Anthony Farrar-Hockley

aubome caipetOpeioNan MnriRtGaden

History Of World War

The editorial team producing

Baiiantine's iiiustroted History of World War 11

The Author of Arnhem:Anthony Farrar-Hockley

A British infantry and airborne soldier in the

Second World War, he has also campaignedwidely since both as a regimental and a

staff officer. After commanding a parachutebattalion and brigade, he now holds a defencefellowship at Oxford University. He haswritten six books, including an account of

his personal experiences in Korea.

**• % Editor-in-Chief:«• 1 BorriePitt

Barrie Pitt, author of 'Zeebrugge', 'St. George's\

Day 1 91 8', '1 91 8 - The Last Act', 'The Edge;

of Battle' and 'Revenge at Sea'. Contributor to \

The Encyclopaedia Britannica on naval war- 1

fare; historical consultant to The Sundayi

Times Colour Magazine, Editor of Purnell's >

History of the Second World War; consultantj

to the producer of the B.B.C. film series,

The Great War. 1

Art director:

Peter Dunbar

Peter Dunbar, has been Art Director of theprestigious London weekly The Economist for

eight years. Responsible for new styles in

format and typography which have revolu-

tionised London publications during recentyears. Art Director of Purnell's History of theSecond World War, one of the outstandingeditorial and commercial successes in British

post-war publishing.

Miliiary Consultant:

Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart

Between the two World Wars Captain Sir

Basil Liddell Hart radically influenced military

development as a leading advocate of air-

power, armoured forces, and amphibiousstrategy. Many of the foremost commanders of

World War II were his 'disciples', including

General Guderian, the creater of the Germanpanzer forces. Sir Basil Liddell Hart has written

some thirty books.

Airborne corpef:

Operation Marlcet Garden

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Editor-in-Chief: Barrie PittArt Director: Peter Dunbar

Military Consultant: Sir Basil Liddell HartPicture Editor: Robert Hunt

Executive Editor : David MasonArt Editor: Sarah KinghamDesigner: John MarshCover: Denis PiperResearch Assistant: Yvonne MarshCartographer: Richard NatkielSpecial Drawings: John Batchelor

Photographs for this book were especially selected from the follovvins- Archives: from left to right page 2-3

Imperi al War Museum ; 7 IWM : 9 Bundesarchiv ; 10 Bundesarchi v ; 11 Ullstein ; 13 IWM ; 16 IWM ; 18-19 IWM ; 18 IWM

;

19 IWM: 20-21 IWM; 23 IWM; 24 IWM: 25 IWM; 27 IWM; 29 IWM; 30-31 IWM; 32 US Army; 33 IWM/Keystone; 35

IWM; 37 IWM; 139 IWM; 40 IWM; 42-43 IWM; 44 IWM: 46 IWM: 47 IWM: 48-49 IWM; 53 Ullstein; 54-55 IWM;56 UUstein/Suddeutscher Verlag; 57 Ullstein: 58-53 IWM; 60 Bibliothek fur Zeitgeschichte; 62 Ullstein: 66-67

Ullstein; 73 US Army; 74-75 IWM; 76 US Army: 77 IWM: 79 IWM: 80 IWM; 81 IWM: 82-83 IWM; 84 IWM: 85 IWM;88 IWM; 89 US Army: 91 IWM: 94 US Army; 95 US Army; 96 US Army; 97 IWM; 99 IWM; 101 US Army; 103

IWM; 104-105 IWM: 108-109 IWM; 109 IWM: 111 Ullstein; 113 Sudd. Verlag; 114 UHstein/IWM: 115 Sudd. Verlag;116-117 US Army; 118 IWM; 119 IWM: 120-121 IWM; 120 IWM: 125 IWM: 128-129 IWM; 129 US Army: 130-131 IWM:132 IWM; 133 IWM; 136 IWM; /IWM; 137 IWM; 139 Sudd. Verlag; ]40;141 IWM; 141 Ullstein; 142-143 IWM: 144

IWM; 149 Ullstein: 151 IWM: 156-157 Ullstein; 157 Ullstein; 159 Ullstein.

Copyright © 1969by Anthony Farrar-Hockley

First printing : November, 1969Printed in United States of America

Ballantine Books Inc.

101 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY10003

Contents

8 Crises and tensions

26 Brereton's army

36 The plan is made

52 'Whence this strange intelligence?'

68 16th September

72 Market begins

102 Garden opens

110 Monday, 18th September

124 The struggle for Hell's Highway

148 'Boys, it is all heir

160 Bibliography

The thrust

to cross

the RhineIntroduction liy Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart

The German rally after the Alliedbreak-out from Normandy at the endof August 1944 was much helped by theAllies' supply difficulties, which re-

duced the first onset to a lightweightcharge that could be checked by ahastily improvised defence, and thencurtailed the build-up of the Alliedarmies for a powerful attack. In part,the supply difficulties were due to thelength of the Allies' own advance. Inpart, they were due to the Germans'strategy in leaving garrisons behindto hold the French ports. The factthat the Allies were thus denied theuse of Dunkirk, Calais, Boulogne andle Havre, as well as the big ports inBrittany, became a powerful indirectbrake on the Allies' ofl"ensive.

Although they had captured the still

greater port of Antwerp in goodcondition, the enemy kept a tenaciousgrip on the estuary of the Schelde,and thus prevented the Allies makinguse of the port.

Before the break-out from Norman-dy, their supplies had to be carriedless than twenty miles from the basein order to replenish the strikingforces. They now had to be carriednearly 300 miles. The burden wasthrown almost entirely on the Allies'motor transport, as the French rail-

way network had been destroyed byprevious air attacks.

In mid-September a bold attemptwas made to loosen the stifi'ening

resistance by dropping three airbornedivisions behind the German rightflank in Holland, to clear the way fora fresh drive by the British SecondArmy up to and over the Lower Rhine.By dropping the airborne forces insuccessive layers over a sixty-milebelt of country behind the Germanfront a foothold was gained on all

four of the strategic stepping-stonesneeded to cross the interval - thepassage of the Wilhelmina Canal atEindhoven, of the Maas (Meuse) atGrave, of the Waal and Lek (the twobranches of the Rhine) at Nijmegenand Arnhem i^spectively. Three of

these four stepping-stones weresecured and passed. But a stumble atthe third forfeited the chance ofsecuring the fourth, in face of theGermans' speedy reaction.This check led to the frustration of

the overland thrust and the sacrifice

of the 1st Airborne Division at Arn-hem. But the possibility of outflank-ing the Rhine defence-line was astrategic prize that justified the stakeand the exceptional boldness of drop-ping airborne forces so far behind thefront. The 1st Airborne Divisionmaintained its isolated position atArnhem for ten days instead of thetwo that were reckoned as the maxi-

mum to be expected. But the chancesof success were lessened by the waythat the descent of the airborne forcesat these four successive points, in astraight line, sign-posted all tooclearly the diregtion of the SecondArmy's thrust.The obviousness of the aim simpli-

fied the opponent's problem in con-centrating his available reserves tohold the final stepping-stone, and tooverthrow the British airborne forcesthere, before the leading troops of theSecond Army arrived to relieve them.The nature of the Dutch countryside,with its 'canalized' routes, also helpedthe defenders in obstructing theadvance, while there was a lack ofwider moves to mask the directnessof the approach and to distract thedefender.After the failure of the Arnhem

gamble, the prospect of early victoryfaded. The Allies were thrown backon the necessity of building up theirresources along the frontiers of Ger-many for a massive offensive of adeliberate kind. The build-up wasbound to take time, but the AlliedCommand increased its own handicapby concentrating, first, on an attemptto force the Aachen gateway intoGermany, rather than on clearing theshores of the Scheldt to open up afresh supply route. The American

advance on Aachen developed into atoo direct approach, and its progresswas repeatedly checked.Along the rest of the Western Front

the efforts of the Allied armies duringSeptember and October 1944 amountedto little more than a process ofnibbling. Meantime the Germandefence was being continuously rein-forced - with such reserves as couldbe scraped from elsewhere, and withfreshly raised forces, beyond thetroops which had managed to maketheir way back from France. TheGerman build-up along the front wasprogressing faster than that of theAllies, despite Germany's greatinferiority of material resources. TheSchelde Estuary was not cleared ofthe enemy until early in November.The account of this great airborne

operation, the most dramatic in thelater stages of the war, has beenwritten for this series by one of themen best qualified to deal with it.

Brigadier Anthony Farrar-Hockley,himself an exceptionally experiencedand distinguished parachute com-mander. His story is wonderfullydetailed, while remarkably vivid, andforms one of the most outstandingbooks in the whole series.

Crises

and tensions

On the night 18th/19th August 1944,

Field-Marshal Giinther von Klugecommitted suicide by taking poisonas he travelled out of France towardsGermany.

It was a mean end to a man who hadheld many posts ofhigh responsibility.That summer, he had succeeded Field-Marshal von Rundstedt as commander-in-chief of all German forces in thewest: Army Group B, commanded bythe intrepid Rommel, struggling to

stem the influx of the allied invasionin Normandy; Eberbach's PanzerGroup West, fighting with them ; ArmyGroup G under Blaskowitz - nine divi-

sions in southern France watching theMediterranean shore; the lines ofcommunication to them through theLow Countries and France; and theforward bases.Rundstedt had been relieved of

this enormous command because hehad failed to throw back the Americanand British assault forces into theChannel waters. The old Field-Mar-shal was tired; exasperated by Hitler'scontinual interference in the day-to-day conduct of battle. As in Russia, soin France, a division or higher could

not be moved without the Fiihrer'sagreement. Precise instructions weresent down to the commander-in-chieffor counterattacks detailing strength,direction and timing. When one ofthese had failed at the end of Junewith the loss of a considerable numberof tanks, Rundstedt was asked by amember of Hitler's staff" what shouldbe done next.'Make peace, you fools,' the Field-

Marshal shouted into the telephone.'What else can you do?'Kluge was at that moment with

Hitler. Recently recovered from amotor accident on the Russian front,

he had been ordered to attend theSupreme Headquarters prior to takingup a new post, for a personal briefing

on the war situation by the Fiihrer.

Rundstedt's advice to make peacewas quoted to him as an example of

the 'defeatism' which inhibited Ger-man arms in Normandy.'Now you are to be commander-in-

chief in the west,' he was told. 'Andyou see what it is that needs to be putright.'

An artillery officer in origin, thenew commander-in-chief was a man of

y, -*.

Above: Field-Marshal von Runstedt (right) poses while visiting troops as

Commander-in-Chief, west. Below: Field- Marshal von Kluge (centre) inspecting

defences in France, July, 1944. Right: Field-Marshal Model surveying defences,

11th September, 1944

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quick intelligence but lacking in

warmth. His soldiers called him "cleverHans'. On arrival in France he spokesharply to the subordinates awaitinghim, this open criticism leading to aquarrel with Rommel. Within a fewdays, however, a tour of his commandshowed him that he must apologise tohis staff and army group commanders.Not only was there no chance ofdefeating the invasion force; theGerman contestants would shortlythemselves be defeated piecemeal un-less several divisions at least weredrawn back. While Kluge was tryingto convince Hitler that such moveswere necessary, Rommel was wounded.Kluge was obliged to go forward tothe headquarters of Army Group Bat La Roche Guyon, on the Seine, totake personal command.He was now somewhat absorbed in

the handling of a battle subject in-

creasingly to the enemy's initiative.

Then suddenly, on 20th July, therecame news of an altogether different

kind: an attempt had been made onHitler's life. Kluge's attention wasdiverted from the fighting at thefront by this sensational event withinGermany. Like many of his seniorcolleagues, he had been aware that acoup was in the wind but was not aconspirator. For some hours, no onein the west knew whether Hitler wasdead or alive. There followed an ur-gent signal from Supreme Head-quarters asserting that the Fiihrerhad survived and was to broadcast tothe nation. "Clever Hans' acted in

character. He declined to support theconspiracy, to bring over the forces in

the west in open revolution. Equally,he made no attempt to arrest thoseprincipals in the plot, now revealed tohim, in his command. He simplyreturned to the direction of the battle.

There was ample work here to occupyhis whole attention. On 1st August,American forces at Avranches brokethrough the German defence ring.

General Patton's Third Army beganto race away south and then east whilethe Canadians, British and part of anAmerican army steadily ground downthe concentration of German forcesimmediately south of Caen. Klugehurried to the front and could not becontacted. Hitler took fright, sus-pecting that he had gone to negotiate

an armistice secretly and inclined tothe view that this was connected withthe attempted assassination. Disen-chanted with Field-Marshal von Kluge,he directed him to return to Germanywithout explanation or warning.Having written a reproachful letter

to the Fiihrer, Kluge left La RocheGuyon and set off in his motor car,ostensibly for Germany, in fact to asuicide's end near Metz.In the six and a half weeks that he

had held command in the west, hisforces had dwindled alarmingly; halfthe German soldiers in Normandy andBrittany had been killed, wounded orcaptured and two thirds of theirarmour, artillery and transport lost.

Attempts had been made by the airforce to support him on the groundand relieve his divisions from airattack. All such operations hadfailed. Once, there was a hope ofeffective intervention when 300 dayfighters were assembled to strikefrom Luftwaffe airfields in France.None reached the battle area. TheAllied air forces controlled the skies.In such a situation, Kluge's suc-

cessor, Field-Marshal Walther Model,took up his post.Despite an eyeglass and scarred

cheeks. Model was neither a Prussian,hochwohlgeboren, nor in any othersense of heritage a pattern of theofficer corps. Uncouth, given to derid-ing officers in front of their men, hehad been helped to high rank due tohis allegiance to Hitler and theNational Socialist Party. But therehad been other talents to recommendhim: courage in battle amply demon-strated in two world wars; a quicktactical brain and a power of ruthlesscommand; a restless energy. He knewwell that Hitler had no doubts as tohis loyalty and admired the doggedskill with which he had conductedseveral hazardous defensive battleswith the Russians. On the severalpublic occasions when the Fiihrer hadattempted to bully him, he hadstaunchly resisted with the roughmanners he used to everyone. Thus,while he now declined to discussHitler's handling of the war with thechiefs-of-staff at Headquarters, Westand Army Group B. he was equally

Lieutenant-General George S Patton

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iiiprepared to accept orders from the?'uhrer or his staff which endangeredlis command.It was fortunate for the Germans

}hat Model had arrived. Within a fewlays, the consequences of the Ameri-can break-out were alarming. Thesecond American army was soonswelling the flood tide streamingeastward.Next, the British and Canadians,

laving destroyed the large group of

iivisions left forward at Hitler's in-

sistence, were able to begin a rapididvance of their own; while fromsouthern France, Army Group G fell

Dack with difficulty as an allied inva-sion force pushed north from theVIediteiTanean sea. On 24th August,VIodel told Supreme Headquarters:hat he needed '.

. . at least thirty to

:hirty-five infantry divisions, and:welve Panzer divisions.' It was al-

ready clear that a stand on the riverSeine could not be made. "We mustook ahead and build more rearwardjositions behind the Somme-Marneine up to and including the West Wallon the German border).' At midnight)n the 29th, his summary of opera-tions for the day included this assess-nent: 'the eleven Panzer and PanzerGrenadier divisions have only five to:en tanks each.' From these he might'orni eleven battle groups each of a:ank company, armoured infantryDattalion, reconnaissance and sup-porting troops; but even this wouldlot be possible unless there were re-

placements of men and armour. He30uld also form four infantry divisions3ut of the sixteen which had, in onecondition or another, reached theSeine. But these men '.

. . have only a'ew heavy weapons and for the mostpart are equipped with nothing moreohan small arms. . . . There is noreserve whatever of assault guns andDther heavy anti-tank equipment.'The ingenious work of Albert Speer,

Reishsminister for armament and warproduction, contrived to supply some3f the deficiencies in armour and guns,rhere were adequate stocks of ammu-aition for the services but supplies ofpetrol were declining. There were, ofcourse, no fresh divisions available;and the reinforcement depots had longsince been stripped of every man fit tofight. Recourse was had to the young

and the old, the age limit dropping tofifteen and rising to sixty, a measurewhich brought just over 500,000 re-

cruits into the army. Many of theseyouths and men were put into twenty-five new Volkskammer divisions tobolster the local defence of the- townsand villages of the Reich. For Hitlerand his immediate entourage, politi-

cal and military, saw now what thecommanders in the field had seen longsince: the British and Americans andFrench were approaching the fron-tiers of the homeland.The propaganda machine began its

work of warning. Rundstedt, re-

appointed commander-in-chief in thewest on 5th September, issued anoi:der of the day

:

'Soldiers Of The Western Front! I

expect you to defend Germany'ssacred soil to the very last!'

Model, at Army Group B, demanded

:

'Soldiers! None of us gives up asquare foot of German soil while still

alive. . . . Whoever retreats withoutgiving battle is a traitor to his people.'

In less heroic terms, Himmler. chiefof the Gestapo, had the followingnotice issued on 10th September:'Certain unreliable elements seem

to believe that the war will be overfor them as soon as they surrender to

the enemy.'Against this belief it must be

pointed out that every deserter will

be prosecuted and will find his justpunishment. Furthermore, his igno-minious behaviour will entail themost severe consequences for his

family - they will be summarily shot.'

Having survived a bomb explosionat his feet and having armies still in

being and a proportion of supplies to

meet their needs. Hitler still hoped to

save Germany from invasion and total

defeat. Briefing two new chiefs of

staff" for Headquarters West and ArmyGroup B on 31st August he remarked:'.

. . at a time of heavy militarydefeats it is quite childish and naiveto look for a politically favourablemoment to make a move. . . . The timewill come when the tension betweenthe allies becomes so strong that, inspite of everything, the ruptureoccurs. History teaches us that all

coalitions break up, but you mustawait the moment however difficult

the waiting may be. I intend to con-

15

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Above: General Eisenhower, Supreme Commander, and the US Navy Secretary,

James V Forrestal. Below: Lieutenant-General Hodges, General Montgomery,Lieutenant-Generals Bradley and Dempsey after a meeting at Headquarters,21st Army Group

tinue fighting until there is a possi-

bility of a decent peace which is bear-able for Germany and secures the life

of future generations. Then I shall

make it. Whatever happens, we shall

carry on this struggle until, asFrederick the Great said, "one of ourdamned enemies gives up in despair".'The tensions between the allies

were somewhat less than Hitler anti-cipated. He failed to understand howunited they were in determination todestroy his dictatorship and henceready to resolve their differences.

Nonetheless, as the break-out fromthe beach-head began to show promiseof becoming an overwhelming suc-cess, tensions hitherto absent duringthe perilous period of landing andlodgement were manifested. Theyarose in two interconnected matters:personality and strategy.The personality of General Mont-

gomery had been accepted, grudginglyor otherwise, during planning andlanding. General Eisenhower, as su-preme commander, had appointed thisexperienced and confident Britishleader as co-ordinator of all the groundforces for the invasion phase. There-after, it had been made clear, as soonas SHAEF, Supreme Headquarters ofthe Allied Expeditionary Force, wasestablished in France, Eisenhowerwould become his own commander-in-chief of ground forces, controllingdirectly the Canadian/British armygroup under Montgomery and anAmerican army group under GeneralOmar Bradley.Eisenhower expected that, as the

beach-head filled with fighting divi-

sions, the area held by the allies wouldexpand to a major lodgement, extend-ing west to Brittany and its deep waterports and harbours and north-east tothe Seine, which some optimisticallyhoped they might reach by the first

week in September. There would thenbe a pause while the newly openedports and harbours received rein-

forcements of men and material, while?

railways were restored and airfields

cleared and while the administrativebase was made ready with forwarddumps and transport companies tosupport the next offensive whichshould carry the allied line to theGerman frontier by May 1945. Butas Clausewitz tells us, no plan survives

the first contact of war.By mid-August, less than ten weeks

after the landings, Montgomery'sgeneralship and Hitler's fanaticaldetermination to defend the Nor-mandy bocage bank by bank hadclearly combined to produce a verydifferent situation to that envisagedin the secret planning rooms inLondon. The prime strength of theNazi armies in France was beingground to destruction in the Falaisepocket; Patton's army had begun its

run towards the Seine. The clearance ofBrittany had become a minor opera-tion to be completed- at their leisure*

On 17th August, Montgomery put it

to Bradley that a new strategy wasneeded; both because the break-outwas taking place much earlier thanthey had originally expected and be-cause it was being conducted in verydifferent circumstances: the Germans'capability seriously to resist furtherin France had been smashed. The ad-vantage was theirs. His own ArmyGroup (21st) and Bradley's (12th)

should combine 'after crossing theSeine together as a solid mass of fortydivisions, which would be so strongthat it need fear nothing. This forceshould advance northwards, passingthrough Belgium north of the Arden-nes and then directly into Germany,through the Ruhr and across the flat

German plain, depriving Hitler of all

his centres of war production.Now the tensions began to appear.Bradley appeared to concur with

this idea; but it was clear to him thatits adoption would mean that he re-

mained under Montgomery's com-mand, however loosely. He was not apetty-minded man but there wereinfluences other than his own patrio-tic inclination to persuade him thatAmerican troops should be under awholly American command. Already,the error of a press censor at SHAEFhad exacerbated the question ofcommand:'New York Herald Tribune: SHAEF,August 16th. The top press relationsofficer at General Dwight D. Eisen-hower's supreme headquarters had theembarrassing duty early today ofdenying a major story that had beenpreviously corroborated and passed bySHAEF's own military censors, andalready had front-page prominence in

17

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Above: Part of the host of prisoners taken during the break-out of the Allies fromNormandy, August, 1944. Below: An example of the widespread destruction ofGerman vehicles and equipment during the break-out. Below right: Infantry ofthe British 43rd (Wessex) Division crossing the Seine, 25th August, 1944

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the first editions of all London'spapers. . . .

'The story, so officially and flatly

denied, was that General Eisenhowerhad taken over the active direction ofthe Allied forces in Normandy andBrittany, that General Sir Bernard LMontgomery remained in command ofthe 21st Army Group, which includesBritish, Canadian and Polish troops,and that General Omar N Bradley hadbeen given an equal status withGeneral Montgomery in command ofthe. 12th Army Group which includesthe 1st and 3rd American armies andthe 2nd French Division.'The official version at this moment ofwriting, 0106 hours, double Britishsummer time, 16th August, is thatGeneral Eisenhower is in France in"active command", that a 12th armygroup has been set up under GeneralBradley, as reported, but that GeneralMontgomery, in addition to being incommand of the 21st Army Group,also is the top-ranking ground com-mander of the invasion forces, still

outranking General Bradley, whoremains subordinate to him.'The native pride of Britain ex-

pressed a different view in the LondonDaily Mirror next day:'We feel it our duty to demand thatGeneral Montgomery be given anapology. . . The meaning (of theSHAEF release) seemed plain. Mont-gomery had been demoted, and that is

the meaning which hundreds of thou-sands of people must have attached tothe statement.'General Marshall wrote from Wash-

ington to Eisenhower to say that bothhe and the Secretary for War felt it

was time that Bradley should beanswerable directly to the supremecommander. 'The late announcement(that Montgomery retained overallcommand of land forces) I have justreferred to has cast a damper on thepublic enthusiasm.'Eisenhower replied, 'It seems that

so far as the press and public are con-cerned a resounding victory is notsufficient; the question of "how" is

equally important.'Meantime, Bradley had put forward

a different strategy which he andPatton, commander of Third Army,had discussed, and which they con-sidered would permit a surer and

quicker way of pushing allied troopsinto Germany. Taking the shortestroute, the Rhine should be crossedbetween Wiesbaden and Karlsruhe anda thrust developed north-east alongthe Main valley. Patton believed thathe could do this with his own army,though neither he nor Bradley ex-plained how they would fight theirway alone through the densely-woodedhills beyond the source of the Main.

All this Eisenhower mulled overbefore he held a conference, at whichMontgomery was present, on 23rdAugust. It was not easy for the su-preme commander to make a decision.Already the chain of supply wasbecoming strained. Cherbourg was theonly major port opening for use andthis was 400 miles from Patton'sarmour crossing the Seine. New rail-

way track was going down faster thanthey had predicted; the engineerswere rebuilding bridges, clearing air-

fields and opening roads at an excep-tional pace. Even so, the forwardtroops were outstripping the resourcesof the supply organisation. The fourarmies moving through France wereusing about 1,000,000 gallons of motorspirit each day. There were insuffi-

cient transport aircraft, railwaytracks, or road trucks to carry such atonnage forward once the Seine wascrossed.Once the Seine was crossed, Paris

would be freed and the initial supplyof the city would fall upon Eisen-hower's supply bases - there was noother organisation to take it on; andthere were no means of transportingthe supplies except his own aircraft,

rail locomotives and trucks.In addition to these considerations

and the fui'ore concerning the com-mand of American soldiers, the su-

preme commander had been asked bythe British government to overrun assoon as possible the bases in the Pasde Calais from which Hitler's Vis -

the flying bombs - were being launchedon London and the home counties.The upshot was a compromise, a

concession to some of the wishes of

both army group commanders to-

gether with an implicit policy of wait-and-see. 21st Army Group should clear

Tanks hastening through France enroute for Belgium

22

Above: Motor Cyclists pass Germantruck on the Brussels road. Aboveright: The British enter Brussels

through to Belgium, cleaning out thePas de Calais and securing the port ofAntwerp, while the American FirstArmy guarded its southern flank.Bradley was to prepare to open anoffensive south of the Ardennes. Thebulk of supplies would go to Mont-gomery's force and*. . . All of us havingagreed upon this general plan,' Eisen-hower wrote to Montgomery, 'theprincipal thing we must now strive foris speed in execution. All the Supplypeople have assured us that they cansupport (your) move, beginning thisminute - let us assume that they knowexactly what they are talking aboutand get about it vigorously and with-out delay.'

So they did.

By 4th September, 21st Army Grouphad captured Antwerp and Brusselswhile Patton's Third Army, despite

its thm ration of petrol, had crossedthe Meuse and was advancing on Metz.On 1st September, Eisenhower's

forward headquarters had opened inFrance and he had assumed directcommand of the two army groups for-

ward. Shortly, he would draw in the6th Army Group advancing from theMediterranean shore. All were nowaware that the time for wait-and-seewas over. A decision as to how the ex-

peditionary force should advance intoGermany must no longer be deferred.At SHAEF, it seemed to Eisenhower

that nothing could withhold theircontinuing advance, other than thelimitations of supply. The British andCanadians should drive on to the Ruhr,the Americans to the Saar as he hadplanned long ago. On 2nd September,meeting Bradley at Chartres withHodges of the First and Patton of theThird Army in attendance, he gaveconsent to 12th Army Group extend-ing into Germany. Though all threegenerals were warned that 21st Army

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Grroup would still have priority insupply, the dashing Patton did notneed more than the nod of eitherEisenhower or Bradley to press on. Hetioped and believed that he wouldichieve such a success as would neces-sitate a reversal of supply policy inbis favour.Unfortunately, while Eisenhower

recognised the dangers of their cir-

sumstances, he does not seem to haverecognised that his encouragement ofboth army groups was to lead to thevery loss of initiative against whichhe warned. His letter to GeneralMarshall on 4th September indicatesthat, surprisingly, his appreciationhad not been taken to its conclusion.'The closer we get to the Siegfried

Line, the more we will be stretchedadministratively, and eventually aperiod of relative inaction will beimposed upon us. The potential dangeris that while we are temporarilystalled the enemy will be able to pickup bits and pieces offerees everywhere

and reorganise them swiftly for de-fending (their frontier) or the Rhine.It is obvious from an overall viewpointwe must now as never before keep theenemy stretched as never before.'

The stretching of the enemy and thesupply line were directly related, how-ever: in attempting to give some sus-tenance to both army groups, therewould be enough for neither, particu-larly in motor spirit. At the limit oftheir resources, the diversion of evena fragment of their fuel supplieshalted 21st Army Group. What wasdiverted, Patton soon discovered, wasinsufficient to sustain his plans to 'git

up and go'. To the astonishment ofRundstedt and Model, to the gratifica-

tion of Hitler, the allied expeditionaryforce came to a halt at the verymoment when the German forces inthe west were spent.From this lost opportunity, out of

this circumstance. Operation MarketGarden was born.

26

Brereton*s

army

In September, 1944, Lieutenant-General Lewis H Brereton was an air-man in command of an unusual army.The chief of the United States NinthAir Force for the Normandy invasion,he was selected by General Eisen-hower as the summer progressed tocreate a new organisation: an army ofparachute and glider-borne troopscombined with the air squadronsneeded to convey them to battle.Departing for a visit to France inJuly, Eisenhower instructed his chiefof staff to leave Brereton in no doubtas to the importance of his post.'Brereton should be working in his

new job instantly. Please inform himthat I am particularly anxious aboutthe navigational qualifications of thetransport command crews. He is to geton to this in an intensive way and tokeep me in touch with his progress.There is nothing we are undertakingabout which I am more concerned thanthis job of his. I want him on the ballwith all his might.'In August, the First Allied Airborne

Army came into being.American and British airborne

forces had taken an important part in

26

the Normandy landings and, thoughscattered, had carried out effectivelythe tasks they had been given. Thesetasks achieved, they were returned tothe United Kingdom to re-equip so asto be ready for further operations atshort notice. But as the break-outbattle developed, the airborne soldiersbegan to feel like the man who tookhis harp to a party; no one would askthem to play. Brereton, taking com-mand of these eager warriors, foundalso to his vexation that his ideas forintensified air navigation training

—

indeed for the joint ground and airtraining of his whole force—werefrustrated as, increasingly, the air-craft were called to France to shuttlesupplies to the racing armies.Brereton's vexation was shared in

Washington. General Marshall, Chief-of-Staff of the United States Army,and his air colleague, General 'Hap'Arnold, believed that a valuableweapon in the expeditionary force wasbeing overlooked. Not for the first

Lieutenant-General Lewis H BreretonCommander, First AlliedAirborne Army

R\/

time, they reminded General Eisen-hower that it was there.The supreme commander did not

need the- reminder. He had already hadnumerous plans drafted for their usewhich the speed of advance had nulli-

fied. Most of these had been for thebenefit of the northern army groupbut in early September he againoffered Brereton's army to Bradley,proposing a mass descent in theMaastricht-Aachen area to assistHodges' troops through the SiegfriedL:.ne. When Bradley replied that hedid not want airborne soldiers but pre-ferred to keep their aircraft to 'feed

gas to George Patton's (Third Army)',Eisenhower directed Brereton else-

where. He was 'to operate in supportof the Northern Group of Armies (21st

Army Group) up to and including thecrossing of the Rhine.' At once, Mont-gomery's staff" drew First Allied Air-borne Army back into their plans.Yet all plans at headquarters 21st

Army Group at that moment weresubsidiary still to the unsettled mainissue: were they or were they not tolaunch the major thrust into Ger-many? Montgomery believed that theopportunity existed north of Aachen;and although the Canadians and theBritish infantry divisions were widelyspread from the Seine to the Scheldt,Horrocks' XXX Corps had its armourwell placed to break out. Given thefuel, this formation would soon testhow far the Germans had resuscitatedtheir defensive strength, while the re-

mainder of the army group would beclose behind. Miles Dempsey, com-mander of the British Second Army,shared Montgomery's confidence andproposed that he should join withHodges and Brereton to strike acrossthe Rhine at Wesel.Montgomery had a more novel idea.

They should lay a carpet of airbornetroops across the waterways intoHolland. Then, with the Rhine behindthem and the Siegfried Line out-flanked, the armoured formationscould turn south and south-east to theRuhr and the great open plain stretch-ing towards Berlin. The concept hadmuch to recommend it. The Germanswould be less likely to expect anapproach by this route; and the air-

borne army, their bases in Englandnicely within flying radius, would

enhance surprise and bring freshtroops to the battlefield for the open-ing of the offensive without imposingon the local supply chain.Anxious to obtain the support he

needed in supplies for Second Armyand the close co-operation of Hodges'army on his right flank, Montgomeryarranged a rendezvous with the sup-reme commander at Brussels airfieldfor the afternoon of 10th September.Eisenhower did not come out from

his aircraft to meet the Field-Marshalin his customary friendly way; on hisreturn from seeing Bradley at Chart-res, he had sprained his knee whichwas still swollen and painful. Mont-gomery entered with General Graham,his senior administrative staff" officer.

With Eisenhower was Air Chief-Mar-shal Tedder, his deputy, and SirHumfrey Gale, chief administrativeofficer at SHAEF. Both commandersknew very well that what they hadcome to discuss was, in eff'ect, theallotment of supply to the armygroups.After greetings, the Field-Marshal

asked that Gale should withdraw - towhich Eisenhower acceded - thoughsurprisingly there was no suggestionto send out Graham. Then, referringto a file he had brought in which werecopies of all his letters and signals tothe Supreme Commander on strategicpolicy since the break-out began,Montgomery made a detailed analysisof the opportunities they had had, thesubsequent events which confirmedthese and, hence, the mistakes whichthe Supreme Commander had made.The Field-Marshal's manner was di-

dactic and, as the review expanded, it

began to assume the character of amaster reproaching a pupil.Eisenhower, a great heart, leaned

across to put a hand on Montgomery'sknee.'Steady, Monty,' he said. 'You can't

talk to me like that. I'm your boss.'

There was a silence in the aircraft.

Then the Field-Marshal, great too inhis own way, accepted the rebuke.'I'm sorry, Ike,' he replied.

Talk was friendlier after that but it

did not lead to either man making amajor concession. Montgomery be-lieved absolutely in the feasibility ofhis 'one really powerful and full-

blooded thrust' into the heart of

28

Germany. Eisenhower feared that asingle thrust by either army groupwould be overwhelmed, whereas theGermans would be unable to countertwo delivered simultaneously over awide arc. Patton's forces were ad-vancing and he was not going to stopthem. Montgomery too must keep upthe pressure within the limits of thesupplies he was receiving. In oneparticular, however, the SupremeCommander was prepared to give all

support to Montgomery's plan: heshould mount as soon as possible

'Market Garden', the airborne opera-tion. A bridgehead across the Rhinewould of course be advantageous and.as a secondary aspect, should permitallied troops to capture the V2 sites

from which Hitler was launching free-

flight rockets, the second of his

'secret' bombing weapons, against thesouth and east of England. But mostimportant of all, Market Gardenwould free the estuary of the Scheldtof the German troops infesting its

right bank. Their presence preventedthe allies from making use ofAntwerp,the third largest port in the world,one fortuitously placed to accept everyform of supply they needed. Once this

was opened, problems of supply wouldbe at an end.So the commanders parted. The

Field-Marshal flew back to his head-quarters assured of support to mountthe airborne operation, determined in

his own heart to strike into andthrough the Ruhr.At the time of his appointment to

command the airborne army, GeneralBrereton had a wide range of experi-

ence in his profession. Originally anaval officer, he transferred to theUnited States Army and its infantflying section prior to the First WorldWar. As an aviator, he flew against theGermans when the American Expe-ditionary Force came to France in

1917. After the war, a young captain,he had enjoyed a tour of duty as air

attach^ at the embassy in Paris. Bythe beginning of the Second WorldWar, he was commanding the ThirdAir Force. He knew a great deal aboutflying and the operation of all kinds ofaircraft ; and he had acquired by 1944 adegree of experience in working withthe British - in the Far East, in India,and through the western desert of

Lieutenant-General 'Boy' Browning,commander of the Allied 1st AirborneCorps

29

Egypt to French North Africa - not all

of this allied relationship as pleasantas he deserved. But inevitably he knewvery little about the detail of groundoperations. Thus his deputy was asoldier and, in the spirit of the alli-

ance, British. His name was F A MBrowning, a Grenadier Guards officer

known throughout the British Armyas 'Boy'.

Lieutenant-General Browning wasnot called 'Boy' in a derisory way: hewas much respected for his profes-sional standards and readiness to ex-amine and develop new ideas. Thoughnot the founder, he was the father ofBritish airborne forces: he broughtthem to maturity. Ideally, he andBrereton should have complementedeach other's experience but, at quitean early stage in their relationship,there was a clash. On 3rd September,Operation Linnet II - the drop pro-posed in the Aachen-Maastricht gap -

was brought to readiness, and Brown-ing, as commander-designate of theairborne corps formed for the assault,met Brereton at his headquarters toreceive final orders. In his diary.Brereton records:

'I told him that the operation wouldbe mounted tomorrow or not at all.

Browning brought up the point thatthe maps of the area could not be dis-

tributed to the lower echelons in timeto brief them properly. I told him thatthe disorganisation of the enemydemanded that chances be taken -

that the operation would not be can-celled except because of weather ordirection from higher headquarters.Browning remained after the con-ference and told me that in his opinionthe operation could not be attemptedat such short notice. . . Later in theevening I received a letter fromGeneral Browning concerning ourdiff"erences of opinion which concludedby saying he felt he could not continueas Deputy Commander of the FirstAllied Airborne Army and thereforetendered his resignation.'(Next day) 4th September, 1944. A

staff' conference was held to push thecompletion of detailed plans for theArnhem operation - Operation Mar-ket. Afterwards I went to Head-quarters British Airborne Corps atMoor Park for a frank talk withGeneral Browning who had cooled off"

considerably after writing his letter,

and was quite willing to have the re-

signation withdrawn. He realised thatunder the circumstances GeneralRidgway (commander of the UnitedStates XVIII Airborne Corps) wouldcommand the airborne forces in Oper-ation Linnet II. After a frank talk I

felt that we understood one another.'Operation Linnet II did not take

place - Bradley at 12th Army Grouphaving refused it - and thus no onemay say certainly whether the air-

man or the soldier was right in this

case. The weight of evidence, how-ever, favours Browning. On what waspracticable in the time, the airbornesoldiers would not have been briefedby their officers until their aircrafthad taken off and were en route to the

30

^**.

target area, an arrangement which atthe very least would have added to thehazards of the operation. With thedisagreement set aside, the two mennow turned their energies to Opera-tion Market, the most likely of the tenairborne operations under study bythe planning staff.

The early conferences for Market,from 4th September onwards, wereprimarily concerned with what couldbe offered operationally. The first

limitation was the number of trans-port aircraft available in Major-General Paul L Williams' UnitedStates IX Troop Carrier Command,and the Royal Air Force 38 and 46Groups under Air Vice-Marshal 'Holly'Hollinghurst and Air CommodoreL Darvell. Between them, supposing

American C-47 Dakota transportaircraft on an English airfield

all their hopes for servicing to be well-founded, they would offer 1,250 C-47Dakotas and a mixed bag of 354 con-verted British bombers. It did not takean advanced mathematician to showthat this quantity would not lift

all the parachutists, tow all theassorted gliders of more than twodivisions. But the distance from theforward lines of the British SecondArmy on the Meuse-Escaut canal toArnhem in Holland was ninety-eightmiles and there were six major water-ways to be crossed before they wereover the Rhine. The very least thatBrowning needed for his airbornecarpet was three and a half divisions.

31

Major-General James M Gavin

There were five divisions to choosefrom: the American 82nd (All Ameri-can), the 101st (Screaming Eagles)and the newly arrived 17th; theBritish 1st and 6th Airborne. In addi-tion, Major-General Stanislas Sosa-bowski's Independent Polish Para-chute Brigade was anxious to join in

the battles of north-west Europe. Soindeed were they all. But the British1st Airborne had seen no action sinceSicily. Hence they were selected. Asthe 17th had not had time to work up,General Ridgway, commander of theXVIII Airborne Corps, offered the 82ndand 101st. The commanders of thesethree divisions, with Sosabowski,were now secretly warned of thecommitment.IX Troop Carrier Command under

Major-General Paul L Williams hada cadre of four groups which hadacquired a variety of experience in theMediterranean, dropping British andAmerican parachutists in North Africaand both parachutists and gliders in

Sicily. Prior to D-day, they had re-

turned to England to join with afurther ten groups sent as reinforce-

ments directly from the United States.There was an intensive training periodbefore the Normandy assault but it

was inadequate for the difficult taskof finding in darkness the droppingzones for the parachutists, the landingzones for the gliders, with the addeddistraction of enemy anti-aircraft

Major-General Maxwell D Taylor

fire. Only twenty-five per cent of the82nd and 101st were dropped in thecorrect areas - hence General Eisen-hower's directions that navigationskills must be developed.The command was very conscious

that their mission was, primarily,combat despite the fact that theyoperated air transport. After D-day,they returned to training keenly.Yet, as operations failed to material-ise, they could not forget that beyondall else their purpose was flying. Dueto the restriction of exercises, air

crew hours were far lower in the TroopCarrierCommand than those in fighter

or bombardment squadrons and cer-

tainly less than those in the transportsquadrons committed permanently to

logistics. Air and grcund crews werenot therefore as downcast as their

commander when, squadron by squad-ron, they were drawn to France.General Brereton had no doubts,

however, that if the airborne armywas to be ready to mount operationsat short notice, his airmen must prac-

tise, practise, practise for combat.. It

took much hard work on his part,

sometimes hard words, to recover,

hold and set to training the continu-ally shifting squadrons. They hadscarcely completed the first phase of

his preparatory programme whenMarket was decided upon.Air-Commodore Darvell's six squad-

rons of Dakotas - 46 Group - and Air

32

Major-General Roy Urquhart Major-General Stanislas Sosabowski

Vice-Marshal Hollinghurst's 38 Groupof converted bombers were betterplaced. The latter had been eng-aged inthe development of British airborneforces since 1941 and had acquired adepth of knowledge in the techniquesof aerial delivery. Darvell's aircraft,

though latecomers to this work, werenot subject to diversion to the extentsuffered by IX Troop Carrier Com-mand. Both of the Royal Air Forcegroups had launched troops success-fully by night and their subsequenttraining had enhanced their confi-

dence. At Browning's instigation, astandard procedure had been adoptedfor all allied airborne troops so thatthe Royal Air Force could readily -

and did - exercise with Americantroops, the United States Army AirCorps with British.The 82nd and 101st Divisions had

much in common, the latter havingbeen formed from a cadre of the first.

The commander of the 82nd was Briga-dier-General Jim Gavin, a former en-listed man, a graduate of West Pointand a rising star in the allied forces.

Aged 37, he had been a captain in 1941,

a volunteer member of the ProvisionalParachute Group at Fort Benning,Georgia. When the 82nd jumped intoSicily in 1943, he was with them, com-manding a regiment. In Normandy, hewas deputy to Matt Ridgway, thencommanding the 82nd; and under-standably he had succeeded him when

Ridgway was promoted to commandXVIII Airborne Corps. Maxwell DTaylor, his colleague in the 101, was agunner, former artillery chief of the82nd in Sicily and in command of the101st in Normandy.Each of their divisions retained a

strong cadre of men who had jumpedin either or both the Mediterraneanand Normandy but these operationsand training accidents in their turnhad removed a significant numberfrom their units, particularly experi-enced leaders. Thus, while they weremature in comparison with the 17thAirborne Division, every man wasaware of the need to train hard inreadiness for the battlefield. In thesouth-west of England the 101st, andin the north midlands the 82nd werpnever idle during that summer of 1944,

whether engaged in rigorous advancedexercises or in the necessary routineof drill, weapon handling, and otherbasic skills. Because the majoritywere volunteers, their response to thistaxing work was prompt and willing.

They were aware of being a corps

d' elite ; men who had stepped out of themass to be committed not only quicklyto the battlefield but to some crucialtask on it. It was a paradox that they,like their British airborne comrades,should discover that they were dest-

ined more often to remain in the rearas a special reserve.The British 1st Airborne Division

33

Front line Sept 17, 1944

f Planned Allied airbotne

dropping zones

Planned mam axis of

Allied advance

UthDIV. Mam German dispositions

Sept 17. 1944

30

PLANNED FINAL POSITIONOFBR.XXX CORPS

\W To Amsterdam Ammersfoort .<*^^^ HERMAN GOERING^^ Hmmersioon,,^

fTC. TRAINING UNITS

Utrecht

\Deventer

Appledoorn^~r-^j:5-_j_^ r

Beekbe-genfe/, lUf"j^

CHRISTIANSENSAREA

J^^^tnmu, Doetmchem-rj

lEMEaZEIl ^

GARRISONTROOPS

BITTRICHS, HO.

Doetmchem

f^l|Niimegen _ cieve

'^™ *-- Reichswald

,G(ave1 V^vWrt-:;, " ""^

DIV..--'

Tilburg

Dispositions of the opposing forces at the beginning of

Operation Market Garden'

British airborne troops en route for Tunisia in November 1942. Those whoreturned formed the veteran nucleus of the 1st Airborne Division

had, like the 82nd and 101st, a strongcadre of veterans. A British parachutebattalion had been raised in 1941 underLieutenant-Colonel Eric Down andtwo others had formed quickly there-after. Raids had been conducted bythese parachutists into Italy andFrance early in 1942 and when theallies landed in French North Africathe parachute brigade, carried inAmerican C-47s, leap-frogged throughAlgeria into Tunisia. It was a uniquebody, having as many universitygraduates amongst the enlisted menas former labourers. They fought on adivisional front when the Germansstruck back, earning the nicknameroten teufeln, red devils, when, wearingtheir red berets, they knocked Arnim'sPanzer Grenadiers off a series ofhill tops. Joined by the remainderof the division, they jumped intoSicily and landed by sea in Italy.Then, shedding a brigade, the divisioncame home for Christmas, 1943, had ahappy leave, took in recruits andstood by for a battle call.

Month after month, there was none.6th Airborne Division departed forNormandy. Again and again, the 1stwere briefed to follow them to Francebut on every occasion the advancing

troops overran the target area beforetheir aircraft took off. There was agrowing recklessness in the division;a danger of ill-discipline in wild par-ties following cancellation of opera-tions. Their disappointment and aserious loss of morale was preventedonly by the close spirit of the officersand men in the division, particularlythose who had served together sinceearly days.When Eric Down, the first battalion

commander, since promoted to com-mand the division, left to raise air-borne forces in India, his successorwas. surprisingly, a major-generalwho had no knowledge of their speci-ality. His name was Roy Urquhart, anofficer of the Highland Light Infantry,modest, straightforward, who hadearned his spurs as a deliberate tac-tician in Sicily and Italy. He con-fessed to air-sickness, omitted to gethimself trained as a parachutist, yetwon the respect of his commandbecause he was sound and sincere.Unfortunately, he did not recognise

that, while there is no mystique inairborne forces, certain character-istics are inherent in them as in all

arms ofamilitary body. Unfortunatelyfor himself - and for them.

35

The plan

is made

On Saturday, 9th September, 'Boy'Browning was in Belgium at Field-Marshal Montgomery's advancedheadquarters. He was to be briefed onthe 21st Army Group plan; more pre-

cisely, the Field-Marshal's concept of

the operation.Montgomery had not then received

Eisenhower's assent - it was on thefollowing day that they met at Brus-sels airfield - but he wanted to advancepreparations as he was supremelyaware that every day of respite givento the enemy must reduce the allies'

chance of victory in 1944.

He began by reiterating the aim of

Market: 'to capture and hold thecrossings over the canals and rivers

on the Second Army's main axis of

advance from about Eindhoven to

Arnhem inclusive.' As soon as the air-

borne carpet was down, OperationGarden was to begin. The British XXXCorps would push forward from theMeuse-Escaut canal with a strongforce of armour; on its left a British

corps would follow up to protect theeastern flank. To the west, it wasexpected that General Hodges wouldlaunch covering operations in parallel

with XXX Corps.

36

At the end of the briefing, the Field-Marshal returned to the subject of thebridges. Dotting the bridge symbolson the map in succession, he remarked,'The (airborne) carpet is very long soit will necessarily be narrow. Theessence of the business is to capturethose bridges intact. And this will

mean,' the finger dotted the bridgesagain, 'dropping as many men on tothe bridges as possible from the word"go".''How long do you think we shall

have to hold the bridge at Arnhem?'asked Browning.'Two days,' said the Field-Marshal.

'They should be up to you by then.'

'We can hold it for four,' said Brown-ing, 'But I think we may be going abridge too far.'

Next day, Sunday the 10th, Brown-ing gave outline orders to the divi-

sional commanders at his head-quarters in the club house of MoorPark golf course, a little to the northand west of London.The southern area of the 'carpet' was

given to the 101st because they were

The US 82nd Airborne Division

practising a mass drop

<•

-*

a

'r»

-«

c

^^

• e••

stationed in south-west England. Inconsequence, they would be able to

fly to their release point withoutcrossing the aircraft stream of otherdivisions. General Taylor was nothappy when he heard the suggestion -

originating with the Field-Marshal -

that he should drop in seven packetsalongside the major and minor bridgesbut, immediately, he said nothing.Next, the 82nd were directed to

seize the bridges over the Maas atGrave and the Waal at Nijmegen.Between these bridges, the road wasdominated by high ground, rare in

Holland, and this too was to be cap-

tured and prepared for defence.

In the extreme north, 1st Airbornewere to land at Arnhem. GeneralBrowning drew a large circle roundthe river crossing and city on his

briefing map.'Arnhem Bridge,' he said, turning to

Urquhart, 'And hold it.'

In the days after the war, there hasbeen some argument as to why theBritish were selected for the distantobjective. American historians havenoted that the British specially re-

quested the most difficult mission;other opinions correctly say thatUrquhart and his staff' had been ex-

amining the area under a previousplan - Operation Comet - and infer

that it was logical that they shoulduse this knowledge for Market. Thereappears to be no record as to why thedecision was taken. A simple explana-tion is that, since the 101st were, for

ease of flying routes, placed in thesouth, it was expedient to place the82nd next to them. In any case, no onecould forecast where the principal

danger would lie.

So Urquhart's division was orderedto take and hold Arnhem bridge, anda bridgehead on the far side to facili-

tate the expansion beyond the Rhineof the divisions in Horrocks' XXXCorps. Because of the distance. GeneralBrowning placed the Polish brigade as

a reinforcement to Urquhart's com-mand. To strengthen further thebridgehead across the Rhine, the 52ndLowland Scottish Division was briefed

to be ready to land next to 1st Air-

borne as soon as an American engineerbattalion prepared aircraft landingstrips. If all went well, six divisions

would be across the Rhine within

three days of the airborne assault.On 11th September, however, all was

not going well in Field-Marshal Mont-gomery's view. As ordered by 12thArmy Group, General Hodges was bothtrying to maintain a continuous frontbetween Dempsey's Second Army onhis left and Patton's Third on his

right - a front of 150 miles - and toadvance through the Siegfried Linewherever resistance was minimal.Inevitably, his divisions were out of

balance. Through no fault of his own,he could not co-ordinate a close actionwith Dempsey or ofi'er a force to pro-

tect the eastern flank of Horrocks'advance. Thus, at a late hour, Demp-sey had to bring another of his owncorps, the VIII, for this latter task.

But VIII Corps were on the Seine,immobile, stripped of their trucks,which were being used to carry for-

ward supplies for Operation Garden.T have investigated my mainten-

ance situation very carefully sinceour meeting yesterday,' the Field-

Marshal signalled to the SupremeCommanderpersonally. 'Your decisionthat the northern thrust toward theRuhr is NOT repeat NOT to havepriority over other operations will

have certain repercussions. ..' He

spelt out Dempsey's dilemma, adding:'The large scale operations by SecondArmy and the Airborne Corps north-wards towards the Meuse and Rhinecannot now take place before 23rd

September at the earliest and possibly26th September.'

It was evident to Eisenhower and his

Chief-of-Staff, General Bedell Smith,that this was no exaggeration. On the12th. Bedell Smith came forward to

Montgomery's headquarters; for if

there was agreement on nothing else,

none doubted that if they were to

secure a Rhine crossing cheaply, it

must be done quickly. There wasbesides the need to isolate and crushGerman resistance in the area of

Antwerp. Patton would be told to

stand on the defensive, said Bedell

Smith; the bulk of 12th Army Group'slogistic support would be given to

Hodges's First Army, with whom 21st

Army Group might .deal directly.

United States truck companies wouldbe switched from the Red Ball express

routes to carry forward supplies at the

rate of an additional 500 tons per day

38

;. nd transport aircraft would bring upanother 500. As quickly as possible,

a bomber force would be gathered to

lift motor spirit to Liege.With these assurances, Montgomery

signalled to Eisenhower on 14th Sep-tember, "Most grateful to you person-ally and Beetle (Bedell Smith) for all

you are doing for us." He confirmedthat, subject to weather. MarketGarden should begin on 17th Septem-ber, as he had originally intended.In England, all the essential plan-

ning decisions had been taken.The allocation ofaircraft had rightly

favoured the two Anierican divisions.

If they were delivered in inadequatenumbers, they could not capture thebridges or the high ground nearNijmegen and XXX Corps would haveno chance of reaching Arnhemspeedily. This left Urquhart with alift for one of his three parachutebrigades, part of the glider brigade andhis advanced divisional headquarters- one third his total force. To offset

this disadvantage. Air Vice-MarshalHollinghurst suggested that theyshould release the troops in the dark-ness of the early morning before the

The British Horsa Glider

dawn mists rose. This would permit asecond lift by the air transport forcein daylight on the 17th besides possess-ing the advantage of enhancingsecrecy and deception.General Brereton did not like this

proposal. The American air crews, ashe knew to his vexation, had not hadtime to train to the standards of nightnavigation he had set. With such anarrow corridor, with time so muchat a premium, accuracy in deliverywas essential to success. At night,

too, the slow Dakotas would bevulnerable to German night fighters,

still active, and the flak batteriescould not be struck effectively im-mediately prior to the passage of thelong streams of aircraft. The fuel

tanks of the Dakotas were not self-

sealing; the risk of substantial lossesbefore reaching the target area wasconsequently high.He therefore ruled that the aircraft

should take off as soon as practicableafter first light on the 17th.

When it was suggested that theymight still make a second drop on the

39

17th, lie continued to resist but withscarcely the same weight of reason.Even if they could not get back indaylight - which some believed possi-

ble - the flak batteries would havebeen struck throughout the day andthe troops on the ground would be ableto guide aircraft to them by beacons.Yet General Brereton persisted thatonly one lift should be attempted onthe 17th, now citing crew fatigue, theneed for spot servicing and emergencyrepair to support his decision. Heattempted to comfort the soldiers withthe assurances of his planning staff"

that the entire force would be deliveredby D plus 2; but whatever comfortthey derived from it grew cold whendetailed calculations showed that theearliest, date for completion must beD plus 3. Nevertheless, Bpereton per-sisted in his decision. What he over-looked was the fact that the operationwas being mounted with one aim alone

:

securing the ground corridor acrossthe Rhine. The air transport operation

British paratroops practise droppingfrom the converted RAF Whitleybomber

was not an end in itself but a meansto an end: an airborne assault. Thismethod offered complete surprise andhence shock action. But the effect ofthe shock would diminish with everyhour that passed after the initial day-light drop took place. The view thatthe air plan would ensure each follow-ing morning air crew and aircraftfresh and fit for operations was a blindone. If Taylor did not receive speedilyhis artillery and glider infantry orGavin the balance of parachute andglider infantry and certain follow upfield and anti-tank batteries; andabove all. if Urquhart did not receivedirectly the two thirds of his force left

behind, the probability was that theinitiative gained by surprise would belost to the enemy.Even if this most cogent argument

did not persuade Brereton to agree toa double delivery on D-day, it is

surely curious that, as an airman, hefailed to see that however slick heexpected air operations to be, hecould not control the weather, whichin the third week of September mightprevent follow up deliveries overseveral days.

As General Brereton's decision torestrict the sortie rate reduced thechances of success, General Urquhart'sarrangements tended to confoundthem. Rightly, he had begun by askingto have his force put down as close tohis objectives as possible. Tho RAFobjected to a dropping zone close tothe Arnhem bridge and to other areasto the east of the town due to flak

positions on the run-in or on the exitroutes or both. A Dutch officer - therewere Dutch liaison teams with eachdivision - advised that the polder orfenland below the west bank of theRhine was likely to be soft and wasin any case intersected by numerouswide drainage ditches. Opposed by thestrong objections of the air force andthe opinion of a native of Holland,Urquhart gave way. Regretfully, hechose dropping and landing zones six

and eight miles to the west and a little

to the north of Arnhem. As a compro-mise, he obtained agreement to drop-ping the Poles on the polder one milesouth of the bridge on the third day ofthe assault; it being expected that theflak in the immediate vicinity wouldhave been cleared by the time of theirarrival and perhaps in some of theother areas. The objections concerningthe suitability of the polder had there-fore been overcome. Its marshy sur-face and ditches were no longer con-sidered unsurmountable. The flak

batteries on the run-in and the for-

midable concentration on Deelen air-

field to the north of Arnhem appearalso to have become acceptable; forthere could be no certainty that, byD plus 2, these would have beendestroyed from the air or overrun onthe ground.The cause of Urquhart's difficulties

is not difficult to discern. In theplanning of any airborne assault, it is

the duty of the air force commanderto state forcefully what circumstanceshe needs to deliver and release thetroops so that they begin the groundoperation from the areas selected withthe maximum strength in men andequipment. Inevitably, as in theplanning for Arnhem., ' some of therequirements of the air force wouldclash with those of the army. Thereshould then follow a phase of discus-sion in order to effect '.ne best com-promise - each of the parties knowing

or coming to realise as the discussionproceeds that matters of principlecannot in any circumstances be sur-rendered. If Urquhart had been anexperienced airborne divisional com-mander, he would have known that thelocation of dropping and landing zonesto targets is a prime factor of success.If the RAF had persisted in refusal todrop anywhere close to the bridge andcity, it would have been his duty tostate that the operation must beabandoned from the soldier's point ofview, having too low a chance ofsuccess. But Urquhart was not experi-enced and did not put to his aircolleagues such a charge. It is veryunlikely indeed that either Holling-hurst, commanding the air elementfor the Arnhem drop, or his Americancolleagues, would have refused simplybecause of the danger of flying intoflak - there is no record of either theRAF or the United States Army AirForce ever refusing an operationalhazard of this sort in the SecondWorld War or since, when it was shownto be necessary. Yet it is scarcely fair

to burden General Urquhart with all

the blame. He did not volunteer forhis command but was surprised by it.

It was a misguided appointment, par-ticularly so when there were to handBrigadiers Lathbury and Hackettcommanding the 1st and 4th ParachuteBrigades in the division, each ofwhom was recommended for divisionalcommand. Indeed, Gerald Lathbury,the senior, had been informed that hewas to be promoted to go to the Indiandivision, while Down stayed with the1st.

The fact was, however, that by 13thSeptember, 1st Airborne Division wascommitted to landing six or eight-

miles to the west of Arnhem betweenthe roads leading to Amsterdam andUtrecht. To get to the bridge, theywould have to pass through a town -

Oosterbeek - or make a detour, eithercourse adding to the time needed tosatisfy the principal requirement : thecapture of the Rhine crossing.None of those attending the divi-

sional commander's conference on theafternoon of Tuesday, 12th September,raised any demur at the orders given.This is not surprising; for Urquhartand his staff disclosed the reasons for

the shortfall in aircraft and the

41

Parachute soldier in a gusting windafter landing

^Sxmti^&^, -,k^-;

^\

w/

'objections' of the RAF to droppingelsewhere. Moreover, if the truth betold, none of those present had anycertainty that the operation wouldtake place. They had all plannednumerous operations previously -

some far more risky than Market -

and they would have been less thanhuman had they been immune to theeffects of cancellation after cancella-tion. It was not that they did not taketheir preparations seriously; simplythat their recent experience suggestedthat they might well be indulging inanother theoretical exercise.The commanders of the 82nd and

101st were less inhibited. Though theyhad also planned numerous operationswithout execution, they had operatedas recently as June and the memoriesof what had gone well, what had gonebadly were more sharply etched ontheir professional minds. Jim Gavinand Browning had close discussionsconcerning the high ground immedi-ately south-east of Nijmegen. Pro-gressively, its importance was borneupon both of them ; the capture of thebridges at Grave and Nijmegen wouldbe nullified if the enemy possessed it.

Adjoining it to the east, towards Cleveand Goch, the Reichswald Forest wasseen to be an area in which the enemymight well be concealed and fromwhich an early German counter-attack would be dangerous. It waseven possible that German troopsmight be conducting refresher train-ing on the high ground; they wereknown to use if for this purpose, asthe Dutch had done in the days beforethe war.Maxwell D Taylor had othei: appre-

hensions. After the initial co-ordinating conference at Headquar-ters, First Allied Airbone Army, heraised with Browning objections con-cerning the dropping of his force inseven packets on to each of the bridgesin his area. Though fully in agreementthat the division must drop close toits targets, he believed they weregoing too much to the other extreme.There was a danger that the groupson first landing would be too weak atone point or another to overcome anenemy in prepared defences such as

C 47 Transports and gliders training

in close formation flying

the steel and concrete posts picked upfrom the photographs provided by airreconnaissance; perhaps even tooweak to resist a local counterattack.But General Browning would notchange the requirement since he hadagreed to it personally with Field-Marshal Montgomery and the matterwas referred to Brereton, whoserelationship with his British corpscommander again came under strain.

'I decided'. General Brereton wrotein his diary on 11th September, 'thatGeneral Taylor would see Montgomeryabout a more concentrated landing.If, after the disadvantages of thefirst manoeuver have been explained(to him), he still insists, we will go inas planned.'Contrary to their expectation, yet

characteristically, Montgomery hadno wish to interfere with or imposepersonal ideas on the detail of theground plan. If they had any doubts,however, they should be discussedwith Dempsey. The diary goes on:

'13th September 1944. General Parks(Brereton's Chief-of-Stafi") who wentwith Taylor to the 21st Army Group,reported that Lieutenant-General SirMiles C Dempsey, commanding theBritish Second Army, was in accordwith our recommendations forchangesin Operation Market. General Demp-sey seems to have a better apprecia-tion of the employment of airborneforces than any other British groundcommander. He is not only a compe-tent soldier but he has a delightfulpersonality - quiet, unassuming andexceedingly modest.'Careful arrangements were made to

preserve secrecy.Until 15th September, knowledge of

the operations was restricted in theairborne corps to those normallypresent at a divisional commander'sorders with the addition of a few staff

officers at the lower headquarters. Bythis stage in their wartime lives, eachformation, each unit had a special set

of rooms secured by locks and wire in

which plans were made. Only thosenamed on a special list held at theentrance were permitted to passinside. On the 15th, battalion com-manders and officers were admittedto the secret ; on the 16th, the soldiers

were briefed. Camps and barrackswere then sealed, though special

45

Above: Lieutenant-General Sir Brian

Horrocks, commander of XXX Corps,

who led the British Armoured columnalong the carpet to the Rhine. Farright: A wrecked V-1 launching site

arrangements were made to send anumber of selected men out to localtowns and villages under caution sothat the word should not spreadthrough the British countryside thatAmericans, Poles and British airbornesoldiers were concentrating for anoperation.In Belgium, General Horrocks, com-

mander of XXX Corps in Dempsey'sarmy, did not brief his subordinatesfor Operation Garden until the 15th.

At 11 o'clock that morning, in thesmall garrison town of Bourg Leopold,he entered the cinema which wassurrounded by military police andfield security detachments.Because he had left his own briefing

until a late hour in the interest of

secrecy; because the operation was ofa special and complex nature; andbecause he was a man who liked aboveall to maintain a personal contactwith those he commanded, Horrockshad all the officers of his corps down tothe rank of lieutenant-colonel present

46

for the briefing, and the brigademajors - principal staff officers - ofthe armoured and infantry brigades.A tall riian, with shining silver hair

worn rather long, he walked to thefront of the auditorium, lightly greet-ing many officers by name. On thestage, which he ascended, a largesketch map had been placed. It wasnow uncovered.There was complete silence as eyes

read, consumed the information dis-

closed: the thin corridor runningnorthwards through Borken and Val-kenswaard to Eindhoven; the symbolsshowing the dropping zones of the101st and their objectives beyond; theroad running on to Grave and Nijme-gen; the Maas, the Maas/Waal canal,

the Waal, the high ground to the eastof the road, all in the area of the 82nd;and beyond, the Rhine, Arnhem and1st Airborne with the Poles.'This is a tale you will tell your

grandchildren," Horrocks began. Thenfearing this sounded too dramatic, headded, 'and mighty bored they'll be.'

Horrocks was a sensitive andimaginative officer. He had developedsuccessfully his own method of com-manding a corps in fast, mobile war-fare in the North African desert; and

<2St

:-^.

-^^Mj^^f^,

tP^'^At*^>

1v:

had then devised a single sledge-hammer tactic for crushing the strongdefences round Tunis and Bizertabefore he was gravely wounded. Hehad now to explain a form of breakoutnovel to them all. Simply, they had todo a hop, skip and a jump overobstacles of unknown type, aided bythe stepping stones secured by theirairborne comrades.As soon as the airborne assault

began, Horrocks would personallygive the signal to start. The GuardsArmoured Division must then rushforward, destroying or sweeping awaythe enemy between its bridgeheadacross the Meuse-Escaut canal andEindhoven. Then on again, throughNijmegen and Arnhem. The narrow-ness of the front was emphasised - it

could scarcely accommodate morethan one tank battalion with infantrysupport at any one time, so they mustbe slick in passing units through oneanother as the leaders took casualtiesand lost the pace. Horrocks' tacticalheadquarters would be close behindand then the 43rd Wessex andthe 50th Northumbrian InfantryDivisions. With only one major road,close control of traffic would beessential. Traffic posts linked by radio

would extend north from the hour ofstarting; each stretch of the roadwould be allotted recovery trucks topull clear tanks or trucks brokendown or hit by enemy fire. The engi-neers were putting all their bridgingmaterial on trucks ready to comeforward to any bridge or culvert blown.Supply traffic, other than for ammuni-tion, was forbidden: they should cramon enough food for four days, motorfuel for 250 miles, and jettison any-thing that was not essential for theshort operation.

'It has to be short,' said Horrocks.'If it isn't, we shall fail those para-chutists. They are relying on us.

'

His officers left the cinema muchstimulated by their briefing. All felt

that they were in the mind of their

corps commander. Knowing his aim,it would be easier to make their owncontribution to Garden. As ever,

without minimising the difficulties,

Horrocks radiated optimism and theyreflected this spirit. All the same,'The Germans seem to be thickening

up a bit,' remarked one commandingofficer to a colleague.'Perhaps it's just as well we're not

leaving them any longer to re-

organise,' was the reply.

47

Briefing

(Ssv-

s<-~

^

.%

Airspeed Horsa Mk II

Span: 88 feet Length: 67 feet Crew: Two Load: 29 troops or one 75mm packhowitzer

Douglas C-47 DakotaSpeed: 230 mph maximum and 167 mph cruising Range: 1,300 miles Crew; ThreeLoad: 9,028 lbs of cargo, 18/24 paratroopers or one glider

50

fil

'Whence this

strange

intelligence?'

On the night of 3rd September, Field-Marshal Model's operational reportrepresented again his critical need ofreinforcement. Horrocks' corps wasabout to enter Antwerp. Between thecity port and the Ardennes, on an arcof 150 miles to the south-east, a fewweak German detachments occupiedportions of the West Wall defences orwatched the major bridges across theAlbert Canal and the Maas river. Theycould not be sure whether the enemyhad already come up to and passedbetween their positions; for therewere gaps of ten and more milesbetween posts. In the north, theremnant of Fifteenth Army had beendriven back to the Scheldt estuary.Sixty miles to the south, a cloud ofdefeated, disorganised groups, for-

merly the Seventh Army, was movingacross the countryside, veering nownorth-eastward towards the bordersof Holland and Germany to avoidbeing run down by Hodges' army.The immediate requirement to man

and hold a defence line to theArdennes, Model reported, was '

. . .

twenty-five fresh divisions with anadequate armoured reserve of five to

52

six Panzer divisions . . . otherwise thegateway into north-west Germanywill be open.'When this signal was received at

Hitler's headquarters in East Prussiaon the morning of 4th September, thestaff" could off"er the Fiihrer no sugges-tions as to where even one freshdivision might be found. Nothing couldbe spared from Russia. Italy had beencut beyond the minimum requirementof its commander for defence. CertainPanzer divisions, spent to exhaustionin the east, were reforming as brigadesbut were unable to be moved.Himmler's new volksgrenadier divi-

sions were still enrolling schoolboysand pensioners. As a desperate expedi-

ent, it was decided to send Model'battalions' as individual units, com-prised of training staff's, police, store-

men, pioneer labour, Todt workers of

all nationalities, hospital convales-cents. The navy was stripped of menin shore establishments. Coastal bat-

teries were ordered to send half their

manpower. Even the flak regiments

General Student inspecting

parachute troops

i^^'ri

^ V

:^:^"'--:i

'^<*-o>^ V

The crossing of the Albert Canal.Tanks and transport cross the bridgeput up by engineers

were obliged to find a quota for thewestern front. The sum of thesemeasures was 135,000, 150 'battalions',the infantry for twenty-five divisions.Though the figure was impressive, thearmy staff knew very well that, evenwhen they were organised and moved,the presence of these units would beof value only to thicken a defenceline already formed and controlled.There was thus some relief when

Goring announced on the 4th that hehad to ofl"er an 'army' already forming,much of it in being. He referred to thesix parachute regiments training andreorganising after operations, some ofwhose battalions had been almostcompletely reconstituted by trainees.The convalescent depots should yielda further two regiments, making atotal of 20,000 troops. To these hewould add a further 10,000 officers andmen from air and ground crews,station staffs and signals who wereidle because of the shortage of fuel forthe Luftwaffe squadrons. Under

General Karl Student, Commander-in-Chief of German airborne forces,they would constitute the FirstParachute Army. That afternoon,Goring telephoned Student, who wasin Berlin, and told him to report assoon as possible to the commander ofArmy Group B.Meantime, Model was watching

anxiously the forces he had deployedin an effort to stem the allied advance.At the beginning of September,

there was only one division in Holland,the 719th, comprised of fit men overforty-five and others, younger, unfitfor full service in the field. Its taskwas coast defence. In August, its

mobility had been improved by a rein-forcement of horses impressed fromthe Dutch populace; its ranks filled

out by Luftwaffe ground staffs. Thiswas the force sent into Belgium tohalt Horrocks.The senior and elderly general com-

manding the division, Karl Sievers,decided to dig his defences on thenorth bank of the Albert canal betweenAntwerp and Hasselt. The canalwaters would oblige the Bjritish topause before crossing, though he had

54

necessarily to leave a number ofbridges undemolished to pass over thefew but precious armoured vehicles,

guns and trucks returning with thestragglers.By chance, another German general

had halted in the same area where,with energy and skill, he was organis-ing an important and unexpectedcontribution to the defence force.

Lieutenant-General Kurt Chill wasalso a senior and older general butone who had been reckoned capable of

commanding a field division, the 85th,

in France. This formation had beenscattered and driven north with theremainder of Seventh Army but, dayby day as they marched. Chill hadwhipped-in whatever he could find of

his own men. He had also taken undercommand pieces of the 84th and 89thDivisions, which accompanied himinto Belgium across the Albert Canal.At Turnhout, Chill's headquartersmanaged to make contact with head-quarters of Seventh Army. Instruc-tions were received to march on intothe Rhineland where they mightreorganise and rest. But while pausingto obtain orders. Chill had discovered

that the length of the Albert Canalwas undefended except for GeneralSievers' men. He decided that theReich would be better served if hestayed in Belgium. On 5th September,he contacted Sievers and agreed to

extend the defences towardsMaastricht. Meanwhile, he had estab-lished strong collecting posts on thebridges round Herentals which identi-

fied every German serviceman, vehicleand gun passing over before directingthem to a concentration area. As theycame in, men and equipment werereceived by a detachment of Chill's

headquarters staff", questioned as to

speciality and then allotted to one oranother unit of the swelling force.

By such means, the gaps closed on8th September in the approaches to

Holland and north-west Germany.With the arrival of the 176th Divisionfrom Aachen, the Albert Canal wasmanned from Antwerp to Maastricht.Behind this thin screen, the first twoparachute regiments were arrivingfrom Germany; one of trainees, theother von der Heydte's 6th ParachuteRegiment, the strongest of Student'sairborne units, a body of veterans.

55

Above: Colonel-General von Zangen. Above right: Lieutenant-General Willi

Bittrich. Right above and below: SS troops in Holland. Far right: The leader of areconnaissance patrol writes his report

close-knit by comradeship in manypast battles.Every day, almost every hour after

the arrival of Horrocks' corps inBrussels, Model had expected to hearthat the British Second Army hadresumed its advance and brokenthrough into Holland. He did notknow that Horrocks' tanks and truckshad petrol only for one hundred miles,a slender ration disposed by Demp-sey's decision to -leave VIII Corps onthe Seine. Horrocks was only tooanxious to move on to the Rhine; somuch so that, as he tells us withadmirable frankness, 'my eyes wereentirely on the Rhine, and everythingelse seemed of subsidiary importance.It never entered my head that theScheldt would be mined, and that weshould not be able to use Antwerp portuntil the channel had been swept andthe Germans cleared from the coastline on either side. Nor did I realise

that the Germans would be able toevacuate a large number of the troopstrapped in the coastal areas across themouth of the Scheldt estuary.'On 6th September, Second Army

opened a small forward supply base in

Brussels. Dempsey told Horrocks tomove on and the 11th ArmouredDivision attempted at once to crossthe Albert Canal. But by this time,Chill's force - now renamed Kampf-gruppe Chill - had collected a numberof anti-tank gun detachments. Thecrossing was denied with a hot fire

which showed that the Germans hadput the delay of two days to good use.Horrocks brought forward an infantrydivision to force a bridgehead at Gheelwhile the Guards Armoured Divisioncaptured another at Beeringen. Butnow von der Heydte's parachutistscame into the battle. Every village,

every copse on the heathland roundBourg Leopold was contested as theGuardsArmoured Division and Belgian'White' Brigade fought towards theMeuse-Escaut canal. Then, on the 10th,

a chance discovery by an armouredcar troop of the British HouseholdCavalry was turned boldly to advan-tage. They found an unmapped roadwhich by-passed Hechtel and led

forward along this route the tanks of

the 3rd Irish Guards to capture, in awaning light, by a brisk action, abridge across the Meuse-Escaut canal.

56

^ -nit '-*.. J! '.'»

•*-;

f

1

V « /;

\^ ^\<#\ m-

^

The British now looked over intoHolland.With the capture of a bridgehead

over the Meuse-Escaut canal, GeneralStudent agreed that the Albert Canaleast of Herentals'should be abandoned.All troops in this sector were orderedto withdraw during darkness behindthe Meuse-Escaut line.

At this time, Model's apprehensionsof a strong British advance fromAntwerp were diminishing. On thecoast, Zangen had been ordered tosend eastward whatever troops ofFifteenth Army he could spare fromthe defence of the Scheldt estuary.The First Parachute Army had severalfurther canals and the rivers Maas,Waal and Rhine on which to deny theapproach to Germany through Hol-land. Behind these, the military com-mander in Holland had been orderedto improvise further defences. A causeof continuing anxiety was the frontin the area of Aachen. Seventh Armywere not receiving the reinforcementsthey needed and there were daily

British troops prepare to cross theMeuse-Escaut canal

reports of troops massing on theeastern flank of the British SecondArmy. On the 14th September, Model'sIntelligence staff offered a forecast ofevents in the form of 'orders' whichthey suggested General Eisenhowermight issue.

'The Second British Army . . . willassemble its formations on the Maas-Scheldt and Albert canals. On its rightwing it will concentrate an attackforce comprised mainly of armouredunits which, after forcing a crossing ofthe Maas, will launch operations tobreak through into the Rhine - West-phalia (Ruhr) industrial area with themain thrust via Roermond. Coveringthe northern flank, the left of the(British) Army will close to the Waalat Nijmegen and thereby create thebasic conditions necessary to cut off

German forces in the Dutch coastalarea. In conjunction with these opera-tions, a large-scale airborne landingis planned by the First Allied AirborneArmy north of the Lippe river in thearea south of Munster, on a date to bedecided.'This was a reasonable guess at allied

intentions - Dempsey had considered

just such a plan - though it committedGeneral Brereton's force to a depthfar greater than any airborne opera-tion envisaged by the allies. BothModel and Rundstedt agreed with its

general premises, which they nowused to endorse their demands for

properly formed and equipped divi-

sions from the Reich.With the approach of the battle line

and in expectation of a major thrustacross the Rhine south of the Lipperiver. Model had already moved hisheadquarters further into Hollandbehind the protective covering of theMaas, Waal and Rhine and the inter-

mediate canals. He thus positionedhimself outside the northern touch-line of the anticipated field of playwhile retaining, thanks to theefficiency of German communications,the ability to signal speedily instruc-tions to the principals in his team:Zangen of Fifteenth Army; Student,with the First Parachute Army in thecentre; Brandenberger and SeventhArmy to the south.In Holland, the local military com-

mander was an air force general,Friedrich Christiansen. Though

despised by his clever, egocentricchief of staff, who referred to him inprivate as "the tug-boat skipper','cunning as a peasant', he had servedthe Reich well by maintaining onlysufficient pressure on the Dutch tomeet his needs without incurringtheir extreme resentment ; an examplewhich his SS colleague would havedone well to follow. Ordered by Modelto form fighting units from the hotch-potch of training establishments,supply depots and garrison staffs - all

that remained after he had despatchedSievers' division and his one corpsheadquarters to the Albert canal - heacted promptly. Forward, on the Waaland the Rhine, he arranged a screenorganisation to catch the scatteringsfrom the defeat in France. To commandit, he appointed an aged general, Hansvon Tettau, to whom he gave theNCOS School and a 'battalion' formedfrom the training base of the SSPanzer Grenadiers. Within ten days,these units had intercepted over 3,000

men - sailors, airmen and soldiers ofvarious arms - who were organisedinto units, the transport and weaponsbrought in amongst them being divi-

W

Lieutenant-Colonel Walter Harzer

ded on a roug'hly equal basis.Behind the screen, Christiansen's

chief of staff disposed the remainingtroops between garrisons and a localreserve. From the training establish-ments of the Waffen-SS, he squeezedtwo more units: two more and areconnaissance company came fromthe Herman Goring Division's recruittraining centre; two were found bythe military police; three byGeorgians and Caucasians who hadvolunteered from Russian prisoner ofwar cages to serve in the Wehrmacht;and amongst the dregs was a battalionof Dutch SS, some of whom had beenrecruited from criminals in localprisons. It was a motley body, rangingfrom the seasoned officers and NCOsfrom the schools, some partly inca-pacitated by wounds, through the rawbut devoted SS and Herman Goringrecruits, to the ad hoc battalions andbatteries caught in Tettau's net,descending to the sly and anxiousrenegades from Russia and Holland.The allied intelligence at this time

of 'small numbers of hastily organiseddefence units' in the Arnhem area,'not amounting to more than a brigadeat the most' was not inexact. That is

to say, it was not inexact as far as it

went. What was not known in thefirst half of September was that Model,denied armour from Germany, had

ordered two Panzer divisions InFranceto concentrate in Holland.Amongst the wreck of the Panzer

army withdrawing through France inlate August was a corps containingtwo divisions of the Waffen-SS: the9th (Hohenstaufen) and 10th (Frundes-berg). Transferred to Normandy fromPoland during June, this corps, H SSPanzer, had arrived in time to jointhe battle round Caen and owed some-thing to Kluge who had begun theirdisengagement without Hitler's sanc-tion, thereby preserving some oftheir strength. Committed again toreopen the Falaise pocket, theysucceeded briefly but at a cost intanks. When Model ordered their with-drawal to the Seine, allied aircraftstruck their columns repeatedly. It

was a depleted corps that crossed theriver north of Paris, yet still an entity.Scarcely pausing, they moved onbetween the Scheldt and the Sambre,threatened by the onrush of Britishtanks into Cambrai and the advancedguards of Hodges' army to the east.Changing direction, increasing thepace. General Willi Bittrich, the corpscommander, drew away from hispursuers and at last, beyondMaastricht, behind the Maas, foundsafe territory in which he might resthis weary remnants.A message from Model reached him

here on 4th September: he was tosend the two divisions - or whatremained of them - to concentrationareas north and north-east of Arnhem.Next day, Bittrich was ordered tofollow with his headquarters. BehindArnhem he would reform his corps,retaining one of his own and receivingtwo other skeleton Panzer divisionsto be disengaged as soon as possiblefrom support of the Seventh Armyline. At once, accompanied by a staff

officer and radio truck, Bittrich droveto Oosterbeek to see Model, while his

headquarters packed and made readyto move.Between the 7th, when Bittrich

arrived at Oosterbeek, and the 10thSeptember, when his headquartershad established itself at Doetinchem,east of the Ijssel, there were severalchanges of plan for II Panzer Korps,not surprisingly in view of the con-tinually changing circumstances of

the battlefield. Zangen had now suc-

60

ceeded in reorganising one division

of those he had evacuated across theScheldt, the 245th, which wouldshortly pass to First ParachuteArmy, but it was a feeble one. It

would be followed by the 59th, two-thirds below strength in infantry butotherwise in good heart. These troopsshould cover adequately the rear of

Sievers' division, the parachutists andKampfgruvpe Chill. To the south.

Model signalled Rundstedt on the 8th,'

. . . there is only a very thin andtotally inadequate defence line. Herethe enemy enjoys almost completefreedom of movement as far as theWest Wall which is held - to the rearof Seventh Army - by only seven oreight battalions on a front of 120

kilometres (seventy-five miles).'

North of Aachen he was organising anad hoc formation, Korps Feldt. namedafter its commander, with a make-shift division of soldiers and airmen.The frontier district headquarters,Wehrkreis VI, would equip Korps Feldtand provide it with whatever oddtanks and guns - mostly from oldFrench stocks - it could scrape to-

gether. Once again the hospitalswould offer men from the variouswards to form 'stomach case' or 'ear

case' battalions. 9th SS Panzer Divi-

sion was to be prepared to movesouth to assist if the Americanspenetrated the West Wall. The 10thwas to go back to Germany to refit.

Increasingly, both Model and Rund-stedt, his immediate superior ascommander-in-chief in the west, be-

gan to fear an invasion of Hollandfrom the sea; German Intelligencehad reported that assault landingcraft were being assembled once moreby the allies. Such landings might wellbe in combination with an airborneassault. As commander in the Nether-lands, General Christiansen wasordered to consider plans to countersuch operations. With the initiative

in his enemies' hands, and indicationsof fresh dangers each day from intelli-

gence and operational reports, Modelwas obliged to diversify his arrange-ments. On 10th September, whenHitler's headquarters ordered theearly despatch to Germany of oneof the two SS Panzer divisions, therewas a further change: it was the9th (Hohenstaufen) that was now to go

r^1^«>. 4xa«-1p l^-A^.M'

General Friedrich Christiansen,military governor of Holland

since the 10th had been strengthenedby fragments of two panzer battalionsdirected into its area.In the absence of the divisional

commander, lying wounded in hos-pital, the 9th Division was commandedby its chief of staff, the young andcapable Walter Harzer. He was orderedby Bittrich to pass all his armour -

about fifteen Mark IV and V tanks -

armoured and scout cars, half-trackedarmoured infantry carriers, artillery,

mortars and supply trucks to Major-General Heinz Harmel's 10th Division.Troop carrying and supply transportwas to be handed" over progressively

61

Major-General Heinz Harmel, commander 10th SS Panzer Division

62

as the 9th left by rail for Germany, thefirst trains being scheduled to departon 13th September.The presence of II SS Panzer Korps

had not gone unnoticed by the localmembers of the brave Dutch under-ground movement. To avoid as far aspossible detection by the radio-direction finding apparatus of theGerman counter-intelligence organi-sation, local messages were collectedby individual groups and then sent toan area radio transmitter for despatchto London. Late on 8th September,the leader of the 'Albrecht' groupcollected a message from Roermondreporting: 'Large transports of SSPanzer troops have passed throughhere from Maastricht direction (duringthe night 7th/8th) heading northwardstowards Maas and Waal.' This waseither 10th SS Panzer or part of corpsheadquarters. On the 14th, 'Albrecht'group reported again, noting thepresence of a division (actually boththe 9th and 10th) west and east of theriver Ijssel and a headquarters(actually II SS Panzer Korps) atDoetinchem. On the same day, theRotterdam radio also passed to Londona message from the 'Kees' group: "SSDivision Hohenstrufl (Hohenstaufen)along Ijssel. Units from this divisionnoticed from Arnhem to Zutphen-Appeldoorn. HQ perhaps at Eefde(actually in Beekbergen). Field forti-

fications being built along the Ijssel.'

These details were passed urgentlyto SHAEF. Combing through their

card-index system, Eisenhower's In-

telligence staff" had no difficulty in

identifying the subject of the Dutchmessages as 9th SS Panzer, with whichmight well, be found the 10th. It wasexpected that they would be re-

equipped with tanks from a Panzerreserve park believed to be 'in the ai'ea

of Cleves (Kleve)' just across the Rhinein Westphalia.General Eisenhower's chief-of-staff.

Bedell Smith, was understandablyalarmed at this new and more detailedcorroboration of 'Albrecht's' reportfrom Roermond. His chief agreed thathe should go forward to see Field-Marshal Montgomery to discusswhether they should either drop theequivalent of a second division atArnhem or move the 101 or 82nd todrop with the British 1st Division.

General Bedell Smith recalled afterthe war that his mission was not takenseriously by the Field-Marshal who'ridiculed the idea' and 'waved myobjections airily aside'. Yet, valid asthese impressions may be, strongreasons prompted Montgomery todismiss any idea of a change of plan -

and hence a postponement - at such alate hour. Every day there wereintelligence reports, many from under-ground sources, of new and unexpectedenemy troop concentrations. Themajority of these proved to be mis-leading. Though the reports of armourat Arnhem certainly had some sub-stance - allied air reconnaissance hadphotographed a small number oftanks in the area after the first Dutchreports had come in - they did notindicate strength. Everywhere alongthe front there were small groups of

tanks, sometimes with self-propelled

guns. There were also various Panzer'divisions', but these were known tobe skeletons of the original bodies.The British and American armies hadpassed in their pursuit across Francecolumn after column of broken andbui^ned out tanks and other vehicles;manifest testimony of the destructionof the German Panzer army in thewest. Why should they now believethat the 'tanks' and 'Panzer divisions'at Arnhem were numerous andthreatening when elsewhere it wasknown that they were not? Moreover,if they delayed Market to change theplan, were they not giving theGermans yet more time to recovertheir strength?All operations of war involved a risk.

It was reckoned by the Field-Marshalthat they had calculated this risk asfar as it was possible to do so. Giventhe weather, Operation Market wason.

63

^-»v.

\- .- jfcfltc^r

Army, Air Force and SS tried to recruit Dutch into local' defence units. Veryfew responded but the variety of uniforms reflects the several controllingagencies

•;.-vk

;.'/"

odel (left) confers with Student, Bittrich and Harmel

L_^

\

16tli September

The Reichskommisar controlling Hol-land was a g-eneral of the SS, HansAlbin Rauter. He was nominally theservant of several German depart-ments of state but the only one ofsignificance was the SS and policedepartment under the notoriousHeinrich Himmler. On the instruc-tions of his chief, Rauter called onModel at his headquarters in the Tafel-berg Hotel in Oosterbeek on 15th Sep-tember as a courtesy and to discussthe operational situation from theirrespective standpoints.

It was Ranter's task to maintaininternal order. He half expected a ris-

ing by the Dutch people at any timeand had advised General Christiansento ensure that military headquarterswere properly protected against sur-prise attack. During his visit, he nowasked Model whether he had sufficienttroops to secure the command post ofArmy Group B in case of insurrection.Model, and his chief of staff" Krebs,found this amusing. 'We have morethan we need, " said Krebs, '250 militarypolice look after our security.'Rauter persisted. Supposing there

should be an airborne landing; wouldthis force still be enough?

68

The two soldiers now gave Rauter abrief discourse on the use of parachutetroops. Their selection and trainingai'e of a special nature, they explained

;

therefore they are used only at criticaltimes. Nijmegen and Arnhem are un-likely to become the centre of a critic-

al battle. The supply line of the Brit-ish Second Army runs from Cherbourg(so they believed) and must thereforebe stretched to its maximum extent.Antwerp is not open to their use andwill continue to be denied even afterthe Scheldt is cleared as it lies withinrange of the VI launchers. Arnhem wasmore than ninety miles from the Brit-ish line

.

' Surely you know, ' said Model,'that Montgomery is a very cautiousgeneral, not inclined to plunge intomad adventures.' Would he attemptto rush forward over such a distanceand without a forward supply base?It was their view that the allied air-

borne army would be used near Diissel-dorf when their ground forces hadcrossed the Rhine. Faced with such aprofessional opinion, Rauter off'ered

no further argument.

Hans Albin RauterSS for Holland

Reichskommissar

^

^^

f\

\

All the same, lie was not convinced.The British were a sporting nation,always ready for a gamble, he felt.

That day he gave orders to Major SeppKrafTt, commanding one of the Waf-fen-SS recruit 'battalions' to move onthe 16th September to Oosterbeek tobe at. hand i^ Headquarters, ArmyGroup B should be attacked.On 16th September, Student's opera-

tional report concluded that ' ... in-

creased motor transport activity andconfirmed armoured preparations (byXXX Corps) strengthen the appreci-ation . . . that a heavy attack must beexpected shortly.'That day, the dispirited 245th Divi-

sion from the Scheldt arrived in rearof Kampfgruppe Chill and began to digdefences along the edges of the drain-age ditches and the canal banks,amongst the thin leafy spinneys andthe villages. To the west, GeneralPoppe brought his 59th Division to therailway and began to load guns andtrucks on to flat cars for the journeyinto North Brabant.North of Arnhem, Lieutenant-Col-

onel Walter Hartzer remained with thebulk of the 9th Division; for only asmall proportion of liis command hadleft for Germany due to the raids ofallied bombers and the Dutch under-ground on the railway tracks anduntil the last he had been ordered topreserve the capability to fight. Hepossessed still the greater part of histank company and almost all of hisother fighting vehicles. To account forthis failure to comply with orders hehad told corps headquarters and 10thDivision that what remained wasunserviceable and could not be moveduntil his fitters had done their work,a lie made jilausible by the gratuitousremoval of tank tracks and truckwheels and the genuine bustle ofexhaustive repair and maintenancein all parks in his area. None of hisequipment had been seen by alliedairmen or reconnaissance camerasbecause of extensive screening bycamouflage nets.

He reckoned without the watchfulDutch underground.On 16th September, Rotterdam trans-

mitted another message from the'Kees' group. 'At Arnhem (there is asign) Meldekopf Hohenstaufi - Hohen-staufen Division Information Post.

Above: Park Hotel, Hartenstein,Model's headquarters. Right: Dutchresistance radio

This iS: assembly place of members ofthe SS division previously reported.Also at Arnhem, Meldekopf Hartzerpresumably forming part of a unitsituated south of Arnhem.'Neither this nor any other of the

connected underground messageswere passed to General Browning.Indirectly, through an officer at head-quarters of XXX Corps, he learnedthat there were reports of Germanarmour in Arnhem and he recalled asimilar report in connection withOperation Comet. When he queriedthis with 21st Army Group, the replywas meant to be both accurate andreassuring: 'not more than a battlegroup, if that.'

Reviewing in his mind what he pos-sessed in anti-tank weapons loadedinto gliders and under the parachut-ists' aircraft, Browning reflected thatone armoured battle group was themost that the corps could cope with.But it was too late to draw back.On the 16th September, General

Brereton lunched with Browning in

the club house at Moor Park andwished him luck. His British deputywas 'in good spirits', he noted in his

diary. Everything now depended onthe final weather forecast. At 1900

hours, assured of a fine day in spite of

early morning fog, Brereton made his

decision : they would fly the operation.

70

?-

1

Market begins

As it grew dark on the Saturday night,while the parachutists and the glidertroops made their way to the airfield

canteens, 200 Lancasters of RoyalAir Force Bomber Command andtwenty-three Mosquitoes began theirjourney towards the four German air-

fields supporting the Netherlands andone near Berlin. The latter, Rheine,was the subject of a special operationdesigned to crater the runways andthus deny take-oflf facility to the newjet fighters stationed there, the first

in Luftwaffe service. Ahead of thebomber force flew a combined force ofAmerican and British aircraft con-taining radio devices to jam theenemy radar detectors.While these raids proceeded, fifty-

nineRAF bombers struck flak defencesin the Netherlands. The targets hadbeen carefully selected so as not tosuggest to the Luftwaffe intelligencestaffs that air corridors were beingopened.Next morning, bombers continued

their preparatory work. Under Spit-fire escort, 100 RAF bombers struckat fiak defences on Walcheren andSchouwen islands and flak ships near-by. Later, a huge force of more than

72

1,000 bombers and fighter escorts ofthe United States Eighth Air Forcestrafed 112 anti-aircraft positions. Bythis time, the last tendrils of morn-ing fog had dispersed from Britishairfields and the air transports hadrisen up from the fields in Hampshire,Berkshire, Wiltshire, Oxfordshire andGloucestershire, Lincolnshire, North-amptonshire and Cambridgeshire,'like a great swarm of bees ascending,singing and droning' as they appearedto an old farmer near Hertford. In theground dispersals, 1,131 allied fighterpilots waited in their Spitfires, Temp-ests, Mosquitoes, P-47s, P-38sandP-51s,ready for the signal to spring into theair to protect the soldiers of the alliedairborne army en route to the Nether-lands. Coastal beacons stood readywith searchlights and radio to provideground fixes for the navigators. Twobeacon ships were at their sea ren-dezvous while over a range of theNorth Sea narrows air-sea rescueteams watched the skies, listened to

their radios.The Pathfinders led the transports:

'Gathering in all the little chickens'C47 Dakotas in flight

Loaded for battle, Horsa gliders formup for their tugs

M

%*^*-f-i^iimk tiaXi

twelve converted British Toombers,six American Dakotas, each withaircrews selected for their skill innavigation and dropping accuracy,each with teams of the army path-finder units who would have twentyminutes to lay out their colouredmarker panels and radio beacons onthe glider landing zones, the para-chute dropping zones. Those carriedin the British bombers suffered thedisadvantage of a journey spent in

almost complete darkness in the tun-nel of the hull. They were unable tosmoke due to the fire risk and whenthe time came to make their exits,

they would have to leave through anaperture in the floor. In contrast, theDakota off'ered bucket seats, a warmcabin with windows and a spaciousdoor in rear on the port side fromwhich to jump. Smoking was permit-ted. There were no volunteers for

transportation in the bombers.Travelling with the main stream

was Ed Murrow, correspondent of theColumbia Broadcasting System whorecorded his impressions:'Early this morning, the paratroop-

ers, laden down with equipment, walk-ed out across a green field and climbedinto the C-47s. After we took off" weseemed to gather more ships as wepassed a series of airfields and thepilot said: "We're gathering in all thelittle chickens before we cross the bigwater." The paratroops sat relaxed;two of them were asleep. The door atthe rear of the plane hadbeen removed

;

all the belts and hinges had been cover-ed with tape to prevent the parachuteharness from fouling. The big fellow

near the door looked down and said:

"Look at them land girls down therepicking potatoes!" The men werecompletely relaxed. Occasionally, onewould rub the palm of his hand on his

trouser leg. One sat staring into his

tin helmet . . .

'Now we are over Holland and I'mgoing to move forward, up to the pi-

lot's compartment, and I've got myparachute harness hung on the door.

We're flying over country that hasbeen inundated . . .

'The skipper is sitting there very

Left: Inside a C47, a para holds his

reserve parachute and 'walkie-talkie'.

Far right: 'There they go ...'

calmly, flying with one hand. There is

no traffic on this one railway (trackbeing followed), which stands wellabove the water. It seems to have beenbuilt along the top of a dyke. Thecountryside below looks like the arearound the Mississippi during the flood

time except that all the houses seem to

be covered with red tile. The spire of amagnificent old Dutch church rises

clear above the little houses that sur-

round it. One barge in a canal, butcompletely deserted.

'I'm standing here, looking backdown the length of the ship now.The crew chief is on his knees back in

the very rear, talking into his inter-

com . . . They're looking out of thewindow rather curiously, almost as if

they were passengers on a peacetimeairline . . .

'The pilot of this plane has just said

:

"Jerry must not live here any more.He isn't shooting at us." We've beenflying straight into Holland for some-thing like twenty minutes, so far with-out any opposition. Our fighters aredown, just almost nosing along thehedgerows, searching the little vil-

lages, and are up above us and on bothsides. This is the real meaning of airpower.

'There's a burst of flak. You can seeit right from the side. It's coming fromthe port side just across our nose, buta little bit low. Tracers going acrossus, in front of our nose. I think it's

coming from that little village justbeside the canal. More tracer comingup now, a lovely orange colour it is,

in just about forty seconds now ourship will drop the men ; they will walkout on to Dutch soil. You can probablyhear the snap as they check the lash-ing on the static line (anchored in theaircraft). There they go ! Do you hearthem count? Three . . . four . . . five . .

.

six . . . seven . . . eight . . . nine . . . ten. . . eleven . . . twelve . . . thirteen . . .

fourteen ... fifteen . . . sixteen. Nowevery man is out. I can see their'chutes going down now. Every manclear . . . they're dropping beside thelittle windmill near a church, hangingthere very gracefully, and seem to becompletely relaxed, like nothing somuch as khaki dolls hanging beneathgreen lampshades. I see the men godown just north of a little road. Thewhole sky is filled with parachutes.

0\

i^

They're all going down so slowly.'It was 12 30 hours.At Vught, a pleasant town on the

Dommel river, General Student hadhis headquarters. 'At about noon (1300hours British Summer Time)', he says,'I was disturbed at my desk by a roar-ing in the air of such mounting in-

tensity that I finally left my studyand went on to the balcony. WhereverI looked, I saw aircraft, troop carriersand large (bomber) aircraTt towinggliders. They flew both in formationand singly. It was an immense streamwhich passed quite low over the house.I was greatly impressed by the spect-acle and I must confess that duringthese minutes the danger of the situa-tion never occurred to me. I merelyrecalled with ijome regret my ownearlier airbori e operations.' Turningto his chief-of-stafF who had come outto join him on the balcony, he cried,

'Oh, how I wish that I had ever hadsuch powerful means at my disposal!'Then, recovering, he began to call forreports concerning those who hadlanded close by (101st), and the dest-ination of the greater (northern)stream which had passed on.

A most complete answer came tohim far more quickly than he couldhave expected. One of the gliders hehad seen had subsequently been hit byflak, losing part of a wing. It falteredand then hurtled to the ground, killinginstantaneously the American soldi-

ers and crew inside. A platoon of Ger-man soldiers ran to the wreckage andbegan to search the bodies. In thebreast pocket of an officer, a soldiernamed Koch found a file of papers andmaps which, after a moment's glance,he passed to his sergeant. It was acopy of the plan for Operation Market.This plan was on Student's desk

within a few hours. It told him notonly where the landings had takenplace but precisely who had arrived,who was to follow and what tasks eachairborne unit had been given. Whilethe information and consequent orderswere prepared for the formations ofFirst Paracliute Army, an attemptwas made urgently to contact Model'sheadquarters in the Tafelberg Hotelat Oosterbeek. But it seemed that thepremises had been abandoned.At 1300 hours, the commander of

Army Group B had been drinking a

glass of wine prior to lunch, for whicha cold table had already been set out.Close to the hour, the sound of manyaircraft engines was heard - not forthe first time that day as there hadbeen several air raids. 'Bombers,'said an officer, going to the window tolook out. What he saw alarmed himmuch more : enemy parachutists weredropping in the open country immedi-ately to the west.This was formidable news. All the

officers present had heard of the sur-prise capture by the British of severalhigh headquarters in their advanceacross France and there had beensome talk of what should be donewhen such circumstances threatened.Whatever their immediate reactions,now that they were in precisely thisdanger, however, outward calm waspreserved due to Model's presence.Quickly, he detailed three tasks: theevacuation of the area to GeneralBittrich's location; their movementto be covered by Sepp Krafft's SSTraining Battalion; Generals Bittrichand Christiansen to be ordered to sendtroops forward as quickly as possible.This delivered. Model ran upstairs topack a suitcase and such papers aswere immediately to hand. Throwingon a black leather jacket, he hurrieddownstairs, carrying his case past thescampering headquarters staff. At theentrance way, the Commander-in-Chief's case sprang open releasingclothes and toilet articles on to thepaving. These were bundled roughlyback while his staff car stood waiting,the engine running, the driver nervous-ly hooting though no one stood intheir way. His suitcase loaded. Modelleapt into the front seat, his personalstaff into the back and the car acceler-ated on to the road, followed by acolumn of other cars, radio vehiclei^

and trucks.A mile along the road towards

Arnhem. Model saw an SS major pedal-ling a bicycle hard in the same direct-

tion. The staff car pulled alongside.Leaning over the open window. Modelcalled out, 'Which way to GeneralBittrich's headquarters?''The Doetinchem road,' the major

shouted back. With a roar, the staff

car shot on into Arnhem.

Horsa in free flight

78

British bomber converted for

paratroops

In the town, the Commander-in-Chief stopped at the garrison head-quarters. Inside, it was clear that theyhad had the news of the landings ; foreverywhere there was confusion : staff

officers, clerks, orderlies and policewere running about, the officers andNCOS shouting, telephones ringing.Using his powerful voice. Model order-ed everyone to be silent and stand still,

an order which was instantly obeyed.He then instructed General Kussin,the commander, to send a radio mes-sage direct to Hitler, telling him whathad happened. The account he gaveKussin included the remark that hehad escaped 'through the eye of aneedle', a nice phrase which the gar-rison commander passed on to theFiihrer.All this took about five minutes.

Model returned to his car and resumedthe journey to Doetinchem and Gener-al Bittrich's headquarters.Bittrich did not receive the news

that parachutists had landed fromArmy Group B but from the LuftwaffeCommunications Network. Thoughthe pathfinder landings went un-noticed, five minutes after the first

release of the main body of parachut-ists, II SS Panzer Korps had a warningwith rough locations of the drop.Soon after, there came a second andmore detailed report. It was confirmedthat both Arnhem and Nijmegen were

involved; areas to which the BritishSecond Army must now drive if theywere to effect relief. He issued thefollowing orders before 1330 hours.'9th SS Panzer Division:1. Division to reconnoitre in the direc-tion of Arnhem and Nijmegen.2. The division to go immediately intoaction, occupying the Arnhem areaand destroying the enemy forceswhich have landed to the west of Arn-hem at Oosterbeek. Immediate attackis essential. The aim is to occupy andfirmly hold the bridge at Arnhem.''10th SS Panzer Division:Division to proceed immediately toNijmegen, occupying the main bridgein strength, and defending the bridge-heads (to the south of the River Waal).'Traffic over the Rhine bridge atArnhem to be controlled by the FieldSecurity Police of II SS Panzer Korps.'When Model arrived, he approved all

that had been done. Already, 10th SS-Panzer Division were calling theirmen in from the Sunday holiday. Theyawaited similar confimation fromthe 9th.

At that time, Harzer was visitinghis reconnaissance battalion to decor-ate its commanding officer with theIron Cross, an award he had won forgallantry in Normandy. He had seenparachutists and gliders landing at adistance but, strangely, took no actionto inform himself of what was happen-ing. If he was relying on the telephone,he overlooked the fact that the Dutchoperators were hastening slowly, apolicy they often used against theGermans. Eventually, while he wasstill at lunch with the officers of thebattalion, a sweating orderly rode upon a bicycle with the message contain-ing his orders. Now Harzer reactedswiftly.

'By the time I returned to my head-quarters at Beekbergen,' Harzer wrotein his battle report, 'my staff hadalerted all stand-by units and thesereported within an hour that theywere ready to move, except the recon-naissance battalion . . . which had to

fit tracks on their armoured personnelcarriers and mount part of their arm-ament, since these vehicles had beenreported unserviceable to corps in

order to avoid handing them over to

the 10th SS Panzer Division.' Therewere also stores to be brought back and

80

unloaded from the three railwaytrains which had left the station forGermany that morning. They werehalted and brought back to the near-est open sidings. In all, Harzer still

had about 3,500 officers and men left

in the area; the 10th Division, 5,000.

though Harmel himself was away in

Germany.Between 1600 and 1700 hours that

afternoon, written orders arrived ateach divisional headquarters, modify-ing those issued earlier but maintain-ing the basic idea that the 9th shouldoperate in the Arnhem-Oosterbeekarea, the 10th round Nijmegen. Bothformations had despatched advancedparties and the reconnaissance bat-talion of the 9th had already crossedthe Rhine to Nijmegen. The 10th werehampered by their lack of radio sets -

another item of equipment whichHarzer had omitted to transfer - butexpected to send off a battle groupshortly. Bittrich's staff remindedthem that speed of action was essent-ial. Confident as he was that theywould contain and then destroy theairborne force on his own side of theRhine, Bittrich was anxious to do so asfar west of Arnhem as possible. UntilHarzer arrived or unless Christiansenhad acted very promptly indeed, theonly force to oppose a move intoArnhem was Sepp Krafft's SS trainees.After the donning of heavy kit and

parachutes, the clambering into theplane; after the aircraft is loaded, thecramped bodies and the engine noise;after the stand-up and the hook-upand the check, the red light and thegreen light, the rush through the door.Above their dropping zones, the para-

chutists passed in quick successionthrough the doors and apertures, weretossed weightless in the slipstream,heard the exhaust roar die to a mur-mur, the friendly protest of the canopyopening. One by one, hanging belowthe sailing silk or nylon, they floateddown quietly. The ground swayed andtilted, seemed suddenly to rush up tomeet their hanging feet and buffettheir bodies.Few men fouled buildings or trees,

few were injured on landing. The maj-ority of the early casualties were kill-

ed or wounded during the last stage ofthe fly-in over the three sets of drop-ping and landing zones. Four men

Dakota over flooded Dutch country

standing in the door - the leaders oftheir 'sticks' - were hit by anti-air-craft shrapnel or machine gun bul-lets. Thirty-five aircraft were lost,

some crashing after they had dis-

charged their loads or cast off theirtugs. Over the DZs of the 101st, twosoldiers drifting down in their para-chutes had the horrible experience ofbeing cut to pieces by a C-47 out ofcontrol which crashed with them tothe ground. The parachute of a soldierin the 82nd failed to open. Five glidersbroke loose or were hit by- flak andcrashed. The air-sea rescue patrolboats recovered a number of theircomrades from the North Sea, twiceunder the fire of the German coastaldefences. But despite the fears thatflak might destroy up to thirty percent of the transport force, the greatmajority of units arrived safely. Asexpected by the soldiers, aircraft hitand sometimes on flre were flownsteadily on by the aircrew withoutregard for their own subsequentchances of escape.Near Arnhem, Lieutenant-Colonel

'Sheriff' Thompson, commander of theBritish airborne artillery battalion,was absorbed in watching the inund-ations spreading inland from themouth of the Scheldt when, 'quitesuddenly, the air photographs we hadso carefully studied came to life andwe were fast approaching our landingzone.'

81

Glider pilot's view

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Left: The Air-landing Brigade's gliders just after arrival. Above: 'Sherriff

Thompson and his artillery HQ unload from their gliders. Below : Lieutenant-Colonel John Frost(right)

KRAFTS BTN.

IIPPERTS GROUP& OTHER UNITShOIV.VONTETTAU

KAMPFGRUPPEHARZERREINFORCED,

\Naa/ WthSSPZ.OIV.

• Bemmel

#7

,Uden

1500 HRS SEPT 19

504th PARA INF. CROSSWAAL.GRENADIER GDS505th ABN INF. ATTACKBRIDGE

Grave/

0820 HRS SEPT 19

GDS.ARMDDIV.LINK UP WITHUS 82nd ABN. OIV.

Hartenstejn Hotel

British & US Airborne attacks

German counterattacks

Miles

1

—

—^—r—I—'T—^-r

Kilometres 10

The situation in the US 82nd and British 6th Airborne Divisions' areas on19th/20th September

Major Wilson's British pathfindercompany had done their work well.

All dropping- and landing zones weremarked and the British and Americannavigators brought their pilots to thesight of the release points. 149 Dak-otas of IX Troop Carrier Commanddropped BrigadierLathbury's 1st Para-chute Brigade on DZ 'X' while 38 and46 Groups cast off 291 gliders for LZ 'S'

and 'Z' . Inside the Horsas and the giantHamilcars, free nowto skimsilently totheir destinations, were Urquhart,divisional headquarters, much of theairborne reconnaissance squadron andthe 1st Air-landing Brigade.The reconnaissance squadron, com-

manded by Major Freddie Gough, wasunder the orders of the 1st ParachuteBrigade. This formation had been de-

tailed to capture Arnhem Bridge andhold the close approaches to it. Briga-dier Lathbury was conscious of theneed for speed of movement and hehad instructed Gough to hasten withthe majority of his armed jeeps to thebridge as soon as they were unloadedfrom the gliders. Thereafter, the 2ndBattalion of The Parachute Regiment,travelling necessarily on foot, wouldrelieve them and develop defences ateither end of the bridge. The 3rd Bat-talion was to follow the 2nd, but on aparallel road to the north, immedi-ately ready as a reinforcement in caseof mishap while the 1st, in reserve,should prepare to occupy the highground just north of Arnhem if theywere not required for any unanticip-ated task. As most of the commandershad expected, however, there was muchthat it had not been possible to anti-cipate.

Their greeting on arrival went far

beyond what they might have fore-

seen. Though they had known thatthe Dutch would welcome them, somemen were hardly out of their para-chute harness before whole familieswere upon them shaking their hands,patting their backs, sometimes kiss-ing the newcomers, the liberators oftheir land. The national Dutch col-our, orange, was appearing on dressesand jackets. The orange calendulawas picked for the British to wear.A sergeant of the 2nd Battalion,

who had fought through the NorthAfrican campaign and been woundedin the assault into Sicily described the

situation this way : 'They just wouldn'tlet you go. I started calling out to themen in my platoon to get over to therendezvous and slung on my webbing[equipment]. But the Dutch wantedto carry everything for us; they'd gottheir hands on packs ,weapons - every-thing. My company commander askeda Dutchman if there were any Jerriesabout. "No," he said. "They've all runaway now you've come to free us." I

thought this was funny but every timewe asked they said "They've all runaway".' Clearly, some had not. Prison-ers had already been taken on the edgeof the dropping zone but they were thefrightened occupants of a supplypost. Others in Tettau's screen forcehad given themselves up. It took the1st Parachute Brigade about fortyminutes longer than they had plannedto complete the rallying of theirnumbers, some of whom had beendelayed by patients and nurses fromthe mental home nearby which wasin use as a general hospital. It wasgetting on for 1530 hours when Lieu-tenant-Colonel John Frost, com-manding the 2nd Battalion, set off

along the road close to the Rhinebank for Arnhem and the bridge.The reconnaissance squadron should,

by this time, have been on its way.But it had not even assembled. 'I

went by glider with A Troop vehicles,'said Lieutenant John Stevenson. 'Wegot down about 10 minutes before the[squadron] parachute party. It took usfour and a half hours to unload andwhen I looked round for the remainderof the troop vehicles I found that,besides the jeep from our glider, onlytwo others had got down so far.' Asother members of the squadronsearched, it became apparent that byan unhappy coincidence, the gliderswhich had failed to arrive were largelytheirs. Brigadier Lathbury had nowto rely on his infantry and instructedFrost to send men forward on his fewjeeps.

The 3rd Battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Fitch were now moving to thebridge by their own route. They, too,

were delayed by the laughing, hand-clapping Dutch. 'You didn't like to berude,' the Regimental Sergeant-Majorcommented, "but some of our men justhad to drop the apples and tomatoesand bits of bread that the people were

87

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Above: CG4A glider unloading on US landing zone, 'elow: A CG4A crashes on

landing

•fy^ii

Above: Leaving the dropping zone. Below : Liberators perform the resupply

mission

giving- them. They were getting heapedup.' Parties were beckoned urgentlyto follow their new Dutch friendswhom they asked for news of Germans.But instead of the enemy, they wouldfind in some back garden or cottage atray of-.drinks, a box of orange flowers,moi'e apples, even cakes. There was adreamlike quality to this sunnySunday afternoon. Everything seemedso peaceful.Yet many of the airborne soldiers

were uneasy. In the distance, occasion-ally, there was the sound of rifle andmachine gun fire. Suddenly they werein streets where there were no civiliansto be seen and the windows wereshuttered, the streets quiet. But if

there was an enemy, the 3rd Battalionwere asking themselves, who werethey and where were they?Much the same question was in the

mind of General von Tettau, down-stream at Rhenen, promoted nowfrom controlling General Christian-sen's screen on the Rhine to commandthe 'division' of local units. An addi-tion to his many anxieties was theknowledge that the SS training unitstended to refer to their local SSchiefs, who referred to his headquartersas 'the old men's club', to his chief of

staff" as 'the actor Ulrich'. BothTettau and Ulrich had seen the air

transport stream but neither knewexactly where the drop had takenplace. Reports made during the after-

noon by telephone were contradictory.Then, just after 1530 hours, a radiomessage was received from SeppKrafft: 'Battalion Krafft is defending2\ kilometres west of former position.Strong reconnaissance operation in

progress. Night attack intended. Notbeen in action yet. One prisoner.Wolfheze occupied. Enemy reconnais-sance observed in direction Wage-nigen.'

Krafft was making the mistake of

thinking his divisional commanderknew what was happening. He wastherefore astonished to receive this

reply: '1620 hours. Enemy air landingsat Driel, Culembourg, Zaltbommeland Nijmegen. Attack independently.'Nijmegen apart, these points were

miles from the DZs and LZs used.Krafft was perplexed. Wildly keen toshow what his youthful SS soldierscould do, he was already issuing such

orders as 'the enemy will be attackedcontinuously with shock troops' whenhe had less than 450 men of all ranks.Three detachments he sent out wereeither destroyed or forced away fromtheir base as Lieutenant-ColonelDobies' 1st Battalion moved towardsWolfheze. He was therefore delightedto see General Kussin, commander ofArnhem garrison, just after five pm,come to discover the situation forhimself. After they had talked andKussin had approved what he wasdoing, the general returned to his carbut declined Krafft's advice to returnby the Johanna Hoeve road north ofthe railway.

'I have no time to spare', said thegeneral, more correct than he knew.For when he took the road to Ooster-beek, he and his companions ran intoan ambush of the 3rd Battalion andthey were all killed by a burst from alight machine gun.Though Krafi"t thought he had been

holding off the enemy, he had largelybeen fighting shadows. But nowHarzer's advanced elements wereappearing to give substance to resist-

ance.Probably the first person to recog-

nise the danger was Major FreddieGough. With the few vehicles availableto his reconnaissance squadron, hehad discovered that both the 2nd and3rd Battalions were opposed on their

routes into Arnhem. He therefore tried

to bypass these by looping northwardbut soon found himself under rangingfire of several high velocity heavyweapons. Field glasses showed thatthese were mounted on armouredvehicles. Returning through Wolfheze,he warned Dobie's battalion. On theJohanna Hoeve road, the battalionadvanced until they were quicklyengaged by four or five machine gunssited in an arc round the first crossroads. It was Krafft's right handcompany, which was evicted by a quickassault. What concerned Dobie wasthe si'ght of several tanks in rear. His6-pounder troop drove them off but hewisely forbore to follow directly withhis infantry, preferring to switch to

the Ede road to the north. As theybegan to move, five tanks and fifteen

Panzer Grenadier half tracks appearedfrom the east. Any move by theparachute battalion further to the

90

I have no time to spareCussin's car ambushed

/General

lorth must be cut off by the enemy in

iheir tracked transport. Dobie decided:o skip back to the south, hoping:o find a gap between the two roads -

t was that or a withdrawal to Wolf-leze under pressure.They broke contact and sought

jover among a number of little copses.Dne rifle company had lost more thanlalf its number. The other two hadtwelve and seventeen casualties re-

spectively. As all this had occurredjetween 1600 and 2000 hours, with notactical advantage gained, the situa-non was becoming critical. Unable toiiake contact on his radio with brigadeleadquarters or any other unit, Dobieiecided that he must nonetheless find

lis way to the high ground as originallyordered.None of the main divisional wireless

communications were working satis-factorily. Amongst the pine planta-tions and towns of Holland the setslad failed, somewhat as the divisionalsignals commander had feared. He had3een begging the War Office to provide

it more compact and powerful set foraii^borne forces and he had failed topersuade some of his colleagues in thedivision to release more seats andfreight in aircraft for additional signalstations.Unable to talk by voice or key to

any of his commanders. GeneralUrquhart took the practical view thathe must seek them out himself. Heleft his small headquarters at theedge of the landing areas to set off byjeep with a signaller. Soon he came onFrost's battalion headquarters closeto the Rhine bank. After brushingaside Krafft's local defences, thebattalion had pushed on but were nowhalted while the leading companydealt with an armoured car supportedby infantry. Frost was somewhereahead. Leaving a message urgingspeed, Urquhart returned along theroad looking for Lathbury.Lathbury's anxiety for speed of

advance - and the fact that his radiohad little contact - had drawn him tofollow first Frost and now Fitch.The 3rd Battalion had run into Krafft'sleft hand company which gave thema demonstration of brave if often un-

91

skilled fighting-. It was this battleinto which General Kussin ran atabout 1730 hours and was killed. At1800 hours, leaving their dead and sixprisoners, the SS youngsters with-drew to the north. A company of the3rd Ba.ttalion had yet to move off

when mortar bombs began to fall,

whether from Krafft's base plates orHarzer's we do not know. But Urquhartarrived to find Lathbury in the middleof this bombardment and soon thegeneral's jeep was hit, his signallerwounded. A mile beyond. Fitch's fore-most troops had also been halted bymore of Harzer's battle group. It wascoming on towards darkness. Urqu-hart had been fired on several timeson his journey from Frost's to Fitch'sbattalion. Close by, the bodies ofGeneral Kussin and his party pro-vided an object lesson. It is not sur-prising that he decided to spend thenight with Lathbury and the 3rdBattalion.From the road near the river bank,

there was further heavy firing andan immense explosion. Frost's bat-talion was continuing to force its wayforward and after nightfall the radioin Brigadier Lathbury's jeep an-nounced that they were on the bridge.West of Wolfheze, Brigadier Pip

Hicks with one and a half battalionsof the air-landing brigade waited inposition round DZ 'Y' for Mondaymorning when 4th Parachute Brigadeshould descend to join the battle.

They dealt briskly with the attemptsof Tettau's division to penetratetheir ranks. Between their posts andthe Rhine, the light batteries werein action.South of Arnhem, south of the

Rhine, the 82nd and 101st had beenexperiencing their own series of peri-lous adventures.The aircraft carrying the 82nd

appeared punctually to discover theletter O latd out in yellow panels witha nearby exposure of violet smoke tomark their dropping and landingzones. Amongst the 7,227 men jumpingwas E Company of 504th ParachuteInfantry, a company with the specialmission of seizing the south end ofthe Maas bridge at Grave.As the C-47s swept over the final

mile of their outward journey. Lieu-tenant John Thompson was standing

in the doorway of one of them, wait-ing for the signal to lead fifteen menofE Company in their jump. He noticedthat, as the green light flashed thesignal to go they were passing overbuildings. Wisely he paused a fewseconds to 'jump on a field just south-west of Grave bridge.' Recovering,they saw they were only 700 yardsfrom their target.

'.. . spasmodic firing could be heard

from the town,' he reported, '.. . two

men landed in a drainage ditch andhad a hard time getting out. Radiocontact with the company was imme-diately tried but we could not getthrough. Seeing that we were veryclose to the bridge and knowing thatthis was our primary mission, I sent amessenger back to where the com-pany was assembling and told thecompany commander that we wereproceeding towards the bridge. Weworked our way down various canalswading in water up to our necks. Bythis time firing from the town and thebuildings around us had increasedconsiderably and there was now firing

coming from a camouflaged flaktower on the southern approach tothe bridge. As we neared [it] we couldsee German soldiers running to andfrom a power plant which was about50 yards due west of the bridge. Theymade several trips carrying some-thing in their arms. We waited untilthey made about three trips and thenraked the area with machine gun fire.

Later, when we overran the powerplant we found four dead German sol-

diers and one wounded. They hadapparently been carrying their equip-ment and blankets. As we got closer,

we were surprised to see two truckscoming down the highway from Gravetowards the bridge. My leading scoutfired, killing the driver. The truckcareered off the road with the Germansoldiers scrambling to get out. Thesecond truck stopped and the soldiersin it jumped out and deployed. . . Wecontinued to work our way along in

defilade towards the flak tower andthe bridge. The flak tower continuedto fire but by now the fire was goingover our heads. My bazooka manworked his way forward and fired

three rounds, two of them going intothe top of the tower. The gun thenceased firing. In it we found two Ger-

92

Americans move through village onway to Hell's Highway

mans dead and one wounded. We tookover the gun and engaged the guns onthe far side. All communication wiresleading across the bridge were cut anda roadblock was set up at the southernend. About this time we were sur-prised to see two automobiles tearingdown the highway towards the bridgefrom Grave. They were destroyedwhen they got close. . . Shortly afterthis, a patrol came from my battalionacross the bridge. .

.'

Although the enemy overcome herebelonged to the inferior Korps Feldt,this timely and determined action byfourteen enlisted men under Lieu-tenant Thompson snatched intact thebridge over the Maas, despite strongdefences and a complete system ofdemolitions. They might have beentempted to wait for the remainder of ECompany but fortunately they didnot; for the rest of the company hadbeen landed too close to the edge ofGrave, from which a hot fire fell

among them. Unable to move round it

in daylight, the company commander

established a roadblock against enemytransport coming up from the south.North of the Maas, Colonel Reuben

Tucker, commander of the 504th, hadalso to capture a bridge across theMaas-Waal canal. The rifle companysent to Maiden had begun to chargethe defences when it was blown up.At Heumen, a company under Cap-tain Thomas Helgeson was kept fromthe southern end by machine gun fire,

several weapons being sighted in aconcrete pillbox on an island. Tocharge on was out of the question butone squad crawled forward to set up amachine gun on the bank and whilethis was fired, the company second-in-command dashed across the bridgewith another officer, a corporal and aradio operator. Another officer andsix men found a boat which they usedto cross the water at a distance. Cap-tain Helgeson feared that the Ger-mans, so plainly surrounded, mustnow fire the demolitions but the after-

noon waned as the fire fight continuedintermittently. At dusk, a specialist

squad from headquarters companyslipped through the deepening shad-ows to the opposite side of the bridge

93

Colonel Shields Warren, Jr (takedpost-war) f

1

1''^^^^H^^l

3!!J^JHi)<Wiuim 1 ;

Left: Colonel Roy E Lindquist. Above:Allied dead

structure to find and cut the demo-lition circuits. With darkness theisland was stormed and the crossingcaptured.General Gavin had now secured two

of the three essential crossings. Buthe was unhappily aware that thebridge at Nijmegen had still to betaken. One of his regiments, the505th, had necessarily been com-mitted to the capture of the highground round Groesbeek and the first

shallow reconnaissance of the Reich-swald forest to the west, in which it

had been feared that there might bearmour. But the heights were too ex-tensive for one regiment; and thusColonel Roy E Lindquist's 508th Para-chute Infantry were obliged to takethe northerly sector in addition tothe tasks of clearing and holding thelanding zone for the gliders arrivingon the 18th and, most important of all,

capturing the Nijmegen bridge.In the performance of these tasks

there had arisen a misunderstanding.General Gavin was clear in his ownmind that at his briefing in Englandhe had ordered Lindquist to send abattalion (that of Lieutenant-ColonelShields Warren Jr) to capture theWaal bridge 'without delay afterlanding'. Lindquist believed that hewas not to send a battalion off" untilhe had a battalion on the high groundand the prospective LZ secured. It

was evening when General Gavin dis-

covered the omission. He told Lind-quist 'to delay not a second longer andget the bridge as quickly as possiblewith Warren'sbattalion'. Fortunately,Warren had already reached thesouth-eastern outskirts of Nijmegenwhere he had established a defenceand sent into the town at about 1830hours a patrol - one rifle platoon fromC Company and his intelligence sec-tion. They had just departed whenWarren was told to capture the bridgeat once.In haste, Warren sent messages to

A and B Companies to meet him at arendezvous on the edge of the town at1900 hours, when he would lead themforward with a Dutch guide. At 1900hours, he met A Company but therewas no sign of B and no news from thepatrol of C Company. At 2000 hours heassumed correctly that B Companywas lost and the small headquarters

97

pai'ty, accompanied by the guide, set

off with A Company and a detachmentof heavy weapons.There were no civilians in the

shadowed streets. All was silent. Atfirst they moved with caution, search-ing- buildings until, finding nothing,Colonel Warren sensibly decided to

risk a chance encounter. He directedthe column along the dark corridor of

the Groesbeekschweg, a main roadrunning towards the centre of Nijme-gen. Moving silently on the rubbersoles of their jumping boots, the para-troopers reached the circular park of

the Keizer Karel Plein, an area fromwhich a boulevard stretched directly

to the bridge. The scouts began to

spread out until a burst of fire wasopened on the column from the parkahead.

It was now 2200 hours. The companycommander shook out his platoons,while his mortar crews set up their

weapons. As they were reorganisingwith urgent whispers, a traffic columnwas heard to enter a side street nearby.With much shouting and the clash of

studded boots on the paving, men wereheard alighting.What they were listening to was the

aiTival of the leading battle group of

the 10th SS Panzer Division. Thefeeble units of Korps Feldt had beenreinforced in the nick of time. Occu-pying Nijmegen bridge defences was acompany of Panzer Grenadiers.Elsewhere, there was better news

for Gavin. The company sent to theReichswald Forest had found no traceof German armour. At Grave, E Com-pany commander had entered thetown shortly after darkness to dis-

cover the basis for an extraordinarynoise. He found the town deserted bythe enemy and the Dutch celebratingby singing a local version of an oldBritish army marching song, 'A longway to Tipperary'.Shortly after the opening of General

Taylor's divisional radio net, it wasdiscovered that one battalion - from501st Parachute Infantry - had beendropped three miles to the north-westof its dropping zone; otherwise, all

6,769 parachutists had come downwithin the divisional boundary. Thecommander of the displaced unit wasLieutenant-Colonel Harry W O Kin-nard Jr, who shed a small detachment

to collect and guard the equipmentbundles while the remainder marchedat a smart pace to their destinations.They took an undefended bridgeacross the narrow Aa river and sup-pressed abruptly the half-hearted re-

sistance offered by the detachment ofKorps Feldt in Veghel town. Here,shortly, they welcomed anotherAmerican battalion entering from thesouth. By 1630 hours. Colonel HowardR Johnson of the 501st reported thathis regiment was in possession of theAa road bridge, Veghel, the bridgeacross the Zuid Willems canal, and astrong road block from Eerde villageto the main road running south toSt Oedenrode.Lieutenant - Colonel Patrick

Cassidy's battalion of the 502nd hadbeen dropped in another regiment'szone but this he turned to good ac-

;

count by capturing the little garrisonin St Oedenrode and a second roadbridge across the winding Dommel

j

stream. 1

Further south, the 506th Parachute'

Infantry had pushed down towards thevillage of Zon, hastening to capturethe road bridge across the Wilhelminacanal. Leading the column was MajorJames L La Prade's battalion which,hoping to gain time and surprise,

passed round to the west of the village.

About a mile from the canal, theycame under the fire of a single 88mmgun dug into the edge of the Zonscheforest with a small infantry screennearby. On their left flank, the fire

from this post prevented them frommoving across the open grounddirectly ahead. La Prade had either to

attack it or move right, into thevillage. He chose to attack but sixty

precious minutes had passed before

the Germans were overcome.The other two battalions of the

regiment, believing that they hadonly to clear Zon itself, had an experi-

ence similar to that of 1st ParachuteBrigade at Arnhem. Though therewere few Germans to be cleared out,

the obstacle to progress was the mobof cheering Dutch citizens who rushedto greet the soldiers between scattered

shooting. This part of the 506th wasemerging from Zon on the south side

just as La Prade, having resumed his

Warm welcome

98

'/"

p-pif-rr i' '• ^ fitu

\ifVtfr-r

's HertogenboschUP^^^

sVught

\^i/h'erns

KINNARD'S BTN. OF 501st PARA. INF.

LAND. DETACHMENT CAPTURED LATER

Boxtel,

59th DIV.

(Poppe)

FROM 15thARMY

«*/• ..XJ^^^Heeswijk

Kasteer

Schijndel

^^^e/r

Eerde501st

/'INF LAND

// Koevering

iSt Oedenrode

1 502nd PARA.,

INF *^

oZonsche

\

Forest

1100MRS. SEPT. 18

BRIDGE BLOWN BYGERMANSWIERZBOWSKI'S PATROL ATTACKED

CASSIOY'S BTN.OF'502nd PARA. INF LAND& TAKE BRIDGE

.BRIDGE BLOWNBUT CAPTURED

•Nuenen

i>-'^06th PARA.1NF LAND

Eindhoven

.^"~\

'*-^ Paratroop dropping zones

Miles

Kilometres

PM. SEPT 18

506th PARA.INF&GDS.ARMD.DIV.LINK UP \\

Valkenswaard \

The situation in the 101st Airborne Division's area on 18th September

1^'ifHttmui-

Second wave at Grave

march, appeared from the west. Allthree battalions were in sight of theroad bridge when the boom and flash

of exploding charges told their ownstory. Running to the bank. La Pradedived into the water and swam across,followed by several of his acutely dis-

appointed command. A small boatwas found in a shed and this was bor-rowed to ferry over more men. Thegallant battalion commander, drip-ping with water and chilled as cloudsbegan to obscure the evening sun,drove out the Germans on the southbank while a platoon of engineersbegan to improvise a footbridge forthe remainder of the regiment.The loss of the bridge was vexing but

not irrecoverable. What concernedGeneral Taylor more as the night de-veloped were signs of increasing pres-sure from the west. His division wascharged with opening the main roadfrom Eindhoven towards the 82nd atGrave - the road he had named 'Hell'sHighway'. It was almost forty mileslong, indefensible, in fact, even whenhis whole division was down, againstany determined thrust by the enemyat any one point. He did not knowwhether the main German attackwould be developed from the east orthe west; they might even use a simul-taneous thrust from both directions.Half in fun but otherwise in commonsense, he intended to treat the prob-lem in the way that early Americanshad dealt with maintaining an openrailroad in the Indian wars: withsecure bases from which he couldmount sorties against raiders.The first straws in the wind were

seen at Kasteel, where Harry Kinnardhad left his injured men with the

party collecting bundles. When Kin-nard sent back to find these men theyhad disappeared but, ominously, therewere bloodstained bandages by thechateau. Forty-eight American para-troopers would not have been cap-tured by a roaming band from KorpsFeldt unless it was a very large one.The probability was that bettertroops were arriving. The second dis-

turbing item of news was from ColonelMichaelis' 502nd. A strong patrol withengineers had been sent to captureand dismantle the demolitions on theroad bridge at Best on the westernside of the Zonsche forest. Though notdirectly on Hell's Highway, its pos-session would afl"ord, as a useful bonus,a second bridge across the Wilhelminacanal. Michaelis reported that he hadsent after this a company which wasunder heavy attack and he had des-patched the remainder of the bat-talion to that flank. On landing, theDutch had assured Taylor that therewas only a tiny German detachmentat Best. Where had this stronger andapparently determined body comefrom? Who had captured Harry Kin-nard's men at Kasteel?With nightfall came a cold driving

rain. With darkness the apprehensionsof the day were, everywhere, fromArnhem to Zon, heightened andexacerbated. At Arnhem, Urquharthad no contact with anyone other thanLathbury and the 3rd Battalion of TheParachute Regiment. Neither Gavinnor Taylor could speak to Arnhem.Browning was unable to raise XXXCorps. Yet despite their discomfortsand apprehensions, wherever theycould do so within their perimetersand sentry posts, men slept soundlyafter the many fatigues of the longday.

101

Garden opens

•At 11 a.m. on Sunday morning, 17thSeptember, 1944' we are told by Lieu-tenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks,'I climbed up an iron ladder leading- tothe flat roof of a large factory on thesouth bank of the Meuse-Escaut canalwhich was to be my command post forthe opening stages of the battle. It

was a peaceful, sunny Sunday morn-ing ....'Then I heard on the wireless that

the airborne divisions were on theirway. Suddenly the armada appearedoverhead .... I ordered "Zero hour.1435 hours". At 2 pm, precisely, therewas a sudden deafening roar and anoise as though an express train waspassing overhead. Our guns hadopened their counter-artillery pro-gramme and the battle of Arnhemwas on.'

Manhandling their heavy shellsfrom stack to breech, the British,Belgian and Dutch gunners were kepthard at work. As the counter-bom-bardment programme switched fromtarget to target, 144 field guns begana rolling barrage over the narrowfrontage of the corridor. Thirty-sixmedium guns opened fire to thicken it.

102

Quite separately, 120 field guns and abattery of 8-inch heavy guns began todrop concentrations of shells on trooppositions, headquarters and vehicleparks selected by ground observersand air reconnaissance during thepreceding days. From zero hour,eight rocket-firing Typhoons swoopeddown on to German positions oneither side of the road leading toValkenswaard and Eindhoven - thesouthernmost stretch of Hell's High-way.At zero hour, the commander of the

leading tank troop, a lieutenant of the2nd Irish Guards named Keith Heath-cote, brought his handset to his

mouth to say, 'Driver advance'.Squeaking and creaking on theirtracks, the tanks began to lumberforward towards the smoke of theirown shellfire, across the Dutch fron-

tier.

The leading squadron was perhaps1,000 yards from its start point whenthe boom and clangour of anti-tankaction began in their rear. Very

Tanks of the Guards ArmouredDivision on the way to Eindhoven

"^f^.SI

1: »-

A column of transport vehicles passingalong a Dutch road as the 11thArmoured Division advance

quickly, nine of the Irish Guards tankswere knocked out. As soon as theiranti-tank guns opened fire, Germaninfantry concealed in trenches fired

their pamerfaust launchers at thetanks, their MG 34s at the infantryriding with the second squadron. Inretaliation, the tanks' machine gunswere turned on every hedgerow andwoodland but the enemy they werefighting were old hands at battle am-bush: both towed 88mm and self-pro-

pelled guns were dug in under camou-flage; the infantry trenches were cutinto banks from which their fire

crossed in enfilade.

The anti-tank network and theinfantry protecting it from bullet orbayonet assault had been designed bya parachutist colonel named Walther.In his Kampfgruppe behind the canalwere two battalions from 6th Para-chute Regiment, two from the 9th and10th SS Infantry Divisions - not to beconfused with those at Arnhem - anda unit of German criminals, the 6th

Penal Battalion. The main road divi-

ded parachutists and SS conveniently.Observing that their first elementaryripostes had failed to suppress theaccurate and deliberate German fire,

the Guards revealed that they werealso far from being novices. Tanks andinfantry co-operated in a series, of

small actions while Typhoons, calledfrom a 'cab-rank' overhead, struck atstrongpoints with dazzling accuracyon the very edge of the battle. Slowly,these measures forced open the corri-

dor.

At 1700 hours, concerned to hastenthe pace of the advance, the Guardsprepared a concerted push. MoreTyphoons of 83 Group mustered in

waves. The medium guns repeatedtheir rolling barrage and grudginglythe enemy gave way, withdrawing to

a greater distance. The advancedguard of XXX Corps accelerated alongthe highway while from the rear twobattalions of the line started their

search for the many pockets of Wal-ther's men unable to get out and un-willing to surrender.The commander of the Guards

Armoured Division, Major-General

104

Allan Adair, had been ordered to reachValkenswaard by the evening of D-day; and this the Guards had accom-plished, an advance of six miles.Though Horrocks had hoped that theymight be in Eindhoven at nightfall, it

had become clear that, on such anarrow front and against an enemy of

high calibre, it was not feasible. ThpIrish Guards battle group deservedtheir rest as they settled down afterreplenishment of vehicles and a hotmeal. Nearby, the Welsh Guards group,warned to continue on the 18th, hadno illusions that Kampfgruppe Waltherhad conceded them a free passage toEindhoven.Indeed, there was an expectation

throughout the whole of XXX Corpsthat the enemy would continue astubborn resistance next day. Thisbeing so, it was surely a mistake toleave the initiatives of the night tothe Germans. Concealed by the dark-ness, Oberst Walther was able to re-

vise and reinforce his defences alongthe road to Eindhoven. A number ofPanthers, the Pzkw.V tank, were de-ployed to replace the anti-tank gunsknocked out during the 17th. Two

minor and uncertain contacts apart,the reinforcing German infantry wereable to dig their trenches freely.

To the south, XXX Corps used thenight to complete internal prepara-tions for fighting next day and for rest.

Infantry patrolling was limited andscarcely productive: no attempt wasmade to raid extensively into Kampf-gruppe Walther to inhibit its rede-ployment by alarm and confusion.The Germans were wont to say onBradley's front, 'We'll begin move-ment at midnight when the Ameri-cans will stop'. On the route to Arn-hem, it stopped for the majority ofthe British column, many of whomhad not seen a minute of action on the17th, by 2200 hours.Right and left of XXX Corps, VIII

and XII Corps displayed a similar lackof enterprise.The first reports of Market Garden toreach Hitler's headquarters were madeby the Luftwaff"e air observation andwarning branch. A little later theyreceived the account of Field-MarshalModel's escape from Oosterbeek, faith-

fully relayed by General Kussin. TheFiihrer reacted with the intermittent

105

A King Tiger Itnocked out in thecorridor

^

displays of emotional excitementcharacteristic of him.Recently he had come to recognise

the menace of the western Allies'

advance; now he perceived a mortaldanger. He railed at the Luftwaffe forpermitting such an operation asMarket, calling them traitors for theway in which they repeatedly failed

him. Speaking of Model's adventure,he reminded the Nazi hierarchy thatthey were not immune from such anoperation. 'At any rate', he said, 'thebusiness is so dangerous that you mustunderstand clearly, if such a messhappens here - here I sit with mywhole supreme command -

. . . Well,then, this is the most worthwhilecatch, that's obvious. I would nothesitate to risk two parachute divi-

sions here if with one blow I could getmy hands on the whole Germancommand.'They did not realise - nor did Model

- that the Allies were unaware thatthey were landing parachutists nextto Headquarters, Army Group B. Thismisapprehension helped to sustain ageneral parachute scare which con-tinued for some days. On 18th Sep-tember, Runstedt's headquarters wentso far as to pass down to Army GroupB a story that the allies had landed anAmerican airborne division in Warsaw.More practically, the Fiihrer and

his staff had to decide what could bedone to counter the airborne assaultand the ground operation which it

clearly presaged. They were still

without a fresh division, organisedand ready in the central reserve.Runstedt was transferring the 107thPanzer Brigade from Aachen and the280th Assault Gun Brigade to joinStudent's army. Poppe's 59th Divisionhad already passed across into thefighting from Fifteenth Army andZangen had nothing else available.Possibly smarting from Hitler's abuse,Goring was able to offer the last of hisparachute force under General Meindlat Cologne, the newest and the leasttrained men. The jet fighter-bomberswere also ready to operate. Twosquadrons of the Me 262s were nowable to take off from the Rheine areato airfields nearer the Netherlands. Apromise was given that they would fly

on the 18th against the Allies.

107

Li «?•»."

»*••

,

H^. AiO^.

rjtr •or^^f^

'«^. "'»i'.

i -

Left: Hell's Highway, Venio - Grave.

Above: Major-General Allan Adair,

commander of the Guards' ArmouredDivision

K

Monday,

18th September

A considerate commander, GeneralHorrocks made it a practice to issue

orders as early as possible each even-ing so as to permit those required to

fight next day the maximum amountof rest. He had an articulate and prac-

tical staff. The orders given to thecorps for 18th September ensured thatadditional infantry would be available

to support the Guards in the close

country ahead and endorsed the needto press the advance towards Arnhem.When the weather report was read,

the chief gunner recognised that hemust be ready to provide for all thesupporting fire next day; it was said

that the evening rain clouds wouldpersist and restrict, probably preventair operations for the next twenty-four hours.At 0600 hours on Monday morning,

the Welsh Guards group began their

encounter with Kampfgruppe Walther.Once more, the 2nd Household Cavalryreconnoitred and probed the country-side ahead. By 1230 hours, two of their

armoured cars had sneaked into Eind-hoven while the main force was bat-tling through the woods south of Aalst.In Eindhoven, they found Colonel Sink

110

and the 506th Parachute Infantry,heroes of the city, struggling to free

themselves from the welcoming bur-ghers in order to capture what re-

mained of the German garrison.Colonel Sink's regiment had passed

over the Wilhelmina canal at Zon by]

midnight using the footbridge pre-

pared by their parachute engineers.With very limited resources, this hadbeen strengthened to accept a fewlight vehicles but it was incapable of

bearing trucks, still less tanks.General Taylor was therefore morethan ever determined to capture thebridge at Best. Early in the morning.Colonel Michaelis sent a secondbattalion of the 502nd to join thefighting on the edge of the Zonscheforest. Equally, the majority of

General Poppe's 59th Division wereconcentrating to force the Americansback. Being infinitely stronger andbacked by artillery, they came close

to overpowering the advancing bat-

talions until a brief period of finer

weather permitted an air strike by a

German troops move in toward the

British dropping zone

fc-

^p

fci*^-

I'^

, ,, , , « / ;:

flight of P-47S. The two battalionsdrew back to combine their defences.In the fighting, one of the command-ing officers was killed.

Close to the steel and concrete roadbridge lay the patrol sent out duringthe previous afternoon from the 502nd.Its commander was Lieutenant Wier-zbowski. He had been despatched withover eighty infantry and engineersbut on the night march, during sev-eral encounters with the enemy, mis-takes, panic and casualties had re-

duced the party. He now musteredfifteen beside himself. After dawn onthe 18th, they heard firing and over aperiod of hours the rattle and banggrew closer. What they could hear wasthe approach of first one and then theother battalion from their regiment -

but so could the German engineers onthe bridge. At 1100 hours, fearing cap-ture, they shattered the concrete andsteel in a single loud explosion. Thenthe battle noises faded again. Fromthe bridge, a German platoon came toattack Wierzbowski's patrol, killingone and wounding four of the sur-vivors. They were driven off". In theafternoon, the two armoured cars ofthe British Household Cavalry whichhad reached Eindhoven came intoview on the far side of the canal andfor a time their machine guns helpedto rebuff the persistent Germanattempts to destroy this determinedlittle post. Between actions, for theremainder of the afternoon, bothBritish and American radios on thecanal tried to discover what was hap-pening in the lOlst's area.

If they had been successful, theywould have discovered that it was anafternoon of inactivity. The bat-talions in the Zonsche forest werebaulked of their wish to capture theBest bridge but denied equally theattempts of the 59th Division to over-whelm them. The third battalion ofthe regiment, Lieutenant - ColonelPatrick Cassidy's at Odenroode, madegood use of his time to improve thedefences. There was every sign thatthey were shortly to be assailed. AtVeghel, the 501st were subject to thesame reconnaissance and probing.General Taylor was relieved to see twoglider battalions arrive that after-noon, delayed by the weather, withmore vehicles and radios, supplies and

a pair of bulldozers. He greatly re-gretted however, the absence of hisartillery.

To the north, the immediate prob-lem occupying General Gavin was thecapture of the Nijmegen bridge. Aftertheir night encounter in the centre ofNijmegen, the 10th SS battle grouphad counterattacked the company ofthe 508th until, ending a confusedstruggle in the darkness, both sideshad drawn apart. To the relief ofColonel Warren, his B Company,drawn by the sound of firing, suddenlyreported and he at once asked hisregimental commander to release CCompany in order that he mightattack the bridge in strength. Whilethe conversation took place over theradio, a Dutch civilian approachedCaptain Jonathan Adams, command-ing A Company, to say that the mech-anism for the demolition of the roadbridge was housgd in the post office,

a few blocks to the north. He ofi"ered

to guide him there. With his battalioncommander's permission, CaptainAdams took a patrol away with theDutchman who skilfully guided themthrough numerous side streets to theedge of their destination. After re-

ceiving a simple plan of action whis-pered in the darkness, the paratroopsstormed the building and overwhelmedthe German guards. The demolitionmechanism was quickly destroyed.But when they came to leave thebuilding it was surrounded by Germantroops. Captain Adams had to revisequickly his ideas and block theentrances. He was evidently facedwith a siege.

Meanwhile, Colonel Warren hadmade some headway with his attackon the bridge, advancing close to thesouthern end. Whatever his hopes, thefire from the immediate area of thecrossing, a weak German attack on hisown position and the light of dawnkept him from capturing it. CaptainAdams and his patrol had not re-

turned, and C Company was still inregimental reserve. A renewed attackmust therefore depend upon B Com-pany and a part of A. Shortly, GeneralGavin arrived to find the battalionheadquarters at work in the Marien-boom School.

It did not take the shrewd Gavinlong to see that, scattered and tired

112

ifter eighteen hours continuous ac-

tivity, Warren's force needed to beconcentrated and given a rest. Order-ing them to draw back, the divisionalcommander was at the same time con-cerned to try again to capture thebridge which, so close now, was still

far from being in his possession.There was little to spare from the

essential defences; the 504th wereholding the Maas crossing at Graveand the Maas-Waal canal; the 505thwas defending the greater part of the[heights and the southern glider zonebut could not also embrace the north-iern sector of the ridge ; thus the 508thhad to commit part of its strength,north of Groesbeek, part in Nijmegen.jThe northern glider sector would alsoineed to be cleared by midday for thejfollow-up landings.

I

In such circumstances. General'Gavin decided to send a single com-pany to try to capture the bridge sup-ported by the fire of his parachute;artillery and all the mortars withinrange. He believed that, approachingifrom a new direction - the south - asmall determined body might still

carry off the task with surprise. It mayalso be that he was half-inclined tobelieve that the Germans were with-drawing from the city. During thenight, a railway train had passedthrough the centre of the divisionalarea without check, though all thepassengers aboard were enemy sol-

diers. Until it passed, no one thoughtto stop it. Observing this success, aGerman commander had filled asecond train at Nijmegen station. Butaroused and ready, the 82nd had con-trived an efficient block across thetracks down the line, round which anambush waited. The prisoners takenwere fearful and irresolute, mostlyfrom garrison and other staffs. Theyclaimed that orders had been given toevacuate the city.

So G Company of the 508th Regi-ment marched down from its positionon top of Hill 64 towards the Waal andthe bridge. At 0745 hours that morningthey passed a radio message to saythat they were moving to an assaultlocation. The Dutch crowds, wearingtheir orange favours, fell back andthey were alone.

Approach through Oosterbeek

Above: 20mm flak gun is set up on the German barrier defence in Arnhem.Below: German troops in positions outs'ide the city

~-:^^.*.'&.-

Above: British carrier knocked out on 17th September. Below: Harzer's panzers

move in

us paratroops street fighting in

Holland

What General Gavin did not knowwas that the reconnaissance battalionof the 9th, in addition to the g-roup ofthe 10th SS Panzer Division, had nowreached the Nijmegen area where theyhad taken local flak units under theircontrol. The 20mm and 88mm guns ofthe latter were the first to fire on GCompany, followed soon by machineguns, rifles and carbines as CaptainNovak, their commander, led them ina dash along the sides of the street.Other German posts on the far side ofthe river opened fire. Rightly, the com-pany was halted. They took up theirown fire positions in the buildings athand.

As the morning wore on, Germanswere seen to be infiltrating westwardfrom the Reichswald forest. An attackdeveloped against the company de-fending the southern landing zone for

the gliders. Continuous skirmishingvexed the paratroops until at last,

with some artillery support, theymade a sortie to clear the manygroups infesting the area. They werefound to be from the 406th (Landes-schutzen) Division of Korps Feldt. Onthe northern zone, about 500 Germanswere in occupation with sixteen 20mmanti-aircraft guns which closed to-

wards Beek. Novak's company wasstill in Nijmegen; there was no resis-

tance to hand. Called from their rest

at 1000 hours, Warren's battalion madea forced march from Nijmegen to

116

rendezvous with their C Companyshortly after midday. The gliderswere due at 1300 hours. With so little

time in hand, Lieutenant-ColonelShields Warren Jr, spread his bat-talion out quickly and gave thesimple order to charge. They emergedfrom cover and began to run downhilltowards the Germans and their guns.The enemy infantry wavered, thenran, some into the fire of their ownflak weapons which drove off to newpositions out of sight. Warren's com-panies reached the far side of thelanding zone just as the aircraft andgliders appeared. They had taken 150prisoners and were to find anotherfifty bodies when they returned acrossthe zone later. Now they stood backas the gliders flew in to a safe landing.

Gavin was more comfortable withthe arrival of his remaining artillery,

though he needed urgently the gliderinfantry. He felt instinctively thatthe Reichswald forest would soon dis-

gorge something more menacing thandetachments from Korps Feldt and hehad still to capture Nijmegen bridge.He had learned, too, in the latter partof the morning that Arnhem wasoccupied by strong forces. His liaison

officer with the Dutch resistancemovement. Captain Brestebeurje, hadbeen shown details of the private tele-

phone system of the Gelderland Elec-tricity Company, still fully operating.It was used to pass quick simple newsitems and one had come from thepower station at Arnhem. It said:

'Germans beating back British.'

As Sunday evening passed. GeneralWilli Bittrich grew restless. In theafternoon he had told Model whatadditional units he would need to des-troy the British north of the Rhine; abill of reinforcement set out in de-

tailed terms as both men now knewfrom Student how much of the Britishairborne division had arrived andwhat they were planning to do. Later,he had heard from Harzer that his re-

connaissance battalion was on its wayto Nijmegen while the remainder of

9th SS Panzer Division, as Kampf-gruppe Harzer, drew into Oosterbeekand Arnhem. One battle group of 10thSS Panzer had also departed for

Nijmegen but after further thoughthe had kept back the majority in theirdivisional area, ready to move eitherinto Arnhem or to reinforce Nijmegen.Reports grew vaguer and fewer:

nothing had been seen in Arnhem andthere were no signs of the Americansin Nijmegen. Bittrich decided to gointo Arnhem to see how matters stoodin the city and he drove to the garri-

son headquarters. All but a smallwatch were manning defences andGeneral Kussin was said to be visiting

the SS Training Battalion. It wasexpected that when he returned hewould be able to ofl"er an intelligencepicture of British movements. Dis-covering two German servicewomenoperating the telephone switchboard,Bittrich asked them to repeat everypiece of information they received to

his headquarters - a promise theykept, earning themselves an Iron

117

Brigadier Lathbury commandedthe British 1st Parachute Brigade

Cross apiece. He decided not to waitfor Kussin but drove back to Doetin-chem.After an hour at his headquarters,

there was still no news. In darkness,he drove back towards Arnhem, findingHarzer's command post among thewoods by Staadsbosch. One battlegroup, he was told, had been sentalong the railway towards Wolfhezeunder the artillery commander, Lieu-tenant-Colonel Spindler. Another wasmoving south towards the Rhine be-tween Arnhem and Oosterbeek ; a thirdto Arnhem road bridge, which varioussources reported as captured by theBritish on the north side. Harzer'soperations were not made easier bythe fact that there were a number ofsmall units or detachments fightingin the area who were not under hiscommand. Hence they passed theirinformation back to other headquar-ters and much of what he had receivedfrom them had been on a chance basis.

Bittrich decided that nothing ofwhat he had heard or seen necessitateda change of plan. He needed only to

refine his arrangements. All theremaining units of 10th SS Panzerwere to leave at once for Nijmegen,taking the ferry at Pannerden to avoiddelay in fighting the British at Arnhembridge. Harzer would get his rfecon-

naissance battalion back fromNijmegen but should meantime usethe reconnaissance unit of the 10th.

He was at once to assume command of

all units in Arnhem and Oosterbeek.Operations by 9th SS Panzer were to

accomplish three tasks

:

'1. To break the resistance of theBritish forces at the Arnhem bridgeand to recapture the north end of

the bridge.2. To prevent the movement of

reinforcements to the British forces

at the bridge from the landing zonesat Oosterbeek.3. To reduce the enemy sector as

soon as the additional troops andarmour (which has been requestedfrom Army Group B) arrive in thearea and, having reduced the sector,

to destroy the troops inside it.'

Spindler's battle group had alreadystruck the 1st Battalion near therailway. Obliged to move without onecompany which failed to find therendezvous, Dobie's column made a

118

painful journey across country-through the rain and darkness. Heinoted in his diary:

'0300 (Monday). Very bad goingthrough woods with guns, carriersetc. Bumped enemy post X tracks697797 approx - caused enemy casual-ties - enemy withdrew. Major Buneand mortar detachment missing.

0430. Reached road junction 709783 -

S Company ran into enemy fire -

Enemy armoured cars off road - MGfire, 20 mm. and mortars. Attackedwith S Company left flank - gainednorthern enemy position and in-

flicted casualties.0700. Passed HQ Company 3rd Bn -

took them along . . .

'

The 3rd Battalion had by morningbeen cut in two by Harzer's battlegroup working south towards theRhine bank. Quite apart from theweakness of the two halves, BrigadierLathbury's jeep and radio were nowseparated from him. While he wasconsidering what his best course wouldbe, a liaison officer from divisionalheadquarters appeared under the gui-dance of a member of the Dutchresistance. Urquhart and Lathburywere told that the second lift with the4th Parachute Brigade and gliderreinforcements were expected at 1500hours. The two men decided to breakaway from Fitch's column to returnto their headquarters.'Would you care to throw a bomb,

sir?' asked the brigadier, offering hisdivisional commander a smokegrenade.

'No, you're much better at it thanI am.'The smoke burst in the open and

Urquhart, Lathbury and his Intel-ligence Officer ran out into the street.Captain Cleminson of the 3rd Bat-talion, watching their departure, sawthat they were making in the con-fusion of the moment directly towardsthe Saint Elizabeth Hospital which heknew to be occupied by Germans. Hedashed after them but a machine gunfired quickly, nicking Lathbury'sspine. He was paralysed. The threeofficers lifted him into a house, 135Alexander Straat, occupied by amiddle-aged couple who offered theirfront room.While they examined the brigadier

and wondered what they should do

Brigadier Pip' Hicks.

now that he was injured, a Germansoldier's face appeared at the window.Urquhart quickly raised his auto-matic pistol and fired, killing him. Afew moments later, the householders,who had withdrawn to converse to-gether, came back to say that theywould hide the wounded man and lookafter him. It was a generous act; theywould both be shot if the Germansdiscovered what they were doing.Carrying Lathbury to a cupboardunder the stairs, the three officers

left by a side door and continued theirjourney.At the bridge. Frost and his force

remained in possession of the northernend. One company and the 2nd Bat-talion headquarters had reached it

on the previous evening just as theGermans began to take up positionsat the southern side. The railwaybridge had been blown up in the facesof C Company as they seized it; BCompany had attacked and screenedthe column from the knoll of DenBrink as they passed and A Companyhad completely killed or captured theremaining fifty enemy attempting toobstruct them, the field security policefrom II SS Panzer Korps. Later,brigade headquarters under thebrigade major had arrived. Part of thebrigade's company of parachute engi-neers swelled the garrison and, afterdaylight on the Monday, inspectedthe bridge to find that it contained no

119

"•1M^m ^Rf^^S?'^

Ji 1 ^ ^^~^^^5

-'4;p«S^ir=#?--

Above: Arnhem road bridge . Left: British paratroops in the woods near

Wolfheze. The man in foreground is holding a Plat gun

iemolition charges. This and otheraews was relayed to divisional head-quarters through the artillery wire-Less net of the Forward ObservationDfflcer. It was a comfort to know thatthe guns of one battery were close

snough to support them.Two gallant attempts were made to

capture the southern end of the bridgebut the enemy had mounted 20mmBak guns to fire directly down thelong open roadway. The Germansattacked from both ends at varioustimes but failed to dislodge the para-chutists. Returning from Nijmegen,Harzer's reconnaissance battalionattempted to force their way acrossfrom the south and succeeded only in

leaving ten of their vehicles blazingon the elevated paving under thegrimly satisfied eyes of the defence.Between these attacks, there were

almost continuous battle noises fromthe town. Dobie had brought the 1st

Battalion close to Den Brink and theSaint Elizabeth Hospital but theattacks they had made to reach this

point had left him with only eighty-two unwounded men. The fit could nolonger carry the casualties and thetrail of their dead lay back throughthe streets held by KampfgruppeHarzer. The 3rd Battalion were in anequal plight. The several commandersin the area were hoping increasinglythat the arrival of the second lift

from England would bring some relief.

At divisional headquarters, GeneralUrquhart had still not returned:Brigadier Hicks of the Air-LandingBrigade had therefore assumed com-mand. During the Sunday and theMonday morning, the battalion andhalf battalion which had arrived with

121

Ede 1500 HRS. SEPT 18

4th PARA. BDE. LANDSBR.1stABN.DIV.

(Urquahart)

\DIVISIONWONTETTAU-

I

\OIY\

>. 1st AIR LANDING BDE.

SECURES DZ•'"^>N ... .•

KRAFFTSSSRECRUIT BTN.

EVENING SEPT. 17

KAMPFGRUPPEHARZER ENTERSTOWN

1st PARA.3rd PARA

Johanna Hoeve

2nd PARA. BINS'

Renkum ^^^^eelsum oosterbeek.

Arnhem

PM. SEPT. 17

FROSTS 2nd BTN^TAKES BRIDGE

Huissen/

Waa/

US82ndABN.DIV.

(Gavin)

2200 HRS SEPT 17_

WthSSPZ.DIV.RECCE BTN..9thSS^PZ.DIV.ARRIVESLATER

NIGHT SEPT 17/18

LCoTRIESTOjTAKE BRIDGE

HatertT

PM. SEPT 17

THOMPSON'S E.Co ^:^.TAKES BRIDGE

504th PARA INF.

Heumen

i' ^VM-^ ]]C Co. 508th TRIES

^DePloeg\p'>^.^^' (/ TO TAKE BRIDGE

ISfllStbNPAffAy '

''

.Maiden/' ^%\!W L/Z V''

'Groesbeek \

,l\/look,>«^ .^'CORPS FELDT

ReichswaldForest

NIGHT SEPT 17/18

HELGESON'S Co.

TAKES BRIDGE

^i:i;:4...^.1 Riethorst

#7

^^

.Uden

CTin^ British & US dropping/landing zones

^^^ British & US Airborne attacks

German counterattacks

Miles

Kilometres

The situation in the US 82nd and British 6th Airborne Divisions' areas on

17th/18th September

him by glider had been holding thedropping and landing zones to beused by the second lift. The attacksagainst them by Tettau's units hadnot been worrying, though the zoneswere too expansive to be sealed

completely against infiltration. Theneeds of Frost's force, as reported bythe artillery, were more serious. At0945 hours, the half battalion of glider

infantry were ordered to make their

way to the road bridge and inform thebrigade headquarters, incidentally,

that all the radio frequencies hadbeen changed in an attempt to improvecommunications. The glider battalionremaining, 7th King's Own ScottishBorderers, stretched out their line of

posts to repel infiltrators.

It had been planned to fly in thesecond lift during the morning butthe weather did not permit it. It was1500 hours before the aircraft appearedand the enemy had now full details of

their direction of flight. Christiansenhad moved a number of flak batteriesinto position while Tettau's division

made a special effort to attack withColonel Lippert's Herman Goringtraining units, a police battalion andthe Dutch SS under Helle. Amongstthem were other 20mm flak guns.The price of restricting air trans-port operations to a single sortie

per day, with or without the loss of

the operations plan to Student, hadnow to be paid at Arnhem as it wasbeing paid by Gavin at Nijmegen andTaylor in the south. In one of the4th Brigade's aircraft '

. . . Suddenlywe saw a couple of planes behind us godown and somebody said, "There gosome poor buggers" . . . Then weheard steel hitting the bottom of theplane but thank God nothing camethrough.' Some distance away. Cap-tain Frank King of the 10th Battalionnoticed 'many anti-aircraft guns andof course at 500 feet we were vulnerableeven to MG and rifle fire . . . The Ameri-can crew-chief was killed near thedoor. There was a certain disorder butno panic ... I gave the order to jump. . . both plane engines were blazing.'There was not only much more flak;

the parachutists and glider units werelanding on zones under aimed smallarms fire and intermittent bursts fromthe flak guns, although the ScottishBorderers had successfully cleared or

captured over 270 Germans from theimmediate area. Brigadier Hackett,commander of 4th Brigade, did not of

course know what had occurred toembarrass their reception but wasvexed because in descending he haddropped his walking stick. Searchingthrough the heather, he came on tenenemy soldiers to whom he calledsharply in his excellent German,'Wait here! I'll attend to youpresently.' Finding his stick, he thenmarched his captives to the rendez-vous appointed for brigade head-quarters.Awaiting him. he found Lieutenant-

Colonel CharlesMackenzie,Urquhart'schief of staff, who told him all thathad happened. Hackett did not like

what he heard and resented theremoval, without reference to him, of

the 11th Battalion which was beingsent directly to Arnhem bridgestraight from the dropping zone with-out time to prepare for movement andindependent of all other movementsinto the town. Senior to Hicks, he felt

that the arrangements being madewere not likely to restore control of

the battle but, after some high wordswith his colleague that evening atdivisional headquarters, the two menagreed a plan for the rest of the 4thBrigade within an overall divisionalconcept. With the 10th and 156thBattalions, plus the Scottish Bor-derers under command, Hackett wouldattack in the morning directly to-

wards the high ground north of thecity, taking the road north of therailway via Johanna Hoeve. They nowhad three brigades on the ground andhad received a useful supply drop thatafternoon. Unaware of the reinforce-ments journeying towards Bittrich,

they were able to hope for a day ofprogress rather than desperatedefence. Every day that they survivedalso brought nearer the prospect of

union with the forces approachingfrom the south.That night, at dusk, the Guards

reached the southern outskirts ofEindhoven. Pausing only to shake the'

hands of their comrades in the 506thParachute Infantry, they drove on toZon. Within an hour of their arrival,

the Royal Engineers were working tobridge La Prade's gap with a structurefor tanks to pass over.

123

The struggle

for Heirs Highway

Through Monday night, the field engi-neers of 14 Field Squadron workedwithout a rest to install their Baileypanels, girders and planking. By dawnon the Tuesday morning, their workwas done and tanks of the GrenadierGuards group began to cross at 0615

hours. Two hours later, they werethirty-two miles on, greeting the 82ndat Grave bridge. The route across theMaas and the Maas-Waal canal intoNijmegen lay open. At Arnhem, onlyten miles beyond Nijmegen, Frost'sforce hung on under attacks of in-

creasing pressure. The corridor seizedand held so efficiently by the 101st

and 82nd seemed to have acceleratedXXX Corps armour towards a close

but successful race to their objectivesbeyond the Rhine.So it might have seemed by a glance

at the map. As in all life, appearanceand reality are rarely the same.Nijmegen bridge remained in Ger-

man possession. On the south side,

10th SS Panzer, had installed eleventowed or self-propelled 88mm anti-tank guns. The flak 88mm and 20mmguns had been reinforced in the openground south again from these where

124

they commanded the streets concen-trating as radii towards a traffic

roundabout by Huner Park. Overlook-ing this open expanse was the medievaltower of Belvedere, surrounded byenduring walls. Anti-tank and flak

detachments around and inside thestout relic, across the park and on thenorthern bank were linked by themachine gun posts of Panzer Grena-diers who had drawn in all that re-

mained of the original city garrisonto strengthen the position. It was aformidable network of weapons.The bridge was not the only factor

inhibiting the advance. To the south,General Taylor still lacked the artil-

lery he needed to cover his long areaof responsibility and there was arecrudescence of the attacks againstHell's Highway.Near the Best bridge, the faithful

Wierzbowski's patrol hung on withextraordinary bravery. In the mistafter dawn, the Germans attackedagain, killing a number of woundedlying blind or unconscious. Private

Fighting for Hell's Highway - the endof an action

H V*JTiA

r

/- 9-

C^^T^b:^'

^^fm

's Hertogenbosch ""^Uld

Vught

Boxtel/

^_j/^ Koevermg

* >?^'77e/fJvot Oedenrode

59thDIV.(Poppe}

PM. SEPT. 19

107th PL BDE. (Von MalUahn)

AM. SEPT. 19

US GLIDER, PARA. INF.

& BR.TANKS CLEARFOREST OF 59th DIV.

Eindhoven

Miles

Kilometres

The situation in the 101st Airborne Division's area on 19th September

Joe E Mann with both arms strickensaved those remaining- by throwinghis body on to a grenade which droppedamongst them. When the enemyformed up to assault, Wierzbowski hadonly three men unwounded. Heavy-hearted, he told one to tie his grubbyhandkerchief to a rifle and waved thissurrender signal.

The two battalions nearby survivedonly because their combined strengthdefied annihilation, though the worstof their casualties on Monday nightand Tuesday morning came fromGenei'al Poppe's artillery. By midday,they were assured of a chance toretaliate. General Taylor sent asquadron of British tanks - the 15th/

19th Hussars - and artillery assignedto him by XXX Corps to join hisdeputy, Brigadier-General Gerald JHiggins. With part of the gliderinfantry, the two parachute battalionsalready in defence and his Britishsupporters, Higgins devised and com-manded a counterattack which pressedand then began to encircle the Ger-mans during the afternoon. The fire

and counter-fire spread, intensifiedthen suddenly dropped. As many ascould of Poppe's 59th Division fled,

leaving over 300 dead and 1,400

prisoners, a measure of their originalstrength around Best and the Zonscheforest. Lieutenant Wierzbowski andhis tiny band emerged alive and fi'ee,

having overpowered their captors inthe final stages of the battle. AtOedenrode, Colonel Patrick Cassidy'sbattalion defeated a massed attack onhis position.Yet even as these local triumphs,

these easements of the pressure fromthe west became known, an onslaughtdeveloped from the east. The 107thPanzer Brigade had arrived fromAachen under Major von Maltzahn - alittle too late to strike simul-taneously with Poppe's division andsever Hell's Highway but in time none-theless to attack when all resourceswere committeed elsewhere. The ZonBailey bridge had part of an Americancompany, some British engineers anda tank troop to defend it besidesGeneral Taylor's headquarters.Maltzahn's Panther tanks knockedout the British armour and stood backto cover with fire from their guns theassault of their infantry. Divisional

headquarters sent an urgent report toGeneral Taylor that the defences werecrumbling. Picking up part of theBritish 44th Royal Tanks, all thatremained of the glider infantry and a57mm anti-tank gun, the generalreturned to lead this force into acounterattack. The British armouropened fire at close range in the dusk.The anti-tank gun and the infantry'srocket launchers, aimed in the lightof a burning British tank, hit severalof the enemy half-tracks. Their dashwas mistaken for numerical strength.Believing that a powerful counter-attack threatened, the Panzer Brigadewithdrew.Further south. Corps headquarters

had also had to join with tanks toreopen- Hell's Highway. Behind them,a British division fought to hold thecrossings of the Meuse-Escaut canalas transport columns crossed underenemy shell and mortar fire. From thisstarting point of the venture, andnorth along the single. road, Britishsupply trucks were burnt and brokenby enemy action. The 'Indian raids'General Taylor had expected weredeveloping.General Gavin's plans at Nijmegen

were partly dependent on the Britishtransport columns. During the day,he had discussed with Generals Brown-ing and Horrocks his plan to seize thebridge. One force of tanks and infantryshould close in on Huner Park throughthe city while two parachute bat-talions should cross the Waal by boatand work up the north bank to thebridge's end. To do this, the 82ndneeded British armoured and artillerysupport in the city and British boatsfor the crossing. Both these were atonce promised but the boats couldnot be brought up Hell's Highwaybefore the morning of the 20th.Impatient of delay, Gavin launchedColonel Vandervoort's 2nd Battalionof the 505th that afternoon with tanksand infantry of the Grenadier Guards.Under supporting fire from the gunsof the 82nd and Guards Division theattack began at 1500 hours.Why so late, we may ask all these

years afterwards: with Arnhem sotenuously held, so urgently needingrelief? Here is the diff"erence betweentheory and practice. The orders haveto be passed from the divisional com-

127

I ^\ '

;f*W«

;-t^1

Above: German prisoners taken nearZon. Far right: An American paratrooperraces through a field raked by 88's

mander to the soldiers who must fight.

However efficient the staffs at the con-nected headquarters, there is a limitto the speed at which plans and orders,developing in detail at every level,

can be transmitted. They must bechecked against error - every timing,every map reference, every target forfire. Even when all this is done, thetanks and infantry must move to theirfinal areas of assembly. Three hourspassed between Gavin's orders andVandervoort's attack with the Grena-diers. It was a competent preparation.They approached the bridge from

east and south. Soon the barrier ofGerman weapons was in action, thestreets shaken by explosions, mistedby the dust of powdered masonry. Thesmaller element coming up from thesouth fought to a point 500 yards fromthe railway bridge but were obligedto halt when all their leading tankswere out of action. From the east, theassault force were in sight of thetraffic roundabout when the fire from

Huner Park became overwhelming.The infantry tried to force a way onby blowing 'mouseholes' through thewalls of the intermediate buildingblocks. At the edge of the park theyfound the buildings fortified by theGermans and prisoners taken werediscovered to be Waffen-SS of the 10thSS Panzer Division.The discovery of the enemy's

identity explained much to Gavin andthe two corps commanders. It endorsedthe need for a weighty concentricattack.Unfortunately, the poor weather

prevailed and the glider infantry, sourgently needed by the 82nd, did notarrive. Attacks were developing fromthe Reichswald forest sufficient tothreaten the platoon and companyposts on the approaches to the Groes-beek ridge; Gavin dared not removeany men from this sector. As a calcu-lated risk, he reduced the bridgegarrisons on Hell's Highway to produceall but two companies of ColonelTucker's 504th Parachute Infantry for

the Waal crossing. Two tank squadronsof the Irish Guards took up positionson the south bank to support the

128

infantry; guns and Typhoons madeready to suppress the enemy on thenorth bank of this wide, deep andswift river.

The attacks on Hell's Highway haddelayed the arrival of the boats andreduced their number from thirty-

three to twenty-six. At 1500 hours,having had no chance to practiseembarkation or paddling, the 504thbegan to board, loading down theflimsy wood and canvas craft withtheir bodies, weapons and ammuni-tion. Encouraged by the gun and air-

craft fire above them, the first wavecast off".

There was no cover on either side of

the river and a sudden increase of

speed and direction in the wind blewaway the smoke laid by the gunners.German shell-fire dropped amongstthem, exploding in the water, burstingin the air above their heads. Severalboats nearing the northern bank wereholed by machine gun fire and sank.Men were wounded, sank and drowned.Men were killed. But courage andquick wits saved some otherwisedoomed. Captain Kappel of H Com-pany threw off" his equipment to dive

after a drowning- soldier. PrivateJoseph Jedlicka, submerg-ed in eightfeet of water, managed to hold hisbreath while he struggled up the slopeto the north bank. Jumbled, dis-organised but steadfast, the para-troops pf the 504th scaled the nearbyhuncl as the British engineers broughtback the remaining boats to crossagain.Those first ashore stormed the

enemy in their trenches along thedykes. Fortuitously, they were notmembers of the 10th SS Panzer or anyfirst-class organisation. A bridgehead750 yards across. 100 deep was taken.But as the movement along the northbank grew, after 1800 hours the qualityof resistance hardened. What borethe advance along was the initiativeand individual spirit of the many smallgroups, which penetrated every weakpoint of the German positions andrefused to be pinned down by fire. It

one group could not get forward,others called that they would goround. The gunner observation oflScerscalled steadily for fire and the IrishGuards, spotting the progress by eye.fired their main armament again andagain.At last. Captain Kappel's company,

mixed with I Company, reached theend of the road bridge. A few minutesearlier they had raised an Americanfiag on the railway crossing to showthat it was taken. On the south, the5th Guards Brigade and Colonel Van-dervoort's battalion had fought acrossHuner Park to the road bridge. Seeingthe flag just after 1900 hours. SergeantRobinson of the Grenadiers dashedforward with his troop. The bridgetrembled with explosions. The Guardslost two tanks almost at once but theothers mounted and crushed the 88swhich fired the shots while at pointblank range. Skidding, lurching, firing,sweating the two tanks reached thefar side in a dead-heat with the leadingsquad of the 504th.The bridge was theirs.The road and rail bridges at

Nijmegen were fully prepared fordemolition before they were attacked.When Market began, Field-MarshalModel ordered their preservation,

Nijmegen. British Cromwell tankscross the bridge

130

Above: Engineers remove the charges from Nijmegen bridge. Below: Relief fromthe Nijmegen action. Right: After the attack by the 9th SS Panzers

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Ceiling: nearly 20,000 feet Rate of fire: 700/800 rounds per minute per gun

believing that he had sufficientstrength to hold the crossing places.In the last hour, a zealous subordinatemight have ordered the firing of thecharges, but were the circuits free?Captain Adams, released from thepost office, believed his patrol hadsmashed them. A member of theDutch resistance had independentlycut cables he believed to run to thecharges. A British engineer officer

descended to the chambers under thebridge and pulled the fuses out fromthe explosive just after SergeantRobinson and the tanks passed over-head.Whatever the truth of the matter,

German reinforcements were unableto get to Nijmegen in time because ofthe British parachutists on Arnhembridge. But this barrier, so stubbornlyheld, could not indefinitely withstandthe reinforced strength of Kampf-gruppe Harzer, urged on by Bittrich,pressed by Model to complete theirdestruction. The defensive posts weremostly in houses on and at each sideof the earth ramp raising the roadto the high bridge spans. Early onTuesday morning.

'. . . a bit after stand-to [the dawn

stand to arms] we heard engine noisesfrom up the river. I looked out halfexpecting to see boats, but it wastanks and some SPs [guns] lumberingalong the eastern road and bank. Theydidn't come too close - just stayed off"

about 1,000 yards and started takingpot shots - sniping, really, with bloodygreat cannon.'These tactics were efi'ective cover

for infiltration by German infantrywho worked their way towards thehouses being slowly but steadilysmashed. Often, the British paratroopswere obliged temporarily to evacuateone or another group of houses underfire and the Germans took them bydefault. But as they were such anessential part of the bridgehead, theyhad to be retaken. Though the para-chutists never failed to take backwhat they needed in the defence, eachcounterattack produced morestretchers with more wounded bodiesfor the cellars of the brigade dressingstation, where the RoyalArmy MedicalCorps doctors and orderlies had little

rest. Almost every hour, too, theCatholic chaplain. Father Denis Egan,

134

75mm Pack HowitzerWeight: 1,340 lbs Rate of fire: Six rounds per minute Range: 9,475 yards max

spent with dying- men who did notbhink to ask, as he did not seek to:issert what branch of the church herepresented. When men are dying,faith is a much simpler problem.Men and ammunition were what

Prost needed to hold on. He was still

Dbtaining devoted support from MajorMumford's battery of VSmm guns nearDosterbeek but, shells being short, thegunners were only asked to help repelnajor attacks. Anti-tank ammuni-tion was reduced to about twelve:'ounds of 6-pounder and seventeen for:he infantry projectors at midday.There was no sign of the 2nd South

StafTords or the 11th Battalion; nolews of the surviving elements of theLst and 3rd Battalions. In the after-loon. a number of houses shelled'requently throug-h the morningDeg-an to burn beyond control. Atiusk, to add to their concern, whatippeared to be a fresh squadron of:anks appeared on the north west edge)f their perimeter. All approachesNeve now occupied by German armour13 well as infantry and assault guns.On the Tuesday morning, Urquhart

rot back to his headquarters at 0725

hours. For over twelve hours, he hadbeen forced to hide in an attic and wasonly relieved when the 11th Battalionand the remainder of the SouthStaflfords reached his house. Borrow-ing a jeep, he di'ove back to find

Mackenzie in one of Model's formerhotels in Hartenstein.'We had assumed, sir,' said Macken-

zie, 'that you had gone for good.'A report was made to him concerning

events in his absence and Hicksreturned to his brigade.Urquhart was now seized of the

necessity to appoint a commander in

Arnhem to control the drive by the11th, South StafTords and the 1st and3rd, if they could be found, to join

Frost at the bridge. Hopefully, sincehe had himself returned unscathed,he sent off Hick's deputy. ColonelHilary Barlow, with a staff officer, aradio and a jeep.

Through the morning, reports camein from the staff visiting the Air-Landing and 4th Brigades and fromthe gunner net working to the bridge.

The actual position of most unitsbecame accurately plotted. Less accu-rate was the information concerning

135

Above left: Lieutenant-Colonel David Dobie. Above right: Major Freddie Gough.

Below: Brigadier J W Hackett

Above left: Lieutenant-Colonel Eddie Myers. Above right: Major Dickie Lonsdale.

Below : Captain Lionel Queripel, VC

the enemy because, although over1,800 prisoners had been captured, somany units of such strange originshad been identified. It was known,however, that the attacks against the1st Borclerers and a party of gliderpilots from the west and north werebeing run by Colonel Lippert whoseNCOs school and training battalionwas assisted by sailors, airmen and amixed bag of soldiers with anti-air-craft guns in support. Helle's DutchSS had also been identified but theirprime aim was self-preservation.There were therefore gaps in theenemy line, particularly to the north,and through these a reconnaissancetroop of Gough's squadron searchedand questioned. One message of manyfrom the Dutch was that one hundredfresh tanks had arrived that day,Tuesday, the 19th, from Germany.This report reached divisional head-

quarters at 1155 hours. If it was true,the division would be able to continueoperations only in a very limited area.Contact with Second Army to thesouth at 1015 hours had told them thatthe Guards Armoured Division were atGrave and the bridge at.Nijmegen hadyet to be taken. Urquhart began tothink that he must stop the 4thBrigade and close his division into asingle perimeter.About 1330 hours on the Tuesday

afternoon, he found Brigadier Hackettby the railway east of Wolfhezestation. As the two men met they werestrafed by three Me 109s, whose attacksat Arnhem were made possible by thelow and heavy cloud over Belgium andBritain.'Unless the enemy alters his plans in

such a way as to favour us," said thebrigadier, 'there's not much future forthe brigade on its present line ofadvance.' A change was unlikely; hewas right up against a cordon estab-lished by Major Spindler, who had fouradditional units under command,including Krafi"t's battalion. Theheaviest strike weapon of the para-chutists was the 75mm howitzer, andthe little shells of these weaponsmerely rattled against the Germanarmour.Warning Hackett to be ready to pull

back and then try the middle roadinto Arnhem - the Heelsum-Arnhemroad - General Urquhart went back to

his headquarters. He had not beengone more than thirty minutes whena message came to the 4th Brigadethat an enemy force (Lippert's, witharmoured cars and self-propelled flakguns) had worked round to the southof the Air-Landing Brigade and weremoving towards Wolfheze and therailway. All the 4th Brigade Transportand anti-tank guns were north of thetrack. If Wolfheze station and crossingwas captured there could be no disen-gagement to the south. The brigadecommander ordered the 10th Bat-talion to come back to hold the areawhile he disengaged the remainder.

All this took time. The 10threported: "The battalion was in closecontact with the enemy and [with-drawal] meant moving back acrossabout 1,000 yards of open groundwhich was swept by small arms. It

had to be carried out, however, andthe companies got back to the level

crossing at Wolfheze. Very heavycasualties were sufl"ered crossing theopen ground . .

.'

Captain Lionel Queripel, command-ing a company of the 10th, was con-cerned to keep men moving; for assoon as the withdrawal was observedby Krafi"t's men and the neighbouringbattalion, they fired every weapon tohand and called their mortars andguns into action. With his own facelaid open by shrapnel. Queripel carrieda wounded sergeant to the safety of aditch, and then rallied a few men tojoin him in an attack on the nearestenemy post from which two MG 34swere firing. A British 6-pounder wasalso held by the Germans at this pointand the little party killed the enemycrew on it. The machine gunners fled.

From the flank, a section of Germansbegan to work their way back to themachine guns, throwing stick gre-nades to cover their movement.Captain Queripel received anotherface wound and was shot in the arm.Now in a German trench, the party

took shelter. 'Get out,' said Queripelto his party, and remained to throwgrenades while they withdrew. Look-ing back, after a dash of one hundredyards, two of the soldiers saw that hewas still fighting when the enemyrushed in, killing him where he stood.Withdrawal in war is never an easy

movement. When fire breaks up the

138

ranks, even the best regiments areliable to disorder, perhaps a momen-tary panic. The dreadful movementback under fire became a nightmareas, suddenly, gliders bringing in trans-port and anti-tank guns of the PolishBrigade began to land amongst themand receive their share of Germanmissiles. The pilots had found the rightlanding zone but the division believedit had cancelled their passage. Behind,RAF transports flew in to drop suppliesinto the hands of the enemy. One.captained by Flight-Lieutenant DavidLord of 271 squadron was seriouslydamaged by flak. Like so many of hiscolleagues, he flew steadily on with histask despite an engine beginning tocatch fire. The crew were ordered tojump to safety. Then, even as theflames spread, he returned alone tomake a second run so as to release thelast load of bundles, when his Dakotacrashed, a fiery mass, to the ground.At dawn on Wednesday, as the 82nd

and the Guards made ready finally tocapture Nijmegen bridge, 1st AirborneDivision was being crushed out ofexistence.On the Wednesday morning at the

bridge. Colonel Frost found himself"... lying face downwards on theground with a fiendish pain in bothlegs', after what seemed "the hell ofan explosion".' He had been seriouslywounded by a mortar bomb and MajorFreddie Gough now took command ofthe defences.

It became clear as the morningpassed that the bridge was slippingfrom their grasp. The German infantrywere kept back from it, were forcedout of the houses through which theysought to break through to the rampand Aorthern span, but the armourgrew hourly more bold as the tankcommanders sensed progressively thatthe British anti-tank weapons werealmost extinct. Presently, two PzkwIlls, painted a buff" yellow, drove up tothe ramp on the western side, pausedand traversed their guns a little.Then two more appeared at the end ofthe ramp, up which they drove untilthey were level with the first spanand looked down into the houses bythe river bank. Covering one another,

Panzer-Grenadiers attack houses bythe Rhine

liu r-.rn

Above: Harzer's armour. Far Right:The British supplies drop wide

each crew watched to see whether anywould pay a penalty for this deliberateapproach, so close to the defendedhouses, so much in the open. Apartfrom a few grenades thrown fromwindows, there was none. Almost atleisure then, the tanks began a slowdestructive fire into the buildings,using a variety of shells - solid steel,

high explosive and white phosphorussmoke, the latter hastening the pro-cess of burning out these nests ofresistance. Panzer Grenadiers beganto advance in little rushes through thegardens on the western side, closingtowards the hguses immediately belowthe bridge.The German tanks and infantry

were also co-operating a mile down-stream between the Rhine Pavilionand the Saint Elizabeth Hospital butless effectively. Here the area was notso open. Harzer's armour lacked aramp from which to fire down directlyinto the paratroops. In consequence,his infantry and engineers were com-mitted to the meticulous and deadly

'^,^

work of fighting house by house, aidedat times by fire from the artillerypositioned in the brickworks on thesouth bank. It was these guns whichhad fired decisively on the previousday when the 1st and 3rd Battalions,the 11th and South Staffords hadsought to break through to thebridge. In this attempt, 272 officers andmen had been killed or wounded,among them all four commandingofficers. Colonel Hilary Barlow, sentby Urquhart on the Tuesday morningto command the four battalions, hadbeen struck down on his journey tothem. He remains missing to this day.What was now left in the area of theRhine Pavilion and between the roadsrunning parallel with the river bankwas a threadbare defence, much of it

unconnected, the men weak for wantof rest, confused by the action con-tinuing blindly hour by hour. Lieu-tenant-Colonel 'Sheriff' Thompson,the artillery battalion commander,returning from one of his frequentvisits to the accessible defences drewtogether as many as he could andreported to General Urquhart on hisreturn that a single commander and a

140

wireless set were urgently needed in

the area.There were few experienced com-

manders to hand, fewer still unwoun-ded. In the dressing station, however,was Major Lonsdale, second-in-com-mand of the 11th Battalion who hadbeen wounded while still descendingunder his parachute. Patched up, hehad been asking for discharge and atask. Urquhart now gave him one withorders to take a radio offered by thegunners and to assume command of

the sector on the river bank towardsthe bridge. Arriving intact, Lonsdalemade a quick tour of his force and sawthat their hold was a tenuous one:the South Staffords had withdrawn to

the Oosterbeek church in rear andwhat remained (he noted) was '

. . .

throughout that afternoon merci-lessly bombed and attacked by theHun. Later that afternoon, Germanflamethrowers were used to greateffect in that they set fire to thenearby woods and with the wind in thewrong direction for us, the smoke andflames made our position uninhabit-able. As a result, I spoke to Div. HQon the wireless, informing them . . .

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that I- would like permission towithdraw to the area of the church.The staff officer to whom I spokereplied: "The man on the spot mustdecide", to which I replied: "OK, in

half an hour's time from now I ambloody well off to the church!" '

At 1845 hours, in the confusion ofthe smoke and an incipient Germanattack, Lonsdale's force made a dashback to the area of the church. It wasa mixed body but now reorganised withgunners and glider pilots integratedwith the infantry. One chaplain.Padre Watkins of the 1st, remainedam.ongst the party, a true guide,comforter and friend. 'The padre gotme out,' a soldier of Lonsdale's forcewrote home to his parents, 'and a lot

of others. I don't know why he didn'tget hit, I didn't hear him saying anyprayers.'The new positions of Lonsdale Force

constituted the eastern sector of adivisional defence perimeter. For nowthat he could no longer hope to relieveFrost with additional troops andsupplies. General Urquhart haddecided early on Wednesday morningsimply to hold fast to a portion of thenorth bank to offer a bridgehead toXXX Corps when it came to the end ofHell's Highway. To the west and north,the perimeter was manned by Hick'sAir-Landing Brigade, effectively aboutfive companies; the resilient andenterprising pathfinder company; thereconnaissance squadron and variousdetachments - glider pilots, Poleswho had come in by glider, gunnerswithout guns, engineers without plant,administrative troops. Divisionalheadquarters remained in the hotel atHartenstein. Thompson's 75mm bat-teries were spread out to fire in supportof sections of the defence.

It was expected that the 4th Para-chute Brigade would make an impor-tant contribution to the defence assoon as it could be brought in fromthe area south of the railway, but onthe Wednesday morning it was still

two miles from the remainder of thedivision. Brigadier Hackett had onceagain to disengage in daylight froman enemy stronger in numbers, mobileand armoured. Thanks to his coolhead they accomplished this withoutdisaster but it was not thereafter astraightforward matter of marching

directly to the nearest divisionaldefence posts. The Germans were nowclosed round the division and the 4thBrigade were obliged to force a waythrough them; in efi"ect, to run thegauntlet. The first intimation of whatwas happening to them came when anumber of wild-eyed men rushed intodivisional headquarters to be stoppedby Urquhart and MacKenzie. Theywere from the 10th Battalion, a handfulof survivors from an ordeal by fire. Alittle later, sixty more of the 10thmarched in under their commandingofficer, on his feet but mortallywounded. In the woods behind, Briga-dier Hackett was leading by fieldcraftand bayonet assault all that remainedof his formation, seven officers andseventy-eight men. In the defence linethat evening, the 4th Brigade was acompany strong.When Brigadier Hackett reported

to his divisional commander, it is

not surprising that he asked at oncefor news of XXX Corps. It was whateveryone wanted to know, whateveryone discussed every hour:where were they; when would theyarrive? Urquhart's headquarters hadnot yet made contact . with eitherHorrocks' or Browning's staffs behindNijmegen and they declined still touse the Electricity Board's privatetelephone circuit. Fortunately, anarmy liaison station and the BBCcorrespondent who had accompaniedthe glider force gave them occasionalcommunication to London and in-

creasingly through the day news ofthe attack on the bridge at Nijmegen.Just after 1400 hours, they heard thatthe Guards Armoured Division and82nd were fighting hard for the Waalbridge. If they captured it that after-noon, men asked one another, wasthere a hope that they would reachthe Rhine next day, Thursday? Nonedoubted that the divisional perimeterwould resist for some time, eventhough the bulk of their supply hadagain been dropped into Germanpositions. But could the bridge defencebe sustained for another day?From the bridge came a report that

Tiger tanks had arrived: four and areconnaissance half track had passedacross to the south that evening.The artillery observation post hadbeen blown from its last eyrie and was

145

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The land forces' drive north from Nijmegen to relieve the 1st Airborne Division

closed. -All houses immediately westof the first span had been lost; smokefrom others nearby was pouring intothe cellars where the wounded lay andthe doctors had told Freddie Goughthat they would be asphyxiated if theyremained there. A truce was arrangedand the stretchers were carried out,many to the Saint Elizabeth Hospitalwhere British doctors and staffs atten-ded with the Dutch to friend and foewithout discrimination, while Germanguards looked on. The truce washonourably observed by the Germans,though they did not hesitate at its

conclusion to crowd in upon thoseremaining to fight. The battle beganagain; the night passed with a bandof diehards still in position, denyingto the Germans the use of the bridgeby unarmoured vehicles.Towards midnight, the firing died

away everywhere, save for anoccasional slow spasm of harassingfire by German guns. To the south,the night sky flickered, too, with theflashes of shells exchanged intermit-tently across the Waal. And at last,

at midnight a message came fromheadquarters. Airborne Corps, to saythat the Nijmegen bridge had beencaptured intact, that armour waspassing across towards Arnhem.Throughout the Tuesday and

Wednesday, all the reinforcementsModel had promised Bittrich werearriving in the Arnhem area: addi-tional infantry - though much of thiswas suspect morally or physically - atraining battalion of engineers withflame throwers, artillery of which theguns had to be towed into position byHarzer's own transport and, at theend, weightiest of all, the King Tigertanks of Abteilung 503. All these werecommitted piecemeal as they arrivedbecause Bittrich believed that hispressure at Arnhem was at the point ofbeing overwhelming, that with eachfresh reinforcement the British mustcrack.He was mistaken. He had taken pains

to reorganise the German forces to thewest of Urquhart's perimeter so thatColonel Lippert commanded all thetroops in that sector. If he had pausedto mount a comprehensive attack,using Lippert's force as a backstop,while driving in with Ka7npfgruppeHarzer reinforced by the King Tigers

and the engineers, Urquhart's defencesmust have been destroyed.Model's refusal to have the bridge

at Nijmegen blown added to Bittrich'sdifficulties; for with its capture. II SSPanzer Korps also began to fight underthe pressure of time. If the GuardsArmoured Division began to advancequickly between the Waal and theRhine, he would have to divert forcesfrom Arnhem to impede them and thiswould delay his destruction of the 1st

Airborne Division. On the Wednesdaynight, he told Harzer that the lastpocket at Arnhem bridge must with-out fail be pinched out on Thursdaymorning and a concerted effort bemade during the day to finish off thelarger sector resisting by Oosterbeek.Events were running late for Army

Group B as much to the south ofNijmegen as to the north of it. Atheadquarters, Fix'st Parachute Army,General Student was now aware thathis plan to cut Hell's Highway bypincers west and east through Bestand Zon had been thrown out oftiming by the counterattacks ofGeneral Taylor's division, Britisharmour and guns. He ordered a renewalof this operation. In the Reichswaldforest, the advanced units of Meindl'sII Parachute Korps were arriving fromGermany but rather than wait for thewhole to form up, he directed that anattack should be mounted at once, onthe Wednesday morning against theGrossebeek heights. Thus Gavin's thindefences were pressed again just asthe struggle for Nijmegen bridgedemanded all available support in

tanks, guns and infantry. Hell's High-way came again under shellfire andwas blocked as before by burningvehicles.When Thursday came, the British

43rd Wessex Division, the infantryneeded to assist the Guards' tanksforward to the Rhine, were still

struggling to get forward along thehighway.

147

'Boys,

it is ail iieli'

On Thursday morning, as soon as it

was light. Major Brinkmann's SSbattle group began to clear Arnhembridge of his persistent foe.

While five Pzkw III tanks and anassault gun fired from several pointsof vantage into the upper storeys ofthe few houses still occupied by theBritish, Panzer Grenadiers workedmethodically through the groundfloors.

Initial entry was achieved by blow-ing a 'mousehole' and as soon as theexplosive fired, stick and egg grenadeswere thrown inside. Protected by theouter wall, an assault team of three orfour soldiers waited only for the shockof detonation before they too hurledthemselves through the hole, sprayingthe room of entry with bullets fromtheir Schmeisser machine pistols. Intheory, this method was irresistible.

In practice, it was inhibited by theBritish paratroops' preparations; theyhad constructed shelters of rubble andfallen beams in corners and alcoves,on stairways and in the entrances tocellars. When these were run down,'

. . . one young Britisher began tododge about to draw our fire, while

148

another tried to come at us from theside with a knife.' "One man remainingleaped at us swinging his rifle as a club.'As if these attempts were not hopelessenough, two of the tanks kept pacewith the Panzer Grenadiers to fire

directly from the street into the frontdoors or windows. At the last, asecond group of Germans rushed thehouses from the opposite end of theblock to catch about forty paratroopsattempting to withdraw through thegardens.'Jimmy Logan (the medical officer)

estimated that the 2nd Battalionwounded are 210'. noted their diarist;that is, about half the battalion, afigurewhichexcludedthe dead. 'Ninety-four were rounded up on D plus 4

[Thursday]' and about a further fifty

of brigade headquarters, gunners,engineers, signallersandServiceCorps,of whom twenty-seven were wounded.The diehards had delayed the openingof the bridge for a further three hoursand a half. By 0915 hours that morning,however, German trucks, in additionto armour, were passing over it freely

The wounded accumulate

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towards Nijmegen, into the Betuwe,the island between the streams of theRhine and the Maas.With the clearance of Arnhem

bridge, the outcome of Market Gardenbecame a simple issue: which sidewould ga,in the bridgehead held byUrquhart''s men? North of the Rhine,the British were denying ground, theGermans attacking; to the south, theroles were reversed.On the Thursday morning, the

Guards Armoured Division sought toopen a corridor through the Betuwe.They found themselves in an expanseof fiat farmland, much of it inter-

sected by drainage ditches and relievedonly by the comfortable structuresand tiled roofs, the gardens andorchards of the small towns, villagesand farmsteads from which the pavedroads ran at right angles. With fewexceptions, these roads were built-upon solid banks to a height of six feet

to carry them above the flood level.

Now, on this late September morningas the mist cleared, they exposed thetanks perfectly to the gun-layers of

the 88s deployed and concealed by10th SS Panzer Division during theprevious night. The Irish GuardsGroup came to a halt.

There are days in war when, fromthe first moment of action, a series ofmistakes and mischances combine tofrustrate success. So it was for theBritish in the Betuwe on the 21st

September. Having halted, the Guardsattempted to place tanks out to aflank to shoot forward of theirinfantry, advancing along the ditcheson either side of the road. But belowthe road level, the sodden polderwould not take the weight of thearmour; the first troop to slither onto it became bogged. It was necessaryto find a side road and this necessitatedmine clearance. When at last theinfantry were able to move forward,they were heavily mortared andbecause of the attacks on Hell'sHighway, the British ration of shellsand mortar bombs for the attack wassmall. The attack did not succeed inclearing more than a few hundredyards, past the first anti-tank post.Behind this, there were more 88s in

depth, protected by machine guns andpanzerfaust rocket launchers; behindagain, tanks were seen.

The defences were not impregnableand the lack of supporting fire for theinfantry might have been borne hadthe air force been able to strike as it

had done on the march to Eindhoven.But this day, the RAF air contactteam on the ground could not com-municate with the Typhoons whichcircled overhead. The Germans weresurprised and elated to see the Luft-waffe joining the fight with Me 110s

and Fw 190s! At nightfall, the Guardshad not advanced a mile beyond thebridge.

It was a dismal day, lightened only bythree events for 1st Airborne. The first

was that direct radio contact wasmade with the gunners of XXX Corpsby an observation officer. CaptainMcMillan, of 1st Airborne Division.General Urquhart was making hismorning round of visits to units when,about 0930 hours, he discovered hischief artilleryman. Colonel Loder-Symonds, engaged in a strange con-versation by wireless."... Yes, and my Christian name is

Robert . . . .

'

'What is your wife's name?' - aquestion from the distant station.•Merlin.'

•What is your wife's favouritesport?'"Falconry.'This seemed enough to overcome the

suspicions of the artillery radiostation in XXX Corps that McMillan'scall to them and Loder-Symonds'subsequent conversation were notpart of a deceitful plot by GermanIntelligence to break into a Britishwireless network. In consequence, theweapon power of 1st Airborne wasboosted - the guns of 64 MediurjiRegiment, eleven miles to the south,were now ranged and corrected on to

German positions close to the peri-

meter. In time, more medium andsome of the heavy batteries would beable to add their strength, to returnto the Germans some of the weight of

shells that they were throwing intothe slender tongue of Dutch land heldon the north bank.Then, at 1800 hours that evening, the

Polish Brigade arrived.Each day, the Germans had feared

the arrival of reinforcements byparachute. The air observation andearly warning system had learned to

150

!^Mv, .V'

mfTm^.

British vehicles devastated by German artillery and mortar fire

watch especially for the transportstreams approaching- the coast and toreport their passing not only to theLuftwaflfe fighter squadrons but alsodirectly to the army at Arnhem.Already, this system had caused muchloss and damage to the air supplycrews. Those arriving at 1245 hours onthe Thursday were severely attackedand little got down to the defence.At 1600 hours supply aircraft returnedand managed to drop a number oflittle bundles and paniers inside theperimeter. While the anti-aircraft wasconcentrated upon them, Harzer re-

ceived a message that 'four-motor'aircraft with gliders had passed overDunkirk on the hour towards Arnhem.There were in addition three waves ofDakotas flying out of the dense lowcloud over England. Receptionarrangements were therefore madefor General Sosabowski and his force.The waiting German soldiers atArnhem noted that, '

. . . the barrelsof the anti-aircraft guns stared upinto the sky from which there cameto our ears a slight hum. It was theGerman fighters . . . Suddenly the first

anti-aircraft gun roared . . . one afteranother, other batteries joined in theattack.'

Instructions had been relayed from1st Airborne headquarters to the Polesthat they should not drop on thepolder south of the bridge but threemiles to the south west, close to thevillage of Driel, whence they shouldseize the southern landing site of theHeavadorp river ferry. Delayed fortwo days by the persistent murk,tossed about during his flight throughclouds, the fiery Sosabowski was inan angry mood when he reached hisrendezvous, a condition made worsewhen he learned that half the air-

craft carrying his men had failed tofind the dropping zone. Undeterred,the Poles formed up quickly underrandom fire from German defences towork towards the ferry site. At thispoint, a woman member of the Dutchunderground, Cora Baltussen. cameto the headquarters to say that theGermans had attacked and capturedthe northern end of the crossingplace, from which they were now firing

directly across the river.

Unaware of these several setbacksto General Sosabowski's plans.General Bittrich believed that theentry of the Poles must be part of afresh plan to link 1st Airborne withXXX Corps. He ordered Harzer to

151

Pfi-w^'y ii'

Poles wait by the Rhine bank. Theyarrived too late

send a company of Pzkw V Panthertanks and Major Knaust's infantrybattalion - newly arrived - to join

10th SS Panzer in their containmentof the British at Nijmegen and to

establish a blocking position south of

Arnhem bridge against the Poles.

These dispositions wei^e particularlywelcome to the 10th who would other-wise have been defending the whole of

Betuwe. Now they might concentrateon the containment of XXX Corps.During Thursday night, Knaust's menpassed south through Elst to find

guides waiting for them in the darkcountryside. Marched to their posi-

tions, they began to dig trenchesamongst farm buildings and into thebanks of the surrounding fields.

In the same darkness, Harzerbrought across the bridge three otherad hoc battalions which had reachedhim, a machine gun battalion, DutchSS Landsturm and a detachment of

the King Tigers. These faced west-ward from Hell's Highway towards thePoles and sent patrols out to discoverwhat Sosabowski and his men wereabout.In darkness. Captain Zwolanski

waded into the Rhine waters and swam

across to the south bank. He wasSosabowski's liaison officer withGeneral Urqnhart. Admitted to thearea by the Polish sentries he madehis way to the farmhouse used now asbrigade headquarters. Inside, his

general was studying his maps.Zwolanski was naked and dripping

when he entered. 'What the hell?'

asked Sosabowski.'I have just swum across the Rhine

to bring you the latest news^ sir.'

'Yes, you look as if you have. Tell

me what it is.'

During the day, Zwolanski reported,the Germans had attacked the Heava-dorp ferry and then been driven backfrom it by the Kings Own ScottishBorderers. But the Germans returnedand were believed to have a battalionsitting on the site. To get the Polesacross the river. General Urquharthad ordered his engineer commander,Lieutenant-Colonel Myers, to con-struct rafts to ferry the Poles over.

It was realised that this would bedifficult and long drawn out but anystrengthening of their numbers, par-

ticularly by fresh troops, wouldimprove the chance of holding on.

Two companies of Poles made their

way quietly to the river bank to

wait. Elsewhere, the brigade captureda party of Germans sent out from

152

Hell's Highway and learned from themthat an attack was to be made fromthis direction next morning-. Sosa-bowski's own patrols reported thatthere was considerable enemy move-ment along Hell's Highway and anetwork of positions covering it fromthe west.When dawn came on the 22nd, and

there was no sign of the British rafts,

the Polish commander drew in histwo companies. With two depletedbattalions to maintain his isolatedposition, he decided to close his ranks.

Early on Friday morning, the House-hold Cavalry once more combinedaudacity with skill to infiltrate partof a squadron through the mist tothe Rhine. At Driel they found thePoles.Back in the Nijmegen bridgehead,

the infantry brought over the Waalon the previous afternoon did not makeuse of the morning mist to advance,as lamentably they had not beenrequired to make use of darkness theprevious night. At a comfortable hour,when they were once more able to seethe ground ahead - and the Germanswere able to see them, no less - theadvance by 43rd (Wessex) Divisionbegan.Whatever the reasons for this late

start, the commanding officer of theleading battalion, Hugh Borrodaile,had no doubt that he must make haste.But in this flat miry land, he had noclose air support, very limited artil-

lery to help him on due to the inter-ruption of shell supply along Hell'sHighway, and no tanks to keep himcompany until he had rooted out the88s opposing them. He decided to takewhat he could by infiltration. His rifle

companies began to push along theditches. When he came to Oosterhoutvillage, however, this tactic wasdefeated; there was a 'battalion' -

about 300 strong - defending it with atank, several self-propelled and anti-aircraft guns and heavy mortars dugin amongst the houses. Colonel Borro-daile tried first one approach andthen another using his own mortarsand machine guns to support theriflemen and the fire of the singlebattery allotted to him. It would havebeen very surprising if these hadsucceeded and they did not.

His brigade commander. BrigadierH Essame, grew steadily more anxiousas the hours passed outside Oosterhout.About midday, he saw that whateverthe embargo, the Somersets neededfull supporting fire. His forceful de-mands brought the divisional artilleryon to the target.While the Somersets made ready for

a formal attack in full strength.Brigadier Essame concentrated asecond battalion, the 5th Duke ofCornwall's Light Infantry with tanksand trucks, supporting machine gunsand 17-pounder anti-tank guns tohasten through Oosterhout as soon asit was taken. The battalion com-mander, Lieutenant-Colonel GeorgeTaylor, was instructed to drive to theRhine at Driel without a pause.At 1520 hours, the Somersets' com-

panies went forward. At 1700 hours,Oosterhout had been cleared out, 139prisoners taken with a tank, an 88mmgun and five light flak guns. Theremainder had managed to withdrawat the last minute. The confusion andspeed of their flight was shortly to aidthe Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry.Having placed himself directly

beside Borrodaile. George Taylorknew at once when the road was clear.

A bizarre figure in breeches, a para-chutist's smock and a despatch rider'shelmet, he leapt into his jeep and badethe column move with all speed.Round the village, through the smokeon the far side the column disappeared,many of the infantry dangerouslyexposed as they clung to the sides oftanks or crouched in open unarmouredthree-ton trucks. The nearest Ger-mans believed at first that thismixture of wheels and tracks hasten-ing past from Oosterhout belonged totheir own defence. They held theirfire. But four miles to the rear, adetachment of SS in tanks andinfantry grew suspicious and theircommander moved them on to theroad. Inadvertently, they broke intoa gap in Colonel Taylor's column sothat the chasers began to be chased.At dusk there was a clash. The Ger-mans began to hunt for the intrudersamongst the villages while the Corn-ishmen and their supporters laid

ambushes with some success.At Driel, Colonel Taylor drove into

the village thirty minutes after leav-

153

ing Oosterhout with his column.Across the river, the slow progress

of XXX Corps was understandablydisappointing to Urquhart and hisforce. The general decided to sendhis chief of staff, Charles Mackenzie,and engineer commander, Eddy Myers,across the river to give his orders tothe Poles and to impress upon GeneralsBrowning and Horrocks that . . . theDivision no longer exists as such andthat we are now merely a collectionof individuals holding on. Make clearto them, Charles,' said GeneralUrquhart, 'that we're terribly short ofmen, ammunition, food and medicalsupplies, and that we need someDUKWs [amphibious trucks] to ferrythe Poles across. If supplies don'tarrive tonight it may be too late.'

At 1210 hours, the two officers left

divisional headquarters for the riverbank where a rubber dinghy had beenhidden. Mackenzie agreed to row,Myers to watch and he swore at hispartner when he splashed his oarsnoisily. By luck, none of the Germanmortar or artillery posts saw them;the only fire was at long range fromsnipers and the bullets sizzled byat a distance. The little boat passedacross and reached the high steepbank on the south side. In Sosa-bowski's headquarters, Mackenzieasked that every soldier that couldbe mustered should be sent acrossthat night. They had been unable tomake rafts but Myers had a sugges-tion: "There are some small three-manrubber dinghies which can be pulledbackwards and forwards across theriver by hawsers.'The arrival at Driel of the front half

of George Taylor's column that nightseemed to promise success. But as thetanks began to move in, two minesexploded beneath their tracks so thatthe remainder had to wait until a wayforward was found for them. A moreimmediate setback was that theDUKWs brought by the battalion couldnot negotiate the steep river bank.They were obliged to rely therefore onthe little dinghies and such rafts asthey might improvise. After threehours, the dinghies began to ferry afew Poles at a time from a crossingheld by the British light infantrymen.The rafts foundered; all but one of thedinghies became holed. Captain David

Storrs of the engineers rowed androwed hour after hour, making twenty-three crossings and by morning fifty

Polish soldiers and perhaps a ton ofammunition and other supplies hadbeen carried into the perimeter.At 0915 hours in the drizzling rain on

Saturday morning. General Urquhartsent this signal to Airborne Corpsheadquarters:•Spasmodic shelling and mortaring

during the night. Movement of self-

propelled guns noted. Otherwise little

change in the perimeter. Severalattacks by infantry and self-propelledguns or tanks supported by extremelyheavy mortaring and shelling are inprogress on north east of perimeter . .

.'

Yet another attack was being moun-ted. On the Thursday. Urquhart hadsubdivided the perimeter into awestern sector under Brigadier Hicks,an eastern under Brigadier Hackett.Each had a number of units allottedby name for the defence - 1st BattalionThe Border Regiment, or 21st Inde-pendent Company, or Lonsdale Force.But the terms, 'battalion', or "com-pany' were no longer meaningful; all

units had become makeshift forceslike Lonsdale's, and like Lonsdale'sthey were shrinking every hour asmembers of each force were killed orwounded.The director of the airborne medical

services. Colonel Graeme Warrack.could do little for the dying; his wholetime and that of his exhausted med-ical officers and staff's was occupiedwith the treatment of those who hada chance of living. Sometimes, thewounded helped him in an unexpectedway - Captain Frank King of the 10thBattalion lying on a stretcher saw agravely wounded young soldier beingsent away because there was no spaceforhim in the crowded dressingstation.He gave up his own place to thesoldier and returned as best as hecould to the battle. By Saturday,almost every wounded man who couldmove at all of his own accord hadfollowed this example, yet the remain-der continued to overflow.With his divisional commander's

permission, Warrack made his way tothe nearest German hospital to askthe senior medical officer there for asafe passage to Harzer's headquarters.It was essential, if the lives of the

154

Miles

I r-Kilometres

KAMPFGRUPPEHARZER

^Elden

Niimegen Bmiles

The position of the British 1st Airborne Division during its stand at Oosterbeek,when the Second Army arrived to relieve it

Betifw: British wolinded are broughin under the flag of truce. Right: Foi

the Germans, a bartle won

i'

^

"^^m..

'-' :::':^'%-"f.^^.'^'''w?\

seriously wounded were to be pre-

served, to arrange some form of

evacuation with a truce.

Harzer's headquarters had movedfrom the woods by Staadsbosch intoArnhem city. As Warrack was talkingto his chief of staff, HauptmannSchwarz, Harzer joined them.

'I am extremely sorry,' he said, 'thatthere should be this fighting betweenour two countries. Of course, we will

help you with your wounded men.'A truce was arranged for two hours

near the Tafelberg Hotel and onBritish jeeps, in German ambulances,500 men were moved out of the immedi-ate battle zone. As soon as they hadgone, the fighting began again. At1500 hours, a block of houses in theeastern sector was fired by the flamethrowers of the Panzerlehr engineers.The heat from the blaze scorched a'company' 200 yards away and burnedto death at once those caught inside.

Saturday night was fine, the sky wasclear and shining with starlight. At2015 hours, Urquhart's situation re-

port for the day read. 'Many attacksduring the day by small partiesinfantry, self-propelled guns and tanksincluding flame throwers. Each attackaccompanied by very heavy mortaringand shelling within Div. Perimeter.After many alarms and excursions thelatter remains substantially un-changed, although very thinly held.

Physical contact not yet made withthose on south bank of river. Re-supply a flop, small quantities of

ammunition only gathered in. Still

no food and all ranks extremely dirtyowing to shortage of water. Moralestill adequate but continued heavymortaring and shelling is havingobvious eff'ects. We shall hold on. Butat the same time hope for a brighter24 hours ahead.'Considering their circumstances, it

was a moderate message. It wascharacterised by the cool fortitudewhich General Urquhart showed as hewalked about amongst his units. 'His

calm and cheerfulness,' remarkedMarek Swiecicki. the Polish warcorrespondent, 'are really the sole

cause of our optimism.'By Sunday, though the general

continued to preserve and encouragewhat remained of his division, all

grounds for optimism had passed.

Three battalions of 43rd Division hadreached the south bank of the riverand one, the 5th Do 3ets, had begun acrossing on a few flimsy craft whichdrownedmany ofthem. Such desperate,devoted strategems were not enoughat this late stage. There were onlytwo practicable ways of relieving 1st

Airborne Division : an assault crossingwith a full complement of boats andbridges for tanks or an evacuation of

the perimeter. On Sunday, GeneralStudent's final attack on Hell's High-way had closed it. Much of the engine-ers" boats and bridging were unableto come forward. Colonel Myers re-

turned to his divisional commanderearly on Monday morning with letters.

One was from General Thomas, com-mander of the 43rd Wessex Division.

It told him that the idea of relievingand extending the airborne bridge-head had been abandoned. 1st Airbornewas to withdraw across the southbank on a date to be agreed betweenUrquhart and himself. They wouldcall it Operation 'Berlin'.

On Monday night, 25th September1944, Operation Market Garden cameto an end and Operation Berlin began.

It had been a dreadful day withfrenzied attacks by the Germans.Snipers had begun to fire into some of

the dressing stations in contrast to theotherwise generous attitude of theenemy to the British wounded. Tankshad driven into the gun lines and for atime the defence zone had been cutalmost in two. Hungry, dazed for

want of sleep, the airborne soldiers

had continued to fight back doggedly,sometimes with wanton bravery. Thissaw them through the daylight hoursuntil a wet blustering evening arrived.

As the fit and walking woundedmade their way to the river, directed

by glider pilot guides, their wearyeyes saw everywhere strange shapes.

The alarming spectres of the nightwere exalted by the groans of thedying and the stench of the dead.

Canadian and British engineerswaited to ferry them across the river

in light boats. XXX Corps artillery

shot an accurate and devastating fire

into the German lines. Late in thenight, a corporal of the 3rd Battalion,

a member of Lonsdale Force, climbedout of the little boat which had broughthim over the Rhine and crossed the

158

bank. He felt suddenly that he couldnot walk another step. Too tired tothink of sleep, oppressed by. the know-ledge of the many friends he had left

on the far side of the river, he couldonly repeat silentl^^ to himself, 'That'sbloody that. That's bloody that!'until he was led to a truck whichdrove him away.He was not quite right. That was not

quite that. It was not all over so faras the struggle was concerned. On thefar bank, already, the Dutch under-ground were combining with theBritish Special Air Service and mem-bers of the 1st Airborne Division toorganise escapes. Major AnthonyDeane-Drummond was to wait, stand-ing in a cupboard, with extraordinarystrength and patience for fourteendays until the Germans should leavethe house in which he was hiding.Brigadier Hackett, now wounded,would be brought out and so wouldBrigadier Lathbury and a score in thedressing stations. After attending totheir patients, Warrack and some ofhis medical staffs would escape.The Dutch stayed on in their home-

land, and they continued in secretways to assist their allies, many tothe extent of losing their lives, be-cause they wanted their homeland tobe free again. They had many monthsto wait.The men of the 82nd and 101st, the

men of 1st Airborne who came backand many ofXXX Corps asked at first,

'was it all a failure ?' Seen so closely, it

may have seemed such; and indeed soit seemed to some at a distance. Field-Marshal Smuts wrote to Mr Churchillfrom South Africa to sympathise forthe setback. The British PrimeMinister's reply provides, perhaps, anepitaph for the September battle:' ... As regards Arnhem, I think youhave got the position a little out offocus. The battle was a decided vic-

tory, but the leading division, asking,quite rightly, for more, was given achop. I have not beeri afflicted by anyfeeling of disappointment over thisand am glad our commanders arecapable of running this kind of risk.'

Bibliography

The author gratefully acknowledges permission to reproduce passages from'A Full Life' by Sir Brian Horrocks (Collins, London), from 'The BreretonDiaries' by L H Brereton, and from Mr Geoffrey Parson's article in the NewYork Herald Tribune. He also wishes to thank the executors of Mr EdwardR Murrow's estate for permission to quote from his CBS News Broadcast

A Full Life Lieutenant-General Sir Brian Horrocks (Collins, London)Airborne Warfare James M Gavin (Infantry Journal Press, Washington)Arnhem Major-General R E Urquhart (Cassell, London)Defeat in the West Milton Shulman (Seeker & Warburg, London)Freely I Served Stanislaw Sosabowski (Kimber, London)Royal Air Force 1939-1945 H St G Saunders (HMSO, London)The American Experience of War 1939-1945 K S Davis(Seeker & Warburg, London)The Army Air Forces in World War II W F Craven and J L Cate(University of Chicago Press, Chicago)The Battle of Arnhem Cornells Bauer (Hodder & Stoughton, London)The Battle of Arnhem Christopher Hibbert (Batsford, London)The Brereton Diaries Lieutenant-General Lewis H Brereton(Morrow, Nev/ York)The Eighty-Five Days R W Thompson (Hutchinson, London)The 43rd Wessex Division at War, 1944-45 Major-General H Essame(University of Chicago Press, Chicago)The Guards Armoured Division Major-General G L Verney(Hutchinson, London)The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich William L Shirer(Seeker & Warburg, London)The Second World War - 'Triumph and Tragedy' Winston S Churchill(Cassell, London)The Second World War 1939-1945: Army - 'Airborne Forces'Lieutenant-Colonel T B H Otway (The War Office, London)The Struggle for Europe Chester Wilmot (Collins, London)The War 1939-1945 D Flower and J Reeves (Cassell, London)United States Army in World War II: the European Theater of Operations -

'The Supreme Command' Forrest C Pogue (Historical Division,

Department of the Army, Washington)United States Army in World War II: the European Theater of Operations -

'The Siegfried Line Campaign' Charles B MacDonald (Historical Division,

Department of the Army, Washington)We Defended Normandy Lieutenant-General Hans Speidel (Jenkins, London)With Prejudice Lord Tedder (Cassell, London)With the Red Devils at Arnhem M Swiecieki (Max Love Publishing Co)

160

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Stalingrad by Geoffrey Jukes(Battle book. No 3)

Panzer Division by Kenneth Macksey(Weapons book. No 2)

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Pearl Harbor by A. J. Barker

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Gestapo and SS by Roger Manveil

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Kasserine Pass by Henry J Middieton

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Leyte Gulf by Donald Macintyre

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The Fall of Singapore by Arthur Swinson(Campaign book. No 5)

The Airborne by Charles MacDonald(Weapons book. No 9)

Birth and Death of the Luftwaffeby Alfred Price

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The Fall of France by John Williams

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The Defence of Moscowby Geoffrey Jukes(Campaign book. No 7)

The Nuremberg Rallies by Alan Wykes(Campaign book. No 8)

The Gun by Ian V Hogg(Weapons book, Noll)

The Raiders by Arthur Swinson(Campaign book. No 2)

Battle for Berlin by Earl Ziemke(Battle book. No 6)

Sicily by Martin Blumenson(Campaign book. No 3)

Kursk by Geoffrey Jukes(Battle book. No 7)

Tarawa by Henry I Shaw(Battle book. No 8)

Breakout from Normandy by David Mason(Campaign book. No 4)

German Secret Weapons by Brian Ford

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Spitfire by John Vader

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Commando by Peter Young(Weapons book. No 7)

Operation Market Garden (Arnhem) by

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In the Autumn of 1944 Germnny's back is

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'Arnhem ... was a decided victory'. _„ „ ,„„,

^'QlS^