AGS Masters Thesis

0

Radicalization, Islam, and Web 2.0:

The role of online social networks in the

radicalization of disaffected Muslims in the United

States and United Kingdom

A Thesis

Submitted to the American Graduate School in Paris

In

Partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

Masters of Arts

Christopher Manning Advisor: Joav Toker

Paris, France

April 15, 2011

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Abstract:

The thesis looks at the theory of online social networks as a method whereby disaffected

Muslims living in the United States and United Kingdom are radicalized to carry out acts

of terrorism. The central theory is increasingly; disaffected Muslims are being influenced

and radicalized by material posted on internet forums as put forth by Marc Sageman.

From there they seek to carry out attacks in the West on behalf of Al-Qaeda or other

terror networks. Often, this occurs without direct coordination of the terror network. The

study uses Fuzzy Set/ Qualitative Comparative Analysis to compare 17 cases from the

United States and United Kingdom across 10 criteria. The result from the study is that the

theory explains part of the cases looked at but not all. However the number of cases that

correspond to the theory are increasing.

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Table of Contents

Section I. Statement of the Problem................................................................................ 3

Section II. Literature Review.......................................................................................... 5

Section III: Methodology ................................................................................................. 23

Why use Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis? .............................................. 23

Cases ............................................................................................................................. 25

Criteria and Calibration of Measurement ..................................................................... 36

Section IV: Data and Analysis......................................................................................... 43

Case Selection............................................................................................................... 43

UNITED STATES CASES ........................................................................................... 46

UNITED KINGDOM CASES...................................................................................... 64

Average cases in the United States and United Kingdom............................................. 74

Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 80

Criteria conclusions based on Data........................................................................... 80

Lone Wolf cases ........................................................................................................ 92

Role of Anwar Al-Awlaqi ......................................................................................... 94

How do these results compare with the theory? ....................................................... 99

Section V: Conclusion and Areas for Further Research ............................................ 106

Bibliography ...................................................................................................................111

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Section I. Statement of the Problem

Does the theory of radicalization and recruitment through online social networks

explain homegrown Muslim radicalism in the United States? In the last ten years there

has been a great deal of emphasis placed on terrorism perpetrated by radicals originating

in the Muslim world. With several high profile cases, a new ‘homegrown’ form of

radicals has been identified as a major threat to the West. It is the apex of fears regarding

terrorism that sleeper cells of radicals could already exist within Western societies. The

twist on this comes from the realization that seemingly ordinary Muslims that might have

strong ties to their community might be radicalized to carry out attacks against their

fellow citizens. This is of course, a worst case scenario offered by politicians cynically

working to gain support. Is there any truth to this scenario however? It is commonly

accepted that a process of radicalization does take place that typically ends in an act of

violence. What is this process? Knowing the process and understanding how to develop

countermeasures is at the heart of a successful homeland defense strategy. The wrong

answers to this question will likely have a very damaging effect on society. Among the

various theories of the radicalization process, there exists a theory of radicalization

through online social networks. In this theory, the backbone of the modern global

communication system, the internet, is used by Al-Qaeda to reach disaffected Muslims

deep within the United States. Further, the theory suggests that Al-Qaeda is only

passively involved in the process, thus this is a self-propagating process requiring only

someone to find the material. The implications inherent in this theory will have a

dramatic effect on how the government and law enforcement in many countries approach

the issue of terrorism. The current security dynamic seeks to target individuals and stop

their activities. Known or suspected terrorists would not be able to enter the United States

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or many other Western countries because of their ties to terrorism, however if by simply

uploading content to an internet forum or other online site, then agents can reach into any

country without effort. The focus then becomes entirely based on confronting the ideas

and arguments presented by Al-Qaeda, not only abroad, but at home as well. Additionally

it would make preventing a terrorist attack immensely more difficult as the radicals

would be homegrown and intimately familiar with the culture. The suggestion put forth in

the theory of radicalization and recruitment though online social networks, presents a

destabilizing view of the radicalization process.

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Section II. Literature Review

Although the study of terrorism and its root causes is decades old and filled with

various theories, the phenomena of Muslim radicalism in the Western democracies has

comparatively little study. The main reason being is that the phenomena is relatively new,

being only a decade old. As such the theories used to describe the Muslim radicalism in

the west are pulled from the vast library of theories from the broader study of Islamic

terrorism. Many scholars simply consider Western Muslim radicals the same issue as the

Muslim radicals in the Middle East. However, there are fundamental differences between

the lifestyle in the West and in the Middle East. The Muslims that are radicalized in the

West have far more in common with the average Westerner than they do with an average

Middle Easterner. As such there needs to be greater scholarship on this issue. Dr. Marc

Sageman’s work is one of the few theories in this field that seek to build away from

reusing theories from the broader study of Islamic terrorism.

Any question dealing with Muslim Radicalization and recruitment in the Western

Democracies has two readily identifiable variables. The first of these being what causes

radicalization? The second being how are they radicalized and recruited? These are the

two major variables. In order to most effectively test the radicalization and recruitment

portion, it is necessary to remove the first variable, in this case by making an assumption

as a means of establishing a fixed point. Therefore, the initial cause is assumed as

Islamophobia, alienation, or some other factor leading to a break between a potential

radical Muslim and the general society in which they live.

As the assumption has been made as to the initial cause of a subject to pursue radical

violent Islam, the remaining variable is the process by which radicalization occurs. As

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with the question of root causation, there are many theories as to the process by which an

individual with a seemingly ordinary background is radicalized to commit acts of

terrorism. Given the assumed root cause, there is naturally a substantial amount of

correlation between the theories, however there is notably a great deal of divergence even

around issues of when the radicalization process actually starts and whether or not

‘process’ is the most accurate term. With regards to the similarities, a basic process

becomes evident. In this process, there is a trigger which leads to a dedication to

extremist philosophy; this philosophy is connected to personal experience, subsequently

leading to allying with other radicals and finally pursuit of violent action. Each theory

while a unique variation on this pattern does not stray far from this basic model.

Transformative Learning process is a theory put forth by several scholars and

describes, “sustained behavioral changes occurring when critical reflection and the

development of novel personal belief systems are provoked by specific triggering

factors”1. Like most other theories of radicalization, there is a critical spark that begins

the process of radicalization and represents a demarcation in the life of an individual

towards violent radicalism. This theory draws on work in the field of adult education

conducted by Jack Mezirow on how education produces a significant change in adults.2

By drawing on theories of how substantial experiences in education can radically alter an

individual’s outlook on the world, it is possible to extrapolate on a how a process to

radicalize would take place. In this theory the focus is on the transformation of cognitive

constructions rather than actual steps. Drawing a key difference between many other

1 Alex S. Wilner and Claire Jehanne Dubouloz, "Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: an

Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization," Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly

Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 22, no. 1 (2010): 33-51. 2 Ibid.

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processes, here the focus is primarily on the mind of the individual undergoing

radicalization, where as other theories explored here focus more on the outward actions.

Despite the novel approach of looking primarily on internal rather than external events,

this theory has not gained as strong a backing as other theories likely because of the

inherent difficulties in proving what precisely is going on in the consciousness or sub-

consciousness of someone being radicalized. In order to arrive at this theory, it would be

necessary to find some way of establishing what a particular radical is thinking. As

interviews during the process are not practical, it is necessary to conduct interviews after

an individual has been detained, or surmise the internal process from external

demonstration. Either method lacks a means of direct study and thus is reliant almost

entirely on circumstantial evidence. As an internal process cognitive constructions are

formed by the mind consciously and often manifested as an outward behavior. This is

reflected in the definition of radicalization given by Wilner and Dubouloz as a, “personal

process in which individuals adopt extreme political, social, and/ or religious ideals and

aspirations, and where the attainment of particular goals justify the use of indiscriminate

violence.”3 The core principles of the theory are,

(1) Meaning Schemes – The specific beliefs, judgments, feelings, and attitudes

which act as a frame of reference in determining personal meaning and

perceptions of experiences. They are observable in behaviour and verbal

interaction;

(2) Meaning Perspectives – A structure of assumptions, based on meaning

schemes, that exist within the learner and filter perceptions and shape

comprehension of new experiences;

(3) Distortions – Meaning perspectives that no longer fit the individual’s current

reality;

(4) Critical Reflection – The ability to critically reflect on these distortions.

Reflection begins with a disorienting dilemma triggered by crises (e.g. personal

3 Alex S. Wilner and Claire Jehanne Dubouloz, "Homegrown Terrorism and Transformative Learning: an

Interdisciplinary Approach to Understanding Radicalization," Global Change, Peace & Security: formerly

Pacifica Review: Peace, Security & Global Change 22, no. 1 (2010): 33-51.. pg 38

8

loss, conflict, illness);

(5) Process of Transformation – An evolution or personal change that can be

either abrupt or gradual.4

The theory contains many of the same elements that are present in other theories of

radicalization however, what is unique here is that all of the emphasis of radicalization is

placed entirely in the mental process. Only the last two elements, critical reflection, and

process of transformation acknowledge the existence of events before and after the

mental process. Critical reflection, as noted, requires a major personal crisis that then

triggers the critical reflection. However, this crisis can happen at any point during

radicalization. In other theories, such as that put forth by researchers from the New York

Police Department detailed later, this crisis is the trigger for the process of radicalization.

Most other theories include this element as the reason why radicalization is a relatively

rare occurrence. The last component, process of transformation, is more like an

overarching construct that describes the entire process of radicalization. The sub-

components of this component; trigger, changing, outcome, coupled with the other

components make this theory supportive of the basic model of radicalization put forth

above. The unique offering of Transformative Learning Theory then is the closer focus on

the internal mental factors that alter the individual’s world outlook through cognitive

constructions.

Where proponents of this theory disagree with other theories is in the elements of

immediate causes leading to radicalization. Wilner and Dubouloz suggest that not all

homegrown radicals are unembracing of local culture. They point out that in a few cases

of homegrown terrorism, subjects enjoyed local cuisine such as fish and chips in Britain

while watching a sporting event. However, such an action does not necessarily indicate

4 Ibid.

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that individuals feel completely accepted by the greater society. Indeed there is no better

way to avoid suspicion than to blend into the larger population as best one can. While the

process suggests a strong element of religious ideology, proponents are quick to point out

that this should not convey a belief that the ideology is truly a form of Islam. Indeed

Wilner and Dubouloz indicate that western radicals are simply violent misfits and not

religious scholars or true foreign policy scholars. Islam is corrupted here to be used as a

justification for the action and not as an actual cause or guide. The same is true of the

complaints from violent radicals about foreign policy. The foreign policy of some

Western nations against Muslim countries is used as an excuse for the actions of the

Radicals, a means of justifying their actions to make them seem legitimate, not as a real

catalyst for the attacks.

The adherence to a gradual process is reflected again in the Psychological Process

Theory. Proponents of this theory such as John Horgan argue that focusing on root causes

or profiles of would-be radicals serves only to discriminate and does little to address the

issue of radicalism. Instead Horgan argues forgoing the search for cause and focus solely

on the process5. Identified are three phases of the process, becoming involved, being

involved, and disengaging. This is a variant on the basic process outlined above in that

the element of disengaging suggests a post-radicalization step. Horgan’s work looked at

radicalization and terrorism in a broader view which went beyond Western Muslim

Radicals. In his study he looked at the Irish Republican Army and Ulster Defence

Association among other groups. While there is of course no opportunity for

5 John Horgan, "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives From Psychology on

Radicalization into Terrorism," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618,

no. 1 (2008): 80-94.

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disengagement for a suicide bomber, such a step does have implications for a de-

radicalization program as a means of counterterrorism. The first two phases becoming

involved and being involved are a simplified version of the same process that is shared

among most theories. Horgan and other proponents of the Psychological Process Theory

focus on the transitions between these phases.

Even within this theory there is much debate as to the usefulness of profiles for

understanding radicals and potential radicals. Horgan steadfastly disagrees with profiles

as a profile only describes those that have already been identified and do not detect those

that do not share the demographic tags. By focusing on profiles, it distracts from the real

issues which are the process. Another proponent of this theory, Andrew Silke, suggests

that profiles can help create a readily understandable concept. Silke offers a rough profile

of a potential radical based on the commonalities of those that have already been

identified. His profile of a potential radical matches with the profile suggest by Mitchell

Silber and Arvin Bhatt of the NYPD. This would seem to illustrate Horgan’s point that

efforts have been made to create a profile of a potential radical, which is only accurate

until a radical is discovered who does not fit the profile. Additionally, the potential exists

for misuse of this profile, although notably Silber and Bhatt caution against seeing the

profile as an active tool.

Most notable about the Psychological Process Theory of radicalization, is the

identified risk factors; emotional vulnerability, dissatisfaction with current activity,

identification with victims, seeing engaging in violence as not being immoral, belief in a

reward for actions, and kinship with others in similar position6. Though Horgan does not

6 John Horgan, "From Profiles to Pathways and Roots to Routes: Perspectives From Psychology on

Radicalization into Terrorism," The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618,

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specifically focus on Muslim radicalization, Silke does focus on Muslim radicalization in

his work and presents the same factors.7 Emotional vulnerability refers to the subject

being alienated or culturally displaced. Both Horgan and Silke suggest this separation

from the larger society as the result of discrimination or racism. In identifying

dissatisfaction with current activity as a risk factor, Horgan is referring to current activity

as peaceful, political approach to deal with issues. The dissatisfaction comes as a result of

an individual’s inability to achieve a redress of grievances in an open and democratic

society. Identifying with victims refers to the subject seeing themselves as part of a larger

International Muslim community, the Umma. The significance here is if a subject sees

themselves as part of the Umma, then anything that happens to Muslims abroad whether

in Kashmir, Chechnya, Iraq, or Palestine, it is an issue that all Muslims must address.

This is a point of disagreement with Wilner and Dubouloz and the proponents of

Transformative Learning Theory. Here foreign policy issues are important to the process

of radicalization, they serve as a point by which a subject can see the plight of Muslims in

a far off land and recognize their own perceived plight at home. This would be part of

what Silke describes as the catalyst events or perceived injustice. During the process of

radicalization, the subject comes to view violence as being justified and a reasonable

course of actions. When it is coupled with the belief that there will be personal rewards

either in this life or the next, that natural barrier against mass violence is all but

eliminated and a subject will often be eager to carry out an act of violence. Finding

kinship with others in a similar position, or as Silke puts it, opportunity and recruitment is

no. 1 (2008): 80-94. 7 Andrew Silke, "Holy Warriors: Exploring the Psychological Processes of Jihadi Radicalization,"

European Journal of Criminology 5, no. 1 (2008): 99-123.

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usually the final step by which the subject is radicalized to the point that it is now

possible to plan and carry out acts of violence against the general population.

The New York Police Department following the September 11th

attacks spent

considerable resources in understanding and combating the threat of homegrown

extremist violence. Mitchell Silber and Arvin Bhatt of the NYPD Intelligence Division

put together a report in 2007 that has largely become the consensus view of the

radicalization process in governments within the United States and elsewhere8. Silber and

Bhatt lay out a four step radicalization process that is common across several cases both

within and without the United States. The first step is Pre-Radicalization. This is the stage

prior to any radicalization. A subject may have thought about radical Islam or violence in

general, but has made no real effort to act on it or identify on these ideas. In some cases

the subject does not even see themselves as particularly religious. The second step is Self-

Identification. Here a subject has a personal event; it could be the death of loved one, a

particularly disturbing experience of racism or discrimination, or some other stimulus.

Silber and Bhatt suggest that this could be; economic, such as losing a job or the inability

to find one; social, seeing oneself as separated from the larger population; Political,

possibly feeling discriminated against because of government action that is perceived to

be anti-Muslim; or Personal. The third phase is Indoctrination. Now that the subject has

identified a reason for radicalizing, this step begins the process whereby they identify

with extremist views. Silber and Bhatt identify this guiding framework as originating

with the Salafi-Jihadist Ideology. This theory focuses a great deal of attention on the

ideology angle where the religious principles of an extreme sect of Islam becomes the

8 Silber, Mitchell D. and Bhatt, Arvin. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Theat. 2007. New York

City, New York City Police Department.

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driving factor in the life of the radical. This is one of the few theories that put so much

emphasis on the religious aspect of the radicalization process. This phase is led by a

strong figure either a religious figure or a fellow radical that is particularly charismatic

and motivating. The final stage is Jihadization. This phase is where planning and

operationalizing of an attack happens. The last stage is where the NYPD identifies as the

demarcation between homegrown groups that carry out attacks and groups that fail to do

so either through lack of resources or logistic capability. Jihadization is also where law

enforcement is able to intervene as most of the previous steps do not require that any laws

be broken. Several of the cases looked at in Silber and Bhatt’s study were intercepted at

this point and show how the individual groups or cells worked to plan and carry out an

attack. 9

As with all the other theories, Silber and Bhatt identify a trigger as being the point at

which a subject begins the radicalization process. What is unique among the theories here

is the Indoctrination phase where a subject begins following the ideology of Salafi-

Jihadism. Other theories such as Transformative Learning Theory and that of Social

Network/ ‘Leaderless Jihad’ Theory of Marc Sageman, identify that religion does play an

element but is more peripheral, used as a means of permitting violence rather than a

driving factor. This element is something that is clearly at odds with the argument put

forth by Wilner and Dubouloz as the later suggests that radicals continue to embrace

elements of the local culture while Silber and Bhatt indicate that through adherence to

religious ideology, the radicals are becoming increasingly separate from even the local

Muslim communities. As a report directed towards law enforcement and

9 Silber, Mitchell D. and Bhatt, Arvin. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Theat. 2007. New York

City, New York City Police Department.

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counterterrorism, there is an emphasis at working with local Muslim communities to

identify those that might pose a threat. This study also emphasizes the role of

Islamophobia both as catalyst for radicalization and as a hindrance for law enforcement

to intervene before the completion of the Jihadization phase. Islamophobia is seen in both

of the other theories presented but is not singled out. In the issue of homegrown Muslim

radicalism in the West, the role of Islamophobia is seen at almost every stage in the

process detailed by Silber and Bhatt. It is ignored by the subject in the Pre-Radicalization

phase, a likely trigger at the Self-Identification phase, and proof of Western hostility in

the indoctrination phase, and perpetuated as a result of the Jihadization phase as well as a

hindrance to law enforcement efforts within the Muslim community.

The theory that through the internet Al-Qaeda is able to recruit Muslims from

anywhere in the world, especially the West, through online social networks is another

theory that is presented to explain this phenomenon. This theory was put forth by Marc

Sageman, a scholar at the University of Pennsylvania. Marc Sageman's theory establishes

the Islamic radicals in the West as part of the larger network10

. His theory is that the

radicalization of Muslims is comprised of four major components;

(1) Sense of moral outrage,

(2) a specific interpretation of the world,

(3) resonance with personal experience, and

(4) mobilization through networks.11

The unique principle of his view of networks such as Al-Qaeda, is after numerous

battlefield loses in Afghanistan, they have moved to recruitment over the Internet

establishing the leaders as being more figurehead than true coordinating leader. This

10 Marc Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists," The ANNALS of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 223-231. 11

Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century 1st ed. (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

15

theory connects terrorists from the London Underground Bombing with the Madrid

Bombers and various other Muslim radicals in the West that have claimed ties with Al-

Qaeda. As part of the larger picture, Sageman also used computers calculating fractal

designs to demonstrate connections between Al-Qaeda and numerous other Islamic terror

networks in a massive Islamic network that he and Christopher Yang have labeled the

'Global Salafi Jihad'12

. The online recruitment he describes generates the necessary 'sense

of moral outrage' through images and video of violence being inflicted on Muslims

around the world. Before the Iraq War, this meant the attacks on Muslims in the Balkans,

in Chechnya, or in Gaza and the West Bank, now there are images from Iraq,

Afghanistan, Pakistan, and more. These methods aim to create a sense of connection

between the viewer and the victim and a sense of a global Muslim community where the

victimization of one is a victimization of all. Sageman's views on those that are recruited

in this way are very dismissive. Sageman notes that, "Terrorists are young people seeking

fame and thrills." These new radicals that comprise the new face of Al-Qaeda in the

Western democracies are described by Sageman as "relatively small group of mostly

young people, who aspire or belong to a violent social movement that uses violence

against civilians for political ends in the name of their version of Islam."13

In an

interesting duel of concepts, he states that trying to understand the ideology of terrorists

is an exercise that is useless as the terrorists are themselves not focused on ideology of

Islamic theology or of a global Islamic Theocracy; they are motivated by strong feelings

and emotions of anger and outrage. This runs counter to the commonly held belief that

12 Christopher C. Yang and Marc Sageman, "Analysis of Terrorist Social Networks With Fractal

Views," Journal of Information Science 35 (2009): 299.

13 Marc Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists," The ANNALS of the

American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 223-231. Pg. 224

16

these are Islamic fundamentalists motivated by religious fervor. To counter the images

presented by extremists over the Internet, Sageman points to the promotion of national

unity and national character. In his testimony to the United States Senate Committee on

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, he acknowledged two very clear

differences between the United States and Europe14

. The first is that the United States

unlike Europe is formed on the history of immigration and is a 'melting pot' of ethnicities

with a focus of inclusion and assimilation. Europe in contrast, is founded on ethnic

identities. In the Netherlands, the national identity is based on Dutch ethnicity, in

Germany it's German ethnicity, in Italy it's Italian, thus having an identity that is based on

an ethnicity sets up a system where immigrants who do not share the common ethnicity

of the population, are excluded. The second point that he made is role of the American

Dream. The American Dream is one of individualism, striving, and achieving based on

personal skills and abilities. His testimony references findings made by the Pew Research

Center about Muslim Americans, in particular, the center reports that 71% of Muslim

Americans believe in the American Dream, the need to work hard, and on the equal

chance for success15

. This sense of individuality that is part of the American Identity is an

oppositional force to the pull of the collectivism that is offered by the recruitment

conducted on-line by Al-Qaeda. He points to Europe as a key example of a collection of

states with strong welfare programs. These programs are a key reason Muslim

Radicalization is seen more in Europe than in the United States. In his 2008 book,

Sageman writes of how low-skilled Muslims flocked to Europe for work after World War

14 Sageman, Marc. Radicalization of Global Islamist Terrorists. 6-27-0007. United States Senate

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

15 Pew Research Center. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream. 5-22-2007.

Pew Research Center.

17

II helping to rebuild the countries devastated by the war16

. These Muslims key

contribution to the employment market was labor, as such once the need for large

numbers of laborers was over, they were left without work. The discrimination in

European cities made it very difficult if not impossible for the Muslim laborers and their

children to attain the necessary education to thrive. The contrast he offers is the United

States, where Muslims did not have the severe discrimination that was in Europe, as such

they were able to become doctors, engineers, and achieve a much higher income and

standard of living. In the modern Western world, Europe is a post-industrial society much

like the United States. However, as noted, the Muslims in the United States are mostly

trained for such a system where as in Europe they are mostly not. Thus in Europe, high

discrimination in the job market and high unemployment has led to a high number of

Muslims on welfare. Sageman sees this as a threat as the unemployed Muslims in Europe

have both large amounts of time to think about jihad, the anger to consider it, and the

funds necessary to put a plan into action.

Bruce Hoffman offers a severe critique of Sageman's theory suggesting that the

examples that he uses in his book are wild mischaracterizations of historical events or,

"employs historically groundless parallels in order to bolster his case that

today's terrorist threat is an exclusively bottom-up phenomenon. The Irish

Republican Army did not, as Leaderless Jihad maintains, begin "in a pub

in Boston" and cross "the ocean to Ireland during World War I." The IRA

was the product of a series of underground associations that were formed

in Ireland in the eighteenth century, migrated to the United States in the

middle of the following century, and then gave rise to the terrorist

campaigns of various successive organizations, such as the Irish

Revolutionary Brotherhood, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, the Fenian

Brotherhood, and Clan na Gael.17

"

16 Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century 1st ed.

(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

17 Bruce Hoffman, "The Myth of Grass-Roots Terrorism," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 3 (2008): 133-138.

18

Hoffman also criticizes his dismissing with little explanation; numerous U.S. government

intelligence reports that suggest that Al-Qaeda is still a major threat to the United States.

This assessment is also backed up by recent British intelligence agencies, as well as past

British and American reports. Instead of the what governments and scholars consider a

clear threat, Sageman focuses on the self-starting groups that are inspired by online Al-

Qaeda recruitment tools, a threat Sageman himself describes as just "a bunch of guys".

The key criticisms Hoffman makes on Sageman's book, are that the empirical data is

almost non-existent to support the claims he is making. The data profiles presented by

Sageman are far too small to support the generalizations he attempts to make. In addition

to the lack of data, Hoffman points out the theoretical models used, and their descriptions

suggest that in fact Sageman has very little understanding of what they are. In the

subsequent issue18

, Sageman responds to Hoffman's criticisms as vastly

mischaracterized19

and that Hoffman bases his criticisms on evidence from political

reports and secondary sources rather than the primary source material. He sees his

theories of a new grass-roots jihad movement spread by the Internet as a paradigm shift

in the approach of terrorism, and Hoffman's criticisms are indicative of a lack of

understanding. In the same issue, Hoffman responds to Sageman's response and reiterates

that the he lacks the data to back his suggestions. In regards to the grass-roots operations

in London in 2005 and elsewhere, Hoffman notes that these attacks still had guidance and

assistance from the 'central command' of Al-Qaeda. David Tucker critiques both Sageman

and Hoffmans' criticisms in his article stating that Sageman does acknowledge that grass-

18 Marc Sageman and Bruce Hoffman, "Does Osama Still Call the Shots?," Foreign Affairs 87, no. 4

(2008): 163-166.

19 Sageman states in reference to Hoffman's critique, "These rules do not condone taking quotes out

of context and building a straw man through gross misrepresentation and then subjecting him to a hatchet

job."

19

roots terrorism is not the sole threat facing the United States and the West and that many

attempts that have been made by such local terror groups have not yielded substantial

results20

. However, he also notes that those that have had deadly results have had strong

assistance from the formal Al-Qaeda members. Tucker also questions Sageman's

understanding of on-line social networks, he suggests that the social networks that exist

on-line cannot yield the results that Sageman describes without also having in person

meetings. Such a logistical element would make the premise of Sageman's theory not

impossible but very difficult and subject to frequent failure.

Unlike other issues in international relations such as nuclear deterrence, state

development, or even causes of terrorism in general, the theories centered on Homegrown

Islamic radicalization are essentially the same. The major differences arise in the scope of

the threat. Some such as Hoffman claim that this new threat from online radicalization is

insignificant. They point out that Al-Qaeda is still very much involved in the planning

and operations of major attacks. A key component to this theory is that the skill and

ability to make a bomb or other explosive device, is not really communicable through

reading either in a book or on the internet. Michael Kenney describes this as ‘Techne’

versus ‘Metis’.21

The terms come from the Greek terms for technical knowledge, ‘techne’

which might be learned from a book or online source, and ‘metis’ meaning experiential

knowledge, that which is learned through practice or experience. Kenney argues that

bomb making and terror attacks in general are an example of ‘metis’ and require the

experience of someone who has prior training. While some things could be learned over

20 David Tucker, "Jihad Dramatically Transformed? Sageman on Jihad and the Internet," Homeland

Security Affairs 6, no. 1 (2010). 21

Michael Kenney, "Beyond the Internet: Metis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for

Islamist Terrorists," Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (2010): 177-197.

20

the internet, the key skills of how to create the bomb cannot. It is this reason that online

radicalization is not a true threat in the sense that real attacks will not come solely from

an online source. This is not to say that there is no appreciation for the online elements,

on the contrary, even those scholars such as Hoffman and Kenney that believe the threat

is over hyped, recognize that the increase in online activity is a shift. What is different is

the magnitude of change that is represented by the online component. Kenney

emphasizes the importance of practical training through the notion of guerilla warfare. A

major gap in this theory is the example of Richard Reid who by all accounts had training

with Al-Qaeda and was in fact himself an Al-Qaeda operative, and the cell that carried

out the July 7th

, 2005 attacks in London. Reid had the training and had the skill to create a

shoe bomb which he could then bring aboard an airplane. That skill and practical

knowledge did not allow him to be successful in his attempt. In contrast, the July 7th

cell

had no training from Al-Qaeda. They were able to accomplish their objectives without the

assistance of the established network of Al-Qaeda or other group. Here we see a major

issue with the metis/ techne argument, a bomb does not need to be complex to be deadly.

While it is true that some cases such as the example of the attempted bombing in Exeter

where a man attempted to set off a bomb which failed to explode demonstrates the value

of practical expertise, the Exeter bomber did not have any real world training, it does not

explain a case such as the Time Square Bomber. That bomb also did not detonate,

although the bomber may have had training while in tribal regions in Pakistan. Another

example is Roshonara Choudhry’s attack on MP Tibbs in the United Kingdom. Choudhry,

who was radicalized through online sources, used a knife to stab MP Timms. It was a

simple attack that required little planning and likely did not require any practical

21

knowledge. This is an example of online radicalization that is not accounted for by

scholars such as Kenney. An attack does not need to be large; it can be small such as

Choudhry’s attack or the attack on filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, who was assassinated by

Islamic radicals in the Netherlands for his criticism of Islam. Often a simple attack on a

high profile individual can have a disproportionately large impact.

The scholars that stress the importance of this new online shift emphasize the

nature of online social networks ability to reach audiences in diverse areas of the globe.

One scholar, Evan Kohlmann, points out that,

“The realities of a globalized society now allow international terrorist

organizations like al Qaeda to dramatically expand their potential reach

by courting sympathizers in dark corners around the world and teaching

them how they can best serve al Qaeda’s interests—without necessarily

visiting an actual military training camp or even speaking directly with al

Qaeda. In fact, despite their somewhat haphazard outward appearance,

homegrown terrorist cells often possess a remarkable shared connection

through reliance on particular al Qaeda training manuals, audio and

video recordings, and even Internet chat forums. While these young men

(and, increasingly, women) may have no formal contact with any terrorist

organization, they can become virtual partners of al Qaeda by carefully

studying its online knowledge base and executing terrorist attacks against

its enemies.”22

Those that emphasize the threat posed by the combination of Islamic Terrorism and

online social networks point to this element of being able to reach a distant audience.

Without an online component, networks like Al-Qaeda would need to deploy a member

into a country to personally connect and recruit potential members. By using the internet

and online social networks, then radicals can reach out across the virtual landscape and

allow their rhetoric to reach into small pockets in distant countries and connect with

radicals. The biggest threat seen by scholars such as Kohlmann and Sageman, is the

22

Evan F. Kohlmann, ""Homegrown" Terrorists: Theory and Cases in the War on Terror's Newest Front,"

The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 95-109.

22

possibility that an attack can come from any vector, thus making the job of law

enforcement and national defense that much harder.

Neither side is really discounting the notion that the use of online social networks

by terrorists is a new threat that can make the difficult job of stopping attacks that much

harder, what is argued is to what degree that threat enhanced by online social networks.

The side of Hoffman, Kenney, and others suggest that there is real practical knowledge

that is needed to carry out a successful attack. While Sageman, Kohlmann, and others

argue that the broad reaching capabilities of the internet has the capacity to radicalize a

much wider range of individuals than before. What remains is a close examination of real

world examples to explore what the real impact or role of online social networks are.

From the period of 2001-2010 there are a number of cases around the world that fit into

the category of homegrown Islamic radicalism. The cases looked at here are all from the

United States or United Kingdom. The emphasis in this study is to examine which

elements are present in the cases. The goal of the study is to identify what can be

determined of the nature of this phenomenon.

23

Section III: Methodology

Why use Fuzzy Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis?

This study makes use of a methodology described as ‘fuzzy set qualitative

comparative analysis. As suggested in the title, there is a relationship between this and

qualitative comparative analysis. Traditional qualitative comparative analysis focuses on

a handful of cases which are then compared using a set of criteria. The result is binary

with either a case has membership in the group or it does not. This can be used then to

ascribe a score with 0 representing a lack of membership in a certain criteria group or 1

representing membership in that criteria group. The limitation then is obvious, as the

results can show only absolutes. Most cases however, do not easily fit into such a

dichotomy and thus there is need to show diversity while still being able compare cases.

The solution used here is fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis.

The term fuzzy set comes from the fact that the methodology allows partial

membership in a criteria group. While still maintaining the scheme of 0 representing lack

of membership and 1 representing full membership, there is now an allowance for cases

to exist between the two. This partial membership is reflected by a decimal number and

thus not fully 1 and not fully 0. The importance is that now cases can be compared and

their inherent diversity can be demonstrated as well. An example of this would be a study

of influential political commentators. In looking to see what variables lead to an

influential status in political commentating, one might identify a variable such as ‘years

of education’23

. In a standard crisp set qualitative comparative analysis, it would only be

possible to show full membership or none. Thus one would either have years of education

23

This is based on an example given by the Professor Charles Ragin of the University of Arizona.

24

or not. However someone who has completed a college degree and someone who has

completed a doctorate cannot be said to have the same level of expertise. Both have years

of education but one has far more years than the other. In fuzzy set qualitative

comparative analysis, some one with fewer years of education might be ranked with a .3

and the person with the completed doctorate would likely be ranked with a 1. This then

reflects that the person who has years of education and attained a college degree is part of

the group criteria ‘years of education’ but not to the same degree.

Because a commonly agreed on calibration of measurement does not exist for

something such as membership in a criteria group, ‘spontaneous formulation of an attack

plan’, it is necessary to explain how a case is measured to have a level of membership or

not. The exact calibrations of measurement used in this study will be discussed in

specifics further in this chapter. The basics however, are based on the Indirect Method of

Calibration described by Charles Ragin24

. This approach allows for ranking based on how

close a case is to the two absolutes, membership and non-membership. A general example

given in Ragin’s paper is:

(a) in the target set (membership = 1.0)

(b) mostly but not fully in the target set (membership =0.8)

(c) more in than out of the target set (membership = 0.6)

(d) more out than in the target set (membership = 0.4)

(e) mostly but not fully out of the target set (membership = 0.2), and

(f) out of the target set (membership = 0.0

As shown here, it is not necessary to have absolute terms of measurement. Instead this is

a method of measuring where a case would be in relation to two other points.

24

Charles C. Ragin, "Fuzzy Sets: Calibration Versus Measurement," Available from

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.87.6568&rep=rep1&type=pdf.

25

Cases

The cases looked at come from both the United Kingdom and the United States.

These two countries are looked at because of the similarities between the two. Perhaps

the most obvious similarity is the language that both nations share. While some notable

differences in the specific words do exist, at basic level both countries have the same

language. Closely related is the similarities in culture that is shared by both the United

States and the United Kingdom. The historical links between the two nations are many

and the forms of government in addition to the basic tenants of laws are common to both

nations. Beyond the civic and cultural similarities, there is the common technology

element. As both share a common language, the online social networks and indeed nearly

all the online media that is available to one is available to the other. For this study this is

important for obvious reasons. The material that would radicalize those in one nation is

the same material that is available just as easily in the other. Thus this variable can be

considered a constant in both cases insofar as actual content is available it can be

assumed that as long as the material had been created at that point, then potential radicals

in both countries should have access to that material.

Additionally the issue of participation in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan are also

constants in this study. The United States while having the distinction of leading both

wars is followed closely by the United Kingdom in terms of military support and rhetoric.

This has begun to change in recent years, however the legacy of those policies remain.

Additionally this study looks at cases ranging from 2001 to 2010 and as such many of the

cases looked at have been affected by the two wars and the involvement of the United

States and United Kingdom. Distinctions are also made between the involvement of the

26

United States and the United Kingdom.

There are differences as well between the two countries. These differences are

what can; in part explain the significant differences between the British experience of

homegrown Islamic terrorism and American homegrown Islamic terrorism. First, and

perhaps the biggest difference between the United Kingdom and the United States is the

relative proximity to the Muslim world. While both countries are insulated by bodies of

water, the United States is insulated by two oceans where as the United Kingdom is

separated from Europe by only the English Channel. Thus it is far easier to reach the

United Kingdom than the United States from the Muslim world. While this is not as

critical in the study of online elements, it is a critical factor when one considers a

radical’s potential options to travel abroad in search of training or Jihad. If one has the

option to form a real-world bond with radical elements, it is logical to assume that they

will. Thus it would be reasonable to expect that those radicalized in the United Kingdom

would be able to reach either Afghanistan or Pakistan easier than those in the United

States.

Closely related to the issue of proximity, is the history of Muslim immigration

patterns to the United States and the United Kingdom. After the Second World War, a

devastated Europe welcomed Muslim laborers to help rebuild. After the rebuilding, the

Muslim laborers were seen as a threat to British, French, and German laborers.

Subsequently, discrimination led to the marginalization of Muslims in Europe. Most live

on the outskirts of cities and face little opportunity for advancement.25

In the United

States, the vast majority of Muslims have immigrated to the United States because of the

25

Sageman, Marc. Radicalization of Global Islamist Terrorists. 6-27-0007. United States Senate

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.

27

opportunities they seek. A Pew Research poll indicated that the majority of Muslim

immigrants to the United States have advanced degrees and/or strong trade skills26

. In

contrast to the Muslims in the United Kingdom, the Muslims in the United States have

the skills and background to be competitive in the American job market. Subsequently,

their children will have the opportunity to attain an education and make the connections

that will enable them to find employment.27

In order to test the theory of radicalization through online social networks, it is

important to look to the cases that have been discovered by the authorities both in the

United States and in the United Kingdom. These have been discovered either through

interdiction by law enforcement, or by tragedy in the wake of a successful attack. All of

the cases have been discovered in the years since the attacks of September 11th

in the

United States. The reasoning for this is twofold, one being that the issue of Muslim

terrorism in the West was not seen as a real threat until after 2001, secondly online social

networks did not really develop into a major force until after 2003. This is the year when

the popular online social network ‘Facebook’ started. While the online social networks

have most likely progressed in terms of sophistication and accessibility since the early

2000s, the early forms of whatever social network might have been used are still

important especially if it is shown there is an increase in plots where the perpetrators

have become radicalized via the internet.

The cases chosen for this thesis are made up of groups of various sizes. In some cases the

group refers to only one individual. It is important to note here that even a group where

the population, that is the suspected terrorists, equals one it is still a group. It is important

26

Pew Research Center. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream. 5-22-2007. Pew

Research Center. 27

Ibid.

28

to include groups where there are several suspected terrorists and groups where there

might only be one to see whether group size has an effect or is an indicator of

radicalization process. There are notably fewer cases from the United Kingdom in part

because of the emphasis in the United Kingdom of maintaining secrecy in cases of

suspected terrorism. This in addition to the number of arrests made that have proven to be

a mistake, have led the authorities in the United Kingdom to be less likely to reveal data

on their suspects. Those that have been tried or those that carried out successful attacks,

are not as difficult to obtain data on however.

In the United States there are ten cases that are looked at. These cases range from

the 2002 case of the ‘Buffalo Six’ to the 2010 case of Faisal Shahzad who tried to blow

up a car in Times Square in New York City. These cases have groups of different sizes

from one member to five or six. Most of those in the case are US citizens having been

born in the United States or having become naturalized citizens. In some of the cases, the

suspects converted to Islam just before beginning their process of radicalization.

The first case chosen here is that of Faisal Shahzad. Mr. Shahzad in 2010 failed in

an attempt to set off a bomb packed in an SUV in Times Square. The bomb was made up

of propane tanks, fireworks, and two 5 gallon gas containers along with wire and

clocks.28

The attempt was noticed by local street merchants when the SUV began to emit

smoke and the merchants notified a NYPD officer who was nearby. When the bomb in

the car began to detonate, it malfunctioned and all that happened was a series of small

noises from the vehicle.29

The terrorist, Mr. Shahzad, was discovered to have perpetrated

28

Alexandra Frean, "Unexploded Car Bomb in Times Square 'amateurish one-off' Terrorism Attempt," The

Times, 2 May 2010. 29

Al Baker and William K. Rashbaum, "Police Find Car Bomb in Times Square," The New York Times, 2

May 2010.

29

the attack with support from the Taliban sect in Pakistan. With their funding and training,

he plotted and carried out the attack.30

Next is the case of Mohamed Osman Mohamud who in late 2010 attempted to

carry out a car bombing of the Christmas tree lighting ceremony in Portland, Oregon. Mr.

Mohamud attempted to detonate a bomb in the center of Portland where the town had

gathered for the annual lighting of their Christmas tree. The bomb was in fact a fake

supplied to Mr. Mohamud by Federal agents as part of a six-month sting operation.31

Following the failed attack, Mr. Mohamud was arrested and charged with attempted

terrorism. Mr. Mohamud was a born in Somalia and had become a naturalized citizen.

The Pakistani contact he met in hopes of gaining support was actually an FBI agent.32

The next case is that of the so called ‘Buffalo Six’ or ‘Lackawanna Six’. In 2002

Mukhtar Al-Bakri, Sahim Alwan, Faysal Galab, Shafal Mosed, Yaseinn Taher, and Yahya

Goba were arrested in 2002. The suspected terrorists were arrested by authorities before

actually attempting to carry out an attack. The six admitted to attending the Al Farooq

training camp in Afghanistan and meeting with Osama Bin Laden.33

The group had

planned to use ‘dirty bombs’ in an attack in New York City, though authorities suggested

they had not gone past the planning phase before being captured.34

In 2007 a group of six men planned an attack on Fort Dix, a military base in New

Jersey. The group was made up of young men mostly from the former Yugoslavia, and

30

Charlie Savage, "Holder Backs a Miranda Limit for Terror Suspects," The New York Times, 10 May 2011. 31

Colin Miner, Liz Robbins, and Erik Eckholm, "F.B.I. Says Oregon Suspect Planned 'Grand Attack'," The

New York Times, 27 November 2010. 32

BBC News, "US teenager held in Oregon over Christmas 'bomb plot'," Available from

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11852953. 33

Phil Hirshkorn, "Buffalo terror suspect admits al Qaeda training," Available from

http://edition.cnn.com/2003/LAW/05/20/buffalo.terror/. 34

Fox News, "Final 'Buffalo Six' Member Pleads Guilty," Available from

http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,87264,00.html.

30

had acquired maps and conducted surveys of the base.35

When they were arrested, they

were in the process of acquiring weapons to carry out the attack. The group had made

videos of their training involving weapons they intended to use in the attack. When they

attempted to get their video tapes transferred to DVD, the store clerk alerted the police.36

The suspects were attempting to purchase AK-47 rifles when they were arrested.

Evidence also included a recording of one of the group saying, “My intent is to hit a

heavy concentration of soldiers.... This is exactly what we are looking for. You hit four,

five or six Humvees and light the whole place [up] and retreat completely without any

losses.”37

The next case is Raleigh Jihad Group who were arrested in 2009 on various

charges including plans to attack the U.S. Marine Corps Base in Quantico, Virginia. The

group was made up of Daniel Boyd, Dylan Boyd, Zakariya Boyd, Anes Subasic,

Mohammad Omar Aly Hassan, Ziyad Yaghi, Hysen Sherifi, Jude Kenan Mohammad.

Daniel Boyd had an extensive history with Afghanistan, and had participated in the war

against the Soviets in the 1980s38

. The group was arrested and charged with plans to

support Jihad abroad, but after their arrest it was also discovered that they had plans to

attack the Marine Corps Base as well. 39

Next is the case of the 2009 New York Subway plot. In late 2009 Najibullah Zazi

was arrested along with two others on charges linked to terrorism.40

Mr. Zazi was arrested

35

Wayne Parry, "6 Charged in Plot to Attack Army Post," The Washington Post, 8 May 2007. 36

Laura Craven, "Circuit City clerk alerted authorities to alleged plot," The Star-Ledger, 9 May 2007. 37

Drewniak, Michael. Five Radical Islamists Charged with Planning Attack on Fort Dix Army Base in New

Jersey. U.S.Department of Justice Public Affairs Office. 5-8-2007. 38

Robert Mackey, "Americans Arrested for Plotting 'Violent Jihad' Abroad," The New York Times, 28 July

2009. 39

Ibid. 40

USDOJ OPA. Najibullah Zazi Pleads Guilty to Conspiracy to Use Explosives Against Persons or

Property in U.S., Conspiracy to Murder Abroad and Providing Material Support to Al-Qaeda.

31

after driving back from Denver where he had acquired bomb material form other sources

and prepared to carry out attacks on the New York subway system41

. Mr. Zazi had been

in the country for years and worked as vendor near Wall Street. Those that had known

him indicated that he did not seem like one that might carry out such a plot.42

Another case is that of the 2005 Los Angeles Bomb plot. The group in this case is

made up of Kevin James, Levar Washington, Gregory Patterson, and Hammad Samana.

The plot was to attack government facilities both U.S. and Israeli in the Los Angeles area

along with several Jewish Synagogues.43

This case is unique in the sense that two of the

group members have extensive criminal records and even converted to Islam while in

prison. This case is important to demonstrate a how a homegrown terror group operates

that may not have used any form of technology to recruit and radicalize.

The case of Zubair Ahmed and Kahleel Ahmed in 2007 is case where Muslims

that were U.S. citizens living in the U.S. were radicalized and planned to commit acts of

terror abroad. In this instance these two along with another individual Mohammad Zaki

Amawi planed to go to Iraq to attack American service personnel there.44

This case shows

that not all radicals plan to commit violent acts within the United States. Indeed there are

possibly many cases of Muslims that have been radicalized in the United States have

traveled to other countries to carry out attacks against Americans or others and have not

been tied back to homegrown terrorism. As they have not been identified as such those

possible cases are not available for study in this thesis.

U.S.Department of Justice Public Affairs Office. 2-22-2010. 41

Ibid. 42

Michael Wilson, "From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect," The New York Times, 25 September

2009. 43

USDOJ, "Four Men Indicted On Terrorism Charges Related to Conspiracy to Attack Military Facilities,

Other Targets," Available from http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2005/August/05_crm_453.html. 44

AFP, "US men charged with plotting attacks," Available from

http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5hPwocgKeK6VjQ_Vt-vD6yq3YqSfQ.

32

The next case is that of Bryant Neal Vinas. In 2008 Mr. Vinas was arrested in

Pakistan after carrying out attacks against American military bases in Afghanistan. After

being brought back to the United States, Mr. Vinas became an informant for the U.S.

Government and revealed plans that were devised to attack the Long Island Rail Road at

Penn Station in New York.45

Here is another case where the radical journeyed to a foreign

country to commit attacks, and ultimately planned to return to the United States in order

to carry out more attacks. This case also offers detailed information into the world of

Jihad that exists in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

The final case from the United States is that of the Fort Hood shooter. In 2009

Major Nidal Malik Hasan, a U.S. Army psychiatrist opened fire in his office at Fort Hood

in Texas. Major Hasan was an Army psychiatrist that had been treating soldiers returning

from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. He had been researching radical Islam on the

internet and was actively in contact with multiple individuals over the internet about the

issue of jihad.46

When Major Hasan opened fire at Fort Hood, he killed 13 people and

was stopped only after being shot by a police officer.47

Major Hasan’s case has

connections through the internet with several of the other cases listed in this study.

In the United Kingdom, there are seven cases that are looked at in this study. Like

the United States cases, the ones looked at here from the United Kingdom are made up of

plots by groups made up of both those that were born Muslim and those that converted.

These cases again range form successful attacks to failed attacks, with the terrible

45

William K. Rashbaum and Souad Mekhennet, "L.I. Man Helped Qaeda, Then Informed," The New York

Times, 22 July 2009. 46

Daniel Schorr, "Was Internet Complicit In Fort Hood Shooting?," Available from

http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=120545573. 47

BBC News, "Deadly shootings at US army base," Available from

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/8345713.stm.

33

bombings of the London Underground and bus system in 2005 to the Exeter bombing in

2008.

The first case is that of the attacks of July 7, 2005. These attacks were carried out

by Hasib Hussain, Mohammad Sidique Khan, Germaine Lindsay, and Shehzad Tanweerr.

These attacks, which took place simultaneously at four separate locations across London,

were the worst attacks experienced in recent memory on British soil. In total 52 people

were killed.48

The experience of this incident was even more shocking to the British

public when it was revealed that the attackers lived in the U.K. and had been in the

country for some time. The British intelligence services, MI5 and MI6 revealed that there

had been no coordination with Al-Qaeda and that the attackers had planned and

conducted their own attack.

The next case is of a 2010 attack on a former British MP. Roshonara Choudhry in

May of 2010 stabbed Stephen Timms. The attack made news across the United Kingdom

as Ms. Choudhry made a number of statements when arrested and at her trial protesting

the U.K.’s policy towards Muslim countries.49

During her time prior to trial, Ms.

Choudhry detailed the process on how she decided to stab MP Timms. This included

viewing speeches made by Muslim religious leaders over the internet as well as other

websites. One of those websites advocated more attacks and praised the stabbing.50

The third case is the 2007 attack on the Glasgow Airport. In mid 2007 a Jeep

Cherokee was crashed into the entrance of the Glasgow Airport and set ablaze. The police

48

Murphy, Paul. Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005. ISC 105/2006. 3-30-2006.

Intellegence and Security Committee. 49

BBC News, "Woman jailed for life for attack on MP Stephen Timms," Available from

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11682732. 50

Duncan Gardham, "Arrest over website that encouraged Muslim to attack MPs," The Telegraph, 10

November 2010.

34

arrested two men in connection to the attack Bilal Abdullah and Kafeel Ahmed although

Mr. Ahmed died shortly after due to burns sustained in the attack.51

The two were also

tied to another failed attack in London where two car bombs failed to go off.52

There

were also others that were initially deemed connected to the attack but were later

released.

The next case is that of the Exeter Bombing. In 2008 Nicky Reilly attempted to

set off a suicide bomb in shopping mall restaurant bathroom in Exeter. The attack failed

as only one of the bombs partially detonated injuring only the attacker and the second

bomb failed to detonate at all.53

The BBC quoted a witness who described the attack by

saying, “There were three explosions. It is my impression they sounded more like

gunshots than a bomb, like a light bulb exploding.”54

The case was later made more

troubling when it was revealed that the attack was a recent Muslim convert who

maintained extensive contact online with Pakistani extremists. It was these connections

that radicalized and instructed Mr. Reilly to carry out the attack.55

Next is the case of Dhiren Barot who was arrested in 2004 in the U.K. for

planning to carry out attacks in the United States. Mr. Barot planned to attack the New

York Stock Exchange, the IMF, the Citigroup building, the Prudential building, and the

World Bank using dirty bombs.56

Mr. Barot had traveled extensively in Pakistan and

51

BBC News, "Two bomb attack suspects released," Available from

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/6899776.stm. 52

CNN, "More suspects held in UK terror attacks," Available from

http://web.archive.org/web/20070703162632/http://www.cnn.com/2007/WORLD/europe/06/30/london.aler

t/index.html. 53

BBC News, "Man held after city centre blast," Available from

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/7415470.stm. 54

Ibid. 55

Adam Fresco, "Bomber Nicky Reilly was brainwashed online by Pakistani extremists," The Times, 16

October 2008. 56

BBC News, "Man admits UK-US terror bomb plot," Available from

35

Afghanistan where he met Sheikh Mohammed the plotter of the September 11th

attacks.

He was identified as in the subsequent 9/11 commission report which indicated that he

had traveled in Malaysia for explosives training. 57

Next is the case of the Transatlantic airline plot where in 2006 a number of British

Muslims sought to carry out a number of attacks using liquids to blow up airlines as they

crossed the Atlantic from the U.K. The eight charged with the attack Tanvir Hussain,

Arafat Waheed Khad, Ahmed Abdullah Ali, Ibrahim Savant, Waheed Zaman, Assad Ali

Sarwar, and Adam Khatib58

, were believed to have had assistance from as many as 12

others across several countries.59

The plot was believed to have been coordinated over the

internet with the plot prepared to be conducted only days after the suspects were arrested.

British authorities raided several internet cafes where the suspects had frequented and are

believed to have received the attack order.60

The final case looked at is that of the Shoe Bomber, Richard Reid who in 2002

attempted to bring down an aircraft using explosives hidden in his shoe. Though he was

initially passed off in the media and some in government as an inept attacker, the

documents produced during his trial reveal that he traveled extensively in the Pakistan-

Afghanistan area meeting with the high ranking Al-Qaeda officials. He is now believed to

have failed only because the device in his shoe was wet.61

While traveling, Mr. Reid used

internet cafes to coordinate and communicate with Al-Qaeda officials. It is also believed


Adam Fresco, "How radical Islam turned a schoolboy into a terrorist," The Times, 7 November 2006. 58

BBC News, "'Terror plot' suspects in court," Available from


BBC News, "Q&A: UK aircraft 'bomb plot'," Available from


CNN, "Terror plot: Internet cafes raided," Available from

http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/08/12/terror.plot/index.html. 61

Michael Elliott, "The Shoe Bomber's World," TIME, 2002.

36

that he had help in constructing the device in Paris.62

Criteria and Calibration of Measurement

In order to examine the role of online social networks in the radicalization process

of these seventeen cases, a set of criteria have been set up to show whether such criteria

are reflective of the role that online social networks play in homegrown radicalization.

Each of these cases are then looked at in regards to their membership in the criteria

groups. These criteria are not necessarily meant to be an absolute measure of all possible

criteria. The reason for limiting the criteria to ten is the result of limitations of time for

the study, as well as the limitations based on the fs/QCA software. The software

recommends limiting criteria to ten or less because of rapid increase of complexity

involved and the time required to calculate.63

The following are the criteria used to study

each of the cases.

-Presence of strong prior relationship between cell members.

What is looked at here is whether there exists a prior relationship between the members

of the cell before the planning of the terrorist act. Scholars such as Marc Sageman,

suggest that those that are radicalized through online social networks are small groups

that have a connection prior to radicalization and the cohesion in the cell comes from

those prior connections.64

A small group can radicalize quicker through common

phenomena such as the ‘echo chamber’ effect where the group agreement serves to

62

CNN, "Timeline: The shoe bomber case," Available from

http://edition.cnn.com/2002/US/01/07/reid.timeline/index.html. 63

Fuzzy-Set/ Qualitative Comparative Analysis 2.0, Ver. 2.0, Department of Sociology, University of

Arizona, Tuscon, AZ. 64

Marc Sageman, "A Strategy for Fighting International Islamist Terrorists," The ANNALS of the American

Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 223-231.

37

strengthen the belief in that argument. In looking at this criteria, 0 or non membership

describes groups that were brought together solely for the plan of attack. This would

suggest that they would be agents of Al-Qaeda or at least organized more along the lines

of a traditional group rather than this newer phenomenon of homegrown radical. The

other extreme, 1 or full membership describes a group that is fully integrated and very

close prior to radicalization. Those that are ‘lone wolves’, a cell made up of only one

individual acting alone, are grouped in at 1 as they would be closer to a fully integrated

group being one person than they would be to the alternative.

-Lack of contact between cell and central Al-Qaeda leadership

One of the hallmarks of radicalization being driven by online social networks is that the

connections are often nearly invisible. In many cases there are few signs for investigators

to go on prior to an attack. With the traditional model of a group such as Al-Qaeda

spreading radicalization, there is a clear target for the governments to focus on. If there is

no direct contact in person between Al-Qaeda or the Taliban and potential cells in the

West, then there is a much more dynamic set of variables for governments to track and

deal with. In this study, 0 or non-membership describes a cell that has direct contact with

Al-Qaeda or Taliban. Typically this is also in conjunction with foreign travel to

Afghanistan or Pakistan. 1 or full membership describes a cell that has no contact with

Al-Qaeda or any other terrorist group and is full insulated from those existing offline

networks.

-Spontaneous formulation of plan for attack. (less than a month)

Another element that is noted as a cause for concern by governments looking at this new

take on radicalization is the short period between initial planning and activation of the

38

plan. A shorter time frame obviously lessens the chance for law enforcement to intercept

or prevent a plan, but also it reduces the chance for law enforcement to study the cell and

build a case. Non-membership in this group describes a cell that has a long period of

planning, a year or more. A long time period would raise the possibility of face to face

meetings, or of foreign travel. If one can make plans to travel to the Pakistani tribal

regions, then they are not likely to have been an example of a cell truly radicalized

through the internet and online social networks. Full membership would describe a cell

that has managed to plan an attack in less than a month. This criteria is a good example of

how fs/QCA can be of use in this study. By allowing for partial membership to groups

that are less than a year but more than a month in planning, there is a simple way to group

cases in to categories without having to rely on precise measurement of months.

-Contribution to radicalization of others via social networks online.

In a traditional radicalization process, those in the cell do not usually work to radicalize

those around them. Naturally the emphasis is on keeping a low profile and not arousing

suspicion. In the online realm, anonymity is far easier to maintain and identities are far

less concrete than in the real world. Thus members of a cell can use the internet to

contribute back to the online social networks and grow the influence of that network. This

would have the effect of spreading radicalization in the way a computer virus might

spread. In this instance, there exists more of a dichotomy than in some of the other

criteria. Either a cell has full membership, contributed jihadist material to online

networks, or non membership, no contribution of jihadist material. Still there are some

potential scenarios that could fit in between such as composing digital media that a non-

cell member will then post online.

39

-No training by Al-Qaeda or Taliban

Similar to the prior criteria regarding direct contact with Al-Qaeda or the Taliban, this

criterion reflects whether or not a cell received training from established terrorist groups

in order to carry out an attack. In theory, a cell radicalized through online social networks

and planning to carry out an attack would be able to find everything needed from

knowledge and designs to actual components online and would not have need of Al-

Qaeda led training. Non-membership in this group describes cells that have been trained

directly by either the Taliban or Al-Qaeda to an extent that it is unreasonable to consider

them Internet-taught. Full membership would describe a cell that is trained without direct

assistance from Al-Qaeda.

-Existence of prior Islamic heritage.

One of the controversial issues involved in dealing with the radicalization of Muslims is

whether Islam itself has any impact on the susceptibility of those that are radicalized. If

circumstances were different, could it be another religion or ethnicity that is common

amongst those that are radicalized? While the question of any connection between

radicalization and Islamic scripture is beyond the scope of this study, it is worth looking

to see if cells are converted to radical Islam or radicalized from an existing Islamic

heritage. Full membership in this group describes a cell in which the members are born

with an Islamic background and raised Muslim. Non-membership describes those that

converted to Islam and then either radicalized or radicalized at the same time as their

conversion.

-Significant technological skill prior to training.

Similar again to the criteria of no training by formal means, this criteria looks at whether

40

any member of the group had skills related to their means of attack prior to training. This

criterion is contingent on the nature of the plan for the attack. If a cell has advanced

computer training, while that maybe noteworthy it is immaterial if their plan is to engage

a target using small arms. Thus full membership in this group describes a cell that has

advanced knowledge or training prior to radicalization that is applicable to the planned

attack. Non membership would obviously describe a group that does not meet this

description. In some cases, law enforcement has apprehended the member or members of

the cell prior to the formulation of the plan. In these instances, any expertise that would

be applicable to an attack will be counted.

-Coherence of hierarchy in cell.

A haphazard group that is organized from a group of friends or relatives radicalized over

the internet would not ordinarily be expected to have a clear hierarchy or command

structure. As such this criteria looks at the nature of a cell hierarchy. As noted by law

enforcement and scholars, a cell or radicals will have a dominant member, but not usually

a clear chain of command.65

A high level of organization or even the existence of a chain

of command, would suggest a sophisticated operation that is highly unlikely to be a

simple group that became radicalized, planned, and trained all through online social

networks. Full membership in this group describes a cell that is well organized and has a

clear order to the hierarchy with division of roles. Non-membership describes a cell that

is lacking organization and is not held together by any real means outside of a common

goal.

-Presence for a plan involving personal attack by non-remote means

65

Silber, Mitchell D. and Bhatt, Arvin. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Threat. 2007. New

York City, New York City Police Department.

41

An interesting attribute of radical Islamic terrorism is the high use of suicide missions,

either in the form of suicide bombings or in the form of a small arms assault where an

escape is not expected similar to the Mumbai attacks where members of Lashkar-e-Taiba

carried out an attack on a hotel and other targets killing over a hundred.66

However, there

exist many examples where the intended means of attack, usually a bomb, is intended to

detonate remotely. Naturally the question arises as to which method would a Western

radicalized group undertake? Would there be any difference between those radicalized in

the United States and those in the United Kingdom? Again this is an example where the

criteria is more of a dichotomy, however there are potential examples where a case can

exist between the two opposites. Full membership in this group describes a cell where the

plan exists to attack without an expectation of survival. Non-membership describes a cell

where the intention is to use means that could be triggered remotely. Additionally, in

cases where no attack had been planned prior to arrest, the case is counted as non-

membership as there is no presence of a plan.

-No foreign travel for training or radicalization.

As with other criteria, this one reflects a hallmark of the theory that homegrown

radicalization occurs with no direct connection to Al-Qaeda or established terror groups.

If a cell or members of that cell travel abroad, it might not preclude the chance that they

were fully radicalized prior, but it would make it far more difficult to claim that they were

in no way radicalized while overseas. Homegrown radicalization over online social

networks reflects a dynamic where the internet and its ability to allow media to reach

anyone and everyone and establishes personal, face to face interactions as unnecessary. If

a cell travels overseas to connect with a terror group or to pursue jihad, then that cell is

66

Ian Black, "Attacks draw worldwide condemnation," The Guardian, 28 November 2008.

42

operating more as a traditional terror cell. Full membership describes a cell that has not

traveled overseas for training or radicalization. Non membership then describes a cell that

has a strong connection with foreign travel that could possibly indicate collaboration with

Al-Qaeda or the Taliban.

The data for these cases comes as much from government documents as possible.

This refers to official government reports, indictments, arrest warrants, or trial

proceedings. All of these documents are public and available online for the cases in the

United States. For the cases in the United Kingdom, research has sought as many official

documents as have been possible. Additional sources for information have come from

newspapers such as the New York Times, Washington Post, The Guardian, The Times,

BBC, NPR, and CNN. In some cases for the older cases, it has even been possible to use

books that have been written about the cases. Every attempt has been made to evaluate

every criterion through the best means possible.

43

Section IV: Data and Analysis

Case Selection

The cases in this study were chosen for a few reasons. The first reason is that this

study looks at multiple cases with an emphasis on variety. With a diverse group of cases,

the similarities then between cases are much more significant. The second reason is the

importance of seeing how the cases reflect the passage of time. As the theory is heavily

based on the functionality and availability of technology such as the internet, computers,

and cell phones, the applicability to cases changes over time as the technology does. To

examine the evolution of technology on the matter of online social networks and

homegrown Islamic radicalization, there must be cases spread across a length of time.

These cases are not chosen at random and therefore the findings may have limited ability

to be generalized across the entire spectrum of cases concerning homegrown Islamic

radicalization. These cases are important because they consist of the most dramatic

examples of homegrown Islamic radicalization. These cases, among which are the 2009

shooting at Fort Hood and the 2005 suicide bombings in London, include the highest

death tolls. In addition to successful attacks, the cases also include unsuccessful attacks.

The various differences between cases; lone wolf vs. group, remote attack vs. suicide

bombing, young attacker vs. old attacker, successful vs. unsuccessful, all work to create a

variety of permutations which allow this study to explore and show what conditions are

most consistent with online social networks and what courses of action are plausible.

The variety of examples in the case selection attempts to provide a look at how

the different component of the cases relate to the criteria. The criteria, being drawn from

various aspects of the competing theories and variations on those theories, naturally are

44

best tested by using cases that demonstrate the permutations possible in creating a terror

cell. The cells in these cases have members that range from early middle-age, to those

just out of high school. There are some that have attained a high level of schooling such

as the cell that carried out the attack at the Glasgow Airport. In other cases the cell

consists of only one person. These cases are the so-called ‘lone wolf’ cases, a name

which is given by counterterrorism officials to cases where a lone individual works with

little to no support from others. Lone wolf cases make up a total of eight out of the

seventeen cases, just under half the cases. The existence of these lone wolf cases in

significant numbers reflects inherent unique qualities of the internet and online social

networks. The ability to reach virtually anywhere in the connected world allows for

greater reach for groups. They can ensure that their message reaches the target audience,

no matter how small that audience might be. Just as advertisers can use the internet to

more effectively target consumers, so too can groups such as Al-Qaeda reach sympathetic

audiences in the United States, United Kingdom, and elsewhere. Beyond the issue of lone

wolf cases, the variety in the selected cases allows for examination of what elements of

the theories are not reflected in the case studies. The argument of motis vs. techne that

was put forth by Kenney suggests that successful attacks will require real world

experience, not simply schematics and videos found on a website.67

Therefore the criteria

based on this, “#5 No training by Al-Qaeda or Taliban, #7 Significant technological skill

prior to training, reflect the examination of whether the differences between the

successful and unsuccessful cases can be summed up by this particular explanation. The

variety in the cases allows for comparison to be made and similarities to be explored.

67

Michael Kenney, "Beyond the Internet: Motis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for


45

Those similarities can be examined then to see if they correspond with the theory

examined.

The cases span the period between late 2001 and 2010. This allows for an

exploration of how these cases demonstrate a possible shift over time. Though the earliest

online social networking sites started in the late 90s, the mainstream social networking

sites would not proliferate until around 2005.68

Although the online social networks

described in this study do not focus primarily on the mainstream sites,69

the behaviors

associated with those sites spill over into other areas such as forums where users can post

messages for others in that community. Another reason for the importance of the cases to

be spread over the decade is the evolution and availability of technology. Though email,

online forums, and some social networking sites, existed prior to 2001 the advancement

of technology and the increase of high-speed broadband networks have rapidly increased

accessibility to online social networks. Without high-speed networks, uploading or

viewing a video is a difficult process. Thus the number of cases where the cell members

describe being inspired by online videos of Anwar Al-Awlaqi speaking on jihad would be

radically altered without access to broadband networks. Additionally the wars in

Afghanistan and Iraq have a strong impact on the motivation of those involved in many

of the cases. Without these wars, it is likely the cases may have been fewer. Also with out

the wars, there would not be footage to be used in the videos that are uploaded via those

high-speed broadband networks. The first decade of the twenty-first century exhibited

major advances in technology with the proliferation of high-speed broadband networks

and miniaturization that allowed for powerful cell phones with cameras and video

68

69

46

capabilities. Additionally the decade saw not only the development and proliferation of

online social networking but also the escalation of warfare in Iraq and Afghanistan.

UNITED STATES CASES

Times Square Bomber

The case of Faisal Shahzad, the Times Square Bomb plot, comes from May 2010. This is

a case of a ‘Lone Wolf’ agent. As a lone wolf this has a unique representation in the data.

The first criterion, presence of strong prior relationships between cell members, is

counted as present and thus is ranked at full membership in this group. The reason is that

establishing strong prior relationships in the cell discounts the possibility of a cell being

grouped together by an outside group, such as a foreign terror network, and thus shows

an element of independence from such a group. As being a Lone Wolf also would not be

evidence of outside influence forming a cell, it represents a fulfillment of that criterion.

The second criterion, Lack of contact between cell and central Al-Qaeda leadership, is

ranked at .25 because the reported U.S. intelligence on Shahzad indicates that he traveled

to his native Pakistan but without his family to receive bomb training from radicals in the

Tribal areas along the Afghanistan/ Pakistan border.70

The reason for this being ranked at

.25 is that the report does not specifically indicate that he had contact with an actual

terror network for the planning process. Direct contact with such a network might suggest

that he coordinated with that network for an attack. In Shahzad’s case he may have

simply received training without contact and planning with the Al-Qaeda leadership. For

criterion three, spontaneous formulation of plan for attack, Shahzad’s case is ranked at

.25. This is due to the length of the planning period that investigators uncovered. Shahzad

70

Greg Miller and Jerry Markon, "Radicalization of Times Square suspect was gradual, investigators say,"

The Washington Post, 7 May 2010.

47

is believed to have been planning his attack beginning in December of 2009, and was

arrested following the failed attempt in May 2010, thus indicating about five months of

planning time. While this is less than half a year from conception to implementation, it is

not ‘spontaneous’ as is suggested in the theories put forth by the work of Evan Kohlmann

and others.71

The fourth criterion, contribution to radicalization of others via online social

networks, is ranked at 0 showing no meeting of the criterion as no evidence could be

found that he contributed to material aimed at furthering online radicalization. For

criterion five, No training by Al-Qaeda or Taliban, Shahzad is ranked at 0 since he

admitted to training by members of the Pakistani Taliban after watching online videos of

Anwar Al-Aulaqi.72

In criterion six, existence of prior Islamic heritage, Shahzad is ranked

at 1, showing that this case meets this criterion. Shahzad is indicated in reports as having

been raised Muslim, and becoming radicalized in 2009.73

For criterion seven, significant

technological skill prior to training, Shahzad is ranked at .2. Shahzad attained a college

degree in Computer Applications and Information Systems in the Fall of 2000, this

suggests then that he had some amount of technical capabilities that could translate to

bomb making. The reason that this is not higher is that while he may have had some

background prior to training to carry out an attack, this training does not directly relate to

the method of attack which was a remote detonated car bomb. For criterion number eight,

coherence of a hierarchy within the cell, Shahzad is ranked at 1. Since he operated as a

Lone Wolf, it would put this case in the same category as a case where there was a clear

71


The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 95-109. 72

Mark Mazzetti and Scott Shane, "Evidence mounts for Taliban role in bomb plot," The New York Times, 5

May 2010. 73

Richard Esposito, Chris Vlasto, and Chris Cuomo, "Sources: Shahzad had contact with Awlaki, Taliban

Chief, and Mumbai massacre mastermind," Available from http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/faisal-shahzad-

contact-awlaki-taliban-mumbai-massacre-mastermind/story?id=10575061.

48

leader. The role of the leader would be to maintain organization in the cell and work

towards the goal. A coherence of a hierarchy such as the presence of leadership or of

highly motivated and organized individual would be contrary to Sageman’s assertion that

those radicalized via online social networks were ‘a bunch of guys’. For criterion nine,

presence for a plan involving personal attack by non-remote means, Shahzad ranks at 0.

The ranking of this criterion is simple as the plan involved a remote detonated car bomb

in Times Square. As it was remote detonated, it is not a non-remote attack. For the tenth

criterion, No foreign travel for training or radicalization, Shahzad’s travel to Pakistan

clearly indicates that this case be ranked at 0.

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Shahzad 1 .25 .25 0 0 1 .2 1 0 0

Portland Bomber

The case of the Portland Bomber comes from November 2010 when Mohamed

Osman Mohamud attempted to detonate a car bomb near a crowd that gathered at

Portland’s Pioneer Square to watch the annual Christmas tree lighting. For the first

criterion, he is ranked with a 1. Mohamud was a Lone Wolf and thus like other cases with

Lone Wolf actors, a strong prior relationship between members is considered applicable.

For criterion two, this case is ranked with .75. Mohamud had initially contacted an

49

individual affiliated with Al-Qaeda who then directed him to contact a second individual.

Mohamud incorrectly copied the email for this second individual, and the FBI who had

been monitoring the exchange, used this opportunity to get involved and develop their

case. For the third criterion, Mohamud ranks at .5. The planning period is short and lasted

only three to four months. Nearly the entire planning period was a sting operation by the

FBI. In the fourth criterion, Mohamud is ranked at 1. Mohamud frequently contributed

articles and other pieces to an online publication called ‘Jihad Recollections’. This is an

online publication that is supportive of violent jihad.74

For the fifth criterion, Mohamud is

ranked at 1. Since the entire period of training and planning was a sting operation by the

FBI, Mohamud was never the recipient of any training by Al-Qaeda, Taliban, or any other

terror group. For the sixth Criterion, this case ranks at 1. Mohamud’s family is reported to

have been observant Muslims75

; Mohamud indicated to investigators that he had been

interested in violent jihad since he was 15, four years prior to his arrest.76

For the seventh

criterion, Mohamud ranks at 0. Though he was able to post material online and possessed

basic computer skills, he did not demonstrate any prior skills that would be readily

applicable to the chosen method of attack. For the eighth criterion, this case ranks at 1.

Once again, because Mohamud was a Lone Wolf, he was the organizer and motivating

factor in the plot. While it could be argued that the FBI operative that posed as an Al-

Qaeda operative represented an additional member of the cell, the ranking would not

change as Mohamud was the sole driving force in the case. The details of the case

indicate that the agent did not encourage Mohamud and in fact is at one point reported as

74


New York Times, 27 November 2010. 75

Ibid. 76

BBC News, "US teenager held in Oregon over Christmas 'bomb plot'," Available from

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-us-canada-11852953.

50

trying to dissuade Mohamud from his plan telling him, “You know there’s gonna be a lot

of children there?” to which Mohamud responded, “Yeah, I mean that’s what I’m looking

for.”77 For the ninth criterion, this case ranks at 0. The plan called for a remote detonated

car bomb using a mobile phone as a trigger. For the tenth criterion, Mohamud ranks at .8.

Mohamud sought to travel to either Pakistan or Yemen for training but was unable to do

so. Still the intention to travel abroad for radicalization remains. The case is ranked at .8

because while he did not actually travel abroad, he fully intended on doing so and thus

may have found a way if the FBI had not been involved.

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Mohamud 1 .75 .5 1 1 1 0 1 0 .8

Lackawanna Six

The Lackawanna Six were a group that were uncovered by the FBI in 2002 and

represent one of the earliest cases of homegrown radicalization investigated in the United

States following the September 11th

attacks. For the first criterion, this case is ranked at

.25. While the group all lived either in Buffalo or the Lackawanna area, they were linked

together very loosely with each member being familiar with only one other. Although

they all were linked in the cell, each member did not have strong connections with every

77


New York Times, 27 November 2010.

51

other member prior to the formation of the cell. For the second criterion, the case is

ranked at 0. After forming the cell, the entire group traveled to Afghanistan where they

are reported to have met Bin Laden.78

For the third criterion, this case is ranked at 1.

Although no plan was discovered to have been actively pursued, the investigation

suggests a belief that the cell might have been capable to carry out an attack in a short

period with limited planning.79

For the fourth criterion, the case is ranked at 0. Although

some of the members did serve as couriers in delivering Al-Qaeda propaganda videos to

sources, they did not produce any material nor post any material online with the goal of

furthering radicalization of others.80

For the fifth criterion, this case is ranked at 0. Again,

as the cell had traveled to Afghanistan and participated in training, they cannot be

considered to meet this criterion. For the sixth criterion, the cell is ranked at 1. All the

members of the cell were practicing Muslims although reports indicate that some were

not radicalized at all, a significant contrast to other cases. For the seventh criterion, the

Lackawanna Six are ranked at 0. There is no evidence of any significant skills prior to

training that might correspond to any possible plans that the group might have set up.

Even though no plan was discovered, the rank still reflects the lack of a plan in that

without a plan, the group still does not demonstrate any technical expertise that could be

used. For the eighth criterion, the group ranks at .25. The group hierarchy as it existed

was based on those who wanted to pursue jihad pushing those who lacked an interest. For

the ninth criterion, the group is ranked at 0. This is because as no attack was conceived,

there is no presence of a plan for a non-remote attack. The tenth criterion is also ranked at

78

Roya Aziz and Monica Lamare, "Profiles The Lackawanna Cell," Available from

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/sleeper/inside/profiles.html. 79

Ibid. 80

Ibid.

52

0 for this case. The entire group traveled to Afghanistan and thus does not meet this

criterion. This case in addition to being the earliest of the United States cases looked at is

also one of the most controversial. The government moved to arrest the cell members

before any real plan was evident. This has been criticized by some as being evidence of

an over zealous attempt to show progress against terrorism.81

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Lackawanna

Six

.25 0 1 0 0 1 0 .25 0 0

Fort Dix Plot

The Fort Dix Plot was discovered in May of 2007 and consists of four young

members who plotted to carry out an assault on the Fort Dix military base in New Jersey.

For the first criterion, the case is ranked at .75. Three of the members were brothers with

another member being a brother-in-law. For the second criterion, the case is ranked at 1.

The investigation conducted by the FBI revealed that although the group had watched

videos of sermons given by Anwar Al-Awlaqi, they did not make contact with Al-Qaeda

or any other network.82

For the third criterion, the case is ranked at 0. The group started

their planning and training in January of 2006 by traveling to Pennsylvania to train with

81

Ibid. 82

Drewniak, Michael. Five Radical Islamists Charged with Planning Attack on Fort Dix Army Base in

New Jersey. U.S.Department of Justice Public Affairs Office. 5-8-2007.

53

weapons. The FBI arrested the group in May of 2007, 17 months later. For the fourth

criterion, the group is ranked at 0. Although they did make a video of their training

exercises, there is no evidence to suggest that they uploaded the video to any site or

contributed in any other way. For the fifth criterion, the group is ranked at 1. As they did

not have any contact with Al-Qaeda or any other network, they also did not receive

training from any group. Their training of firing weapons and target practice was carried

out in the Pocono Mountains in Eastern Pennsylvania. For the sixth criterion, the group is

ranked at .5. Although they were initially from Muslim families, they were not practicing

Muslims until a few years prior to training. For the seventh criterion, the group is ranked

at 0. There is no evidence of any extensive skill pertaining to weapons training or assault

planning prior to their training. For the eighth criterion, the group is ranked at .75. There

was evidence of planning among all the members, additionally Shnewer was in charge of

surveillance of the base while the Dukas brothers procured the weapons. For the ninth

criterion, this case is ranked at 1. The group planned to carry out an assault on the Fort

Dix Base disguised as a pizza delivery. This then meets the criterion as an assault requires

the members be in proximity to their targets.83

For the tenth criterion, the case is ranked

at 1. There is no evidence of foreign travel by members. Their training in Pennsylvania

was well documented by the group. It was those recordings that when they attempted to

have them transferred from tape to a digital format was discovered and reported to the

police.84

83

Ibid. 84

Ibid.

54

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Fort

Dix

Plot

.75 1 0 0 1 .5 0 .75 1 1

2009 New York Subway Plot

The case of the New York Subway Plot comes from September 2009 where

United States authorities intercepted Najibullah Zazi, and later Zarein Ahmedzay and

Adis Medunjanin, who they were monitoring and believed to be preparing an attack. For

criterion one, this case is ranked at .9. Although the main part of the cell, the three named

above, had been friends since high school, they received extensive help from others such

as Ferid Imam who was charged by Canadian officials in 2011.85

For criterion two this

case is ranked 0. Zazi and Ahmedzay told authorities that he had traveled to Pakistan to

meet with Al-Qaeda agents who would give him training.86

For criterion three, this case is

ranked .5. They indicated he received general training prior to planning his attack. That

planning period is believed to have been about four months.87

For criterion four, the case

is ranked 0. There is no evidence that any of the cell members contributed to any online

social network. For criterion five, the case is ranked 0. Zazi claimed that the handwritten

85

A. G. Sulzberger, "Two more men charged in plot to bomb subways," The New York Times, 25 February

2010. 86



U.S.Department of Justice Public Affairs Office. 2-22-2010. 87

Ibid.

55

notes that were discovered in his possession by authorities were part of a religious book

he downloaded. In reality, they were notes he made while at an Al-Qaeda training camp.88

Additionally, the both Zazi and Ahmedzay, in working with government investigators

have been cooperative in detailing their experiences with Al-Qaeda. For criterion six, the

case is ranked 1. All members of the group are believed to have strong Islamic

background. Zazi is originally from Afghanistan and lived under Taliban rule for some

years before moving to the United States.89

For criterion seven, the case is ranked 0.

None of the members had any expertise prior to training that would benefit his plan. For

criterion eight, the case is ranked .75. The cell did have a strong semblance of structure,

and motivating factors. At one point Ahmedzay expressed his reticence at carrying out

suicide bombings in the United States, the other members in the group and in particular

Zazi, encouraged Ahmedzay to continue with the plan. However the group also required

the outside assistance from Imam and others that also had stronger ties to Al-Qaeda than

the cell. For criterion nine, the case is ranked 1. The planned attack called for suicide

bombs to be detonated near the eight year anniversary of the September 11th

attacks. The

warrant for Zazi’s arrest indicates that the government found handwritten notes with

instructions on how to craft a number of different components that would be used in the

construction of an explosive device.90

For criterion ten, the case is ranked 0. The three

cell members clearly traveled to Peshawar, Pakistan in 2008 and by Zazi and Ahmedzay’s

own admission sought to join in jihad against the United States. Subsequently they were

88

Ibid. 89

Michael Wilson, "From Smiling Coffee Vendor to Terror Suspect," The New York Times, 25 September

2009. 90



U.S.Department of Justice Public Affairs Office. 2-22-2010.

56

recruited and trained by Al-Qaeda.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

NY

Subway

Plot

.9 0 .5 0 0 1 0 .75 1 0

Raleigh Jihad Group

The Raleigh Jihad Group was a cell in North Carolina that was dealt with by the

FBI in July of 2009. The group is unique in that the leader, Daniel Boyd, had been

involved with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan in the 1980s during their fight against the

Soviet Union.91

For the first criterion, the case is ranked at .5. Boyd recruited the cell

members specifically for jihad. For the second criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Although

Boyd clearly had contact with elements that would become Al-Qaeda in the 1980s when

they were the Mujahideen, there is no evidence that he was coordinating with Al-Qaeda

or any other terror network. For the third criterion, the case is ranked at 0. The plan for

attack, which after more than two years, from November 2006 to July 2009, ultimately

was to attack the Marine base at Quantico.92

For the fourth criterion, the case is ranked at

0. The investigations by the FBI show that Boyd recruited operatives via his social

91

M. J. Stephey, "Daniel Boyd: A Homegrown Terrorist?," TIME, 2009. 92

Ibid.

57

network, however not primarily via an online social network.93

For the fifth criterion, the

case is ranked at 1. There is no evidence of training from either Al-Qaeda or the Taliban,

although Boyd did fight with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. For the sixth criterion, the

case is ranked at .5. Some of the members did have a strong Muslim heritage; however

the others, including Boyd, were converts and believed to have been radicalized by Boyd.

For the seventh criterion, the case is ranked .8. Most of the group had experience in jihad

prior to the plan of attacking the Marine base. Boyd had fought in the Soviet-Afghan

War; he also took his son to Gaza to train. Two other members Yaghi and Sharifi, traveled

to Jordan and Kosovo respectively, for jihad.94

For the eighth criterion, the case is ranked

.75. Daniel Boyd was the clear head of the cell. For criterion nine, the case is ranked at 1.

The plan to attack the Marine Base is clearly an example of a direct, non-remote attack.

For the tenth criterion, the case is ranked at 0. As noted above the cell had traveled

extensively abroad for the purpose of jihad and training.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

ista

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Raleigh .5 1 0 0 1 .5 .8 .75 1 0

Los Angeles Bomb Plot

The Los Angeles Bomb Plot consists of a group called, Jam’iyyat Ul-Islam Is-

93

Robert Mackey, "Americans Arrested for Plotting 'Violent Jihad' Abroad," The New York Times, 28 July

2009. 94

Ibid.

58

Saheeh (JIS), which was formed by two convicts who radicalized while in prison. Their

plan called for attacks on several targets including a military base, a synagogue, and an

Israeli consulate.95

For the first criterion, the group is ranked at .5. While two of the

members, James and Washington, formed the group while in prison, the rest of the group

was recruited by Washington who was released before James. For the second criterion,

the group is ranked at 1. No evidence exists of contact between JIS and Al-Qaeda or any

other group. For the third criterion, the group is ranked at 0. Washington began to recruit

members in 2004, but their plan had not been carried out when they were arrested in

August of 2005.96

For the fourth criterion, the group is ranked at 0. There is no evidence

that the group contributed to any online site. Washington recruited the other members in

the group at a Mosque. For the fifth criterion, the group is ranked at 1. The group did not

have any training from Al-Qaeda or any other group. Additionally, although they had a

plan to use bombs, they had not yet begun the training process to make such weapons.97

For the sixth criterion, the group is ranked at .25. Only one was born Muslim, Samana,

and the other three were later converted to Islam.98

For the seventh criterion, the group is

ranked at 0. There is no evidence of any kind of expertise that would be helpful in the

planned attack. For the eighth criterion, the group is ranked at 1. There was a clear rank

order with in the group with James as the mastermind and Washington as his second who

also recruited others to the group while James was in prison.99

For the ninth criterion, the

group is ranked at 0. The plan of the group was to use bombs that could be remotely

95

U.S.Department of Justice Public Affairs Office and U. Four men indicted on terrorism charges related to

conspiracy to attack military facilities, other targets. 8-31-2005. 96

Ibid. 97

Ibid. 98

Andrew Murr, "Thwarting Terror," Newsweek, 12-15-2007. 99

U.S.Department of Justice Public Affairs Office and U. Four men indicted on terrorism charges related to

conspiracy to attack military facilities, other targets. 8-31-2005.

59

detonated, perhaps using cell phones. For the tenth criterion, the group is ranked at 1. No

evidence exists suggesting there was foreign travel. Additionally, given the criminal

background of the two leaders, it is unlikely that they would have traveled abroad for

training.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

JIS .5 1 0 0 1 .25 0 1 0 1

Bryant Neal Vinas

The case of Bryant Neal Vinas comes from 2008. The plan was to attack the Long

Island railroad in New York around Thanksgiving 2008 when the railroad would be very

busy with the holiday travelers.100

For criterion one, Vinas is ranked at 1. As with the

other Lone Wolf cases, this case represents strong uniformity in goal as there is only one

member of the cell. For the second criterion, the case is ranked at .5. Vinas viewed jihadi

sites prior to traveling to Pakistan in 2007. While in Pakistan he met with representatives

of Al-Qaeda.101

This account comes from Vinas himself, and there is no other evidence to

suggest who he met with or if that person actually had any contact with Al-Qaeda’s

100

Campbell, Benton J, Loonam, James, Knox, Jeffery, and Kamdang, Len. United States of America vs.

John Doe. 08-CR-823. 1-28-2009. Foley, Marie, US District Court, Eastern District of New York. 101

Ibid.

60

leadership. For the third criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Vinas returned to the United

States only weeks prior to the planned attack to prepare. The fourth criterion is ranked at

0. Vinas did not indicate any contributions to online sites. For the fifth criterion, Vinas is

ranked at 0. As noted Vinas did travel to Afghanistan where he says he did train to with

jihadis to carry out attacks in the United States. For the sixth criterion, the case is ranked

at 0. Vinas was raised Catholic, and only converted to Islam in 2004.102

For the seventh

criterion, the case is ranked at 0. Vinas’ background does not contain anything that would

suggest he had any particular expertise prior to traveling to Afghanistan and Pakistan for

training. For the eighth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Again since Vinas is considered

a Lone Wolf, he is the motivating factor in his group. The ninth criterion is ranked at 1.

Vinas had plans to attack the train using a suicide bombing. The tenth criterion is ranked

at 0. Since he traveled to Afghanistan and Pakistan, he is not self-trained.103

The

information in this case in a large part comes from Vinas himself. After he was arrested,

he cooperated with authorities and provided a detailed record of his activities both abroad

in Pakistan and Afghanistan and when he returned to the United States.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Vinas 1 .5 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0

102

William K. Rashbaum and Souad Mekhennet, "L.I. Man Helped Qaeda, Then Informed," The New York

Times, 22 July 2009. 103

Campbell, Benton J, Loonam, James, Knox, Jeffery, and Kamdang, Len. United States of America vs.

John Doe. 08-CR-823. 1-28-2009. Foley, Marie, US District Court, Eastern District of New York.

61

Major Nidal Hasan

The case of the Fort Hood shooter happened in 2009 when Major Nidal Hasan an

army psychiatrist at Fort Hood who opened fire on his fellow soldiers killing 13.104

For

the first criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Hasan was a Lone Wolf. For the second

criterion, the case is ranked at .25. Hasan did have email contact with Anwar Al-Awlaqi,

the radical Imam who has ties to Al-Qaeda and made several videos that served to

radicalize a number of others. 105

For the third criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Hasan,

despite repeated requests, was to be deployed to Afghanistan shortly before the shooting.

He was told about the deployment in October and the shooting happened in November.

For the fourth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Hasan frequently emailed Al-Awlaqi and

posted material on the internet stating his viewpoints in justifying suicide bombings.106

For the fifth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Hasan conducted significant amount of

research into violent Islamic ideology presenting on issues regarding suicide bombings

and jihad as being justifiable. However, the training that he used in his attack came from

his training as a soldier. For the sixth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Born into a

Muslim family, Hasan was described as being ‘devout, but discrete’.107

However in the

Army, he was noted as having a strong focus and inclination toward extremist violent

Islam. For the seventh criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Hasan demonstrated the ability to

contribute material online. In relation to his attack, his training as a soldier provided him

the skills necessary to carry out the attack. For the eighth criterion, the case is ranked 1,

104

Lieberman, Joseph and Collins, Susan. A Ticking Time Bomb: "Counterterrorism lessons from the U.S.

Government's failure to prevent the fort hood attack". 3-2-2011. 105

Ibid. 106

Ibid. 107

Ibid.

62

as again Hasan is a Lone Wolf. The ninth criterion is ranked at 1. As much as it can be

considered a plan, Hasan attacked by shooting more than a dozen soldiers and civilians.

For the tenth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Hasan did not travel abroad for training.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Hasan 1 .25 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

Toledo Terror Plot

The case of the Toledo Terror Plot was broken up by the FBI in 2006 after having

been watched since 2004. The cell was infiltrated by an FBI informant who watched and

documented the group’s activities leading up to the arrests.108

For the first criterion, the

cell is ranked at .5. The group lived in the same town but it is not believed that they had

strong connections prior to the formation of the cell. The second criterion is ranked at .25.

The group leader Mohammad Zaki Amawi had frequent communications with a contact

in the Middle East, however it is not certain if that person was affiliated with Al-

Qaeda.109

For the third criterion, the case is ranked 0. The cell was monitored by the FBI

for almost two years. During that time the undercover agent noted training and discussion

of targets but no attack had taken place. For the fourth criterion, the case is ranked 1. The

cell made videos that showed how to create suicide vests and IEDs. For the fifth criterion,

108

Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Made in the U.S.A.: The Case of the Toledo Terror Cell," Available

from http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/july/toledo-terror/toledo-terror. 109

Ibid.

63

the case is ranked at 1. The cell used computers to find material on making bombs and

other devices.110

For the sixth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. All the members in the

group had an Islamic background. For criterion seven, the case is ranked at 0. The group

did not have any skills that would have been beneficial prior to training. The undercover

agent did have extensive training but did not share it with the group, which the FBI is

quick to note in their press release.111

For criterion eight, the group is ranked at .5. The

cell had a clear leader who was Amawi. For criterion nine, the group is ranked at 0. There

was no clear plan that was developed before the FBI made arrests. Based on what they

were researching, it might have eventually been a suicide bombing. For criterion ten, the

group is ranked at .75. Amawi traveled to the Middle East to distribute computers and

attempt to set up means to fund jihad groups in the area. The undercover agent also went

with Amawi.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Toledo .5 .25 0 1 1 1 0 .5 0 .75

110

US District Attorney's Office Northern District of Ohio. Three sentenced for conspiring to commit

terrorist acts against Americans overseas. 10-22-2009. 111

Federal Bureau of Investigation, "Made in the U.S.A.: The Case of the Toledo Terror Cell," Available

from http://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/2010/july/toledo-terror/toledo-terror.

64

UNITED KINGDOM CASES

7/7 Bombers

The series of attacks that were carried out on July 7, 2005 were the worst attacks

in London since the Second World War. The cell that carried out the attacks was

investigated by the British Government and their findings were published in a series of

reports. For the first criterion, the case is ranked at .25. The investigations by the British

Government reveals that the group met prior to the attack and some members may have

know each other prior to the planning.112

The reports suggest that there is no evidence to

suggest that they had long prior relationships. For the second criterion, the case is ranked

at 1. The group was influenced by Anwar Al-Awlaqi, but the report of MI5, the British

Domestic intelligence service indicates that there were no connections to Al-Qaeda.113

For the third criterion, the case is ranked at .5. The cell began their planning period at the

beginning of 2005 and carried out the attacks in July of 2005. For the fourth criterion, the

case is ranked at .75. Although the group did not directly upload material to the internet,

they did make martyrdom videos that were then obtained by Al-Qaeda and posted as

radicalization material.114

For the fifth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. The evidence

available on the case indicates that all of their training material came from the internet.

For the sixth criterion, the case is ranked at .75. Of the four members, three were raised

Muslim, and the fourth, Lindsay, converted. For the seventh criterion, the case is ranked

at 0. The report from the British Government does not indicate that the members had an

advances training in explosives or technology prior to their training for the plot. For the

eighth criterion, the case is ranked at .75. There was a clear ringleader, Mohammed

112


Intellegence and Security Committee. 113

Ibid. 114

Ibid.

65

Siddique Khan. For the ninth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. The attack was carried out

through the use of suicide bombings. For the tenth criterion, the case is ranked at .5. Two

of the bombers had visited Pakistan at one point; however the others in the group did not

travel.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

7/7 .25 1 .5 .75 1 .75 0 .75 1 .5

Glasgow Airport attack

The attack on the Glasgow airport in 2007 was carried out by two individuals.

The original plan was to attack a nightclub in London. However, when that plan failed the

plan switched to a backup plan that consisted of carrying out the attack in Scotland.115

For the first criterion, the case is ranked at .3. The two individuals, Kahfeel Ahmed and

Bilal Abdullah, attended Cambridge around the same time; however they were not the

same graduating class. For the second criterion, the case is ranked at .8.No direct

evidence indicating contact between the cell and Al-Qaeda, however the group was

inspired and based the plan on a video posted by Al-Zarqawi on the internet. For the third

criterion, the case is ranked at .6. Although the main planning for the main plan for an

attack in London began in February 2007, the secondary plan to attack the Glasgow

115

Matthew Taylor, "The doctor, the engineer and a failed call that averted disaster," The Guardian, 17

December 2008.

66

airport started later, possibly with only three months of planning.116

For the fourth

criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Abdullah distributed jihadist material online. This was

actually what tipped off MI5 which then began an investigation into the cell.117

For the

fifth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. According to the report from the British

Government, the group is believed to have learned how to create their bombs through use

of the internet. For the sixth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Both individuals were

raised Muslim in practicing families. For the seventh criterion, the case is ranked at .8.

Abdullah had training as a doctor and Ahmed had training in Mechanical and

Aeronautical engineering. While not directly related to bomb making, these skills could

have allowed the two to make bombs that had a deadlier capacity.118

For the ninth

criterion, the case is ranked at .5. The initial plan in London called for the detonation of a

bomb within the nightclub and then a car bomb outside the nightclub, both to be

detonated remotely. After these bombs failed to detonate, then the cell enacted the plan to

ram a car packed with explosives into the Glasgow Airport. For the tenth criterion, the

case is ranked at .75. Abdullah was not a native of the United Kingdom. He was born in

Iraq, leaving for the U.K. only after becoming a doctor. He could have been radicalized in

Iraq or even had some training. 119

116

Ibid. 117

Ibid. 118

Ibid. 119

Andrew Pierce, "Ties that bind terror car bomb suspects," The Telegraph, 5 July 2007.

67

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Glasgow .3 .8 .6 1 1 1 .8 .5 .5 .75

Exeter bombing

The Exeter bombing case from May of 2008 is an example that shows the

limitations of online instruction for an activity such as bomb making. The bomber, Nicky

Reilly, was found in a bathroom stall at a restaurant with severe burns after the bomb he

attempted to detonate failed to explode.120

For the first criterion, the case is ranked at 1.

Reilly was a Lone Wolf case, although police initially did investigate others Reilly was

found to have acted alone. For the second criterion, the case is ranked .9. Reilly never had

any direct dealings with Al-Qaeda in person. Instead all communications are believed to

have gone through email or online chats.121

For the third criterion, the case is ranked at 1.

The police investigating this case believed that there was likely only a few weeks of

planning before the attack. For the fourth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Reilly had an

account on the internet video site, youtube.com from which he posted videos and

discussed jihad.122

For the fifth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. The entirety of the

training was conducted through the internet. For criterion six, the case is ranked at 0.

120


http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/england/devon/7415470.stm. 121

Ibid. 122


October 2008.

68

Reilly converted to Islam at age 17; when he carried out his attack he was 22.123

For the

seventh criterion, the case is ranked 0. There is no evidence of any skill prior to his

training online that would have benefited him in constructing his bomb. For criterion

eight, the case is ranked 1. Reilly acted alone. For criterion nine, the case is ranked 1. The

attack that Reilly is believed to have been attempting was that of a suicide bombing. For

criterion ten, the case is ranked 1. At no time did Reilly travel outside of Exeter for

training or for radicalization. This case raised the possibility of Al-Qaeda or other terror

networks reaching out to those of limited mental capacity or mentally ill to be used as

suicide bombers. This fear is reported to be seen by MI5 as a similar tactic as had been

used in Iraq.124

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Exeter 1 .9 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1

Dhiren Barot

The case of Dhiren Barot is an example of a case where the individual was

radicalized in the United Kingdom and served as an operative of Al-Qaeda in the West.

Barot was tied by police to several different plots, but not as an attacker.125

Instead they

believe that Barot served to ensure that other cells carried out Al-Qaeda’s bidding and

123

Ibid. 124

David Leppard and Abul Taher, "MI5 fears jihadis will use mentally ill as suicide bomber," The Times,

25 May 2008.

125

Adam Fresco, "How radical Islam turned a schoolboy into a terrorist," The Times, 7 November 2006.

69

served as a link between Al-Qaeda and other cells. Interestingly, Barot is the kind of

operative that the online social networks and their use by Al-Qaeda to inspire Western

Islamic Radicals, is meant to render obsolete. For the first criterion, the case is ranked at

1. Although Barot interacted with other cells, he was himself not affiliated with anyone

else. He can be considered a cell of one, or a Lone Wolf. For the second criterion, the

case is ranked at 0. Because of the path Barot traveled in Al-Qaeda, he traveled to

Pakistan and was himself, tied to Al-Qaeda leadership. For criterion three, the case is

ranked 0. Although Barot is believed to have been in contact and assisted other cells, he

did so by providing reconnaissance. For criterion four, the case is ranked at 0. Barot did

write a book in 1999 which was a jihad recruiting book, but there is no evidence he

contributed online.126

For the fifth criterion, the case is ranked at 0. Barot received

extensive training in Pakistan and later in Malaysia as he progressed through the ranks in

Al-Qaeda. For the sixth criterion, the case is ranked at 0. Barot was born Hindu and

converted to Islam in the United Kingdom at age 20.127

For the seventh criterion, the case

is ranked at 0. There is no evidence that he had any applicable skills prior to training. For

criterion eight, the case is ranked at .9. Barot on his own would put him in category of

Lone Wolf, when he interacted with other cells, he would be considered to have been in a

leadership capacity temporarily. For the ninth criterion, the case is ranked at 0. A plan did

not yet exist that Barot was directly carrying out prior to arrest. For the tenth criterion, the

case is ranked at 0. As previously stated, Barot traveled to Malaysia and Pakistan.

126

Ibid. 127

Ibid.

70

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

. S

po

nta

neo

us

form

ula

tio

n o

f

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

N

o t

rain

ing

by

Al-

Qae

da

or

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Barot 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 .9 0 0

2006 Transatlantic Plot

The 2006 Transatlantic Plot was described at the time by the governments of the

United Kingdom and the United States as being the biggest plot since September 11th

.128

The plan was to position operatives on several different airliners crossing the Atlantic.

While in flight, the cell members would use liquids that when combined and triggered

would explode and destroy the airplanes.129

Following this plot, airline security

implemented strict restrictions on the amounts of liquids passengers could bring onboard.

For the first criterion, the case is ranked at .1. The various parts of the cell or sub-cells

maintained email and phone contact. There is no other evidence of extensive contact. For

the second criterion, the case is ranked at .1. The group sent Rashid Rauf to Pakistan to

meet with Al-Qaeda. Out of all the members of the group, he is believed to have been

only one of two to have made contact between the group and Al-Qaeda.130

For the third

criterion, the case is ranked at .5. The arrests were made before the plot could be

finalized. When the first arrests were made, an email instructing the remaining members

to put the plan into motion was sent. Authorities were able to make the remainder of the

128


http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/europe/08/12/terror.plot/index.html. 129



Ibid.

71

arrests before any were able to do so. For the fourth criterion, the group is ranked at .2.

The group did make martyrdom videos, based on what happened with the videos in the

July 7th

bombing case, it is reasonable to believe that the same thing would have

happened to the videos in this case had it been successful. For the fifth criterion the cell is

ranked at .9. The cell relied on internet resources in conjunction with the training that

Rauf received in Pakistan. For the sixth criterion, the cell is ranked at .5. About half the

cell were converts and the other half were of Islamic upbringing. For the seventh

criterion, the case is ranked at .1. Out of the twenty members, only one is noted as having

a strong background in science. For criterion eight, the case is ranked at .9 Rauf was

responsible for much of the contact with Al-Qaeda, while the cell itself was led by

Abdulla Akmed Ali. For the ninth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. In order to mix the

chemicals, the cell members would need to be on the aircraft. The subsequent explosion

would be while the plane was still in flight. For the tenth criterion, the case is ranked at

.8. The leader traveled to Pakistan several times for training and Rauf also traveled to

Pakistan to meet with Al-Qaeda

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

.

Sp

on

tan

eou

s fo

rmu

lati

on

of

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

No

tra

inin

g b

y A

l-Q

aed

a o

r

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Trans-

Atlantic

.1 .1 .5 .2 .9 .5 .1 .9 1 .8

Richard Reid

The case of Richard Reid is more commonly know as the case of the ‘shoe

72

bomber’. In December of 2001, while aboard a flight from Paris to the United States,

Reid attempted to ignite an explosive hidden in his shoe.131

He was subdued by a flight

attendant and passengers. For the first criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Reid was a Lone

Wolf. For criterion two, the case is ranked at 0. Both the investigators in Europe and the

United States agree that Reid was in fact an Al-Qaeda operative with direct contact with

the leadership of Al-Qaeda.132

For the third criterion, the case is ranked at .75. Reid began

the plan in August of 2001 and put that plan into action in December of that year.133

For

the fourth criterion, the case is ranked at 0. There is no evidence that Reid contributed to

any social networks. It is also important to not that at this time many of the tools to create

and contribute to online social networks did not exist yet. Those that did exist, such as

web forums, were still in a very early stage. For the fifth criterion, the case is ranked at 0.

Much of the training that Reid had took place when he was in Pakistan. For the sixth

criterion, the case is ranked at .5. Reid was born in London in 1973. He converted to

Islam in the mid 1980s, gravitating towards radicalism in the 90s.134

For the seventh

criterion, the case is ranked at 0. Reid did not posses any skills prior to training. For the

eighth criterion, the case is ranked at 1, as again Reid was a Lone Wolf operative. For the

ninth criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Reid’s attack called for the detonation of a bomb

in his shoe while the plane was in flight. For the tenth criterion, the case is ranked at 0.

Reid traveled to Pakistan and trained with Al-Qaeda from 1999-2000.

131

Michael Elliott, "The Shoe Bomber's World," TIME, 2002. 132

Ibid. 133

Ibid. 134

Ibid.

73

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

.

Sp

on

tan

eou

s fo

rmu

lati

on

of

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

No

tra

inin

g b

y A

l-Q

aed

a o

r

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Reid 1 0 .75 0 0 .5 0 1 1 0

Roshonara Choudhry

The case of Roshonara Choudhry comes from 2010. In late 2010 Choudhry

repeatedly stabbed British MP Stephen Timms in his office. Choudhry is believed to have

been inspired to do so after watching videos made by Anwar Al-Awlaqi.135

For the first

criterion, the case is ranked at 1. Choudhry operated as a Lone Wolf. For the second

criterion, the case is ranked at 1. There was no evidence of direct contact with Al-Qaeda.

Choudhry’s inspiration seems to have come from videos made by Al-Awlaqi. For the

third criterion, the case is ranked at 1. After getting the idea of attacking MP Timms,

Choudhry would have only needed a few days to plan. For the fourth criterion, the case is

ranked at.5. While Choudhry did not personally contribute to online networks, videos

made at her trial have been used on many radical sites.136

For the fifth criterion, the case

is ranked at 1. There is no evidence for training by Al-Qaeda. For the sixth criterion, the

case is ranked at 1. Choudhry was raised as a practicing Muslim. For criterion seven, the

case is ranked at 0. There is no evidence of any skills that would have benefited

135

Duncan Gardham, "Arrest over website that encouraged Muslim to attack MPs," The Telegraph, 10

November 2010. 136

BBC News, "Woman jailed for life for attack on MP Stephen Timms," Available from

http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-england-london-11682732.

74

Choudhry’s plan. For criterion eight, the case is ranked at 1. Choudhry was a Lone Wolf.

For criterion nine, the case is ranked at 1. Choudhry’s attack called for her to be within

striking distance of MP Timms. For criterion ten, the case is ranked at 1. There are no

signs that Choudhry ever traveled abroad for training or radicalization.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

stro

ng

pri

or

rela

tio

nsh

ip b

etw

een

cel

l

mem

ber

s.

Lac

k o

f co

nta

ct b

etw

een

cell

an

d A

l-Q

aed

a

Lea

der

ship

.

Sp

on

tan

eou

s fo

rmu

lati

on

of

pla

n f

or

atta

ck.

Co

ntr

ibu

tio

n t

o

rad

ical

izat

ion

of

oth

ers

via

on

lin

e so

cial

net

wo

rks.

No

tra

inin

g b

y A

l-Q

aed

a o

r

Tal

iban

.

Ex

iste

nce

of

pri

or

Isla

mic

her

itag

e.

Sig

nif

ican

t te

chn

olo

gic

al

skil

l p

rio

r to

tra

inin

g.

Co

her

ence

of

hie

rarc

hy

in

the

cell

.

Pre

sen

ce o

f a

pla

n

inv

olv

ing

no

n-r

emo

te

atta

ck.

No

fo

reig

n t

rav

el f

or

trai

nin

g o

r ra

dic

aliz

atio

n

Choudhry 1 1 1 .5 1 1 0 1 1 1

Average cases in the United States and United Kingdom

Though the cases looked at here are not randomly selected and so may not be

representative of the total number of cases involving homegrown Islamic radicalism on

some level, there is adequate data to create an idea of what differences exist between the

cases from the United States and United Kingdom. The average rating for each of the

criteria is listed below in the two graphs which are split between the United States and

United Kingdom. In doing this, the various cases now can be compared against an

average calculated from all the ratings above. In synthesizing a single case that represents

the all the cases from a country, both countries can easily be compared together against

each other. A single average case however, is limited with regards to other aspects that

can be looked at in this study. One such limitation is that there can be no consideration of

progression over time. As such the cases will be looked at in chronological order later in

this study.

75

The average of the cases from the United States reflects a hypothetical cell that is

likely to know each other and have strong prior connections between the members in that

cell. The cell is likely to be made up of members that were either born Muslim with a

strong heritage of observing Muslim traditions, or converting for a significant period of

time prior to radicalization. This is significant because at 72.5% fulfillment of the

criterion, this reflects that based on the cases looked at, three out of four cells are likely to

have members that have a strong Islamic background. This is a very interesting when

compared with the same criterion in the United Kingdom as is detailed below. A strong

hierarchy with in the cell is also very important. According to the average at 80%

fulfillment of the criterion, the cell is likely to have a coherent source of motivation and

leadership. Whether this is a member in the leadership role or a case of a lone wolf, the

model based on the average indicates that there will likely be a strong central focus in the

motivation with in the cell. Interestingly this is in keeping with Victoroff’s depiction of

terrorist networks, particularly with the concept of leadership. Victoroff describes

terrorist groups, and on a smaller scale cells, as being made up of certain archetypes that

fill specific roles with in a cell.137

Virtually all cells with in the cases from the United

States that are not lone wolf cases, exhibit a leader that adheres to the structure that

Victoroff suggested. The types of leaders suggested by Victoroff include; self-imagined

idealist, self-imagined messianic, ethnic or religious animus driven, and entrepreneur.138

The majority of the cases looked at from the United States then fall into the category of

having a leader that is religiously driven. Several cases such as the New York Subway

plot from 2009 or the Lackawanna Six cell show cells where a member expressed

137

Jeff Victoroff, "The Mind of the Terrorist: A Review and Critique of Psychological Approaches," The

Journal of Conflict Resolution 49, no. 1 (2005): 3-42. 138

Ibid.

76

misgivings with carrying out the plan. The leader of the cell subsequently convinced the

reluctant cell member to carry out the act. The cells where a reluctant member objects, is

also a cell that had traveled to Afghanistan or Pakistan for training, and as few if any of

the leaders exhibited anything resembling visions of self-grandeur, it stands to reason that

these leaders used religious dogma to rally their follower or followers. Additionally this

hypothetical cell is slightly more likely than not to have no training from Al-Qaeda, the

Taliban, or any other larger terror network. However, it should be noted that this is only

true to a limited degree. The average rating is .6, and thus is only marginally above the

half way point that separates presences of the criterion and non-presence.

Pre

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US .74 .5 .425 .3 .6 .725 .2 .8 .5 .455

The average case in the United Kingdom shows a cell that is planning an attack

that is not using remote means. The average fulfillment for this criterion is 78.6%; the

overwhelming majority of cases looked at show a cell that looks to commit attacks that

will bring them into direct contact with their victims. Additionally the average of cases in

the United Kingdom show high fulfillment of the criterion, ‘coherence of hierarchy in the

cell’. The average shows a rating on this criterion at .864. There is a strong element of

structure among the cells in the United Kingdom. Not only do the UK cells have a

stronger sense of structure within the group, at an average rating of .621 the cells are

77

nearly two-thirds of the time likely to have a plan for an attack that requires very little

time between preparation and attack. There may be a connection between having a strong

hierarchical structure within the cell and rapid development of an attack plan. The UK

cells are also just over half of the time seen to have traveled overseas to receive training.

This may then account for low amount of planning time. Additionally, a simple method of

attack such as a stabbing or suicide bombing is likely to require less time and preparation

than a remote detonated bomb. In the former, a cell would only need to know how best to

get past any security that may be present. In the later example, the cell would need to be

able to not only get past security, but prepare an explosive that would be detonated

remotely and ensure that said bomb is not discovered. The case of the Glasgow Airport

attack shows this well. That cell had originally attempted to detonate a bomb remotely in

a nightclub in London. When the nightclub victims fled outside, a second bomb was

prepared to detonate remotely.139

However, due to an issue with cell phone reception in

the nightclub, the bomb never received the signal. When the cell tried to set off the car

bomb outside, the chemicals lacked enough oxygen to detonate.140

Following these failed

attempts, British Counterterrorism officials immediately set about finding the cell.141

The

cell knowing that the British law enforcement was now closing in on them, opted for an

attack on the Glasgow airport near where they were hiding. The plan called for them to

ram the entrance with a Jeep and detonate the propane tanks they had in their vehicle.

Ultimately, this plan was also not successful because the tanks were not properly set

139

Matthew Taylor, "The doctor, the engineer and a failed call that averted disaster," The Guardian, 17

December 2008. 140

Ibid. 141

Ibid.

78

up.142

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UK .664 .543 .621 .492 .7 .536 .129 .864 .786 .579

There are a few areas where there is significant difference in the average ratings

of the UK cells and the US cells. The first is that the cells in the United States are rated at

74% fulfillment of criterion, ‘presence of a strong prior relationship between members’.

In contrast, the cells in the United Kingdom rate at 66.4% on average. Both rankings are

high but it shows that among the cases looked at, there are fewer strong connections

between members prior to training. This perhaps suggests the cell members were brought

together by an external element, either an individual with prior ties to Al-Qaeda, or that

the group was linked prior to the formation of the cell by social networks that are online

and thus evidence of online social networks having a significant role in the formation of

these cells in the United Kingdom. The UK cells are also ranked at 54.3%, little more

than half, for fulfillment of the criterion, ‘lack of contact between cell and Al-Qaeda

leadership’. This is more than the rating of 50% on average in the US cells. The UK cells

then are slightly more likely to have contact with Al-Qaeda than the US cells, but are also

far less likely to have training from Al-Qaeda. The UK cells have an average rating of

70% fulfillment on the criterion of ‘No training by Al-Qaeda or Taliban’. This suggests

142

Adam Fresco, "Duo who attacked Glasgow airport 'were resigned to death', say officers," The Times, 5

July 2007.

79

that if the UK cells are in contact with Al-Qaeda, they are not receiving a significant

amount of support or training. Another possibility is that Al-Qaeda may encourage the

cells and suggest targets through online means.

Those goals are then carried out by the cell that operates as an independent agent or

agents. In the case of the 7/7 bombers, the cell received no direct support from Al-Qaeda,

but two of the members had traveled to Pakistan.143

The British government suggests that

this was an ideological trip rather than an operational meeting.144

The conclusion of the

British government report is the cell was influenced by the internet, without clear support

from Al-Qaeda. In this example, there is a cell that is radicalized and moved to carry out

a terror attack via the internet. This case shows that a group can form and seek to carry

out an attack with little to no training or guidance from Al-Qaeda or other terrorist group.

In the United States, the case of Major Nidal Hasan, the Fort Hood shooter, is another

example showing clear signs of online social networks having a role in a homegrown

Islamic terrorist. Hasan like the 7/7 bombers, was heavily influenced by the lectures of

Anwar Al-Awqai who also influenced several other cases in the United States and United

143


Intellegence and Security Committee.; Mark Townsend, "Leak reveals official story of London bombings,"

The Observer, 9 May 2006. 144

Ibid.

Average Case Ratings

0

0.2

0.4

0.6

0.8

1

1st

Criter.

2nd

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3rd

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4th

Criter.

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US UK

80

Kingdom.145

Hasan carried out the attacks with no direct influence or support from Al-

Qaeda. What both these cases show, along with other cases on both sides of the Atlantic,

is that there are real cases where the internet is used to connect Al-Qaeda and its

associates with those looking to carry out attacks in the West.

Analysis

Criteria conclusions based on Data

Based on the data gathered in the study, for the first criterion, ‘strong prior

relationship between members prior to training’, the data suggests two different stories

for the United States and the United Kingdom. What this criterion looks for is a scenario

where the cell members know of each other well enough before training, either through

family, personal history, or from Mosque, and they gradually radicalize each other and

bring others in to the close circle. From there the cell has formed and begins to look at

options for attack.146

This is the basic model for radicalization that relies on a social

network that exists in the non-virtual or real world. The opposite of this would be a group

that has virtually no relationship prior to the formation of the cell. In this scenario it

would be necessary for some other set of connections to bring the group members

together. This set of connections would be a social network that is formed online and then

brought into the real world after radicalization. The later model is the one suggested by

Kohlmann and others.147

The data from the United States cases do not support the

argument for cells being formed through online social networks. Instead the rankings for

145

Philip Sherwell and Duncan Gardham, "Fort Hood shooting: radical Islamic preacher also inspired July

7 bombers," The Telegraph, 23 November 2009. 146

Lt. Com. S. P. Huntington, Royal Navy, "Al-Qaeda: a Blueprint for International Terrorism in the

Twenty-First Century?," Defence Studies 4, no. 2 (2004): 229-255. 147


The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 618 (2008): 95-109.

81

this criterion are, with the exception of one case, all at least at 50% fulfillment or above.

This indicates that the history of how the cell members met and formed the cell has more

in common with the first scenario above, of meeting through real world connections, than

from the second scenario. In the United Kingdom, the results are quite different. With the

exception of the lone wolf cases, the remaining cases are all below 50% fulfillment. In

the United Kingdom, as suggested by the data, cells meet for the sole purpose of an

attack. Part of the reason for the stark difference between the United States cases and the

United Kingdom cases here might be reflective of the initial intentions of the cell. Several

of the cases in the United States where members of the cell have traveled abroad do so

because they are seeking to participate in attacks overseas. After interacting with

extremist groups in Afghanistan or Pakistan, they return to the United States after being

implored by those extremist groups that they can do more for their cause at home than in

Afghanistan or Pakistan. This is the point in the Lackawanna case where the cell became

more reluctant to continue, also in the New York Subway plot where Ahmedzay

expressed reluctance to carry out attacks inside the Untied States. Thus the cell is initially

formed in the United States with different goals than the cells in the United Kingdom.

One of the key points of the theory of online social networks being used for

radicalization is that Al-Qaeda does not need to have direct contact with the cells

themselves.148

The idea being that Al-Qaeda can post information, propaganda, or decrees

on an online message board somewhere and disaffected Muslims will see this and seek to

undertake jihad and attack Western nations in the homeland. A crude analogy might be to

liken radicalization to a virus, and this theory suggests that the virus is now airborne.

Such a concerning concept is even more concerning as it is at least partially support by

148

Ibid.

82

the data from these cases. Unlike the previous criterion, the second one, ‘Lack of contact

between cell and Al-Qaeda leadership’, shows closer ratings overall between the two

countries. In the United States, the cases show radicalization happening before the cell

contacts Al-Qaeda, if they do at all. Only Daniel Boyd of the Raleigh cell could really be

considered to have had prior contact with groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and that

would be from when he was over there during the 1980s. In the United Kingdom cases,

there were two cases where the individuals involved were actually Al-Qaeda agents

working in the Untied Kingdom. Though they were radicalized in the United Kingdom,

their attack plans were devised with Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Of the other cells, there is

far less evidence to suggest any contact between Al-Qaeda or any other group and the

cases in the United Kingdom. The average over all is significantly higher than the United

States, in part because the cells did not initially look to carry out attacks overseas before

deciding to carry out an attack in the United Kingdom.

Generating a spontaneous plan for an attack, criterion three, is an element of

homegrown terrorism that is a source of great concern for counterterrorism officials. The

ability to blend in seamlessly with the population, to travel overseas or acquire material

without raising concerns greatly complicates the task of preventing attacks. The data from

the cases suggests that in the cases from the United States, the cells took more time to

plan and strategize than the cells in the United Kingdom. There are a few factors that

likely contribute to the differences in planning periods. First, as noted above, many of the

cells in the United States did not initially plan to carry out an attack in the United States.

Second, the cells in the United States planned attacks that required more time to set up

and prepare. These attacks usually included bombs that would be remotely detonated. As

83

almost none of the cases looked at in either the United States involved cell members that

had explosives or mechanical expertise prior to training, any cell planning a remote

detonated attack would require extra time to plan. The only two examples in either the

United States or the United Kingdom of cell members that might have had the expertise

to carry out an attack with explosives prior to training were Nidal Hasan from the Fort

Hood attack and Kafeel Ahmed from the Glasgow Airport attack. In the United Kingdom

cases, the attacks were of a less ambitious sophistication. The cases involved a stabbing,

two suicide bomb attacks, a car bomb attack, and two plots involving explosives on an

airplane. None of these attacks were planned to be remote, although the Glasgow cell had

attempted a remote detonated attack before the Glasgow Airport attack using a car bomb.

In order for anything to become a self-sustaining phenomenon on the internet,

there must be new users who contribute new material to carry on the theme or message.

This is true also for radicalization through online social networks. Thus in criterion four,

the goal is to see if any of the cases looked at might have been responsible for

perpetuating the model. The data gathered suggests that if radicalization through online

social networks is self-sustaining, these are not the ones that help ensure that outcome. In

the United States, only two of the cases involve a cell member that actively published

material on the internet pertaining to radicalization or jihad. In the United Kingdom, there

are two clear cases where the individuals posted some material online and three more

where the cell contributed only by creating videos, or in Choudhry’s case protesting in

the courtroom, which were to later be posted online by others. Thus it can not be said that

there is no content being provided by any of those homegrown radicals that attempt to

carry out attacks, it is just a small amount. Another interesting difference exists between

84

the United States and the United Kingdom. The cells that carried out suicide bombings in

the UK left martyrdom videos. This adheres to a similar model of attack that is carried

out in Afghanistan and Iraq. In the United States however, none of these cells left behind

martyrdom videos.

The concept of a disaffected Muslim who radicalizes from material viewed online

and then carries out a deadly attack, is at the basis of what scholars suggest is Al-Qaeda’s

current plan and a source of great concern for the counterterrorism community. If groups

like Al-Qaeda can radicalize someone over the internet with little to no contact, a sort of

‘downloadable jihadist’, then all the current security precautions are null. However, is it

really even possible to carry out an attack successfully with only the training acquired

through the internet? This is the basic argument of Michael Kenney who explains that

there are two different types of knowledge; metis the knowledge of experience, and

techne the knowledge gained from reading. The question then remains, where does bomb

making and terrorism in general fit? If one considers this a trade, then it would be more

like metis. If it is something that can be learned from reading, then clearly the distribution

of material related to jihad on the internet is a major cause for concern. Kenney suggest

this is not the case, “developing a feel or ‘‘knack’’ for building bombs and performing

other violent acts requires practice and learning-by-doing, which is difficult to obtain

from the Internet, no matter how many online manuals one reads or instructional videos

one watches.”149

Kenney used the attack on the Glasgow Airport as an example for his

argument. He uses testimonies from investigators that detailed the very obvious design

flaws that the cell made which prevented their attack, from not having an oxygen source

149

Michael Kenney, "Beyond the Internet: Mētis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for


85

adequate to allow their crude bomb to explode, to placing nails on the floor of the car

which would give the nails a downward trajectory on detonation rather than an outward

one.150

Kenney points out that the consensus among counterterrorism officials is that

most would-be homegrown terrorists use internet resources to design and build their

bomb but do not realize how difficult it is to make a functional device. This is also

reflected in the data and cases looked at in this study as most of the cases are not

successful. Thus the high ratings indicating that few cells had training from Al-Qaeda or

other terrorist is not unexpected. From the cases in the United States, the average rating is

.6 which indicates more than half the cases had no training of any kind from Al-Qaeda.

Of these six cases, only one was successful, which is of course Hasan who was trained in

weapons by the Army. The remaining four, Vinas and the NY Subway cell were picked

up prior to any attempted attack, Shahzad’s attempt to detonated a car bomb in Times

Square failed as the construction of the bomb was flawed, and the Lackawanna cell did

not have a clear plan in place at all before their arrests. Only four of the cases did not

involve the use of bombs as the primary attack, and none of the cells had any expertise in

bomb making. In the United Kingdom the pattern is the same. Of the cases looked at

from the United Kingdom, four out of seven cells had no training from Al-Qaeda. Of the

remaining three, one was Richard Reid and another Dhiren Barot, who were both Al-

Qaeda agents and had strong connections to the network. The third case was the

Transatlantic plot which British Intelligence believes was planned by Al-Qaeda

leadership. The trend that is clear across cases from both countries is that radicalized cells

are enthusiastic to participate in jihad, but lack a clear understanding of the mechanics of

how to do so. Kenney’s assertion that terrorism is a practical knowledge application

150

Ibid.

86

would seem to be supported by the evidence in these cases. However, this should not be

understood to mean that groups with no real training in bomb making will never succeed

in an attack.

One of the more controversial issues surrounding homegrown Islamic

radicalization is that the focus is on a small minority in the United States and European

countries such as the United Kingdom. This is particularly true in the case of the United

States where Muslims make up an estimated 0.6% of the American Population.151

The

small size of the Muslim population and the general unfamiliarity with Islam on the part

of Non-Muslim Americans has created an environment where Islamophobia, the fear and

distrust of Islam and Muslims, thrives.152

The perception that any Muslim anywhere

could suddenly radicalize and attack after viewing online material is a myth that both

scholars and law enforcement seek to dispel. However in studying homegrown

radicalization of Muslims, it is useful to examine if those perpetrating these acts are

converts or those that have been born and raised Muslim. Many scholars such as

Sageman, Silber and Bhatt, and others agree, as do their models of radicalization, that the

spark of radicalization comes from a personal event that serves as the trigger. This event

is often a point of great distress. This suggests that Islamic heritage and Islam itself, has

little to do with the ideology espoused by those who become homegrown radicals.

Keeping this in mind, the data from this study presents some interesting insights. In the

United States, the cases have an average rating of .725 fulfillment of the sixth criterion,

‘existence of prior Islamic heritage’. This indicates that the cells in these cases have a

151

Pew Research Center. Muslim Americans: Middle Class and Mostly Mainstream. 5-22-2007. Pew

Research Center. 152

Pew Research Center. Public Remains Conflicted Over Islam. 8-24-2010. Washington, D.C., Pew

Research Center.

87

stronger Islamic heritage than the cells looked at in the cases from the United Kingdom,

which have an average rating of .536. This would indicate that there are more converts

among the cases in the United Kingdom. In one particular case from the United

Kingdom, that of the Exeter bomber Nicky Reilly, the individual had no prior Islamic

heritage before being converted to radical Islam through online forums and postings. As

noted before, MI5 believes that Reilly was specifically used and indoctrinated by Al-

Qaeda because of his Asperger’s Syndrome.153

This is case where the traditional model

does not easily fit. That model presumes that potential radicals do not have any

significant mental handicaps. To date however, there do not appear to be any other cases

in the United States or United Kingdom that are similar to this case of radicals targeting a

mentally handicapped individual to carry out an attack.

If the cells do not have any training from Al-Qaeda, it is then also important to

look at if the cells had any training or expertise prior to radicalization or training that

would provide them with the practical knowledge to carry out an attack. Again from

Kenney’s concept of practical and theoretical knowledge, the assumption would be that if

the cells are to be successful in their attacks, then they will have to be sufficiently trained

in the skill of explosives or weaponry. As it has already been seen that these cells have

not been trained by Al-Qaeda or other terror group, then the only other way for the cells

to have this practical knowledge is if they had attained it prior. The results are very

similar to those of the other criterion, there is little to suggest any of the cells had any

prior skills that would be applicable to their plans, again with the exception of a few. This

few are the established Al-Qaeda agents, Barot and Reid, and Hasan who was a trained

153

David Leppard and Abul Taher, "MI5 fears jihadis will use mentally ill as suicide bomber," The Times,

25 May 2008.

88

soldier. In the United States cases, the average rating is .2 fulfillment of the criterion. In

the United Kingdom the average is .129 fulfillments. This again clearly demonstrates the

concept of practical versus theoretical knowledge as put forth by Kenney. The definition

of what constitutes practical knowledge and what kinds of knowledge are and are not

applicable would have to be very clear as both members of the cell that carried out the

attack at the Glasgow Airport had advanced degrees. One was a medical doctor and the

other was a mechanical engineer. Yet they made what authorities described as amateurish

mistakes in their bomb construction and attacks.154

It should be noted as well that the two

trained by Al-Qaeda to carry out attacks, Barot and Reid, also failed in their attempted

attacks. Reid was prevented by a combination of passengers on the plane and the

explosives in his shoe being too wet from the previous day’s rain.155

Barot was arrested

by authorities before he could even move his plan into an operational stage. Thus without

more evidence to show that the presence of practical knowledge in terms of terrorism, is

key factor in the success of a cell, it is hard to significantly prove the application of

Kenney’s concept of practical and theoretical knowledge to the results of this study.

There are strong signs to suggest that this might be applicable but not enough to prove

this in any substantial way.

Without terrorist training, cells of homegrown Islamic radicals are at a

disadvantage in accomplishing their goals. In order for a cell of more than one member to

function efficiently, there needs to be a clear leader and possibly even a developed

hierarchy within the cell. This would allow the cell function and work towards a common

goal. Additionally the leader provides motivation to the cell and ensures that they do not

154

Michael Kenney, "Beyond the Internet: Mētis, Techne, and the Limitations of Online Artifacts for

Islamist Terrorists," Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (2010): 177-197. 155


89

reconsider their actions and disassociate from the cell. The average rating from the cases

in the United States is 80% fulfillment of this criterion. From the United Kingdom the

average rating is 86.4% fulfillment. These averages also take into account lone wolf cases

as complete fulfillment of the criterion since a lone wolf is still a cell and needs to

function as their own leader. Even when the lone wolf cases are removed from

consideration in the cases from both countries, there remains a high fulfillment of this

criterion. This suggests that groups undertaking jihadist activity may form a hierarchy

within their group. This however is really evidence of a theory of power in small groups

put forth by Louis Rath. Rath states that the power in small group reflects inequalities

that are inherent in the group and that one individual will usually emerge as the leader

and ensure compliance in the group towards a goal.156

This theory reflects the dynamic in

groups such as the Lackawanna group and the NY Subway plot. In both cells, there were

members that expressed reluctance and in both these members were brought back into

compliance by another member that served as the leader. Thus the results reflect the

realities of group dynamics; also it serves to indicate that on this aspect, the cells are not

much different from any other small group.

The attacks that are carried out by Islamic terrorists around the world can be

divided into two categories, attacks that are carried out through remote means and those

that are carried out through non-remote means. Non-remote attacks would include suicide

bombings, shootings, and stabbings. Remote attacks would refer to bombs that are

remotely detonated such as with a cell phone, or an attack that is used in Iraq and

Afghanistan, the Improvised Explosive Device which may be left along the side of a road

to explode later. On this criterion there is considerable difference between the United

156

Louis Raths, "Power in Small Groups," Journal of Educational Sociology 28, no. 3 (1954): 97-103.

90

States cases and the United Kingdom cases. The average rating of fulfillment of this

criterion of the US cases is 50%. In the United Kingdom cases, the average rating for this

criterion is 78.6%. The cells in the United Kingdom are almost entirely positioned around

suicide attacks in the sense that no means of escape after the attack would be realistic.

The only two that do not count towards the fulfillment of the criterion are the Glasgow

Airport cell and Barot. The Glasgow cell initially attempted an attack in London using

remote detonated bombs, when those failed they carried out their attack on the airport in

Glasgow which was a non-remote attack. Barot was arrested before a plan was set up.

When authorities arrested him he was scouting targets for a potential attack. In the United

States, there were five cases which were intended to be remote attacks or were

apprehended before a plan could be devised. The five that were non-remote attacks, Fort

Dix, NY Subway plot, JIS cell in Los Angeles, Fort Hood, and Bryant Vinas. It is difficult

to explain why there is such a divide in the United States cases between remote and non-

remote attacks. There does not seem to be any pattern evident between the cells.

Though the question of how the cells train or prepare to carry out an attack has

been covered in this study the tenth criterion looks at how the idea of how ‘homegrown’

are the homegrown cells. For this criterion, the United States cells have an average rating

of 45.5% fulfillment of the criterion and the United Kingdom cells have 57.9%. At first

this may seem paradoxical since the proximity of the United Kingdom to the Middle East

is far greater than the United States to the Middle East. This however does not reflect the

trend that is evident in these cases. This trend is reflected in the criterion regarding

training by Al-Qaeda. Many of the cells from the United States initially travel to Pakistan

in order to train and travel into Afghanistan, only to be told by Al-Qaeda to return to the

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United States and carry out attacks there. Additionally, there is not too much of a

difference between the ratings for the cases of both countries. In the United States, four

cases have no foreign travel. Interestingly, these four cases all have strong reasons for not

traveling abroad. The Portland Christmas Tree bomber Mohamed Mohamud was

enveloped in and FBI sting while attempting to travel, The Fort Dix cell was mostly

young adults who likely would not have been able to afford the expenses, the L.A. cell

had two members that had extensive criminal records that might have aroused the

suspicion of the authorities, and Nidal Hasan was assigned to Fort Hood and would likely

have aroused suspicion. Hasan is likely the only case where the homegrown radical’s

choice of timing for the attack was linked to his desire not to travel to Afghanistan or

Pakistan. Hasan discovered he was scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan only weeks before

his attack at Fort Hood. He had strong objections to participating in warfare against other

Muslims.157

In the United Kingdom, the two cases where there was no travel abroad,

Nicky Reilly in Exeter and Roshonara Choudhry, also have reasons such travel was not

undertaken. In the case of Reilly, he likely did not feel there was anything to be gained by

travel. Additionally, he received much of his instruction over the internet. Those

instructions likely instructed him not to travel to Afghanistan or Pakistan. As for

Choudhry, her target was MP Steven Timms over his support for the war in Iraq. As her

attack was carried out by stabbing the MP, there was little that traveling to Afghanistan or

Pakistan would have done to help her plan.

157


Government's failure to prevent the fort hood attack". 3-2-2011.

92

Lone Wolf cases

One element that has significant implications for government policy is the number

of lone wolf cases. Lone wolf cases in terrorism research are nothing new. Theodore

Kaczynski, the Unabomber, is one such example of a lone wolf terrorist that was

immensely difficult for the United States government to track down. The ideology and

typography of lone wolf terrorism was looked into with some depth by Ze’en Ivainsky

who looked primarily at the anarchist terrorists around the turn of the twentieth century.

Presciently, Ivainsky wrote of the anarchists, “The distinguishing feature of anarchist

assassination is the fact that it is done by a ‘lone wolf’ and is neither initiated nor backed

by any underground organization.”158

Ivainsky’s observation that lone wolf terrorists are

self-initiators and lack the back of networks, accurately describes the type of terrorists

seen today in the lone wolf cases. In addition to being difficult to hunt down by law

enforcement, there are plenty of historical cases to show that lone wolf terrorists can have

a dramatic impact on world affairs. Gavrilo Princip, the assassin who shot Archduke

Ferdinand setting in motion a chain of events that led to World War I, was a member of a

terrorist network called the Black Hand. It is not a stretch to see parallels between Princip

attacking Archduke Ferdinand and Roshonara Choudhry attacking MP Steven Timms.

Similar still is the notion that these lone wolf actors are faceless until they strike.

In the current era, the concept of lone wolf terrorists takes on a new twist.

Through the use of the internet, online forums and video posting sites among other

things, contact between Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or Pakistan can indirectly reach a

disaffected individual in New York, London, Exeter, Chicago or elsewhere, and create a

158

Ze'ev Iviansky, "Individual Terror: Concept and Typology," Journal of Contemporary History 12, no. 1

(1977): 43-63.

93

potential terrorist. Such as in the case of Nicky Reilly in Exeter, an individual with no

resemblance to any ‘profile’ can ally themselves with Al-Qaeda and turn themselves into

a weapon. In the case of Reilly, his Asperger’s syndrome was used by extremists online to

radicalize him and use him to create a bomb with which to kill his fellow citizens.159

The

ability to connect that has been provided by the internet is a significant advancement, but

this advancement is not isolated only to those that have a mainstream opinion, quite the

opposite in fact. Where as previously a small group or network, such as the Black Hand

for example, may have been able to spread their message through printing pamphlets or

through outburst during a trial, today’s terror networks can craft a website and set up a

hidden organization entirely on the internet. In a sense the internet is like an impossible

shape where all points meet and the opposite simultaneously. Where once knowledge that

might have filled an entire library, it can now fit on a small, handheld computer.

Not all knowledge can be downloaded via the internet, or even printed in a book.

The debate over metis and techne as described by Kenney still applies here. Of the eight

cases looked at which involve a lone wolf terrorist, only two accomplished their goals,

and one of those only had temporary success. Major Hasan succeeded in his attack at Fort

Hood and Roshonara Choudhry managed to stab MP Timms repeatedly. Noted however

that Hasan’s goals were not necessarily clear prior to his attack other than shoot U.S.

soldiers, and Choudhry only managed to severely maim the MP who managed to recover.

Successful terrorist attacks are rare compared to the number of failed attempts. Hasan as

a soldier, was trained to fire a weapon and kill, where as someone like Reilly, had no

background in explosives. Reilly’s knowledge came from reading, and thus could be

159


October 2008.

94

considered ‘techne’, where as Hasan had military training and practice, what is

considered ‘metis’.

For law enforcement, a lone wolf cell is perhaps the most difficult scenario from

the angle of intervention. In most cases, the authorities might want to use divisions within

the cell to convince members to inform on each other, such as in the NY Subway case.

Other times authorities might decide to have an informant infiltrate the cell to provide

information on the cell’s plans, such as in the Toledo case. In a situation where there is a

lone wolf, it is much more difficult to detect and investigate. Authorities investigating the

case of the Portland Christmas Tree lot utilized mistakes made by Mohamud to steer him

in to an FBI sting operation. The break which allowed the FBI to steer him into the sting

in the first place was when Mohamud emailed a contact that was under surveillance by

the FBI. When Mohamud attempted to email a second contact in Pakistan, he entered the

email address incorrectly. This is when the FBI seized their opportunity to set up their

sting operation. Of course the lone wolf cells also have strong disadvantages as well.

Unlike the cells with multiple members, lone wolf cells have only one person to rely on.

The more people in the cell the more likely the members will balance out the weakness of

the members.

Role of Anwar Al-Awlaqi

If there is one single element that arises again and again in these cases, it is the

role of Anwar Al-Awlaqi. Several of the cases looked at are tied to Al-Awlaqi either

through direct communication or by means of viewing one of his lectures. Even more

cases beyond the ones looked at here have been tied to him by British and American

Intelligence agencies. Al-Awlaqi’s connection with jihad and Al-Qaeda can be traced

95

back to 2000 and his name and his writings and lectures appear in the investigations of

most of the plots perpetrated by homegrown radicals since 2000160

. From his location in

Yemen, Al-Awlaqi publishes videos of his lectures online and frequently writes blog

entries concerning what Muslims should do in the West to be good Muslims. While the

United States officials do not believe that Al-Awlaqi currently is personally planning or

helping to plan attacks in the United States and United Kingdom, they do believe that he

is not only a driving force ideologically, but the key driving ideological force in

radicalizing Muslims in the United States and United Kingdom.161

Al-Awlaqi is the driving force specifically in the United States and United

Kingdom because he is one of the only Al-Qaeda clerics that are not only fluent with the

English language, but fluent in the culture and customs of the United States and United

Kingdom as well. Born in Las Cruces, New Mexico in 1971, Al-Awlaqi’s father was

attending New Mexico State University pursuing a master’s degree.162

The family would

return to Yemen in 1978. After receiving a scholarship to attend Colorado State

University, Al-Awlaqi returned to the United States in 1991 to pursue civil engineering.

Interestingly he traveled to Afghanistan in 1993 and had a very negative experience,

expressing to his friends how he disliked the poverty the people lived in.163

He pursued

his Islamic faith and shortly after graduating he became an imam in Denver and would

later move to San Diego to run a mosque.164

While in San Diego, Al-Awlaqi began to

have connections to jihadists including some with connections to the first World Trade

160

Bobby Ghosh, "How Dangerous Is the Cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki?," TIME, 2010. 161

Ibid. 162

Ibid. 163

Ibid. 164

Ibid. ; Ironically, it was in San Diego while pursuing his master’s degree that he was detained by police

for soliciting prostitutes, according to U.S. intelligence officials.

96

Center attack in 1993, and would eventually lead him into contact with Al-Qaeda.165

The FBI found that he had held frequent meetings with the some of the 9/11

hijackers who attended his mosque after Al-Awlaqi relocated to Virginia.166

Although Al-

Awlaqi publicly denounced the 9/11 attacks, the FBI was already gathering evidence

suggesting that he may have condoned or even encourage the attackers. As a result of the

FBI investigations Al-Awlaqi would leave for the United Kingdom in 2002 where he

would live for two years before returning to Yemen in 2004. Having spent so much time

both in the United States and the United Kingdom, Al-Awlaqi has an ability to reference

the culture in the United States and United Kingdom in his lectures. His ability to connect

with the disaffected Muslims in the United States and United Kingdom is at the heart of

what makes him able to influence and radicalize so many that would later carry out plots

to commit attacks against the United States and United Kingdom. Below is a chart

detailing eleven example of homegrown Islamic radicals who where influenced by Al-

Awlaqi. The list includes many of the cases looked at in this study and some that were not

included in the study.

Terror Plots tied to Anwar Al-Awlaqi167

US - Sept 01 9/11: Investigators believe Al-Awlaqi to be the spiritual adviser of the

hijackers based in Virginia. Al-Awlaqi would flee to Yemen as U.S.

investigators begin to look at his connection to the hijackers.

UK – July 05 7/7 bombers: British investigators discover bombers frequently met at a

bookstore that sold his lectures in book and CD form.

UK – July 05 July 21 plot: British Investigators discover cell that failed to carry out

second wave of bombings were followers of Al-Awlaqi and attended his

lectures when he was in the UK.

CAN – June

06

Toronto 18: Cell watched videos of Al-Awlaqi’s lectures while planning

to attack the Canadian Parliament.

165

Ibid. 166

Ibid. 167

Laura Roberts, "Anwar al-Awlaki: terror plots linked to Yemen-based cleric," The Telegraph, 21

December 2010.

97

UK – Aug. 06 Transatlantic Plot: During the trial of cell members, Abdulla Ahmed Ali

proclaims his admiration for Al-Awlaqi

US – May 07 Fort Dix Plot: Cell members discuss being inspired by Al-Awlaqi during

their trial.

US – Nov 09 Fort Hood: Nidal Hasan found to have been in email contact with Al-

Awlaqi.

US – Dec 09 Christmas Day bomber: Umar Farouk Abdul-mutallab who attempted to

detonate a bomb in his underwear, is found to have been a follower of

Al-Awlaqi,

UK – May 10 MP Timms stabbing: Roshonara Choudhry is inspired to act after

viewing hours of videos of Al-Awlaqi’s lectures.

US – May 10 Times Square Bomber: Faisal Shahzad is inspired to carry out his plot

after reading internet posts from Al-Awlaqi.

US – Dec 10 Portland Bomber: Mohamed Mohamud is inspired to carry out an attack

after reading post on the internet by Al-Awlaqi.

The trend in the chart above is that not only are there many cases where Al-Awlaqi either

influenced the cell directly or indirectly through internet posts, but that the incidents are

increasing. Al-Awlaqi left for Yemen in 2004, shortly after that he began posting material

online that would be viewed by any disaffected Muslim that might look for it.

Before becoming willing to carry out an attack, homegrown Islamic radicals will

look for a means to justify their actions. This is usually enabled by a “virtual spiritual

sanctioner” who provides the justification they seek to carry out their plan.168

This is the

role that is played by Al-Awlaqi. His lectures are closely followed by would be

homegrown radicals. The lectures are often only basic lectures on Islam and Muslim

practices, however there is a significant number of his lectures and internet postings that

refer to attacks on the United States and United Kingdom. These lectures regarding

attacks espouse how Islam and the West are diametrically opposed and as a result of the

inevitable conflict between the two, only one can triumph.169

Beyond lectures and

postings like this Al-Awlaqi also wrote a guide to supporting jihad which implores the

168



Bobby Ghosh, "How Dangerous Is the Cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki?," TIME, 2010.

98

reader to take up the fight against the West.170

For a disaffected Muslim who is

experiencing a point of personal crisis, finding a charismatic voice like Al-Awlaqi is an

irresistible lure. Interspersed among his religious teachings, are his lectures on the

conflict between Islam and the West. This is the point described by some scholars as the

self-identification point in radicalization where the disaffected Muslim views their

personal crisis as a sign of a conflict between the West and Islam.171

As they follow his

lectures, they gradually absorb his teachings imploring them to carry out attacks against

the United States and United Kingdom. This serves as religious justification condoning

their plan to carry out an attack.172

Al-Awlaqi is credited with making Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula into a

network with an international reach rather than just a regional threat.173

In some ways this

threat from Al-Awlaqi and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula represents a separate threat

from the Al-Qaeda of Osama Bin Laden. Indeed, both Al-Awlaqi and Bin Laden share

similar roles in their networks. Both serve primarily as ideological heads of their groups

and are responsible for the justification of attacks rather than the actual planning. A major

difference between the two networks however is that while the Al-Qaeda of Bin Laden is

focused on larger more complicated attacks such as the 9/11 attacks or the Madrid

Attacks, Al-Awlaqi through Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula reach out through the

internet to influence disaffected Muslims anywhere in the world. By using homegrown

radicals, Al-Awlaqi and his Al-Qaeda affiliate can ensure that attacks are far more

170

Bobby Ghosh, "How Dangerous Is the Cleric Anwar Al-Awlaki?," TIME, 2010. 171

Silber, Mitchell D. and Bhatt, Arvin. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Theat. 2007. New

York City, New York City Police Department. 172



Laura Roberts, "Anwar al-Awlaki: terror plots linked to Yemen-based cleric," The Telegraph, 21

December 2010.

99

amorphous than the 9/11 attacks. Although there are fewer successful attacks by

homegrown Islamic radicals, the psychological impact of someone that might seem

familiar carrying out an attack is much greater. The threat coming from online

radicalization efforts of Al-Awlaqi, Al-Qaeda, and other radical groups is a new form of

threat. In a piece regarding the details of Shahzad’s plot to set off a car bomb in Times

Square, the Wall Street Journal quoted General Petraeus, “In the age of the Internet,

virtually anyone has the reach, because virtually anyone can reach out through

cyberspace…and influence these individuals in ways that just were not possible in the

past.”174

How do these results compare with the theory?

The theory looked at in this study is that of homegrown Islamic radicalization

through online social networks. This is the argument championed by Marc Sageman and

Evan Kohlmann among others and represents a concept of Al-Qaeda operations that is

even more amorphous and decentralized that previously conceived. Although this model

is fairly new, only coming about in 2007, the acceptance of the theory has spread from

the New York City Police Department to the halls of the United States Senate, and

beyond. Many of the critics of this model, chief among them Bruce Hoffman, have

argued that Al-Qaeda is resurgent in the region along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.

Hoffman says that this is where the main threat is located and that the idea of homegrown

Islamic terrorism is a minor threat that ignores key connections between supposedly

independent cells and the main network of Al-Qaeda. Another challenge to the model of

online radicalization is the argument of Michael Kenney regarding practical and

174

Youchi J. Dreazen and Evan Perez, "Suspect Cites Radical Imam's Writings," The Wall Street Journal, 6

May 2010.

100

theoretical knowledge. This study compared the cases of 17 cells to see how close these

cases resemble the model put forth by Sageman and Kohlmann, and where challenges

show merit and necessitate a possible revision. The conclusion reached through analysis

of the data, is that the theory of homegrown Islamic radicalization through online social

networks serves to explain the nature of many of the cases but not all. There remain cases

that do not conform to the model suggested by Sageman and Kohlmann. In these cases

the traditional model of Al-Qaeda’s operations, where the network recruits a young

disaffected Muslim in person, trains them, and subsequently assigns them to carry out an

attack, still represents some of the cases. This model of ‘offline’ social networks, which

make minimal use of the internet beyond communications, describes the cases that

dominate the earlier half of time frame that is looked at in this study. The model of online

social networks being used to radicalize and inspire attacks, describes the cases in the

later half of the time frame. As evidenced in the timeline on the following page, the cases

which were chosen with diversity of variables in mind and focused on homegrown cases,

have a higher number in the later years of the time frame as opposed to the earlier

portion. This is to be expected given the highly decentralized nature of the model

presented by Sageman and Kohlmann. What is indicated in this study is that the model

does explain some of the cases which are mostly from recent years. However the

remaining cases are different enough from the model as to suggest that more than one

model exists.

The two models of recruiting and radicalizing disaffected Muslims in the United

States and United Kingdom are roughly defined by the traditional theory of how Al-

Qaeda recruits members, and the theory of online social networks recruiting and

101

radicalizing. The cases looked at in this study separate into the two categories with only a

few exceptions. The exceptions consist of a blending of the two models, to form a hybrid.

This accounts for the case of Faisal Shahzad and Bryant Neal Vinas. Both were

radicalized through material online, the lectures of Al-Awlaqi, jihadist videos or other

material. They continued their process by traveling to Pakistan to make contact with Al-

Qaeda to join their cause. This hybrid model is similar then to the case of the

Transatlantic plot in 2006 where some in the cell were recruited through online social

networks, and additionally, there was strong coordination with Al-Qaeda.

The cases that fit into the model suggested by Sageman represent a growing number of

cases. Of the course of the time frame looked at in the study, the number of cases that fit

with this description increase, where as the number of cases that represent the traditional

model appear to decline. There is not enough data in the study to conclusively indicate

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that there is a clear shift from recruitment and radicalization through personal contact to

the new model of online social networks and of terrorism coming primarily from

homegrown radicals. The indication is these cases suggest such a shift.

The online model derived from the data in this study differs from what is called

for in Sageman and Kohlmann’s theories in several ways. The aspect of the lone wolf is

largely considered to be an anomalous point in the study of terrorism in general. This

mindset has clearly filtered down to the more specific study of homegrown Islamic

radicalization. The theories regarding homegrown radicalization treat lone wolf cases as

wildcards in the data rather than elements to be considered. Sageman’s theory is

colloquially known as the ‘bunch of guys’ theory, and underlines a key assumption in his

study. He assumes that all cells are made up of small groups that radicalize themselves

through access to material on the internet. He does not probe in any real depth the

possibility of an individual self-radicalizing over the internet and carrying out attacks.

There is some acknowledgement of timing that is due for Sageman’s theory. His book

which details his theory was released in 2008. Prior to several of the high profile lone

wolf cases studied here. To date, Sageman has not published any articles or books

regarding homegrown terrorism since 2008. Thus the developments since that time reflect

a need to augment the theory, not to abolish it. Beyond the question of lone wolf cases,

which is reflected to a limited degree in the variant theory produced by the NYPD, there

exists strong correlation to the theory and model put forth. Many of the cases have

documented evidence specifically stating that the cell had a sense of moral outrage,

usually regarding foreign policy of either the United States or United Kingdom. The best

104

cases of this are Roshonara Choudhry who stabbed MP Timms because of his strong

support for the War in Iraq, Mohamed Mohamud who espoused rhetoric to the

undercover FBI agents during the sting operation, Nidal Hasan who held steadfast

opposition to both wars, and the July 7th

bombers who expressed their outrage in their

martyrdom videos. There are of course more examples; these are only the most

prominent. The cells clearly showed a specific interpretation of the world as evidenced by

the recurring theme of Al-Awlaqi’s lectures which are tied to most of the cases. Another

recurring theme in the cases was their resonance with personal experiences. This is the

element that is common across so many theories, and represents the catalyst of the

radicalization process where a disaffected individual will fully embark on their path to

jihad. It is also closely tied to a specific interpretation of the world. As each cell acquired

they specific interpretation either through Al-Awlaqi or another online source, they begin

to relate those teachings to their own lives. This then leads to the final aspect of

Sageman’s theory, mobilization through networks. Sageman is one of the few who do not

break this aspect into multiple parts. More often this element is arranged like the NYPD

model where it is spread among the phases; indoctrination, jihadization, and attack.175

This point in the model is where the ‘spiritual sanctioner’ gives his religious justification

for jihad, and where several criteria regarding the process come into play. Specifically

these criteria are where the biggest differences between the cases explained by the

traditional model differ from the cases explained by the new model of radicalization and

recruitment through online social networks. As seen in the graph below, there is a stark

difference between cases belonging to the traditional model and the new online social

175

Silber, Mitchell D. and Bhatt, Arvin. Radicalization in the West: The Homegrown Theat. 2007. New

York City, New York City Police Department.

105

network model. These six criteria all relate to the operations of the cell, how they train,

how they plan, and how they attack. What this indicates is that the biggest shift between

the two models occurs at this point in the process. Again the NYPD model does specify

some of these elements, and Kohlmann’s work show also explores some of these criteria

as well. These criteria are the clear difference between the two models with regards to

this point in the process.

106

Section V: Conclusion and Areas for Further Research

The issue of homegrown Islamic radicalization in the West will likely be a source

of debate for a long time. The shift from a physical, in person relationship between

recruiter and radical to one based on remote connections with little evidence to arouse

suspicion is a nightmare scenario of counterterrorism officials on both sides of the

Atlantic. The ability of Al-Qaeda and other terror networks to carry out operations

through the use of ordinary Muslims that blend seamlessly into society is a massively

concerning dynamic. One can see where such a dynamic may lead to major shifts from

focuses on liberty to focuses on security and a major increase in paranoia and

Islamophobia. This is the fear that is the core of Al-Qaeda’s goals, to make the West fear

Islam. The opposite of this fear is the reality of the situation. How much knowledge can

truly be obtained through the internet? How effective can a digital document explaining

how to carry out an attack be compared to the hands-on explanation of an experienced

individual? How much truth is there in the fear that Al-Qaeda need only post information

on a website or forum and the diaspora of disaffected and radical Muslims around the

world will care out the plan? What is the true potential of this new paradigm of terror, the

so-called ‘leaderless jihad’176

? In short what is the role of online social networks in the

radicalization and recruitment of homegrown Muslim radicals?

Based on the data presented here, there is some correlation between the cases

from the United States and the United Kingdom in the criteria for the theory. Most

notably there is near identical correlation between the two countries on the criteria of

176

Marc Sageman, Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century 1st ed. (Philadelphia:

University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008).

107

technical skills of the cell members (low), a coherence of hierarchy within the cells, and

also with the existence of prior relationships between the various members of the cell.

However there are some significant differences between the homegrown radicals in the

UK and the US. Among these differences, the cells in the United States tend to be attacks

that are planned for several months where as the UK cell’s had planning and prep periods

that only lasted a matter of weeks to just over a month. While the data on UK cells

contributing online to radical sites is inconclusive, the United States groups clearly

contributed very little online. Interestingly there is also a trend in the United Kingdom of

very innovative cells that have far less contact with Al-Qaeda than their American

counterparts. US cells have far more in the way of foreign travel and a much higher

likelihood of collaboration with Al-Qaeda or Taliban groups. The picture painted here is

of homegrown British cells that are almost spontaneous in their creation and strike

quickly with almost no warning. The same is not apparently true in the United States. The

small majority American cells are consumers of online radicalization content but seek to

commit jihad primarily overseas and not in the United States. Over all the bigger concern

is the increase in lone wolf cells. These cells have the potential to occur anywhere and

have no requirements for coordination with others in the cell. The majority of these lone

wolf cases have few outward signs and can radicalize and prepare through online

resources, although with various levels of success.

Over the course of the decade in question, 2001 to 2010, a shift is clearly visible

from the traditional model where the network and the cells are created through direct

connection between individuals whereby the Al-Qaeda filters plans through a loosely

connected network built on personal relationship, to a model that is even more

108

decentralized where personal connections are replaced by internet connections. In the

new paradigm, which parallels the growth of the mainstream online social networks,

there is no need for an intricate network where a command or initiative is relayed via

personal connection. In this new system, the top level need only to provide the incentive

to fight and the spiritual sanctioning. This new dynamic as theorized by Marc Sageman,

Evan Kohlmann, and others, is to paraphrase William Randolph Hearst, ‘I’ll provide the

pictures, and you provide the war.’ Al-Qaeda and other networks no longer need to

actually be networks but instead only need to be providers of propaganda. This theory

mirrors the reality of organizations that advertise and advocate on various online social

networks such as Facebook and Twitter to further their goals either of selling a product or

urging action on an issue. This paradigm is mirrored by Al-Qaeda and others to convince

others to carry out attacks. Rarely, if ever, do Islamic Radicals use the mainstream online

social networks, such as Facebook or Myspace177

, instead favoring the ‘Dark Web’178

which refers to websites in particular and in a general sense the entire internet that is not

readily available through a search engine such as Google.

Though this shows that Al-Qaeda has the ability to reach and influence on a

global scale with easy and at virtually zero cost, the factor of operational ability remains a

key issue. Kenney’s theory of practical versus theoretical knowledge is central in

explaining how although online social networks can allow disaffected Muslims to

radicalize anywhere, the ability to successfully carry out an attack remains elusive. As

177

It should be noted here that some sites such as Yahoo Groups are frequently used by Islamic radicals as

an online place to discuss. A notable exception as Yahoo is very much a mainstream site and network;

however Yahoo does provide the ability for the Yahoo Group to be made accessible only by password and

will not show up on a search engine. 178

Tim Stevens, "Regulating the "Dark Web": How a Two-Fold Approach Can Tackle Peer-to-Peer

Radicalisation," The RUSI Journal 154, no. 2 (2009): 28-33.

109

demonstrated in many of the cases looked at in this study, the ability to read about

carrying out an attack online far from guarantees a successful attack. With only a single

exception, the July 7th

bombings in London, the attacks have all failed unless the attacker

either has a simple plan such as a stabbing or has prior training in the method of attack

such as Nidal Hasan. A sub group of this example are the cases where the attacker

radicalized though online social networks, then sought to carry out attacks overseas

against Western forces in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iraq, or elsewhere. These radicals may

be trained to some degree by Al-Qaeda or other group, but are then sent back to carry out

attacks in their homelands. Even this training does not guarantee success however. This

last group is also more likely to attract notice from government officials, and is often

what leads investigators to make arrests.

The theory of radicalization and recruitment through online social networks as put

forth in large part by the work of Marc Sageman does not provide a universally

applicable model for all cases of homegrown Islamic radicalization. However, it does

describe a portion of the cases, which is steadily growing as online social networks grow.

Due to the low cost and effort required to create the necessary online material, it is certain

to be the central model of future cases. At current time the method of disseminating the

experiential knowledge needed to carry out an attack remains elusive. This has the effect

of a high number of potential attacks with a much lower rate of attacks that are successful

in their goal. This is not an issue that will disappear in the near future; on the contrary the

model formed by the theory of Marc Sageman suggests that many more attacks will

occur.

There is a great deal of potential for future research in to this topic. It will be very useful

110

to expand the examination of homegrown Islamic radicalization to other countries such as

France179

which has had its own history of violence stemming from homegrown Islamic

radicals. Russia also has a number of cases where by homegrown Islamic radicals have

fought on behalf of Chechen rebels. It would be useful to examine how far the model

extends if at all past the Anglophone world. Another area for further research is on how

the model might apply to other cases beyond Islamic radicalization. A key ability of the

internet is allowing individuals that have a particular worldview to quickly and easily

find others that have that same worldview, no matter how different it may be from the

mainstream. Users can browse the internet in relative anonymity and discard their cloak

of anonymity at their choosing. This is as much true for fans of obscure media as it is for

would-be radicals. The model put forth by Marc Sageman could be minimally modified

and possibly used to describe far-right wing militia groups in the United States, or neo-

Nazi groups in Germany. Yet another area for further research is into how the internet is

used to provide detailed information on ‘do-it-yourself’ projects and that information is

not transferable to the realm of terrorism. While it should not be the goal of anyone

studying this matter to improve the method of teaching terror, it is useful to understand

why something like this is difficult to teach online. As the internet continues to grow and

online social networks expand ever more into the daily lives of everyone, the study of

how these tools can be utilized to further an objective of terrorism is ever more critical.

179

Some investigators suspect that Richard Reid must have had assistance in crafting his bomb while in

Paris. They point to a lack of any evidence to suggest that he stayed in a hotel, and his apparent ease in

acquiring the necessary components for his bomb.

111

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