Agricultural Tenancy in Semi-Arid Tropical Villages of India
Transcript of Agricultural Tenancy in Semi-Arid Tropical Villages of India
Progress Report
Economics Program 17
Agricultural Tenancy
in Semi-Arid Tropical Villages of India
N S~ Jodha
ICRISAT
International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics
ICRSAT Patancheru PO
Andhra Pradesh 502 324 India
October 1980
ABSTRACT
Farm-level data on agricultural tenancy in three agroclimatic
zones of peninsular India confirm earlier findings that the agricul-The heteroshytural land market in India is largely a tenancy market
geneity of tenants resulting largely from the ratherrecent emergence
of large farmers as tenants may further complicate tenancy policies The emergence of large farmers as
enacted in order to help the poor not only adversely affect small-farm tenants but lead to
tenants may concentration of land otherwise prevented by ceilings on owned lad
found to be highly flexible and responsiveThe terms of tenancy were parties and r -wasoncontingenciesto resource positions of the two
Tenancy tended to equalize the landbullock ratiosfaced by them but not the landfamily labour ratios of tenant and land owntas To
lesser extent tenancy also tended to induce or facilitate interlinked a
other agriculturalfactor markets particularly fortransactions in credit
Agriultural Teniancy In Semi-Arid Tropical Ni 1Vages of-india
I
The temporary transfer of land via tenancy is one ofr the oldest insitutional
devices evolved in order to facilitate adjustmentsiin agricuiturgi fadtor
markets However one of the side effects ofthe adjustment proceS resultshy
ing mainly froN--th6i-nequal resource position of Jandlord and tenants has
been the ossible exploitation of tenants Consequently as in India prior
to indepefidence tenancy was largely viewed as an instrument of exjioitatdon
of the ak dgulation of tenancy therefore became a key feature -f pobstshy
independence India The regulatory measures in association with fastdtcshy
lining landman rtios and technological improvements in agriculturet have
considerably transformed the objective circumstances under which iefiancy
now operates Tenancy seems to have acquired new reasons and varied forms
t Agricultural Economist International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (11TA) in Tanzania Early-drafts of this paper were prepared while ktde author was Economis at the International Crops Research Institte for the Semi-Arid Tropics whose assistance is greatfully acknowledged Th3 author is thankful to Hans P Binswanger Dayanatha Jha and James G Ryan for their valuable suggestions during the preparation of this paper fie also thanks MJ Bhende SS Badhe KG Kshirsagar V Bhaskar qao and T Balaramaiah the Economic Investigators who helped in conducting this study
Released for publication by ICRISAT January 1981) as Conference Paper 2 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mec-anisms of Rural Labor Narkets in Developing Areas held in Hyderabad India August 22-24 1979 It will be published in Hans P Binswanger and M Rosenzweig (eds) Rural labor markets in Asia Contractual Arrangement Employment and Wages Yale University Press 1901
For documentation and analysis ci tenancy in India in recent years see Vyas (1970) Khusro (1973) Rao (1972) Rao (1975) Joshi (1975) Bardhan (1976) Sanyal (1977) Bardhan and Rudra (1978)
1
2
This has meant there is a need pra fresh ad closerw190k at agricultural
A a n rs cls- tarclua
tenancy especially as a means of adjustment and interlinked transaction
in agricultural factor markets (Bardhan 1978 Srinivasan 1978) However
cospite the strong desire on the part of scholars to dmcent the eftent ad Eorms of
tenancy and tha availability of theoretical models to capture the rationale -of agricultural tenancy efforts directed to study tenancy per se usually have not succeeded -Because of the great capacity of farmers to hide it- +agricultural tenancy simply disappears once one starts investigating it
through the usual one or two round surveys Because of its very sensitive
nature the subject calls for participant observation over a longer pert d
of time
The present paper discusses some dimensions of agricultural tenancy in three agroclimatic zones in semi-arid tropical India It is based on fairly
continuous observation and intensive interaction with rural households for a
period of 3 to 4 years The details presented here complement the information
presented in two accompanying papers by Ryan and Chodake (1979) and Doherty
et al (1979) presented at an ADC-ICRI1AT Labor Market Conference Those
papers discus$othet facets of agricultural labor markets in thesame areas
DATA
Data used in thispaper were collected as a part of ICRISAT Village Level r-
Stt dies (VLS) commenced in May 1975 in twovillages each in the districts of Akola (Maharashtra) Sholapur (Maharashtra)-and Mahbubnagar (Andhra Pradesh)
The areas represent three agroclimatic zones in peninsular semi-arid tropical
India The methodological details type of data etc are presented in Jodha
et al (1977) The information relevant to this study is presented below
3
Under the VLS data were collected from a randomly selected panel of 30
farm households and 10 labor households (which include land operators with
less than 02 ha of operated area) Data were collected on various socioshy
economic and agrobiological aspects at an interval of 20 to 30 days The
datacollection was done under the sxpervision of ICRISAT Center economists
by resident investigators with rural backgrounds masters degrees in agrishy
cultural economics and who belonged to the same linguistic group as the
villagers
Details about tenancy were not collected until 2 years of field work
were completed in the villages The only information about tenancy collected
since the beginning of field work in May 1975 was the ownership status of
each plot The initial concealment of tenanted plots disappeared over time
Collection of input-output data and their cross checking with data in scheshy
duleson household transactions bullock and labor utilization further helped
revealing not only tenancy transactions but their terms and conditions
All plots involving laad transfers between households via tenancy as
well as sale purchase gift succession etc during the first 4 years of
the VLS were first listed Separate interviews foi collecting additional
data about those plots were conducted in the third and fourth years of field
work Information from both parties in the land transfer was collected even
if one of the parties was not a panel respondent of the village studies
The data include their resource position the terms conditions and backshy
ground of the transaction The quantitative information was supplemented by
investigators personal observatioas and the authors own field notes
-------------------- -- -- ------------------------ -- ------- -------------------------
Table I Details of the villages covered in TCRTSATsvillage level s audies
Raliiall -Irriga- Farm-size Groupsc (ha)Annual Varia- tionb Small Medium Large
Village District St-te average bility Soil type - C V -
- --
Kanzara Akola Naharashtra -120-- 27 Medium deep 49 021 25 2 26-560 gt 560 Vertisols
Kinkheda Akola 820 27 38 021-30 301-560 gt 560 Kalman Sholap i -690 29 Deep and medium 104- 021-600 60-l075i gt1075
deep Vertisols -
Shirapur Shoiapur 690- 29 Deep Vertisols 133 021-2S0 251-600 gt 600
Aurepalle Mahbub - Andhia 710 28 Shallow and 210-- 01 2S 25- 5 gt-2 - nagar Pradesh - medium deep L
4
Alfisols -
Dokur 1ahbub 710 28 Shallow and 6601 -021 100 1 -3 OOFgt3 00 nagar - medium deep-
Alfisolsshy
--------------------- ------------ ------------------shy
a _CRISAT has been conducting studies in the six villages since May 1975 (Jodhi efa 1977) roirrigated areas asproporionf gosscropped areas (average 3 years)
Cbn the basis of operational and holfingo
5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first examine the importance of tenancy transactions in total landtransshy
fers The rest of the discussion is devoted to tenancy only the partners
in tenancy transactions terms and conditions (including period of lease)
the reason given by farmers for lease transactions and a verification of
these reasons from other data
Tenancy dominated land market
Table 2 presents the new land transfers occuring during the 4 years via
leasing-in leasing-out return of land due to termination of earlier leases
sale purchase gift succession property division etc in which at least 2
one party was a L-panel respondent
Inthe villages every year 14 to 46 of the operated area of the sample
households was temporarily or permanently changing hands via new land transshy
fers of different types Furthermore 77 to 97 of new land transfers wu
due to tenancy transactions only This once again confirms the fact that
in the ontoxt of Indian villages the land market operates largely through
tenancy rather than through outright salepurchase (Bardhan and Rudra 1978)
Thus it is appropriate to study the land market and its functioning largely
in terms of tenancy
The data about Kalman (Sholaput) and Kinkheda (Akola) Villages relate only
to the first three years throughout this paper 3ownership of land is one of the biggest sources of security in the villages MVen the opportunity no one wants to sell land During periodic crises through droughts floods and other calmities farmers prefer W mortgage or lease out the land in the hope of getting the land back at some future time If they fail to regain the land the leased or mortgaged land is adjusted as salepurcahse (Jod a 1978) Also see Rao (1972)
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
ABSTRACT
Farm-level data on agricultural tenancy in three agroclimatic
zones of peninsular India confirm earlier findings that the agricul-The heteroshytural land market in India is largely a tenancy market
geneity of tenants resulting largely from the ratherrecent emergence
of large farmers as tenants may further complicate tenancy policies The emergence of large farmers as
enacted in order to help the poor not only adversely affect small-farm tenants but lead to
tenants may concentration of land otherwise prevented by ceilings on owned lad
found to be highly flexible and responsiveThe terms of tenancy were parties and r -wasoncontingenciesto resource positions of the two
Tenancy tended to equalize the landbullock ratiosfaced by them but not the landfamily labour ratios of tenant and land owntas To
lesser extent tenancy also tended to induce or facilitate interlinked a
other agriculturalfactor markets particularly fortransactions in credit
Agriultural Teniancy In Semi-Arid Tropical Ni 1Vages of-india
I
The temporary transfer of land via tenancy is one ofr the oldest insitutional
devices evolved in order to facilitate adjustmentsiin agricuiturgi fadtor
markets However one of the side effects ofthe adjustment proceS resultshy
ing mainly froN--th6i-nequal resource position of Jandlord and tenants has
been the ossible exploitation of tenants Consequently as in India prior
to indepefidence tenancy was largely viewed as an instrument of exjioitatdon
of the ak dgulation of tenancy therefore became a key feature -f pobstshy
independence India The regulatory measures in association with fastdtcshy
lining landman rtios and technological improvements in agriculturet have
considerably transformed the objective circumstances under which iefiancy
now operates Tenancy seems to have acquired new reasons and varied forms
t Agricultural Economist International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (11TA) in Tanzania Early-drafts of this paper were prepared while ktde author was Economis at the International Crops Research Institte for the Semi-Arid Tropics whose assistance is greatfully acknowledged Th3 author is thankful to Hans P Binswanger Dayanatha Jha and James G Ryan for their valuable suggestions during the preparation of this paper fie also thanks MJ Bhende SS Badhe KG Kshirsagar V Bhaskar qao and T Balaramaiah the Economic Investigators who helped in conducting this study
Released for publication by ICRISAT January 1981) as Conference Paper 2 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mec-anisms of Rural Labor Narkets in Developing Areas held in Hyderabad India August 22-24 1979 It will be published in Hans P Binswanger and M Rosenzweig (eds) Rural labor markets in Asia Contractual Arrangement Employment and Wages Yale University Press 1901
For documentation and analysis ci tenancy in India in recent years see Vyas (1970) Khusro (1973) Rao (1972) Rao (1975) Joshi (1975) Bardhan (1976) Sanyal (1977) Bardhan and Rudra (1978)
1
2
This has meant there is a need pra fresh ad closerw190k at agricultural
A a n rs cls- tarclua
tenancy especially as a means of adjustment and interlinked transaction
in agricultural factor markets (Bardhan 1978 Srinivasan 1978) However
cospite the strong desire on the part of scholars to dmcent the eftent ad Eorms of
tenancy and tha availability of theoretical models to capture the rationale -of agricultural tenancy efforts directed to study tenancy per se usually have not succeeded -Because of the great capacity of farmers to hide it- +agricultural tenancy simply disappears once one starts investigating it
through the usual one or two round surveys Because of its very sensitive
nature the subject calls for participant observation over a longer pert d
of time
The present paper discusses some dimensions of agricultural tenancy in three agroclimatic zones in semi-arid tropical India It is based on fairly
continuous observation and intensive interaction with rural households for a
period of 3 to 4 years The details presented here complement the information
presented in two accompanying papers by Ryan and Chodake (1979) and Doherty
et al (1979) presented at an ADC-ICRI1AT Labor Market Conference Those
papers discus$othet facets of agricultural labor markets in thesame areas
DATA
Data used in thispaper were collected as a part of ICRISAT Village Level r-
Stt dies (VLS) commenced in May 1975 in twovillages each in the districts of Akola (Maharashtra) Sholapur (Maharashtra)-and Mahbubnagar (Andhra Pradesh)
The areas represent three agroclimatic zones in peninsular semi-arid tropical
India The methodological details type of data etc are presented in Jodha
et al (1977) The information relevant to this study is presented below
3
Under the VLS data were collected from a randomly selected panel of 30
farm households and 10 labor households (which include land operators with
less than 02 ha of operated area) Data were collected on various socioshy
economic and agrobiological aspects at an interval of 20 to 30 days The
datacollection was done under the sxpervision of ICRISAT Center economists
by resident investigators with rural backgrounds masters degrees in agrishy
cultural economics and who belonged to the same linguistic group as the
villagers
Details about tenancy were not collected until 2 years of field work
were completed in the villages The only information about tenancy collected
since the beginning of field work in May 1975 was the ownership status of
each plot The initial concealment of tenanted plots disappeared over time
Collection of input-output data and their cross checking with data in scheshy
duleson household transactions bullock and labor utilization further helped
revealing not only tenancy transactions but their terms and conditions
All plots involving laad transfers between households via tenancy as
well as sale purchase gift succession etc during the first 4 years of
the VLS were first listed Separate interviews foi collecting additional
data about those plots were conducted in the third and fourth years of field
work Information from both parties in the land transfer was collected even
if one of the parties was not a panel respondent of the village studies
The data include their resource position the terms conditions and backshy
ground of the transaction The quantitative information was supplemented by
investigators personal observatioas and the authors own field notes
-------------------- -- -- ------------------------ -- ------- -------------------------
Table I Details of the villages covered in TCRTSATsvillage level s audies
Raliiall -Irriga- Farm-size Groupsc (ha)Annual Varia- tionb Small Medium Large
Village District St-te average bility Soil type - C V -
- --
Kanzara Akola Naharashtra -120-- 27 Medium deep 49 021 25 2 26-560 gt 560 Vertisols
Kinkheda Akola 820 27 38 021-30 301-560 gt 560 Kalman Sholap i -690 29 Deep and medium 104- 021-600 60-l075i gt1075
deep Vertisols -
Shirapur Shoiapur 690- 29 Deep Vertisols 133 021-2S0 251-600 gt 600
Aurepalle Mahbub - Andhia 710 28 Shallow and 210-- 01 2S 25- 5 gt-2 - nagar Pradesh - medium deep L
4
Alfisols -
Dokur 1ahbub 710 28 Shallow and 6601 -021 100 1 -3 OOFgt3 00 nagar - medium deep-
Alfisolsshy
--------------------- ------------ ------------------shy
a _CRISAT has been conducting studies in the six villages since May 1975 (Jodhi efa 1977) roirrigated areas asproporionf gosscropped areas (average 3 years)
Cbn the basis of operational and holfingo
5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first examine the importance of tenancy transactions in total landtransshy
fers The rest of the discussion is devoted to tenancy only the partners
in tenancy transactions terms and conditions (including period of lease)
the reason given by farmers for lease transactions and a verification of
these reasons from other data
Tenancy dominated land market
Table 2 presents the new land transfers occuring during the 4 years via
leasing-in leasing-out return of land due to termination of earlier leases
sale purchase gift succession property division etc in which at least 2
one party was a L-panel respondent
Inthe villages every year 14 to 46 of the operated area of the sample
households was temporarily or permanently changing hands via new land transshy
fers of different types Furthermore 77 to 97 of new land transfers wu
due to tenancy transactions only This once again confirms the fact that
in the ontoxt of Indian villages the land market operates largely through
tenancy rather than through outright salepurchase (Bardhan and Rudra 1978)
Thus it is appropriate to study the land market and its functioning largely
in terms of tenancy
The data about Kalman (Sholaput) and Kinkheda (Akola) Villages relate only
to the first three years throughout this paper 3ownership of land is one of the biggest sources of security in the villages MVen the opportunity no one wants to sell land During periodic crises through droughts floods and other calmities farmers prefer W mortgage or lease out the land in the hope of getting the land back at some future time If they fail to regain the land the leased or mortgaged land is adjusted as salepurcahse (Jod a 1978) Also see Rao (1972)
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
Agriultural Teniancy In Semi-Arid Tropical Ni 1Vages of-india
I
The temporary transfer of land via tenancy is one ofr the oldest insitutional
devices evolved in order to facilitate adjustmentsiin agricuiturgi fadtor
markets However one of the side effects ofthe adjustment proceS resultshy
ing mainly froN--th6i-nequal resource position of Jandlord and tenants has
been the ossible exploitation of tenants Consequently as in India prior
to indepefidence tenancy was largely viewed as an instrument of exjioitatdon
of the ak dgulation of tenancy therefore became a key feature -f pobstshy
independence India The regulatory measures in association with fastdtcshy
lining landman rtios and technological improvements in agriculturet have
considerably transformed the objective circumstances under which iefiancy
now operates Tenancy seems to have acquired new reasons and varied forms
t Agricultural Economist International Institute of Tropical Agriculture (11TA) in Tanzania Early-drafts of this paper were prepared while ktde author was Economis at the International Crops Research Institte for the Semi-Arid Tropics whose assistance is greatfully acknowledged Th3 author is thankful to Hans P Binswanger Dayanatha Jha and James G Ryan for their valuable suggestions during the preparation of this paper fie also thanks MJ Bhende SS Badhe KG Kshirsagar V Bhaskar qao and T Balaramaiah the Economic Investigators who helped in conducting this study
Released for publication by ICRISAT January 1981) as Conference Paper 2 This is a revised version of a paper presented at the ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mec-anisms of Rural Labor Narkets in Developing Areas held in Hyderabad India August 22-24 1979 It will be published in Hans P Binswanger and M Rosenzweig (eds) Rural labor markets in Asia Contractual Arrangement Employment and Wages Yale University Press 1901
For documentation and analysis ci tenancy in India in recent years see Vyas (1970) Khusro (1973) Rao (1972) Rao (1975) Joshi (1975) Bardhan (1976) Sanyal (1977) Bardhan and Rudra (1978)
1
2
This has meant there is a need pra fresh ad closerw190k at agricultural
A a n rs cls- tarclua
tenancy especially as a means of adjustment and interlinked transaction
in agricultural factor markets (Bardhan 1978 Srinivasan 1978) However
cospite the strong desire on the part of scholars to dmcent the eftent ad Eorms of
tenancy and tha availability of theoretical models to capture the rationale -of agricultural tenancy efforts directed to study tenancy per se usually have not succeeded -Because of the great capacity of farmers to hide it- +agricultural tenancy simply disappears once one starts investigating it
through the usual one or two round surveys Because of its very sensitive
nature the subject calls for participant observation over a longer pert d
of time
The present paper discusses some dimensions of agricultural tenancy in three agroclimatic zones in semi-arid tropical India It is based on fairly
continuous observation and intensive interaction with rural households for a
period of 3 to 4 years The details presented here complement the information
presented in two accompanying papers by Ryan and Chodake (1979) and Doherty
et al (1979) presented at an ADC-ICRI1AT Labor Market Conference Those
papers discus$othet facets of agricultural labor markets in thesame areas
DATA
Data used in thispaper were collected as a part of ICRISAT Village Level r-
Stt dies (VLS) commenced in May 1975 in twovillages each in the districts of Akola (Maharashtra) Sholapur (Maharashtra)-and Mahbubnagar (Andhra Pradesh)
The areas represent three agroclimatic zones in peninsular semi-arid tropical
India The methodological details type of data etc are presented in Jodha
et al (1977) The information relevant to this study is presented below
3
Under the VLS data were collected from a randomly selected panel of 30
farm households and 10 labor households (which include land operators with
less than 02 ha of operated area) Data were collected on various socioshy
economic and agrobiological aspects at an interval of 20 to 30 days The
datacollection was done under the sxpervision of ICRISAT Center economists
by resident investigators with rural backgrounds masters degrees in agrishy
cultural economics and who belonged to the same linguistic group as the
villagers
Details about tenancy were not collected until 2 years of field work
were completed in the villages The only information about tenancy collected
since the beginning of field work in May 1975 was the ownership status of
each plot The initial concealment of tenanted plots disappeared over time
Collection of input-output data and their cross checking with data in scheshy
duleson household transactions bullock and labor utilization further helped
revealing not only tenancy transactions but their terms and conditions
All plots involving laad transfers between households via tenancy as
well as sale purchase gift succession etc during the first 4 years of
the VLS were first listed Separate interviews foi collecting additional
data about those plots were conducted in the third and fourth years of field
work Information from both parties in the land transfer was collected even
if one of the parties was not a panel respondent of the village studies
The data include their resource position the terms conditions and backshy
ground of the transaction The quantitative information was supplemented by
investigators personal observatioas and the authors own field notes
-------------------- -- -- ------------------------ -- ------- -------------------------
Table I Details of the villages covered in TCRTSATsvillage level s audies
Raliiall -Irriga- Farm-size Groupsc (ha)Annual Varia- tionb Small Medium Large
Village District St-te average bility Soil type - C V -
- --
Kanzara Akola Naharashtra -120-- 27 Medium deep 49 021 25 2 26-560 gt 560 Vertisols
Kinkheda Akola 820 27 38 021-30 301-560 gt 560 Kalman Sholap i -690 29 Deep and medium 104- 021-600 60-l075i gt1075
deep Vertisols -
Shirapur Shoiapur 690- 29 Deep Vertisols 133 021-2S0 251-600 gt 600
Aurepalle Mahbub - Andhia 710 28 Shallow and 210-- 01 2S 25- 5 gt-2 - nagar Pradesh - medium deep L
4
Alfisols -
Dokur 1ahbub 710 28 Shallow and 6601 -021 100 1 -3 OOFgt3 00 nagar - medium deep-
Alfisolsshy
--------------------- ------------ ------------------shy
a _CRISAT has been conducting studies in the six villages since May 1975 (Jodhi efa 1977) roirrigated areas asproporionf gosscropped areas (average 3 years)
Cbn the basis of operational and holfingo
5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first examine the importance of tenancy transactions in total landtransshy
fers The rest of the discussion is devoted to tenancy only the partners
in tenancy transactions terms and conditions (including period of lease)
the reason given by farmers for lease transactions and a verification of
these reasons from other data
Tenancy dominated land market
Table 2 presents the new land transfers occuring during the 4 years via
leasing-in leasing-out return of land due to termination of earlier leases
sale purchase gift succession property division etc in which at least 2
one party was a L-panel respondent
Inthe villages every year 14 to 46 of the operated area of the sample
households was temporarily or permanently changing hands via new land transshy
fers of different types Furthermore 77 to 97 of new land transfers wu
due to tenancy transactions only This once again confirms the fact that
in the ontoxt of Indian villages the land market operates largely through
tenancy rather than through outright salepurchase (Bardhan and Rudra 1978)
Thus it is appropriate to study the land market and its functioning largely
in terms of tenancy
The data about Kalman (Sholaput) and Kinkheda (Akola) Villages relate only
to the first three years throughout this paper 3ownership of land is one of the biggest sources of security in the villages MVen the opportunity no one wants to sell land During periodic crises through droughts floods and other calmities farmers prefer W mortgage or lease out the land in the hope of getting the land back at some future time If they fail to regain the land the leased or mortgaged land is adjusted as salepurcahse (Jod a 1978) Also see Rao (1972)
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
2
This has meant there is a need pra fresh ad closerw190k at agricultural
A a n rs cls- tarclua
tenancy especially as a means of adjustment and interlinked transaction
in agricultural factor markets (Bardhan 1978 Srinivasan 1978) However
cospite the strong desire on the part of scholars to dmcent the eftent ad Eorms of
tenancy and tha availability of theoretical models to capture the rationale -of agricultural tenancy efforts directed to study tenancy per se usually have not succeeded -Because of the great capacity of farmers to hide it- +agricultural tenancy simply disappears once one starts investigating it
through the usual one or two round surveys Because of its very sensitive
nature the subject calls for participant observation over a longer pert d
of time
The present paper discusses some dimensions of agricultural tenancy in three agroclimatic zones in semi-arid tropical India It is based on fairly
continuous observation and intensive interaction with rural households for a
period of 3 to 4 years The details presented here complement the information
presented in two accompanying papers by Ryan and Chodake (1979) and Doherty
et al (1979) presented at an ADC-ICRI1AT Labor Market Conference Those
papers discus$othet facets of agricultural labor markets in thesame areas
DATA
Data used in thispaper were collected as a part of ICRISAT Village Level r-
Stt dies (VLS) commenced in May 1975 in twovillages each in the districts of Akola (Maharashtra) Sholapur (Maharashtra)-and Mahbubnagar (Andhra Pradesh)
The areas represent three agroclimatic zones in peninsular semi-arid tropical
India The methodological details type of data etc are presented in Jodha
et al (1977) The information relevant to this study is presented below
3
Under the VLS data were collected from a randomly selected panel of 30
farm households and 10 labor households (which include land operators with
less than 02 ha of operated area) Data were collected on various socioshy
economic and agrobiological aspects at an interval of 20 to 30 days The
datacollection was done under the sxpervision of ICRISAT Center economists
by resident investigators with rural backgrounds masters degrees in agrishy
cultural economics and who belonged to the same linguistic group as the
villagers
Details about tenancy were not collected until 2 years of field work
were completed in the villages The only information about tenancy collected
since the beginning of field work in May 1975 was the ownership status of
each plot The initial concealment of tenanted plots disappeared over time
Collection of input-output data and their cross checking with data in scheshy
duleson household transactions bullock and labor utilization further helped
revealing not only tenancy transactions but their terms and conditions
All plots involving laad transfers between households via tenancy as
well as sale purchase gift succession etc during the first 4 years of
the VLS were first listed Separate interviews foi collecting additional
data about those plots were conducted in the third and fourth years of field
work Information from both parties in the land transfer was collected even
if one of the parties was not a panel respondent of the village studies
The data include their resource position the terms conditions and backshy
ground of the transaction The quantitative information was supplemented by
investigators personal observatioas and the authors own field notes
-------------------- -- -- ------------------------ -- ------- -------------------------
Table I Details of the villages covered in TCRTSATsvillage level s audies
Raliiall -Irriga- Farm-size Groupsc (ha)Annual Varia- tionb Small Medium Large
Village District St-te average bility Soil type - C V -
- --
Kanzara Akola Naharashtra -120-- 27 Medium deep 49 021 25 2 26-560 gt 560 Vertisols
Kinkheda Akola 820 27 38 021-30 301-560 gt 560 Kalman Sholap i -690 29 Deep and medium 104- 021-600 60-l075i gt1075
deep Vertisols -
Shirapur Shoiapur 690- 29 Deep Vertisols 133 021-2S0 251-600 gt 600
Aurepalle Mahbub - Andhia 710 28 Shallow and 210-- 01 2S 25- 5 gt-2 - nagar Pradesh - medium deep L
4
Alfisols -
Dokur 1ahbub 710 28 Shallow and 6601 -021 100 1 -3 OOFgt3 00 nagar - medium deep-
Alfisolsshy
--------------------- ------------ ------------------shy
a _CRISAT has been conducting studies in the six villages since May 1975 (Jodhi efa 1977) roirrigated areas asproporionf gosscropped areas (average 3 years)
Cbn the basis of operational and holfingo
5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first examine the importance of tenancy transactions in total landtransshy
fers The rest of the discussion is devoted to tenancy only the partners
in tenancy transactions terms and conditions (including period of lease)
the reason given by farmers for lease transactions and a verification of
these reasons from other data
Tenancy dominated land market
Table 2 presents the new land transfers occuring during the 4 years via
leasing-in leasing-out return of land due to termination of earlier leases
sale purchase gift succession property division etc in which at least 2
one party was a L-panel respondent
Inthe villages every year 14 to 46 of the operated area of the sample
households was temporarily or permanently changing hands via new land transshy
fers of different types Furthermore 77 to 97 of new land transfers wu
due to tenancy transactions only This once again confirms the fact that
in the ontoxt of Indian villages the land market operates largely through
tenancy rather than through outright salepurchase (Bardhan and Rudra 1978)
Thus it is appropriate to study the land market and its functioning largely
in terms of tenancy
The data about Kalman (Sholaput) and Kinkheda (Akola) Villages relate only
to the first three years throughout this paper 3ownership of land is one of the biggest sources of security in the villages MVen the opportunity no one wants to sell land During periodic crises through droughts floods and other calmities farmers prefer W mortgage or lease out the land in the hope of getting the land back at some future time If they fail to regain the land the leased or mortgaged land is adjusted as salepurcahse (Jod a 1978) Also see Rao (1972)
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
3
Under the VLS data were collected from a randomly selected panel of 30
farm households and 10 labor households (which include land operators with
less than 02 ha of operated area) Data were collected on various socioshy
economic and agrobiological aspects at an interval of 20 to 30 days The
datacollection was done under the sxpervision of ICRISAT Center economists
by resident investigators with rural backgrounds masters degrees in agrishy
cultural economics and who belonged to the same linguistic group as the
villagers
Details about tenancy were not collected until 2 years of field work
were completed in the villages The only information about tenancy collected
since the beginning of field work in May 1975 was the ownership status of
each plot The initial concealment of tenanted plots disappeared over time
Collection of input-output data and their cross checking with data in scheshy
duleson household transactions bullock and labor utilization further helped
revealing not only tenancy transactions but their terms and conditions
All plots involving laad transfers between households via tenancy as
well as sale purchase gift succession etc during the first 4 years of
the VLS were first listed Separate interviews foi collecting additional
data about those plots were conducted in the third and fourth years of field
work Information from both parties in the land transfer was collected even
if one of the parties was not a panel respondent of the village studies
The data include their resource position the terms conditions and backshy
ground of the transaction The quantitative information was supplemented by
investigators personal observatioas and the authors own field notes
-------------------- -- -- ------------------------ -- ------- -------------------------
Table I Details of the villages covered in TCRTSATsvillage level s audies
Raliiall -Irriga- Farm-size Groupsc (ha)Annual Varia- tionb Small Medium Large
Village District St-te average bility Soil type - C V -
- --
Kanzara Akola Naharashtra -120-- 27 Medium deep 49 021 25 2 26-560 gt 560 Vertisols
Kinkheda Akola 820 27 38 021-30 301-560 gt 560 Kalman Sholap i -690 29 Deep and medium 104- 021-600 60-l075i gt1075
deep Vertisols -
Shirapur Shoiapur 690- 29 Deep Vertisols 133 021-2S0 251-600 gt 600
Aurepalle Mahbub - Andhia 710 28 Shallow and 210-- 01 2S 25- 5 gt-2 - nagar Pradesh - medium deep L
4
Alfisols -
Dokur 1ahbub 710 28 Shallow and 6601 -021 100 1 -3 OOFgt3 00 nagar - medium deep-
Alfisolsshy
--------------------- ------------ ------------------shy
a _CRISAT has been conducting studies in the six villages since May 1975 (Jodhi efa 1977) roirrigated areas asproporionf gosscropped areas (average 3 years)
Cbn the basis of operational and holfingo
5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first examine the importance of tenancy transactions in total landtransshy
fers The rest of the discussion is devoted to tenancy only the partners
in tenancy transactions terms and conditions (including period of lease)
the reason given by farmers for lease transactions and a verification of
these reasons from other data
Tenancy dominated land market
Table 2 presents the new land transfers occuring during the 4 years via
leasing-in leasing-out return of land due to termination of earlier leases
sale purchase gift succession property division etc in which at least 2
one party was a L-panel respondent
Inthe villages every year 14 to 46 of the operated area of the sample
households was temporarily or permanently changing hands via new land transshy
fers of different types Furthermore 77 to 97 of new land transfers wu
due to tenancy transactions only This once again confirms the fact that
in the ontoxt of Indian villages the land market operates largely through
tenancy rather than through outright salepurchase (Bardhan and Rudra 1978)
Thus it is appropriate to study the land market and its functioning largely
in terms of tenancy
The data about Kalman (Sholaput) and Kinkheda (Akola) Villages relate only
to the first three years throughout this paper 3ownership of land is one of the biggest sources of security in the villages MVen the opportunity no one wants to sell land During periodic crises through droughts floods and other calmities farmers prefer W mortgage or lease out the land in the hope of getting the land back at some future time If they fail to regain the land the leased or mortgaged land is adjusted as salepurcahse (Jod a 1978) Also see Rao (1972)
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
-------------------- -- -- ------------------------ -- ------- -------------------------
Table I Details of the villages covered in TCRTSATsvillage level s audies
Raliiall -Irriga- Farm-size Groupsc (ha)Annual Varia- tionb Small Medium Large
Village District St-te average bility Soil type - C V -
- --
Kanzara Akola Naharashtra -120-- 27 Medium deep 49 021 25 2 26-560 gt 560 Vertisols
Kinkheda Akola 820 27 38 021-30 301-560 gt 560 Kalman Sholap i -690 29 Deep and medium 104- 021-600 60-l075i gt1075
deep Vertisols -
Shirapur Shoiapur 690- 29 Deep Vertisols 133 021-2S0 251-600 gt 600
Aurepalle Mahbub - Andhia 710 28 Shallow and 210-- 01 2S 25- 5 gt-2 - nagar Pradesh - medium deep L
4
Alfisols -
Dokur 1ahbub 710 28 Shallow and 6601 -021 100 1 -3 OOFgt3 00 nagar - medium deep-
Alfisolsshy
--------------------- ------------ ------------------shy
a _CRISAT has been conducting studies in the six villages since May 1975 (Jodhi efa 1977) roirrigated areas asproporionf gosscropped areas (average 3 years)
Cbn the basis of operational and holfingo
5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first examine the importance of tenancy transactions in total landtransshy
fers The rest of the discussion is devoted to tenancy only the partners
in tenancy transactions terms and conditions (including period of lease)
the reason given by farmers for lease transactions and a verification of
these reasons from other data
Tenancy dominated land market
Table 2 presents the new land transfers occuring during the 4 years via
leasing-in leasing-out return of land due to termination of earlier leases
sale purchase gift succession property division etc in which at least 2
one party was a L-panel respondent
Inthe villages every year 14 to 46 of the operated area of the sample
households was temporarily or permanently changing hands via new land transshy
fers of different types Furthermore 77 to 97 of new land transfers wu
due to tenancy transactions only This once again confirms the fact that
in the ontoxt of Indian villages the land market operates largely through
tenancy rather than through outright salepurchase (Bardhan and Rudra 1978)
Thus it is appropriate to study the land market and its functioning largely
in terms of tenancy
The data about Kalman (Sholaput) and Kinkheda (Akola) Villages relate only
to the first three years throughout this paper 3ownership of land is one of the biggest sources of security in the villages MVen the opportunity no one wants to sell land During periodic crises through droughts floods and other calmities farmers prefer W mortgage or lease out the land in the hope of getting the land back at some future time If they fail to regain the land the leased or mortgaged land is adjusted as salepurcahse (Jod a 1978) Also see Rao (1972)
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We first examine the importance of tenancy transactions in total landtransshy
fers The rest of the discussion is devoted to tenancy only the partners
in tenancy transactions terms and conditions (including period of lease)
the reason given by farmers for lease transactions and a verification of
these reasons from other data
Tenancy dominated land market
Table 2 presents the new land transfers occuring during the 4 years via
leasing-in leasing-out return of land due to termination of earlier leases
sale purchase gift succession property division etc in which at least 2
one party was a L-panel respondent
Inthe villages every year 14 to 46 of the operated area of the sample
households was temporarily or permanently changing hands via new land transshy
fers of different types Furthermore 77 to 97 of new land transfers wu
due to tenancy transactions only This once again confirms the fact that
in the ontoxt of Indian villages the land market operates largely through
tenancy rather than through outright salepurchase (Bardhan and Rudra 1978)
Thus it is appropriate to study the land market and its functioning largely
in terms of tenancy
The data about Kalman (Sholaput) and Kinkheda (Akola) Villages relate only
to the first three years throughout this paper 3ownership of land is one of the biggest sources of security in the villages MVen the opportunity no one wants to sell land During periodic crises through droughts floods and other calmities farmers prefer W mortgage or lease out the land in the hope of getting the land back at some future time If they fail to regain the land the leased or mortgaged land is adjusted as salepurcahse (Jod a 1978) Also see Rao (1972)
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
---------------------------------------------------------- --
--------------------------------------------------
6
Tablv- 1iistribution o(total new land transfersby type of land2L tansactions in six Indian SAT Villages (1975-76 to 1978-79)
a
- Transfexmd Percentage oftransfeired area via -
Village Arcab Tnny Tenancy c alePurchase Others
- -(ha)
KANZARA 1176 92 8
(16)
rKINllEIA 877 96 2 2(15)
KLA2579 97 1 2 (36)
SHIRAPUR 4160 90 6 (46)
89r643AUREPALLE
DOR1 805 77~ 27~ 3 (20)
a Based on the data from 240 panel hiouseholds and their partners ih Village Level Studies haveland transactions from six villages
been conducted by ICRISAT since May 1975 (Jodha et at1977)
b Includes all land transactions inwhich atleast one of the parties was a panel household Data for Kalman and Kinkheda villages relate to three years only Figures irn parentheses indicate the transferred _land as percentage to total operated area of sample hooseholds The percentages are in terms of area transferredoperated area per year
C Includes all land transfers due to leasing in leasing out ofland -including the land transfers resulting from termination of previous Leased-in Icased-out lands for leane0IrrUgjtsleases - and which already existed at the6-time of beginning of field workold eses) areexcluded from this table i
d Includes all land transfers due to gifts succession and land reform laws etc
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
7
The intervillage differences in the extent of land transfers were due
largely to the differences in the extent of tenancy The higher extent If
tenancy in the Sholapur villages was due to the delayed impact of a prolonged
drought of 1971-72 to 1973-74 during which the majority of farmers lost
their bullocks and other assets and failed to recoup them in the following
years (Jodha 1978 Jodha et at 1977) In the highly irrigated village of
Dokur (Mahbubnagar) the practice of leasing land on a seasonal basis (twice
a year) was responsible for the high extent of tenancy relative to the other
village (Aurepalle) in the same district4 Both irrigation and drought seem
to necessitate a greater extent of periodic resource adjustments and the
latter is partly achieved through tenancy
Partners in land tenancy
The following discussion relates to different aspects of land transactions
resulting from tenancy Furthermoroe these transactions include cases
existing at the beginning of the field work as well as those taking place
during the course of 3 to 4 years of field work Land transfers resulting
from termination of previous leases are excluded in the remainder of the
aalysis
Tablef3 presents the shares of different farm size groups in the total
iand leased in as well as in the total land leased out Contrary to the conventional belief that tenants are invariably small farmers or landless
laborers being exploited by landl6rds with large holdings Table 3
4One of the reasons for the small amount of tenancy and therefore total land transfers in Aurepalle was the extent of absentee landlordism where lease periods in most caaes exceeded 2 to 3 years and no new land transfers due to termination of leases were recorded
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
8
Table 3 Share of different farm size groups in tenanted land area in ix indianSAT villages 1975-76 to 197879a
iArea -leased in byb Area leasedOut byb
Village Small Medium Large Small Me4iu-i arge Farmsc Farmsc Farmsc Farms Farms Farms
KANZARA 34- 16 50 22 34 - 144
30 27 KINKHEDA 56 14 $ 1 42
KALMAN 39 48 13r S9 30 P 11
SHIRAPUR 26d 17 57 19 41
AUREPALLE 27 4 69i -42 16 4
DOKUR- 17dr~o04 1- 42 2V - 59 1 shy
-----
a Based on details from the 240 panel households and their Partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villshyages datairelate to first three years only
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel responshydents which existed at the beginning of the field work as well as new
Stransactionswhich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequent tables exclude the land transfers re3ulting from termination of leases
c For details of farm size groupssee Tablel Labor households who participated in tenancy transactions are included with small farmers
d Includes some initially landless labor households
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
9
reveals that large farmers leased in and small farmers leased out substantial
areas of land In four of the six villages large famers hai the largest
share (42 to 69) of total land leased-in Only in one village (Xinkheda)
did small farmers received the largest share of leased-in land On the
other hand of the total land leased out large farmers contributed the
largest share in three villages In fact the bulk of the land leased out
belongod to small and medium-scale farmers The implications for policy are
discussdd in the last section 6
Concentration of land
The data about partnerships in land leasing are presented in a different
form in Table 4 First there was considerable transfer of land within
5Fo- definition of farm sizo groups see Table 1 6 The large scale emergence of large farmers tenants to be a ratheras seems xeclat phenomenon in the count_--y and appears to have developed as adjustshyan ment to land reforms laws which attept to reduce and restrict the growthof ownership holdings and not noerational holdings which include leased land I some areas HYV-based technology (Vyas 1970) and rapid tractorizashytion (Jodha 1974) also induced large farmers to lease in land in place of leasng out as they did in the past No extensive data on this dynamic aspect of tenancy could be collected in the study villages However somerelevant details were gathered from (1)a small number of households that have been traditionally leasing in or leasing out land and (2J village Patwaris and other revenue officials most of whom had been constant witnesses to the changing agrarian situation in their areas These discussions as well as the data (especially the Patwari records) clearly confirm the recent emergence of land leasing by large farmers
7For the purpose of Table 4 relative land holding positions of partners were considered Accordingly the land transfer from small farmer to medium farmer and the land transfer from medium or small farmer to largefarmer we-e put in the same category Similarly land transferred from smail farmer to landless labor from large farmer to medium farmer or small farmer were put in the same category Hence smaller biggercategorie3 of Table 4 are different from farm size categories of Table 1
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
----------------------------------------------
10
tI 4 Distidtion of tdtal lealsed out and by groups of tenancy partners in six -Indian SAT villages (1975-76 to I78-79)
-------------------------------- -- -- -
Leased out landb
Within the same farm From smaller From larger
to smallersize groupsc- to largerVillage Share of Large 0thers farms farms
farms
29d 7 24 30 KANZARA Arlta Transactions (20) (27) (25) (28)
8 4712 33KINKHEDA Area Transactions (8) (37) (13)- (42)1
33 43 24KALMAN Area Transactions (39) (46) (15)
2626 18 30SHIRAPUR Area (31) (22)Transact ions bull(I0) (37)
42 24 27 7AUREPALLE Area (53) (14)Transactions (20) (13)
6 24 31 28DOKUR Area
(11)Transactions (6) (28) (55) ----------------shy
a Based on details from the240panel households and their partners in For Kalman aldKinkheda villagestenwucy tranactions in six villages
data relate to the first three years only
Includes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedb atthe time of beginniiig of the field work as well as new transactions
This and subseshywhich too place during the four years of field work
quent tabies exclude the land transfers resulting fromtermination of
leases
Labor househ6ds who partishy Fordetailsof farm size groups see Tablel
cipated in tenancytransactions are included with small farmers
The top figure relates--to percent of-area covered whilefthe bottom figured in parenthesis relates tothe percent-of transactions covered under the
respective categories
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
differit fa-si~eg Between30 and 6UV laid-treisfe poundelih thisth l~egargest
this (si and -2) -In of h ags~ego~ fcojkuns 1I two-bt si~cvl~e
hare_of Aea transacd was among the large farmnis themselves In four
out of si vljaps the-proportion of land traflis f-rom relatively smaller
to relativerlyarge armswasgreater than vice-versa Whether Oe considers
area or nupibqr of4transactionsi In other words lsAd was transferred from mi
small er~op~ rs to lrgpr operators -which implies a tendency oward concenshy
tration of operational holdings I
Detailed discussions with farmers evealed that many small farmers
prefer to lease -aut-land tp larger farmers who have a better retcce position and management capacity eiure higheri production and theref6 a higher
absolute share to theAandowner4 The possibility of advance pai ieits in cash
or kind to be adjusted against thecrop share alsoinducessmaller fa6meri to
lease out land4to lrger farmers Also when small fndoners find it diffishy
cult to supplementtheir landhQldings through leasing Ai land theymay
decide to aseouttheirowa-land i
- Aurepalle vilage where absentee landlordsare itnerodus lairge4iraimers
usually transact land within their own group becausf of-increased pblitical
and legal awakening among the rural poor who may take advantage of tenancy
lasis which can create problems for their landlords
Period of lease
Tenancy laws usually cq rq~rership rights to the actual tilli of the
land after he cultivatesqasedn land for a specific period-A pehensiu
created by these laws wjs quite widespread and natoconfined to large farmers
only This was yartyoifirmed by theshort peribdl of lease ormoit of ti
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
12
transactions -To guard-against the loss bf land thri6zgh long-tm I eases
landowners either tried t change tenants everyyear or leaseout land toi the same tenanton an annual basis Table 5 shows that except for AurepaIle
between 70 and 98 of area (66 to 96 of transactions) involved land leased
out for year or less In the highily irrigated village ofDokur the leases
were mostly on a single Season basis In Aurepalle village the pattern
was different because of a greater proportion of absentee landlords (to be
discussed later)
Teriancy transactions covering a lease period of 3 years and more were
closely examined This revealed that 52 of such cases for all villages put
togethdi involved landowners who were absentee landlords Another 37 of
thesecases involved landowners who were relatively small farmers and had to
lease out their land due to indebtedness to the tenant or they worked as
(informally) attached laborers of the tenant The remaining cases of longshy
term leases involved land owners who leased out land due to old age disabishy
lities or kinship ties with tenants Furthermore most of the long-term
tenancy cases involved fixed rental payment as against crop-haring arrangements
This isquite understandable in view of the typa of partners involved in longshy
term leases
Terms and condition of leases
Other terms and conditions of the lease arrangements also showed considerable
similarities in different villages Except in Aurepalle and to some extent
Kanzara the proportion of land area under fixed rental agreements was not
important In Aurepalle more than 76 of the leased area and 73 of lease
transactions has fixed rental arrangement This was largely becaAe of the
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
13
largo number of absentee landlords The phenomenon of absentee landlordism
in Aurepalle can probably be attributed to (1) nearness of the village to the
city of Hyderabad to which most of the concerned landowners (both small and
large) migrated l-aving land to reliable caretaker tenants who pay only
nominal rents and (2) the unique social structure of the village where large
farmers have more power over all transactions than elsewhere in the six
villages (Dohety et at 1979)
Sharing o output by landowner and tenant was the most common arrangement
in all villages excpt Aurepalle Between 77 and 99of transactions fell in
this category Table 5 presents the proportions of leased land as well as
proportions of lease transactions according to the tenants share in input
and output In practically all the output-sharing cases (including those in
the miscellaneous category) the tenant received 50 to 75 of gross output
However the arrangements concerning sharing of inputs did not show a clear-
cut picture Important variations occurred even within each agroclimatic
zone In Kinkheda the tenant bore all input costs on 96of the leased area
while in Knzara this was the case for only 42 of the area Mare is a
complete reversal in Sholapur district where in Kalman 50 input sharing
was practiced on 90 of the area while in Shirapur this type of input sharing
hardly occurred at all
Under normal circumstances the tenants share was 50of both inputs
and outputs The tenants share of inputs could rise to 75 or more if the
leased-in land has soil problems and whore crop production is faced with
considerable risk The tenants share in output also increased above 50 if
the landowner (especially a small farmer) failed to privide the inputs agreed
to in the lease (eg labor) Such contingencies arose when small landowners
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
Tabl Dist-ibutionof ieased-oot land 5y pirioof-Elease isii IndianTable S (1975-76 to 1978-79)a AT iI geshy
--- -- - - -- --- ------- - -r ----- - --_ 7---- _-- ----------------
P of e SProportion of leased out land in each of theviliageb o l h of - Kinkheda Kalman Slirapur -kurepalle DOkurKanara
2 --------- -----------------shy
1 year or less Area Trinsadtions
74c
(83) 95
-(96) 70 (66)
-98 (95)
1 (40)
79 (78)
Area 9ycars19 16 - 76 Transactions (8) 20) (3) 12)
3-S years -
Area Transactions
4 (8(3)(8)
- 10 (26) -
7 (2)
Syars- Area - 8 Neg 8 Transgct iohs (6) (
Based on details from the 240 panel households and-their partners in tenanck trinsationsa in six vilages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to firstthree years-onl
b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out -land of-panel respondents which existed at the time of beginning of the field work-as well asnew transactions which took place during the four years of field work Thisand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting-from termination of leases
6 The top figure rel~tes to percent area covered Whil the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to thepercent of transactions-covered under the respective categories
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
-- ---
Table 6 Distribution of tenancy land by terms and conditions in sfxiMrSAT IiTe -I5-76 to I97V79)a
TPefeeikae of leasedout area umder bull Tenants share in Input (1)I0it ut F-Svsaaage bullrental o _e_-_-- _ 050 _- _P 1 o rna0=50 to 75 OSO 0=50 to 7SI
a i-- ---- -- --- -
KANZARA Area 17e 42 2Tragsc ions (23) (33) (31) (13)
KINKHEDA Area 2 96 -Transactions (4) (92) (4)
AI N Area 4 4 r 290
SIiAJR Area 1 96 1 2
AtfEPALLE A i i Transactions 76 ~ shy(73) (24)
(3bullPKR AreaTransactions 373) 4 lt) (93)0-4 (4)
D - Ara 3 94 3
ascd on details from the 240 panel households and their partners intenancy transections in sixvillages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages ata relate to first three years only
ncludes all cases of leased-out land of panel respondents which existedaittZhe tihme oIf beginning ofthe field work as well as new transactionshich took place during the four years of field work This and subsequenttables eiclhi the land transfers resulting from termination of leases
The top figure relates to percent of area covered while the bottom figure in parenthesis relates to the percent oftrAnsactions covered underte v spective Eategories
Best Auilccble-Doze~
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
16
outmigrated due to midseason droughts or when other weather conditions
compelled the landowner to first concentrate on self-ctiltivated plots eg
weeding at a critical time or when umforeseen factors such as sickness
or death of family workers or bullocks affected their resource position
Thus the midseason contingencies involving increased cost of cultivation
for the tenant usually entitled him to a higher share of output according to
an informal and fiexible apttern These observations at the micro level are
consistent with those of Poumasset (1979) at a more macro level for various
crops in the Philippines
The tenants input share could exceed 50 if he had not compensated the
landowner in other ways at the beginning of the contract As observed parshy
ticularly in the Sholapur villages (and in some cases the Akola villages)
some tenants (who were often larger landowners) proided advances or loans
to the poorer landowners as a part of the tenancy transaction The amount
was adjusted against the landowners share in the output at harvest time
If the full amount was not adjusted in one year because of a poor crop the
lea3e was renewed for the next year The tenants who did not give such
a higher proportion of input costs 8 advances to the owners usually I-ad to bear
In the cases where the tenant decided to raise crops requiring costly
inputs such as fertilizer or pesticides the tenants share in input as well
as output increased accordingly Owing to such input-output sharing arrangeshy
ments tenancy did not discourage the adoption of improved technology It was
observed that decisions about crop choice were largely at the discretion of
8Such advances however were not paLd in the case of leaso transactions involving problem soils involving greater crop prbduction risks
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
17
the ~t However were tenais smallandowners) deee on lai wners forifmv1ion of input sup ies c~idfi etc wasthe crop choice uiuiiy dlactiM tby the land~wfier Avery limitednumber of such cases were observed
in Kaia village wamp aersllanted hybrid cotton Insuch casesthe sharidgirrangements f04vario iinputs differed 9
The above discussion broadl)idescri s the fi6rmal pattern of np ishyoutput sharing arrangementstWtW sfx villagesn The exceptions exised
tonly in the cases where tenanh fv highly dependent on landowners and
vice versa for different inptts and other provisions
An analysisofterms and conditions of tenancy in relation to farm size of tenants and landowners did not reveal any clear differences that could be attributed to unequal position defined interms -f tfirpre-tenancy size of
operitIonal holding -
Relative to opportunities for factor ratio adjustments or for gains from interlinked transactions discussed 16low forial terms and ampditions or
problems associated Vititlji weret-bften mentioned as reasonsfoi r
against tenancy 1 0
Reasons for leasing land
Farmers gave ulore than 30 reasons why they decided to lease lad For purpose
of analysis thd iieis6ns were grouped in the following categories
bull
9For analysis of sharing arrangements for plots involving fGrkier u8ePlrdee 3a (1978)
104lisi p -suggested by the fact that we could detect very feW crswhere the formal terms and conditions (lease period share in outpu andinut e~c) coctituted the reason for hbeakup or reformation of tenantfI 4 ner terms in the six villages ONt-o a total of 46 caseAwher due to mutual differences tenancy partnerships changed only 3 resultQ4dfrom disputes over the formal terms and conditions The remaining cases tookplace due to changes in the circumstances related to the other factors rentioned above
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
18
(1)4resource ta4ustqtS (3)alterawti-ye n~rlocking factor makets
earning oppVtunities-rin the- case of small landowners who leasedcout v d=
(4) - _a4jstnonal bsente landloism(S) miscellaneous factors ncludig 7
phys4cal factorssuch as dis4tanq~eo plQts and plots having problem soilY
which created aanagee3nt andsiprob4s and (6) social and kinship ties
Tho distributionof tnanctransactions as iwell as the land-area
transacteiwas tabulatd separately for tenants and landowners As there
was no difference in the substantive conclusions suggested by tenancy transshy
actions and transacted landurea Table 7 presents data only on transactions
Fu thermore Table gives the distribution of tenancy transactionsby
landowners reasonsronly
Except in Aurepalle village resource adjustment was the principal
factor behind the tenancy transactions when viewed from the stamdpoint of
lUpowners Of course the role of this factor wasm rse important-An the
case of sma~li ilandoners If the availabilityof Ailterriative earning
opportunities -a-lso viewed-as axesource Adjustmfnt -th)erole of resource
adjustment in tenancy transactios is further increased 11 If the misce
llaneous category of reasons is disregarded the next important factor
leading owners to lease out land is that they are absentee landlords For
bullud sstandableaeasons is- was more inpprtant inthe case of largefamrs
In t ca-2 iz04landowners interlocking of factor markets was uo shy
important
1WhiIedeszibinc the role of alternative earning opportunities n 4ihducing particularly the small land holders to lease out their lands in most cases th6sr6 alternative oppor ties are offered by public measures suCbb as the Eapmiymhet Guarante Sdhemeahd other rural works This is yet an6ther exa ple rf th inpaot Of publintervention on the operations of agriculshytural factor markets For other illustrations of this nature seeDoherty
( et at 79) Joa U978)
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
Table 7 Distribution 4f tenancy transactlons by reasons in six SAT Indiau villages (1975-76 to 1 8 79 )a
Farm Proportions of tenancy -transactions by reason in villagesReason Size KANARA KINKHEDA KALMAN SHI RAPUR AUREPALLE DOKUR
Groups -- --- - --- -- - - - - -
1Resource Small 71 - 062 1o so
adjust- Medium 57 7 - 30 43 60 376-men Large 31 29 - 293 33 44 Total St 1 41 3 54 29 39
2Interlock- Small 20 17 8 - 13 11 ing of Medium 7r 40 8 - 13
factor Large -- 34 11 -- 22 -arkets Total 6 8 - - 2-1 IS -7 12
3Alternative Sall 1-2 10 3 - 10 gt-7 4 3 earning Medium - - - 6 20
A 3opportu- Large - -ll 41--nities Total 3 4 - II j --7 32
4Traditio- Small 110 3 3- 30 al absen- Medium -14 -- -6tee land- Large 54 43 33 _22 33 1
lordism Total 18 2S 9 6 6 S
sOthers Small 9 20 37 12 - 33 6 Meditm 36 -29 - 30 1 35 20
- -Lar3e IS 28 - 13 28 22-- z1 Total 18 22 SO 14 -- l I2
------ -- ----------------------------- ----- S
a Based on details from the 240 sample households and their partners fn tenacy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda villages data relate to first three years only
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
20
When the same data were analyzed according to the reasons for tenancy
gven by tenants temporary migration and absentee landlordism evidently
disappeared as reasons and the role of resource adjustments and interlocking
factor markets was urther strengthened
Resource adjustment through tenancy
To have optimum or fuller utilization of available resources such as family
labor or bullocks the farmer tries to hire different resources in or out
How far this adjustment had been achieved through leasing of land is revealed
by Table 8 The table presents the availability of land area per family
laborer and owned bullock before ampnd aIter the tenancy transaction in the
case of landowners as well as tenants Only those cases are considered where
resource adjustment was the main reason for tenancy In four of the six
villages tenancy did not tend to equalize the landfamily labor ratios on the
contrary it further widened the differences in the landfamily labor ratio
itt these villages This implies that tenancy transactions are not entered
primarily to adjust land availability with family labor availability On
the other hand except for Aurepalle land tenancy tend to equalize land
bullock ratios Once the fallow land was excluded from the analysis (bracketed
figures in Table 8) the tendency towards equalization of landbullock ratios
between landowners and tenants is further strengthened This supports the
12An important limitation of Table 8 is that it does not give any weight to irrigated land which uses ore human and bullock labor Of courseirrigated plots were important only in Dokur village But there tenant and lemd owner both had irrigated lands prior to and after the lease transactions
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
-------------------------- --------------
21
Table 8 Resource adjustments through land tenancy in-six Indian SAT vil q 0 756o~4)
---------------------------------------------------- ft------------------ft -----------------------
Village and Availability of land before and after transactionb partner in Per family worker c iPer bullokc7 7-i
tenancy Before After Before After
hajgt C (ha)(ha) )
VANZAA ) Wl oner 26 19 9 72
Tenart S 19 S
kINKHEDA 5 -i rx -
Lan- owner 33 21 77 50(4S)-Tehant + bull i- l tl 7 ~ 9 li-- t
t-id-wner 17 09 183 SS Tenant l -38 334 72(58)
SHIRAPJR Land Owner 17 04 309 58
) Teriijt - (Yt rotlO1i jtr19 44 - 8 2(
AUREPALE1 Land owner 11 09 26 21 Teiet o )r c- gt 37 (87)
DOKIa tiiiowner 05 02 38 1S Tenant O1106 08 - 16
a Based on details from the24 panel hooseholdi iand -their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalman and Kinkheda
vil-lages data relateto first-three yea rsonly poundW k b Includes all cases of leased-in and leased-out land of panel resshy
pondents hih existed at he-time~of beginningloftthe field work as well as new transactions which took place during the four years
of field work This iand subsequent tables exclude the land transshyfers resulting from termination of leases
c Includes details of all land owners and tenants inwhose case reshysource adjustment was the main reason for tenaucytransaction
d bulligures in parenthes inricme rho sltuaioi on~e idI land iS
excluded from land availability per bullock
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
22 earlier findings reported by Bliss (1976) The fact that it is primarily the landbullock ratios that are equalized and not the landlabor ratio suggests that the labor hire market operates more smoothly than the bullock
hire market13
Interlinking of factor markets
Interlinking of factor markets in Indian agriculture is discussed by Bharadwaj (1974) Bardhtan and Rudra (1978) and others In the present study the laboshyrious detection of interlinked transactions revealed by different VLS schedules and follow-up investigations led to a finding that between 6 and 21 of tenancy transactions could be regarded as interlinked factor market operations The definition of interlinked market operations was fairly broad and included all factor product and service market transactions between tenancy partners where tenancy acted as a direct or indirect cause or effect of the transacshy
tion The first line of Table 9 repeats information from Table 7 and shows that interlinked transactions with tenancy were fairly important in Sholapur district followed by Mahbubnagar district but were negligible in Akola district The importance of different interlinked transactions differ from region to region For instance in Sholapur villages land and credit transshyactions are primarily linked Unlike in the conventional pattern in these villages the tenantsgive loans to the landowners to obtain land on lease However where old debts existed the reverse was the case and in such cases leasing of land credit as well aslabor supplythrough tied or untied labor were sometimes simultaneously involved In the case of the Akola
13For more detail on the impact of factor markets on factor proportions seeRyan and Rathore (1978)
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
- - -
able -
9 Digtribution of interltnked transactions aimonghe partneri intenincy ins-ix dianSAT Viilages (1975-76 to 1978-79)a 3
Akola District Sholapur District MahbubnagarDistrict
r -bull Kanzaa Kinkheda Kalman Shirapur Aurepalle c Dokur
Linked transactibns as 0 0 percentage of alI tenshyancy transactio1T 6 8 21 15 7 12
percentag of Iffiked ransactions involving
Land lease +Credit 6 6 5 31 88 -Land lease + labor 18 IC1j - 3 -4- 9 18 Land lease + credit
labor 6 - 0
717 - S1Is CM __271002 10 -30 Land leaje 4 cre Iit
Smarketnig -Land lease _Oter _
47 23
40 27 -
8
21 d
pound-
1-10C oo234 L
z 7 -
16 48
4Percentage Of aH 0
tenancy - -
transact ions involving -shylabor
shycommitments t 15 2 6 6
-3 0 m 6
- - k
a dased- ondetils ffqm the 240panel households and their partners in tenancy transactions in six villages For Kalinand Kinkheda villages data relate to-firlt three years only
b The Table rel-ates to only those cases where interlocking of factor marketwas detected to be induced or facilitated by tenancy ransactions The occuritence of-at 4east one mutual
transaction of a particufar nature recorded throuigh Various LS scheule anfori-thrcvghSpecific interviews of tqnanciy pa6rtn6rs is considered as indicat r oi interlinke trhsshyactions -- - 4
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
24 villages the few interlinked transactions involved primarily credit and marketing One of the reasons for this pattern was the role of public intervention in terms of the monopoly purchase of cotton by the Cotton Marketing Federation in Maharashtra which during the early years of field work deferred payments and had other rigidities of operation Small farmers sometimes had to do their cotton marketing through large farmers as informal intermediaries which led to interlinked tenancy credit and market transshyactions In Mahbubnagar land transactions were linked with a variety of miscell eous transactios Post of those transactions related to off-farm activities in towns procirement of inputs in scarce supply distribution
of irrigation water etc
Links between land leasing and labor do occur but are not very common From the first third and fourth rows of Table 9 one can compute the proporshytion of all tenancy transactions linked with any labor commitments These are shown in the last row and indicate that labor commitments ar involved in less than 7 of the cases
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study is based on farm level data collected over 3 to 4 years under the ongoing village level studies of ICRISAT The very high proportion (77 to 97) of land transfers via tenancy in total land transfers once again confirms that in India the land market is largely a tenancy market The relatively greater extent of tenancy in those villages that are prone to drought or have substantial irrigation suggests that both these factors tend to necessitate greater periodic resource adjustments which are facilitated by tenancy
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
25
Large farmers have recently emerged as tenants and small farmers as landowners This contradcts the conventional presumptionwhere theIn
is usually thought of as a poor and small operatpr while the landlord 4s believed to be invariably 52a large farmer Inthestudy villages 42t
of total leased-out land was acquired by large farmers andS -to 8t of
total leased-out land belonged to small and medium farmers This has several
policy implications (1)The heterogeneity of the tenant class further- comshyplicates development of tenurial policies Tenancy policies be consishycannot
dered as exclusively oriented to benefit the poor since large tenants could
alsp benefit (2) The small tenant now has new competitors with superior
resource positions competing for limited land resources In some cases this has induced small landowners to lease out their lan4 instead of supplementing it by leasing in land (3) Tenancy allowslarge farmers to circumvent land
ceiling lawi which apply only land andto owned not leased in land
Output sharing rather than fixed rental was the most comtnon paitern in alYVillages except Aurepa~le Terms of tenancy are very flexible and dipend on (i) land productivity(2) capital availability ontie part Of landshy
oifwir and tknanz4 and (3)midseason contingencies affecting either 9fthe
ppparties This was true both across village and within villages Due p ttib praci 6 of direct linking of output shares to input shares and bqcse ciop hoce was largely the tenants decision tenancy does not appear 0todis
courage adoption of (high cost)new technology JI1isource adjustment was the principal reason for leasing of land iofive
of 5utsixvillages In the sixth village Aurepalle the traditional type of
abse6iee landiordism dominated the tenancy situation In all villages eXCept
Aiielle tenMcycleariytended to reducethe large ap between landoeier-
Best AvallcrbM ocAl
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
inyldhperf ~lock ~fiever enncy id iotl th + is pausibe ++~ampiaiz aiiId~i~l~ lacrratios Thi+ quite pius 1 asast nd te qu-ilii- the+~ l~~
there are several alternative meais to handle excesses or shortages of
fwiity lib6r in 16ladion-to awh+d 6 and the most imp6 tant beng the hi red
ibor tdlrket
bull rrIAtrlotkingof ac++a +markets or factor-product markets where t nanc7
a+ Oi + a++r 99+ th +GA most impoirant reas9Pn ~-i ~1 rbull a
a bull a
behind tenancy in some villages Land leasing and credit were often intershy
linked in Sholapur villages where unlike the -oveniional pattern tcrnts
extended credit to landownersto obtain land on leasing In Alcola villages
mostdegin6rlinking involied l1and lease credit and cotton marketing Intershy
-+ inkec 1rhnsactions in Mahbubnagar were more complex an of various types
Theyinvolvd transactions related to supply of scarce inputs urban-rural
links sharing of water facilities etc
Thus tenancy is primarily an outgrowth of bullock power adjustmentsa
and credit market imperfections (linkedtransactions with credit) The
huron labou-r market seems to be functioning sufficiently well and few
households seem to lease land for reasons of excessor shortage of family
irt r6lation to owned land or because of difficulties in hiring dailylabot
labor
Terms of1etngYare flexible and responsive to resource positions oT
tenants and liaioawner and fto midseason contingencies affecting eitherof the
parties+
ble DocumentBest Avai
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
27
REFERENCES
Bardhan6 iP l976Variat 6h etetland fbias of agriculm ltenancy analysis- of Indialirdata across regions and over timEconomic and Political Weekly11501-n 1
Bardhan PK and radras A 1979 hterlinkae of land labr and crditfeRtions an analysis of village survey data in east ISdia Economicand Political Weekly 13367-84
Bharadwaj Krishna 1974 Production onditiaiiin Indian apicultureCambridge Cambridge University Press
Bliss Christopher J 1976 Risk bearing in Indimi agriculture Agrishycultural Development Council Rsearch and Training Seminar onand Uncertainty in Agricultural Development 943 March Risk
1976 CM14T lBaton Mexico 1976 (mimed)
Doherty VS Dinswanger HP Balaramaiah T Bhende MJ KshirsagarKG Bhaskar Rao V and Raju PSS 1979 Common features~and contrasts in labor relations in the semi-aridtropics of IpdiaPresented at the ADC-ICRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms ofRural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISATPataneherti AP India
Jha Dayanath 1978 Fertilizer use and its determinants a review withspecial reference to semi-arid tropidal India ICRISAT EconomicsProgram report Patancheru AP India
Jodha NS 1974 A case of the process of tractorizaition Economic andPolitical Weekly 9A111-A118
Jodha NS Asokan M and Ryan JG 1977 Village study methodologyand resource endowments of the selected villages in ICRISATsvillage level studieL ICRISAT Economics Program occasional paper 16Patawcheru AP India
Jodha HS 1078 Effectiveness of farmers adjustment to risk Economicand Political Weekl 13A38-A48
Joshl PC 1975 Land reforms a lrend report In Survey of Researchin Economics vol4 Agriculture Part IIBoiay Allied Publishers
Khusro AM 1973 The economics of land reforms tnd farm size inIndia BombayMacmillan Company
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document
28
Rao CHH 1975 Technological change and distribution of gains in IndfiA ariculurek nstitute f Economic Growth New Delhi
Rao VM 1972 Land transfers in rural communities some findings in Economic and Political Weekly 7A133-A144ryotwari region
shares rice cornRotmasset J 1979 Explaining patterns in landowner coconut and abaca in Philippines Presented at ADC-ICRISAT Confeshyrence on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Markets in Developing Areas 22-24August 1076 IampISAT Patancheru P India_
Ryan JG and Rathore MS 1978 Factor proportions fact6mrket access and the development and transfer of technology ICRISAT_ Economics Progrim iepo)t Patnicheru AP India
Ryan JG and Ghodake RD 1979 Labor market behavior in rural vilshylages of sbuth India iffects of season sex and socioeconomic stashytus ICRISAT EconObiks Program progress repor 14 Presented at ADC-ICtRISAT Conference on Adjustment Mechanisms of Rural Labor Marshykets in Developing Areas 22-24 August 1979 ICRISAT Patanchefu AP India
SanyalP S i977 Trends in some characteristics of land holdings an anaiysis for a few states Sarvekshana 1(1) 1-13
Srinivasan TN 1978 India project on impact of agricuitutmal deveshylopment on employment and poverty phase I a methodological note Washington World Bank
Vyas VS 1970 Tenancy in a dynaic setini Economiciand Political Weekly S A73-A80
Best Available Document