Air Land Sea No 2 May 2010

8/11/2019 Air Land Sea No 2 May 2010

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Staff

DirectorCol David B. Hume, USAF

Deputy DirectorVacant

Editor

Mrs. Bea Waggener, Civilian, USAF

Publications OfficerMAJ Brian Bolio, USA

Purpose: ALSA Center publishes the ALSB three times ayear. ALSA is a multi-Service DOD field agency sponsoredby the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command(TRADOC), Marine Corps Combat Development Command(MCCDC), Navy Warfare Development Command (NWDC),and Curtis E. LeMay Center for Doctrine Development andEducation (LeMay Center). This periodical is governed by

Army Regulation 25-30, Chapter 10. The ALSB is a vehicleto spread the word on recent developments in warfightingconcepts, issues, and Service interoperability. The intent

is to provide a cross-Service flow of information amongreaders around the globe. Disclaimer: Since the ALSB isan open forum, the articles, letters, and opinionsexpressed or implied herein should not be construed tobe the official position of TRADOC, MCCDC, NWDC,Lemay Center, or ALSA Center.

Submissions: We solicit articles and readers comments.Contributions of 1,500 words or less are ideal. Submitcontributions, double-spaced in MS Word. Include name,title, complete unit address, telephone numbers, and e-

mail address. Graphics can appear in an article, but you

must also provide a separate computer file for eachgraphic and photograph (photos must be 300 dpi).Send e-mail submissions to [email protected] Center reserves the right to edit content to meetspace limitations and conform to the ALSB style andformat. Next issue: Sep 2010. Submission DEADLINE:COB 1 July 2010. Theme of this issue is Cordon andSearch.

Reprints: ALSA Center grants permission to reprintarticles Please credit the author and the ALSB Local

CONTENTSIN HOUSE

Directors Comments .............................................................. 3

FEATURE ARTICLES

Close Air Support in the Indirect Firefight ........................................ 4

Joint Fires Officer (JFO) for US Army Attack and Reconnaissance

Aviators .............................................................................................. 8

Combined Arms in the CAS Firefight .............................................. 11

CAS Perspective from the Ground ALO/JTAC ................................ 15

Data Link CAS: Terminology and Application ................................. 19

CAS in a Different Kind of War ........................................................ 25

* * * * * * * * * * * *


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Directors Comments

The Air Land Sea Application (ALSA)Center will celebrate its 35th birthday this

July. Since its beginning in 1975, ALSAcontinuously works to rapidly develop multi-Service tactics, techniques, and procedures(MTTP) to meet the immediate needs of thewarfighter. We are committed to solvinginteroperability problems for the Soldiers,Sailors, Airmen, Marines, and CoastGuardsmen who live and fight at the tacticallevel of war; the purpose of the Air Land SeaBulletin (ALSB) is to provide a forum forwarfighters to discuss what worked andwhat needs to get fixed. Currently, we have8 active projects in various phases ofdevelopment with 10 additional publicationsgoing into research for revision this year.

Speaking of our next ALSB, the theme isCordon and Search with article submissionsdue 1 July 2010 for the September 2010issue. It should be a good production.

Close air support (CAS) is the theme ofthis ALSB. CAS is an essential form of theapplication of airpower that supports groundoperations and has been an important aspectof military operations since the advent of theairplane. We start off with a piece by Lt ColWestern Sisler who highlights how CAScontributed to counter indirect fire (C-IDF)operations during the deployment to Baghdadin the Summer of 2007. He gives us goodprocedures both ground and air forces mayuse when participating in this type ofoperation. Our second article highlights the

capabilities of the US Armys attack andreconnaissance aviators. In it, CW4 Boyleadvocates their use as Joint Fires Observers(JFOs) within CAS operations. He makes hisargument that these highly skilled aviatorsalready possess many of the qualificationsneeded to be JFOs and may provide

provides some suggestions on how we maylearn from adopting a CAS interoperabilityassociation or liaison similar to the MarineCorps. Maj Vesseys article is followed by acommentary written by a couple of his 6thCombat Training Squadron-mates, Capt VifaCampbell and TSgt Astrauskas. They providesome schoolhouse insights on what CAS pilotsneed to know, how they can improve theirtactics, and some suggestions from a JTACinstructor on training and procedures. Next,we present an intriguing article by CaptAbram Burk on how digital link technology isbeing adopted in CAS operations. His piecetitled Datalink CAS: Terminology andApplication, outlines how aircrews are usingdatalink to decrease their CAS response time.

We finish this edition of the ALSB with a piecestraight from the field. Lt Col Matt Foley andMaj Bryan Trinkle are both currently deployedto Afghanistan and are heavily involved inCAS operations supporting the currentcounterinsurgency (COIN) fight and the overallcoalition effort. A good read for CAS operatorspreparing to deploy.

I would like to wish CAPT MatthewDanehy fair winds and following seas as hecontinues to excel in the Navy and reports forduty as the new deputy commander ofAirborne C2 and Logistics Wing, Norfolk NAS,VA. CAPT Danehys contributions to ALSAwere immense and he will be sorely missed.We also have to say goodbye to Lt Cols DavidNorm Kilcher and Aaron Polston as they

recently departed for new assignments.However, we welcome aboard our new Navyaction officer, LCDR Cynthia Squat Dieterlyas well as our new Marine officer Maj JeffreyRichie Hughes. We look forward to theircontributions and expect great things fromthem. Enjoy the ALSA Bulletin and please, as


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Close Air Support in the Indirect Firefight

USAF SSgt Pete Wartena passes a joint terminal attack controller (JTAC) call to Capt Joby Bennett at the air supportoperations center (ASOC) in Camp Victory, Iraq, 27 April 2007. Wartena is the JTAC flight duty technician and Bennett is theair liaison officer flight officer, both assigned to the 3 ASOC. (USAF photo by TSgt Cecilio M. Ricardo, Jr.)

ByLt Col Jim Western Sisler, USAF

BAGHDAD, SUMMER OF 2007Enemy use of indirect fire (IDF)

weapons (rockets and mortars)

against coalition forces is acontinuing threat. Conducting fixed-wing counter indirect fire (C-IDF)operations requires detailed integra-tion between all units/Servicessupporting the effort. Close air

Airmans point of view. Within anapproximately 10 NM by 15 NM area,there were six Army brigades (BDEs).

This made airspace coordination andthe passing of positive identificationextremely difficult. Despite these

difficulties, fixed-wing aircraft con-trolled by the 9th Expeditionary AirSupport Operations Squadron(9 EASOS) tactical air control party(TACP) were able to successfullysupport C-IDF operations, respond-

During the Summerof 2007, MND-Bexperienced regularIDF attacks through-out the Divisions

area of operations.


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environment are reactive efforts thatrequire aircraft on-station to catchshooters in the act.

C-IDF PLANNING

While C-IDF operations were areactive effort, it was possible toutilize historical analysis todetermine when to have aircraftoverhead. The MND-B Fires andEffects Cell (FEC) maintained anextensive database of IDF events thatwas updated daily. This analysiswas broken down by geographical

location as well as timeboth day ofthe week and specific times duringeach day. Based upon peak IDFtimes, the Division TACP generatedair support requests (ASRs) insupport of these operations.

Due to the difficulty of findingIDF before attacks, aircraft had to be

in close proximity to the expectedPOOs. These aircraft could,however, be utilized for other tasksuntil an attack occurred. TheDivision TACP was responsible forassigning aircraft to missionrequests from the BDE/battalion(BN) TACP, essentially a predecessor

of the Joint Air to GroundIntegration Cell (JAGIC). The aircraftconducted counter-improvisedexplosive device (C-IED) searches inresponse to ground force movementsor in response to information fromIraqi citizens or conducted armedoverwatch for short-notice groundmissions. With six BDEs to support,there was never a lack of supportrequests. Rather than requestingmany individual missions from theair support operations center(ASOC), CAS assets were distributedin the MND-B AO.

component planning by filling themajority of MND-B needs withoutneeding dozens of individual ASRsfrom the BDEs. As long as there wasat least one targeting pod equipped

aircraft over Baghdad, the 9 EASOSwas capable of responding to a POO.Finally, C-IDF support did noteliminate the ability of the groundunits to request their own CAS tomeet individual unit requirements.

C-IDF EXECUTION

The 9 EASOS Division TACP was

the command and control agency forthe operation. This was coordinatedin advance through the ASOC andMulti-National CorpsIraq (MNC-I).Aircraft were able to respond to IDFPOOs in any sector of the AO. Ifthere were multiple IDF POOs at onetime, attacks on the International

Zone took precedence. A troops incontact (TIC) situation or suspiciousvehicle track took precedence over acurrent attack. 9 EASOS did notwant to relinquish a current track ortake support away from a known TICsituation to conduct a search.

PROCEDURES

Speed of response is critical to asuccessful C-IDF effort. The enemywas very quick to depart the POOlocation. A joint effort is requiredthat integrates not only the airbornesensors, but static sensors (camerasin balloons or on towers), or groundforces as well. All available sensors

need to slew to the POO in order tocatch the attack in progress andprovide a positive identification. Thestatic sensors then pass theidentification to the aircraft that cantrack vehicles or personnel throughthe urban clutter Rotary wing

Speed of response iscritical to a success-

ful C-IDF effort.


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Figure 1. CAS/C-IDF Procedure

CAS/C-IDF PROCESS:The following procedure was used in the C-IDF fightusing CAS assets to support the ground commander:

1. POO report was announced over the radio/on mIRC chat.

2. MND-B Division JTAC posted POO information in the TACP mIRC windowand announced POO information on the Joint Air Request Net. (AlertedTACP who may not be looking at mIRC.)

3. Controlling BDE/BN JTAC directed aircraft to POO.a. If POO was in a different sector, these procedures were continued until

POO sector TACP was on freq.b. Conducted handover of aircraft to POO sector TACP, as time permitted.

4. Recorded time aircraft reported pod on POO (trend analysis).5. Responded to situation, as required.

a. Positive identification (PID) of IDFtrack / engage in accordance withrules of engagement (ROE)/special instructions (SPINS).

b. Suspicious personnel / vehiclestrack.c. Nothing foundreturn to previous mission.

6. Reported results in Joint Effects Report or Mission Reportwere as detailedas possible.a. Callsign of aircraft on station. (If no aircraft, stated whytanker,

mission not supported, etc.)

b. Time of POO.c. Time to get pod on POO.d. Results:

(1) Found POO thermal signature (for rockets)? Y/N(2) PID of IDF crew? (Aircraft witnessed an attack in progress.)(3) Contact on suspicious personnel / vehicles with resultsof tracking effort.

(a) Grid.

(b) Description of personnel / vehicles.(c) Location of personnel / vehicle stops.e. Additional remarks:

(1) Airspace difficulties.(2) Radio communications difficulties.(3) Aircraft re-tasked during tracking of suspicious personnel/vehicle.

If necessary, TACP from thebrigade that the aircraft was workingwith would control the aircraft andpass data until the TACP in the POOsector could establish contact withthe aircraft. The procedure isoutlined in figure 1 Since this was a

C-IDF RESULTSFrom May to July 2007, when

aircraft were on-station and able torespond to IDF events, the resultswere:


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After July 2007, the number ofattacks dropped significantlypreventing further analysis andrefinement of these techniques. Inaddition, remotely piloted vehicles

(RPVs) were not available on aregular basis, but these procedureswill work for any type of aircraft.

Technological advancements, suchas digital POO informationtransmitted to the aircraft, willgreatly reduce the time required toget sensors on target, enhancing the

effectiveness.SUMMARY

CAS in C-IDF operations utilizesairpower's responsiveness to support

high-priority, reactive events. Theserocket and/or mortar attacks willcontinue to be a tactic utilized by ourenemies until we demonstrate thecapability to defeat these attacks.

While arguably not the most efficientuse of airpower, political and militaryrealities require all available forces tosupport in the best way possible.Fixed-wing aircraft or RPVs canprovide significant contributions toC-IDF operations, if properly plannedand executed in conjunction with

sister Services.

The setting sun silhouettes US Army Soldiers assigned to the Army 1st Infantry Division and US Air Force Airmen from the116th Expeditionary Air Support Operations Squadron (EASOS) working together as part of a tactical air control party (TACP)to clear the area of threats around Balad Air Base, Iraq, during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM. (USAF Photo by SSgt Aaron D.

Allmon II)

After July 2007, thenumber of attacksdropped significantlypreventing furtheranalysis and refine-ment of these

techniques.


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Joint Fires Observer (JFO) for US ArmyAttack and Reconnaissance Aviators

A US Army AH-64D Apache Longbow helicopter, armed with AGM-114 Hellfire air-to-ground missiles and 2.75-inch rocketpods, in flight during a test conducted at the Boeing/McDonnell Douglas facility, located near Mesa, AZ. (US Army Photo)

By

CW4 Michael P. Boyle, USA

Sometimes you just need a fewmore rounds or a bigger boom toservice a specific target. Theweapons organic to US Army attackand reconnaissance helicoptersprovide effects sufficient for most

battlefield targets, but generally notpowerful or plentiful enough to takeout targets such as buildings orunderground bunkers. Fixed-wingmanned and unmanned aircraftsuch as those in service with the US

i i C d

present. Army aviation can easily

increase the number of qualifiedobservers serving in the Army byincluding all attack and reconnais-sance aviators. This simpleimprovement brings more relevancyto joint assets and dramaticallyincreases effects while simulta-neously reducing airborne

bureaucracy.THE BACKGROUND

Before the release of the jointtactics, techniques, and proceduresfor close air support (CAS)publication (Joint Publication [JP] 3-

Army aviation caneasily increase thenumber of qualifiedobservers serving inthe Army by includ-ing all attack and

i


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airborne equivalents, forward aircontrollers (airborne) [FAC(A)s] arethe primary controllers for CASassets. JP 1-02, Department ofDefense Dictionary of Military and

Associated Terms, states that a JTACis a qualified (certified) Servicemember who, from a forwardposition, directs the action of combataircraft engaged in close air supportand other offensive air operations.

The definition further states that aJTAC will be recognized across theDepartment of Defense as capableand authorized to perform terminalattack control. The definition ofterminal attack control out of JP 3-09.3 is: The authority to control themaneuver of and grant weaponsrelease clearance to attackingaircraft. In the eyes of the Air Force,these references establish that only

those qualified and certified forterminal attack control arerecognized to perform those actions.With no past requirement andcurrently no such process to qualifyand certify Army aviators in thenecessary tasks for terminal attackcontrol, we have lost that capability

unless the joint community changesthe JP 3-09.3. With the reasoningbehind the establishment of limitedindividuals being able to control jointfires at least partially due to anumber of past fratricide andcollateral incidents, the probability ofthat change is low. None of this

matters if enough JTACs exist to fillevery position in every Army groundcombat unit's platoons, thus givingthe ground commanders continuousaccess to CAS, but the Air Force isthousands short of meeting thatmark To fill the gaps the Army Air

support of Type 2 and 3 CASterminal attack controls, andperform autonomous terminalguidance operations (TGO)." BetweenAugust 2005 and November 2008,

the JFO course at Fort Sill, OK,produced 1,063 certified JFOs, and itcan sustain more than 500graduates per year at currentproduction levels. By filling the JTACgaps, the JFOs give the groundcommanders better access to CAS.However, JFOs must stillcommunicate through a qualifiedand current JTAC/FAC(A) for theCAS asset to engage the target(unless the unit is in need ofemergency CAS, i.e., in contact withthe enemy). The JFO program hashelped immensely, but hascompounded the problem for Armyaviators as many anecdotal stories

from Iraq and Afghanistan testifythat JTACs have refused targetingrequests from Army attack andreconnaissance aviators since theyare not listed on the air tasking order(ATO) as qualified observers.

THE PROBLEM

There is no regulatory reason forJTACs to deny targeting data fromArmy aviators. It occurs because the

JP 3-09.3 states that a "JTACacquires the target or acquirestargeting data from a scout, combatobservation and lasing team (COLT),fire support team (FIST), unmannedaerial vehicle (UAV), special

operations forces (SOF), or otherassets with accurate real-timetargeting information." Theambivalence of other assets leavesthe decision up to the JTAC as towho can provide accurate real-time

There is no regula-tory reason for

JTACSs to denytargeting data from

Army aviators.


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engagements), and artillery(including providing terminal laserguidance for precision guidedartillery). It appears appropriate toconsider these highly trained

professionals competent enough toprovide targeting informationthrough a JTAC/FAC(A) to a CASasset, including the ability toterminally guide laser guidedweapons.

THE WAY AHEAD

Three options present themselves

with only one being truly viable. Thefirst option is to train Army attackand reconnaissance aviators asFAC(A)s. This is prohibitive for tworeasons. The first is that the Armydoesn't have a FAC(A) school, forcingus to rely on the Marine Corps dueto their existing helicopter FAC(A)

training program. This is costly andputs a burden on the USMC's abilityto train their own aviators if we sendaviators to their school in thenumbers we need. The secondreason is that the currencyrequirements for FAC(A)s require aminimum of 12 controls a year withlive aircraft where JFOs may do

simulated controls. The Air Forcehas difficulty maintaining thecurrency of their own FAC(A)s due tolimited training sorties available athome station and Army FAC(A)swould add to that strain. Accordingto the USMC, who trains all pilots-in-command (PICs) as FAC(A)s, you

need between 33-50% of the unitsaviators to be qualified and currentto meet mission requirements. Thismodel forces us to send more Armyaviators through the USMCs schoolthan USMC aviators. Of course, we

thus limiting the number of aviatorstrained. By limiting their numbers,many missions flown in Iraq orAfghanistan will fail to include asingle JFO from the four aviators

flying in a typical 2-ship mission.This gap is unacceptable to theground commander who may lackboth JTACs and JFOs (a realpossibility due to the ongoingshortage of both). The third optionrequires the Fires Center at Fort Sill,OK; the USAF; and USSOCOM toaccept that the current training allArmy attack and reconnaissanceaviators receive in flight schoolprovides equivalency (or nearequivalency) to the training JFOsreceive at Fort Sill. The current JFOsyllabus (March 2009) consists of 1week of academics and 1 week ofsimulated/live training. In flight

school, the aviators receive a total ofabout 6 academic hours covering thesame subjects that the JFO schoolteaches in about 23.6 hours (if youcompare apples to apples with about6.5 hours being redundant for theaviators). This disparity can either beaccepted as is, or the flight school

academics will need to be adjusted tomeet the same standards as the JFOschool. Additionally, the 35 or soadditional simulator/live traininghours the JFOs receive are morethan made up by the aviators duringthe gunnery and mission trainingthey receive as part of flight schoolas the JFOs are taught as a classand the aviators are trained one onone in the cockpit. As for cost, theonly additional cost will come fromthe additional academics for thestudents if they are required tomatch hour for hour with the JFO

The third optionrequires the FiresCenter at Fort Sill,OK; the USAF; andUSSOCOM to acceptthat the currenttraining all Army

attack andreconnaissanceaviators receive inflight schoolprovides equivalency(or near equivalency)to the training JFOs

receive at Fort Sill.


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opposed to some or none) andrequires only a new memorandum ofagreement to be signed in order to beimplemented.

CONCLUSION

Supporting the groundcommander is what CAS is all about.Limiting the use of attack andreconnaissance aircraft in the role of

targeting observer is also potentiallylimiting the ground commander as towhat CAS options he has and canput lives at risk. Accepting that Armyattack and reconnaissance aviators

are equivalent to JFOs, will cost littleor no money and will give back tothese aviators the same capabilitiesthey had in the past.

Combined Arms in the CAS Firefight

US Marine Corps Capt Aaron P. McGrew, from Headquarters Company, 2nd Battalion, 8th Marine Regiment, listens as CplBrian T. Short communicates with a pilot as part of a tactical air control party (TACP) at a range outside Camp Taqaddum,Iraq, 29 March 2008. The TACP is being conducted to maintain aircrew proficiency, train future squad leaders in theemployment of air and indirect fire, and maintain proficiency among mortarmen. (USMC photo by Cpl Jeremy M. Giacomino)

We must remember that one man is much the same as another, and that he is best who is trained in


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flexible systems, and justifying ourweapons systems to the theatrecommanders, requires training anddoctrine that achieves effectivecombined arms. It cannot be ignored

any longer; the current and futurefight will be CAS-centric, requiringthe most effective use of combinedarms.

COMPARING AND CONTRASTINGSERVICES

Effective CAS requires detailedintegration with the ground scheme

of maneuver. The USMC integratestheir pilots and ground officers at theearliest level, Officer CandidateSchool. Later in their career thechain of command puts forward aircontrollers (FACs) both on theground and airborne, in a position tocoordinate face to face with the

ground commander, creating a trustbetween ground and air forces thatmakes for effective CAS. Work-uptraining utilizes live fire fromartillery, aircraft, and ground forcesintegrated with realistic staffplanning and execution. In short,the system trains to the highest andmost severe standard prior to going

into combat.

While the US Army has requesteda greater amount of joint terminalattack controllers (JTACs) and isbuilding a more robust air liaisonofficer (ALO) community, there isfriction that exists in the trainingand execution of CAS. While the

ground commander has a specificrequirement for integration at hislevel, it appears that there is a breakdown. From training at the National

Training Center (NTC) to execution inthe field, there is no detailed face to

discussions as of late. Now with thepossibility of a dedicated lightattack/FAC(A) platform (OA-X), thesituation continues to develop.

Technology in weapons and sensors

has also reached a peak. This is allgreat, but without realistic combinedarms training and integration, agreat opportunity may be lost.

First, the USAF FAC(A)communities must integrate into theground scheme of maneuver. Whileit may seem like a waste of time to a

fighter pilot, what must beunderstood is that, that one daysitting in on a briefing and makingliaison with the ground commanderwill pay dividends when the FAC(A)is utilized to his full potential.Having the pilot flying the missionsin the room with those he issupporting always builds trust.Without a dedicated effort from theregular flying community to makeliaison, and relying only on ALOsupport, the effective use of CASassets can be lost. On a day to daybasis the ALO has the ability toinfluence and advise, but the aircrewmust understand that building a

team requires members to be in thesame room. Failure to liaise leads toextended time in coordination on thebattlefield, where lives andopportunities can be lost.

The FAC(A) is an extension of thetactical air control party (TACP). Hisconduit is the JTAC on the ground.

The aircrew can gain thecommanders trust throughincreased coordination and under-standing on how responsibility isdelegated to the FAC(A). This willfurther help the JTAC clear fires

The aircrew cangain the comman-ders trust throughincreased coordina-tion and under-standing on howresponsibility is

delegated to theFAC(A).


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This FAC(A) pilot can also doubleas the expert on the scheme ofmaneuver (SOM) for the CAS fightwhen he returns to the squadron.Having a coherent point of contact is

critical. Creating a network of pilots,ALOs, and ground commanders thatcan communicate criticalinformation and integrate the fight,with a small effort put forward, isalso essential.

In training there has to be adedicated effort at Green Flag and

other large force exercises (LFEs) tobuild this liaison. Having flightcrews fly via helicopter or drive to theNTC at Ft. Irwin for a face to facebrief will be required. The Army inturn must have its commanders putforward an effort to accommodatethe air fight into the training. Allplanning must be integrated, despitewho is being supported, and who issupporting. The USAF and USAmust develop or integrate objectivesand exercises into phased training,varying between supported andsupporting exercises for all units.

COMBINED ARMS COORDINATION

The battlefield is more dynamicthan ever before. Technology at thelowest levels has helped bring thisalong. CAS was thought to be athing of the past, but increasedurbanization and development of ourenemys capabilities has changedthat dramatically. It will be thechallenge of the future to make use

of the lessons learned and developour schools and training to addressthese challenges.

The USAF CAS aircrew andFAC(A) are extensions of the groundcommander The JTAC is the

to execute on an event-basedtimeline.

Finally the FAC(A)/JTACcommunity must train to a moresevere standard. Combined arms

integration must be achieved.Simulation of artillery is notacceptable; aircrew must see real lifechallenges in working with indirectfire assets and agencies. Workingwith USMC and US Army rotary-wing aircraft must also becoordinated. The integration at the

staff level will help the USAF FAC(A)understand the clearance of firesbetter as well. It will be up to HQUSAF and HQ USA to listen to thelower level commanders to find theperfect way to task assets to eachprospective school and LFEs.

JTAC / ALO TRAINING

A greater link between theprofessional JTAC and CAS aircrewmust be made. USMC aircrew havea direct link to the FAC on theground, they are all USMC aviators.While the career ALO program maywork towards this, there has to be atrue integration of the CAS fight inthe USAF. Setting a standard anddeveloping greater coordinationbetween the ground controller andaircrew will help to build teamworkprior to stepping onto the battlefield.

The USAF JTAC communityrequires greater combined armsintegration in training at all levels.In the JTAC Qualification Training,Air Combat Command must putforward an effort to build a coursethat has fully supported air training.With a new JTAC memorandum ofagreement (MOA) coming out, thetime is right to support a full MOA

It is not possible tosimulate workingwith the groundscheme ofmaneuver. To do sowill only cause great

confusion whenforces have to worktogether on the

battlefield.


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to increase training opportunities atthe schoolhouse so that trainees arefull-up, certified JTACs upongraduation. Having the trainingincreased at the school house will

create greater standardization acrossthe community.

Developing an advanced JTACInstructor or JTACI course thatutilizes assets from either FighterWeapons School or integrating it intoRed Flag exercises can build a linkbetween the subject matter experts

(SMEs) in the air and on the ground.While this standard may not bedriven at the weapons school itself,the integration into the platformstraining as support for the JTACI willbuild an understanding and trustthat will hopefully transcend into theair support operations center (ASOC)and eventually the Army tacticaloperations center (TOC). Currentlythese exercises only utilize JTACs assupport elements. This is anopportunity lost to forge a true air-ground team.

To integrate, the ALO attached toArmy units and his JTACs mustbecome fully integrated into the staff

and participate in training exercisesthat include combined arms fromboth USA and USAF. While therewill be reluctance at many levels, thechange will be worthwhile whenfighters put ordnance on target, withthe commanders full intent achieved.

This shift in mindset for the ALO will

be difficult and will require backingfrom his leadership, but the benefitwill be better coordination and anofficer that understands the unit heis supporting. The ALO tour shouldbe taken as a career building

women on the ground to learn fromthe Marines and develop a trulycombined arms team that trains tothe highest standard, in the mostsevere realistic training.

This list of items may seem longand lofty, but it can be achieved bygiving teeth to the experts andschools that already exist within theUSAF and USA. Integration ofaircrew into the fight, conducting livefire combined arms training, anddeveloping our professional JTAC,

FAC(A), and ALO can be achieved.There must be emphasis put intocombined arms, otherwise we facethe possibility of not being fullyprepared for future conflicts, riskinglives and success on the battlefield.

S ( S ) 6

The ALO tourshould be taken asa career buildingexperience. Thiswill require USAFleadership to view it

as such.


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CAS Perspective from the Ground ALO/JTAC

From left, US Army SGT Travis Young and SSG Steve Majors, US Air Force A1C Bobby Olsen and Army SSG JasonMcCullough prepare for a mission in the Avon Park Air Ground Training Complex in Avon Park, FL, 6 November 2007, during

Atlantic Strike VI. Atlantic Strike is a US Central Command Air Forces initiative and the only joint, tactical-level, urban, close airsupport training event dedicated to supporting the war on terror. Young, Majors, and McCullough are platoon leaders and

Olsen is a joint terminal attack controller. (USAF photo by A1C Stephenie Wade).

ByCapt Russell Vifa Campbell, USAF

andTSgt Christopher Astrauskas, USAF

As close air support (CAS) pilotswe have a good idea how to get the

job done in the air but we lack the

experience and knowledge of what isgoing on in the ground fight. As anA-10 pilot I thought I had a goodunderstanding on the ground fightand how to meet the groundcommanders intent. As a joint

i l k ll ( T )/ i

operational for pilots it gave them theunique opportunity to see the fightfrom the ground operatorsperspective. This program imbedded

JTAC instructors into A-10squadrons to train and get BALOsready to go to war with operationalArmy units. This was a gateway for

the JTACs to have a direct influenceon the pilots who provided them CASand for the pilots to learn what thefight was like from the ground. Thisalso allowed the pilots to see how thetactical air control party (TACP) is


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experience for a pilot to see howdifferent the battlefield looks fromthe ground and to see what the jetslook like as well. With theseexperiences and expertise these

same pilots were able to educate therest of their community about whatit is like to be a JTAC.

Due to various reasons, the BALOprogram went away for young pilots.BALOs were replaced with enlistedBALOs (EBALOs) who are veryexperienced JTACs. This made an

ALO assignment the only way forCAS pilots to get into the field and bepart of a TACP. This is still a goodprogram, but it has taken the

JTAC/TACP expertise out of thesquadrons. This doesnt give thesquadrons many opportunities forArmy mission development training,equipment training, and trips to the

OP. Currently the Air Force is takingrated officers and attaching them toArmy units as ALOs for 3 years. Thisprogram captures the expertise offighter and bomber aviators andbrings that expertise to the groundfight. A lot of these officers get JTACqualified while serving as ALOs.

Following their ALO tour, theseofficers go back to flying and theytake this ground knowledge back tothe flying units.

WHAT CAS PILOTS NEED TOKNOW

The fight we are fighting today isnothing like how we train. During

training we show up on the rangeand the scenarios we practice arestill mostly OP CAS. This is verydifferent from how JTACs areemployed downrange. For most OPCAS scenarios the JTAC is on top of

coordinates from Falconview orPrecision Strike Suite-SpecialOperations Forces (PSS-SOF).Downrange, depending on the unitthe JTAC is supporting will

determine where he is physicallylocated. More than likely he will besitting in the tactical operationscenter (TOC) with radios and therewill be a remotely piloted vehicle(RPV) feed, joint fires observer (JFO)or fires support team (FIST)providing him targeting information.He will most likely have a ROVERfeed to help build situationalawareness (SA) in the target area.With that in mind, Type 1 control isout of the question. Other times the

JTAC will be out forward with hismaneuver unit, able to provide Type1, 2, or 3 controls, but againdepending on the unit, he may not

have all the tools at his disposal.The JTACs travel with the Army

in vehicles organic to that specificunit. Stryker, high mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicle (HMMWV),or on foot, the JTAC will be withthem; with equipment pertinent tothat specific mission. JTACs have a

lot of equipment that is heavy,difficult to set up and depending onthe operation the JTAC may notbring everything. Furthermore, thebatteries are large and dont lastlong. If there is no availablepreparation time to build geo-rectified gridded reference graphics

(GRGs), or if the JTAC finds himselfin a dynamic situation like a troopsin contact (TIC), the JTAC will haveto rely upon basic techniques todevelop coordinates for their 9-lines.When out forward, the JTAC knowshi iti b d hi l b l

This was aninvaluable expe-rience for a pilot tosee how different

the battlefieldlooks from theground and to seewhat the jets look

like as well.


17/32

into the target area so the JTAC cangive a "Talk-On" to the actual target.Depending upon the type of attack,bombs on target (BOT) or bombs oncoordinates (BOC), the pilot may self

generate coordinates for GPS guidedmunitions or will deliver the weaponsvisually.

WHAT CAS PILOTS CAN IMPROVEON

Being on the other end of the CASspectrum can provide a lot of lessonslearned. With the current fight

requiring our Air Force to shift itsfocus from missions like airsuperiority and suppression ofenemy air defenses (SEAD) to CAS,we are starting to see many unitsstruggle to get up to speed. Many ofthese units do not have CAS as aprimary mission and must spin up togo to war by attending specialtraining exercises like Green Flag.

The focus on the current fight hasmade many fighter units weak whenit comes to high threat scenarioswith weather and deconfliction forartillery. Flying these high threatscenarios is almost a lost artthroughout many fighter

communities. Working a time overtarget (TOT) or time to target (TTT)into practice scenarios can help dealwith the situation if it arises intheater.

There are many pilots that showup on station and questioneverything the JTAC says. As pilots

we have a responsibility to minimizecollateral damage and preventfratricide or the killing of innocentcivilians. Pilots have a tendency totry to drive the fight. In CAS, pilotsneed to remember that we are a

Also, JTACs need to request effectsfrom the pilots and not dictate ourtactics. Tell the pilots what effects

you want and they will select theweapon that best suits the targets.

Do not give restrictions unless thereis a good reason for it. There arescenarios when giving restrictions orasking for certain weapons may bewarranted. If you are in a TIC and 50meters from the enemy thenrequesting the aircrafts guns over abomb is more appropriate.

From the JTAC perspective, JP 3-09.3 is the only way to run a CASfight. A strict adherence to thispublication is the way to keep allCAS players on the same page andexpedite attacks. Questioning the

JTAC is good in some situations.Conversely, JTACs are now beingtaught to question pilots as well, and

to be more directive in certainsituations. This can apply to manysituations, but primarily when itcomes to BOC attacks and thecategory of coordinates attached tothat BOC attack. Sometimes whenthe JTAC needs a BOC he usuallyneeds an attack quickly and may not

have time to explain the reasons toaircrews. The new 3-09.3 (8 July2009) addresses some of these issuesin the BOT/BOC discussions.Bottom line, more discussion isneeded between squadron weaponsofficers and JTACs to help clear themuddy waters on issues that the

new 3-09.3 has presented.The Marines have the right

mentality when it comes to CAS. Theevery Marine is a rifleman ethos isengrained into every Marine Corpsaviator from the beginning of their

In CAS, pilots needto remember that we

are a support asset.We are there to sup-port the units on theground and meet theground commanders

intent.


18/32

SUGGESTIONS FOR CAS PILOTSFROM A VETERAN JTAC

The following are a fewsuggestions for CAS from a JTACperspective. On the topic of

weaponeering, JTACs are gettingbetter at this but ultimately the pilotshould try to drive the desired effectsunless otherwise directed by the

JTAC. If a JTAC trumps the pilotthere is probably a good reason for iton the ground, e. g., the groundcommander wants specific ordnance

for whatever reason.JP 3-09.3 mandates a readback

of lines 4, 6, restrictions, and anyother items the JTAC requires. If a

JTAC asks for a readback of a non-standard item it is usually for his SAor because it makes the situation inthe air clearer to him. Knowing whattype of delivery and attack will allowthe JTAC to know which flightmember should readback lines 4, 6,and restrictions and who to look forand give appropriate clearance to.

CAT coordinates arent alwaysessential. Knowing this from the

JTAC will help the attacking aircraft,but on the flip side, it is NOTnecessary to prosecute the attack.Nothing slows down weapons effects

quite like a JTAC and aircrew gettingspun up over the CAT coordinates,when time could be better spentemploying or adjusting leads hits.

During training, the JTAC and

the supporting pilot both havespecific training requirements, butwhen a JTAC is on range, use the

JTAC whenever possible. Makescenarios challenging and dynamic,OP CAS is not relevant in the currentfight and is considered negativetraining. Post mission debriefs are

essential. Keep an open mind toother perspective (ground vs. air).Debriefs are often uncomfortable,but constructive as well. The besttime to make mistakes aggressivelyis in training, where all may benefitfrom the lessons learned.

Training should not only focus oncurrent real-world operations.Realize that the current fight isimportant, but we should not forgetor place less emphasis on things likeSEAD timing options, low altitudetactics, and Joint Air Attack Team(JAAT) to name a few. The next fightmay force us to utilize these skills;therefore, we need to be as well

rounded as possible when it comesto CAS.

OFNOTE:

The

JTACs

are

using

a

copyofALSAsvery

ownJFIREhandbook.

when a JTAC ison range, use theJTAC wheneverpossible Makescenarios challen-ging and

dynamic


19/32

Data Link CAS: Terminology and Application

A USAF A-10 Thunderbolt II aircraft from the 75th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron out of Bagram Air Base, Afghanistan,deploys flares during a combat patrol over Afghanistan 11 December 2008. (USAF photo by SSgt Aaron Allmon)

ByCapt Abram SOLE Burk, USAF

Increasing battlefield situationalawareness (SA) traditionally requiresa significant amount of voicecommunication between air andground parties. The advent of datalink technology enables digital closeair support (CAS) integration(typically conducted via voice),facilitating timely and successfulemployment of airpower in supportof the ground force commander.Effective data link operation requires

applications are independent of theindividual systems. Integrationbetween Link 16 and SADL playersassumes an operational gateway

Joint Range Extension (JRE) +Multifunctional Distribution System(MIDS) + SADL radio with line ofsight (LOS) connectivity. Eventhough variable message format

(VMF) and improved data modem(IDM) are other digital capabilities forCAS, they are outside this articlesscope.

Link 16 was originally designedand utilized for air to air missions

The advent of datalink technology

enables digital closeair support (CAS)integration (typicallyconducted via voice),facilitating timelyand successful em-ployment of air-


20/32

associated with the entire system.JTIDS is a system encompassingterminals, software, hardware, RFequipment, and the waveform

generated.1 This entire system is a

large volume of equipment. With therequirement of fighter-sizedterminals, a compact version wascreated termed MIDS. Within MIDS,there are different terminals built fordifferent fighters called Low Volume

Terminals (LVT). F-16s and F-18suse LVT-1, while F-15s (A-E) operatewith a LVT-3. The F-15s LVT-3 isalso called FDL. Even though thereis a difference between the terminalssize, quantity, and quality ofinformation passed, from the usersstandpoint, its transparent.

SADL was created primarily as anair-to-ground and ground-to-groundsystem with a less robust air-to-air

capability. It is typically called SADL(the software), or EnhancedPositional Location Reporting System(EPLRS)the radio terminalhardware through which SADLoperates. An EPLRS radio is notnecessarily SADL capable, but mustinclude specific software. Current

users include A-10s, some Block 30F-16s, and some JTACs, with futureexpansions to the Air Force HH-60sand HC-130s.

With the evolution of digitalcapabilities in the cockpit, there arenow three main ways to passinformation: via voice, digital

targeting messages, and digital textmessages. Though voice is mostutilized, digital targeting and textmessages expand the existingmethods, potentially enhancing andexpediting target and/or friendly

STD) 6016. A J-series message is afixed-format message, containingtactical data and commands, whichis used to exchange information.Link 16 and SADL cannot operate

directly with each other due to datalink infrastructure differences; thus,a gateway is required to transfer databetween Link 16 and SADL players.

This article will focus primarily on J-series messages: J2.0, J2.2, J3.1,J3.5, J12.0, J12.6, J16.0, andJ28.2.

The J2.X series messages arecalled Precise Participant Locationand Identification (PPLIs)symbology reflecting the currentposition of that player. Air players inany given network are shown as aJ2.2 whether part of the flight or

just part of the donor list (typicallydenoted as a circle with a vector

line). JTACs may appear as eitheran additional air player (for examplea J2.2 could represent a JTACutilizing Jockey software onEPLRS/SADL within LOS of a SADLparticipant) without a vector.Furthermore, a JTAC may bedisplayed as a J2.0 (Indirect

Interface PPLI) when a JTAC istransmitting his position via satellitecommunications (SATCOM) from a

Tactical Air Control Party-Close AirSupport System (TACP-CASS)terminal to an air support operations

center (ASOC) gateway.2 The

symbology for both a J2.0and J2.2

is very similar. This difference in theJTAC symbol is based on the JTACsystem and the broadcast method,LOS or beyond line of sight (BLOS).

The J3.X series of messages arecalled surveillance tracks. These

With the evolution ofdigital capabilities in

the cockpit, thereare now three mainways to pass infor-mation: via voice,digital targetingmessages, anddigital text

messages.


21/32

main J3.X series messages are aJ3.1 Emergency Point, and a J3.5Land Track. J3.1 messages aretraditionally used for downed aircraftand personnel recovery (PR)-type

events. The J3.5 is one of the mostcommon messages published by C2.J3.5 messages always include trackposition, course, and speed;moreover, they typically includeidentification (ID) (friendly, neutral,suspect, unknown, or hostile),platform type (such as armor, troop,artillery, antiaircraft, etc.) and other

amplifying information.3

The J12.Xseries of messages areControl messages. The J12.0message is a C2 Mission Assignmentused for tasking, while a J12.6 is a

Target Sorting message (certainJ12.6messages are sensor points ofinterest [SPIs]). Most aircraft on the

data link have the ability to receive aJ12.0 (which requires a responsefrom the aircraft, eitherWILCO/CANTCO) and transmit/receive a J12.6. Currently, there isnot a J12.0 mission assignment(MA) message for CAS; however, theATTACK MA can be used for CAS

tasking. This message includestarget and elevation. There is nodigital 9-line with J-seriesmessaging. A-10Cs are currently theonly fighter aircraft with the abilityto transmit ATTACK J12.0s. Incontrast, generating a J12.6 (as aSPI or point) is not as time

consuming and can be sent by anyUSAF fighter aircraft. In the CASfight, a J12.6 primarily designatesthe target, a mark point, or asensors LOS. The J12.6is a way toget other data link participants cued

pod, etc.) and sending it to anothernetwork participant. The J28.2message can only be generated bycertain aircraft and C2 platforms,while almost all airframes can read

them.While these annotations for

message types can be confusing, itsessential that pilots use thiscommon language to reference theinformation appropriately.Communication regarding thesemessage sets is also important.Figure 1 (on the next page) is a list ofdata link brevity terms discussingCAS relevant items.4, 5 This list doesnot include some terms discussed inthe multi-Service Brevity codespublication, but instead focuses ondigital CAS specific terms.

In order for network users,specifically fighters, to send J-seriesmessages to other participants, pre-mission planning is required. TheOPTASKLINK should be referencedfor the overall data link settingswhile the air tasking order (ATO)should be utilized for players in aspecific area of operations (AO). Forair players to utilize J-series

messaging, they must be part of alocal group.

From the Air Force perspective,there are two local groups. The firstgroup, consisting of 4-8 members iscalled the flight (or team), alltypically in the same formation. Theother local group is called the donor

list. This is a list of air players thatthe flight/team will exchange J-series messaging with fortargeting/SA purposes (J12.0,J12.6, J16.0, J28.2, etc.). Donorlist capacity and population differs

While these annota-tions for messagetypes can be confus-ing, its essential thatpilots use thiscommon language toreference the infor-

mation appropriately.

Term 3-1Definition A-10Remarks


22/32

Figure 1. US Air Force / A-10 Example CAS Data Link Communication Terms Information Flow

share J12.6messages. For example,in order for the A-10C to receive anSPI message from an F-16 equippedwith Link 16, the F-16 targeting pod

(TGP) LOS must be sent.Based on data link capabilities,

in-flight preparation starts well priorto the AO update. Combined with amoving map or horizontal situationdisplay (HSD), users may be able to

information is gathered by the flightis called an AO sweep. Flight leadsshould annotate track (J3.5)locations via coordinates andbullseye location to ensure thisinformation is not lost based on LOSwith the C2 agency. For example,flight leads should copy factor threattracks, troops in contact (TIC) tracks,and emergency points into theiraircraft systems Each track (J3 5)

Term 3 1 Definition A 10 Remarks

CONTACT

(Point of Reference)Acknowledge sighting

Implies visual contact with a reference, not identified asFriendly or Hostile

CONTACT POINTImplies visual contact with broadcast 12.6 in Tactical

Awareness Display (TAD)

HOOK

(Point of Reference)

Link 16 directive call to cue sensors to A/Gpoint

Directive call to use TAD to hook a particular symbol(SADL)

POINTLink point / track of interest; can be associatedwith a directive call

Specifically, refers to 12.6 broadcast

DATA

(Object w/Position)

Standby for data link message concerningobject at stated location

Specifically, refers to text messages or CAS message(28.2, 12.0)

STANDBY POINT / DATA

(Bearing/Range) or Description

Informative call that a data link message is being sent.Point is used for 12.6 broadcast. Data used for a 28.2 or12.0

ZAP POINT / DATA Request for data link information Point refers to 12.6, data refers to 28.2 or 12.0

DROP POINTData link target sorting message is no longerneeded/ desired

Directive call to terminate 12.6 broadcast

HOLD POINTMaintain Primary Designated Target on thecurrent track to maintain to the data link 12.6

Continue to broadcast 12.6

CHECKPOINTDirective/descriptive call to check 12.6 broadcast setting(ex: current target)

MATCH POINTDirective call to hook a broadcast 12.6 and ZAP POINTback for confirmation

TIMBER The Link 16 network

TIMBER SWEET Confirms receipt of data link information

TIMBER SOUR

Potential problems with the net entry; initiates

pre-mission link troubleshooting

HOLLOW Any data link message not received

CHECKTIDSDirective/descriptive call to reference data linkdisplay; may be followed by amplifying info

JACKAL Surveillance NPG of Link 16/TADIL JReference surveillance track numbers with the termJACKAL Normally used in reference to land track(3.5).

COPYDirective call to input a hooked symbol on the TAD intothe next available mission point

TARGET POINT

(Bearing/Range) Target the reference data link target sortingmessage

Directive call to make data link point SPI in preparationfor a system delivery

flight leadsshould copy factorthreat tracks,troops in contact


23/32

message lengths to 28 characters perline to avoid possible data corruptionamong platforms. J28.2sfrom a C2agency can supplement the AOsweep with additional details.

Additionally, fighters can send aJ28.2 for check-in and otheradministrative functions in acommunication limited environmentto J28.2capable JTACs or agencies.Also, these fighters may send J28.2messages, or even J12.6s, whendeparting an AO in order toaccomplish an AO handoff.

However, transmission of the J12.6assumes that each flight has placedthe outgoing fighter on its donor list.As a technique, if donor/team spaceis limited, only place the flight leadsof each formation airborne duringthe respective vulnerability time.Despite data links capability to

provide vast amounts of SA toindividual users, it does not replacevoice communication. One reasonfor this is that J3.5sand J28.2sdonot provide any automatic reply fromthe user to confirm receipt. Inaddition, the information is only ascurrent as its last update from the

C2. As a CAS fight evolves, C2 maynot be in the loop with the most up-to-date information and only voicecommunication can fill that gap.

As fighters enter the CAS fightand into JTAC control, digital

information passage should betempered with the current situation.Due to the nature of CAS, JTACsmay not have the time, equipment,or necessity to send digital

information. If the JTAC is digitalcapable, finding the friendly locationfor subsequent employment may bequicker. The JTACs location may berepresented by a J3.5 (transmittedby C2/ASOC), J2.0 or J2.2(equipment dependent as previouslydiscussed). Any of these positionalreports aid in finding the friendly

position, but they may not define thefriendly position. Being visualfriendlies will still require eyeballsoutside the cockpit. With data link,a JTAC operating certain systems (orflight lead) can broadcastcoordinates to fighters (or other flightmembers) via a J12.6(target sorting)

message. Using this J12.6, fighterscan cue onboard sensors to thatlocation to confirm or refine targetcoordinates. With the A-10C Suite5/6, for example, each J12.6includes an index number to ensurethe receiver is using the currentJ12.6 (in order to defeat latency

issues and old J12.6sstill appearingon the data link). Figure 2 gives aninter-flight communication exampleof passing target information viaJ12.6message.

This terminology directsthe flight member to

consult the image on the

HSD, locate the J12.6

from the flight lead, andcopy that point into his

own system with the

respective label, T1C.

For example, Hog 1 has identified a cluster of vehicles for GBU-38 (or other precisionguided munition) employment. To pass the proper locations to the flight, Hog 1 will obtainthe proper coordinates suitable for employment and pass them throughout the flight.

Hog 1:JTAC, Hog 1, contact TGP, 4 x vehicles arrayed east to west.

This response from each

flight member confirms

receipt of the appropriate

J12.6, confirms the point

is loaded into the system,d th l ti

If the JTAC is digitalcapable, finding the

friendly location forsubsequent employ-ment may bequicker.... Beingvisual friendlieswill still requireeyeballs outside the

cockpit.


24/32

In a TIC, timeliness is essential dueto friendly ground forces receiving

effective fire.5 At a minimum, pilots

need target and friendly locations,factor threats, and restrictions in

order to employ effectively. With anon-digital JTAC, or whentime/conditions do not permit the

JTAC to use digital devices, flightleads should use voicecommunications to quickly getinformation. Once visual friendlies,the target can be marked by a J12.6from the JTAC, FAC(A), or on-scene

commander. One technique is toallow the primary flight lead or on-scene commander to employ first viavoice and visual confirmation.

Following that employment, theflight lead can quickly pass initialtarget area SA through a J12.6 bybroadcasting either his TGP LOS or

employment location as the SPI. Forexample:

Hog 3: Hog 1, Hog 3 visualfriendly location, no-joy on target.

Hog 1 : Hog 3, Hog 1, stand bypoint, target location, personnel in thetree line.

Hog 3 : Hog 3, contact point.

Though the J12.6is marking thetarget location (much like a whitephosphorus rocket), it should not bethe sole means of targetidentification. On a situationaldisplay, most fighters will have botha target identifier and line from the

broadcaster to the target. Thisprovides verification of the senderand his target. While a set offighters prosecutes the TIC, otherfighters checking in (and on thedonor list) may gain awareness on

current fighters and ground party.These fighters should require less ofa talk-on and less communicationprior weapons employment.However, this does not relax therequirement for the aircraft to gain

TALLY and/or VISUAL prior toemployment. Additionally, voicecommunication is still required foreither data link verification or finalcoordination. Units should strive toteach the proper balance of data linkand voice communication to providetimely, efficient, and effective CAS.

Data link (Link 16 and/or SADL)has the capability to enhance CASoperations on the battlefield. Withthis advantage, users must recognizewhen to apply the technology and,more importantly, when it isbecoming a limiting factor. Mutualsupport contracts must balance the

amount of SA that can be gleanedfrom data link, with the amount ofheads-down time required to processthe situation. Despite limitingfactors, proper training, systemsetup, flight contracts, and digitalexecution can enable more efficientCAS operations while providing the

enemy less opportunity to deny,disrupt, or deceive voicecommunication.

END NOTE1

Understanding Link 16, A Guide Book for

USAF Operators, December 2002.2

Mills, Maj Scott, 66 WPS, Nellis AFB, NV,

Interview in Feb 2010.3

Understanding Link 16, A Guide Book for

USAF Operators, December 2002.4

Air Force Tactics Techniques and

Procedures (AFTTP), Volume 3-1.GeneralPlanning, May 2006.5

This terminology directsthe additional flight to

acquire the J12.6 on the

HSD/MFCD, but it is

not a requirement toenter the coordinates

into a system.

Units should striveto teach the properbalance of datalink and voicecommunication toprovide timely,efficient, and

effective CAS.


25/32

CAS in a Different Kind of War

USAF JTAC TSgt Joel McPherson, center, calls for close air support during a firefight with insurgents near the village ofQatar Kala on 29 July in the Watapur Valley, Afghanistan. (AF Times Photo by Colin Kelly, staff)

ByLt Col Matt Foley, USAF

and Maj Bryan Trinkle, USAF

There has been a change in theexpectations and requirements forthe employment of close air support(CAS) in Afghanistan over the past 8months. Unlike any time in recentUS military operations, the strategicimpact of tactical engagements is

being scrutinized at the highesttheater command level. Increasinglycomplex command directives andrules of engagement (ROE) have beenimplemented to ensure that kineticengagements are consistent with the

and appropriate advice to supportedground force commanders.

With an average of three kineticevents a day throughoutAfghanistan, it is a certainty that anyair-to-ground engagement will bereviewed at the InternationalSecurity Assistance Force (ISAF)command level to ensure the strikewas conducted within the

parameters of the applicable ROEand in the spirit of the current ISAFCommander (COMISAF) TacticalDirective (TD). COMISAF has high-lighted his concern to allcommanders, stating I expect


26/32

and turn the Afghan people against

us.1 It is absolutely imperative that

all tactical air control party (TACP)and JTAC personnel conductingoperations in Afghanistan are well

versed in the spirit and letter of thelaws laid out in OperationENDURING FREEDOM (OEF) andISAF ROE, and have a completeunderstanding of how to apply theseROE on the battlefield. Uponentering the theater, JTAC crews willbe provided comprehensive scenario-based training to document and

ensure familiarity with the ROE andits practical application as part oftheir theater qualification training.However, it is critical that deployingterminal attack control teamsfamiliarize themselves with ISAF andOEF ROE and COMISAF TD as partof their predeployment training. This

guidance is available on SIPRnet atboth the US Central Command(USCENTCOM) and US Air ForceCentral (USAFCENT) websites.Additional information should soonbe available on 561st Joint TacticsSquadrons and 504th ExpeditionaryAir Support Operations Groups

websites which will help span theaccessibility gap of between thetheaters ISAF Secret network andthe SIPRnet.

Once established with theirsupported ground force, JTAC teammembers will be informed of ROEadjustments via special instructions(SPINS) changes and Joint ControllerInformation File (JCIF) updates.During a 6-month deploymentseveral modifications to the ROE arelikely. These updates can be drivenby shortcomings identified throughi l t h i th

application of these guidelines on thebattlefield.

Finally, close coordination withsupported ground force commanderswill ensure lethal airpower is

employed effectively, where andwhen appropriate. Several incidentsin recent months have highlighteddeficiencies in understanding andapplication of air-to-ground ROE atthe tactical commander level. Theair-to-ground weapons employmentcivilian casualty incident in Kunduzis a high profile example of theramifications and political conse-quences of a tactical misjudgment inCAS execution that quickly led tostrategic implication. The fallout inthe international community andamong coalition forces has hadimmeasurable second and thirdorder effects.

Commanders have broadresponsibilities and count on timely,complete, and accurate advice fromtheir terminal attack control (TAC)teams. As part of a joint team, JTACexpertise in ROE is essential toensure commanders have all theinformation they need to make

sound tactical decisions in the heatof battle. If there is time fordiscussion, the JTACs advice can bethe difference between a tacticalvictory and a strategic mistake. Ifthere is not time for discussion, it isprobably a self-defense situation,and the ROE becomes much more

permissive. Full understanding ofcollateral damage estimate require-ments, target engagement authority,appropriate command echelonapproval, and ROE strike pre-requisites is critical to mission

it is critical thatdeploying terminalattack controlteams familiarizethemselves withISAF and OEF ROEand COMISAF TDas part of theirpredeployment

training.


27/32

CURRENT ALSA PUBLICATIONS

AIR BRANCH POC [email protected] DATE PUB # DESCRIPTION / STATUS

AOMSW

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Air Operations in MaritimeSurface Warfare

Distribution Restricted

17 NOV 08 NTTP 3-20.8

AFTTP 3-2.74

Description: This publication consolidates Service doctrine,TTP, and lessons-learned from current operations and exercisesto maximize the effectiveness of "air attacks on enemy surfacevessels".

Status: Current

AVIATION URBAN OPERATIONS

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Aviation Urban OperationsDistribution Restricted

9 JUL 05 FM 3-06.1

MCRP 3-35.3A

NTTP 3-01.04

AFTTP 3-2.29

Description: Provides MTTP for tactical-level planning andexecution of fixed- and rotary-wing aviation urban operations.

Status: Assessment

IADS

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for an Integrated Air DefenseSystem


1 MAY 09 FM 3-01.15

MCRP 3-25E

NTTP 3-01.8

AFTTP 3-2.31

Description: Provides joint planners with a consolidatedreference on Service air defense systems, processes, andstructures to include integration procedures.

Status: Current

JFIRE

Multi-Service Procedures for the Joint

Application of Firepower


20 DEC 07 FM 3-09.32

MCRP 3-16.6A

NTTP 3-09.2

AFTTP 3-2.6

Description: Pocket size guide of procedures for calls for fire,CAS, and naval gunfire. Provides tactics for joint operations

between attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft performingintegrated battlefield operations.

Status: Current

JSEAD / ARM-J

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for the Suppression of EnemyAir Defenses in a Joint Environment

Classifi ed SECRET

28 MAY 04 FM 3-01.4

MCRP 3-22.2A

NTTP 3-01.42

AFTTP 3-2.28

Description: Contributes to Service interoperability by providingthe JTF and subordinate commanders, their staffs, and SEADoperators a single, consolidated reference.

Status: Current

JSTARS

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for the Joint SurveillanceTarget Attack Radar System


16 NOV 06 FM 3-55.6

MCRP 2-24A

NTTP 3-55.13

AFTTP 3-2.2

Description: Provides procedures for the employment of

JSTARS in dedicated support to the JFC. Describes multi-Service TTP for consideration and use during planning andemployment of JSTARS.

Status: Assessment

KILL BOX

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Kill Box Employment


4 AUG 09 FM 3-09.34

MCRP 3-25H

NTTP 3-09.2.1

AFTTP 3-2.59

Description: Assists the Services and JFCs in developing,establishing, and executing Kill Box procedures to allow rapidtarget engagement. Describes timely, effective multi-Servicesolutions to FSCMs, ACMs, and maneuver control measureswith respect to Kill Box operations.

Status: Current

SCAR

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Strike Coordination andReconnaissance


26 NOV 08 FM 3-60.2

MCRP 3-23C

NTTP 3-03.4.3

AFTTP 3-2.72

Description: This publication provides strike coordination andreconnaissance (SCAR) MTTP to the military Services for theconduct of air interdiction against targets of opportunity.

Status: Current

SURVIVAL EVASION AND RECOVERY 20 MAR 07 FM 3 50 3 Description: Provides a weather proof pocket sized quick


28/32

AIR BRANCH POC [email protected]

TITLE DATE PUB # DESCRIPTION / STATUS

TST (DYNAMIC TARGETING)

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Targeting Time-SensitiveTargets


20 APR 04 FM 3-60.1

MCRP 3-16D

NTTP 3-60.1

AFTTP 3-2.3

Description: Provides the JFC, the operational staff, andcomponents MTTP to coordinate, de-conflict, synchronize, andprosecute TSTs within any AOR. Includes lessons learned,multinational and other government agency considerations.

Status: Revision

UAS

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Tactical Employment ofUnmanned Aircraft Systems


3 AUG 06 FM 3-04.15

NTTP 3-55.14

AFTTP 3-2.64

Description: Establishes MTTP for UAS addressing tactical andoperational considerations, system capabilities, payloads,mission planning, logistics, and most importantly, multi-Serviceexecution.

Status: Revision

LAND AND SEA BRANCH POC [email protected] DATE PUB # DESCRIPTION / STATUS

ADVISING

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Advising Foreign Forces


10 SEP 09 FM 3-07.10

MCRP 3-33.8A

NTTP 3-07.5

AFTTP 3-2.76

Description: This publication serves as a reference to ensurecoordinated multi-Service operations for planners andoperators preparing for, and conducting, advisor teammissions. It is intended to provide units and personnel that arescheduled to advise foreign forces with viable TTP so that theycan successfully plan, train for, and carry out their mission.

Status: Current

AIRFIELD OPENINGMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures for Airfield Opening


15 MAY 07 FM 3-17.2

NTTP 3-02.18

AFTTP 3-2.68

Description: A quick-reference guide to opening an airfield inaccordance with MTTP. Contains planning considerations,

airfield layout, and logistical requirements for opening anairfield.

Status: Current

CORDON AND SEARCH

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Cordon and SearchOperations


25 APR 06 FM 3-06.20

MCRP 3-31.4B

NTTP 3-05.8

AFTTP 3-2.62

Description: Consolidates the Services best TTP used incordon and search operations. Provides MTTP for the planningand execution of cordon and search operations at the tacticallevel of war.

Status: Assessment

EOD


Procedures for Explosive OrdnanceDisposal in a Joint Environment

App roved f or Publ ic Release

27 OCT 05 FM 4-30.16

MCRP 3-17.2C

NTTP 3-02.5

AFTTP 3-2.32

Description: Provides guidance and procedures for theemployment of a joint EOD force. It assists commanders andplanners in understanding the EOD capabilities of eachService.

Status: Revision

MILITARY DECEPTIONMulti-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Military Deception

Classifi ed SECRET

12 APR 07 MCRP 3-40.4A

NTTP 3-58.1

AFTTP 3-2.66

Description: Facilitate the integration, synchronization,planning, and execution of MILDEC operations. Servce as aone stop reference for service MILDEC planners to plan andexecute multi-service MILDEC operations.

Status: Current

NLW

Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques,

and Procedures for the TacticalEmployment of Nonlethal Weapons


24 OCT 07 FM 3-22.40

MCWP 3-15.8

NTTP 3-07.3.2

AFTTP 3-2.45

Description: This publication provides a single-source,consolidated reference on the tactical employment of NLWsand offers commanders and their staff guidance for NLWemployment and planning. Commanders and staffs can usethis publication to aid in the tactical employment of NLW duringexercises and contingencies.

Status: Current

PEACE OPS

Multi-Service Tactics Techniques and

20 OCT 03

Change 1

FM 3-07.31

MCWP 3-33.8

Description: Provides tactical-level guidance to the warfighterfor conducting peace operations.


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LAND AND SEA BRANCH POC [email protected]


TECHINT


Procedures for Technical IntelligenceOperations


9 JUN 06 FM 2-22.401

NTTP 2-01.4

AFTTP 3-2.63

Description: Provides a common set of MTTP for technicalintelligence operations. Serves as a reference for Servicetechnical intelligence planners and operators.

Status: Assessment

UXO

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Unexploded ExplosiveOrdnance Operations


16 AUG 05 FM 3-100.38

MCRP 3-17.2B

NTTP 3-02.4.1

AFTTP 3-2.12

Description: Describes hazards of UXO submunitions to landoperations, addresses UXO planning considerations, anddescribes the architecture for reporting and tracking UXOduring combat and post conflict.

Status: Revision

CFSOF I&I


Procedures for Conventional Forces andSpecial Operations Forces Integration andInteroperability


17 MAR 10 ATTP 6-03.05

MCWP 3-36.1

NTTP 3-05.19

AFTTP 3-2.73

USSOCOM Pub3-33V.3

Description: This publication assists in planning and executingoperations where conventional forces and special operationsforces (CF/SOF) occupy the same operational environment.

Status: Approved

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: [email protected]


AIRSPACE CONTROL

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Airspace Control


22 MAY 09 FM 3-52.1

AFTTP 3-2.78

Description: This MTTP publication is a tactical leveldocument, which will synchronize and integrate airspacecommand and control functions and serve as a single sourcereference for planners and commanders at all levels

Status: Current

BREVITY

Multi-Service Brevity Codes


APR 10 ATTP 1-02.1

MCRP 3-25B

NTTP 6-02.1

AFTTP 3-2.5

Description: Defines multi-Service brevity which standardizesair-to-air, air-to-surface, surface-to-air, and surface-to-surfacebrevity code words in multi-Service operations.

Status: Current

CIVIL SUPPORT

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Civil Support OperationsDistribution Restricted

3 DEC 07 FM 3-28.1

NTTP 3-57.2AFTTP 3-2.67

Description: Fills the Civil Support Operations MTTP void andassists JTF commanders in organizing and employing Multi-

Service Task Force support to civil authorities in response todomestic crisis.

Status: Assessm ent

COMCAM

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Combat CameraOperations


24 MAY 07 FM 3-55.12

MCRP 3-33.7A

NTTP 3-13.12

AFTTP 3-2.41

Description: Fills the void that exists regarding combat cameradoctrine and assists JTF commanders in structuring andemploying combat camera assets as an effective operationalplanning tool.

Status: Current

HAVE QUICK

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for HAVE QUICK Radios


7 MAY 04 FM 6-02.771

MCRP 3-40.3F

NTTP 6-02.7

AFTTP 3-2.49

Description: Simplifies planning and coordination of HAVEQUICK radio procedures. Provides operators information onmulti-Service HAVE QUICK communication systems whileconducting home station training or in preparation forinteroperability training.

Status: Assessm ent

HF-ALE 20 NOV 07 FM 6-02.74 Description: Standardizes high power and low power HF-ALE

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH POC l 2@l l f il


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Joint Task Force Liaison Officer Integration (JTF LNO) 27 January 03 Rescinded 29 September 09

NEW PROJECTS

TITLE SERVICE DESCRIPTION / STATUSMilitary Diving Operations (MDO)

Multi-Service Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Military Diving Operations


USA

USMC

USN

USAF

Description: This MTTP publication describes USMilitary dive mission areas (DMA) as well as the forcestructure, equipment, and primary missions that eachService could provide to a JTF Commander.

Status: Final Coordination Draft

RECENTLY RESCINDED PUBLICATIONS

COMMAND AND CONTROL (C2) BRANCH - POC: [email protected]


JTF IM

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Joint Task ForceInformation Management


10 SEP 03 FM 6-02.85

(FM 101-4)

MCRP 3-40.2A

NTTP 3-13.1.16

AFTTP 3-2.22

Description: Describes how to manage, control, and protectinformation in a JTF headquarters conducting continuousoperations.

Status: Assessm ent

EW REPROGRAMMING

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for the Reprogramming ofElectronic Warfare and Target SensingSystems


22 JAN 07 FM 3-13.10

(FM 3-51.1)

NTTP 3-51.2

AFTTP 3-2.7

Description: Supports the JTF staff in planning, coordinating,and executing reprogramming of electronic warfare and targetsensing systems as part of joint force command and controlwarfare operations.

Status: Revision

TACTICAL CHAT

Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques, andProcedures for Internet Tactical Chat in

Support of Operations


7 JUL 09 FM 6-02.73

MCRP 3-40.2B

NTTP 6-02.8

AFTTP 3-2.77

Description: This publication provides MTTP to standardizeand describe the use of internet tactical chat (TC) in support ofoperations. It provides commanders and their units with

guidelines to facilitate coordination and integration of TC whenconducting multi-Service and joint force operations.

Status: Current

TACTICAL RADIOS

Multi-Service CommunicationsProcedures for Tactical Radios in a JointEnvironmentApp roved f or Publ ic Release

14 JUN 02 FM 6-02.72

MCRP 3-40.3A

NTTP 6-02.2

AFTTP 3-2.18

Description: Standardizes joint operational procedures forSINCGARS and provides an overview of the multi-Serviceapplications of EPLRS.

Status: Assessm ent

UHF TACSAT/DAMA

Multi- Service Tactics, Techniques, and

Procedures Package for Ultra HighFrequency Tactical Satellite and DemandAssigned Multiple Access Operations


31 AUG 04 FM 6-02.90

MCRP 3-40.3G

NTTP 6-02.9

AFTTP 3-2.53

Description: Documents TTP that will improve efficiency at theplanner and user levels. (Recent operations at JTF level have

demonstrated difficulties in managing limited number of UHFTACSAT frequencies.)

Status: Assessm ent


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Air Operat ions i n Mari tim e Surf ace Warf are(AOMSW)

17 Nov 08

Avi atio n Urb an Oper atio ns

9 Jul 05

Joint Application of Firepower (JFIRE)

20 Dec 07

Kill Box Employment

4 Aug 09

Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses(JSEAD)

28 May 04

Survival Evasion and Recovery

Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar

System (JSTARS)

16 Nov 06

Conducting Peace Operations (PEACE OPS)

14 Apr 09 (CH1)

Cordon and Search Operations

25 Apr 06

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD)

27 Oct 05

Integrated Air Defense System (IADS)

1 May 09

Military Deception (MILDEC)

12 Apr 07

Nonlethal Weapons (NLW)

24 Oct 07

Tactical Convoy Operations (TCO)

13 Jan 09

Technical Intelligence (TECHINT)

9 Jun 06

Brevity Codes

Apr 10

Air fiel d Open ing

15 May 07

Civil Support Operations

3 Dec 07

Combat Camera Operations (COMCAM)

24 May 07

Have Quick Radios

7 May 04

High Frequency-Automatic Link

Establishment Radios (HF-ALE)

20 Nov 07

Joint Air Traffic Control (JATC)

23 Jul 09

Joint Task Force Information Management(JTF-IM)

10 Sep 03

Electronic Warfare Reprogramming

22 J 0

Strike Coordination and Reconnaissance

(SCAR)

26 Nov 08

Air spac e Cont rol

22 May 09

Adv isi ng Fo reig n Fo rces

10 Sep 09

ALSA ORGANIZATION

JASC

Joint Actions Steering Committee

Director

Col David B. Hume, USAF

Deputy

Vacant

NCOIC Support Staff

TSgt Christal Jefferson, USAF Cheryl Parris, Admin Support Asst

Sonya Robinson, Budget Analyst

Leila Joyce, Office Auto Asst

Publishing Staff

Beatrice Waggener, Editor

Brian Bolio, Publications Officer

Air Land and Sea Command and Control

Lt Col Brent Brockinton, USAF Lt Col (s) Robert Bradeen, USAF Lt Col Michael Woltman, USAF

Maj Ray Zuniga, USAF MAJ Troy Ewing, USA MAJ Brian Bolio, USA

Maj Jeffrey Hughes, USMC MAJ Joseph Leach, USA LCDR Cynthia Dieterly, USN

USA, Vacant USA, Vacant USA, Vacant

USAF, Vacant USAF, Vacant

ALSA CENTER


32/32

ALSB 2010-2 32

ALSA CENTER

ATTN: ALSB

114 ANDREWS STREET

LANGLEY AFB VA 23665-2785

OFFICIAL BUSINESS

Air Land Sea No 2 May 2010

Documents

Transcript of Air Land Sea No 2 May 2010