Akron, OH 44302-1606 220 South Balch Street, Suite 118 this Court's mandates in Berea City School...

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF OHIO

WILLIAMSBURG COURT CO., LLC,

Appellant,

V.

SUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OFREVISION, SUMMIT COUNTY FISCALOFFICER AND S't'OW-MONROE FALLS CITYSCIIOOL DISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATIONAND RICHARD LEVIN, TAX COMMISSIONEROF OHIO

Appellees.

CASE NO.

Appeal from the OhioBoard of Tax Appeals

Board oi'Tax AppealsCase No. 2006-K-1717

NOTICE OF APPEAL OF APPELLANTWILLIAMSBURG COLJRT CO., LLC

Karen H. Bauernsclunidt, #0006774Timothy J. Kollin # 0030062(COUNSEL OF RECORD)Karen II. Bauernschmidt Co., LPA1370 West 6°' Street, Suite 200Cleveland, Ohio 44113(216) 566-8500(216) 566-0942 - [email protected]

COUNSEI, FOR APPELLANTWILLIAMSBURG COURT CO., LLC

Milton C. Rankins, #0051933(COUNSL;L OF RECORD)Summit County Assistant ProsecutorTax Division220 South Balch Street, Suite 118Akron, OH 44302-1606(330) 643-2620(330) 643-8540 - Facsimilemrankins(a;summitoh.net

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEESSUMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF REVISIONAND SUMMIT COUNTY FISCAL OFFICER

11.;! ^^ ^.}}

Mark H. Gillis, #0066908(COUNSEL OF RECORD)Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLC6400 Riverside Drive, Suite DDublin, OH 43017(614) 228-5822(614) 540-7474 - [email protected]

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEESTOW-MONROE FALLS CITY SCHOOLDISTRICT BOARD OF BDUCATION

Richard LevinI'ax Connnissioner of Ohio30 East Broad Street, SuiteCohmlbus, OH 43215(614) 466-2166(614) 466-6401 - Facsimile

TAX COMMISSIONER OF OHIO

Notice of Appeal of A epp Ilant

Appellant, Williamsburg Coitrt Co., LLC, hereby gives notice of its appeal as of right, pursuant to

R.C. §5717.04, to the Supreme Court of Ohio, fi-om a Decision and Order of the Board of Tax Appeals,

journalized in Case No. 2007-K-1717 on March 30, 2010. A true copy of the Decision and Order of the

Board being appealed is attached hereto as Exhibit A and incorporated hercin by reference.

Appellant, Williamsburg Court Co., LLC, complains of the following errors in the Decision and

Order of the Board of Tax Appeals:

1) The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is unreasonable and unlawful for the reason that theBTA failed to determine a value for the subject real property based upon its own indepen(ientanalysis of the evidence in the record as required by Ohio law.

2) The Board of Tax Appeals errcd in determining that the property owner failed to sustain itsburden of proof.

3) 1'he Board of "I'ax Appeals unreasonably and unlawfully excluded the Declaration ofCondominium Ownership from evidence to the detriment of the property owner.

4) The Board of '1'ax Appeals unreasonably and unlawfully disregarded the unrebuttedtestitnony of the property owner as to the condition of eighteen (18) of the uuits that were guttedas of tax lien date.

5) When the Board of Tax Appeals rejected the property owner's testimony regarding thecondition of the sribject units as o1'tax lien date, the Board erred in not utilizing the recent saleprice to value the subject property.

6) The decision of the Board of 1'ax Appeals is unreasonable and unlawful, since it failed to followDayton-Montgommery C. Port Auth_ v. tLlontgomery (.'ty. BcL OfRevision. 113 Ohio St. 3d 281,

2007-Ohio-1948.

7) The decision of the Board of'l'ax Appeals is tmreasonable and unlawful since it failed to followthis Court's mandates in Berea City School Dist. Bd of Edn. v. Cuyahoga County Br7. of

Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio 4979.

8) The Board of 1'ax Appeals' decision is unreasonable and imlawful in that it concluded that theProperty Owner did not provide sufficient evidence to support the presumption that the saleprice was the best evidence of value.

'The decision and order of the Board of Tax Appeals is umeasonable and unlawful since it is incontravention of Ohio laws and the Ohio Constitution.

10) The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals violates Arlicle X1I; Section 2 Ohio Constitution thatproperty should be taxed by uniform rule according to value.

11) The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals violates the right of "equal protection" under ArticleI, Section 2 and Article II, Section 26 Ohio Constitution and Amendment XIV, Section 1 UnitedStates Constitution in that it treats the Appellant different from other property owners forpurposes of vahiation.

12) The decision of the Board of Tax Appeals is against the manifest weight of the evidence for thereason that it determined a value for the subjeet property in excess of a recent, arms length saleprice.

Appellant, Williamsburg Court Co., LLC, requests that the Court reverse the unreasonable and

uiilawful decision of the Board of Tax Appeals and remand the matter to the Board of Tax Appeals to

issue an Order setting forth the total valuation of the propeil.y for tax year 2005 at a true value of

$1,244,000.

Respectfully subniitted,

Karen H. Baueni§chmidt, #0006774Timothy J. Kollin, # 0030062Counsel of Record

COUNSEL FOR APPELLAN'T,WILLIAMSBURG COURT CO., LLC

PROOF OF SERVICB

I hereby certify that a copy of this Notice of Appeal was sent this LLV day of April, 2010 by

certified mail, return receipt requested to:

Milton C. Rankins, #0051933Sununit County Assistant Prosecutor220 South Balch Street, Suite I 18Tax DivisionAkron, OH 44302-1606

AT'I'ORNEY FOR APPELLEESSLJMMIT COUNTY BOARD OF REVISIONAND StJMMIT COUN't'Y FISCAL OFFICER

Mark FI. Gillis, #0066908Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLC6400 Riverside Drive, Suite DDublin, OH 43017

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEESTOW-MONROE FALLS CITY SCHOOLDISTRICT BOARD OF EDUCATION

Mr. Richard LevinTax Connnissioner of Ohio30 East Broad Street, 22nd FloorCohmibus, OH 43215

TAX COMISSIONER OF OHIO

Karen H. BauemsdTimothy J. Kollin,Counsel of Record

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANT,WILLIAMSBURG COURT CO., LLC

OHIO BOARD OF TAX APPEALS

Williamsburg Court Co., LLC,

Appellant,

vs.

CASE NO. 2006-K-1717

(REAL PROPERTY TAX)

DECISION AND ORDER

Summit County Board of Revision, SummitCounty Fiscal Officer, and Stow-MunroeFalls City School District Board ofEducation,

Appellees.

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant - Karen H. Bauernschmidt Co., LPAKaren H. Bauernschmidt1370 West 6th Street, Suite 200Cleveland, Ohio 44113

For the County - Sherri Bevan WalshAppellees Summit County Prosecuting Attomey

Milton C. RankinsAssistant Prosecuting Attorney220 South Balch Street, Suite 118Akron, Oliio 44302-1606

For the Appellee - Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLCBd. of Edn. Mark H. Gillis

Rich & Gillis Law Group, LLC6400 Riverside Dr., Suite DDublin, Ohio 43017

MAR 3 0 2010Entered

Ms. Margulies, Mr. Johrendt, and Mr. Dunlap concur.

Appellant, Williamsburg Court Co., LLC, appeals a single decision of the

Summit County Board of Revision ("BOR") in which it determined that the true and taxable

values of forty-six individual parcels of real property should remain unchanged from that at

which they were originally assessed by the Summit County Fiscal Officer ("fiscal officer")

for ad valorem tax purposes for tax year 2005. Although the fiscal officer and BOR

EXHfB1T A

determined that the total true value of these parcels was $1,977,160, appellant asserts

through its notice of appeal that a more accurate value is $1,244,000. We proceed to

consider this matter upon appellant's notice of appeal, the transcript certified by the BOR

pursuant to R.C. 5717.01,' the record of this board's hearing, and the post-hearing briefs

filed on behalf of appellant and the appellee Stow-Monroe Falls City School District Board

of Education ("BOE").

On February 13, 2006, appellant filed a complaintZ with the BOR seeking a

decrease in the total true value of forty-six individual parcels, i.e., parcel numbers 56-18849

through 56-18856, 56-18861, 56-18862, 56-18866 through 56-18868, 56-18872, 56-18873,

56-18878, 56-18885, 56-18887, 56-18833 through 56-18848, 56-18857 through 56-18860,

56-18865, 56-18874 through 56-18877, and 56-18879 through 56-18881, apparently

improved with four buildings with fourteen apartments in each building, i.e., 56 individual

units.' On the face of its complaint, appellant indicated a decrease was warranted because

"[t]he property addresses were purchased for a lesser per-unit purchase price; also, units

were taken off line and are unimproved (interior) pending rehabilitation." S.T. Appellant

also noted that the properties had "sold within the last 3 years" for $1,500,000." Thereafter,

' Contrary to appellant's suggestion, appellant's brief at 2, the audio disc of the BOR's liearing is audible.Although appellant indicates that the property record cards for the subject property are not included in thestatutory transcript and that instead only tax bills are included, id., the documents to which appellant refers,entitled "Integrated Assessment System Review Document," appear to be the web-based version of propertydata maintained by the fiscal officer. Appellant also contends that these documents reflect the fiscal officer's"retroactive" dividing of the property as of tax lien date based upon appellant's later separation of the

property into individual condominium units. See discussion, infra.2 Appellant filed a second complaint in July 2006, apparently believing it could do so for each "half' of thetax year. Although jurisdictionally deficient as an independent complaint, see, generally, R.C. 5715.19(A),this complaint appears to merely reiterate the claims made in appellant's original complaint, disclosing that

the sale referenced in its original complaint occurred in May 2004.3 During his testimony before this board, Gus Frangos, a member of appellant, testified that the subjectproperty "consists of roughly five-and-a-half to six acres of property. On the property itself are 14 buildings.You had mentioned 10 in the opening statement. It's 14 buildings. And each building has 14 apartments init. So it comes up to 56 units - 56 total apartment units. And other than the four buildings, you know, there is

a meadow and green space." I-I.R. at 16.

2

the BOE filed a "counter-complaint" pursuant to R.C. 5715.19(B) in which it requested that

the fiscal officer's values be retained.

Both appellant and the BOE were represented at the hearing convened before

the BOR, the former through Mr. Frangos, a member of appellant, who presented copies of

several documents, few of which were discussed before either the BOR or this board,

including: (1) a"re-recorded"" general warranty deed, with recorded filing dates of April 30,

2004 and June 24, 2004, evidencing the transfer of the subject property from Sams

Investment, Inc. to appellant "for Ten Dollars ($10.00) and other good and valuable

consideration"; (2) DTE Form 100, entitled "statement of reason for exemption from real

property conveyance fee," recorded on March 31, 2005, indicating that a conveyance fee

need not be paid on a transfer between "Williamsburg Court Co. LLC" and "Williamsburg

Court Co. LLC" because the property was transferred "[t]o or from a person when no money

or other valuable and tangible consideration readily convertible into money is paid or to be

paid for the real estate-and the transaction is not a gift," see R.C. 319.54(F)(3)(m); (3) a

borrower's closing statement referencing a loan amount of $1,500,000; (4) an undated,s but

signed, "equity purchase agreement" between Apache Court Partners, LLC6 and Nicholas

Zarnas and Hibbard Stow, LLC whereby the latter sold their entire membership interest in

"Williamsburg Court Co. LLC"' for $1,875,000; and (5) photographs depicting some of the

units improving the subject property and the remodeling efforts which were underway.

° Appearing on this document is a notation indicating that "[t]his deed is being refiled to correct the Grantee's

name. (From Williamsburg Court Co., LLC to Williamsburg Court Co., LLC}"

This document references a date of "April _, 2004."6 Frangos explained that a prior owner had backed out of the purchase and at that point he became involved inthe purchase, doing so through the above-referenced equity purchase agreement which he signed as a memberof Apache Court Partners, LLC.7 Paragraph 3.4 indicated that "SELLER acknowledges that the sale of the within Membership Interest is

premised upon the COMPANY'S ownership in fee of certain residential real estate apartments conmonly

3

Frangos initially indicated he had mistakenly referenced the purchase price on

appellant's complaint as $1,500,000, which represented the loan amount, and that the actual

price for which the property transferred in mid-2004 was $1.875 million. He testified that

the property was purchased with the idea of "condominiumizing" the apartment units after

effecting necessary improvements which began immediately following the purchase and

apparently continued up to the time of the BOR hearing. Throughout this remodeling

process, some units continued to be used as rentals, while others were taken "offline" and

torn down to the studs, with several having been sold or under contract by the time of the

BOR hearing." Frangos indicated that by dividing the purchase price of $1,875,000 by the

total number of units purchased, i.e., fifty-six, a per unit price of approximately $33,480

resulted.9 With respect to the parcels still owned by appellant wlxieh are at issue in this

appeal, he suggested that the twenty-eight parcels with units currently being rented be valued

at $33,500, while the remaining eighteen parcels in stages of remodeling be valued at

$17,000,10 reflecting a total true value of $1,244,000.

Upon consideration of appellant's presentation and the arguments made in

opposition by the BOE, the BOR elected to retain the fiscal officer's valuation of the

Footnote contd.refen•ed to as Williamsburg Apartments in Stow, Ohio, permanent parcel nos. - and - and more fullydescribed in Exhibit B attached hereto and made a part hereofj.]" Despite such reference, this exhibit was notincluded with either the agreement provided to the BOR or this board. See S.T. and Ex. B.8 In response to questioning by the BOR, member Frangos testified that once fully renovated, two-bedroomflats were selling for $79,900, two-bedroom townhomes were selling for $89,900, and three-bedroomtownhomes were selling for between $99,000 and $109,000. He indicated that at the time of the BOR hearingseventeen units had been sold and closed, while another five were under contract. When questioned about hisownership interests in properiies the valuation of which was challenged, he stated that only nine or ten had

sold prior to March 31, 2006.9 Frangos indicated that following appellant's acquisition of the subject property, individual units wereassigned their own parcel numbers as part of its conversion to individual condominiums. Some questions wasraised whether the 2004 purchase price would be allocated among fifty-six or forty-six units.10 When asked how he arrived at his $17,000 figure for unfinished units, Frangos initially admitted he wasunsure given their incomplete condition, but later proposed that such an amount may be supported by backingout various remodeling oosts which he approximated as follows: $9,000 to $12,000 in exterior costs, e.g.,roof/siding, $4,000 landscaping throughout the property, $2,000 to $4,000 in decks, $15,000 in interiorrenovations in flats, $19,000 in interior renovations for townhomes.

4

property and the present appeal ensued. This matter was then scheduled for hearing at which

Frangos again appeared as the sole witness, testifying to appellant's acquisition of the

property in mid-2004 for $1,875,000, the process of converting the property to individual

condominium units, and the ongoing remodeling necessary to effect such conversion to

which he attributed costs of "between [$]30- and 32-, 33,000 a unit." H.R. at 48.

Before we may address the merits of appellant's appeal, we must first rule

upon an evidentiary issue over which the presiding attorney examiner reserved ruling. Filed

immediately prior to hearing, and renewed orally during the course of such hearing, the BOE

moved to exclude from evidence appellant's exhibit B entitled "Declaration of

Condominium Ownership," arguing that although this document was in existence at the time

of the BOR's September 2006 hearing, having been recorded with the fiscal officer on

March 31, 2005, it had not been provided to the BOR. The BOE argues that appellant is

precluded from presenting this evidence on appeal by virtue of R.C. 5715.19(G) which

states:

"A complainant shall provide to the board of revision allinformation or evidence within the complainant's knowledge orpossession that affects the real property that is the subject of thecomplaint. A complainant who fails to provide suchinformation or evidence is precluded from introducing it onappeal to the board of tax appeals or the court of common pleas,except that the board of tax appeals or court may admit andconsider the evidence if the complainant shows good cause forthe complainant's failure to provide the information or evidenceto the board of revision."

In WPH Cherry Valley, LLC v. Licking Cty. Bd. of Revision (Oct. 6, 2009),

BTA No. 2006-K-1294, unreported, we considered the implication of R.C. 5715.19(G),

commenting as follows:

5

"The import of this statute has been considered on manyoccasions, the thrust of which is to require complainants toprovide relevant information to county boards of revision sothat such tribunals may fulfill their duty to consider initialvaluation challenges. See, e.g., Coventry Towers, Inc, v.

Strongsville (1985), 18 Ohio St.3d 120, 121 ('This provisionrequires a complainant before the board of revision to submit allpertinent information affecting the property in question withinhis knowledge or possession at that time.'); CASA 94, L.P. v.

Franklin Cry. Bd. of Revision (2000), 89 Ohio St.3d 622; Leber

v. Green Cry. Bd. of Revision, Greene App. No. 2007-CA-39,

2008-Ohio-613. See, also, F & R L.P. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of

Revision (Jan. 12, 1996), BTA No. 1994-K-1389, unreported, at5(`Accordingly, a coinplainant must provide the county boardof revision with all pertinent information affecting the propertywhich is within its knowledge or possession. By imposing thisrequirement upon a coinplainant, county boards of revision arebetter able to perform their statutory duties of hearingcomplaints, determining the value of real property and, whenappropriate, revising the assessment of such property forpurposes of taxation. See R.C. 5715.01 and R.C. 5715.11. Inorder to ensure compliance with the preceding requirement,R.C. 5715.19(G) continues, stating that if a complainant fails toprovide such information to the county board of revision, absenta demonstration of good cause, it is precluded from doing so on

subsequent appeal.'); Libby Holdings, LLC v. Cuyahoga Cly.

Bd. of Revision (Sept. 23, 2008), BTA No. 2006-B-2206,

unreported; 64 W. Northwood Avenue, LLC v. Franklin Cty. Bd.

of Revision (Junc 15, 2007), BTA No. 2005-A-1370,

unreported. Compare, e.g., CDC Cleveland L.L. C. v. Cuyahoga

Cty. Bd. of Revision (Apr. 22, 2008), BTA No. 2006-A-233,unreported (good cause found to exist for permitting testimonyof witness who had not appeared before the county board ofrevision due to a personal illness and because witness who hadtestified no longer worked for the company nor resided withinthe state)." Id. at 6-7.

Appellant neither claims that exbibit B was not in existence when the BOR

convened its hearing nor that it was not in appellant's possession. Instead, it posits that this

board may receive such evidence where it serves to "clarify the record as set forth within the

Statutory Transcript" and was "introduced to support the testimony that was given by Mr.

Frangos at the Board of Revision." Appellant's reply brief at 2. We disagree. Appellant has

6

failed to demonstrate good cause for its failure to present this document to the BOR and as a

result it must be stricken from our consideration.

Turning to the merits of appellant's appeal, we note the standards applicable to

our review. "While a determination of the true value of real property by a board of revision

is entitled to consideration by the BTA, such determination is not presumptively valid."

Amsdell v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 572, 574. See, also,

Springfield Local Bd. ofEdn. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 68 Ohio St.3d 493, 495;

Cambridge Arms, Ltd. v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1994), 69 Ohio St.3d 337, 338.

Nevertheless, "[w]hen cases are appealed from a board of revision to the BTA, the burden of

proof is on the appellant, whether it be a taxpayer or a board of education, to prove its right

to an increase [in] or decrease from the value determined by the board of revision."

Columbus City School Dist. Bd. of Edn. v, Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision (2001), 90 Ohio

St.3d 564, 566.

As it did before the BOR, appellant argues the subject property be valued by

dividing the purchase price reflected within the equity purchase agreement, i.e., $1,875,000,

by the total number of units purchased, i.e., fifty-six, and applying the resulting figure,

approximately $33,500, to the units appellant was currently renting, while units in the

process of being remodeled be valued at $17,000 based upon Frangos' testimony, an amount

totaling $1,244,000. Alternatively, should the board question the values attributed by

Frangos to remodeled units, appellant suggests that the $33,500 figure simply be applied to

all forty-six units parcels herein, for a total value of $1,541,000. In response, the BOE

argues that the equity purchase agreement is an acquisition not of property, but of business

7

interests, and that even if accepted there exists no evidence to support the reduced values

attributed to units being remodeled.

The parties presented no appraisal evidence before either the BOR or this

board and instead their arguments focus upon the utility of the sale occurring in mid-2004 in

establishing the value of the subject property. R.C. 5713.03 requires that where there exists

an arm's-length sale of a property "recent" to tax lien date, the sale price constitutes the best

evidence of the property's true value for purposes of taxation. See, also, Berea City School

Dist. Bd. of Edn. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 269, 2005-Ohio-4979.

VJhere evidence of a sale has been provided, "a rebuttable presumption exists that the sale

has met all the requirements that characterize true value." Cincinnati Bd. of Edn. v.

Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision (1997), 78 Ohio St.3d 325, 327. Typically, "the only rebuttal

lies in challenging whether the elements of recency and arm's-length character between a

willing seller and a willing buyer are genuinely present for that particular sale." Cummins

Property Servs., L.L.C. v. Franklin Cty. Bd. of Revision, 117 Ohio St.3d 516, 2008-Ohio-

1473, at ¶13.

Citing Salem Med. Arts & Dev. v. Columbiana Cty. Bd. ofRevision ( 1998), 82

Ohio St.3d 193, the BOE challenges the utility of the equity purchase agreement, suggesting

it reflects the value of the business rather than that of the realty owned by the business. We

need not reach the question of whether or not the BOE has met its burden in this regard, see,

generally, St. Bernard Self-Storage LLC v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. of Revision, 115 Ohio St.3d

365, 2007-Ohio-5249, because we conclude that the sale is unreliable for another reason.

Recently, in Worthington City Schools Bd. of Edn. v. Franklin Cty. Bd of

Revision, 124 Ohio St.3d 27, 2009-Ohio-5932, the Supreme Court reversed this board's

8

reliance upon a sale, cautioning that temporal proximity of sale and tax lien dates is not the

only factor affecting whether a sale may be considered recent. The court admonished this

board that "recency `encompasses all factors that would, by changing with the passage of

time, affect the value of the property' *** [and that] recency factors include `changes that

have occurred in the market."' Id. at ¶32 (quoting New Winchester Gardens, supra, and

Cummins Property Servs,, supra). Indeed, this board has held that physical changes effected

to a property can render a sale, even though near in time to a tax lien date, remote for

purposes of determining its value. Cf. Blatt v. Hamilton Cty. Bd. ofRevision, 123 Ohio St.3d

428, 2009-Ohio-5260. See, also, Bd. of Edn. for Washington Local Schools v. Lucas Cty.

Bd. of Revision (Feb. 2, 2010), BTA No. 2007-K-1482, unreported; Bd. of Edn. of the

Cleveland Mun. School Dist. v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (Sept. 1, 2009), BTA No.

2007-K-1602, unreported; Bd. of Edn. of the Akran City School Dist. v. Summit Cty. Bd. of

Revision (Oct. 7, 2008), BTA No. 2006-K-1818, unreported; Copley-Fairlawn City School

Dist. Bd. of Edn. of the Akron v. Summit Cty. Bd. of Revision (Dec. 21, 2007), BTA No.

2006-A-1074,unreported.

In the present case, Frangos indicated that following appellant's acquisition of

the subject property it immediately embarked on converting the property from apartments

into condominiums with units being remodeled and prepared for sale to individual owners.

He testified to the extent of the remodeling necessary to effect such changes and, generally,

the costs involved. In its brief appellant acknowledges under a subheading entitled "Physical

Changes to the Subject Property," that "[fjrom the June 23, 2004 sale date to the tax lien date

of January 1, 2005, the Property Owner engaged in an interior demolition of eighteen (18) of

the fifty-six units at the subject property." Appellant's brief at 4.

9

Under circumstances such as these, where the property underwent a significant

physical transformation between the sale date and tax lien date, we are unable to conclude

the mid-2004 sale price is the best indicator of value. We acknowledge Frangos' ability,

without being qualified as an expert, to express an opinion regarding the subject's value, see,

generally, Tokles & Son, Inc. v. Midwestern Indem. Co. (1992), 65 Ohio St.3d 621, however,

such testimony must still be competent and probative, and "[w]hile an owner may testify as

to the value of his or her property, there is no requirement that the finder of fact accept that

value as the true value of the property." WJJK Investments, Inc. v. Licking Cty. Bd. of

Revision ( 1996), 76 Ohio St.3d 29, 31. Having rejected the mid-2004 sale, Frangos'

testimony does not present this board with an acceptable methodology of valuing the subject

property. Although appellant proposes a generalized per unit valuation, the units themselves

are not uniform in size/style and the record is unclear, particularly in light of the sale of

certain units, which ones were being rented or remodelcd as of the effective tax lien date,

rendering the valuation methodology overly simplistic. Further, Frangos' generalizations

regarding the value of units undergoing remodeling is entirely unsupported by the record."

" In its brief, appellant refers to the court's decision in Dayton-Montgomery Cty. Port Auth. v. Montgomery

Cty. Bd of Revision, 113 Ohio St.3d 281, 2007-Ohio-1948, arguing that this board must accept its evidence inthe absence of support in the record for the auditor's valuation of the subject property. We have previously

commented upon such generalized citations to Dayton-Montgomery, 5nding, as we do herein, the case to be

factually distinguishable from the instant matter. In Dayton-Montgomery, the court reversed this board's

decision to reinstate a county auditor's value where we determined that the property owner's evidence wasnot probative of value and also found support lacking for the board of revision's change in value. Underthose circumstances, the court concluded that the reinstatement of the auditor's initial valuation was in error,due to urisubstantiated adjustments the auditor made to the subject property's valuation. However, in thepresent case, the board of revision made no change to the auditor's valuation of the subject property and as

the court held in Salem Med. Arts & Dev. Corp., supra, at 195, and reiterated in Vandalia-Butler City School

Dist. Bd of Edn. v, Montgomery Cty. Bd. of Revision, 106 Ohio St.3d 157, 2005-Ohio-4385, at ^12, "`In the

absence of probative evidence of a lower value,' a county board of revision and the BTA `are justified intixing the value at the amount assessed by the county auditor."' See, also, Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of

Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 47. Indeed, as recently, pointed out in Colonial Village Ltd, v. Washington

Cty. Bd. of Revision, 123 Ohio St.3d 268, 2009-Ohio-4975, "the board of revision (or auditor) bears noburden to offer proof of the accuracy of the appraisal on which the county initially relies, with the result thatthe BTA is justified in retaining the county's valuation of the propeity when an appellant fails to sustain its

10

Accordingly, we find appellant has failed to satisfy its affinnative burden on

appeal, see, e.g., Simmons v. Cuyahoga Cty. Bd. of Revision (1998), 81 Ohio St.3d 47, and it

is therefore the decision of the Board of Tax Appeals that the true and taxable values of the

subject property, as of January 1, 2005, are as follows:

Parcel No. 56-18849TRUE VALUE TAXABLE VALUE

Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750

Parcel No. 56-18852TRUE VALUE TAXA.BLE VALUE




Footnote contd.burden of proof at the BTA" and therefore "[t]he county's appraised value thus forms in most cases a defaultvaluation that must be preferred and adopted if the appellant at the BTA fails to prove a different value of the

property ***.°" Id. at¶¶23 and 31.

11

Parcel No. 56-18854

LandBuildingTotal

TRUE VALUE

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

TAXABLE VALUE

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750


LandBuildingTotal

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750


LandBuildingTotal

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750

Parcel No. 56-18861

LandBuildingTotal

TRUE VALUE

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

TAXABLE VALUE

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750

12


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 3,680 $ 1,290Building $ 43,510 $ 15,230

Total $ 47,190 $ 16,520

Parcel No. 56-18878TRUE VALUE TAXABLE VALIJE



Land $ 3,180 $ 1,110Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 38,950 $ 13,630




Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750

13

Parcel No. 56-18834

LandBuildingTotal

TRUE VALUE

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

TAXABLE VALUE

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750


LandBuildingTotal

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750


LandBuildingTotal

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750

Parcel No. 56-18837

LandBuildingTotal

TRUE VALUE

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

TAXABLE VALIJE

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750

Parcel No. 56-18838

LandBuildingTotal

TRUE VALUE

$ 6,360$ 35,770$ 42,130

TAXABLE VALUE

$ 2,230$ 12,520$ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750

14












Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750

15


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,52.0Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750


Land $ 6,360 $ 2,230

Building $ 35,770 $ 12,520

Total $ 42,130 $ 14,750





Parcel No. 56-18874TRUE VALUE TAXABLE VALUE,

Land $ 3,680 $ 1,290Building $ 43,510 $ 15,230

Total $ 47,190 $ 16,520

16

Parcel No. 56-18875TRUE VALUE TAXA.BLE VALUE

Land $ 3,680 $ 1,290

Building $ 43,510 $ 15,230Total $ 47,190 $ 16,520


Land $ 3,680 $ 1,290

Building $ 43,510 $ 15,230Total $ 47,190 $ 16,520


Land $ 3,680 $ 1,290

Building $ 43,510 $ 15,230Total $ 47,190 $ 16,520

Parcel No. 56-18879TRUE VALUE

Land $ 3,680Building $ 43,510Total $ 47,190

TAXABLE VALUE

$ 1,290$ 15,230$ 16,520


Land $ 3,680Building $ 43,510Total $ 47,190

$ 1,290$ 15,230$ 16,520

Permanent Parcel No. 56-18881TRLJE VALUE TAXABLE VALUE


We order the Fiscal Officer of Summit County to list and assess the subject

property in conformity with this decision and order.

ohiosearchkeybta

17

I hereby certify the foregoing to be atrue and complete copy of the actiontaken by the Board of Tax Appeals ofthe State of Ohio and entered upon itsjournal this day, with respect to thecaptioned matter.

Akron, OH 44302-1606 220 South Balch Street, Suite 118 this Court's mandates in Berea City School...

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