Akbayan v Aquino

AKBAYAN V AQUINO

Facts:

The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the

Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister

Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing

cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and

growth (for both countries).”

JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets

in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that

encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.

The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee

on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard

differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy

projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and

trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic

waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and

economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.

Issues:

1. Do the petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the

Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress

2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant

petition.

3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the

general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in

denying access thereto.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens

Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the

Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade

Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-

Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers

submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public

since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has

become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives

issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in

the course of the negotiations.

The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final

text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for

discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations

continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese

representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern

the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan

but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.”

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would

discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The

Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where

negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more

favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said:

“We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right

to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court,

however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer

towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise

thereof.”

NORTH COTABATO VS GRP PANEL

Facts:

The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement

of Peace of 2001 (MOA) is assailed on its constitutionality. This document prepared by the joint efforts of

the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP) Peace Panel and the Moro Islamic Liberation

Front (MILF) Peace Panel, was merely a codification of consensus points reached between both parties

and the aspirations of the MILF to have a Bangsamoro homeland.

Issue: When the Executive Department pronounced to abandon the MOA, is the issue of its

constitutionality merely moot and academic and therefore no longer justiciable by the Court?

Ruling:

Yes. Since the MOA has not been signed, its provisions will not at all come into effect. The MOA will

forever remain a draft that has never been finalized. It is now nothing more than a piece of paper, with no

legal force or binding effect. It cannot be the source of, nor be capable of violating, any right. The instant

Petitions, therefore, and all other oppositions to the MOA, have no more leg to stand on. They no longer

present an actual case or a justiciable controversy for resolution by this Court.

An actual case or controversy exists when there is a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite

legal claims, which can be resolved on the basis of existing law and jurisprudence. A justiciable

controversy is distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute, in that the former

involves a definite and concrete dispute touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal

interests. A justiciable controversy admits of specific relief through a decree that is conclusive in

character, whereas an opinion only advises what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.

The Court should not feel constrained to rule on the Petitions at bar just because of the great public

interest these cases have generated. We are, after all, a court of law, and not of public opinion. The power

of judicial review of this Court is for settling real and existent dispute, it is not for allaying fears or

addressing public clamor. In acting on supposed abuses by other branches of government, the Court must

be careful that it is not committing abuse itself by ignoring the fundamental principles of constitutional

law.

TAN VS REPUBLIC

Facts:

Julita P. Tan, is the registered owner of a parcel of land consisting of 7,161 square meters located

at the southern bank of the Zapote River in Sitio Wawa, Pulang Lupa, Las Piñas City as evidenced by a

TCT. She acquired this property from the San Antonio Development Corporation (SADC) as shown by a

document denominated "Irrevocable and Exclusive Special Power of Attorney" dated April 6, 2001,

whereby she assumed SADC’s "obligation of paying all imposable taxes due said land."

The Public Estates Authority (PEA) is a government-owned and controlled corporation which manages

the Manila-Cavite Coastal Road(Coastal Road), also known as the R-1 Expressway.

Prior to the transfer of the property to petitioner by SADC, or on March 29, 1985, PEA wrote SADC

requesting permission to enter the latter’s property, then covered by TCT No. 439101, for the purpose of

constructing thereon the southern abutment of the Zapote Bridge at the Coastal Road. PEA also proposed

to SADC to start their negotiation for its acquisition of the latter’s property. However, they failed to reach

an agreement for the past 20 years.

On October 9, 2001, the BIR informed PEA that the current zonal value of the property is P20,000.00

per square meter. In the meantime, the construction of the Coastal Road was completed. PEA has been

collecting toll fees from the road users in the average amount of P1,039,404.85 per day, as shown by a

document denominated "Traffic Count of the Year 2002. Despite its collection of huge toll fees, PEA

continuously refuses to pay petitioner any compensation.

Issue: Whether or not the just compensation for petitioner’s property should be based on the BIR zonal

valuation in 1985 when petitioner entered the subject property.

Ruling:

The Court of Appeals, in its challenged Decision, held that PEA’s taking of petitioner’s property

occurred in 1985. Even if PEA requested permission to enter the subject property and petitioner granted

such request on condition that PEA should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00, "it does not change the

fact that there was ‘taking’ of the property for public use." Consequently, the compensation should be

computed on the basis of the zonal value of the property at that time (1985) which was P2,900.00 per

square meter per letter dated July 12, 2001 of the BIR to PEA.

The Court of Appeals is wrong. PEA’s entry into the property with the permission of SADC, its previous

owner, was not for the purpose of expropriating the property. Records show and as stressed by Mr. Justice

Renato C. Dacudao of the Court of Appeals in his Dissenting Opinion, SADC allowed PEA to enter the

land on condition that it should pay a monthly rental of P10,000.00. Thereafter, PEA, in a letter dated

May 28, 1985, requested SADC to donate or sell the land to the government. On October 22, 1985,

SADC responded, offering to sell the land to PEA for P1,288,980.00, plus P400,000.00 representing the

value of the improvements destroyed by PEA when it entered the property. However, since 1985 up to the

present, no agreement has been reached between PEA and SADC or herein petitioner who acquired the

property from the latter.

While PEA has been earning huge toll fees, it has refused to pay petitioner any compensation for the use

of her property in violation of her right as an owner.The above circumstances clearly show that when

PEA entered petitioner’s land in 1985, it was not for the purpose of expropriating it. We stress that after

its entry, PEA wrote SADC requesting to donate or sell the land to the government. Indeed, there was no

intention on the part of PEA to expropriate the subject property. Why did it ask permission from SADC to

enter the property? Thereafter, why did it request SADC to donate or sell the land to the government? It

could have simply exercised its power of eminent domain.

Section 2, Rule 67 (on Expropriation) of the same Rules provides, among others, that upon the filing of

the complaint or at any time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff shall have the

right to take or enter upon the possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized

government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. It bears reiterating that

in Republic v. Vda. de Castellvi, we ruled that just compensation is determined as of the date of the taking

of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first.

We have made it clear that there was no taking of the property in 1985 by PEA for purposes of

expropriation. As shown by the records, PEA filed with the RTC its petition for expropriation on

September 22, 2003. The trial court, therefore, was correct in ordering respondent, through PEA, upon the

filing of its complaint for expropriation, to pay petitioner just compensation on the basis of the BIR zonal

valuation of the subject property at P20,000.00 per square meter.

NPC VS IBRAHIM

Facts:

The NPC constructed underground tunnels on the property of the respondents without their knowledge

and consent and without any expropriation proceeding. It contended that it constructed an easement on

the property.

Issue: Is there expropriation?

Ruling:

YES. Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a corresponding transfer of title

or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a restriction or limitation on property rights over

the land traversed by transmission lines also falls within the ambit of the term expropriation.

The manner in which the easement was created by the NPC, violated the due process rights of the owners

as it was without notice and indemnity to them and did not go through proper expropriation proceedings.

NPC could have, at any time, validly exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire the easement over

the property as this power encompasses not only the taking or appropriation of title to and possession of

the expropriated property but likewise covers even the imposition of a mere burden upon the owner of the

condemned property. (Rep. v. PLDT, 136 Phil. 20 (1969)). Significantly, though, landowners cannot be

deprived of their right over their land until expropriation proceedings are instituted in court. The court

must then see to it that the taking is for pubic use, that there is payment of just compensation and that

there is due process of law.

In disregarding this procedure and failing to recognize the owners’ ownership of the sub-terrain portion,

NPC took a risk and exposed itself to greater liability with the passage of time. It must be emphasized that

the acquisition of the easement is not without expense. The underground tunnels imposed limitations on

the owners’ use of the property for an indefinite period and deprived them of its ordinary use. The owners

are clearly entitled to the payment of just compensation. Notwithstanding the fact that NPC only occupied

the sub-terrain portion, it is liable to pay not merely an easement fee but rather the full compensation for

the land. This is so because, the nature of the easement practically deprived the owners of its normal

beneficial use. The owners, as the owners of the property thus expropriated, are entitled to a just

compensation which should be neither more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than

the money equivalent of said property.

NPC contended that if ever it is liable, it should be made to pay the value of the land from the time it

constructed the tunnels. Is the contention correct? Why?

No. To allow it to use the date it constructed the tunnels as the date of valuation would be grossly unfair.

First, it did not enter the land under warrant or color of legal authority or with intent to expropriate the

same. It did not notify the owners and wrongly assumed that it had the right to dig the tunnels under their

property. Secondly, the improvements introduced in no way contributed to an increase in the value of the

land. The valuation should be based at the time of the discovery of the construction of the underground

tunnels.

PNOC VS MAGLASANG

Facts:

Petitioner insists that contrary to the findings of the two courts below, the determination of

justcompensation should be reckoned prior to the time of the filing of the complaint for

expropriation. According to petitioner in Civil Case No. 3267-O, petitioner took possession of the land on

January 1, 1992 when PNOC leased the same from its administrator as evidenced by a Lease Agreement

for the period of January 1, 1992 to December 31, 1992.Thus, taking, for purposes of computing just

compensation, should have been reckoned from January 1, 1992.

Ruling:

The Court rejected the State’s contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise to a

permanent right to occupy, since by express legal provision a lease made for a determinate time, ceases

upon the day fixed, without need of a demand.Neither can it be said that the right of eminent domain may

be exercised by simply leasing the premises to be expropriated.Where, as here, the owner was

compensated and not deprived of the ordinary and beneficial use of his property by its being diverted to

public use, there is no taking within the constitutional sense.

The time of the taking may be reckoned in 1994.For Lot 11900, on October 24, 1994, the date of

the filing of the complaint although the plaintiff took possession of the property in 1991 due to a lease

contract executed between plaintiff and defendant yet the intention to expropriate was manifested only

upon the filing of the complaint

MACTAN VS URGELLO

Facts:

In 1964, respondent Milagros Urgello and the Civil Aeronautics Administration [CAA]

(subsequently known as Bureau of Air Transportation [BAT], then later as the Air Transportation

Office [ATO]) entered into a compromise agreement (which stemmed from an expropriation

case filed by the CAA) wherein the CAA agreed to purchase Urgello’s Lot No. 913-E-3 for

P3,105.00 to be used in the expansion of the Lahug Airport in Cebu City, subject to the

resolutory condition that in the event that the Republic of the Philippines would no longer use it

as an airport, its title or ownership would revert back to respondent or her heirs upon

reimbursement of the purchase price of P3,105.00.

On April 27, 1966, the Mactan Airport commenced its operations and the Philippine

Airlines stopped using the Lahug Airport. Filipinas Airways and Air Manila ceased too to use the

Lahug Airport at the end of 1966 and thereafter used the Mactan Airport.

By letter of July 8, 1985, respondent Urgello requested the BAT for the reconveyance to her of

Lot No. 913-E-3 and she tendered RPB Demand Draft No. 148284 in the amount of P3,105.00.

The BAT received the draft, but it did not reconvey the lot, prompting respondent to file on

August 9, 1985 a Complaint for Reconveyance with Damages against it before the RTC of Cebu

City, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-4115. The trial court rendered judgment in favor of

Urgello.

On July 31, 1990, Republic Act No. 6958, the Charter of herein petitioner Mactan-Cebu

International Airport Authority (MCIAA), was signed into law. R.A. 6958 created the MCIAA

and transferred to it all the assets of the Lahug Airport.

Despite the judgment in CEB-4115, BAT still refused to reconvey to Urgello the property. Other

cases were filed by Urgello. In one of these cases – a complaint for reconveyance with damages

(docketed as CEB-19418) -- Urgello impleaded the MCIAA as one of the defendants. The trial

court in this case ruled in favor of Urgello. It declared that the reconveyance of Lot No. 913-E-3

is a solidary obligation of all three (3) defendants – Department of Public Works and Highways,

MCIAA, and ATO. The ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. The MCIAA elevated the

case to the Supreme Court. MCIAA claims that since ATO never turned over Lot No. 913-E-3

to it, it cannot be compelled to assume ATO’s obligation to reconvey the same.

Issue: Has MCIAA assumed ATO’s obligation to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3 to Urgello by virtue

of RA No. 6958?

Ruling:

Yes.

Since respondent’s cause of action against the ATO with regard to Lot No. 913-E-3 refers to its

retention of title thereto despite the occurrence of the resolutory condition stipulated in the

Conditional Deed of Sale, MCIAA’s liability would depend on whether it is ATO’s successor-in-

interest with respect to the said lot.

Section 15 of Republic Act No. 6958 is clear, however, that upon its passage, all existing airport

facilities and other properties were thereby transferred to MCIAA, viz:

All existing public airport facilities, runways, lands, buildings and other properties, movable or

immovable, belonging to or presently administered by the airports, and all assets, powers, rights,

interest and privileges relating to airport works or air operations, including all equipment which

are necessary for the operation of air navigation, aerodrome control towers, crash, fire, and

rescue facilities are hereby transferred to the Authority.

Section 17 states that:

Upon the transfer to and acceptance by the Authority of the existing physical facilities,

intangible assets and completed projects referred to in the preceding sections, all debts,

liabilities, and obligations of government agencies or entities concerned in respect of such

physical facilities, tangible assets and completed projects within the airports shall likewise be

assumed by the Authority.

The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the

whole law. It is [a] cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute’s clauses and phrases

must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof

must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to produce a harmonious

whole. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 6958 must thus be read vis a viz Section 15 as well as the

other provisions of the said law.

The "airports" referred to in Section 15 are the "Lahug Air Port" in Cebu City and the "Mactan

International Airport in the Province of Cebu," which belonged to the Republic of the

Philippines, then under the Air Transportation Office (ATO).

It may be reasonable to assume that the term "lands" refer to "lands" in Cebu City then

administered by the Lahug Air Port. This section involves a "transfer" of the "lands," among

other things, to the petitioner and not just the transfer of the beneficial use thereof, with the

ownership being retained by the Republic of the Philippines. This "transfer" is actually an

absolute conveyance of the ownership thereof.

Thus, Republic Act No. 6958 transferred Lot No. 913-E-3 to MCIAA. MCIAA is thus bound, as

ATO’s successor-in-interest, to reconvey Lot No. 913-E-3. And it is solidarily liable with its co-

petitioners to pay rentals in arrears over the said lot.

GARCIA PADILLA VS ENRILE

Facts:

The records show that nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested on July 6, 1982

at about 1:45 p.m. when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of Bayombong, Nueva after securing a Search

Warrant conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong. Apprehended during the said raid were

Dra. Aurora Parong, Benjamin Pineda, Sabino Padilla, Francisco Divinagracia, Zenaida Mallari, Letty

Ballogan, Norberto Portuguese, and Mariano Soriano who were then having a conference in the dining

room of Dra. Parong's residence which had been doing on since 10:00 a.m. of that same day.

The other four (4) detainees herein, namely: Imelda de los Santos, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanita Granada,

and Bienvenida Garcia, were arrested on the following day, July 7, 1982 by the same PC teams. On July

15, 1982, Tom Vasquez was arrested, and his Volkswagen car, bearing Plate No. DAP 347, was seized by

the PC authorities.

The herein fourteen (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong,

Nueva Vizcaya from July 6, 1982 until their transfer on the morning of August 10, 1982 to an undisclosed

place reportedly to Camp Crame, Quezon City, to Echague, Isabela, and to Tuguegarao, Cagayan.

Hence, this petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother

of detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr. on August 13, 1982. The mandamus aspect of the instant

petition has, however, become moot and academic, and whereabouts of petitioners having already

become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.

Ruling:

The last question relates to the legality of the Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued by the

President on July 12, 1982, tested by the conformity of its issuance to the procedure laid down under LOI

1211, petitioners insisting that the LOI limits the authority of the President to cause the arrest and

detention of persons engaged in or charged with, the crimes mentioned in Proclamation No. 2045. They

contend that the procedure prescribed in the LOI not having been observed, the PCO issued thereunder

did not validate the initial illegal arrest of the herein petitioners as wen as their continued detention.

By its very nature, and clearly by its language, LOI 1211 is a mere directive of the President as

Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines to his subordinates or implementing officers

for the ultimate objective of providing guidelines in the arrest and detention of the persons covered by

Presidential Proclamation No. 2045. The purpose is "to insure protection to individual liberties without

sacrificing the requirements of public order and safety and the effectiveness of the campaign against

those seeking the forcible overthrow of the government and duty constituted authorities. " LOI 1211 does

not, in any manner, limit the authority of the President to cause the arrest and detention of persons

engaged in, or charged with the crimes or offenses mentioned in said Proclamation in that he (President)

would subject himself to the superior authority of the judge who, under normal judicial processes in the

prosecution of the common offenses, is the one authorized to issue a judicial warrant after a preliminary

investigation is conducted with a finding of probable cause. Those who would read such an intention on

the part of the President in issuing LOI 1211 seems to do so in their view that LOI forms part of the law

of the land under the 1976 amendment of the Constitution. They would then contend that a PCO issued

not in compliance with the provisions of the LOI would be an illegality and of no effect.

To form part of the law of the land, the decree, order or LOI must be issued by the President in the

exercise of his extraordinary power of legislation as contemplated in Section 6 of the 1976 amendments

to the Constitution, whenever in his judgment, there exists a grave emergency or a threat or imminence

thereof, or whenever the interim Batasan Pambansa or the regular National Assembly fails or is unable to

act adequately on any matter for any reason that in his judgment requires immediate action. There can be

no pretense, much less a showing, that these conditions prompted the President to issue LOI 1211. Verily,

not all LOI issued by the President should be dignified into forming part of the law of the land.

PENERA VS COMELEC

Facts:

Petitioner and private respondents were candidates for mayor of the Municipality of Sta.Monica, Surigao

del Norte in the last May 2007 elections. The former filed her certificate of candidacy on the day before

the prescribed campaign period. When she went to the COMELEC Office for filing she was accompanied

by her partymates.Thereafter, they had a motorcade which was consist of two trucks and ten

motorcycles running around the municipality convincing the residents to vote for her and the

other candidates of their political party.

Due to this, private respondent filed a petition against her alleging premature campaigning as provided in

the Omnibus Election Code Section 80 which says: “Election or partisan political activity outside

campaign period.--- It shall be unlawful for any person, whether or not a voter or candidate, or for any

party, or association of persons, to engage in an election campaign or partisan political activity except

during the campaign period.” She argued that she is not guilty since she was not yet a candidate at that

time and the campaign period has not yet started when the motorcade was conducted.

While the petition was pending in the COMELEC, she was voted as mayor and took her office thereafter.

The COMELEC Second Division decided in favor of the complainant and found her guilty of premature

campaigning. Likewise, when she appealed in the COMELEC En Banc, the previous decision was

affirmed.

Subsequently, she filed with the Supreme Court which decided against her. It held that the conduct of the

motorcade is a form of election campaign or partisan political activity, falling under Section 79(b)(2) of

the Omnibus Election Code which says: “[h]olding political caucuses, conferences, meetings, rallies,

parades, or other similar assemblies, for the purpose of soliciting votes and/or undertaking any campaign

or propaganda for or against a candidate[.]”Furthermore, it was held that she should vacate

the position. Now, she comes for a motion for reconsideration using the same arguments.

Issue: Is Penera guilty of premature campaigning?

Ruling:

NO. Any act is lawful unless expressly declared unlawful by law. It is enough that Congress stated that

“any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effectonly upon the start of the

campaign period.” So, it is lawful if done before the start of the campaign period. This plain language of

the law need not be construed further.

Moreover, on the day of the motorcade, she was not yet a candidate for. As what was decided in the Lanot

Casewhich says that prior to the campaign period, even if the candidate has filed his/her certificate of

candidacy, he/she is not yet considered as a candidate for purposes other than the printing of ballots.

Hence, she cannot be guilty of premature campaigning for in the first place there is no candidate to talk

about. What she did was an exercise of her freedom of expression.

ROQUE VS COMELEC

Facts:

This case is a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioners of the September 10,

2009 ruling of the Supreme Court, which denied the petition of H. Harry L. Roque, Jr., et al.

for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus to nullify the contract-award of the 2010 Election

Automation Project to the joint venture of Total Information Management Corporation (TIM)

and Smartmatic International Corporation (Smartmatic).

In this MR, petitioners Roque, et al. are again before the Supreme Court asking that the contract

award be declared null and void on the stated ground that it was made in violation of the

Constitution, statutes, and jurisprudence. Intervening petitioner also interposed a similar motion,

but only to pray that the Board of Election Inspectors be ordered to manually count the ballots

after the printing and electronic transmission of the election returns.

Petitioners Roque, et al., as movants herein, seek a reconsideration of the September 10, 2009

Decision on the following issues or grounds:

1. The Comelec’s public pronouncements show that there is a "high probability" that there will

be failure of automated elections;

2. Comelec abdicated its constitutional functions in favor of Smartmatic;

3. There is no legal framework to guide the Comelec in appreciating automated ballots in case

the PCOS machines fail;

4. Respondents cannot comply with the requirements of RA 8436 for a source code review;

5. Certifications submitted by private respondents as to the successful use of the machines in

elections abroad do not fulfill the requirement of Sec. 12 of RA 8436;

6. Private respondents will not be able to provide telecommunications facilities that will assure

100% communications coverage at all times during the conduct of the 2010 elections; and

7. Subcontracting the manufacture of PCOS machines to Quisdi violates the Comelec’s bidding

rules.

Note: (This digest would only deal with the procedural aspect of the MR. Only those

issues or

grounds wherein the Court made a ruling re: procedure would be discussed

here.)

Issue: Is the motion for reconsideration meritorious?

Ruling:

No.

Upon taking a second hard look into the issues in the case at bar and the arguments earnestly

pressed in the instant motions, the Court cannot grant the desired reconsideration.

Petitioners’ threshold argument delves on possibilities, on matters that may or may not

occur. The conjectural and speculative nature of the first issue raised is reflected in the very

manner of its formulation and by statements, such as "the public pronouncements of public

respondent COMELEC x x x clearly show that there is a high probability that there will be

automated failure of elections"; "there is a high probability that the use of PCOS machines in the

May 2010 elections will result in failure of elections"; "the unaddressed logistical nightmares—

and the lack of contingency plans that should have been crafted as a result of a pilot test—make

an automated failure of elections very probable"; and "COMELEC committed grave abuse of

discretion when it signed x x x the contract for full automation x x x despite the likelihood of a

failure of elections."

Speculations and conjectures are not equivalent to proof; they have little, if any, probative value

and, surely, cannot be the basis of a sound judgment.

Petitioners, to support their speculative venture vis-à-vis the possibility of Comelec going

manual, have attributed certain statements to respondent Comelec Chairman Melo, citing for the

purpose a news item on Inquirer.net, posted September 16, 2009.

Reacting to the attribution, however, respondents TIM and Smartmatic, in their comment,

described the Melo pronouncements as made in the context of Comelec’s contingency plan.

Petitioners, however, the same respondents added, put a misleading spinto the Melo

pronouncements by reproducing part of the news item, but omitting to make reference to his

succeeding statements to arrive at a clearer and true picture.

Private respondents’ observation is well-taken. Indeed, it is easy to selectively cite portions of

what has been said, sometimes out of their proper context, in order to assert a misleading

conclusion. The effect can be dangerous. Improper meaning may be deliberately attached to

innocent views or even occasional crude comments by the simple expediency of lifting them out

of context from any publication.

Petitioners’ posture anent the third issue, i.e, there no is legal framework to guide Comelec in the

appreciation of automated ballots or to govern manual count should PCOS machines fail, cannot

be accorded cogency. First, it glosses over the continuity and back-up plans that would be

implemented in case the PCOS machines falter during the 2010 elections. The overall fallback

strategy and options to address even the worst-case scenario—the wholesale breakdown of the

80,000 needed machines nationwide and of the 2,000 reserved units—have been discussed in

some detail in the Decision subject of this recourse. The Court need not belabor them again.

While a motion for reconsideration may tend to dwell on issues already resolved in the decision

sought to be reconsidered—and this should not be an obstacle for a reconsideration—the hard

reality is that petitioners have failed to raise matters substantially plausible or compellingly

persuasive to warrant the desired course of action.

Significantly, petitioners, in support of their position on the lack-of-legal-framework issue,

invoke the opinion of Associate, later Chief, Justice Artemio Panganiban in Loong v. Comelec,

where he made the following observations: "Resort to manual appreciation of the ballots is

precluded by the basic features of the automated election system," and "the rules laid down in the

Omnibus Election Code (OEC) for the appreciation and counting of ballots cast in a manual

election x x x are inappropriate, if not downright useless, to the proper appreciation and reading

of the ballots used in the automated system." Without delving on its wisdom and validity, the

view of Justice Panganiban thus cited came by way of a dissenting opinion. As such, it is without

binding effect, a dissenting opinion being a mere expression of the individual view of a member

of the Court or other collegial adjudicating body, while disagreeing with the conclusion held by

the majority.

And going to another but recycled issue, petitioners would have the Court invalidate the

automation contract on the ground that the certifications submitted by Smartmatic during the

bidding, showing that the PCOS technology has been used in elections abroad, do not comply

with Sec. 1222 of RA 8436. Presently, petitioners assert that the system certified as having been

used in New York was the Dominion Image Cast, a ballot marking device.

Petitioners have obviously inserted, at this stage of the case, an entirely new factual dimension to

their cause. This we cannot allow for compelling reasons. For starters, the Court cannot plausibly

validate this factual assertion of petitioners. As it is, private respondents have even questioned

the reliability of the website24 whence petitioners base their assertion, albeit the former, citing

the same website, state that the Image Cast Precinct tabulation device refers to the Dominion’s

PCOS machines.

Moreover, as a matter of sound established practice, points of law, theories, issues, and

arguments not raised in the original proceedings cannot be brought out on review. Basic

considerations of fair play impel this rule. The imperatives of orderly, if not speedy, justice

frown on a piecemeal presentation of evidence and on the practice of parties of going to trial

haphazardly.

Moving still to another issue, petitioners claim that "there are very strong indications that Private

Respondents will not be able to provide for telecommunication facilities for areas without these

facilities." This argument, being again highly speculative, is without evidentiary value and hardly

provides a ground for the Court to nullify the automation contract. Surely, a possible breach of a

contractual stipulation is not a legal reason to prematurely rescind, much less annul, the contract.

Finally, petitioners argue that, based on news reports,28 the TIM-Smartmatic joint venture has

entered into a new contract with Quisdi, a Shanghai-based company, to manufacture on its behalf

the needed PCOS machines to fully automate the 2010 elections.29 This arrangement, petitioners

aver, violates the bid rules proscribing sub-contracting of significant components of the

automation project.

The argument is untenable, based as it is again on news reports. Surely, petitioners cannot expect

the Court to act on unverified reports foisted on it.

BY: MEL LEGS

2006 Political Law Case Digests

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE

UNILAB, INC. vs. ERNESTO ISIP and/or SHALIMAR PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 163858. June 28, 2005

Facts: UNILAB hired a private investigator to investigate a place purported to be manufacturing fake

UNILAB products, especially Revicon multivitamins. The agent took some photographs where the

clandestine manufacturing operation was taking place. UNILAB then sought the help of the NBI, which

thereafter filed an application for the issuance of search warrant in the RTC of Manila. After finding

probable cause, the court issued a search warrant directing the police to seize “finished or unfinished

products of UNILAB, particularly REVICON multivitamins.” No fake Revicon was however found;

instead, sealed boxes where seized, which, when opened contained 60 ml bottles of Disudrin and 200mg

tablets of Inoflox, both were brands used by UNILAB. NBI prayed that some of the sized items be turned

over to the custody of the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD) for examination. The court granted the

motion. The respondents then filed a motion to quash the search warrant or to suppress evidence, alleging

that the seized items are considered to be fruit of a poisonous tree, and therefore inadmissible for any

purpose in any proceeding, which the petitioners opposed alleging that the boxes of Disudrin and Inoflox

were seized under the plain view doctrine. The court, however, granted the motion of the respondents.

Issue: Whether or not the seizure of the sealed boxes which, when opened, contained Disudrin syrup and

Inoflox, were valid under the plain view doctrine.

Held: It is true that things not described in the warrant may be seized under the plain view doctrine.

However, seized things not described in the warrant cannot be presumed as plain view. The State must

adduce evidence to prove that the elements for the doctrine to apply are present, namely: (a) the executing

law enforcement officer has a prior justification for an initial intrusion or otherwise properly in a position

from which he can view a particular order; (b) the officer must discover incriminating evidence

inadvertently; and (c) it must be immediately apparent to the police that the items they observe may be

evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject to seizure

It was thus incumbent on the NBI and the petitioner to prove that the items were seized on plain view. It

is not enough that the sealed boxes were in the plain view of the NBI agents. However, the NBI failed to

present any of officers who were present when the warrant was enforced to prove that the the sealed

boxes was discovered inadvertently, and that such boxes and their contents were incriminating and

immediately apparent. It must be stressed that only the enforcing officers had personal knowledge

whether the sealed boxes and their contents thereof were incriminating and that they were immediately

apparent. There is even no showing that the NBI agents knew the contents of the sealed boxes before they

were opened. In sum then, the petitioner and the NBI failed to prove that the plain view doctrine applies

to the seized items.

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION

PEOPLE’S JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN

G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005

Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the People’s Journal claiming that a certain

Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots wayward neighbors’ pets that he finds in his

domain. It also claimed that BF Homes residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested

for the deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future. Thoenen claimed

that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed in the community. He is seeking for

damages.

The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a “social and moral duty to

inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the public good and protect the moral public

(sic) of the people,” and that the story was published in good faith and without malice.

Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and therefore protected by the

constitutional provision on freedom of speech.

Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. In the instant case, even if we

assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged communication, it lost its character when the

matter was published in the newspaper and circulated among the general population, especially since the

individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official nor a public figure.

Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes residents did not ask

for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for

verification of Thoenen’s status as a foreign resident. The article is also untrue because the events she

reported never happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently either

does not exist, or is not a lawyer.

There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional lie nor the careless error

materially advances society’s interest in ‘uninhibited, robust, and wide-open’ debate. Calculated

falsehood falls into that class of utterances which “are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are

of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly

outweighed by the social interest in order and morality… The knowingly false statement and the false

statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not enjoy constitutional protection”

CUSTOMS SEARCH

TOMAS SALVADOR vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 146706. July 15, 2005

Facts: On June 3, 1994, a Special Mission Group from the PAF Special Operations Squadron conducted

routine surveillance operations at the Manila Domestic Airport to check on reports of alleged drug

trafficking and smuggling being facilitated by certain PAL personnel. They were ordered to keep close

watch on the second airplane, an Airbus 300 parked inside the Domestic Airport terminal. At around

11:30 that same evening, three (3) persons had boarded the Airbus 300. The team did not move, but

continued its surveillance. At 12:15 a.m. the team leader reported that the three (3) persons who earlier

boarded the Airbus 300 had disembarked with their abdominal areas bulging and then boarded an airplane

tow truck with its lights off. At the Lima Gate of the Domestic Airport, the team blocked and stopped the

tow truck. The team leader identified himself and asked the four (4) persons on board to alight, and

approached Aurelio Mandin whose uniform was partly open, showing a girdle. Then, a package wrapped

in brown packaging tape fell. Suspecting that the package contained smuggled items, the leader yelled to

his teammates, “Positive!” Thereupon, the rest of the team surrounded petitioner and his two co-accused

who surrendered without a fight. The team searched their bodies and found that the three were wearing

girdles beneath their uniforms, all containing packets wrapped in packaging tape. Mandin yielded five (5)

packets, while petitioner and Santos had four (4) each. The team confiscated the packets and brought all

the accused to the PAFSECOM Office.

Issue: Whether or not the seized items are admissible in evidence.

Held: Our jurisprudence provides for privileged areas where searches and seizures may lawfully be

effected sans a search warrant. These recognized exceptions include: (1) search of moving vehicles; (2)

search in plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver or consented searches; (5) stop-and-frisk situations;

and (6) search incidental to a lawful arrest.

Here, it should be noted that during the incident in question, the special mission of the PAF operatives

was to conduct a surveillance operation to verify reports of drug trafficking and smuggling by certain

PAL personnel in the vicinity of the airport. In other words, the search made by the PAF team on

petitioner and his co-accused was in the nature of a customs search. As such, the team properly effected

the search and seizure without a search warrant since it exercised police authority under the customs law.

Law enforcers who are tasked to effect the enforcement of the customs and tariff laws are authorized to

search and seize, without a search warrant, any article, cargo or other movable property when there is

reasonable cause to suspect that the said items have been introduced into the Philippines in violation of

the tariff and customs law. They may likewise conduct a warrantless search of any vehicle or person

suspected of holding or conveying the said articles, as in the case at bar.

DOUBLE JEOPARDY

MARCELO LASOY and FELIX BANISA, vs. HON. MONINA A. ZENAROSA

G.R. No. 129472. April 12, 2005

Facts: On July 2, 1996 the accused were arrested fro possession and transport of marijuana leaves (in

bricks). They were charged with the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, with the information

containing the fact that they were in possession of and were transporting, selling or offering to sell 42.410

grams of dried marijuana fruiting tops. The accused was then arraigned, pleaded guilty and convicted.

Subsequently they applied for probation. Thereafter the prosecutor’s office filed two motions to admit

amended information (claiming that the marijuana recovered was 42.410 kilos, not grams) and to set aside

the arraignment of the accused; the accused then moved to quash the motion raising the constitutional

protection against double jeopardy.

Issue: Whether or not double jeopardy attaches.

Held: To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid

complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the

charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted or the case against him dismissed or otherwise

terminated without his express consent.

An information is valid as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the acts

or omissions constitutive thereof. In other words, if the offense is stated in such a way that a person of

ordinary intelligence may immediately know what is meant, and the court can decide the matter according

to law, the inevitable conclusion is that the information is valid. The inescapable conclusion, then, is that

the first information is valid inasmuch as it sufficiently alleges the manner by which the crime was

committed. Verily the purpose of the law, that is, to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge

against them, is reasonably complied with.

Moreover, an administrative order of the Supreme Court designated Regional Trial Courts to exclusively

try and decide cases of … violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, regardless of the

quantity of the drugs involved. (PP. vs. Velasco)

Therefore, the requisites of double jeopardy being present, the defense attaches.

EMINENT DOMAIN

REPUBLIC, as represented by the NIA vs. CA and FRANCISCO DIAZ

G.R. No. 147245. March 31, 2005

Facts: Manuel Diaz owned approximately 172 hectares of property devoted to the planting of palay. The

property was located in La Fuente, Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija, and allegedly yielded between 132 to 200

cavans of palay per hectare every year. After Manuel Diaz’s death, his son, Franciso Diaz, was appointed

administrator of the property.

In 1972, the National Irrigation Administration bulldozed ten (10) hectares of the Property to build two

irrigation canals. Although the canals when finished occupied only a portion of the 10 hectares, the entire

area became prone to flooding two months out of every year because of the side-burrow method NIA

used in the construction of the canals. NIA completed the canals without instituting expropriation

proceedings or indemnifying the property’s owners. Respondent then sought compensation from NIA for

the land affected by the canals, as well as for losses due to unrealized profits. In 1980, NIA belatedly

offered to buy the portions of the Property occupied by the canals pursuant to NIA’s expansion program.

The 1980 deeds of sale were never implemented. Respondent did not receive any consideration pursuant

to these deeds. On 20 August 1993, respondent, as administrator of the Property, filed an action for

damages and just compensation against NIA. NIA countered that respondent’s right to bring the action

had prescribed in accordance with RA 3601, as amended by PD 552. NIA also argued that respondent’s

failure to pursue the implementation of the 1980 deeds of sale amounted to laches.

Issue: Whether or not prescription or laches bars the respondent’s right to just compensation.

Held: The principle of laches finds no application in the present case. There is nothing inequitable in

giving due course to respondent’s claim for compensation. Both equity and the law direct that a property

owner should be compensated if his property is taken for public use.

Eminent domain is the inherent power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular

uses to promote public welfare. No one questions NIA’s authority to exercise the delegated power of

eminent domain. However, the power of eminent domain is not limitless. NIA cannot exercise the power

with wanton disregard for property rights. One basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain is

the constitutional directive that, “private property shall not be taken for public use without just

compensation.”

The thirteen-year interval between the execution of the 1980 deeds of sale and the 1993 filing of the

complaint does not bar the claim for compensation. This Court reiterated the long-standing rule “that

where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto

either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owner’s action to recover the land or the value thereof

does not prescribe.”

BAIL

JUDGE NAPOLEON INOTURAN, vs. JUDGE MANUEL Q. LIMSIACO, JR

A.M. No. MTJ-01-1362. May 6, 2005

Facts: Mario Balucero was charged before the RTC of Makati Branch 133, the presiding judge of which

is Napoleon Inoturan, with the violation of BP 22. Balucero, however, failed to appear during arraignment

despite notice. Inoturan then issued a bench warrant against him. Balucero was subsequently arrested in

Bacolod City, but was released upon posting of a property bail before the MCTC of Pulupundan, Negros

Occidental, which order was signed by Judge Manuel Limsiaco, Jr. The arraignment of Balucero was

subsequently set, but he failed to appear notwithstanding his receipt of notices. Inoturan then ordered that

the property bond be cancelled and forfeited. He then ordered Ignacio Denila, the Clerk of Court of the

MCTC to forward the property bond. Unable to comply with Inoturan’s order, Denila was cited in

contempt and was detained. Denila was ordered released by Limisiaco. Upon investigation, the Office of

Court Administrator found that Judge Limsiaco ordered the release of the some other accused although

they did not post bail. Limsiaco was administratively charged for gross ignorance of the law and

negligence in the performance of his duties.

Issue: What are the requisites before an order for release can be given in cases of bail?

Held: Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a

bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court as required under the conditions herein after

specified. It is thus clear that without bail, an accused under detention cannot be released. As found by the

investigating Judges, accused Balucero did not post bail but still respondent Judge Limsiaco ordered his

release.

A person applying for bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty. Indeed,

bail is unavailing with respect to an accused who has not voluntarily surrendered or has yet to be placed

in legal custody. In this case, Limsiaco issued the Order for the release of accused Balucero on November

21, 1996 or fifteen (15) days before December 6, 1996, the day he was actually arrested.

Moreover, Limsiaco acted without authority in approving Balucero’s alleged application for bail. Section

17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that “if the accused is arrested in a

province, city of municipality, other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with any Regional

Trial Court of said place, or if no judge thereof is available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal

trial judge, or municipal circuit trial judge therein.” Here, respondent should not have approved

Balucero’s application for bail. It is only one of the 14 Branches of the RTC in Bacolod City which has

the authority to act thereon.

POLICE POWER

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., petitioner, vs. JAC LINER, INC., respondent.

G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005

Facts: The City of Lucena enacted an ordinance which provides, inter alia, that: all buses, mini-buses and

out-of-town passenger jeepneys shall be prohibited from entering the city and are hereby directed to

proceed to the common terminal, for picking-up and/or dropping of their passengers; and (b) all

temporary terminals in the City of Lucena are hereby declared inoperable starting from the effectivity of

this ordinance. It also provides that all jeepneys, mini-buses, and buses shall use the grand central

terminal of the city. JAC Liner, Inc. assailed the city ordinance as unconstitutional on the ground that,

inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property,

and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies.

Issue: Whether or not the ordinance satisfies the requisite of valid exercise of police power, i.e. lawful

subject and lawful means.

Held: The local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the

following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a

particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably

necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon

individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method

The questioned ordinances having been enacted with the objective of relieving traffic congestion in the

City of Lucena, they involve public interest warranting the interference of the State. The first requisite for

the proper exercise of police power is thus present. This leaves for determination the issue of whether the

means employed by the Lucena Sangguniang Panlungsod to attain its professed objective were reasonably

necessary and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The ordinances assailed herein are characterized

by overbreadth. They go beyond what is reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem. Additionally,

since the compulsory use of the terminal operated by petitioner would subject the users thereof to fees,

rentals and charges, such measure is unduly oppressive, as correctly found by the appellate court. What

should have been done was to determine exactly where the problem lies and then to stop it right there.

The true role of Constitutional Law is to effect an equilibrium between authority and liberty so that rights

are exercised within the framework of the law and the laws are enacted with due deference to rights. It is

its reasonableness, not its effectiveness, which bears upon its constitutionality. If the constitutionality of a

law were measured by its effectiveness, then even tyrannical laws may be justified whenever they happen

to be effective.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

COMMISSION OF SIMPLE NEGLIGENCE, VIOLATION OF REVENUE REGULATION NO. 4-93

BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, et al vs. LILIA B. ORGANO

G.R. No. 14995, February 26, 2004

Facts: Respondent Lilia B. Organo is a revenue collection officer of the BIR, Revenue Region 7, Quezon

City. On May 13, 1997, then BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinsons-Chato filed with the BIR a formal

administrative charge against petitioner for grave misconduct and dishonesty.

Respondent filed a verified answer, in which she admitted that she had no specific authority allowing her

to receive withholding tax returns and check payments. She alleged in her counter-affidavit that her duties

as collection officer consisted merely of collecting delinquent accounts and performing other tasks that

her supervisor would assign to her from time to time; and that her acceptance of the withholding tax

returns and check payments for transmittal to BIR-authorized banks was a mere assistance extended to

taxpayers, without any consideration.

The administrative case against respondent was transferred to the Office of Ombudsman, which adopted

the “proceedings, evidence/exhibits presented at the administrative proceedings before the BIR.” In due

course, it rendered its decision finding respondent guilty of grave misconduct.

Issue: Whether or not respondent is liable for grave misconduct.

Held: The Court held that by accommodating and accepting withholding tax returns and checks payments

respondent disregarded as established BIR rule. Revenue Regulation No. 4-93 requires payments through

the banks precisely to avoid, whenever possible, BIR employee’s direct receipt of tax payments. Yet,

respondent was not deterred from making accommodations that circumvented this provision.

To compound matters, her acts were essential ingredients paving the way for the commission of fraud

against, and consequent damage to, the government. Her claimed ignorance thereof cannot erase her

liability. Obviously, she disregarded the established practice and rules. In the face of her silence, the fact

that the checks ended up in an unauthorized BIR account eloquently speaks, at the very least, of her gross

negligence in taking care of collections that should not have passed through her hands in the first place.

Because of her complicity in the transgression of the cited BIR regulation as well as her gross negligence,

respondent is administratively liable for simple misconduct and is suspended for six months.

POWER OF COA

RODOLFO S. DE JESUS, ET AL. vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT

G.R. No. 149154, June 10, 2003

Facts: The Board of Directors (BOD) of the Catbalogan Water District granted to themselves RATA, rice

allowance, productivity incentive, anniversary, and year-end bonus and cash gifts, as authorized by

Resolution No. 313 of the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA). The COA disallowed and

ordered the refund of these allowances as they are not allowed by P.D. No. 198, the Provincial Water

Utilities Act of 1973.

Issue: Whether COA is vested with authority to disallow release of allowance not authorized by law even

if authorized by the LWUA.

Held: Art. IX, Sec. 2 D of the Constitution mandates the COA to audit all the government agencies,

including government-owned and controlled corporations (GOCC) with original charters. The COA is

vested with authority to disallow illegal or irregular disbursements of government funds. A Water District

is a GOCC with a special charter since it is created pursuant to special law, PD 198. The COA can

disallow allowances not authorized by law, even if authorized by the LWUA.

Considering that the disallowed allowances were received in good faith, without knowledge that payment

had no legal basis, the allowances need not to be refunded.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE & QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS; RULE ON EXHAUSTION OF

ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES; DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION;WHEN APPLICABLE

SMART COMMUNICATIONS, INC. ET AL. V. NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS

COMMISSION (NTC)

G.R. 151908, August 12, 2003

Facts: The NTC issued Billing Circular 13-6-2000 which promulgated rules and regulations on the billing

of telecommunications services. Petitioners filed with the RTC a petition to declare the circular as

unconstitutional. A motion to dismiss was filed by the NTC on the ground of petitioner’s to exhaust

administrative remedies. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss but on certiorari, the CA reversed RTC.

Held: 1. Administrative bodies had (a) quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and (b) quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules

and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute and

the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. To be valid, such rules and regulations must

conform to, and be consistent with, the provisions of enabling statute.

Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the power to hear and determine questions of fact

to which the legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by law

itself in enforcing and administering the same law. In carrying out their quasi-judicial functions, the

administrative officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold

hearings, weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them for their official action and exercise of

discretion in a judicial.

2. The determination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrative body

contravenes the law or the constitution is within the judicial power as defined by the Constitution which is

“ the duty of the Courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally

demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there haw been a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government.” The NTC circular was issued pursuant to its quasi-legislative or rule-making power.

Hence, the action must be filed directly with the regular courts without requiring exhaustion of

administrative remedies.

3. Where the act of administrative agency was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function,

exhaustion of administrative remedy is required, before going to court.

4. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies only where the administrative agency exercises its quasi-

judicial or adjudicatory function. Thus, in cases involving specialized disputes, the same must be referred

to an administrative agency of special competence pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This

doctrine of primary jurisdiction applies where the claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a

regulatory scheme, has been placed within the special competence of an administrative body. In such

case, the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its

view.

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 6770 ( THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1998) PENALTIES WHICH ARE FINAL

AND UNAPPEALABLE;

RENATO HERRERA v. ELMER BOHOL

G.R. No. 155320. February 5,2004

Facts: Renato F. Herrera, former Director III at DAR Central Office, approved the request for shift of

item number of Plaridel Elmer J. Bohol, a Senior Agrarian Reform officer at the BARIE. The shift or item

number from 577-1 of Fund 108 to 562-3 of Fund 101 resulted to Bohol ontaining his salary under Fund

101. When Bohol was informed that he could not draw his salary under such item anymore because his

item was recalled and was given to another person, he charged Herrera before the Office of the

Ombudsman, with Grave Misconduct and/or Inefficiency and Incompetence. The Ombudsman found

Renato Herrera guilty of simple misconduct and was suspended for one month without pay. Such decision

was contested by Herrera and he even appealed to the CA on the ground that he did not fail to take

measures to correct respondent’s recall; but, such petition was just denied by the CA.A petition for review

was raised to the SC stressing that one month suspension, as stated in the Ombudsman Act of 1998, is

appealable considering that it is not among those enumerated as final and unappealable.

Issue: Whether or not the provision in R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1998,

providing suspension of not more than one month’s salary is final and unappealable.

Held: Sec. 27 of RA No. 6770 states that: “any order, directive or decision imposing the penalty of public

censure, reprimand, suspension of not more than one month’s salary shall be final and unappealable…”

Salary suspension is an effect of work suspension following the “no work, no pay” principle. It will be the

employee concerned who will be suspended and such suspension without pay,being final, and

unappealable, is clearly expressed the law. RA No. 6770, therefore, is a legal and clear basis of denying

the petitioner’s appeal.

COMMAND RESPONSIBILITY;HEAD OF A DEPARTMENT OR A SUPERIOR OFFICER SHALL

NOT BE CIVILLY LIABLE FOR THE WRONGFUL ACTS.OMISSION OF DUTY, NEGLIGENCE

FOR MISFEASANCE OF HIS SUBORDINATE.UNLESS HE HAS ACTUALLY AUTHORIZE BY

WRITTEN ORDER OF THE SPECIFIC ACT OR MISCONDUCT COMPLAINED OF

ALBERTO V. REYES, ET AL. v. RURAL BANK OF SAN MIGUEL (BULACAN), INC.ET. AL,.

G.R. No. 154499, February 27, 2004

Facts: In a letter dated May 19,1999, addressed to then BSP Governor Singson, RBSMI charge the

petitioner with violation of RA No. 6713 ( code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and

Employees). The Monetary Board (MB) of the BSP created an Ad Hoc Committee to investigate the

matter.

The ensuing investigation disclosed that sometime in September 1996, RBSMI, which had a history of

major violations/exceptions dating back to 1995, underwent periodic examination by the BSP. The

examination team headed by Principio noted serious 20 exceptions/violations and deficiencies of RBSMI.

Through Resolution No. 96, the MB required RBSMI to submit within 15 days a written explanation with

respect to the findings of the examiner. It also directed the Department of Rural Banks DRB), to verify,

monitor and report to the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector (SES) on the findings

noted, until the same shall have been corrected.

Meanwhile on June 13,1997, the MB approved Resolution No. 724 ordering RBSMI to correct the major

exceptions noted within 30 days from receipt of the advice, and to remit to the BSP the amount of

P2,538,483.00 as fines and penalties for incurring deficiencies in reserves against deposit liabilities.

More than a year after, however, the RBSMI asked for a reconsideration of MB Resolution No. 724

insofar as the imposition of fine amounting to P P2,538,483.00.On January 21, 1999, the MB adopted

Resolution No. 71, authorizing the conditional reversal of sixty of the dispute on the findings on reserve

deficiency. Subsequently, on April 7, 1999, the MB approved the interim reversal of the entire amount of

the penalty “pending the outcome of the study on the legal and factual basis for the imposition of the

penalty.”

The above incidents, particularly the alleged “brokering” by Reyes and the petitioners’ “unsupported”

recommendation to impose a penalty of P2,538,483.00 for legal reserve deficiency, prompted the

respondent to file the letter-complaint charging the petitioners with “unprofessionalism.”

In the Decision if March 14,2003, this Court found Deputy Governor Reyes and Director Domo-ong

liable for violation of the “standards of professionalism” prescribed by RA 6713in that they used the

distressed financial condition of respondent RBSMI as the subject of a case study in one of the BSP

seminars and did the “brokering” of the sale of RBSMI. The Court modified the decision of the CA by

reducing the penalty imposed from the a fine equivalent to six months’salary to a fine of 2 months salary

for Reyes and one month salary for Domo-ong.

The court exonerated petitioner Proncipio of the Administrative charges. The exoneration is subject to

RBSMI’s Motion for Partial Reconsideration.

Issue: Whether or not the Superior officer shall not be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of

duty, negligence or misfeasance of his subordinate officer.

Held: The immunity of public officers from liability for nonfeasance, negligence or omissions of duty of

their official subordinate and even for the latter’s misfeasance or positive wrong rests, according to

MECHEM, “upon obvious considerations of public policy, the necessities of the public service and the

perplexities and embarrassments of a contrary doctrine.” These official subordinates are themselves

public officers though of an inferior grade, and therefore directly liable in the cases in which any public

officer is liable, for their own misdeeds or defaults.

Under the Admin Code of 1987, which provides that head of a department or a superior officer shall not

be civilly liable for the wrongful acts, omissions of duty, negligence, misfeasance of his subordinates,

unless he has actually authorized by written order the specific act or misconduct complained of.

ELECTION LAW

RONALD ALLAN POE a.k.a. FERNANDO POE, JR. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO

P.E.T. CASE No. 002. March 29, 2005

Facts: In the 2004 election, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (GMA) was proclaimed the duly elected President

of the Philippines. The second-placer in the elections, Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed an election protest

before the Electoral Tribunal. When the Protestant died in the course of his medical treatment, his widow,

Mrs. Jesusa Sonora Poe a.k.a. Susan Roces filed a motion to intervene as a substitute for deceased

protestant FPJ. She claims that there is an urgent need for her to continue and substitute for her late

husband to ascertain the true and genuine will of the electorate in the interest of the Filipino people. The

Protestee, GMA asserts that the widow of a deceased candidate is not the proper party to replace the

deceased protestant since a public office is personal and not a property that passes on to the heirs.

Protestee also contends that under the Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, only the registered

candidates who obtained the 2nd and 3rd highest votes for the presidency may contest the election of the

president.

Issue: May the widow substitute/intervene for the protestant who died during the pendency of the latter’s

protest case?

Held: Only the registered candidate for President or for Vice-President of the Philippines who received

the second or third highest number of votes may contest the election of the President or the Vice-

President, as the case may be, by filing a verified petition with the Clerk of the Presidential Electoral

Tribunal within thirty (30) days after the proclamation of the winner.

An election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee, hence,

substitution and intervention is allowed but only by a real party in interest. Note that Mrs. FPJ herself

denies any claim to the office of President but rather stresses that it is with the “paramount public

interest” in mind that she desires “to pursue the process” commenced by her late husband. However,

nobility of intention is not the point of reference in determining whether a person may intervene in an

election protest. In such intervention, the interest which allows a person to intervene in a suit must be in

the matter of litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervenor will either gain or

lose by the effect of the judgment. In this protest, Mrs. FPJ will not immediately and directly benefit from

the outcome should it be determined that the declared president did not truly get the highest number of

votes.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY FOUNDATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. VS.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMELEC CHAIRMAN BENJAMIN ABALOS, SR., ET AL.

G.R. No. 159139. January 13, 2004

Facts: On June 7, 1995, Congress passed R.A. 8046 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to conduct a

nationwide demonstration of a computerized election system and pilot-test it in the March 1996 elections

in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) and for other purposes). On December 22,

1997, Congress enacted R.A. 8436 (An act authorizing the COMELEC to use an automated election

system in the May 11, 1998 national or local elections and in subsequent national and local electoral

exercises, providing funds therefore and for other purposes).

On October 29, 2002, COMELEC adopted its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004

elections. It resolved to conduct biddings for the three phases of its Automated Election System: namely,

Phase I-Voter Registration and Validation System; Phase II-Automated Counting and Canvassing

System; and Phase III-Electronic Transmissions.

President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued EO No. 172, which allocated the sum of P 2.5 billion to fund

the AES for May 10, 2004 elections. She authorized the release of an additional P 500 million, upon the

request of COMELEC.

The COMELEC issued an “Invitation to Apply for Eligibility and to Bid”. There are 57 bidders who

participated therein. The Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) found MPC and the Total Information

Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible. Both were referred to Technical Working Group (TWG) and

the Department of Science and Technology (DOST).

However, the DOST said in its Report on the Evaluation of Technical Proposals on Phase II that both

MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in technical evaluation. Notwithstanding these

failures, the COMELEC en banc issued Resolution No. 6074, awarding the project to MPC.

Wherefore, petitioners Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines wrote a letter to the

COMELEC chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. They protested the award of the contract to respondent MPC.

However in a letter-reply, the COMELEC rejected the protest.

Issue: Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in awarding the contract to

MPC in violation of law and in disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure.

Held: The Court has explained that COMELEC flagrantly violated the public policy on public biddings

(1) by allowing MPC/MPEI to participate in the bidding even though it was not qualified to do so; and (2)

by eventually awarding the contract to MPC/MPEI. It is clear that the Commission further desecrated the

law on public bidding by permitting the winning bidder to alter the subject of the contract, in effect

allowing a substantive amendment without public bidding.

SPECIAL ELECTION

ARTURO TOLENTINO AND ARTURO MOJICA VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, SENATOR

RALPH RECTO AND SENATOR GREGORIO HONASAN

G.R. No. 148334. January 21, 2004

Facts: Following the appointment of Senator Teofisto Guingona as Vice-President of the Philippines, the

Senate on February 8, 2001 passed Resolution No. 84, calling on COMELEC to fill the vacancy through a

special election to be held simultaneously with the regular elections on May 14, 2001. Twelve senators,

with 6-year term each, were due to be elected in that election. The resolution further provides that the

“Senatorial candidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term

of former Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. which ends on June 30, 2004.

On June 5, 2001, after canvassing the election results, the COMELEC proclaimed 13 candidates as the

elected Senators, with the first 12 Senators to serve the unexpired term of 6 years and the 13th Senator to

serve the full term of 3 years of Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr. Gregorio Honasan ranked 13th.

Petitioners Arturo Tolentino and Arturo Mojica, as voters and taxpayers, filed the instant petition for

prohibition, praying for the nullification of Resolution No. 01-005.

Issue: Whether or not the Special Election held on May 14, 2001 should be nullified: (1) for failure to

give notice by the body empowered to and (2) for not following the procedure of filling up the vacancy

pursuant to R.A. 6645.

Held: (1) Where the law does not fix the time and place for holding a special election but empowers some

authority to fix the time and place after the happening of a condition precedent, the statutory provision on

the giving of notice is considered mandatory, and failure to do so will render the election a nullity.

The test in determining the validity of a special election in relation to the failure to give notice of the

special election is whether want of notice has resulted in misleading a sufficient number of voters as

would change the result of special election. If the lack of official notice misled a substantial number of

voters who wrongly believed that there was no special election to fill vacancy, a choice by small

percentage of voters would be void.

(2) There is no basis in the petitioners’ claim that the manner by which the COMELEC conducted the

special Senatorial election on May 14, 2001 is a nullity because the COMELEC failed to document

separately the candidates and to canvass separately the votes cast for the special election. No such

requirement exists in our election laws. What is mandatory under Section 2 of R.A. 6645 is that the

COMELEC “fix the date of election,” if necessary, and state among others, the office/s to be voted for.

Significantly, the method adopted by the COMELEC in conducting the special election on May 14, 2001

merely implemented the procedure specified by the Senate in Resolution No. 84. Initially, the original

draft of said resolution as introduced by Senator Francisco Tatad made no mention of the manner by

which the seat vacated by former Senator Guingona would be filled. However, upon the suggestion of

Senator Raul Roco, the Senate agreed to amend the resolution by providing as it now appears, that “the

senatorial cabdidate garnering the 13th highest number of votes shall serve only for the unexpired term of

former Senator Teofisto Giongona, Jr.”

ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF COMELEC

BAYTAN ET AL. VS. COMELEC

GR No. 153945. February 4, 2003

Facts: Reynato Baytan registered as a voter in two precincts and the COMELEC En Banc affirmed the

recommendation of its Law Department to file information of double registration in violation of the

Election Code. Baytan filed with the Supreme Court a petition for certiorari on the grounds, among

others, that there was no probable cause and that election cases must first be heard and decided by a

Division before the COMELEC En Banc can assume jurisdiction.

Held: 1. It is well- settled that the finding of probable cause in the prosecution of election offenses rests in

the sound discretion of the COMELEC. Generally, the Court will not interfere with such finding of the

COMELEC, absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion. This principle emanates from the

exclusive power of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of all election investigation of all

election offenses and to prosecute the same.

2. Under Sec. 2, Art. IX-C of the Constitution, the COMELEC exercises both administrative and quasi-

judicial powers. The administrative powers are found in Sec 2. (1), (3) to (9) of Art IX-C. The

Constitution does not provide on whether these administrative powers shall be exercised by the

COMELEC en banc or in division. The COMELEC en banc therefore can act on administrative matters,

and this had been the practice under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. The prosecution by the COMELEC

of violations of election laws is an administrative power.

3. The exercise by the COMELEC of its quasi-judicial powers is subject to Sec.3, Art.IX-C which

expressly requires that all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, shall be decided by

the COMELEC in division, and the motion for reconsideration shall be decided by the COMELEC en

banc.

IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

BAROT VS. COMELEC ET AL.

GR No. 149147. June 18, 2003

Facts: In the May 14, 2001 elections Barot was proclaimed the 10th winning candidate for councilor of

Tanjay City, Negros Oriental. On May 29, 2001 the Chairman of the Board of Canvassers sent a

Memorandum to the COMELEC requesting for authority to correct the Certificate of Canvass and to

proclaim Tabaloc, instead of Barot, as the 10th winning candidate for Councilor, by errors committed by

the Board of Canvassers. The COMELEC considered the Memorandum as a petition, and after notice and

hearing, granted the request. Tabaloc was proclaimed the 10th winning Councilor. Barot filed with the

Supreme Court a petition for and prohibition.

Held: 1. Rule 27, Sec.5, par (b) of the COMELEC Rules provides that a petition for correction must be

filed not later than five (5) days following the date of proclamation, impleading the candidates who may

be adversely affected thereby. Rule 1, Sec.4 of the COMELEC Rules also provides that “in the interest of

justice and in the order to obtain speedy disposition of all matters pending before the Commission, these

rules or any option thereof may be suspended by the Commission.” The filing of the petition beyond the

5- day period was upheld in the interest of justice, it having been clearly shown that it was Tabaloc and

not Barot who was the 10th winning candidate for councilor.

2. The COMELEC had the authority to consider the Memorandum of the Chairman of the Board of

Canvassers, after notice and hearing, may even motu propio correct errors committed by in the tabulation

of the votes.

PRE-PROCLAMATION CONTROVERSY

NAVARRO VS. COMELEC

GR No. 150799. February 3, 2003

Facts: Petitioner was a candidate for Mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections and during the canvassing, he

petitioned the Board of Canvassers (BOC) to exclude the election returns contained in nine (9) ballot

boxes on the ground that said boxes were not secured by the required “3 padlocks.” The BOC denied the

petition and petitioner appealed to the COMELEC. The COMELEC en banc denied the appeal and

ordered the BOC to proceed with the canvassing and proclaim the winning local candidates. Petitioner

lost in the election.

Held: 1. Lack of the required number of padlocks on the ballot boxes is not a proper issue in a pre-

proclamation controversy. The issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy are

enumerated in Sec 243 of the Omnibus Election Code, to wit:

a. Illegal composition or proceeding of the board of canvassers;

b. The canvassed election returns are incomplete, contain material defects, and appear to be

tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies

thereof as mentioned in Sections 233, 234, 235, and 236 of this Code;

c. The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are

obviously manufactured or not authentic; and

d. When substitute or fraudulent returns in controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of

which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates.

This enumeration is exclusive.

2. A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face and

the COMELEC as a general rule need not go beyond the face of the returns and investigate the alleged

election irregularities. In the case of Baterina, et al. v. COMELEC, 205 SCRA 1, the following facts were

shown: (a) failure to close the entries with the signatures of the election inspectors; (b) lack of inner and

outer seals; (c) canvassing by the Board of copies not intended for it; (d) lack of time and date receipt by

the Board of the election returns; (e) lack of signatures of petitioners’ watchers; and (f) lack of authority

of the person receiving the election returns. It was held that while said facts may, indeed, involve

violation of the rules governing the preparation and delivery of election returns for canvassing, they do

not necessarily affect the authenticity and genuineness of the subject election returns as to warrant their

exclusion from the canvassing. Above facts are clearly defects in form insufficient to support a

conclusion that the election returns were tampered with or spurious.

3. The COMELEC en banc validly ordered the proclamation of the winning candidate even during the

pendency of the appeal to the COMELEC from the BOC’s denial of the petition for exclusion of the

questioned election returns. RA 7166, Sec 20 (I) provides as follows:

(i) The BOC shall not proclaim any candidate as winner unless authorized by the Commission after the

latter has ruled on the objection brought to it on appeal by the losing party. Any proclamation in violation

hereof shall be void ab initio, unless the contested returns will not adversely affect the results of the

election.

Above-quoted provision applies only where the objection deals with a pre-proclamation controversy.

IMMUNITY FROM CRIMINAL LIABILITY

COMELEC VS. TAGLE, ET AL.

GR No.s 148948 & 148951, February 17, 2003

Facts: In connection with the May 11, 1998 elections, candidate for Mayor Florentino A. Bautista filed a

complaint against Mayor Federico Poblete et al. for vote –buying in violation of Sec 261 (a) and (b) of the

Omnibus Election Code. The Information was docketed as Criminal Case No. 7034-99 of the RTC of

Imus, Cavite. Subsequently, a complaint for vote-selling in violation of Sec 261 (a) of the Omnibus

Election Code was filed with the Prosecutor’s Office as witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 and the

Provincial Prosecutor in Imus, Cavite filed separate Informations for vote-selling against said witnesses.

On appeal, the COMELEC en banc declared that the witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 were

exempt from criminal prosecution pursuant to 4th paragraph of Sec 28, RA No. 6646, otherwise known as

“The Electoral Reforms Law of 1987” which grants immunity from criminal prosecution to persons who

voluntarily give information and willingly testify against those liable for vote-buying or vote-selling. The

Law Department of the COMELEC moved to dismiss the Informations against the said witnesses but the

RTC in Imus, Cavite denied the motion to dismiss.

Held: 1. One of the effective ways of preventing the commission of vote-buying and of prosecuting those

committing it is the grant of immunity from criminal liability in favor of the party whose vote was

bought. Sec 28 of RA No. 6646 concludes with the following paragraph:

The giver, offeror, the promissory as well as the solicitor, acceptor, recipient and conspirator referred to

in paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 shall be liable as principals:

Provided, that any person, otherwise guilty under said paragraphs who voluntarily gives information and

willingly testifies on any violation thereof in any official investigation or proceeding shall be exempt

from prosecution and punishment for the offenses with reference to which his information and testimony

were given: Provided, further, that nothing herein shall exempt such person from criminal prosecution for

perjury or false testimony.

2. To avoid possible fabrication of evidence against the vote-buyers, especially by the latter’s opponents,

Congress saw it fit to warn “vote-sellers” who denounce the vote-buying that they could be liable for

perjury or false testimony should they not tell the truth.

3. The prosecution witnesses in Criminal Case No. 7034-99 are exempt from criminal prosecution for

vote-selling by virtue of the proviso in the last paragraph of Section 28, RA 6646. At the time when the

complaint for vote-selling was filed with the office of the Provincial Prosecutor, the respondents had

already executed sworn statements attesting to the corrupt practice of vote-buying. It cannot then be

denied that they had already voluntarily given information in the vote-buying case. In fact, they willingly

testified in Crim. Case No. 7034-99.

4. The COMELEC has the exclusive power to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses

punishable under the election laws and to prosecute the same. The Chief State Prosecutor, all Provincial

and City Prosecutors, or their respective assistants are, however, given continuing authority, as deputies

of the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigation of complaints involving election offenses and to

prosecute the same. This authority may be revoked or withdrawn by the COMELEC anytime whenever,

in its judgment, such revocation or withdrawal is necessary to protect the integrity of the COMELEC and

to promote the common good, or when it believes that the successful prosecution of the case can be done

by the COMELEC. When the COMELEC nullified the resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor, it in effect

withdrew the deputation granted by the COMELEC.

PREMATURE CAMPAIGNING

PANGKAT LAGUNA VS. COMELEC ET AL.

G.R. No. 148075. February 4, 2002

Facts: On January 30, 2001 then Vice Governor Teresita Lazaro succeeded to the office of the Governor

of Laguna when then Gov. Jose Lina was appointed Secretary of the DILG. Upon assumption of office as

Governor, Lazaro publicly declared her “intention to run for Governor” in the coming May 2001

elections. Subsequently, she ordered the purchase of trophies, basketballs, volleyballs, chessboard sets, t-

shirts, medals and pins, and other sports materials worth P4.5 millions. Gov. Lazaro bidded 79 public

works projects on March 28, 2001. Pangkat Laguna, a registered political party, filed a petition for

disqualification of Gov. Lazaro for premature campaigning.

Held: 1. The act of Gov. Lazaro in “ordering the purchase of various items and the consequent

distribution thereof of Laguna, in line with the local government unit’s sports and education program” is

not election campaigning or partisan political activity contemplated and explicitly prescribed under the

pertinent provisions of Sec 80 of the Omnibus Election Code.

2. Evidence is wanting to sufficiently establish the allegation that public funds were released, disbursed,

or expended during the 45-day prohibitive period provided under the law and implementing rules. Absent

such clear and convincing proof, the factual findings of the COMELEC cannot be disturbed considering

that the COMELEC is the constitutional body tasked to decide, except those involving the right to vote,

all questions affecting elections.

PUBLIC CORPORATION / PUBLIC OFFICERS

LOCAL GOVERNMENTS; SANGGUNIANG PANLALAWIGAN; MAJORITY OF ALL THE

MEMBERS REQUIRED TO CONSTITUTE QUORUM

MANUEL ZAMORA VS. GOV. JOSE CABALLERO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2002

Facts: Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley, filed before

the RTC a petition to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its

sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. Said sessions noted the resignation letter of

Board Member Sotto, declared the entire province under a state of calamity and approved the Governor to

enter into the contract with the Allado Company. Zamora, the petitioner, argued that the Sanggunian,

during its February 26 session, conducted official business without a quorum since only 7 out of the 14

members were present. He further questioned the February 8 session’s validity arguing that only 7

members were present and the failure to provide written notice to all members at least 24 hours before the

holding of the special session. Respondents argued that Board Member Sotto was in the United States

during such sessions and that the actual number of Board Members in the country was only 13 which,

they claimed, should be the basis for the determination of a quorum. Such petition raised by Zamora was

dismissed by the RTC but reversed and granted by the Supreme Court.

Issues: 1) Whether or not Section 53 (a) of the LGC provides and specifies applicable rule regarding the

determination of a quorum.

2) Whether or not Sanggunian Members who are abroad should not be included in the counting of the

entire Sangguniang body.

3) Whether or not the approved decisions during the sessions, alleged to be without quorum, is deemed to

be valid.

Held: Section 53 (a) of the LGC states that : “A majority of all members of the Sanggunian who have

been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business.” Quorum is defined as

the “number of members of a body which, when legally assembled, will enable the body to transact its

proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or

ordinance or do any valid act.” When required to constitute a quorum, “majority” means the number

greater than half or more than half of the total.

As further stated, it requires the majority of ALL members of the Sanggunian. Quorum should, thus, be

based on the total number of members regardless of whether or not a member is said to be abroad.

Therefore, in cases where decisions have been made during sessions deemed to have not met the required

quorum, such sessions and decisions shall be considered void.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT; 3-TERM LIMIT

RAYMUNDO ADORMEO VS. COMELEC, ET AL.

G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002

Facts: Respondent Talaga was elected Mayor of Lucena City in 1992, re-elected in 1995, but lost to

Tagarao in 1998 elections. Tagarao was recalled and in the May 12, 2000 recall elections, Talaga won and

served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001. Talaga was candidate for Mayor in the May 14,

2001 elections, and a petition for cancellation of his certificate of candidacy was filed on the ground that

he has served as Mayor for three consecutive terms.

Issue: Whether or not Talaga has served as Mayor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms.

Held: The term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the right to be elected as well as

the right to serve in the same elective position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has

served three consecutive terms in an elective local office. He must also have been elected to the same

position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.

In the case at bar, Talaga did not serve for 3 consecutive terms. For nearly 2 years, he was a private

citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in the 1998 elections.

“If one is elected representative to serve the unexpired term of another, that unexpired term, no matter

how short, will be considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive terms

allowed”—this comment of Constitutional Commissioner Fr. Bernas applies only to members of the

House of Representatives. Unlike government officials, there is no recall election for members of

Congress.

PUBLIC OFFICERS; ANTI-GRAFT

MAYOR ALVIN GARCIA VS. HON. PRIMO. MIRA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 148944. February 5, 2003

Facts: City Mayor Garcia was charged by Ombudsman Special Prosecution Officer Jesus Rodrigo Tagaan

for violation of the Anti-Graft Law as a result of his having entered into a contract with F.E. Zuellig for

the supply of asphalt batching plant for three years. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros and

Quejada alleged that petitioner entered into the contract without available funds appropriated to cover the

expenditure in violation of Sections 85 and 86 of P.D. 1445 or the State Audit Code of the Phil.; that

petitioner exceeded the authority granted him by the Sangguniang Panlungsod; and that the contract is

manifestly disadvantageous to the City. Note however that thereafter, Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan

resigned from his office and his name was withdrawn as complainant in the case. Instead of filing a

counter-affidavit, Garcia filed with the Supreme Court a petition to prohibit the Ombudsman from

conducting the preliminary investigation on the ground that there is no sufficient complaint.

Issue: Whether or not the complaint/affidavits filed against Garcia is sufficient in form or manner.

Held: For purposes of initiating a preliminary investigation before the Office of the Ombudsman, a

complaint in any form or manner is sufficient. The Constitution states that the Ombudsman and his

Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner

against public officials or employees of the government. In Almonte vs. Vasquez, 244 SCRA 286, we

held that even unverified and anonymous letters may suffice to start an investigation. The Office of the

Ombudsman is different from the other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government because

those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and influence, can

quash, delay, or dismiss investigations against them. The joint affidavits of State Auditors Cabreros and

Quejada contain allegations specific enough for petitioner to prepare his evidence and counter-arguments.

The fact that Special Prosecution Officer Tagaan already resigned from his office and that his name was

withdrawn as complainant in the case is of no consequence. First, Tagaan’s report and affidavit still form

part of the records of the case. He can still be called by subpoena, if necessary. Second, Tagaan was only

a nominal party whose duty as special prosecutor was to investigate the commission of crimes and file the

corresponding complaint whenever warranted. Since the illegal acts committed are public offenses, the

real complainant is the State, which is represented by the remaining complainants.

PUBLIC OFFICERS; APPOINTMENT; CONFIRMATION BY COA

ATTY. ELPIDIO SORIANO III VS. REUBEN LISTA, ET AL.

G.R. No. 153881. March 24, 2003

Facts: Eight officers of the Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) were promoted by the President to Vice

Admiral, Rear Admiral, Commodore, Naval Captain, and they assumed office without confirmation by

the Commission on Appointments (COA). Petitioner, as a taxpayer, filed a petition with the Supreme

Court questioning the constitutionality of their assumption of office, which requires confirmation of the

COA.

Held: Petitioner has no locus standi. A party bringing a suit challenging the constitutionality of an act or

statute must show not only that the law or act is invalid, but also that he has sustained, or is in immediate

or imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement and not merely that he

suffers thereby in some indefinite way. The instant petition cannot even be classified as a taxpayer’s suit

because petitioner has no interest as such and this case does not involve the exercise by Congress of its

taxing power.

Pursuant to Executive Order of President Ramos, the PCG was transferred from the Department of

National Defense to the Office of the President, and later to the Department of Transportation and

Communication (DOTC).

Posted by UNC Bar Operations Commission 2007

De Leon vs Esguerra

Facts:

Alfredo de Leon won as barangay captain and other petitioners won as councilmen of barangay dolores,

taytay, rizal. On february 9, 1987, de leon received memo antedated december 1, 1986 signed by OIC

Gov. Benhamin Esguerra, february 8, 1987, designating Florentino Magno, as new captain by authority of

minister of local government and similar memo signed february 8, 1987, designated new councilmen.

Issue:

Whether or not designation of successors is valid.

Held:

No, memoranda has no legal effect.

1. Effectivity of memoranda should be based on the date when it was signed. So, February 8, 1987 and

not December 1, 1986.

2. February 8, 1987, is within the prescribed period. But provisional constitution was no longer in efffect

then because 1987 constitution has been ratified and its transitory provision, Article XVIII, sec. 27 states

that all previous constitution were suspended.

3. Constitution was ratified on February 2, 1987. Thus, it was the constitution in effect. Petitioners now

acquired security of tenure until fixed term of office for barangay officials has been fixed. Barangay

election act is not inconsistent with constitution.

US Vs. Ruiz 136 SCRA 487

Facts:

The usa had a naval base in subic, zambales. The base was one of those provided in the military bases

agreement between phils. and the US. Respondent alleges that it won in the bidding conducted by the US

for the constrcution of wharves in said base that was merely awarded to another group. For this reason, a

suit for specific preformance was filed by him against the US.

Issue: Whether the US naval base in bidding for said contracts exercise governmental functions to be able

to invoke state immunity.

Held:

The traditional role of the state immunity excempts a state from being sued in the courts of another state

without its consent or waiver. This rule is necessary consequence of the principle of indepemndence and

equality of states. Howecer, the rules of international law are not petrified; they are continually and

evolving and because the activities of states have multiplied. It has been necessary to distinguish them

between sovereign and governmental acts and private, commercial and proprietory acts. the result is that

state immunity now extends only to sovereign and governmental acts.

The restrictive application of state immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial

transactions of the foreign sovereign. Its commercial activities of economic affairs. A state may be

descended to the level of an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be

sued. Only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply where the conracts relates the exercise

of its sovereign function. In this case, the project are integral part of the naval base which is devoted to

the defense of both US and phils., indisputably, a function of the government of highest order, they are

not utilized for , nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.

Gonzales vs. Hechanova 9 SCRA 230

Facts:

Respondent executive secretary authorized importation of 67,000 tons of foreign rice to be purchased

from private sources. Ramon A. Gonzales, a rice planter and president of ilo-ilo palay and corn planters

asso., filed and averring that in making or attempting to make importation of foreign rice are acting

without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction because RA 2207, explicitly prohibits the importation of

rice and corn by Rice and Corn Administration or any government agency.

Issue:

Whether an international agreement may be invalidated by our courts.

Held:

The power of judicial review is vested with the supreme court in consonace to section 2 art. VIII of the

constitution. the alleged consummation of the contracts with vietnam and burma does not render this case

academic. RA 2207, enjoins our government not from entering contracts for the purchase of rice, but from

entering rice, except under conditions prescribed in said act.

A judicial declaration of illegality of the proposed importation would not compel our government to

default in the performance of such obligations as it mat have contracted with the sellers of rice in question

because aside from the fact that said obligations may be complied without importing the said commodity

into the phils., the proposed importation may still be legalized by complying with the provisions of the

aforementioned law.

In Re Garcia 2 SCRA 985

Facts:

Arturo E. Garcia,has applied for admission to the practice of law in the phils. without submitting to the

required bar examinations. In his verified petition, he avers among others that he is a filipino citizen born

in bacolod city of filipino parentage. He finished Bachillerato Superior in spain. He was allowed to

practice law profession in spain under the provision of the treaty on academic degrees and the exercise of

profession between the republic of the phils.

Issue:

Whether treaty can modify regulations governing admission to the phil. bar.

Held:

The court resolved to deny the petition. The provision of the treaty on academic degrees between the

republic of the phils. and spanish state cannot be invoked by the applicant. said treaty was intende to

govern filipino citizens desiring to practice their profession in spain. The treaty could not have been

intended to modify the laws and regulations governing admission to the practice of law in the phils., for

the reason the executive may not encroach upon the constitutional prerogative of the supreme court to

promulgate rules for admission to the practice of the law in the phils. The power to repeal, alter or

supplement such rules being reserved only to the congress of the phils.

Villavicencio vs Lukban L-14639

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila Mayor together with the police officer, took custody of 170 women at the night of

October 25 beyond the latter's consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Davao City where

they were signed as laborers.

A writ of habeas corpus was filed against the mayor on behalf of those women. The court granted the

writ, but the mayor was not able to bring any of the women before the court on the stipulated date.

Issue:

Whether or not the act of mayor has a legal basis.

Held:

The supreme court said that the mayor's acts were not legal. His intent of exterminating vice was

commendable, but there was no law saying that he could force filipino women to change their domicile

from manila to nother place. The women, said the court, although in a sense "lepers of society" were still

filipino citizens and such they were entitled to the constitutional enjoyed by all other filipino citizens. The

right to freedom of domicile was such a fundamental right that its suppression could considered

tantamount to slavery.

The supreme court upheld the right of filipino citizens to freedom of domicile or the Liberty of abode.

"Ours is a government of laws and not of men."

Posted by Rhydel's Blog

Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil 328 (1938)

F: This is a quo warranto petition to oust respondent Bonifacio from the office of Provincial Governor of

Laguna. It is contend¬ed that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to office,

respondent was a Captain in the Philippine Army and for this reason, is ineligible to that office.

HELD: Section 2, Art. XI of the 1935 Const. (similar to the 1987 provision) prohibits members of the

Armed Forces from engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise taking part in any election

except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. As Section

431 of the Election Law, as amended disqualifies from voting only members in the active service of the

Philippine Army and no claim is made that this discrimination is violative of the Constitution, it follows

that the respondent, being in the reserve force, is not disqualified from voting. The respondent being a

qualified elector and the possession by him of the other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial

office not being chal¬lenged, he is not ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has been

elected.

The constitutional provision mentioned contemplates only those in the active service otherwise it would

lead to widespread disqualification of the majority of the able bodied men who are part of the reserve

corps of the armed forces from voting and from being voted upon.

Raison d' etre for the disqualification: Members of the armed forces are servants of the State and not the

agents of any political group.

For more case digests and law school notes visit lizajamarga.com.

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Philippine Agila Sattelite Inc. vs. Lichauco

G.R. No. 142362, May 3, 2006

Constitutional Law, State Immunity Against Suit

FACTS:

Petitioner Philippine Agila Satellite Inc. is a duly organized corporation, whose President and Chief

Executive Officer is co-petitioner Michael C.U. De Guzman. PASI was established by a consortium of

private telecommunications carriers which in 1994 had entered into a Memorandum of Understanding

with the DOTC, through its then Secretary Jesus Garcia, concerning the planned launch of a Philippine-

owned satellite into outer space. The Philippine government, through the DOTC, was tasked under the

MOU to secure from the International Telecommunication Union the required orbital slots and frequency

assignments for the Philippine satellite.

The government, together with PASI, coordinated through the International Telecommunication Union

two orbital slots, designated as 161º East Longitude and 153º East Longitude, for Philippine satellites.

PASI wrote then DOTC Secretary Amado S. Lagdameo, Jr., seeking for official Philippine government

confirmation on the assignment of the two aforementioned Philippine orbital slots to PASI for its

satellites. Secretary Lagdameo, Jr. replied in a letter confirming “the Philippine Government’s assignment

of Philippine orbital slots 161E and 153E to PASI for its satellites.”

PASI averred that after having secured the confirmation from the Philippine government, it proceeded

with preparations for the launching, operation and management of its satellites, including the availment of

loans, the increase in its capital. However, respondent Lichauco, then DOTC Undersecretary for

Communications, allegedly “embarked on a crusade to malign the name of Michael de Guzman and

sabotage the business of PASI.”

Aggrieved by Lichauco’s actions, PASI and De Guzman instituted a civil complaint against Lichauco, by

then the Acting Secretary of the DOTC. The complaint, alleging three causes of action, was for

injunction, declaration of nullity of award, and damages.

The third cause of action, for damages, imputed several acts to Lichauco as part of her alleged “crusade”

to malign the name of plaintiff De Guzman and sabotage the business of PASI.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the suit is against the state?

HELD:

The hornbook rule is that a suit for acts done in the performance of official functions against an officer of

the government by a private citizen that would result in a charge against or financial liability to the

government must be regarded as a suit against the State itself, although the latter has not been formally

impleaded. However, government immunity from suit will not shield the public official being sued if the

government no longer has an interest to protect in the outcome of a suit; or if the liability of the officer is

personal because it arises from a tortious act in the performance of his duties.

As earlier noted, the complaint alleges three causes of action against Lichauco: one for injunction against

her performing any act in relation to orbital slot 153º East Longitude; one for declaration of nullity of

award, seeking to nullify the alleged award of orbital slot 153º East Longitude; and one for damages

against Lichauco herself.

As stated earlier, it is when the acts done in the performance of official functions by an officer of the

government will result in a charge against or financial liability to the government that the complaint must

be regarded as a suit against the State itself. However, the distinction must also be raised between where

the government official concerned performs an act in his/her official and jurisdictional capacity and

where he performs an act that constitutes grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack of jurisdiction. In

the latter case, the Constitution itself assures the availability of judicial review, and it is the official

concerned who should be impleaded as the proper party- defendant or respondent.

As to the first two causes of action, the Court ruled that the defense of state immunity from suit do not

apply since said causes of action cannot be properly considered as suits against the State in constitutional

contemplation. These causes of action do not seek to impose a charge or financial liability against the

State, but merely the nullification of state action. The prayers attached to these two causes of action are

for the revocation of the Notice of Bid and the nullification of the purported award, nothing more. Had it

been so that petitioner additionally sought damages in relation to said causes of action, the suit would

have been considered as one against the State. Had the petitioner impleaded the DOTC itself, an

unincorporated government agency, and not Lichauco herself, the suit would have been considered as one

against the State. But neither circumstance obtains in this case.

The doctrine, as summarized in Shauf v. Court of Appeals states: “While the doctrine appears to prohibit

only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to complaints filed against officials of

the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the

judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the

same, such as the appropriation of the amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit

must be regarded as against the state itself although it has not been formally impleaded. It must be noted,

however, that the rule is not so all-encompassing as to be applicable under all circumstances.”

It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for acts contrary

to law and injurious to the rights of plaintiff. As was clearly set forth by Justice Zaldivar in Director of the

Bureau of Telecommunications, et al. vs. Aligaen, etc., et al.: “Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal

acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an

action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or violated by such acts, for

the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from

suit. In the same tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the

director of a State department on the ground that, while claiming to act for the State, he violates or

invades the personal and property rights or the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an

assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional

provision that the State may not be sued without its consent.' The rationale for this ruling is that the

doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.

Santiago v. COMELEC

G.R No. 127325, March 19, 1997

Constitutional Law, People's Initiative, Political Law

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative,

filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective

Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition,

the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the

hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the

oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18,

1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil

action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s initiative if there is an enabling law passed by

Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in

the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

Is R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative?

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people

are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the

Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or

resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or

repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution.

Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and

Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of

the law is initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully

provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have

provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or

hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more

important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum on national

and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on amendments to the

Constitution.

Osea vs. Ambrosio

G.R. No. 162774,April 7, 2006 Administrative Law

FACTS:

Petitioners contend that the breach of contract in view of respondents' failure to comply with the building

plans and technical specifications of the residential dwelling involves a violation of the Civil Code which

is within the jurisdiction of regular courts, and not with the HLURB whose jurisdiction covers only cases

of unsound real estate business practice and those that may be included within, or is incidental to, or is a

necessary consequence of its jurisdiction.

Respondents argue, on the other hand, that the HLURB has exclusive jurisdiction, it arising from

contracts between the subdivision developer and the house and lot buyer or those aimed at compelling the

subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations.

ISSUE:

Whether or nor HLURB has jurisdiction?

HELD:

HLURB has jurisdiction.

P.D. No. 957 Section 3 of this statute provides:

“. . . National Housing Authority [now HLURB]. — The National Housing Authority shall have exclusive

jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this

Decree.”

The need for the scope of the regulatory authority thus lodged in the HLURB is indicated in the second,

third and fourth preambular paragraphs of P.D. 957 which provide:

“WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers, operators,

and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and maintain properly

subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and other similar basic

requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot buyers;

WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent manipulations

perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators, such as failure to deliver

titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrances, and to pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent

sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent purchasers for value;”

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“WHEREAS, this state of affairs has rendered it imperative that the real estate subdivision and

condominium businesses be closely supervised and regulated, and that penalties be imposed on fraudulent

practices and manipulations committed in connection therewith.”

The provisions of P.D No. 957 were intended to encompass all questions regarding subdivisions and

condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the

HLURB, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of

contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may take recourse. The business of

developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any question

arising from the exercise of that prerogative should be brought to the HLURB which has the technical

know-how on the matter. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must commonly interpret and apply

contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no

longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by the regular courts.

As observed in C.T. Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada:

The argument that only courts of justice can adjudicate claims resoluble under the provisions of the Civil

Code is out of step with the fast-changing times. There are hundreds of administrative bodies now

performing this function by virtue of a valid authorization from the legislature. This quasi-judicial

function, as it is called, is exercised by them as an incident of the principal power entrusted to them of

regulating certain activities falling under their particular expertise.

In the Solid Homes case for example the Court affirmed the competence of the Housing and Land Use

Regulatory Board to award damages although this is an essentially judicial power exercisable ordinarily

only by the courts of justice. This departure from the traditional allocation of governmental powers is

justified by expediency, or the need of the government to respond swiftly and competently to the pressing

problems of the modern world. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Furthermore, Executive Order (EO) No. 90 series of 1986, "IDENTIFYING THE GOVERNMENT

AGENCIES ESSENTIAL FOR THE NATIONAL SHELTER PROGRAM AND DEFINING THEIR

MANDATES, CREATING THE HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT COORDINATING

COUNCIL, RATIONALIZING FUNDING SOURCES AND LENDING MECHANISMS FOR HOME

MORTGAGES AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES," so named the HLURB to recognize its mandate and

authority over the development of housing in general and low-cost housing in particular. Thus Section 1

(c) of said EO provides:

Human Settlements Regulatory Commission — The Human Settlements Regulatory Commission;

renamed as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, shall be the sole regulatory body for housing

and land development. It is charged with encouraging greater private sector participation in low-cost

housing through liberalization of development standards, simplification of regulations and

decentralization of approvals for permits and licenses.

This Court has thus consistently held that complaints for breach of contract or specific performance with

damages filed by a subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the owner or developer fall under

the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB.

Moreover, under the doctrine of primary administrative jurisdiction, courts cannot or will not determine a

controversy where the issues for resolution demand the exercise of sound administrative discretion

requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine

technical and intricate matters of fact.

Under the circumstances attendant to the case, the HLURB has the expertise to determine the basic

technical issue of whether the alleged deviations from the building plans and the technical specifications

affect the soundness and structural strength of the house. Petitioners' position that an action for damages

is not incidental to or a necessary consequence of the cases within the purview of the HLURB's

jurisdiction does not lie. Being the sole regulatory body for housing and land development, the HLURB

will be reduced to a functionally sterile entity if, as petitioners contend, it lacks the power to settle

disputes concerning land use and housing development and acquisition, including the imposition of

damages if the evidence so warrants.

MIAA vs. Joaquin Rodriguez

G.R. No. 161836, February 28, 2006

Constitutional Law, Expropriation

FACTS:

Petitioner Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA), a GOCC operating the Ninoy Aquino

International Airport Complex, implemented expansion programs for its runway in the 70’s. So it bought

and occupied some of the properties surrounding the area through expropriation. In 1996, respondent lot

owner proposed to sell to MIAA at P2,350.00 per square meter one of the lots already occupied by the

expanded runway. No deal was made. So respondent Rodriguez bought the bigger lot, a portion of which

was occupied by the runway, as well as all the rights to claim reasonable rents and damages for the

occupation, from its owner then, Buck Estate, Inc., for P4 million.

Rodriguez demanded from the MIAA full payment for the property and back rentals for 27 years,

amounting to P468.8 million. Failing to reach an agreement with MIAA, Rodriguez filed a case for accion

reinvindicatoria with damages. Finding that the MIAA had illegally taken possession of the property, the

trial court ruled respondent’s favor. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s decision, holding that

Rodriguez is entitled to back rentals only from the time he became the registered owner of the property in

1996.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not Rodriguez was a buyer in bad faith, for having purchased the subject lot in a highly

speculative and scheming manner, and in anticipation of a grossly disproportionate amount of profit at the

expense of the Government?

2. Whether or not Rodriguez is entitled to exemplary damages and attorney’s fees?

HELD:

The petition is partly meritorious.

There is “taking” when the expropriator enters private property not only for a momentary period but for a

more permanent duration, or for the purpose of devoting the property to a public use in such a manner as

to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof. In this context, there was taking

when the MIAA occupied a portion thereof for its expanded runway. Where actual taking was made

without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and the owner sought recovery of the possession of the

property prior to the filing of expropriation proceedings, the Court has invariably ruled that it is the value

of the property at the time of taking that is controlling for purposes of compensation.

Thus, in Commissioner of Public Highways v. Burgos, wherein it took the owner of a parcel of land

thirty-five (35) years before she filed a case for recovery of possession taken by the local government unit

for a road-right-of-way purpose, this Court held:

…there being no other legal provision cited which would justify a departure from the rule that just

compensation is determined on the basis of the value of the property at the time of the taking thereof in

expropriation by the Government, not the increased value resulting from the passage of time which

invariably brings unearned increment to landed properties, represents the true value to be paid as just

compensation for the property taken.

The reason for the rule, as pointed out in Republic v. Lara, is that --

". . . (W)here property is taken ahead of the filing of the condemnation proceedings, the value thereof may

be enhanced by the public purpose for which it is taken; the entry by the plaintiff upon the property may

have depreciated its value thereby; or, there may have been a natural increase in the value of the property

from the time the complaint is filed, due to general economic conditions. The owner of private property

should be compensated only for what he actually loses.

The subject lot was occupied as a runway of the MIAA starting in 1972. Thus, the value of the lot in 1972

should serve as the basis for the award of compensation to the owner.

On actual damages for the occupation of the subject lot, undeniably, the MIAA’s illegal occupation for

more than 20 years has resulted in pecuniary loss to Rodriguez and his predecessors-in-interest. Such

pecuniary loss entitles him to adequate compensation in the form of actual or compensatory damages,

which in this case should be the legal interest (6%) on the value of the land at the time of taking, from

said point up to full payment by the MIAA. This is based on the principle that interest runs as a matter of

law and follows from the right of the landowner to be placed in as good position as money can

accomplish, as of the date of the taking. Case laws ruled that the indemnity for rentals is inconsistent with

a property owner’s right to be paid legal interest on the value of the property, for if the condemnor is to

pay the compensation due to the owners from the time of the actual taking of their property, the payment

of such compensation is deemed to retroact to the actual taking of the property, and hence, there is no

basis for claiming rentals from the time of actual taking.

On buyer in bad faith, the point is irrelevant. Regardless of whether or not Rodriguez acted in bad faith,

all that he will be entitled to is the value of the property at the time of the taking, with legal interest

thereon from that point until full payment of the compensation by the MIAA. There is nothing wrongful

or dishonest in expecting to profit from one’s investment. However, Rodriguez can fault but only himself

for taking an obvious risk in purchasing property already being used for a public purpose. To our mind,

these are wanton and irresponsible acts which should be suppressed and corrected. Hence, the award of

exemplary damages and attorneys fees is in order.

Gudani vs. Senga

G.R. No. 170165, August 15, 2006 Political Law, E.O. 464

FACTS:

Petitioners Gen. Gudani and Lieutenant Colonel Balutan are high-ranking officers of Philippine Marines

assigned to the Philippine Military Academy (PMA) in Baguio City. Senator Biazon invited several

senior officers of the military to appear at a public hearing before a Senate Committee to clarify

allegations of massive cheating and the surfacing of copies of an audio excerpt purportedly of a phone

conversation between the President and then Commission on Elections Commissioner Garcillano. At the

time of the 2004 elections, Gen. Gudani had been designated as commander, and Col. Balutan a member,

of “Joint Task Force Ranao” by the AFP Southern Command. Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)

Chief of Staff Lt . Gen. Senga were among the several AFP officers also received a letter invitation from

Sen. Biazon to attend the hearing. But only Gen. Gudani, and Col. Balutan attended the invitation from

Sen. Biazon.

Thereafter, the Office of the Chief of Staff of the AFP issued a Memorandum addressed to Gen. Baloing.

It was signed by Lt. Col. Hernando DCA Iriberri in behalf of Gen. Senga. Noting that Gen. Gudani and

Col. Balutan had been invited to attend the Senate Committee hearing, the Memorandum directed the two

officers to attend the hearing. Conformably, Gen. Gudani and Col. Balutan filed their respective requests

for travel authority addressed to the PMA Superintendent.

However, Gen. Senga did not attend to the requested hearing as per instruction from the President that

NO AFP PERSONNEL SHALL APPEAR BEFORE ANY CONGRESSIONAL OR SENATE

HEARING WITHOUT HER APPROVAL. `

While

Akbayan v Aquino

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