CMU VS EXEC. SECThe Facts and the CasePetitionerCentralMindanaoUniversity(CMU) is a chartered educational institution owned and run by the State.[1]In 1958, the President issued Presidential Proclamation 476, reserving 3,401 hectares of lands of the public domain in Musuan, Bukidnon, as school site for CMU.Eventually, CMU obtained title in its name over 3,080 hectares of those lands under Original Certificates of Title (OCTs) 0-160, 0-161, and 0-162.Meanwhile, the government distributed more than 300 hectares of the remaining untitled lands to several tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities.Forty-five years later or on January 7, 2003 President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation 310 that takes 670 hectares from CMUs registered lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities in Barangay Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon.On April 3, 2003, however, CMU filed a petition for prohibition against respondents Executive Secretary, Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Chairperson and Commissioner of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), and Lead Convenor of the National Anti-Poverty Commission (collectively, NCIP,et al)before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay City (Branch 9), seeking to stop the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 and have it declared unconstitutional.TheNCIP,et almoved to dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the action, pointing out that since the act sought to be enjoined relates to an official act of the Executive Department done inManila, jurisdiction lies with the Manila RTC.The Malaybalay RTC denied the motion, however, and proceeded to hear CMUs application for preliminary injunction.Meanwhile, respondents NCIP,et almoved for partial reconsideration of the RTCs order denying their motion to dismiss.On October 27, 2003, after hearing the preliminary injunction incident, the RTC issued a resolution granting NCIP,et als motion for partial reconsideration and dismissed CMUs action for lack of jurisdiction.Still, the RTC ruled that Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional, being a valid State act.The RTC said that the ultimate owner of the lands is the State and that CMU merely held the same in its behalf.CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution but the RTC denied the same on April 19, 2004.This prompted CMU to appeal the RTCs dismissal order to the Court of Appeals (CA) Mindanao Station.[2]CMU raised two issues in its appeal: 1) whether or not the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional.[3]In a March 14, 2008 decision,[4]the CA dismissed CMUs appeal for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that CMUs recourse should have been a petition for review oncertiorarifiled directly with this Court, because it raised pure questions lawbearing mainly on the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310.The CA added that whether the trial court can decide the merits of the case based solely on the hearings of the motion to dismiss and the application for injunction is also a pure question of law.CMU filed a motion for reconsideration of the CAs order of dismissal but it denied the same,[5]prompting CMU to file the present petition for review.The Issues PresentedThe case presents the following issues:1.Whether or not the CA erred in not finding that the RTC erred in dismissing its action for prohibition against NCIP,et alfor lack of jurisdiction and at the same time ruling that Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional;2.Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed CMUs appeal on the ground that it raised purely questions of law that are proper for a petition for review filed directly with this Court; and3.Whether or not Presidential Proclamation 310 is valid and constitutional.The Courts RulingsOne.The RTC invoked two reasons for dismissing CMUs action.The first is that jurisdiction over the action to declare Presidential Proclamation 310 lies with the RTC of Manila, not the RTC of Malaybalay City, given that such action relates to official acts of the Executive done inManila.The second reason, presumably made on the assumption that the Malaybalay RTC had jurisdiction over the action, Presidential Proclamation 310 was valid and constitutional since the State, as ultimate owner of the subject lands, has the right to dispose of the same for some purpose other than CMUs use.There is nothing essentially wrong about a court holding on the one hand that it has no jurisdiction over a case, and on the other, based on an assumption that it has jurisdiction, deciding the case on its merits, both with the same results, which is the dismissal of the action.At any rate, the issue of the propriety of the RTC using two incompatible reasons for dismissing the action is academic.The CA from which the present petition was brought dismissed CMUs appeal on some technical ground.Two.Section 9(3) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980[6]vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction over the final judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies.But where an appeal from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review oncertiorarifiled directly with this Court.The question in this case is whether or not CMUs appeal from the RTCs order of dismissal raises purely questions of law.As already stated, CMU raised two grounds for its appeal:1) the RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the action; and 2) Presidential Proclamation 310 was constitutional.Did these grounds raise factual issues that are proper for the CA to hear and adjudicate?Regarding the first reason, CMUs action was one for injunction against the implementation of Presidential Proclamation 310 that authorized the taking of lands from the university.The fact that the President issued this proclamation inManilaand that it was being enforced inMalaybalayCitywhere the lands were located were facts that were not in issue.These were alleged in the complaint and presumed to be true by the motion to dismiss.Consequently, the CMUs remedy for assailing the correctness of the dismissal, involving as it did a pure question of law, indeed lies with this Court.As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional.CMU points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been properly raised and heard.NCIP,et alhad not yet filed an answer to join issue with CMU on that score.What NCIP,et alfiled was merely a motion to dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the Malaybalay RTC over the injunction case.Whether the RTC in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the proclamation, resulting in the denial of CMUs right to be heard on the same, is a factual issue that was proper for the CA Mindanao Station to hear and ascertain from the parties.Consequently, the CA erred in dismissing the action on the ground that it raised pure questions of law.Three.Since the main issue of the constitutionality of Presidential Proclamation 310 has been raised and amply argued before this Court, it would serve no useful purpose to have the case remanded to the CA Mindanao Station or to the Malaybalay RTC for further proceedings.Ultimately, the issue of constitutionality of the Proclamation in question will come to this Court however the courts below decide it.Consequently, the Court should, to avoid delay and multiplicity of suits, now resolve the same.The key question lies in the character of the lands taken from CMU.InCMU v. Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB),[7]the DARAB, a national government agency charged with taking both privately-owned and government-owned agricultural lands for distribution to farmers-beneficiaries, ordered the segregation for this purpose of 400 hectares of CMU lands.The Court nullified the DARAB action considering the inalienable character of such lands, being part of the long term functions of an autonomous agricultural educational institution.Said the Court:The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and academic facility overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land for future programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges inAmerica, a type of educational institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West. What we now know asMichiganStateUniversity,PennStateUniversityandIllinoisStateUniversity, started as small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing educational programs.They were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology and scientific research.Funds for the support of the educational programs of land grant colleges came from government appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources.It was in this same spirit that President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for theMindanaoAgriculturalCollege(forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational institution, to develop and train future farmers ofMindanaoand help attract settlers to that part of the country.x x x xThe education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and development of this country.[8]It did not matter that it was President Arroyo who, in this case, attempted by proclamation to appropriate the lands for distribution to indigenous peoples and cultural communities.As already stated, the lands by their character have become inalienable from the moment President Garcia dedicated them for CMUs use in scientific and technological research in the field of agriculture.They have ceased to be alienable public lands.Besides, when Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) or Republic Act 8371[9]in 1997, it provided in Section 56 that property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon its effectivity shall be recognized and respected.In this case, ownership over the subject lands had been vested in CMU as early as 1958.Consequently, transferring the lands in 2003 to the indigenous peoples around the area is not in accord with the IPRA.Furthermore, the land registration court considered the claims of several tribes belonging to the areas cultural communities in the course of the proceedings for the titling of the lands in CMUs name.Indeed, eventually, only 3,080 hectares were titled in CMUs name under OCTs0-160, 0-161 and 0-162.More than 300 hectares were acknowledged to be in the possession of and subject to the claims of those tribes.WHEREFORE, the CourtGRANTSthe petition,SETS ASIDEthe March 14, 2008 decision and September 22, 2008 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 85456, andDECLARESPresidential Proclamation 310 as null and void for being contrary to law and public policy.

G.R. No. 173415 March 28, 2008MARIANO TANENGLIAN,Petitioner,vs.SILVESTRE LORENZO, MARIO DAPNISAN, TIMOTEO DAPNISAN, FELIX DAPNISAN, TONAS TAMPIC, REGINA TOBANES, NORMA SIMEON, RODOLFO LACHICA, ARNES SERIL, RODOLFO LAVARO, FAUSTINO SALANGO, PEDRO SANTIAGO, TEOFILO FULMANO, GEORGE KITOYAN, PEPTIO GAPAD, DAMIAN PENERIA, MIKE FERNANDEZ, PABLO SACPA, WILFREDO AQUINO, ANDREW HERRERO, ROGELIO CARREON, MANUEL LAGARTERA AND LORENTINO SANTOS,Respondents.D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO,J.:This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Resolution1dated 5 April 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 93668 dismissing outright the petition for certiorari filed therewith by petitioner Mariano Tanenglian on the grounds that it was the wrong remedy and it was filed beyond the 15-day reglementary period. Likewise assailed herein is the Resolution2dated 4 July 2006 of the appellate court denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.This case involves two parcels of land (subject properties), located and adjacent to the Sto. Tomas Baguio Road, with areas of 7,860 square meters and 21,882 square meters, covered respectively by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. T-29281 and T-29282 registered in the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City both in the name of petitioner.Respondents Silvestre Lorenzo,et al., members of the Indigenous Cultural Minority of the Cordillera Administrative Region, filed a Petition3for Redemption under Sec. 12, Republic Act No. 38444dated 29 July 1998 before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) praying that: (1) they be allowed to exercise their right of redemption over the subject properties; (2) TCTs No. T-29281and T-29282 in the name of petitioner be declared null and void; (3) the subject properties be declared as ancestral land pursuant to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6657;5and (4) petitioner be ordered to pay disturbance compensation to respondents.In a Decision dated 16 August 1999, the Regional Adjudicator held:WHEREFORE, ALL THE PREMISES CONSIDERED AND IN THE BEST INTEREST OF AGRARIAN JUSTICE, JUDGMENT IS HEREBY RENDERED IN FAVOR OF [HEREIN RESPONDENTS] AND AGAINST [HEREIN PETITIONER] AS FOLLOWS:1. Declaring that the parcels of land respectively occupied by [respondents] as ancestral lands pursuant to the provisions of Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6657.2. Declaring [respondents] as the ancestral landowners of the parcels of land which they are occupying and tilling;3. Ordering the Department of Agrarian Reform through its Regional Office, the Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City to acquire the said parcels of land respectively occupied by [respondents] for distribution to them in order to ensure their economic, social and cultural well-being pursuant to provisions of Section 9 of RA No. 6657;4. Ordering the Regional Engineering Office of DAR-CAR, Baguio City to conduct subdivision survey on the said parcels of land occupied by [respondents] and for DAR-CAR to issue individual Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLOAs) and have the same registered with the Office of the Registry of Deeds of Baguio City;5. Ordering [petitioner] or anybody under his command not to disturb the peaceful possession of [respondents] ancestral landholdings; and6. Ordering the Office of the Register of Deeds, Baguio City to cancel Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. T-29281 and T-29282 both in the name of [petitioner] and for the latter to surrender to the Office of the Register of Deeds of Baguio City the owners duplicate certificate copies of said titles.6Petitioner received a copy of the afore-quoted Decision on27 August 1999. He filed with the Regional Adjudicatora motion for reconsideration thereof on13 September 1999, which theRegional Adjudicator denied in his Order dated 11 October 1999. Petitioner received the Regional AdjudicatorsOrder denying his motion on19 October 1999. On the same day, 19 October 1999, petitioner filed a Notice of Appeal,7but the appeal fee ofP500.00 in postal money order was postmarked20 October 1999. Petitioners Notice of Appeal was denied by the Regional Adjudicator in his Order dated 26 October 1999.8The Regional Adjudicatorslatest Order reads:ORDERSubmitted before the Board through this Adjudicator is a "NOTICE OF APPEAL," dated October 19, 1999, of the DECISION in the above-entitled case dated August 16, 1999 with a POSTAL MONEY ORDER in the amount of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) ONLY (APPEAL FEE) POSTMARKED Makati Central Post Office, M.M., dated October 20, 1999 filed by [herein petitioner] through counsel.It is noteworthy that both the aforesaid "NOTICE OF APPEAL" and "APPEAL FEE" were not filed and paid, respectively, within the REGLEMENTARY PERIOD as provided for by the DARAB NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE under Section 5, Rule XIII which states:SECTION 5. Requisites and perfection of the Appeal.a) The Notice of Appeal shall be filed within the reglementary period as provided for in Section 1 of this Rule. x x xb) An appeal fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) shall be paid by the appellant within the reglementary period to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated. x x x.Under the 3rd paragraph of said SECTION 5, it further states:Non-compliance with the above-mentioned requisites shall be a ground for the dismissal of the appeal."The records of this case show that the [petitioner] through counsel filed his "Motion for Reconsideration" of the Decision of this case on September 13, 1999 which was the 15th day of said Reglementary Period. The 15th day was supposed to have been on September 11, 1999 counted from August 28, 1999, the following day after [petitioner] through counsel received a copy of the Decision on August 27, 1999 but because September 11, 1999 was a Saturday, the 15th day was September 13, 1999, the following working day. Now, nowhere on the records of this case show that the required "Appeal Fee" was paid on or before the 15th day of the Reglementary Period.The records of this case also show that this instant "NOTICE OF APPEAL" was filed on October 19, 1999, (Postmarked Makati Central P.O., M.M.) the day when [petitioner] through counsel received copy of the Denial of the said "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION." Since September 13, 1999 was the 15th day of said 15-day reglementary period, this instant NOTICE OF APPEAL" is considered filed out of time. Even the "Appeal Fee" of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) in POSTAL MONEY ORDER, it is postmarked October 20, 1999, MAKATI CENTRAL P.O. M.M. Since September 13, 1999 was the 15th day of said 15-day reglementary period, this "APPEAL FEE" is considered paid out of time.Additionally, even granting without admitting that this instant "NOTICE OF APPEAL" and "APPEAL FEE" were filed and paid, respectively, within the required reglementary period, [petitioner] through counsel miserably failed to state any ground in the Notice of Appeal as provided for under SECTION 2, RULE XIII of the DARAB NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE.9WHEREFORE, premises considered, and pursuant to the provisions of SECTION 5 and SECTION 2, Rule XIII of the DARAB NEW RULES OF PROCEDURE, this instant "NOTICE OF APPEAL" is hereby DENIED.10Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration on 5 November 1999 but the same was denied by the Regional Adjudicator on 15 November 1999.Respondents filed a Motion for Execution on 27 October 1999. The Regional Adjudicator issued a Writ of Execution dated 17 November 1999.11Petitioner thereafter filed an original action forcertioraribefore the DARAB to annul the Order dated 26 October 1999, Order dated 15 November 1999 and the Writ of Execution dated 17 November 1999, all issued by the Regional Adjudicator. In a Resolution dated 5 May 2005, the DARAB denied petitioners petition forcertiorarifor lack of merit,12holding that:While it is true that the filing of the Notice of Appeal dated October 19, 1999 was made within the reglementary period to perfect the same, however, the required appeal fee was not paid within the reglementary period because the last day to perfect an appeal is October 19, 1999, while the appeal fee in a form of postal money order is postmarked October 20, 1999. Precisely, there is no payment of appeal fee within the 15-day reglementary period to perfect an appeal. Therefore, the order of the [Regional Adjudicator] denying the notice of appeal of the petitioner is well within the ambit of the provisions of the above-quoted Rule, particularly the last paragraph thereof, hence the instant petition must necessarily fail.13Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the foregoing resolution was denied by the DARAB in another Resolution dated 17 January 2006,14a copy of which was received by petitioner on2 February 2006.Refusing to concede, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari15under Rule 65 with the Court of Appeals on17 March 2006.In a Resolution dated 5 April 2006, the Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition, reasoning as follows:Sections 1 and 4, Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide that an appeal from the award, judgment, final order or resolution of the Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, among other quasi-judicial agencies, shall be taken by filing with the Court of Appeals a petition for review within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof, or of the denial of the motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo.x x x xEven if we consider the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review, the same must still be dismissed for having been filed beyond the reglementary period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy of the Resolution dated January 17, 2006. As pointed out in the above-cited case, appeals from all quasi-judicial bodies shall be made by way of petition for review with the Court of Appeals regardless of the nature of the question raised.Well-settled is the rule that certiorari is not available where the proper remedy is appeal in due course and such remedy was lost because of respondents failure to take an appeal. The special civil action of certiorari is not and can not be made a substitute for appeal or a lost appeal.16Petitioners motion for reconsideration of the afore-quoted ruling was denied by the appellate court in a Resolution dated 4 July 2006.Hence, the present Petition, raising the following issues:(a) Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly dismissed the Petition under Rule 65 filed by the Petitioner mainly on the ground that the proper remedy is a Petition under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court.(b) Whether or not the Regional Adjudicator acted within his authority when he declared the subject parcels of land as "ancestral lands."(c) Whether or not the Regional Adjudicator acted within his authority when he declared that the titlesof the petitioner should be declared null and void.Preliminarily, petitioner is actually asking us to rule on the propriety of (1) the denial of his Notice of Appeal by the Regional Adjudicator, affirmed by the DARAB; and (2) the dismissal of his Petition forCertiorariby the Court of Appeals.The Regional Adjudicator denied petitioners Notice of Appeal because the latter was delayed for one day in the payment of appeal fee.The 2003 Rules of Procedure of the DARAB lays down the following procedure:RULE XIVAPPEALSSection 1. Appeal to the Board. An appeal may be taken to the Board from a resolution, decision or final order of the Adjudicator that completely disposes of the case by either or both of the parties within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the resolution/decision/final order appealed from or of the denial of the movants motion for reconsideration in accordance with Section 12, Rule IX, by:1.1 filing a Notice of Appeal with the Adjudicator who rendered the decision or final order appealed from;1.2 furnishing copies of said Notice of Appeal to all parties andthe Board; and1.3 paying an appeal fee of Seven Hundred Pesos (Php700.00) to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated or through postal money order, payable to the DAR Cashier where the Office of the Adjudicator is situated, at the option of the appellant.A pauper litigant shall be exempt from the payment of the appeal fee.Proof of service of Notice of Appeal to the affected parties and to the Board and payment of appeal fee shall be filed, within the reglementary period, with the Adjudicator a quo and shall form part of the records of the case.Non-compliance with the foregoing shall be a ground for dismissal of the appeal.SECTION 4. Perfection of Appeal. An appeal is deemed perfected upon compliance with Section 1 of this Rule.A pauper litigants appeal is deemed perfected upon the filing of the Notice of Appeal in accordance with said Section 1 of this Rule.The general rule is that appeal is perfected by filing a notice of appeal and paying the requisite docket fees and other lawful fees.17However, all general rules admit of certain exceptions. InMactan Cebu International Airport Authority v. Mangubat18where the docket fees were paid six days late, we said that where the party showed willingness to abide by the rules by immediately paying the required fees and taking into consideration the importance of the issues raised in the case, the same calls for judicial leniency, thus:In all, what emerges from all of the above is that the rules of procedure in the matter of paying the docket fees must be followed. However, there are exceptions to the stringent requirement as to call for a relaxation of the application of the rules, such as: (1) most persuasive and weighty reasons; (2) to relieve a litigant from an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure; (3) good faith of the defaulting party by immediately paying within a reasonable time from the time of the default; (4) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (5) the merits of the case; (6) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules; (7) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; (8) the other party will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby; (9) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence without appellants fault; (10) peculiar legal and equitable circumstances attendant to each case; (11) in the name of substantial justice and fair play; (12) importance of the issues involved; and (13) exercise of sound discretion by the judge guided by all the attendant circumstances. Concomitant to a liberal interpretation of the rules of procedure should be an effort on the part of the party invoking liberality to adequately explain his failure to abide by the rules. Anyone seeking exemption from the application of the Rule has the burden of proving that exceptionally meritorious instances exist which warrant such departure.19We have not been oblivious to or unmindful of the extraordinary situations that merit liberal application of the Rules, allowing us, depending on the circumstances, to set aside technical infirmities and give due course to the appeal. In cases where we dispense with the technicalities, we do not mean to undermine the force and effectivity of the periods set by law. In those rare cases where we did not stringently apply the procedural rules, there always existed a clear need to prevent the commission of a grave injustice. Our judicial system and the courts have always tried to maintain a healthy balance between the strict enforcement of procedural laws and the guarantee that every litigant be given the full opportunity for the just and proper disposition of his cause.20If the Highest Court of the land itself relaxes its rules in the interest of substantive justice, then what more the administrative bodies which exercise quasi-judicial functions? It must be emphasized that the goal of courts and quasi-judicial bodies, above else, must be to render substantial justice to the parties.In this case, petitioner was only one day late in paying the appeal fee, and he already stands to lose his titles to the subject properties. We find this too harsh a consequence for a days delay. Worthy to note is the fact that petitioner actually paid the appeal fee; only, he was a day late. That petitioner immediately paid the requisite appeal fee a day after the deadline displays his willingness to comply with the requirement therefor.When petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition forCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, his Petition was dismissed. The Court of Appeals held that the petitioner availed himself of the wrong remedy as an appeal from the order, award, judgment or final order of the DARAB shall be taken to the Court of Appeals by filing a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court and not a petition forcertiorariunder Rule 65.On this point, we agree with the Court of Appeals.Pertinent provisions of Rule 43 of the Rules of Court governing appeals from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals, provide:SECTION 1. Scope. This Rule shall apply to appeals from judgments or final orders of the Court of Tax Appeals and from awards, judgments, final orders or resolutions of or authorized by any quasi-judicial agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions. Among these agencies are the Civil Service Commission, Central Board of Assessment Appeals, Securities and Exchange Commission, Office of the President, Land Registration Authority, Social Security Commission, Civil Aeronautics Board, Bureau of Patents, Trademarks and Technology Transfer, National Electrification Administration, Energy Regulatory Board, National Telecommunications Commission, Department of Agrarian Reform under Republic Act No. 6657, Government Service Insurance System, Employees Compensation Commission, Agricultural Inventions Board, Insurance Commission, Philippine Atomic Energy Commission, Board of Investments, Construction Industry Arbitration Commission, and voluntary arbitrators authorized by law.x x x xSEC. 3. Where to appeal. An appeal under this Rule may be taken to the Court of Appeals within the period and in the manner herein provided, whether the appeal involves questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law.SEC. 4. Period of appeal. The appeal shall be taken within fifteen (15) days from notice of the award, judgment, final order or resolution, or from the date of its last publication, if publication is required by law for its effectivity, or of the denial of petitioners motion for new trial or reconsideration duly filed in accordance with the governing law of the court or agency a quo. Only one (1) motion for reconsideration shall be allowed. Upon proper motion and the payment of the full amount of the docket fee before the expiration of the reglementary period, the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review. No further extension shall be granted except for the most compelling reason and in no case to exceed fifteen (15) days.In Nippon Paint Employees Union-Olalia v. Court of Appeals,21we clarified:It is elementary in remedial law that the use of an erroneous mode of appeal is cause for dismissal of the petition for certiorari and it has been repeatedly stressed that a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost appeal. This is due to the nature of a Rule 65 petition for certiorari which lies only where there is "no appeal," and "no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." As previously ruled by this Court:x x x We have time and again reminded members of the bench and bar that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when "there is no appeal nor plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law." Certiorari can not be allowed when a party to a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, certiorari not being a substitute for lost appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually exclusive and not alternative or successive.Petitioner clearly availed himself of the wrong mode of appeal in bringing his case before the Court of Appeals for review.Petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court instead of a petition for review under Rule 43, not because it was the only plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available to him under the law, but, obviously, to make up for the loss of his right to an ordinary appeal. It is elementary that the special civil action of certiorari is not and cannot be a substitute for an appeal, where the latter remedy is available, as it was in this case. A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court cannot cure a partys failure to timely file a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. Rule 65 is an independent action that cannot be availed of as a substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal, including that under Rule 43, especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by a partys neglect or error in the choice of remedies.22All things considered, however, we do not agree in the conclusion of the Court of Appeals dismissing petitioners Petition based on a procedural faux pax. While a petition forcertiorariis dismissible for being the wrong remedy, there are exceptions to this rule, to wit: (a) when public welfare and the advancement of public policy dictates; (b) when the broader interest of justice so requires; (c) when the writs issued are null and void; or (d) when the questioned order amounts to an oppressive exercise of judicial authority.23InSebastian v. Morales,24we ruled that rules of procedure must be faithfully followed except only when, for persuasive reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not commensurate with his failure to comply with the prescribed procedure, thus:[C]onsidering that the petitioner has presented a good cause for the proper and just determination of his case, the appellate court should have relaxed the stringent application of technical rules of procedure and yielded to consideration of substantial justice.25The Court has allowed some meritorious cases to proceed despite inherent procedural defects and lapses. This is in keeping with the principle that rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice and that strict and rigid application of rules which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice must always be avoided. It is a far better and more prudent cause of action for the court to excuse a technical lapse and afford the parties a review of the case to attain the ends of justice, rather than dispose of the case on technicality and cause grave injustice to the parties, giving a false impression of speedy disposal of cases while actually resulting in more delay, if not a miscarriage of justice.26We find that petitioners case fits more the exception rather than the general rule. Taking into account the importance of the issues raised in the Petition, and what petitioner stands to lose, the Court of Appeals should have given due course to the said Petition and treated it as a petition for review. By dismissing the Petition outright, the Court of Appeals absolutely foreclosed the resolution of the issues raised therein. Indubitably, justice would have been better served if the Court of Appeals resolved the issues that were raised in the Petition.Conspicuously, the period to appeal had lapsed so that even if the Court of Appeals considered the petition as one for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, still the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period. But, there can be no blinking at the fact that under Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court, "the Court of Appeals may grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days only within which to file the petition for review." By any reckoning, the Court of Appeals may even grant an additional period of fifteen (15) days within which to file the petition under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. In other words, the period to appeal from quasi-judicial agencies to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 is neither an impregnable nor an unyielding rule.The issue involved in this case is no less than the jurisdiction of the Regional Arbitrator to render its Decision dated 16 August 1999 declaring the subject properties as ancestral lands. As well, it is too flagrant to be ignored that these lands are covered by a Torrens title in the name of the petitioner. The Court of Appeals should have looked past rules of technicality to resolve the case on its merits.For DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case, there must exist a tenancy relationship between the parties. A tenancy relationship cannot be presumed. There must be evidence to prove the tenancy relations such that all its indispensable elements must be established, to wit: (1) the parties are the landowner and the tenant; (2) the subject is agricultural land; (3) there is consent by the landowner; (4) the purpose is agricultural production; (5) there is personal cultivation; and (6) there is sharing of the harvests. All these requisites are necessary to create tenancy relationship, and the absence of one or more requisites will not make the alleged tenant a de facto tenant.27In Heirs of Rafael Magpily v. De Jesus,28tenants are defined as persons who - in themselves and with the aid available from within their immediate farm householders they cultivate the lands belonging to or possessed by another with the latters consent; for purposes of production, they share the produce with the landholder under the share tenancy system, or pay to the landholder a price certain or ascertainable in produce of money or both under the leasehold tenancy system.In this case, respondents did not allege much less prove that they are tenants of the subject properties. There is likewise no independent evidence to prove any of the requisites of a tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents. What they insist upon is that they are occupying their ancestral lands covered by the protection of the law.In his Decision, the Regional Adjudicator himself found that there was no tenancy relationship between petitioner and respondents, to wit:[Herein petitioner] pleaded for his defense to the claims of [herein respondents] right of redemption contending that the [respondents] have not proven any tenurial relationship with him. Indeed, the records show that herein [respondents] have not proven their tenurial relationship with [petitioner], hence Section 12 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended, does not apply to the said claim of right of redemption.As to the claim of [respondents], that is, for "disturbance compensation" under Section 36(1) of Republic Act No. 3844, said provision of law to the opinion of the Board through this Adjudicator, cannot apply in the said claim since [respondents] have not also proven tenancy-relationship which is a requirement to be entitled to "disturbance compensation."29Under law and settled jurisprudence, and based on the records of this case, the Regional Adjudicator evidently has no jurisdiction to hear and resolve respondents complaint. In the absence of a tenancy relationship, the case falls outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB; it is cognizable by the Regular Courts.30Moreover, the Regional Adjudicator in his Decision dated 16 August 1999 found that:The third claim of herein Petitioners as prayed for is their right to "ancestral lands" under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6657 which provides as follows:SECTION 9. ANCESTRAL LANDS. For purposes of this act, ancestral lands of each indigenous cultural community shall include but not limited to lands in the actual, continuous and open possession and occupation of the community and its members: Provided, that the Torrens System shall be respected.The rights of these communities of their ancestral land shall be protected to insure their economic, social and cultural well-being. In line with the principles of self-determination and autonomy, the system of land ownership, land use and the modes of settling land disputes of all these communities must be recognized and respected. (Underscoring Supplied.)Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the PARC may suspend the implementation of the act with respect to ancestral lands for the purpose of identifying and delineating such lands; Provided, that in the autonomous regions, the respective legislatures may enact their own laws in ancestral domain subject to the provisions of the constitution and the principles enumerated, initiated in this Act and other (sic).Applying the aforecited provisions of law, it is clear without fear of contradiction that herein Petitioners are members of the indigenous cultural community (the Kankanais and Ibalois) of the Cordillera Administrative Region (CAR). It is also clear that they have been in the actual, continuous and in open possession and occupation of the community as evidenced by residential houses, tax declarations and improvements as seen during the ocular inspection (the property in question).While it is true that the aforecited provisions of law provides an exception that is: "Provided, that the Torrens System shall be respected," so that in this instant case, there is a CONFLICT in that while the property in question is occupied by herein Petitioners, the same property is titled (T-29281 and T-29282) in the name of herein Respondent, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN married to ALETA SO TUN (a Chinese) who are not members of the cultural minority.In this case, the Torrens System shall be respected. But under the 2nd paragraph of said law, it went further to say, "THE RIGHT OF THESE COMMUNITIES TO THEIR ANCESTRAL LANDS SHALL BE PROTECTED TO ENSURE THEIR ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL WELL-BEING. IN LINE WITH THE PRINCIPLES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND AUTONOMY, THE SYSTEM OF LAND OWNERSHIP, LAND USE AND THE MODES OF SETTLING LAND DISPUTES OF ALL THESE COMMUNITIES MUST BE RECOGNIZED AND RESPECTED. (Underscoring supplied.) It is therefore the considered opinion of the Board through this Adjudicator that the property subject of this case which is an ancestral land be acquired by the government (through the Regional Office of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the Cordillera Administrative Region, Baguio City), for eventual distribution to the herein Petitioners. This is the spirit of the law.31It is worthy to note that the Regional Adjudicator, in ruling that the subject properties are ancestral lands of the respondents, relied solely on the definition of ancestral lands under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6657. However, a special law, Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997, specifically governs the rights of indigenous people to their ancestral domains and lands.Section 3(a) and (b)32of Republic Act No. 8371 provides a more thorough definition of ancestral domains and ancestral lands:SECTION 3. Definition of Terms. For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:a) Ancestral Domains Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;b) Ancestral Lands Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.Republic Act No. 8371 creates the National Commission on Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous People (NCIP) which shall be the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well-being of the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous people (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto.33Prior to Republic Act No. 8371, ancestral domains and lands were delineated under the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and governed by DENR Administrative Order No. 2, series of 1993. Presently, the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains and lands is guided by the principle of self-delineation and is set forth under Sections 52 and 53, Chapter VIII of Republic Act No. 8371;34and in Part I, Rule VII of NCIP Administrative Order No. 01-98 (Rules and Regulations Implementing Republic Act No. 8371).35Official delineation is under the jurisdiction of the Ancestral Domains Office (ADO) of the NCIP.36It is irrefragable, therefore, that the Regional Adjudicator overstepped the boundaries of his jurisdiction when he made a declaration that the subject properties are ancestral lands and proceeded to award the same to the respondents, when jurisdiction over the delineation and recognition of the same is explicitly conferred on the NCIP.The Regional Adjudicator even made the following disposition on petitioners TCTs:As to the two (2) TCTs (T-29281 and T-29282) issued to herein respondent, the records (Annex "C" for Respondent) of this case show under the 3rd and 4th paragraphs of the DECISION dated June 28, 1991 provides:The subject parcels of land were originally titled in the name of ULBANA ALSIO under Original Certificate of Title No. 0-131 which she obtained on July 15, 1965 (Exhibit "D") through a petition for the judicial reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211` (Exhibits "A" and "B") that was granted by the Court of First Instance of the City of Baguio in its decision dated February 08, 1965 (Exhibit "C") subsequently by Alsio to Jose Perez (Exhibit "I") in turn to Rosario Oreta (Exhibit "J") and then to Lutgarda Platon on April 30, 1972 (Exhibit "K"). At the time Platon acquired the property, it was already subdivided into two (2) lots hence, she was issued TCT Nos. T-20830 (Exhibit "G") and T-20831 (Exhibit "H").Meanwhile, on December 22, 1977, P.D. 1271 was issued nullifying all decrees of registration and certificates of title issued pursuant to decisions of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in petition for the judicial reopening of Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but allowed time to the title holders concerned to apply for the validation of their titles under certain conditions.The aforecited two (2) paragraphs give credence to the allegation of the Petitioners in their original petition (nos. 16, 17 and 18) that the titles of Respondents predecessors-in-interest were secured through fraud. They referred as an example a letter (Annex "E" for Petitioners) coming from the Land Management Bureau, Manila which made the recommendation as follows:RECOMMENDATIONIn view of the foregoing findings, it is respectfully recommended that the steps be taken in the proper court of justice for the cancellation of the Original Certificates of Title No. 0-131 of Ulbano Alsio and its corresponding derivative titles so that the land be reverted to the mass of the public domain and thereafter, dispose the same to qualified applicants under the provisions of RA No. 730.37Once more, the Regional Adjudicator acted without jurisdiction in entertaining a collateral attack on petitioners TCTs.In an earlier case for quieting of title instituted by the petitioner before the trial court, which reached this Court as G.R. No. 118515,38petitioners ownership and titles to the subject properties had been affirmed with finality, with entry of judgment having been made therein on 15 January 1996. A suit for quieting of title is an action quasi in rem,39which is conclusive only to the parties to the suit. It is too glaring to escape our attention that several of the respondents herein were the defendants in the suit for quieting of title before the trial court and the subsequent petitioners in G.R. No. 118515.40The finality of the Decision in G.R. No. 118515 is therefore binding upon them.41Although the Decision in G.R. No. 118515 is not binding on the other respondents who were not parties thereto, said respondents are still confronted with petitioners TCTs which they must directly challenge before the appropriate tribunal.Respondents, thus, cannot pray for the Regional Adjudicator to declare petitioners TCTs null and void, for such would constitute a collateral attack on petitioners titles which is not allowed under the law. A Torrens title cannot be collaterally attacked.42A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment is made as an incident to said action,43as opposed to a direct attack against a judgment which is made through an action or proceeding, the main object of which is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of such judgment, if not yet carried into effect; or, if the property has been disposed of, the aggrieved party may sue for recovery.441avvphi1The petitioners titles to the subject properties have acquired the character of indeafeasibility, being registered under the Torrens System of registration. Once a decree of registration is made under the Torrens System, and the reglementary period has passed within which the decree may be questioned, the title is perfected and cannot be collaterally questioned later on.45To permit a collateral attack on petitioners title, such as what respondents attempt, would reduce the vaunted legal indeafeasibility of a Torrens title to meaningless verbiage.46It has, therefore, become an ancient rule that the issue on the validity of title, i.e., whether or not it was fraudulently issued, can only be raised in an action expressly instituted for that purpose.47Any decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down anytime.48In Tambunting, Jr. v. Sumabat,49we declared that a void judgment is in legal effect no judgment, by which no rights are divested, from which no rights can be obtained, which neither binds nor bonds anyone, and under which all acts performed and all claims flowing therefrom are void. In the Petition at bar, since the Regional Adjudicator is evidently without jurisdiction to rule on respondents complaint without the existence of a tenancy relationship between them and the petitioner, then the Decision he rendered is void.Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Granted. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 5 April 2006 and 4 July 2006 areREVERSEDandSET ASIDE. The Decision dated 16 August 1999 of the Regional Adjudicator in Cases No. DCN NO 0117-98 B CAR to DCN 0140-98 B CAR is declared NULL and VOID, and the respondents petition therein is orderedDISMISSED, without prejudice to the filing of the proper case before the appropriate tribunal. No costs.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 100091 October 22, 1992CENTRAL MINDANAO UNIVERSITY REPRESENTED ITS PRESIDENT DR. LEONARDO A. CHUA,petitioner,vs.THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD, THE COURT OF APPEALS and ALVIN OBRIQUE, REPRESENTING BUKIDNON FREE FARMERS AGRICULTURAL LABORERS ORGANIZATION (BUFFALO),respondents.CAMPOS, JR.,J.:This is a Petition for Review onCertiorariunder Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to nullify the proceedings and decision of the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB for brevity) dated September 4, 1989 and to set aside the decision the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the DARAB which ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the Central Mindanao University (CMU for brevity) land and their inclusion in the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP for brevity) for distribution to qualified beneficiaries, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.This case originated in a complaint filed by complainants calling themselves as the Bukidnon Free Farmers and Agricultural Laborers Organization (BUFFALO for brevity) under the leadership of Alvin Obrique and Luis Hermoso against the CMU, before the Department of Agrarian Reform for Declaration of Status as Tenants, under the CARP.From the records, the following facts are evident. The petitioner, the CMU, is an agricultural educational institution owned and run by the state located in the town of Musuan, Bukidnon province. It started as a farm school at Marilang, Bukidnon in early 1910, in response to the public demand for an agricultural school in Mindanao. It expanded into the Bukidnon National Agricultural High School and was transferred to its new site in Managok near Malaybalay, the provincial capital of Bukidnon.In the early 1960's, it was converted into a college with campus at Musuan, until it became what is now known as the CMU, but still primarily an agricultural university. From its beginning, the school was the answer to the crying need for training people in order to develop the agricultural potential of the island of Mindanao. Those who planned and established the school had a vision as to the future development of that part of the Philippines. On January 16, 1958 the President of the Republic of the Philippines, the late Carlos P. Garcia, "upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, and pursuant to the provisions of Section 53, of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended", issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College, a site which would be the future campus of what is now the CMU. A total land area comprising 3,080 hectares was surveyed and registered and titled in the name of the petitioner under OCT Nos. 160, 161 and 162.1In the course of the cadastral hearing of the school's petition for registration of the aforementioned grant of agricultural land, several tribes belonging to cultural communities, opposed the petition claiming ownership of certain ancestral lands forming part of the tribal reservations. Some of the claims were granted so that what was titled to the present petitioner school was reduced from 3,401 hectares to 3,080 hectares.In the early 1960's, the student population of the school was less than 3,000. By 1988, the student population had expanded to some 13,000 students, so that the school community has an academic population (student, faculty and non-academic staff) of almost 15,000. To cope with the increase in its enrollment, it has expanded and improved its educational facilities partly from government appropriation and partly by self-help measures.True to the concept of a land grant college, the school embarked on self-help measures to carry out its educational objectives, train its students, and maintain various activities which the government appropriation could not adequately support or sustain. In 1984, the CMU approved Resolution No. 160, adopting a livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program" under which the land resources of the University were leased to its faculty and employees. This arrangement was covered by a written contract. Under this program the faculty and staff combine themselves to groups of five members each, and the CMU provided technical know-how, practical training and all kinds of assistance, to enable each group to cultivate 4 to 5 hectares of land for the lowland rice project. Each group pays the CMU a service fee and also a land use participant's fee. The contract prohibits participants and their hired workers to establish houses or live in the project area and to use the cultivated land as a collateral for any kind of loan. It was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and/or employees. This particular program was conceived as a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program to utilize available land, train people in modern agricultural technology and at the same time give the faculty and staff opportunities within the confines of the CMU reservation to earn additional income to augment their salaries. The location of the CMU at Musuan, Bukidnon, which is quite a distance from the nearest town, was the proper setting for the adoption of such a program. Among the participants in this program were Alvin Obrique, Felix Guinanao, Joven Caballero, Nestor Pulao, Danilo Vasquez, Aronio Pelayo and other complainants. Obrique was a Physics Instructor at the CMU while the others were employees in the lowland rice project. The other complainants who were not members of the faculty or non-academic staff CMU, were hired workers or laborers of the participants in this program. When petitioner Dr. Leonardo Chua became President of the CMU in July 1986, he discontinued the agri-business project for the production of rice, corn and sugar cane known as Agri-Business Management and Training Project, due to losses incurred while carrying on the said project. Some CMU personnel, among whom were the complainants, were laid-off when this project was discontinued. As Assistant Director of this agri-business project, Obrique was found guilty of mishandling the CMU funds and was separated from service by virtue of Executive Order No. 17, the re-organization law of the CMU.Sometime in 1986, under Dr. Chua as President, the CMU launched a self-help project called CMU-Income Enhancement Program (CMU-IEP) to develop unutilized land resources, mobilize and promote the spirit of self-reliance, provide socio-economic and technical training in actual field project implementation and augment the income of the faculty and the staff.Under the terms of a 3-party Memorandum of Agreement2among the CMU, the CMU-Integrated Development Foundation (CMU-IDF) and groups or "seldas" of 5 CMU employees, the CMU would provide the use of 4 to 5 hectares of land to a selda for one (1) calendar year. The CMU-IDF would provide researchers and specialists to assist in the preparation of project proposals and to monitor and analyze project implementation. The selda in turn would pay to the CMU P100 as service fee and P1,000 per hectare as participant's land rental fee. In addition, 400 kilograms of the produce per year would be turned over or donated to the CMU-IDF. The participants agreed not to allow their hired laborers or member of their family to establish any house or live within vicinity of the project area and not to use the allocated lot as collateral for a loan. It was expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.Initially, participation in the CMU-IEP was extended only to workers and staff members who were still employed with the CMU and was not made available to former workers or employees. In the middle of 1987, to cushion the impact of the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project on the lives of its former workers, the CMU allowed them to participate in the CMU-IEP as special participants.Under the terms of a contract called Addendum To Existing Memorandum of Agreement Concerning Participation To the CMU-Income Enhancement Program,3a former employee would be grouped with an existing selda of his choice and provided one (1) hectare for a lowland rice project for one (1) calendar year. He would pay the land rental participant's fee of P1,000.00 per hectare but on a charge-to-crop basis. He would also be subject to the same prohibitions as those imposed on the CMU employees. It was also expressly provided that no tenant-landlord relationship would exist as a result of the Agreement.The one-year contracts expired on June 30, 1988. Some contracts were renewed. Those whose contracts were not renewed were served with notices to vacate.The non-renewal of the contracts, the discontinuance of the rice, corn and sugar cane project, the loss of jobs due to termination or separation from the service and the alleged harassment by school authorities, all contributed to, and precipitated the filing of the complaint.On the basis of the above facts, the DARAB found that the private respondents were not tenants and cannot therefore be beneficiaries under the CARP. At the same time, the DARAB ordered the segregation of 400 hectares of suitable, compact and contiguous portions of the CMU land and their inclusion in the CARP for distribution to qualified beneficiaries.The petitioner CMU, in seeking a review of the decisions of the respondents DARAB and the Court of Appeals, raised the following issues:1.) Whether or not the DARAB has jurisdiction to hear and decide Case No. 005 for Declaration of Status of Tenants and coverage of land under the CARP.2.) Whether or not respondent Court of Appeals committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in dismissing the Petition for Review onCertiorariand affirming the decision of DARAB.In their complaint, docketed as DAR Case No. 5, filed with the DARAB, complainants Obrique, et al. claimed that they are tenants of the CMU and/or landless peasants claiming/occupying a part or portion of the CMU situated at Sinalayan, Valencia, Bukidnon and Musuan, Bukidnon, consisting of about 1,200 hectares. We agree with the DARAB's finding that Obrique, et. al. are not tenants. Under the terms of the written agreement signed by Obrique, et. al., pursuant to the livelihood program called "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Program", it was expressly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed between the CMU and the faculty and staff (participants in the project). The CMU did not receive any share from the harvest/fruits of the land tilled by the participants. What the CMU collected was a nominal service fee and land use participant's fee in consideration of all the kinds of assistance given to the participants by the CMU. Again, the agreement signed by the participants under the CMU-IEP clearly stipulated that no landlord-tenant relationship existed, and that the participants are not share croppers nor lessees, and the CMU did not share in the produce of the participants' labor.In the same paragraph of their complaint, complainants claim that they are landless peasants. This allegation requires proof and should not be accepted as factually true. Obrique is not a landless peasant. The facts showed he was Physics Instructor at CMU holding a very responsible position was separated from the service on account of certain irregularities he committed while Assistant Director of the Agri-Business Project of cultivating lowland rice. Others may, at the moment, own no land in Bukidnon but they may not necessarily be so destitute in their places of origin. No proof whatsoever appears in the record to show that they are landless peasants.The evidence on record establish without doubt that the complainants were originally authorized or given permission to occupy certain areas of the CMU property for a definite purpose to carry out certain university projects as part of the CMU's program of activities pursuant to its avowed purpose of giving training and instruction in agricultural and other related technologies, using the land and other resources of the institution as a laboratory for these projects. Their entry into the land of the CMU was with the permission and written consent of the owner, the CMU, for a limited period and for a specific purpose. After the expiration of their privilege to occupy and cultivate the land of the CMU, their continued stay was unauthorized and their settlement on the CMU's land was without legal authority. A person entering upon lands of another, not claiming in good faith the right to do so by virtue of any title of his own, or by virtue of some agreement with the owner or with one whom he believes holds title to the land, is a squatter.4Squatters cannot enter the land of another surreptitiously or by stealth, and under the umbrella of the CARP, claim rights to said property as landless peasants. Under Section 73 of R.A. 6657, persons guilty of committing prohibited acts of forcible entry or illegal detainer do not qualify as beneficiaries and may not avail themselves of the rights and benefits of agrarian reform. Any such person who knowingly and wilfully violates the above provision of the Act shall be punished with imprisonment or fine at the discretion of the Court.In view of the above, the private respondents, not being tenants nor proven to be landless peasants, cannot qualify as beneficiaries under the CARP.The questioned decision of the Adjudication Board, affirmedin totoby the Court of Appeals, segregating 400 hectares from the CMU land is primarily based on the alleged fact that the land subject hereof is "not directly, actually and exclusively used for school sites, because the same was leased to Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Philippines)".In support of this view, the Board held that the "respondent University failed to show that it is using actually, really, truly and in fact, the questioned area to the exclusion of others, nor did it show that the same is directly used without any intervening agency or person",5and "there is no definite and concrete showing that the use of said lands are essentially indispensable for educational purposes".6The reliance by the respondents Board and Appellate Tribunal on the technical or literal definition from Moreno's Philippine Law Dictionary and Black's Law Dictionary, may give the ordinary reader a classroom meaning of the phrase "is actually directly and exclusively", but in so doing they missed the true meaning of Section 10, R.A. 6657, as to what lands are exempted or excluded from the coverage of the CARP.The pertinent provisions of R.A. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, are as follows:Sec. 4. SCOPE. The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover, regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No. 229 including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.More specifically, the following lands are covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program:(a) All alienable and disposable lands of the public domain devoted to or suitable for agriculture. No reclassification of forest of mineral lands to agricultural lands shall be undertaken after the approval of this Act until Congress, taking into account ecological, developmental and equity considerations, shall have determined by law, the specific limits of the public domain;(b) All lands of the public domain in excess of the specific limits ad determined by Congress in the preceding paragraph;(c) All other lands owned by the Government devoted to or suitable for agriculture; and(d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.Sec. 10 EXEMPTIONS AND EXCLUSIONS. Lands actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for parks, wildlife, forest reserves, reforestration, fish sanctuaries and breeding grounds, watersheds and mangroves, national defense,school sites and campuses including experimental farm stations operated by public or private schools for educational purposes, seeds and seedlings research and pilot production centers,church sites and convents appurtenant thereto, mosque sites and Islamic centers appurtenant thereto, communal burial grounds and cemeteries, penal colonies and penal farms actually worked by the inmates, government and private research and quarantine centers and all lands with eighteen percent (18%) slope and over, except those already developedshall be exempt from the coverage of this Act.(Emphasis supplied).The construction given by the DARAB to Section 10 restricts the land area of the CMU to its present needs or to a land area presently, actively exploited and utilized by the university in carrying out its present educational program with its present student population and academic facility overlooking the very significant factor of growth of the university in the years to come. By the nature of the CMU, which is a school established to promote agriculture and industry, the need for a vast tract of agricultural land and for future programs of expansion is obvious. At the outset, the CMU was conceived in the same manner as land grant colleges in America, a type of educational institution which blazed the trail for the development of vast tracts of unexplored and undeveloped agricultural lands in the Mid-West. What we now know as Michigan State University, Penn State University and Illinois State University, started as small land grant colleges, with meager funding to support their ever increasing educational programs. They were given extensive tracts of agricultural and forest lands to be developed to support their numerous expanding activities in the fields of agricultural technology and scientific research. Funds for the support of the educational programs of land grant colleges came from government appropriation, tuition and other student fees, private endowments and gifts, and earnings from miscellaneous sources.7It was in this same spirit that President Garcia issued Proclamation No. 476, withdrawing from sale or settlement and reserving for the Mindanao Agricultural College (forerunner of the CMU) a land reservation of 3,080 hectares as its future campus. It was set up in Bukidnon, in the hinterlands of Mindanao, in order that it can have enough resources and wide open spaces to grow as an agricultural educational institution, to develop and train future farmers of Mindanao and help attract settlers to that part of the country.In line with its avowed purpose as an agricultural and technical school, the University adopted a land utilization program to develop and exploit its 3080-hectare land reservation as follows:8No. of Hectares Percentagea. Livestock and Pasture 1,016.40 33b. Upland Crops 616 20c. Campus and Residential sites 462 15d. Irrigated rice 400.40 13e. Watershed and forest reservation 308 10f. Fruit and Trees Crops 154 5g. AgriculturalExperimental stations 123.20 43,080.00 100%The first land use plan of the CARP was prepared in 1975 and since then it has undergone several revisions in line with changing economic conditions, national economic policies and financial limitations and availability of resources. The CMU, through Resolution No. 160 S. 1984, pursuant to its development plan, adopted a multi-disciplinary applied research extension and productivity program called the "Kilusang Sariling Sikap Project" (CMU-KSSP). The objectives9of this program were:1. Provide researches who shall assist in (a) preparation of proposal; (b) monitor project implementation; and (c) collect and analyze all data and information relevant to the processes and results of project implementation;2. Provide the use of land within the University reservation for the purpose of establishing a lowland rice project for the party of the Second Part for a period of one calendar year subject to discretionary renewal by the Party of the First Part;3. Provide practical training to the Party of the Second Part on the management and operation of their lowland project upon request of Party of the Second Part; and4. Provide technical assistance in the form of relevant livelihood project specialists who shall extend expertise on scientific methods of crop production upon request by Party of the Second Part.In return for the technical assistance extended by the CMU, the participants in a project pay a nominal amount as service fee. The self-reliance program was adjunct to the CMU's lowland rice project.The portion of the CMU land leased to the Philippine Packing Corporation (now Del Monte Phils., Inc.) was leased long before the CARP was passed. The agreement with the Philippine Packing Corporation was not a lease but a Management and Development Agreement, a joint undertaking where use by the Philippine Packing Corporation of the land was part of the CMU research program, with the direct participation of faculty and students. Said contracts with the Philippine Packing Corporation and others of a similar nature (like MM-Agraplex) were made prior to the enactment of R.A. 6657 and were directly connected to the purpose and objectives of the CMU as an educational institution. As soon as the objectives of the agreement for the joint use of the CMU land were achieved as of June 1988, the CMU adopted a blue print for the exclusive use and utilization of said areas to carry out its own research and agricultural experiments.As to the determination of when and what lands arefound to be necessaryfor use by the CMU, the school is in the best position to resolve and answer the question and pass upon the problem of its needs in relation to its avowed objectives for which the land was given to it by the State. Neither the DARAB nor the Court of Appeals has the right to substitute its judgment or discretion on this matter, unless the evidentiary facts are so manifest as to show that the CMU has no real for the land.It is our opinion that the 400 hectares ordered segregated by the DARAB and affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated August 20, 1990, is not covered by the CARP because:(1) It is not alienable and disposable land of the public domain;(2) The CMU land reservation is not in excess of specific limits as determined by Congress;(3) It is private land registered and titled in the name of its lawful owner, the CMU;(4) It is exempt from coverage under Section 10 of R.A. 6657 because the lands are actually, directly and exclusively used andfound to be necessaryfor school site and campus, including experimental farm stations for educational purposes, and for establishing seed and seedling research and pilot production centers. (Emphasis supplied).Under Section 4 and Section 10 of R.A. 6657, it is crystal clear that the jurisdiction of the DARAB is limited only to matters involving the implementation of the CARP. More specifically, it is restricted to agrarian cases and controversies involving lands falling within the coverage of the aforementioned program. It does not include those which are actually, directly and exclusively used and found to be necessary for, among such purposes, school sites and campuses for setting up experimental farm stations, research and pilot production centers, etc.Consequently, the DARAB has no power to try, hear and adjudicate the case pending before it involving a portion of the CMU's titled school site, as the portion of the CMU land reservation ordered segregated is actually, directly and exclusively used and found by the school to be necessary for its purposes. The CMU has constantly raised the issue of the DARAB's lack of jurisdiction and has questioned the respondent's authority to hear, try and adjudicate the case at bar. Despite the law and the evidence on record tending to establish that the fact that the DARAB had no jurisdiction, it made the adjudication now subject of review.Whether the DARAB has the authority to order the segregation of a portion of a private property titled in the name of its lawful owner, even if the claimant is not entitled as a beneficiary, is an issue we feel we must resolve. The quasi-judicial powers of DARAB are provided in Executive Order No. 129-A, quoted hereunder in so far as pertinent to the issue at bar:Sec. 13. AGRARIAN REFORM ADJUDICATION BOARD There is hereby created an Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board under the office of the Secretary. . . . The Board shall assume the powers and functions with respect to adjudication of agrarian reform cases under Executive Order 229 and this Executive Order . . .Sec. 17. QUASI JUDICIAL POWERS OF THE DAR. The DAR is hereby vested with quasi-judicial powers to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters including implementation of Agrarian Reform.Section 50 of R.A. 6658 confers on the DAR quasi-judicial powers as follows:The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform. . . .Section 17 of Executive Order No. 129-A is merely a repetition of Section 50, R.A. 6657. There is no doubt that the DARAB has jurisdiction to try and decide any agrarian dispute in the implementation of the CARP. An agrarian dispute is defined by the same law as any controversy relating to tenurial rights whether leasehold, tenancy stewardship or otherwise over lands devoted toagriculture.10In the case at bar, the DARAB found that the complainants are not share tenants or lease holders of the CMU, yet it ordered the "segregation of a suitable compact and contiguous area of Four Hundred hectares, more or less", from the CMU land reservation, and directed the DAR Regional Director to implement its order of segregation. Having found that the complainants in this agrarian dispute for Declaration of Tenancy Status are not entitled to claim as beneficiaries of the CARP because they are not share tenants or leaseholders, its order for the segregation of 400 hectares of the CMU land was without legal authority. w do not believe that the quasi-judicial function of the DARAB carries with it greater authority than ordinary courts to make an award beyond what was demanded by the complainants/petitioners, even in an agrarian dispute. Where the quasi-judicial body finds that the complainants/petitioners are not entitled to the rights they are demanding, it is an erroneous interpretation of authority for that quasi-judicial body to order private property to be awarded to future beneficiaries. The order segregation 400 hectares of the CMU land was issued on a finding that the complainants are not entitled as beneficiaries, and on an erroneous assumption that the CMU land which is excluded or exempted under the law is subject to the coverage of the CARP. Going beyond what was asked by the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed the complainants who were not entitled to the relief prayed for, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion because it implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.The education of the youth and agrarian reform are admittedly among the highest priorities in the government socio-economic programs. In this case, neither need give way to the other. Certainly, there must still be vast tracts of agricultural land in Mindanao outside the CMU land reservation which can be made available to landless peasants, assuming the claimants here, or some of them, can qualify as CARP beneficiaries. To our mind, the taking of the CMU land which had been segregated for educational purposes for distribution to yet uncertain beneficiaries is a gross misinterpretation of the authority and jurisdiction granted by law to the DARAB.The decision in this case is of far-reaching significance as far as it concerns state colleges and universities whose resources and research facilities may be gradually eroded by misconstruing the exemptions from the CARP. These state colleges and universities are the main vehicles for our scientific and technological advancement in the field of agriculture, so vital to the existence, growth and development of this country.It is the opinion of this Court, in the light of the foregoing analysis and for the reasons indicated, that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding of grave abuse of discretion by respondents Court of Appeals and DAR Adjudication Board. We hereby declare the decision of the DARAB dated September 4, 1989 and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 20, 1990, affirming the decision of the quasi-judicial body, as null and void and hereby order that they be set aside, with costs against the private respondents.SO ORDERED

[G.R. No. 133507. February 17, 2000]EUDOSIA DAEZ AND/OR HER HEIRS, REP. BY ADRIANO D. DAEZ,petitioners, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS MACARIO SORIENTES, APOLONIO MEDIANA, ROGELIO MACATULAD and MANUEL UMALI,respondents.KorteD E C I S I O NDE LEON, JR.,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorariof the Decision[1]of the Court of Appeals[2]dated January 28, 1998 which denied the application of petitioner heirs of Eudosia Daez for the retention of a 4.1685-hectare riceland pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law[3], thereby reversing the Decision[4]of then Executive Secretary Ruben D. Torres and the Order[5]of then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. Corona, both of which had earlier set aside the Resolution[6]and Order[7]of then Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao denying exemption of the same riceland from coverage under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27.The pertinent facts are:Eudosia Daez, now deceased, was the owner of a 4.1685-hectare riceland in Barangay Lawa, Meycauayan, Bulacan which was being cultivated by respondents Macario Soriente, Rogelio Macatulad, Apolonio Mediana and Manuel Umali under a system of share-tenancy. The said land was subjected to the Operation Land Transfer (OLT) Program under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27[8]as amended by Letter of Instruction (LOI) No. 474[9]. Thus, the then Ministry of Agrarian Reform acquired the subject land and issued Certificates of Land Transfer (CLT) on December 9, 1980 to private respondents as beneficiaries.However, on May 31, 1981, private respondents signed an affidavit, allegedly under duress, stating that they are not share tenants but hired laborers[10]. Armed with such document, Eudosia Daez applied for the exemption of said riceland from coverage of P.D. No. 27 due to non-tenancy as well as for the cancellation of the CLTs issued to private respondents.In their Affidavit dated October 2, 1983, Eudosia Daez and her husband, Lope, declared ownership over 41.8064 hectares of agricultural lands located in Meycauayan, Bulacan and fourteen (14) hectares of riceland, sixteen (16) hectares of forestland, ten (10) hectares of "batuhan" and 1.8064 hectares of residential lands[11]in Penaranda, Nueva Ecija. Included in their 41.8064-hectare landholding in Bulacan, was the subject 4,1685-hectare riceland in Meycauayan.On July 27, 1987, DAR Undersecretary Jose C. Medina issued an Order denying Eudosia Daezs application for exemption upon finding that her subject land is covered under LOI No. 474, petitioner being owner of the aforesaid agricultural lands exceeding seven (7) hectares.[12]On June 29, 1989, Eudosia Daez wrote a letter to DAR Secretary Benjamin T. Leong requesting for reconsideration of Undersecretary Medinas order. But on January 16, 1992.[13]Secretary Leong affirmed the assailed order upon finding private respondents to be bonafide tenants of the subject land. Secretary Leong disregarded private respondents May 31, 1981 affidavit for having been executed under duress because he found that Eudosias son, Adriano, who was then the incumbent Vice-Mayor of Meycauayan, pressured private respondents into signing the same.Undaunted, Eudosia Daez brought her case on February 20, 1992 to the Court of Appealsviaa petition for certiorari. The Court of Appeals, however, sustained the order of Secretary Leong in a decision dated April 29, 1992. Eudosia pursued her petition before this court but we denied it in a minute resolution dated September 18, 1992. We also denied her motion for reconsideration on November 9, 1992.SclawMeantime, on August 6 and 12, 1992, the DAR issued Emancipation Patents (EPs) to private respondents. Thereafter, the Register of Deeds of Bulacan issued the corresponding Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs).Exemption of the 4.1685 riceland from coverage by P.D. No. 27 having been finally denied her, Eudosia Daez next filed an application for retention of the same riceland, this time under R.A. No. 6657.In an order dated March 22, 1994, DAR Region III OIC-Director Eugenio B. Bernardo allowed Eudosia Daez to retain the subject riceland but he denied the application of her eight (8) children to retain three (3) hectares each for their failure to prove actual tillage of the land or direct management thereof as required by law.[14]Aggrieved, they appealed to the DAR.On August 26, 1994, then DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao, set aside the order of Regional Director Bernardo in a Resolution,[15]the decretal portion of which reads,viz.:"WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Resolution is hereby issued setting aside withFINALITYthe Order dated March 22, 1994 of the Regional Director of DAR Region III.The records of this case is remanded to the Regional Office for immediate implementation of the Order dated January 16, 1992 of this office as affirmed by the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.SO ORDERED."Eudosia Daez filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied on January 19, 1995.[16]She appealed Secretary Garilaos decision to the Office of the President which ruled in her favor. The dispositive portion of the Decision[17]of then Executive Secretary reads:"WHEREFORE, the resolution and order appealed from are hereby SET ASIDE and judgment is rendered authorizing the retention by Eudosia Daez or her heirs of the 4.1685-hectare landholding subject thereof.SO ORDERED."[18]Aggrieved, private respondents sought from the Court of Appeals, a review of the decision of the Office of the President.On January 28, 1999, the said Decision of the Office of the President was reversed. The Court of Appeals ordered, thus:"WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of July 5, 1996 and Order dated October 23, 1996 of the public respondents are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the Resolution and Order of DAR Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao respectively dated August 26, 1994 and January 19, 1995 are REINSTATED.SO ORDERED."Hence, this petition which assigns the following errors:"I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT DISTINCTION BETWEEN EXEMPTION FROM AGRARIAN REFORM COVERAGE AND THE RIGHT OF RETENTION OF LANDOWNERS IS ONLY A MATTER OF SEMANTICS THAT AN ADVERSE DECISION IN THE FORMER WILL FORECLOSE FURTHER ACTION TO ENFORCE THE LATTER CONSIDERING THAT THEY CONSTITUTE SEPARATE AND DISTINCT CAUSES OF ACTION AND, THEREFORE, ENFORCEABLE SEPARATELY AND IN SEQUEL.SclexII. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT APPLIED THE PRINCIPLE OF RES JUDICATA DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE PREVIOUS CASE CITED (EXEMPTION FROM COVERAGE DUE TO NON-TENANCY) AND THE PRESENT CASE (RETENTION RIGHT) ARE OF DIFFERENT CAUSES OF ACTION.III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED/OPINED THAT THERE WAS A CUT-OFF DATE (AUGUST 27, 1985) FOR LANDOWNERS TO APPLY FOR EXEMPTION OR RETENTION UNDER PD 27 AND THOSE WHO FAILED TO FILE THEIR APPLICATIONS/PETITIONS ARE DEEMED TO HAVE WAIVED THEIR RIGHTS.IV. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DECLARING THAT PETITIONERS (RESPONDENTS THEREIN) ARE GUILTY OF ESTOPPEL.V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE LAND SUBJECT OF THIS CASE IS NO LONGER OWNED BY PETITIONERS SINCE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS HAVE ALREADY BEEN ISSUED NOT ONLY THEIR RESPECTIVE CERTIFICATES OF LAND TRANSFER BUT ALSO THEIR INDIVIDUAL CERTIFICATES OF TITLE OVER THE DISPUT