or an
accident n 53 above
59 See Gianottirsquos criticism in Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul 80ndash3
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serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983091 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
serious shortcoming of this reading is that it concentrates almost exclusivelyon the concept ldquo jawhar rdquo without paying due attention to the argument in
which it appears
Al-Ghazālī could not possibly have intended ldquo jawhar rdquo in this context toinclude both material and immaterial substances as that would have nulli10486781048681edhis proofs for both the creation of the world and consequently the existenceof God To prove the creation of the world ex nihilo he uses the traditionalfour-step argument from accidents derived in particular from the version pro-pounded by al-Juwaynī which in general outline goes as follows (i) accidentsexist (ii) all accidents are temporally-originated (iii) substances ( jawhar ) ieatoms cannot be devoid of accidents (iv) what cannot be devoid of and hence
cannot pre-exist temporally-originated things must itself be temporally-origi-nated since an in10486781048681nitely-regressive series of past temporally-originated eventsis impossible therefore the world de10486781048681ned as the totality of atoms and acci-dents is created ex nihilo9830941048624 A98314210486781048681rming the possibility of incorporeal beingsother than Godmdashthat is of a third class of primary created beings comprisingself-subsisting entities that unlike atoms are not space-occupying and unlikeaccidents do not inhere in a space-occupying substratummdashwill immediatelyundermine the third step in the argument For following the earlier kalām tra-dition al-Ghazālī argues from a particular class of accidents to prove that noatom can be devoid of accidents belonging to that class and hence the moregeneral principle that no atom can be devoid of any accidents whatsoever Hisaccidents of choice following al-Juwaynī are the contraries of motion andrest one of which must exist in every atom in the world9830941048625 However if sub-stances divide into atoms and immaterial entities then the argument will failto prove the temporal origination of the latter since they cannot contain anyaccidents (strictly in the classical kalām sense of the term) certainly neithermotion nor rest It will follow that there may exist in the world substances
that have not been proved to be created ex nihilo so it will not follow that the world as a whole is created ex nihilo If this argument proves unsound then so
too will the argument from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God whichgoes as follows All that is originated in time must be originated by a cause the
world is originated in time therefore the world is originated by a cause983094983090 Anyhalf-decent theologian not to mention al-Ghazālī would have been aware of
60 Al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 26ndash34 cf al-Juwaynī al-Shāmil 123ndash262 al-Irshād 17ndash27 On theproof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God see Davidson Proofs for Eternity
Creation and the Existence of God 134 983142f
61 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 28 cf al-Juwaynī al-Irshād 18
62 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 24
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983092 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
the disastrous implications that follow out of suggesting the possibility ofimmaterial beings let alone a98314210486781048681rming their existence
There is evidence in later kalām sources con10486781048681rming the incompatibility
argued here between the notion of immaterial beings and the classical kalām argument from accidents This point is made in Sayf al-Dīn al-Āmidīrsquos (d6311233) philosophical work al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir (Splendid Light on Bright Wisdom) where he criticises the argument on account of ldquoafailure to prove that everything other than the Necessary Existent throughItself must contain accidentsrdquo since it neglects to consider separate entities
which are completely free from matter9830941048627 The same point is implied in thechapter on theological and philosophical proofs for the existence of God in
Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsīrsquos (d 6721274) Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid (The Rules of What-To- Believe) which opens as follows
Chapter One On Proving the Producer of the World ldquoThe worldrdquo refers toeverything other than God exalted What is other than God exalted areeither substances ( jawāhir ) or accidents If substances are proven torequire a Producer then it will follow that accidents require Him sincethey require what [substances] require Kalām theologiansdeny the existence of incorporeal substances ( ja- wāhir ghayr jismāniyya) as will be explained later So they 10486781048681rst prove thatbodies and substances [ie atoms] are created in time and then arguefrom this to prove that they have a pre-eternal creator They use di983142ferent
ways to prove that bodies are created in time One of them is that theysay Bodies cannot be devoid of created things [ie accidents] and allthat cannot be devoid of created things must [itself] be created there-fore all bodies are created This proof is based on the a98314210486781048681rmation of fourclaims 10486781048681rst the a98314210486781048681rmation of the existence of [accidents9830941048628] second
establishing that no body can be devoid of them third establishing thatall [accidents] are created in time fourth establishing that all that can-not be devoid of created things is itself created9830941048629
63 al-Āmidī al-Nūr al-bāhir 5220 I am grateful to Laura Hassan (983123983119983105983123) who is currently
preparing a study on aspects of al-Āmidīrsquos philosophical and theological thought forbringing this passage to my attention
64 The text here and in the third claim reads lsquocreated thingsrsquo (ḥawādith) which in this case
refers to accidents
65 Naṣīr al-Dīn al-Ṭūsī Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾid in al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133 135
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
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9830899830911048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2329
983089983091983093 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
The two other proofs of creation ex nihilo are drawn from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī(d 6061210) and are of no relevance here In his commentary on this passageal-Ṭūsīrsquos student Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥillī (d 7261325) distinguishes two de10486781048681ni-
tions of ldquothe worldrdquo namely (1) ldquoeverything other than Godrdquo and (2) ldquotheheavens and the earth and what is in betweenrdquo which in contrast to the formerde10486781048681nition excludes immaterial substances if their existence is a98314210486781048681rmed983094983094 Inthe former de10486781048681nitionmdashthe one used by classical kalām theologians and as wehave seen by al-Ghazālīmdashno such exclusion is possible Al-Ghazālī would have classed the proposition that the world consistsexclusively of atoms and accidents which he deploys in the argument fromaccidents as a ldquopurely estimative propositionrdquo ( wahmiyya ṣirfa) understood as
a proposition that may seem to be certain and primary (awwaliyya) but in factis false (kādhiba) and stems from the estimative facultyrsquos tendency to judgematters that lie beyond the senses no di983142ferently than it judges familiar sensorythings9830941048631 Indeed in his logical works al-Ghazālī reproduces with slight adjust-ments two closely-related examples given by Avicenna for precisely this classof propositions namely that a being that has no de10486781048681nite location ( jiha) isimpossible and that a self-subsistent being that is neither connected to the
world nor disconnected from it and neither inside the world nor outside it isimpossible Both propositions amount to a rejection of the possibility of cre-ated immaterial beings9830941048632
So al-Ghazālī had a choice between (1) employing the conventional kalām argument from accidents and avoiding any discussion of immaterial souls any-
where in the book and (2) undertaking an overhaul of the discussion ofcreation and Godrsquos existence Although I suspect that he might have consid-ered the latter option he chose the former despite the false reasoning itinvolved and its contradicting the substance dualism he championed else-
where To appreciate why he does so we should 10486781048681rst revisit his low view of the
nature and objectives of kalām not only that practised by earlier mutakallimūnbut also by implication his own kalām output As already mentioned al-Ghazālīrsquos top priority in al-Iqtiṣād and otherkalām
works was persuasion rather than knowledge He demotes kalām to a meretherapeutic dialectical art that is instrumental only in producing assent in thecentral doctrines of orthodoxy among a certain class of people namely simple
66 al-Ḥillī Kashf al-fawāʾid 133ndash467 On al-Ghazālīrsquos notion of ldquoestimative propositionrdquo and its Avicennan background see
Gri983142fel ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra)rdquo 16f 22ndash24 28
68 al-Ghazālī Miḥakk al-naẓar 52ndash3 idem Miʿyār al-ʿilm 129ndash30 cf Ibn Sīnā al-Shifā ʾ
al-Manṭiq al-Burhān 64ndash5 idem al-Najāt 115ndash18
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
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9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2429
9830899830911048630 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
believers who adhere to the teachings of religion on the basis of uncritical imi-tation (taqlīd ) but are intellectually a step above the illiterate believer andhave begun to question or doubt their inherited beliefs either by their own
thinking or due to external in8520701048684uences To remedy (muʿālaja) their doubts andrestore their peace of mind (ṭumaʾnīna) al-Ghazālī prescribes that they bespoken to in ways that are persuasive and acceptable to them (kalām muqniʿmaqbūl ʿinda-hum) If at all possible one should simply describe these doubtsas evil or absurd or cite a Qurʾānic verse ḥadīth or statement of a respectedperson and only resort to dispensing rational arguments should such basicmeans fail983094983097 Yet to be e98314210486781048681cacious in producing assent arguments used by thekalām theologian must be simple and start from premises that are readily
acceptable to the target audience They need not be demonstrative argumentssince their purpose is not to provide knowledge of reality (ʿilm taḥqīq) For thisreason many of the arguments that al-Ghazālī himself advances in a kalām setting fall below the standards of apodicticity set out following the Aristoteliantradition in his logical works He tells us that his main kalām workal-Iqtiṣād is superior to earlier kalām sources since it goes further towards criticalenquiry (taḥqīq) and knowledge (maʿrifa)mdashwithout fully providing eithermdashthan the conventional (rasmī ) kalām of earlier theologians10486311048624 The di983142ference isonly one of degree for the book is still to a great extent executed along theconventions (rasm) of classical kalām Al-Ghazālīrsquos arguments for the existence of God and the creation of the
world in time are a perfect case in point Of his aforementioned two optionsmdasheither (i) to follow and to re10486781048681ne as much as possible the traditional methodor (ii) to employ di983142ferent proofs for these two doctrinesmdashonly the formeroption was feasible and that is for at least three reasons First had he decidedto dispense with the proof from accidents he would have had to 10486781048681nd alterna-tive proofs for creation ex nihilo and the existence of God For the latter
doctrine he could have adapted Avicennarsquos argument from contingency(imkān)10486311048625 yet that was still closely associated with widely-condemned philo-sophical doctrines particularly the conception of God as a necessitatingcause1048631983090 In any case al-Ghazālī would not have found an alternative proof for
69 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 11 cf Shihadeh ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzīrdquo 142ndash8
70 al-Ghazālī al-Arbaʿīn 24 idem Jawāhir al-Qurʾān 81
71 As he does in one of his Maḍnūn texts see al-Ghazālī Kitāb al-Maḍnūn bihī ʿalā ghāyrahlihī in Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha 1ndash62 esp 9ndash10 This work is of unquestionable
authenticity most evidently because it refers on p 3 to the authorrsquos Jawāhir al-Qurʾān
72 That said this argument was later adapted to a theistic worldview as can be observed in
the works of Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī and later Ashʿarīs
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2529
983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2629
983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2529
983089983091983095 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
creation ex nihilo that did not start from change undergone by material entitiesand as such applied to immaterial entities which are neither observably sub-
ject to change nor always demonstrably so Second even if it was possible to
devise or borrow an alternative argument that proved the createdness ex nihilo of both material and immaterial beings excluding God it would have appearedat the very least a proof so alien and potentially contentious that it would havesharply deviated from the authorrsquos declared objective of writing an accessibleand rather conservative theological compendium that e98314210486781048681caciously producedassent in the central doctrines of orthodoxy and left its target readers with nonagging doubts Introducing arguments associated with unorthodox schools ofthought not least the philosophers in a subject as cardinal as the existence of
God might have even appeared sacrilegious a danger con10486781048681rmed by al-Ghazālīrsquosfrequent arguments against the condemnation of views simply on account oftheir unorthodox provenance or associations10486311048627 Any major shift in the para-digm in a conservative book such as al-Iqtiṣād by introducing unconventionaldoctrines arguments or formats would have been controversial and counter-productive Third the argument from accidents had itself acquired somethingof the status of an incontrovertible dogma in classical kalām10486311048628
It is for these reasons that our theologian chooses to employ an unsound butconservative and persuasive argument to prove the creation of the world exnihilo But he leaves us clues as to his concessionary probably reluctant nod toconvention at one point in the argument from accidents he tells us that theexistence and temporality of accidentsmdashrespectively the 10486781048681rst and secondprinciples of the argumentmdashare self-evident and incontrovertible but henonetheless goes on to prove both premises ldquoto uphold the conventionalmethodrdquo (li-iqāmat al-rasm)10486311048629 And in al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya another kalām text he maintains that the existence of God can be recognised simply by theinnate disposition ( 983142983145ṭra) of humans or by contemplating signs of design in the
world but nonetheless goes on to set out the conventional Ashʿarite argumentsfor creation and the existence of God ldquoin emulation of scholars who practisedrational theologyrdquo (al-iqtidāʾ bi-l-ʿulamāʾ al-nuẓẓār )1048631983094
73 For instance al-Ghazālī al-Munqidh 21983142f Tahāfut ed Marmura 5ndash7 ed Bouyges10ndash13
Miʿyār al-ʿilm 131
74 As pointed out for instance by Ibn Khaldūn (d 8081406) al-Muqaddima 335 95ndash96
Engl transl 352ndash53 144 On the principle of ldquothe conversion of evidencerdquo ( inʿikās) whichled to this view see my ldquoArgument from Ignorancerdquo 204ndash5 and 217ndash20
75 al-Ghazālī al-Iqtiṣād 27
76 al-Ghazālī al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya 8026 98 The text is also part of al-Ghazālī Iḥyā ʾ 11834
In this passage naẓar refers to the practice ofkalām
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2629
983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2629
983089983091983096 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
Conclusion
Let us conclude by quickly summarising our main 10486781048681ndings First of all I have
shown that it would be wrong to read the discussion of eschatology in al-Iqtiṣād as advocating a standard materialist classical kalām anthropology straight andsimple one that rejects and clashes with the substance dualism that al-Ghazālīpropounds in other works of his The anti-philosophical argument he refers tois not at all an argument against the theory of the immaterial soul moreoverthe partial selective eschatology he sets out provides fragmentary details ofthe afterlife of the body but explicitly avoids spelling out any views on thenature or afterlife of the soul Instead he includes a subtle hint to be decoded
by the more discerning readers at the substance dualism he subscribes to inother works written around the same period shortly before or after al-Iqtiṣād I have also argued that the general ontology put forth in the beginning of
al-Iqtiṣād is none other than classical Ashʿarī atomism most importantlybecause atomism must be premised in the classical-kalām argument fromaccidents for the creation of the world ex nihilo which in turn is premised inthe cosmological proof from creation ex nihilo for the existence of God
Al-Ghazālī had little choice in this book but to commit this obvious contradic-tion of substance dualism due as we have just seen to his conception of kalām as an inherently conservative art meant 10486781048681rst and foremost to persuade aver-age believers of orthodox tenets as opposed to a genuine science
This article has concentrated on al-Iqtiṣād an undated book that was com-pleted either in or shortly after 4881095 following his completion of theTahāfut 10486311048631 It gives a snapshot of his thinking around the same period during
which he also published his most important book the Iḥyā ʾ Whether in works written later on in his life he develops a di983142ferent possibly freer more con10486781048681-
dent and more consistent approach to dealing with the conundrum of
substance dualism in the context of Ashʿarī theology falls outside the purviewof our study and remains to be seen10486311048632 In any case what we have here is an
77 The Tahāfut was completed on 11 Muḥarram 48821 January 1095 as stated in one manu-
script (see Bouygesrsquos introduction to his edition of the Tahāfut p ix) For a brief chronol-
ogy of al-Ghazālīrsquos works including al-Iqtiṣād see Treiger Inspired Knowledge 11ndash14
78 Al-Ghazālī tells us in al-Munqidh 45 that between the years 490ndash5001097ndash1107 he
became certain on ldquocountless groundsrdquo including direct experience (dhawq) demonstra-tions and religious grounds that man consists of body and soul I read this as indicating
that he became more profoundly committed to this doctrine largely (as he would say)
due to the direct experience o983142fered by Su10486781048681 practice rather than as evidence of a lack of
commitment prior to this date (See also Frank Gri983142felrsquos reading of the passage in
Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology 285)
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2729
9830899830911048633 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
important early episode in the process through which the theory of the ratio-nal soul became accommodated in Ashʿarī thought
Bibliography
Abū Saʿda Muḥammad Ḥ al-Āthār al-sīnawiyya fī madhhab al-Ghazālī fī l-nafs al-
insāniyya Cairo Dār Abū Ḥarbiyya 1991
al-Āmidī ʿ Alī ibn Abī ʿ Alī al-Nūr al-bāhir fī l-ḥikam al-zawāhir [Facsimile of 983117983123983123 Ankara
Dil ve Tarih-Coğrafya Fakuumlltesi Ismail Saib 631 2866 4624 and 4830] 4 vols (vols
1ndash3 and vol 5 vol 4 is missing) Frankfurt Institut fuumlr Geschichte der Arabisch-
Islamischen Wissenschaften 2001Davidson Herbert A Proofs for Eternity Creation and the Existence of God in Medieval
Islamic and Jewish Philosophy New York Oxford University Press 1987
Druart Theacuteregravese-Anne ldquoThe Human Soulrsquos Individuation and its Survival after the Bodyrsquos
Death Avicenna on the Causal Relation between Body and Soulrdquo Arabic Sciences
and Philosophy 10 (2000) 259ndash73
Frank Richard M Al-Ghazālī and the Ashʿarite School Durham 983118983107 Duke University
Press 1994
al-Ghazālī Abū Ḥāmid al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-ʿArabiyya 1344 [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Iḥyāʾ ʿ ulūm al-dīn 16 vols Cairo Lajnat Nashr al-Thaqāfa al-Islāmiyya 1356ndash1357
[1937ndash1938]
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād 983117983123 Dublin Chester Beatty Ar 3372
mdashmdashmdashal-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by I A Ccedilubukccedilu and H Atay Ankara Nur Matbaasi
1962
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by M ʿImrān Cairo Dār al-Baṣāʾir 2009
mdashmdashmdash al-Iqtiṣād fī l-iʿtiqād Edited by A M al-Sharfāwī Jeddah Dār al-Minhāj 2012
mdashmdashmdash Jawāhir al-Qurʾān wa-duraruhu [wa-Kitāb al-Arbaʿīn fī uṣūl al-dīn] Edited by
Kh M Kāmil and ʿI al-Sharqāwī Cairo Maṭbaʿat Dār al-Kutub wa-l-Wathāʾiq al-
Qawmiyya 14322011
mdashmdashmdash Miḥakk al-naẓar fī l-manṭiq Edited by M B al-Naʿsānī al-Ḥalabī and M al-
Qabbānī al-Dimashqī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-Adabiyya w d [1925]
mdashmdashmdash Miʿyār al-ʿilm fī fann al-manṭiq Edited by M Ṣ al-Kurdī Cairo al-Maṭbaʿa al-
ʿArabiyya 13461927
mdashmdashmdash al-Munqidh min al-ḍalāl Erreur et deacutelivrance Edition (following J Ṣalībā and
K ʿAyyād) and French transl by F Jabre Beirut Commission libanaise pour la traduc-tion des chefs-drsquoœuvre 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Qudsiyya Arabic edition and English transl in Abdel Latif Tibawi
ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Sojourn in Damascus and Jerusalemrdquo Islamic Quarterly 9 (1965)
65ndash122
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2829
983089983092983088 983123983144983145983144983137983140983141983144
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = The Incoherence of the Philosophers Tahāfut al-falāsifa
Edited and transl by M E Marmura 2nd ed Provo Brigham Young University Press
2000
mdashmdashmdash Tahāfut al-falāsifa = Tahacircfot al-Falacircsifat ou laquoIncoheacuterence des Philosophesraquo Edited by M Bouyges Beirut Imprimerie Catholique 1927
Gianotti Timothy J Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul Unveiling the Esoteric
Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾ Leiden E J Brill 2001
Gri983142fel Frank ldquoAl-Ġazālīrsquos Concept of Prophecy The Introduction of Avicennan
Psychology into Ašʿarite Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 14 (2004)
101ndash44
mdashmdashmdash Al-Ghazālīrsquos Philosophical Theology New York Oxford University Press 2009
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālīrsquos Use of lsquoOriginal Human Dispositionrsquo ( 983142983145ṭra) and Its Background in
the Teachings of al-Fārābī and Avicennardquo The Muslim World 102 (2012) 1ndash32
mdashmdashmdash ldquoReview of Timothy J Gianotti Al-Ghazālīrsquos Unspeakable Doctrine of the Soul
Unveiling the Esoteric Psychology and Eschatology of the Iḥyāʾrdquo Journal of the
American Oriental Society 124 (2004) 108ndash11
Hennig Boris ldquoGhazali on Immaterial Substancesrdquo In Substance and Attribute in Islamic
Philosophy Western and Islamic Tradition in Dialogue Edited by C Kanzian and M
Legenhausen Heusenstamm Ontos Verlag 2007 55ndash66
al-Ḥillī Ibn Muṭahhar al-Ḥasan ibn Yūsuf Kashf al-fawā iʾd fī sharḥ Qawāʿid al-ʿaqāʾ id
Edited by Ḥ M al-ʿĀmilī Beirut Dār al-Ṣafwa 14131993
Ibn Sīnā al-Ḥusayn ibn ʿAbdallāh al-Najāt min al-gharaq fī baḥr al-ḍalālāt Edited by
M T Dānishpazhūh Tehran Intishārāt-i Dānishgāh-i Tihrān 13641985
mdashmdashmdashal-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād = Epistola sulla vita futura Edition and Italian
transl by F Lucchetta Padua Editrice Antenore 1969
mdashmdashmdash al-Risāla al-Aḍḥawiyya fī l-maʿād Edited by Ḥ ʿĀṣī Beirut al-Muʾassasa al-
Jāmiʿiyya li-l-Dirāsāt wa-l-Nashr wa-l-Tawzīʿ 14041984
mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Manṭiq al-Burhān Edited by A al-ʿAfīfī and I Madkūr Cairo al-
Maṭbaʿa al-Amīriyya 13751956mdashmdashmdash al-Shifā ʾ al-Ṭabīʿiyyāt al-Nafs = Avicennarsquos De anima (Arabic text) Being the
Psychological Part of Kitāb al-Shifā ʾ Edited by F Rahman London Oxford University
Press 1959
mdashmdashmdashal-Shifā ʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt = The Metaphysics of The Healing al-Shifāʾ al-Ilāhiyyāt A
Parallel English-Arabic Text Edited and transl by M E Marmura Provo (Utah)
Brigham Young University Press 2005
al-Juwaynī ʿAbd al-Malik ibn ʿAbdallāh Kitāb al-Irshād Edited by M Mūsā and ʿ A ʿAbd
al-Ḥamīd Cairo Maktabat al-Khānjī 1950mdashmdashmdashal-Shāmil fī uṣūl al-dīn Edited by ʿA S al-Nashshār F B ʿAwn and S M Mukhtār
Alexandria Munsha aʾt al-Maʿārif 1969
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998
7232019 Al-Ghazali and Kalam the Conundrum of Body-Soul
httpslidepdfcomreaderfullal-ghazali-and-kalam-the-conundrum-of-body-soul 2929
983089983092983089 983105983148-983111983144 983137983162983297983148983339 983137983150983140 983115983137983148983297983149
Ibn Khaldūn ʿ Abd al-Raḥmān ibn Muḥammad al-Muqaddima Edited by ʿA al-Shaddādī
3 vols Casablanca Bayt al-Funūn wa-l-ʿUlūm wa-l-Ādāb 2005
mdashmdashmdashThe Muqaddimah An Introduction to History English translation by F Rosenthal
2nd ed 3 vols Princeton Princeton University Press 1967Kukkonen Taneli ldquoReceptive to Reality Al-Ghazālī on the Structure of the Soulrdquo The
Muslim World 102 (2012) 541ndash61
Majmūʿah-yi falsafī-yi Marāgha A Philosophical Anthology from Maragha Containing
Works by Abū Ḥāmid Ghazzālī ʿ Ayn al-Quḍāt al-Hamadānī Ibn Sīnā ʿ Umar ibn Sahlān
Sāvi Majduddīn Jīlī and others Facsimile edition with introductions in Persian and
English by Nasrollah Pourjavady Tehran Markaz-i Nashr-i Dānishgāh 13802002
Makdisi George ldquoThe Non-Ashʿarite Shā10486781048681ʿism of Abū Ḥāmid al-Ghazzālīrdquo Revue des
Etudes Islamiques 54 (1986) 239ndash57
Marmura Michael E ldquoAvicenna and the Problem of the In10486781048681nite Number of Soulsrdquo
Mediaeval Studies 22 (1960) 232ndash9
mdashmdashmdash ldquoAl-Ghazālī on Bodily Resurrection and Causality in the Tahāfut and the Iqtiṣād rdquo
In Probing in Islamic Philosophy Studies In The Philosophies Of Ibn Sina Binghamton
983118983129 Global Academic Publishing 2005
Nakamura Kojiro ldquoWas Ghazālī an Ashlsquoariterdquo Memoirs of the Research Department of
the Toyo Bunko 52 (1993) 1ndash24
Shihadeh Ayman ldquoThe Argument from Ignorance and Its Critics in Medieval Arabic
Thoughtrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 23 (2013) 171ndash220
mdashmdashmdash ldquoClassical Ashʿarī Anthropology Body Life and Spiritrdquo The Muslim World 102
(2012) 433ndash77
mdashmdashmdash ldquoFrom al-Ghazālī to al-Rāzī 6th12th Century Developments in Muslim
Philosophical Theologyrdquo Arabic Sciences and Philosophy 15 (2005) 141ndash79
Sīdbī Jamāl R Naẓariyyat al-nafs bayna Ibn Sīnā wa-l-Ghazālī Cairo al-Hayʾa al-Miṣriyya
al-ʿĀmma li-l-Kitāb 2000
Treiger Alexander Inspired Knowledge in Islamic Thought Al-Ghazālīrsquos Theory of Mystical
Cognition and Its Avicennian Foundation Abingdon and New York Routledge 2012 Walton Douglas N Ad Hominem Arguments Tuscaloosa (Ala) The University of
Alabama Press 1998