air assault brigades

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A new kind of brigade has appeared in the Souiet force structure. ~It provides additional capabilities that haue not been arailableto the Soviets in thepast. This articleprouides a look at this newelement and considers its organ ization and role.

Major Roger E. Ber t , US Army

Air Assa u lt Br iga d e s :btd

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,;:New E le k n t in t h eSovie t ! ibesantFo r c e !r u c t u r e$.*.


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Introduction

S OVIET m ilita ry d octr in e, a s is well-kn own , h as a lways p la ced h ea vy em -ph a s is on th e employmen t of desan t orla nd in g forces . With in th e desant forcespec t rum, u oz du sh no-d esan tn yye u oysk a(VDVI or th e a ir bor ne for ce, in p ar ticu la r,h as been th e eu bject of s pecia l a t ten tionand in teres t . Th e organ iza tion of th eSoviet a irborn e force bega n in 193o, an d,u n der th e d irection of th en Red arm y ch iefof s ta ff, ,Ma rsh al M. N. Tu kh ach evsk i, itp ion eer ed th e d evelopmen t of a ird rop a nda ir -land ing t a ct ic s .Th e h is tor ica lly la -ge s ize of th e s ta nd-

in g VD V for ce r eflect s it s p er ceived va lu eto th e Soviet m ilita ry. Cu rren tly ma in -ta in ed a t a level of 50,000 to 60 ,000 per-s on n el, th e VDV s tren gth h a s been a sh igh a s 100,000 du rin g th e pos twa rper iod . As th e wor lds la rges t a irborn eforce, it h as b een con s ta n tly m o$ lern izedan d re-equ ipped to im prove m ob ility an dfirepower an d h as reach ed a poin t wh eretod ay it figh ts es sen tia lly a s a m otor izedr ifle force on ce it is on th e grou n d . As afu rth er con fir ma tion of it s p er ceived u til-ity to s en ior Soviet grou n d force com-m an ders . vir tu a lly a ll m ajor So}r iet exer-cis es h ave in clu ded th e u s e of troops fromt h e a ir bor ne for ce.Given th is b ack grou n d, it is n ot s u rp ris -

in g th a t th e S?vie@ h ave in t rodu ced an ew u n it in th e a irborn e d esan t forces tru ctu re: tbe so-ca lled a ir a s s au ltb r igade. Th e appea ran ce of th is type ofbr iga de rep res en ts a s ign ifica nt in crea sein th e n um ber of a irborn e-ded ica ted per-s on nel in a ddit ion to th e a lready s izab leW2 V force. As a n ewly organ ized an ddep loyed force, tbe a ir a s sa u~t br igadepres um ably provides a n ew ca pa bility for

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perform in g cer ta in m is sion s th at previ-ou s ly belon ged to oth er forces or cer ta inn ew m is s ion s th a t res u lted from a re-eva lu a t ion of fu tu re comba t requ ire-ment s .With th is in m in d, I will a ddres s th es u bord in at ion , orga niza tion a nd d ep loy-

men t of a ir a s s a u lt b r igades , a s well as,m os t im porta ntly, th eir p ros pect ive m is -s ion s . To p rop er ly eva lu a te p oten tia l m is -s ion s , it will be n eces sa ry to specu la teabou t why th es e u nits were organ ized ,dep loyed and in respon s e to wh a tstrategy.

Air Assault Brigade:Organization and Deployment

Air a s s au lt b r igades a re believed toh a ve b een d ep loyed with Soviet for ces forth e pa s t th ree to fou r yea rs . So fa r, th eyh ave been d etected in th e Soviet Un ion swes tern m ilita ry d is t r icts (M Ds ) and inth e forwa rd-dep loyed Grou ps of Forces(GOFS) in Ea s tern Eu rope: cover in g ana rea th a t con s t itu tes es s en t ia lly th eWestern tewt r uoyny (7TI or th ea ter ofwar . Ba sed on th e dep loym en t pa ttern ofth es e forces , it is a s s umed th a t th ebr igades a re MD or fron t-level (in war-t im e) a ss ets . Tberd h ave been s om e ten ta -t ive in dica t ion s th at th es e br igades m aybe a s s ign ed a s low a s a rmy level, bu t th isr ema in s un con firmed .A compa ris on of th e a ir a s s au lt b ri-

ga des orga niza tion an d wea pon s d is tr i-b u tion (Figu re 1) with th os e of a s ta nda rdBi1 4D a irb orn e amp hib iou s in fa ntry com -ba t veh icle (AA lCV)-equ ip p ed a ir bor n eregim en t (Figu r e 2 )8 in dica tes th at th e a ir -born e regim en t was probab ly th e baeic..model for th e br igades . As is typ ica l ofSoviet a irborn e u n its , th e a ir a ss au lt b ri-gade h a s a very h igh den s ity of crew-

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AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

I Au Assau lt 1L_.._J

GElmBmsupplyCompany

,I Ant!a#rcraft II EngineerBattery Company I# I triI MeiftcalPlatoon/ Company IL I

Principal Items of EquipmentD30 122mm towed how! tzer 18 S044 a5mm aux!hary-propel led fi eld gun 6M1943 120mm mortar 6 RPGJ6D antitank grmade launcher 150SA7 Grad sur face-to-ai r mss! le . 45 A(XJ 7 30mm automat !c grenade Iaunchel 24ZU23 23mm antiaircraft gun E RPKS74 545nMn Ilgh t machmegun 111BRDM AT3f5 antt taok gu !ded m] ssde launcher 9 BMD ambome amphibmus infantry combat vehtcle 64Manpack AJ3/4 anti tank gu !ded mmwle 14 BRDM and BRDM2 amph]blous scou t cars 4SPG9 73mm r ecod less an ti tank gun 36

Ih!s represents a Provisional assessment of the strength, orgamzawm and equtpment of the a!r assault brigade, basedon fragmental mformat)on from several sources

Figure 1

s er ved a nd in divid u al a n tita n k wea pon sth e ra t io in term s of n umber of weapon sper 1 ,000 tr oop s is n ea rly twice th at fou n din a s tan da rd m otorized r ifle d ivis ion .However , t h er e a r e n ot ic ea b le d iffer en c es .Th e br iga de h as m ore com ba t ba tta lion s,a m ixtu re of two BMD-equ ipped an d twopa ra ch u te a s s a u lt ba t ta lion s an d anor ga n ic a r tiller y b a tt a lion .Th e comb in a tion of t wo BAfD-equ ip ped

ba tta lion s an d two pa ra ch u te ba tta lion sis very in tr igu in g. Th e BMD bat tal ionsa re tota lly in keep in g with th e recen ttren d toward in crea s ed m obility with inth e VD V wh er e a ll d ivis ion a l r egim en tsa re bein g equ ipped with th e BMDAA ICV.8 However , th e exis ten ce ofs ta nda rd pa ra ch u te ba tta lion s with in th ea ir a ss au lt b riga de in con tra ct to th e over -a ll t ra n s it ion with in th e VD V toward

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h ea vier a irborn e u n its m igh t s eem con -trad ictory, Th e explan a t ion for th is istwofold.Firs t , a ir a s s a u lt b r igades an d, in pa r-

t icu la r , th eir n on -BJ 4D-equ ipped ba t-t alion s wou ld , in s om e ca s es , b e em p loyedclos er to th e forwa rd lin e of own troops{F LO1 l. As a fron t-level a ss et , t hes e u n itswou ld s u pp or t a rm ies a nd d i~,is ion s in th efron t comman der s m an eu ver plan a td is ta n ces fa vor ab le for ea rly lin k u p or fir esu pport . As a resu lt , it is les s cr it ica l fort h es e b at ta lion s t o h a ve ~h e in cr ea s ed fir e-power an d m obility th at l?I?fDs provideu nits opera t in g fa rth er in th e en emysr ea r a rea .

Secon d, it is a ss u med th at th e a ir lift forth es e b riga des wou ld b e p rovid ed p rim ar-ily by th e fronts t a ct ica l a ir a rmy (TAA).In a smu ch a s th e lift capab ility a t frontlevel is lim ited (a poin t th a t will bed is cu s s ed in m ore d eta il la ter), it s im ply isn ot fea sib le to equ ip a ir a ss au lt b r iga deswith m ore equ ipm en t th an can be m ovedwit h ou t exces s ive ext er n al s u pp or t.In th e fin al an alys is , it p robab ly is n o

acciden t (a s th e Soviet s a re fon d of eay-in g) th at th e a ir a ss au lt b r iga de s bru ctu res tron gly res em bles th at of a rein forceda ir bor ne r egim en t. In S oviet exer cis e p la ys ubs equ en t to 197o, m os t a irborn e u n itssuppor t ing frontal opera tion s h ave been

I AwbomeRegiment (BMtT)1,455 II

mE3Elmmmm

I I

mlz!$!zl\ Principal Items of Equipment

M1943 120mrn mortar 6 AGS17 30mm automat tc g renade launcher 18SA7 Grad sur face-to.al r missi le 36 RPKS74 545mm bght machmegun123 23mm antimrcraft gun

836 BMII awborne amphibious infantry combat vehicle 90BRDA4 AT 315 afmtank gu !ded mmsde launcher 9 BROM and BRDM2 amphibious scout cars 4RPGJ6D ant! tank grenade launcher 111

Tha represents d prowsonal assessment of the strength, organization and equipment of the aIr assault brigade, basedon f ragmentary mformat ,on f rom several sources

Figure 2

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of th e regim en ta l eize.gWith on ly m in or d ifferen ces in s ize an d, organ iza tion , th e Soviet fron t com -

m an ders oppos in g NATO n ow h ave an in -tegrrd, a irb or ne-ca pa ble force a va ila blefor u s e in th eir op era tion s . Never th eles s ,it is m ore probab le th at , u n like su pport -in g s irborn e regim en ts , s ir a s s a u lt br i-gades wou ld be dep loyed n ot a s in tegra lu n its bu t a s ta ilored su bu n its -th a t is ,on e or two ba ttaon ta sk forces . Th is iss u gges ted firs t h y th e n umber of ba t-ta lion s an d th e d ifferen ces in mobility(BiMD-equ ipped vers u s pa ra ch u tea s s au lt ) and , s econ d, by th e in adequ atefrontal a ir lift a va ila ble for a b riga de-s izem ovem en t. A la rge-s ca le opera tion cou ldb e m ou n ted u n der cu rren t con dit ion s on lywith h igh er ech elon s u pp or t.Th e qu es t ion s th at logics fly a r is e a re

Why were th es e br igades crea ted , forwha t roles an d m is s ion s , an d why wereth ey a ss ign ed to th e fron t level? Befor e a t-tem pt in g to a ddres s th es e qu es tion s, it isn eces s a ry to n ote th a t th e bu lk of th eop en -s ou r ce in form at ion a b ou t n ew Sovietu m.ts is n orma lly der ived from exercis ep lay an d from what th e Soviets ch oos e toreves f abou t u n it a ct ivit ies or from dis -cu s s ion s in th eoret ica l jou rn als . As yet ,th e Soviet m ilita ry p res s h a s been verycircum spect abou t d is cu s s in g th e a ira ss au lt b riga de a s a u orga niza tion . Th ere-fore. s pecu la t ion abou t it s m is s ion s an demploymen t mu st be ba sed on :. An a nrdys is of ca pa bilit ies im plicit in

it s o rgan iza t ion .. An in feren ce of it s u ses a s in d ica tedin gen era l referen ces to s ir a ss au lt forces

in th e Soviet m ilita ry pres s.. An iden t ifica t ion of th e sh ortcom -

in gs in front ca p ab ilit ies it a d dr es s es .e A determ in at ion of it s role in th e con -

text of overall Sovie t ope r a tiona l- leve ldoctrine.Th e la s t poin t is es pecia lly cru cia l to an

u n ders t s nd in g of th e in ten ded role of a ira s s au lt b r igades . It is cru cis f beca u se ofs ign ifican t ch an ges th at h ave occu rredan d will con t in u e in th e Soviet opera -t ion a l-level a pp roa ch to figh tin g a nd win -n in g a war in Eu rope. To fu lly a pprecia tebow s ir a ss au lt b r igades m igh t be u sed , itis importan t to u n ders tan d th is fu n -damen trd a ltera t ion in Soviet m ilita ryth in kin g a bou t h ow to d efea t NATO.

The Operational Maneuver Group:Tha Soviet Answer to the Active Defense

C. N. Don n elly, a fr equ en t a n d r es pect edau th or on Soviet m ilita ry a ffa irs a t th eSoviet Stu dies Cen tre, Roya l Milita ryAca dem y, Sa nd hu rs t, in th e Un ited Kin g-dom , a rgu es pers u a s ively in a recen ta rt icle th at th e Soviets h ave in trod uced an ew oper a tion a l- le vel c on c ep t s p ec ifica llydes ign ed to cou n ter NATOs a ct ived efen s e s tr ategy wh ich is a ck nowled geda s a very effect ive form of defen se. ]Accord in g to Don nelly, Soviet m ilita rydoctr in e h old s th a t , if war breaks ou t inEu rope, it m us t be won very qu ick ly if itis to be won a t a ll. If th e wa r were tocon tin u e too lon g, it cou ld develop in to aca ta st rop hic s tra tegic n u clea r exch a nge,a s well a s en gen der in tern al cen tr ifu ga lp res su res th at cou ld b low th e Soviet b locapar t .(h e pr im ary ta s k of th e Soviets , th ere-

fore, is to redu ce NATOS preps ra t iont im e s in ce su rpr is e is s o cru cia l tos u c ce ss . Ia If s u c ces s fu l, NATOS d efen s eswou ld n ot lik ely b e h ea vily for tified , ech e-lon ed in dep th or h ave a s tr on g op e~a -t ion s f r es er ve .Soviet p lan n ers well rea lize th a t th e

ea rly a nd effect ive u s e of NATOs ta ct ica Jn u clea r wea pon s wou ld s ever ely d is ru p t ifn ot d es troy th eir offen sive. Th u s, a s tra t-

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egy an d an opera t ion a l p la n wou ld ben eeded t o fores ta fl th e im plem en ta tion ofNATOs ta ct ica l n uclea r op t ion an d to a c-complis h a ra pid colla p s e of NATOsp olit ico-m ilita ry s ys tem . Su ch a s tra tegywou ld r eq u ir e:o Th e a ch ievem en t of su rp r is e an d

- a ss u m e NATOs d efen s e t o b e off-b ala n ce.. A maxim um amou n t of s h ock in th e

firs t few h ou rs of a tta ck .. Pa ra lyzin g NATOs comman d an d

c on t rol s ys t em .q Th e a ch ievem en t of rap id ra tes of ad

va nce on s evera f im por ta nt a xes d eep in toNATOs ter r itory to sh at ter th e defen se.q Th e redu ct ion of r is k rep reeem ted by

NATOs t act ica l n u clea r op tion .In s tu dyin g N ATOs defen se pla nn in g,}ta rs aw Pact m ilita ry an a lys t s s ees ever al a s pect s of th e a ct ive d efen s e s tra t-egy th at cou ld be exp loited given th e cor-r ect op era tion rd t act ics . Th es e a re, for ex-a mple. NATOS n eed tO iden tify th e m ~nth ru s t ea r ly, it s la ck of a s tron g opera -t ion a l r es erve a nd t he con s equ en t requ ire-m en t to pu ll u n its from on e pa r t of tb ed efen s e lin e t o s tren gth en a not her .Tbe Soviet opera tion al-level a ns wer to

s u cces sfu lly exp loit in g th es e fa ctors a ndt h u e a ch ievin g t h e s tr at egic r equ ir em en tsis th e resu rrect ion of a World War I I con -cep t th e m ob ile grou p cu rren tly re-fer red to a s th e opera t ion a l m an eu vergrou p or OMG. Th es e organ iza t ion swere th e m eet s u cces s fu l m ean s of ex-p loita t ion th at th e Soviet s fou nd to tu rnta ct ica l s u cce;s in to opera tion al s u cces san d a ch ieve a h igh ra te of a dvan ce togrea t dep th du rin g th e war..J u et wh a t is an OMG, an d wha t doee it

do? At a rmy level, th e ba s is for a n OMGwou ld be a ta n k d]vis ion , wh ile a t frontlevel it wou ld be m ajor eiem en ts of a ta n ka rm y. Ta ilored a nd pos sib ly rein forced tom eet s pecific requ ir em en ts , t hes e gr ou p swou ld likely be dep loyed by man y of th e

a rm ies in an offen s ive on s evera l a xesa lon g a b road fron t on th e first or secondday of h os t ilit ies . Su ppor ted by frontala via tion , orga n ic h elicop ter gu n sh ip s a nda rt illery, OM Ge wou ld s eek th e

rapid transfer of the attackingfo;c;s efforts in to the enem ys opera-tion al d eferrsiu e d epth and th e cond uct ofthe offensive with decisive goals, at theh igh tem pos and at a great depth. Specific m is s ion s a s s ign ed to OMGS

a lon g th eir a xes of a dva nce wou ld in clu deto:e Des t roy n u clea r weapon s an d de-

liver y s ys t em s .q Des t roy or n eu tr a lize comman d

pos ts , elect ron ic wa rfa re u n it s an dfa cilit ies , a n d a ir d efen s e wea pon s .e Preven t th e with d rawa l of en emy

troops .e Dela y th e adva n ce of res erves from

t he en em ys d ep th .o Pa ra lyze th e en em ys logis t ica l s ys -

tem.e Cap tu re ma jor im por ta n t a rea s an d

ob ject ives to be h eld u n til th e m ain forcesarrive.Opera tin g a t a con sidera ble d is ta nce in

fron t of an OMG wou ld be it s forwa rddeta ch m en t. Th is eh men t, con sis tin g ofa ba t ta lion ta s k force for a n a rm y OMG ora regim en ta l ta s k force for a front OMG,wou ld be s epa ra ted from th e OM G mainbody by 20 to 40 k ilometers . Forwa rddeta chm en ts wou ld gen era lly con du ctr econ n a is s an ce for t h e OMG, id en tifyin gweak poin ts to be a t ta cked by th e OMG.Forward deta chm en ts wou ld try to den yth e en em y th e oppor tu n ity to con solida teon fa vorab le lin es of defen se, con du ctra id in g opera tion s a nd s eize tm gets if, bydoin g s o, th ey wou ld s ign ifica nt ly a id th ea dva nce of th e m ain body. Relyin g to acon sidera ble degree on th e ab le, bold ,a n d d ecis ive op er at ion s of forwa rd d et ach -m en ts , th e Soviet s h ope to a ch ieve ad-

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van ce ra tes of a t least 4 0 t o 5 0 k ilom et er sp er d ay.Th e OMG con cep t is s t ill evolvin g both

th rou gh d is cu ss ion in Soviet m ilita ryjou rn als a nd in a ctu a l p ra ct ice du rin g ex-ercis es . As Don n elly emph as izes , th eOM G is n ot a n ew forma tion ; it is th e u seof exis t in g u n it s in a d ifferen t way an d a ss u ch rep res en ts a con cep t of th e verygrea tes t im porta nce a s pecific des ign todefea t p res en t NATO d efen sive p la ns . 2

Air Assault Brigades:An OMGConnect ion?

Soviet d is cu s s ion s con cern in g th ereviva l of th e mobile grou p con cep treported ly s ta r ted a rou nd 1976 an d h aves ub sequ en tly in ten sified , with pa rt icu -la r ly broad covera ge in th e m ilita ry p res sin 1979 .2! Th e t im e of th es e d is cu ss ion s,qu ite apa rt from oth er fa ctors , s u gges tss om e correla t ion between a ir a s s au ltb r igades and th e OMG ccm cep t in th a t itrep res en ts th e approxim ate lea d t im e re-qu ir ed t o d ecid e u n it forma tion , or ga n ir .a -t ion a nd th en dep loym en t ( 1976-79).Apa r t from th e t im e coin ciden ce,

h owever , th e key role of forward deta ch -m en ts and ra id in g opera t ion s in th e OM Gcon cep t an d th e con com ita nt em ph as is inrecen t OM G litera tu re on th e im por ta nceof ta ct ica f a ir a s s au lts an d desant opera-t ion s s eem to clea rly in dica te a m ajor rolefor a ir a s s a u lt b r igades in OIMG opera -t ion s , if n ot a n in terrela tion sh ip . Severa ls ta tem en ts from Soviet / Wa rsaw Pacts ou rces a ddres s in g OMGS an d a irborn e/a ir a s s a u lt opera t ion s may fu rth er illu s-t r ate th is :. in contrast (o the past, [offensive]

capabilit ies have nou~ considerably ex-panded , especially in the depth to whichblou~s can be deliuered by rocket forces,


aviation , long range artillery, and the ex-ten s ive u s e of a ir a ss au lt / a ir bor ne for ces .(Empha s is ad ded.). . pn n eipal task s of th e air force are.

to land tactical desan ts drawn from theraid ing and m aneu uenng forces or fromthe m ain forces of ground troops acting insupport of the operational m aneuvergroups, Th is task involves transportaircraft or helicopters landing groundtroops. . ..25

the essence of [the theory of a deepoffensiue operation] consisted of thesim ultaneous suppression of the enem y Sd efen se a long it s en ti re d ep th , pen et rat ionof its tactical zone on a selected a;is witha subsequen t rapid extension of tacticalsu ccess. in to th e operation al zon e by in tro-duczng exploitation forces [tanks,m oton zed n fle troops, cavalry] an d lan d-ings of airbornelair assau lt forces for them ost rapid ach ievem ent of the ass?gnedmi ss io n .

. th ese [m obile] grou ps an d [forw ardand special] detachm ents together u ,ithatrborne forces. prou ided experience forthe Lm prouem en t on the theory of deepcombat opera tion s. Certa in ly, a irborn e and a ir a s s au lt

forces a re con s idered to be importa n telem en ts of th e OM G force s tru ctu re. Th equ es tion th at rem ain s, h owever , is : I Iowdoes , th e role of th e a ir a s s au lt b r igadesdiffer from th at of con ven tion a l a irborn eor h eliborn e for ces ? Th e a ns wer lies in ex-am in in g th e fa ctors th a t in flu en ced th ecrea tion of th e u n its .Two fa ctors in flu en ced th e decis ion s to

form an d dep loy th es e u n its . Firs t wa s th en eed to fill wh a t cou ld be term ed th efronts a ir bor n e/ h elib or n e for ce em p loy-men t dead zon e. Doctr in a lly, th eSoviet s h ave m ain ta in ed th at h eliborn ea ss au lts a nd la nd in gs ca n be con du cted a sfa r forwwd of th e FLOT as 50 k ilom etersth at is , ta ct ica l dep th (s ee Figu re 3). In

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Strategic

Operational

F,gure 3

pra ct ice, h owever , th es e a ss au lt s ra relyexten d beyon d 15 to 20 k ilom eters for -wa rd of th e forwa rd edge of th e ba tt le a reaa nd a re often m u ch clos er . Th e a ppa ren trea son for th is s ub s ta nt ia l d ifferen ce be-tween th eory a nd pra ct ice lies in tbe pr in -cip al wea k nes s es of h elib or ne for cest h ela ck of m ob ilit y a nd firep ower . To s u rvivea t grea ter d is ta ir ces , th es e forces n eed a r-t illery a nd, a via tion fire s u pp or t a nd ea rlylin ku p with a dva ncin g u n it s .Airborn e opera tion s in s uppor t of frorr-

ta l offen s ives h a ve gen era lly b een of regi-m en ta l s ize in exerciees . Alth ou ght heoret ica lly p os s ib le a n ywh ere with in 50to 500 k ilom eters forwa rd of th e FLOTwh en su ppor t in g a front, s u ch op er a t ion s

a re u su a lly con du cted a t dep th s m u chgrea ter th& 50 k ilom eter s . Th u s, a deadzon e appea rs -an a rea of som ewh ere be-tween 20 an d approxim a tely 100 k ilo-m eters d eep in th e en em y defen sive zon e.Th is dead zon e h as exis ted a e a res u lt of

th e front comma nder in ability to rea chver t ica lly h eyon d 20 k ilom eters in to th een em ys defen sive zon e. If th e frorzt com-m an der wan ted to a s s a u lt deeper in to th een emys rea r a rea , h e wa s forced to re-qu es t a irborn e a s s ets from th e Gen errdSta ff or it s wa r t im e m an ifes ta t ion , th eStauka (gen er al h ea dqu a rt er s s ta ff): Th ecom man der cou ld n ot be a s s u red th at h isrequ es t wou ld be approved or th a t anopera t ion wou ld be la u n ch ed qu ick lyen ou gh t o exp loit a fleet in g op por tu n ity.As th e n ew OMG con cep t im p lies ,

Soviet m ilita ry p la n n ers en vis ion an u mber of ra pid , d eep pen et ra tion s a J on gs evera l a xes or m ain d ir ect ion s, a s th eSoviet s term it , by a rm y-level an d pos s i-b ly even front-level OM Gs . To m ain ta inth e h igh ra tes of a dvan ce con s ideredpos eib le u nder n on nu clea r con dit ion ,OMGS wou ld be ca lled u pon to s eize keyter ra in -th at is , r iver -cros ein g s ites ,pa ss es , cros sroa ds , ra il ju n ct ion e, a nd s ofor th to deflect rea ct in g en em y res ervesen d, in sh or t , to perform th e fu ll ran ge ofrea r a rea m is s ion s .s lIn a dd it ion , th es e op era tion s s hou ld be

ca rr ied ou t , a ccord in g t o Soviet s tr at egiccon s id er a tion s , in a r ela t ive ly c omp re ss edt im e fram e if a n offen siw a ga in st NATOie to be s ucces sfu l. Th is r ela tee to th e s ec-on d fa ctor res pon sib le for a ir a ss au lt bri-gade form at ion th e n eed to p rovide th efron t comm an der a nd (p os sib ly) s ubord i-n a te a rmy comm anders with organ ic a ira s s a u lt forces th a t wou ld be ava ila b lefrom th e s t=t of th e opera t ion s.With pla n n in g a im ed a t a rela t ively

sh or t , in ten se con flict with th e commit-m en t of OMGS on D+l or D+2 , it wou ld

28


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s eem con sis ten t th at th es e opera t ion aJ -level comman ders n eed in tegra l a ir -de-livered forces to h elp m ain ta in th e requ i-s it e s peed of advan ce. Fu rth er , th es eforces wou ld provide a rap id respon eecapab ility a m ean s by wh ich to rea ct toany abru p t ch an ge in th e comba t s itu a -t ion . Th e vrdu e of th es e forces in an over -a fl en viron men t th at dem an ds th e u tm os tflexib ility an d adaptab ility of com -man d er s is s elf-e vid en t .Th e n eed to exten d th e rea ch of th e

front commander in to NATOs opera -t ion al defen se in su ppor t of OJ NIGS is re-flect ed in t he BLfD b at ta lion com pon en tsof a ir a ss au lt b r iga des . Th es e ba tta lion sm ore s ubs ta n t ia l firepower en d m ob ilitywou ld perm it th em to s u rvive a t grea terd is ta n ces from th e FLOT for lon gerper iod s of t im e th an h eliborn e troops . Asa bon u s, th e a va ila bility of a ir a ss au lt bri-ga des cou ld r ed u ce s om ewh a t t he comm it-m en ts of a irborn e d ivis ion s. Alth ou ghclearly VD 1~ u n it s wou ld be u sed exten -s ively in su ppor t of f ron ta/ operat ions ,th ere sh ou ld be a grea ter a va ila b ility ofth em for s t ra tegic res erve (Res erves ofth e Su prem e High Comman d) m is s ion s orto ca rry ou t m is s ion s a t even grea terop er a tion a l/ s tr a tegic d ep th s .In sh ort , th e a ir a s s a u lt b r igade wou ld

aPPem to be th e s olu tion to th e problem ofprovid in g th e f i-on t -level comman der anorganic for ce for ver tica l m ovem en ts . Th eemph a s is on th e OMG as a viab le mean sa t th e opera tion al level by wh ich to defea tNATO, a level wh ich p reviou sly d id gotp os s es s s u ch for ces , fu rth er r ein for ces t hep er cep tion of a d ir ect r ela tion s h ip .Wh a t k in ds of m is s ion s cou ld be ex-

pected for a ir a s s au lt b r igadee? Howwou ld th ey be emp loyed with OMGS? Asa proba ble th reed im en sion sd or ver t ica lexten s ion of an OM G, a ir a s s au lt bri-gadea , in gen era f, wou ld h a ve th e s amekiu ds of m is sion s as th e u n it th ey su p-

port . Of foremos t impor ta n ce wou ld beth e des t ru ct ion of n u clea r weapon s an ddelivery s ys tem s , a s well a s commen dpea ts , ra dio-electron ic m ea ns of com ba tan d a ir defen se weapon s . In Exercis eNEMAN, h eld in th e Ba ft ic MD in 1979 ,an a irborn e ba t ta Iion with B MD.s w asdropped on an en em y d ivis ion com man dpos t on th e secon d day of th e exercis e.Alth ou gh it is n ot kn own wh eth er th is u nit wa s from err a ir a s s au lt b r igade or as ta nd ar d a irb or ne d ivis ion , it h igh ligh ts apos s ib le m is s ion for a ir a ss au lt b r igadeelements .Proba bly on e of th e s in gle m os t im por-,

ta n t m is eion s t o b e a sa ign ed t o a ir%s au ftb r igades in su ppor t of OMGS wou ld beth e seizu re en d occu pa tion of key ter ra inin pa rt icu la r, r iver -cros sin g s ites . It isvir tu a lly im p os s ib le t o id en t ify a fiy s ign i-fica nt Soviet exer cis e in th e wes tern MDsa nd GOFS th at does n ot in corpora te s om etype of r iver -cros s in g opera tion . Wh ileSoviet m ilita ry writers extol th e n eed fors u cces s fu l for din g of wa ter ob s ta cles fr omth e m arch by forward deta ch men ts , beli-born e or a irborn e a ss a u lts , in m os t ca ses ,a re u sed to s eize an d h old b ridgeh ea ds u n-t il r elieved b y a dva n cin g for ces .

If OMGS a re to su s ta in da ily ra tes of ad-van ce of a t lea s t 40 to 50 k ilom eters , on eof th e key fa ctors in th is a ch ievemen twou ld be th e cros s in g of wa ter ba r r ierswith ou t dela yth a t is , with ou t bein gforced to dep loy an d seize or fin d a cros s-in g p oin t. Alt hou gh t im ely r iver cr os s in gsa re obviou sly very im porta n t , oth er ter-ra in ob ject ives , s u ch a s m ou n ta in p as ses ,cros s roa ds , gap cros s in gs , an d s o forth ,wh ich cou ld im pede th e a dva nce of OMGSwou ld a ls o be likely ob ject ives for a ira s s au l t s .An oth er m is s ion for a ir a s s au lt bri-

ga des wou ld b e th e wid es pr ea d con du ct .ofra ids in su ppor t of OMGa . Ra id s wou ld becon du cted by com pa ny or even ba tta lion -

1983,

29


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MILITARY REVIEW

s ize elemen ts on t ergets in fron t of orpa rrd lel to th e OMGe ma in azis of ad-va nce. Ra id in g opera tion s wou ld dis ru pten emy forces rea ct in g to th e OM Gspa s s age, a s well a s s imp ly in crea s e th eamou n t of con fu s ion in th e rea r a rea .Lieu ten an t Gen era l V. G. Rezn ich en ko,a s s is ta n t commandan t of th e Fru n zeMilita ry Aca dem y, in a n a rt icle cit in g th ecu rren t offen sive a pp lica tion of les son sim rm ed from th e Ba tt le of Mos cow, n oteda pprovin gly th e a d h oc form ation of r tr id-in g detachmen ts to a t ta ck ta rgets in th een emy rea r to des troy person n el an dequ ipmen t , den y th e en emy res t , to sowpan ic. 3 He wen t on to add th a t :. . . these [m obile] groups and detach-m en ts togeth er with airborne troops u sed

for the first tim e in the Battle of Moscoroh ave provid ed experien ce for th e im prove-m ent of the theory of deep com bat opera-tions.8sOth er ra id in g opera tion cited for th eir

e ffe ct iven es s a n d cu rr en t a p plic ab ilit yy in -clu de th e cros sin g of th e Dn ieper River in1943 an d th e Man ch u r ia Campa ign of1945. Du rin g th e Dn ieper ckos s in g,grou ps of 600 to 800 a irborn e troopsopera ted in depen den tly beh in d Germ antin es for two mon th s . Du r in g th e two-week Man ch u ria Campa ign in 1945, 20a irborn e pa r t ies of 50 to 500 person n elwere in ser ted in th e J a pa nese rea r a rea s In a ddit ion to ra id opera tion s in direct

su pport of OMG m ovem en ts , a ir a es a u ltbr igades cou ld be u sefu l for va r iou secon om y-of-force m is s ion s . As n otedp reviou s ly, a perceived weakn es s ofNATOe ,a ct ive defen se s tra tegy is th en eed for ma in th ru s t s of an a t ta ck to beid en tified ea rly in t he con flict . La ndin gsof a ir a s s a u lt t roops cou ld ea s ily be u seda s fein ts or d ecep t ion s to con fu se th edefen der a bou t th e loca t ion of th e ma inob je ct ives . In E xe rc is e ZAPAD 81, for e x-am ple, a d ivers ion ary h et iborn e a ss a u lt

wa s Ia u ncbed in th e en em ys rea r a rea todraw away res erves , wh ile a s econ d a ira s s a u lt wa s a imed a t s eizin g a r iver -cros sin g s it e for th e 0MG.9 8Th e grea ter depth in th e en em ys defen -

s ive zon e to wh ich a ir a s s a u lt forces canbe p rojected an d th e h igh m ob ility of th eBMD ba tta lion s m ake th em idea l for re-con na is sa nce s uppor t of OMGS a nd th eirforwa rd deta ch men ts . Th e Soviet s en vi-s ion OM G forward deta ch men ts opera t-in g from 20 to 40 k ilom eters in fron t of th ema in body. Th e im por ta n ce Soviet m ili-ta ry writers a tta ch to th es e deta ch men tsc an n o t b e ove remph a s ize d. sgOn e of th e les son e p rom in en t in Soviet

lit era tu re a bou t World Wa r- H op era tion sof mobile grou ps (an d forwa rd detach -men ts ) is th a t r econ n a is s a n ce of tbeen em y an d bh e ter ra in a lon g th e grou psm ain a zis of a dva n ce m u st b e im proved.Cer ta in ly, th e in s er t ion of a ir a s s a u ltforces a t va r iou s dep th e a lon g th e pro.jet ted OMG m ain direct ion of adva ncewou ld be in va lu ab le in p rovid in g t im elyin form ation on rou te con dit ion s, a s wella s en em y troop m ovem en ts . In deed , it isn ot u n rea son ab le to ch ara cter ize s u ch a ira s s a u lt recon na is s a n ce elem en ts a s th eforwa rd deta ch m en ts forwa rd deta ch -merit , an d , wh en opera t in g a s su ch , enOMG m igh t s tretch from h ead to toe a sm u ch a s 1 00 k ilom et er s.Fin a fly, an oth er poseib le a ir a s s a u lt

m is s ion is u niqu ely a s s ocia ted with th eOMG con cep t . OMGS opera t in g inNATOs rea r a rea s wou ld. . . requ ire con sid erably m ore in th e w ay

of support and protection than do forcesin th e first ech elon of th e battle form ationof the m ain forces. Th is coupled with thegreat uariety and the great im portattce ofthe tasks these groups perform m akesa widesp rea d u se of avia tion n eces s aryto sn pport th em effect ively. (Em ph as isadded . P


11/18


Alth ou gh clos e a ir su pport by fixed-win g a ircra ft is in clu ded , th e prim arym ean s of a ir su ppor t , a s exp res s ed by Ma-jor Wojciech Mlch a la k , wou ld be h eli-cop ters . In h is d is cu s sion of pos sib le ba s-in g m od es for h elicop ter u n it s s u pp or t in gOMGS, t hes e t hree s h ,ern a tives were pro-posed:8 Th e crea tion of EMorgan ic OMG a irech elon t ha t p en et ra tes u,ith OMGS in toth e en emys rea r a rea s an d is ba s ed an dop era tes d irect ly with OMGS.. Th a t h elicop ters su ppor t OMGS bycon ven t ion a l m eth odsth a t is , fromba ses s ited with th e m ain forces .e Th a t h elicop ter s in it ia lly su ppor t

from ba ses with m ain forces , bu t a t deci-s ive momen ts in th e opera t ion th e h eli-cop ter s , a fter ca r ryin g ou t specific m is -s ion s , la nd in t he gi-ou pin gs of t he ra id in gor man eu ver in g troops . Th ere th ey a res erviced a nd rep len is hed a nd th ey retu rnto ba t t le opera t in g join tly with th e rs id-in g an d m an eu ver in g forces . . .Of th e th ree proposa ls , th e la s t is th e

prefer red ch oice. To s u cces sfu lly im ple-

m en t th is ba s in g op tion , a s Ivfich s la kn otes , it wou ld be n eces s a ry for OMGu n it s t o loca te, s ecu re s ad d efen d s u ita bleh elicop ter Ia ndin g zon es . Certa in ly, th er econ n a is sa n ce of la n din g zon es is a p os si-b le m is s ion for forwa rd-deployed a ira ss a u lt t its , an d, in fact , th e s ecu rin g an dtem pora ry defen se of Iaqd in g zon es au drdrs tr ips a re both very p roba ble ta sks .For example, d orin g ZAPAD 81, a h et i-

born e a s s a u lt wa s con du cted on an a ir-field in th e en emys rea r a rea . After th ea s s a u lt force h ad secu red th e lan d in gs tr ip , t ra n spor t a ircra ft followed withcom ba t veh icles a nd a dd it ion al forces .Th es e for ces imm ed ia tely d ep ar ted t o lin ku p with advan cin g n ava l in fan try u nit swh ich h ad ju s t ca rr ied ou t a u a mph ib iou sa s s a u lt . It is appa ren t th a t th is type ofopera tion is idea fly s u ited for a ir a ss au ltbr iga des . Th e p ara ch u te ba tt alion s ca n b ein ser ted eith er by a ird rop or h elicop terla n din g, wit h t h e BMD b a tt tilon s la n din gsho rt ly th e rea ft er .In deed , it is m ore an d m ore Iikely th at

s ir lan din g, with it s sh or ten ed t im e in th e


12/18

MILITARY REVIEWla nd in g a rea , n ot a irdrop opera tion s m aybe th e prefera b le m eth od of a ir a es a u ltforce in s er t ion . Lieu ten an t Gen era l N.Pavlenko, VD V ch ief of s ta ff, n otes th atth e p rima ry goa f for s irborn e forces is tos h or ten th e t im e n eeded by u nit s (regi-m en ts ) a nd s u bu n it s (b at t r r fion s a nd com -p an ies ) to p repa re for len din g a nd com ba topera tion s.4 An d, les t on e believe h e ison ly refer r in g to a irdropped forces ,Pa vlen ko em ph as izes th at in th e n am e ofou r for ce Vozd ush no-Desan tn yye Voysk ath e word pa ra ch u te is m is s in g. Th efu tu re of t irborn e opera tion s looks m oreim pres sive th an th e p res en t.5 BY th is ,Pa vlen ko s eem s to imp ly an equ ally im -por ta n t role for both a ir la n ded an d a ir-d ropped forces . With th e a ir la ndin g of a ira s s a u lt forces eith er by h elicop ter ort ra n sp or t a ircr aft , a s ign ifica n t r ed u ct ionin dep loym en t t im e is a ch ieved . As tofea sib ilit y u n der com ba t ver su s in terven .t ion con dit ion s, Soviet a irborn e forcescen ied ou t 20 sepa ra te s irborn e a s s a u ltopera tion s du rin g th e 1945 Man ch ur ia r rCr n n pa iFY-a fl we re a ir la n d ed $cTh ere a re, of cou rs e, oth er m &hods of

in s er t in g a ir a s s a u lt b r igade elem en tswh ich wou ld ta ke advan tage of th e per-s on n els a irborn e s k ills , a n d th ere a res itu a tion s wh ere a ir-la nd in g opera tion sa re n ot pos sib le. An y of a n um ber of prac-t ica l va r ia t ion s exis t . For exam ple, a ir-born e elem en te m aybe dropped to es ta b -t is h a b r idgeh ead a t a r iver -cros s in g s itefor th e OM Gs forwa rd deta ch men t with afollow-on drop of BA4D u n it s for s uppor tif lin ku p ie expect ed to ta ke s om e t im e. Orth e BA4D-equ ipped u n it s cou ld bed ropped a t a grea ter dep th to s ecu res n oth er cros s in g s ite rdon g th e OMGsa xis of a dva n ce. Th e gr ea ter s u rviva b ilit yof th es e u nit s wou ld perm it th em to per-form th es e m is s ion s more readily th ans t r ict ly pa ra ch u te or h eliborn e a s s a u ltforcee.

Figu re 4 s h ows an exam ple of th e u se ofa irborn e forces to s eize s evera l cros sin gcites on a brea kth rou gh forces a xis of a d-van ce, a s well a s a deeper in s er t ion tod ela y en em y r es erves . Wit h t he excep tionth at a h eliborn e a s s a u lt wou ld p robablyb e em ployed t od ay for t he firs t ob ject ive,th is is a very rep res en ta tive s ch em at ic ofh ow a ir a s s a u lt b r igadee m igh t b e u sed ineu ppor t of an OMG or an y exp loita t ionforce. ;.

Unanswered Questions

Th e a ir a es a u lt br igade, p s r t icu lwly incom bin at ion with OM Gs , a n d it s pot en -t ia I u ses a re im pres s ive. Bu t it is im por-ta n t to em ph as ize th a t a n u mber of qu es -t ion s n eed to be an swered before a fu llu nders ta n d in g of ite in ten ded em ploy-m en t is a t ta in ed . As Don nelly poin ts ou ta bou t OMGS, wh ile th e con cep t h as beenadop ted by Soviet m ilita ry p lan nere, th eim plem en ta tion deta ils h ave n ot b een re-s olved .a Mu ch th e s am e ca n be s aid of a ira s s a u l t b rigad es .Soviet m ilita ry liter a tu re h as extolled

th e pa s t an d p ros pect ive va lu e of a ir- ,born e/ a ir a ss a u lt forces , both in gen era fan d in rela t ion to OMGS. However , it h aen ot b een specific a bou t wh ich k in ds ofopera t ion s a re th e m os t im por tan t for a ira ss au lt b r iga des or th e m ech an ics of th eirexecu t ion . In d eed , wit h ou t op en a ck nowl-edgem en t of th eir exis ten ce, a nd , in ligh tof th e con tin u in g evolu tion of th e OMGcon cep t , it is p robable th a t th ere a re n oSoviet a n swers to th es e qu es t ion s a t th ep res en t t im e.Cer ta in ly, th e m is s ion s an d pos s ib le

ta ct ics of a ir a s s a u lt b r igades ou tfin edp reviou s ly a re wit hin u n it ca pa b ilit ies a n da re b as ed on eit her t be res u k.s of exer cis esor a ca refu l read in g of Soviet m ilita ry

32 October .,


13/18

Schemat ic of How Air Assaul t Brigades Might Be Used

-5.Q Ikw3tmal mrborne Lmdmglegend:c1 Cmnmrtmen! 1,, of breakthrough em,),. MRC Motmmd rtf!, mrw Afl Army ,$,l ,0AL Am, Corm AR wly r,swwID

BEE Breakth,owh ,. P10,2,,


14/18

MILITARY REVIEW

SovietType MI-8 HIP MI-6 Hook MP24 Hmd

Range lkdometets) 425 620 360Troop Capacdy 28 65-70 8-12Speed (kil ometers per hour] 260 300 275

The M, 26 Halo A armeared m 1978 as the M, 6 replacement The M,.6 can carrv 1 B!#O, The MI.26 can carry 2 BMDsand 1 BMP

HelicopterArmyAssau lt Helmopter Regtmentr

2 MI 24 Hr.d 0/[ squadrons (4o hel icopters~2 MI 8 HID CIE squadrons (20 hehcoptersy

front Independent Hehco@ Regment (Assault)2 M, 24 squadrons (40 helmopters~2 Ah 8 squadrons (20 helmopters)

Independent Hel icopter Regiment (Transpor t)2 M, 6 heavy Ilft squadrons (16 helicopters)2 M, 8 med!um lift squadrons (26 helicopters)

UnitsFront/ArmyL!ft CapacNy2

320-480560

Total 880.1.040bft Capac it y

320-480560

Total 880-1,040

1,020728

Total 1,748Secondary rol e IS troop transport, primary rnl ssl ons are attack/fire support [Hind D) or ant dank (H!nd-E)

Normal {y , one squadron fs t tanspor t-o rien ted (HIP C), whale the other IS attack/f!re suppoti -ortented (HIP QNot,,

Assault h,l,coder re~,mmt, may be ,It,th,d to ,,.,,, ,, m,ded but ,,, n,! ,,ta,, to tank m mmb,md arms ,,.,,% by Iabl,, .1 or~a$zat,m mdWwne!

1l,l! wabll! b,, ,r, ,,;cu IXM ,, Ih,,, theoretlc?lly w,,,bl, 1 ,,l,! ,1? Ilft w!8bllIt+,$ ,r, much 10.,,. ,%I!!w fro. wI,,., .,ss,0 (,1!,,1 ,,$$,ra,wor,, OW,,,Q,,I ,,,$1, W,,, ,,w,x,m,tel 80 wceti md Other .,ss,0 ,wJ,rem,t,

Figu re5

an s ir a s s a u lt br igade. In a dd it ion , withth e excep t ion of th e Mi-6 Hook heli-cop ters , th ere ie n ot an oth er fi-ont-levela irframe capable of tran spor t in g th eB&f,!) AA ICVS of t h e s ir a s sa u lt b riga des .Fu rth er com plica tin g th e s itu a t ion is th efact th a t if th e front comma n der d ecid esto con du ct a con ven t ion a l h eliborn ea s s a u lt with a m otor ized r ifle ba t ta lionba sqth e s tan da rd Soviet force for s u chan opera t ionh is en tire h elicop ter lift

ca pa cit y is es s en t ia lly comm it ted .Thu s, it is clea r th a t a ma jor problemexis ts with orga nic fron t lift ca pa bilit ies

an d th e employmen t of s ir a s s au lt bri-ga des . Th e s ize of th e problem va riesd irect ly with th e s ize of th e in ten dedopera t ion . If a ir a s s au lt u n it s a reem ployed a s com pan y-s ize ra id in g pa r-,,t ies , for example, th en th e front com-m an der ca n s hift h is lift a ss ets m ore com -for tab ly. If, on th e oth er h an d, h e wan ts

34 October .


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t o dep loy a ba t ta lion ta sk force, h a rdch oices con cer n in g m is s ion p rior it y wou ldh ave to be made or very ca refu l opera -t ion ef s eq u en ce p la n n in g con d u ct ed .Look in g a t th e OMG con cep t , in pa r t ic-u la r , with it s imp licit h igh opera t ion aldyn am ics an d compres sed t im e frame, its eem s likely th a t th e front commanderwou ld even tu ally receive add it ion s lifta s s ets to en ab le h im tc m ou n t addit ion alopera t ion s in su pport of h is a rmy OMGS.Th is ca n be don e in eith er of two ways .Th e fron t tir a s s a u lt br igades may bedirect ly su pported with h eavier lift eir -cr aft for BMDs by Soviet m ilita ry tran s-por t avia t ion or uoyenno-transportnayaauiatsiya (VTA) u nits , or front TAAsm igh t be au gm en ted with a dd it ion al h eli-cop ter hr an s por t a ircra ft u n its .Th e s econ d opt ion wou ld s eem m ore a t-tr act ive if on ly t o r ed u ce t he coor din a tionprob lem s crea ted by th e firs t op t ion .Fu rth er , if, in fa ct , s ir a s s au lt b r iga deswere crea ted to give tbe fi-on t commanderan organic for ce t o in flu e n ce a ct ion d eep erin b is opera t ion a l zon e, it wou ld on ly belogica l t ha t h e a fs o r eceive organic meansfor em ployin g it . ~A s econ d, s om ewh at rela ted fa ctor , cer-

ta in to a ffect a ir a s s a u lt b r igade opera -t ion s in s u pp ort of O.MGS, is a ir s u pp or tin tbe s en s e of fire eu pport an d aer ia lres u pp ly. As n oted p reviou s ly, th e exten -s ive u se of h elicop ters is en vis ion ed bySOviet / t ts rs aw Pa ct m ilita ry a rra fys ts a sa mean s for p rovid in g th e fire s u pport indepth th a t ie vita l to th e eu rviva f ofOMGS and th eir a t ta ch ed a ir a s s a u ltelem en ts , a s well a s th e resu pp ly of th es eu n it s . Propos ed s upport s ch em es in clu detem pora rily b as in g h elicop ter u n it s in th een emys rea r a rea to bet ter a s s is t u nit sopera t in g th ere. Th is is am bit iou s, if n otau da ciou s , p lan nin g to s ay th e lea st .Even a s th e s ir ba t t le ra ges a bove 100

m eter s a t t itu de for con trol of th e sky in a


Cen tra l Eu ropean con flict , a eim ils r con -flict wou ld be waged for con trol of th e 106m eters b en ea th it wh ere h elicop ter forceswou ld n orm afly opera te. It rema in s to bes een wh eth er th e Sot iets wou ld be ab le tocon sis ten tly p roject h elicop ter n ir s u ppor t in opera t ion a l dep th for OMGS anda t ta ch ed u n its wh ich will be dep loyedover s u bs ta n tia l d iet sn ces in th e en em ysrear .

Warsaw Pact OMG advoca tes h ave a l-ready a ckn owledged th a t th e expected s izea ble los s ra te am on g h elicop ters su pport in g OMGs s eem s to h ea fu n ds - m en ta l fa ctor wh en d ecid in g th e cp pa cityof th e ~ou n d forces to opera te in th edepth of th e en emy forma tion s . Th isfa ctor may in deed be th e fu lcrum onwh ich res ts th e opera t ion a l s u cces s offa ilu re of OMGS s uppor ted by s ir a ss au ltbrigades.A th ird qu es tion or fa ctor s ris in gefrom

s ir a ss au lt b riga de op era tion s in . s u pp or tof 0 .!4 Gs is command an d con t rol. Aira ss au lt b riga de elem en ts wou ld p rob ab lybe a s s ign ed in su pport of a rm ies r fivi-s ion ef OMGS hy th e front commander .Fu r th er , t he front wou ld a la o h ave to a lln -ca te a ir lift s u pport for each deta ch ed a ira s s a u lt u n it elth ou gb an army might heable to p rovide it s own fire s u pport if ana ss au lt h elicop ter regim en t is a t ta ch ed .Th e p la nn in g a nd coord in a t ion prob lem sspan nin g th es e ech elon s of com man d a reob viou s , b u t th es e wou ld b e exa cerh a :edeven fu rth er by th e d is tan ces s epa ra tin gthem.Wh ile in it is f opera tion al p lan nin g en dexecu tion m igh t be su cces s fu l,~ a u bee-qu en t opera t ion s wou ld u navoidably bepla n n ed an d con du cted in a flu id en drapid ly ch an gin g com ba t en viron men t.Divis ion al OMGS, if s ucces s fu l in pen e-tra tin g NATOs op era tion a l d efen s e zon e,wou ld be a ttemptin g to coord in a te an dd irect th e opera tion s of th eir forwa rd de-

1983 35


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1

MILITARY REVIEW

ta ch men ts s om e 20 to 40 kilom eters to th efron t, th e opera t ion s of s u pport in g a ira ss au lt u n its eith er on th e a zes of a dva nceor con du ct in g ra ids a s tr ide th em , an d th eopera t ion s of a tta ch ed or s u pport in g a ircover for th e en tire zon e of op era tion s .Will comm an ders of OMGS, forwa rd d e-ta ch men ts , a ir a ss au lt u n its , an d s o for thb e a ble to coord in a te th es e op er at ion s s u c-ces s fu lly? Th e S oviet s r ecogn ize t he p rob -lem bu t a re u n su re of it s s olu tion . Rezn i-ch en ko writes th at :. . . the success of offensive com bat isd irectly d epen den t on th e level of train ingof com m anders and staffs: the lower thatIeuef, th e grea ter mu s t be th e degree ofcen t ra lized con t rol. (Emph a s is a d ded .)zIt is , a t bes t , u n cer ta in wh eth er in -crea sed extern al con trol, if fea sib le con -s id er in g th e locu s of op er at ion s , wou ld en -s u re s u cces s fu l coord in a t ion of th es eu n its a ct ivit ies . In an y ca s e, th is wou ldb e a p rob lem r equ ir in g r es olu t ion t hr ou ghfu rth er refin em en t of th es e typ es of op era -t ions.

Conclusions

Th e a ir a s s au lt b r igade, a s a n ew ele-m en t of th e Soviet force s tru ctu re,r ep res en ts a s ign ifica nt in cr ea se in front-level ca pa bilit ies . Wh er ea s p reviou s ly t h efron t comman der h ad to rely on Min is tryof Defen se/ Gen era l Sta ff-con troRed a ir-born e forces for tm gets m ore th an 20 kilo-m eter s forward of th e FLOT, h e n ow h asa n orga n ic ca pa bility for ver tica l a ss au ltsin to th is h eretofore dead zon e. Th es ebr iga des , with th eir com bin at ion of pa ra -ch u te an d BMD a ss au lt b at ta lion s , com -pen sa te for th e mobility and firepowers hortcom in gs of h eliborn e a ss au lt forcesth at lim ited th e exten t of th eir employ-m en t an d crea ted th is dead zon e.

Wh ile it is u n con firm ed wh eth er a ira s s a u lt b r igades were formed a s a d irectr es u lt of t he OMG con cep ts r es u rr ect ion ,th ey will d efin itely ea se th e im plem en ta -t ion of it s goa ls . Togeth er with oth erSoviet rea r a rea forces , s u ch a s d iver-s ion ary briga des , regu la r a irborn e d ivi-s ion s a nd even KGB (Commit tee of Sta te ISecu rity) s ab oteu re, th es e br iga des exa -cer ba te even fu r th er NATOs b eh in d-th e-Iin es s ecu rity p lan nin g p rob lem s. Withth e addit ion of a ir a s s a u lt b r igades ,Soviet forces a re n ow prepa r in g to con -d uct ver t ica l a ss au lts th rou gh ou t th e fu lld ep th of th ea ter op er at ion s .Th e a ir a ss au lt b riga de is ca pa ble of p er-

form in g a myriad of m is s ion s , bu t, a sm ore opera tion al exp er ien ce is ga in ed , itwill p robab ly en d u p perform in g cer ta ins p ecific t yp es of m is s ion s mor e fr equ e n tlyth an oth ers . Ch ief am on g th ese, pa r t icu -la r ly in su ppor t of OMG opera t ion s ,wou ld b e th e s e;zu re of k ey terra in cr it ica lto a s u cces sfu l a dva nce s u ch a s obs ta cle-cros sin g s it es a nd s o for th .Alth ou gh a ir a s s au lt b r igades a re

poten tia lly r ich in em ploym en t p os sib il-it ies , ezis t in g prob lem s demand a tten -t ion . Th es e in clu de th e sou rce of in it ia la ir lift , s u bs equ en t a ir -d elivered fire s u p-port an d resu pp ly, an d con trol by an dcoord in at ion with su pported m an eu verforces . Th es e a re n ot in sign ifica nt prob-lem s by any mean s , an d it is n ot a t a ll cer-ta in th a t th ey ca n b e s olved s a tis fa ctor ily.Never th eles s , a ir a s sa u lt b r igades

repres en t a fu rth er m an ifes ta t ion of th eS oviet em p h as ie on desant op er at ion s a n dth eir p rojected s ca le in a wa r with NATO.Un like many who a rgu e th a t th e u s e ofa ir bor n e/ a ir a s ea u lt for ces is p a ss 6 , S ovietm ilita ry p lan n ers con t in u e to demon -s tra te con fiden ce in su ch forces . Th e ,.organ iza tion and deploymen t of a ira s sa u lt b r igades a re th e m os t recen t con -firma tion of th ie.

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,.AIR ASSAULT BRIGADES

NOTES, D,cfm.ry f B,,>. M,r,,.ry Term, CA Sow.{ V,,WL S.LW,

WIIO.1OI Documents, uSGOvernm,nl Prrnfrg Otl,ce, Wa,h,nQ10, DC, 1965 067 l.the Sov,elm,l$tar, !ex,con, Oesan,.r,,l.dmg ,.,.,$, ,, Oer, ed ,, -troop, ,lended ., ,Mnd,r,g, C,, Wh,chthaw ,!?.,0 ,anaea. 0. enemy.o.c.!ya temtory. m, me pqm,e(JI cons.ct,ng combat .0.,.,,.s Accocd, ng to lhe tm.,tmr,me!hod,ed, a,and!g force ma beamp.!b,ou, a,rt,oroe 0,.ornb,ned adaCC0rG2.0 10ZtSSa$, ,QOrDOSe sue. alorcemavbeWatwy. ODwat>m:tm lactwa ,

2 The term a,r .S,,UH !m$gade ,s ,t,,mly of Wesler.r< g,.rel,ect!.rja we,,ern uder,,and!.g el, .s,zeand q.,umed,ole ,!IS .? ,W. ho. ,., so!.!.,,1 ,>tom es ,.!1s

3 I Sov Ief mact,ce I., Meat,,, ,., .,,10 t,ne.rr. 3 to 1 S,. Ma, or MIcta.l Cr.tcher. The S0,,,1 A,rborneD,.,,,.. He.,e. 01 the SovCeI GrO. 0 Forces Defense 1I. 11,LI, c, AQency ,DIA), *ash, gto, DC, March

Pr,me.e, Ye vozti.shfio Desa.tnYkh Voysk Mezfi.ovennyyPerma, Voyen.o.fsfor(chesksy Zhur.al tMIIIlarY Wstorlcar Jo.rWl, October 1982, D7227 LCe.@nant General V Rezntche. ho, ,Razvltlye lam?!


18/18

MILITARY REVIEWNasf.mtelno.o Bova,. !Joyen.o I$torrche$rn,y Zn.m.! IMrwa!vH,smr,cal Jo.rnaO, December 1981, D 3728 t. Exercise NEMAN, .ona.cted m 1979. a helrtmrne assault

m se(ze a mm crossI.Q We was Iauncma altertn.dwssonal forward detachment w,?. able to force the r!er from the march 1mmucb as tanks were .01. to s. PDort the crossing by d,fect f!re,th,s .sw3.11 was carr,eo 0.1 very close m aa.a.c,. g Ir,e.alv forces2S! There we. number of ..,13 mat both m Wa.et,me and war

l,me belong exclusively to tn. Sov,et General Sta!f or Stavk.resoectlvely These ..(M mcl.de all vuv lorces, SDec, a SQ.. I,.,l,$lery anti even corrmnea arms rownat!cms Th, s pool of forces wcal, ed ,IIe RGK {Reserves o, the SuPrwne Wgh Conmnand) They.,, CJIII.IIY COmmtlt,o OIY , dve,t ,uDDO,t 0? S,a.k. P1anneO. . . . . . ...=.........=

30 Tne Seuure.1 we, cms.mg Stes m esDec#aw cr,vcal m theE.ro,e8n theater of 0,,,,:,0s Accor d,.. to a 1965 Sov,et Stud,,m.ces ,. thts theater vm.lo encounter waief otmtacles *DO meterswoe every 35 m 60 kilometers 700 m 300 meters w,ae every 100 to150 k,, ometers .0 g,..,., ,.,300 me, er, w,de every 250 to 300, I[orne , e ,,31 For an e..ellent art$cle 0. Sovret rear W,, rn$ssmns am IX

ltc. see C N Do.. + Owrat,ons m me Enemy Rem,, Mt.,a,ro..l Defense Revrew VOl. me 13. Number 1 1980 .. 354132 M!chala. Av,at, on , the Raca Maneuver OP&on, of

Gro.no Forces P.I,s. Art f.,.. e.o Arr Defense Rev!ew, 00 c$t~,33 S.e Krasnaya Zero. (Re. star) 2429 July >979 For . full

anawt!cal account of NCMAN, see R!ctmrd ode., ,, Exerc!seNEMAN, RLW,ew .! me So., et G,mmu Forces, DiA b%?tungton,DC ,,. .,. ?980 5,.36 FO, .xamDIe, during Exerc,5eS NEMAN 79 BROTHE8H000

,N 4RMS 80 and 2APA0 87, hel,borne .ss,,!s were .sed to secure,,.., .,Ossl ... 1., ,0,,,, .,.[0!,,,,0 10.,,s

37 K~s!le. Slaovlen,, ? ! Ra,vrt(ye VO$OU,O Desa!n,khv..,. voveo ls,o,, cr,es,,, Zh. ma, (M>),,.,. tl,.sfor, cal,o;raO, w of $@ 83-84

38 A Shem ..0 R ode., Exerc,se ZAPAD 81. Rem. of fheSowet GroO Force3 L71A, W.s.lbto, D C Alml 1982, P 439 For example, Rezn>che. uo Ra. v,l!ye T.8!!R,

Nast.oaiel .0.. 8.,., VOW... !st.r,cheshv Zh.mal IMslmaryHc.1 20rall 0. 0,[ P 38 .,$te, that the !ncreaseO ,01, 01ows,oal Iorwaro Celachment. t. me Cons.ct of maneuver .Dera,,0s 1, 0, of the mlartan! fa, !O,S m the .Ch,eemel .1 h,Qh D,Ie.sve tempos Lmm Boyev.ye Pr,menenwe Bronelamo.veh (Mekh. ,,rm. a, ti. V..,* V..,.. Is,ortcfies k,, Zhum. Jlwd.r, Hslor,cal Jo.r.. ft, .0 it Chief 0, me him. ovskvA.aLIwny 01 the Tam Forces, note, that the large role PlaYeO byforward deiachme, s I wcmd war 1+has .01 lost [!1s1 swn, f,ca.ceu.uer contemporary CO. akt,ons. See .1s. K$reYe; an-a D-on yen%.,, 0..,, 60,.0.0 Pr?menenfa PSredovhb Otre.o rsho.kfi

(Mehham2,r0aflWM/ KO%WSO. vow... !smrrkshv Z..ia (wJ,I,!arv H,. Iorc.: Journal .O .,1 D 27 ..5 General d 1.. ArmyM KOZ!OV Paz.,lsw Srr.teg,, 10perarmov. Isk.$. tva,, Voyenrm,s,.,,c.,sMvo Z?7UC.1 (Mrl, !a,y tft, for(ca! 30,,0, November19B2, D 144D Re, WhekO R,av(l,ye Takf,ks Nast.oateInou. 80.

/.,0 Is?.nche,hr, Zn.raJ (M,M.W H,$forrcal JOuraI1 0P cft

II 3641 M#chalak, A.,.,,.. m !,. Ilatd Mane.,., 0De,at02nS 01

Ground Forces. Polish Au Fo,ce anti A,r Defense Revle.. 0.0 .,t.Llz42 lb(ti cm 2443 For a full account, see v Atahu s Verlo!etov. Kras.aYa

z.ez.a lRea star), 11 seotember 1983. D 2 W!we .ncertaln. t IS mvQel,ef mat th!s .ss..11 was carried ..! w alr assault brog.deelements The hoops co.d.cl!ng me OPeratm were newr referredto ., ,nOtortz,d rifle troom as ,s often done when de, C,;halak Av>at,on I. the R.,. !4..,.,,, ODW.,,0., of

Gm..a Force,, Polo. Afr t arm .0 Arr Defense Re.,e* on .,:,L13

52 !?e, nk.hen. o Raz,!(e 7,8 I,*, Na, !oa?elno.o Boy,Voemm lSIOrrche$.r, Z/win. ( (Mcl,tery Firstor(cd Journal), o. cc,D 38

Major Roger E. Bert is currently u student atthe US Army Russ inn Znstztuce, Garmwch, WestGermany. He receuxd a B.A J?om Syrrzcum Uni.uersity, an M L.A from Johns Hopkins Uniuepsity and an MA. from Georgetown Unwersity.He has held various command and staf f posi -trons L. Korea and t he C ont nzent al Unitedstates, 1,

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